

S. HRG. 110-777

**NOMINATIONS OF THE 110TH
CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION**

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

—————
JANUARY 30 THROUGH DECEMBER 19, 2007
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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*Note: Appointed February 12, 2008.

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NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Negroponete, John D., to be Deputy Secretary of State

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-216, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Obama, Menendez, Voinovich, Murkowski, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Isakson, and Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH BIDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order, please. We're delighted this morning to have Ambassador Negroponete back before us. We're equally delighted to have Senator Stevens and Senator Lieberman. We're told by staff you folks have a full morning and a lot going on in your committees, so Senator Lugar and I will forego our opening statements and yield immediately to you, Senator Stevens, for your introduction and then to Senator Lieberman. Then we will make our opening statements and invite Ambassador Negroponete to make his, if that meets your needs.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That's very gracious of you.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you so much. Let me put my statement in full in the record and just summarize—

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be.

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I'm pleased to be back again before your committee. Ambassador Negroponete and I have been friends from at least 1977, when he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries. I'm delighted he's joined today by his wife, Diana, and Maria and George and Sophia behind us.

John came to Alaska in that capacity many times and he handled the fisheries agreements that were important to our young State. He negotiated in 1978, the landmark accord, which protected Alaska's salmon stocks from Japanese high sea fisheries and those benefits continue through today.

Over the years, I have worked with John in many positions. I'm sure you all know his background but he has been Ambassador to four countries: Honduras, Mexico, The Philippines, Iraq. He has been a permanent representative to the United Nations and Director of National Intelligence. I think—I don't know any man who has had more positions in my time here. He has been one who has had great success, particularly in his most recent assignment where he has brought together this massive intelligence concepts of our Federal Government and coordinated them and done an excellent job and I think everyone realizes what a great job he's done.

He now seeks to go back to the Department of State. As we all know, that is where his heart has been and he has stated himself that all his life, he has wanted to do this kind of this work and this position he's going to take now is extremely important to us and our country.

Winston Churchill once observed that the price of greatness is responsibility, and John has been willing to accept responsibility on many occasions. So I hope the committee will quickly recommend his confirmation as the Deputy Secretary of State and I know of no man who can do a better job.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Stevens. I do understand you may have to leave, and thank you for making the effort to be here.

Senator STEVENS. I'll turn it over to my colleague to finish his comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lieberman.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT**

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Thanks Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator Coleman, and other members of the committee.

I'm greatly honored to appear before you and to have been asked, along with Ted Stevens, to introduce John Negroponte to this committee and to ask you to confirm him for the high position of Deputy Secretary of State. He is enormously well qualified for this position.

Ted said he went back to 1977 in knowing John. I would like to say that we go back to the sixties. We were both at Yale. We may have crossed as he left in 1960 and I entered there by trying to subtly indicate that he is older than I am. I am much more distinguished. [Laughter.]

There, it struck me that we swore allegiance at the end of our alma mater to God, Country and Yale. I think John and I both thought that was in descending order of importance, God, Country and Yale and in fact, like so many at that time, he was committed to a life of public service and went right from college to the Foreign Service and has served our Nation with the highest honor and greatest positive effect in a number of posts that are part of his record, which I will not enumerate, since that time, including being Ambassador to Iraq during a very difficult period where he, I thought, was very effective and advanced the cause of both stability and freedom to the best of his ability.

When he was nominated for this post, John said, and I quote, "Whether in Baghdad, Kabul, Kosovo, or elsewhere, these dedicated

professionals, that is the—his fellow members of the Foreign Service are on the front line of advancing America’s commitment to freedom.”

And I agree with that and I appreciate his commitment to those who with him, have served as Foreign Service officers, the cause of our Nation abroad and I think it gives him an extra measure of understanding of effectiveness as he comes to this high position.

I would add just one more experience that I’ve had with John that I think speaks well for his ability to take on what is not only a diplomatic assignment but also an administrative assignment.

As my colleagues know, the Senate asked our Senate Committee, then known as the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, now Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, to take up the task of considering and recommending to the Senate the legislation recommended by the 9/11 Commission and then seeing it through the Senate and the House to passage.

Obviously, that Commission recommended and we in Congress created the new position of Director of National Intelligence, the DNI, to essentially bring together these disparate entities within our American Intelligence community, which had not been working well together. So to make a long story short, had not connected the dots, if you will.

This was a challenge that required not only a strong administrative hand, if I may say so, but all the diplomatic skills that John Negroponte learned in his many diplomatic assignments, which is negotiating among and coalescing the disparate groups within the American Intelligence community. He has done, I think, an extraordinarily good job at that.

The work goes on because it’s enormous work but he has brought us, in a short period of time, to a point where we are quite simply, because of his work, better protecting the people of America and preventing a reoccurrence of the nightmare that we all experienced on 9/11.

I can think of no one who is better able, at this moment, to assist Secretary Rice, both in the management of the Department of State and in the implementation of its responsibilities throughout this challenging world.

So I’m honored to have been asked to introduce Ambassador Negroponte to you. I recommend him to you and I hope you’ll be able to confirm him unanimously.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you very much. Both of you being here speaks loudly for Ambassador Negroponte. I appreciate you being here.

As indicated earlier, I’ll proceed now with a brief opening statement and Senator Lugar will have an opening statement, and we’ll turn it over to the Ambassador with our hope and expectation that he’ll introduce his family to us again and make his statement. Then we’ll go to questions.

Today, as is obvious, the committee considers the nomination of John Negroponte to be the Deputy Secretary of State. It has been over 7 months since Deputy Secretary Zoellick announced he was leaving the Department, and in doing so, the administration has set a dubious record—the longest period without a Deputy Sec-

retary of State since the position was created in 1972. So we're happy, and the reason why we moved this as quickly as we could is to rectify that situation.

Ambassador Negroponte is well known to us all. I will not take the time of the committee nor the nominee to go through his long record of service, some of which has been referenced already. Senior officials must have good judgment, and they must be forthcoming with the Congress and the American people about the difficulties we face in Iraq and elsewhere. I would say respectfully, Mr. Secretary, that Deputy Secretary Armitage, from my position, was just such a person. I would urge you to take a look at him as a model, in my view, for dealing with the committee.

Last week, General Petraeus, the new military commander in Iraq, told the Committee on Armed Services that the situation in Iraq was "dire." The Iraq Study Group, whose leadership will appear before this committee this afternoon, called the situation "grave and deteriorating." Because it has been reported that you, Mr. Ambassador, will be taking a leading role in Iraqi policy, as I indicated to you in the ante room, I'm going to ask you to give your assessment of the situation in Iraq. How is Iraq different than when you served there? Do you believe the President's surge policy will succeed? What are the elements of a workable political solution that the President says is needed and we all say is needed, in order to end the sectarian violence? What are the elements of that solution?

If you are confirmed, I hope you will not confuse the Senate's endorsement of you as an endorsement of the policies of the administration that has nominated you. After 3 weeks of hearings in this committee, I am more convinced than ever that surging our forces into the midst of a civil war in Iraq is a tragic mistake. I'm equally convinced that our only chance to leave Iraq with our interest intact, rests on a political solution that ends the sectarian violence and the cycle of revenge. It seems to me that can only be accomplished by empowering strong regional governments, as the Iraqi constitution provides for, giving the Sunnis a fair share of the oil revenues, and bringing in the neighbors in support of such a political settlement.

If we do that, we still have a chance, at least a chance of avoiding having traded a dictator for chaos. If we're going to surge anywhere, Mr. Ambassador—you will probably hear from some of the committee beyond me but you'll clearly hear on the Senate floor—we think that surge should be Afghanistan, not Iraq, where the Taliban appears to be making a serious comeback. So there may be some questions about Afghanistan, as well.

Every Deputy Secretary takes on duties assigned to him by the Secretary of State, so I will ask you, Mr. Ambassador, to outline the areas of responsibility that you expect to have as Deputy Secretary and to give us your assessment of the major policy questions facing us in each of those areas.

I'd like to specifically request that you give your views on Darfur, which was a major responsibility undertaken by Deputy Secretary Zoellick, which seems to have fallen from the priority list.

The administration has rightly called Darfur genocide but those words have not matched our deeds thus far to stop it, and I'd like

your assessment as well on North Korea, which I understand will be part of your job description.

So let me now, again welcome you but turn this over to Senator Lugar for any remarks he may have. Then we'll hear from you, and I hope you'll introduce your family.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to welcome John Negroponte again to this committee. As a result of his distinguished career in government, most recently as the Nation's first Director of National Intelligence and his earlier assignments as our Ambassador to Iraq and our Ambassador to the United Nations, he is well known to many of us.

We admire his accomplishments and we are thankful for the cooperation he has provided to our committee in the past. We know that you share the committee's view that the State Department has a leadership role to play in addressing the urgent international challenges facing our country. We need a diplomatic core that can shape complex bilateral relationships, repair and build alliances, and pursue United States policy through a labyrinth of foreign languages and cultures.

We need ambassadors who can lead our interagency teams overseas, negotiate successfully with host governments, and speak authoritatively as the President's personal representatives.

We need foreign aid programs run by professionals who know how to encourage democratic practices and boost economic development, even in the toughest environments—and we need communications experts who can get our message across to foreign audiences.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the challenges of North Korea and Iran, crises in Darfur and Somalia, consume both time and energy at the Department and of this committee. A host of other issues, including international energy security, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, the Arab/Israeli peace process, our developing relationships with emerging giants in China and India, and our outreach in our own hemisphere require daily attention.

But we must also strengthen the Department itself. The Deputy Secretary has traditionally handled key management problems before they reach the Secretary, refereeing internal squabbles, and overseeing the right mix of tools, people, and resources to address whatever crisis is brewing next. Thus, you must be concerned not only with the Department's direction but also with its capabilities.

This committee has worked enthusiastically to bolster these capabilities. In 2003, we embarked on an effort to improve the capacity of the Department to deal with stabilization and reconstruction emergencies. Last June, the Senate unanimously passed legislation that Senator Biden, Senator Hagel, and I sponsored to authorize a crisis response fund, the State Department's Reconstruction and Stabilization Office and a Rapid Response Corp. The President's call in his State of the Union speech for the creation for such a civilian corp is a breakthrough for this concept. We should work to translate the President's enthusiasm into funding personnel and responsibility.

This committee has been instrumental in efforts to boost the Department's capability in other ways. We have worked with our Senate colleagues to foster support for multiagency contributions to the building of safe embassies. We have worked to maintain the Department's primacy in determining which countries will receive the United States foreign assistance and how much they should receive. We are working to back up the authority of ambassadors as they oversee the United States' campaign against terrorism.

We continue to argue for a foreign policy budget that reflects the pivotal roles of the State Department, USAID, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. All of these efforts are works in progress and we need you as a partner in pursuing them.

One other area where I hope you can make improvements is in the timely filling of key policy positions. The position for which you have been nominated has been vacant since July 7, 2006. The Department is without a Counterterrorism Coordinator. The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs—a portfolio which includes critical international energy issues—is soon to depart for the World Food Program. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Office went without a permanent coordinator for some 8 months before John Herbst arrived. The Political Military Bureau is losing its leader, and there are a number of other top posts that are being vacated.

We should be seeking the best people to fill posts as attrition occurs. We're a Nation at war in two countries, and every gap in civilian leadership is felt.

With a Foreign Service career that has spanned decades, you have a unique understanding of the Department's shortcomings as well as the vital contributions its employees make to building a peaceful and prosperous world. I am grateful that you are undertaking this task and I look forward to working with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Ambassador, the floor is yours. Thank you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN NEGROPONTE, NOMINEE TO BE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE**

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Thank you very much, Chairman Biden and Senator Lugar and members of the committee. It is a privilege to appear before you as the President's nominee for the position of Deputy Secretary of State.

I am accompanied this morning by my wife, Diana, and to her right is my daughter, Sophia, and to her right is my daughter, Marina, and to her right is my son, George.

Chairman BIDEN. Welcome. This is getting to be an old habit for you guys. Welcome back. It's delightful to have you here.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Thank you, sir, and I also have a daughter, Alejandra, who may show up later in the hearing. She had an engagement that she had to attend earlier this morning.

Let me say at the outset how much I appreciate Senators Stevens and Lieberman taking time from their busy schedules to present me to the committee. Over the year, they have offered me a great deal of wise counsel, support, and not the least, warm friendship.

Mr. Chairman, as someone who started his career as a young Foreign Service officer on October 5, 1960, I welcome my nomination to be Deputy Secretary of State as an opportunity of a lifetime. During my tenure in the Foreign Service, I have been a Vice Consul, a Consul, a Consul General, an Assistant Secretary of State, and an Ambassador. These positions have enabled me to serve at a one-officer post in Hue, in South Vietnam, and as Chief of Mission of one of our largest embassies in Mexico City.

Both assignments were challenging and rewarding as were the many others in Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East and of course, here in Washington.

If I am confirmed by the Senate, the experience overseas and at home will help Secretary Rice promote the transformational diplomacy that is the cornerstone of her leadership of the Department of State.

Globalization is bringing many challenges to the world, empowering a host of new international actors. Nonetheless, constructive diplomatic relations between and among nations remains central to preserving international stability and security and expanding opportunities for economic and cultural interactions.

Diplomacy helps us pursue peaceful cooperation in regions threatened by conflict. It helps us bolster the international rule of law and ensure respect for human rights. It gives the opportunity to support weak and failing states and build coalitions to stabilize and strengthen them and it enables us to protect our citizens, advance our economic interests and promote our image as a Nation defined by its democratic values.

I have appeared before this committee for confirmation hearings seven times. The first occasion, 30 years ago, when my responsibilities focused on oceans, fisheries, and law of the sea, and most recently, when the President nominated me—

The CHAIRMAN. I don't mean to interrupt, but we're still looking for that treaty.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, that's why I stuck that in here, Mr. Chairman. I was hoping you might say that. [Laughter.]

And most recently, when the President nominated me to be United States Ambassador to the newly sovereign Iraq, I volunteered to go to Baghdad because I believed and still believe that it is possible for Iraq to make a successful transition to democracy. I believed and still believe that failure in Iraq would be a disaster for Iraqis, for our friends in the region, and for the United States. If confirmed, I expect to devote considerable time and effort to the implementation of our policies in Iraq.

Supporting our Nation's security on the frontlines of this new century, the men and women of the Department of State face great challenges. The United States must maintain a full-time diplomatic presence in many parts of the world where conditions are demanding, harsh, and often dangerous. It is a tribute to the courage and dedication of our Foreign Service that the Department already has filled 84 percent of its positions in Iraq for the summer of 2007, and 96 percent of the positions programmed for Afghanistan.

The Secretary's vision of transformational diplomacy goes beyond the special needs we must address in Afghanistan and Iraq, however. The Department of State is a critical component of national

security and I hope the Department will be viewed that way in terms of its mission and budget. We have well over 100 hardship posts around the world and 22 posts where restrictions limit or prohibit accompaniment by family members. The Department's senior leadership has a great responsibility to support and protect all its personnel abroad, just as it has an obligation to develop our future generations of diplomatic leaders.

If the Senate confirms me, I would hope that in addition to Iraq, I could make a strong contribution to our foreign policy in those parts of the world where I have spent the most time in my career: Asia and Latin America. As Deputy Secretary, I will face challenges in many other areas, too numerous to list in full, from promoting America's economic business and energy interests overseas to supporting our programs in public diplomacy.

Mr. Chairman, I have always consulted closely with this committee and any Members of Congress who have an interest in issues for which I am responsible. I will remain available to you and seek your counsel and again, I want to say that I regard this nomination as a great honor and I am grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the confidence that they have placed in me.

I would welcome the committee's questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Negroponte follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN. D. NEGROPONTE,
NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, it is a privilege to appear before you as the President's nominee for the position of Deputy Secretary of State.

Let me say at the outset how much I appreciate Senators Stevens and Lieberman taking the time from their busy schedules to present me to the committee. Over the years, they have offered me a great deal of wise counsel, support, and, not the least, warm friendship. Senator Stevens, Senator Lieberman, I am in your debt. Thank you very much.

As someone who started his career as a young Foreign Service officer on October 5, 1960, I welcome my nomination to become Deputy Secretary of State as an opportunity of a lifetime.

During my tenure in the Foreign Service, I have been a vice-consul, consul, consul general, assistant secretary of state, and ambassador. These positions have enabled me to serve at a one-officer post in Hue, South Vietnam, and as chief of mission of one of our largest embassies in Mexico City. Both assignments were challenging and rewarding, as were the many others in Asia, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, and of course, here in Washington. If I am confirmed by the Senate, my experience overseas and at home will help Secretary Rice promote the transformational diplomacy that is the cornerstone of her leadership of the Department of State.

Globalization is bringing many changes to the world, empowering a host of new international actors. Nonetheless, constructive diplomatic relations between and among nation states remain central to preserving international stability and security, and expanding opportunities for economic and cultural interactions.

- Diplomacy helps us pursue peaceful cooperation in regions threatened by conflict, bolster the international rule of law, and ensure respect for human rights;
- It gives us the opportunity to support weak and failing states and build coalitions to stabilize and strengthen them; and
- It enables us to protect our citizens, advance our economic interests, and promote our image as a nation defined by its democratic values.

I have appeared before this committee for confirmation hearings seven times—the first occasion 30 years ago when my responsibilities focused on oceans, fisheries and law of the sea, and most recently when the President nominated me to be United States Ambassador to the newly sovereign Iraq. I volunteered to go to Baghdad because I believed and still believe—that it is possible for Iraq to make a successful transition to democracy. I believed and still believe—that failure in Iraq would be a disaster for Iraqis, for our friends in the region, and for the United States. If con-

firmed, I expect to devote considerable time and effort to the implementation of our policies in Iraq.

Supporting our Nation's security on the front lines of this new century, the men and women of the Department of State face great challenges. The United States must maintain a full-time diplomatic presence in many parts of the world where conditions are demanding, harsh, and often dangerous. It is a tribute to the courage and dedication of our Foreign Service that the Department already has filled 84 percent of its positions in Iraq for the summer of 2007 and 96 percent of the positions programmed for Afghanistan.

The Secretary's vision of transformational diplomacy goes beyond the special needs we must address in Iraq and Afghanistan, however. The Department of State is a critical component of national security, and I hope the Department will be viewed that way in terms of its mission and budget. We have well over 100 hardship posts around the world and 22 posts where restrictions limit or prohibit accompaniment by family members. The Department's senior leadership has a great responsibility to support and protect all its personnel abroad, just as it has an obligation to develop our future generations of diplomatic leaders.

If the Senate confirms me, I would hope that, in addition to Iraq, I could make a strong contribution to our foreign policy in those parts of the world where I have spent the most time in my career—Asia and Latin America. But as Deputy Secretary I will face challenges in many other areas too numerous to list in full from promoting America's economic, business, and energy interests overseas to supporting our programs in public diplomacy.

Mr. Chairman, I have always consulted closely with this committee, and any Member of Congress who has an interest in issues for which I am responsible. I will remain available to you and seek your counsel.

Again, I regard this nomination as a great honor, and I am grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the confidence they have placed in me.

I welcome the committee's questions. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Your experience is so broad and your recent assignments have been so significant, I suspect all of us have an awful lot of questions.

I will take you at your word that you will make yourself available to the committee so we won't have to pursue every one of them today. And again, I welcome your family. With the permission of the Chairman, I'd like to suggest 8-minute rounds. Let me begin by asking you, Mr. Secretary, do you support or oppose a dialog with Iran and Syria now, regarding Iraq?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I believe that both Syria and Iran have not been doing what they could do to support a peaceful course of events in Iraq and I think that they know what they need to do. As far as dialog is concerned—and I refer specifically with regard to Syria, to allowing 40 to 70 foreign fighters to flow into Iraq through Syria every month. That's the intelligence communities' estimate and Iran's support amongst other things, for extremist Shia elements in Iraq.

As far as dialog is concerned, as you know, Senator, we have an embassy in Syria so there has been no lack of opportunity to exchange views if the Syrians had chosen to dialog with us constructively and that door is always open to them.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, we're waiting to hear from them.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. There's a channel, I would say.

The CHAIRMAN. But they must initiate the channel. That's what your saying?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I don't think that our people in our embassy in Damascus are adverse to initiating a discussion with the Government of Syria.

The CHAIRMAN. But have they?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I haven't reviewed all the diplomatic traffic of late but my point is that that diplomatic channel exists at the Charge d'Affaires——

The CHAIRMAN. I'm not trying to be confrontational. I'm trying to make sure I understand. We've haven't had an ambassador in there since last summer, and I'm trying to get a straight sense of what the administration's position is. They point out, accurately, that they know what our concerns are, quote unquote. But my specific question is, do you believe that at your level, the level of the Secretary of State, do you think there should be an initiation of discussions with Syria and with Iran relating to Iraq? Not whether they can come to us. Should we initiate discussions?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think the view at this time, Mr. Chairman, is that they know what they need to do. I would never want to say never with respect to initiating a high-level dialog with either of these two countries but that's the position as I understand it at this time. The one other point I'd like to make with respect to Iran is that we have, I think, made what I would consider at least, to be a very interesting and attractive offer to them in exchange for suspension of their nuclear enrichment program, which is now something that has been demanded unanimously by the Security Council, that would open the door to a dialog with us and that as Secretary Rice has said on a number of occasions, if they were to do that, she would be more than prepared to have discussions with the Government of Iran.

The CHAIRMAN. In the jargon of ordinary Americans, that's a precondition, correct?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. A precondition but it is not a unilateral precondition, Mr. Chairman. It's one that, in fact, is demanded by the international community through a unanimously adopted Security Council resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that's correct but it might be misleading. Our European friends, as I talk to them, think we should be having dialog, separate and apart. So it's misleading to suggest that there is a unilateral view among our allies in the United Nations, that they should cease and desist. That view is separate and distinct from what leaders at our level in European capitals are saying to me, why aren't you? We have urged the administration, on a separate track, to have direct dialog relative to Iraq. Is that not true?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I'm sure there are European countries that would urge us.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I'm sure you know that, right? I mean, you know that to be a fact. You head up the entire intelligence community. Is there any doubt about what I just said?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I just can't name for you——

The CHAIRMAN. No, I'm not asking you to name——

Mr. NEGROPONTE [continuing]. At the moment, which countries——

The CHAIRMAN. But you don't doubt that at all?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. No, I don't doubt it whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. So it's just slightly misleading to suggest that there is a uniform view from Europeans and the Security Council. Let me move on.

What is the administration's view or your view about the development that appears to have taken hold that Saudi Arabia and Iran are really brokering Lebanon now? Is that a good development or a bad development?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I think it is a reflection of the fact that countries in the region have a strong interest in what is happening in Lebanon. Iran, of course, has been a significant player in that country, indirectly at least, for a number of years through its support for Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia, I think, is a little bit concerned, if I might characterize it that way, at the upsurge or the rising influence of Shia Islam in the Middle East and since they have a number of Sunni friends in Lebanon and that they have provided a certain amount of economic assistance. In fact, after us, I think they were the second—made the second largest pledge at the recent assistance conference.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that's correct.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Right. So I think both of those countries have—I believe they have some role to play in the situation in Lebanon.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the newspaper accounts accurate, that the Saudis and the Iranians are talking with one another as well as the parties in Lebanon?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I believe that there is some recently initiated dialog between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The CHAIRMAN. The only point I'm making is I know of no country that has a greater concern about the rise of Iran, with the possible exception of Israel, than Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis have concluded that they have a mutual interest, it appears, in making sure that Lebanon doesn't evolve into a civil war again. So they're talking, which really makes it even more confusing to me why we're not initiating discussions on a single track or with no preconditions, with those two countries.

I have 30 seconds left, so I'll yield to my friend from Indiana. Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm heartened by your initial testimony, Secretary Negroponte, that you favor a Law of the Sea Treaty. We've been working on this, as you know, for a while and it hasn't happened yet but I would be hopeful that the chairman would initiate work on the situation. Would you just affirm again the administration's position?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I'm grateful that you asked the question and I put the reference to Law of the Sea in my opening statement because I spent a number of years working on related questions and there must be literally hundreds of individuals in this town and throughout the United States who at one point or another, over the past 30 or 35 years, have worked on the Law of the Sea and you will recall, Senator, back in the 1970s, this was considered one of the defining issues in negotiations between us and the Third World. I think it is a treaty that is very much in the national interest and in the national security interest. I understand it has been voted out of the committee one time and sent to the floor. I've also been advised that given the time that has elapsed, it may be desirable—but this would be at your own—this would be up to the Sen-

ate and your committee to have another hearing on the issue of the Law of the Sea before sending it back.

But I do think that a very strong case can be made that this is a treaty that is in the national interest. It protects our economic and national security interests.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you for that affirmation. It was interesting, Senator Stevens was here to introduce you this morning, and he related your long association on issues related to the Law of the Sea and that, of course, enthused Senator Stevens as they do us.

I want to use this hearing to inquire, not that you're able to solve these problems, but perhaps you can alleviate them. I'm just concerned after briefings we've had with Chris Hill, our ambassador to talks with the North Koreans, 6-party talks, that for example, just the other day, before the meeting in Berlin with Ambassador Hill and representatives of North Korea. There was a meeting involving administration officials, including State Department officials, to discuss proliferation finance with some of our major allies. On the margin of the meeting, some American officials reportedly raised the prospect of imposing a travel ban on key North Korean leaders as provided under a United Nations resolution that gives them that ability. Unhappily, of course, this came just as Ambassador Hill was preparing to try to get North Korean leaders to meet with him in Berlin. So he was able to allay that but it's startling that our administration people were even making that suggestion. Now the State Department has raised that all the time, sort of month after month but nevertheless, right on the threshold of having the potential for six-power talks again, why we want to censure the North Koreans and maybe properly so. We're not doing enough to account for their funds. This could have been done in July, August, September, and October, but right before we come once again to the threshold—all I'm asking, and this will be an internal problem, I suspect, for you and Secretary Rice, to find who in the administration is orchestrating these countervailing situations. They are not helpful and without gaining any assent from you because you've not been involved, I would just say that we take it seriously in the committee as you do. This is a very, very important set of negotiations.

Let me just ask affirmatively, however, on January 11, President Bush signed legislation that Senator Obama and I had authored on proliferation interdiction assistance. This deals with weapons that are other than weapons of mass destruction. In one tour, we discovered large stashes of weapons. We discovered Europeans were working in Ukraine, for example, to try to get MAN-PAD missiles under control and various other weapons of terror. So the law has been passed, but will you work to try to make certain that there is some funding and planning and effective administration of our participation with Europeans and others who could be involved in attempting to control these weapons?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I certainly intend to look into that, Senator. I hope you'll indulge me. I still have a day job and I continue to be the Director of National Intelligence so I haven't been able to master every one of these subject matters as well as I would have liked.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that but I'm just highlighting it on the screen.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. But I will certainly put that on my radar screen.

Senator LUGAR. And on the same subject, present interdiction efforts—including the Proliferation Security Initiative—are moving ahead but how are these effectively coordinated within the State Department? And if you have not researched that, please do so. It seems to me this is another area in which a number of our authorities are trying to do a lot of good but it's not evident that everybody is on the same page and it's important that they get there. The State Department does have quite a role in this and we've had Bob Joseph and others testifying from time to time but I'm hopeful that all these proliferation efforts succeed because currently, there is a great deal of accounting in the press for what seemed to be failures or holes in the system. The Department of Defense has a role here, too, and the National Security people, but clearly, your coordination of this, your mastery of many parts, would be extremely important.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think Under Secretary Joseph has done some excellent work in this regard and the intelligence community has been very supportive, of course, of the Proliferation Security Initiative and I think there have been some interesting and significant successes over the past couple of years in that regard.

Senator LUGAR. Perhaps at some point later we'll have a chance to review with you as you survey the situation, how we can be effective.

Finally, let me just say that I sent a number of our staff members to 20 embassies to look at coordination between the State and the Defense Departments in the campaign against terror. They've written a very good report. It's been widely commented on in the press as well as the official circles. I don't know whether you've had a chance to review the study but I hope that you'll do so. We had direct testimony as to various embassies in which the ambassador was not necessarily completely clueless with regard to what the Defense Department was doing, but very frequently not wholly informed, and it offends people. We're a bit lax in cluing our ambassador in.

Now, having all of these activities going on in a country—you've served as an ambassador to various countries—can be rather unnerving, if you're the ambassador and you do not really know what other parts of your government are doing, particularly as conspicuous as the Department of Defense. Now without getting into interagency warfare here, let me just say, this is a serious problem, and we tried in a tactful way by visiting 20 embassies, to try to bring testimony of specifics. I hope that you will study that and work to coordinate those problems.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I will, indeed, Senator, and I do want to say here I think it is important to state for the record that I'm a strong believer in the country team system. I'm a strong believer that our ambassadors abroad are the coordinators of the entire United States Government effort in particular countries except in the case of military commands, and I believe that it is the responsibility of

ambassadors to be intimately familiar with the activities of all agencies operating in their country of assignment.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Negroponte. It's nice to have you before the committee. I particularly want to thank you for your years of public service. I had the opportunity to be with you in Iraq when you were our ambassador and I must tell the committee, I was very much impressed by the manner in which you gave us access to information during that period of time, and your frank assessments during that period that I was there. So I applaud you for your years of public service.

I want to ask, if I might, just a couple questions that perhaps you're prepared to answer now. If not, I'm sure we'll have a chance later to talk about these. As I visit embassies around the world, U.S. Embassies, I'm always concerned about the support that we give—budget support to the various missions. There always seems to be not enough dollars available, which is true in all agencies, but it's particularly concerning to me because of the increased expectations we have about our embassies' work around the world.

I'm just wondering what your budget priorities would be in the agency, to help in our field missions around the world, as to whether you—you know there are going to be tight budgets. You know you're not going to get all the dollars you need. But whether you have a game plan so that we can better meet our needs around the world.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think that I'd have to defer, Senator, in terms of giving you any specifics with respect to budget priorities at this time, particularly since the budgets have just been submitted and we're really not—I'm not in a position at this point, I don't think, at any time soon, to be helping shape the 2008 or 2007 supplemental budgets.

Senator CARDIN. But you have served as ambassador at several posts.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Yes, sir.

Senator CARDIN. You know the frustrations that are out there in the field.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I do and I think that as somebody who has been a career Foreign Service officer all my life, I tend to put, in my own mind, the highest priority on providing recruiting and supporting the best qualified possible personnel so I think human resource issues are going to be a very high priority for me and then of course, supporting these people adequately in the field. I think that one large part of that budget you're talking about, Senator, is of course the security requirements, which have risen. I won't say astronomically but they've risen very significantly over the years in terms of the kinds of monies that have to be spent to be able to protect our embassies and consulates overseas.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. I want to go to an area that I consider the highest priority on the short-term and that's the Sudan and Darfur. I have been—this Nation has played a critical role in bringing world attention to the problems in the Sudan. We have not gotten the type of help internationally to stop the genocide.

There have been conversations about a Plan B although I'm not certain what a Plan B is. I'm just interested in your assessment of what we need to do in Darfur and your commitment to make sure this receives the highest priority within the Department of State.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I'm certainly conscious, Senator, of the importance of Darfur. I had an opportunity to work on that issue some when I was the Ambassador to the United Nations. I also think it is important that the President selected Mr. Andrew Natsios to be the Special Negotiator, the Special Envoy for Darfur, and I think that has been a very positive development. I think he brings a lot of energy to that issue and as Director of National Intelligence, we have quite significantly increased the priority we attached to collecting intelligence and information on what is happening in the Darfur region. But as you quite, I think, correctly suggest in your question, we're not there yet. The rebel groups still have not been brought into—a number of them have not been brought into the agreement. There are still problems with the government not wanting to allow a U.N. force into the country and I think that Darfur is going to require continued or continue to require a sustained effort on the part of our Government.

Senator CARDIN. I thank you for that. I agree with that and I think we need to look at effective ways to bring an end to the genocide.

I'm just curious, as Director of National Intelligence, you've played a critical role in trying to coordinate intelligence gathering and analysis among the different agencies, particularly concerns that we've had within the Department of State and Department of Defense. Is your position going to change now that you're moving from the Director to the State Department?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I'd like to think not, Senator. I think that in my experience during these almost 2 years as Director of National Intelligence, what we've really worked toward is to try to integrate the intelligence community as much as possible so that you have a sort of seamlessness among all the different agencies and I think we've built up a much greater degree of collegiality and integration than existed previously.

Senator CARDIN. Well, we'll see whether your position stays consistent now that you're changing roles. Let me just touch upon an issue that is going to be critical and that is how we're dealing with Iran and how we're dealing with Syria, under what conditions should we engage in direct talks with those countries and what role they play in trying to resolve what's happening in Iraq and in the region. I just welcome your thoughts as to how we are going to be effective in policies in Iran and also in Syria.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. First, I'd like to say, Senator, that I think Iran has—its behavior has been emboldened in the past couple of years. I think back in 2003, their behavior was not as bold as it has been recently in terms of their assertiveness in Iraq, where I mentioned earlier, they've been providing this lethal equipment to Shia extremists in Lebanon, in the Palestinian territories. I think that just generally speaking, Iran has played a more assertive role than it did previously. I think Syria also has not played a constructive role. The situation in Lebanon, the assassination of President Hariri. We still haven't got to the bottom of that and there are con-

cerns in that regard and their failure to take adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign fighters across their border and into Iraq. I was mentioning earlier—I don't know if you were here—to Senator Biden that we have diplomatic relations with Syria and we have an avenue for dialog although we have not initiated high-level talks with them and we have been discussing the Iran issue with our European friends and the Security Council and in the context of the nuclear issue, there has been a dialog with Iran, albeit indirectly. But the view at the moment is that we are reluctant to initiate a high-level diplomatic dialog with Iran until there has been some progress on this nuclear issue.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you and welcome, Mr. Ambassador. As you know, you have many admirers and supporters here in the Congress that is a result of the respect that you have achieved over many years of service to this country. I believe—and I have told you this—that in my opinion, you are one of the pre-eminent diplomats of our time and we are grateful that you and your family have agreed to take on another challenging assignment. We'll miss you as Director of National Intelligence and you and I have had an opportunity to work closely on that issue. But the experience that you will bring, in addition to your other experiences, to the new job at State will be important and they will relate directly as you know better than almost all of us—it will relate directly to what you will be dealing with. And to your family, thank you, for your continued sacrifices. I know you are very proud of your father and your husband, as you should be.

I want to pursue the diplomatic course since that's what you are and that's what you will be working on in the portfolio that you will take responsibility for and in your testimony, you note and I quote, "Diplomacy helps us pursue peaceful cooperation in regions threatened by conflict, bolster the international rule of law, and ensure respect for human rights," and I think there is rather wide agreement on that point up here.

The two primary authors of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, the Iraqi Study Group Commission, will appear before this committee this afternoon and we will get into some detail on their 79 recommendations, some of them very much focused on what we have talked about this morning to some extent, Iran and Syria. And if you recall, one of the most significant contributions, I believe, recommendations surely, that was made by that Commission of 10 individuals of various political philosophies, all I think qualified to study a critical issue. But one of their most important recommendations, at least in my mind, was their focus on a regional diplomatic strategy on Iraq that includes engagement with Iran and Syria.

Now, judging from your testimony and what your life has been about, the Baker-Hamilton Commission focused on diplomatic engagement and I think most of us have some general agreement that the future of Iraq will be determined by some diplomatic framework, some political accommodation, resulting in a political resolution. It won't be decided by the military—nothing ever is.

Now, we heard what you said in response to direct questions about Iran and Syria and I first would ask you, do you agree with the Baker-Hamilton Commission report? That again, there must be a regional diplomatic strategy and focus on Iraq that includes engagement with Iran and Syria—without going into the specifics but would you agree with that general concept?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I would agree that the regional actors have a role to play in the stability and security of Iraq. I would depart from that proposition and that, of course, would include Syria and Iran. But then if you go to the next question as to where would you concentrate your diplomatic activity as a matter of priority and initially, then I think opinions might differ as to exactly how you would focus that but certainly one area where I think everybody is comfortable advocating diplomacy is in trying to shore up support for the Government and the country of Iraq by its neighbors and we've certainly approached other countries in the region—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and so forth, but you've heard my answer on the Iran and Syria question.

Senator HAGEL. But if diplomacy is important as you have noted here and I believe in your words, you talk about peaceful cooperation in regions—regions—your words—and it was noted regions in the Baker-Hamilton report, then wouldn't it follow that some framework is going to have to be presented, built, that would include the regional powers. I mean, that's my comprehension of what you said and what the Baker-Hamilton report—

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Right.

Senator HAGEL. Again, understanding that there are differences in how you do that. But my question to you is, do you think that regional framework is important to solve or start to resolve the chaos, the problem that we have in Iraq?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think it—first of all, I think it is important that there be an understanding by the different countries of the region, including Syria and Iran, for example, as to what kind of behavior is expected from them and what kind of behavior could help contribute to stability in Iraq. I would not say that as a matter of priority, one would have to go right to a regional-type conference or regional-type diplomatic scenario although I don't think that that should be ruled out. It was used with respect to Afghanistan with all the neighbors of Afghanistan. You may remember the six-plus-two formula.

Senator HAGEL. As you know, you were there and of course, with your intelligence assignment the last year and a half, you know, of course, that the Iraqi Government, the Prime Minister, the President have made trips to Tehran. The Iraqi Government is dealing with the Iranian Government, directly, at the highest level, between the President and the Prime Minister. Is there some contradiction there? Do you believe that we won't deal with those countries? But yet our Iraqi allies, who we are supporting with our blood and our treasure and our reputation, we are not on the same page there? Is there some conflict to that in your mind?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I wouldn't want to suggest that we're not aware of what Iran thinks on various subjects. I wouldn't want to suggest that we're completely cut off from understanding what their positions are because certainly in the negotiations at the

United Nations with respect to the nuclear program, we've learned through the Europeans in some detail, we're in contact with the many different friendly countries to us that have diplomatic representation in Iran. We learn a lot. We have our own interest section, the Swiss Embassy in Tehran handles our interests in Tehran. So we're not devoid of diplomatic possibilities although I would be the first to concede that it's not the same thing as having full—blown direct diplomatic contact.

Senator HAGEL. Do you think we are drifting toward a military confrontation with Iran?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I don't think that has to be, Senator. I think we would strongly prefer that the issues between us and Iran be resolved peacefully.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join the chorus of voices that have spoken about your outstanding service to our country and admire and appreciate it. I enjoyed our conversation about several different aspects and looking forward, I want to say, Ambassador, that in that context, however, if at the end of the day, I support your nomination, which I likely will, unless you answer questions today in a way that confounds me, which I doubt—that doesn't, however, express a support for the President's policies because I believe the President is headed in the wrong direction. So having said that, let me just ask you a couple of questions.

Do you agree with the assessment of the situation on the ground in Iraq that the Iraq Study Group put out at the time of its report?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I was anticipating questions on Iraq, Senator. I prepared a few remarks here that I think are responsive to that, because I expect it will be transmitting the national intelligence estimate on Iraq to Congress the first thing next week, by Monday at the latest. Of course, I want the NIE to speak for itself, but what I would like to say is that my belief that success in Iraq remains possible is based on my experience in dealing with Iraq as United States Ambassador to the U.N. and Ambassador to Iraq and as Director of National Intelligence, and I don't think I'm at variance with the intelligence community in my judgments and here's what I would say.

Iraq is at a precarious juncture. That means the situation could deteriorate, that there are prospects for increasing stability in Iraq and achieving increased stability will depend on several factors. Among them, the extent to which the Iraq Government and political leaders can establish effective national institutions that transcend sectarian or ethnic interests and within this context, the willingness of Iraqi security forces to pursue extremist elements of all kinds.

It will also depend on the extent to which extremists, most notably al-Qaeda in Iraq can be defeated in their attempts to foment intersectarian struggle between Shia and Sunnis and lastly, the extent to which Iraq's neighbors stop the flow of militants and ammunitions across their borders. So I think that progress is possible in these dimensions, laying the foundations for success.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that answer but let me be more specific. Let me read some excerpts and tell me whether you agree or disagree: violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think over the past year, that's been true.

Senator MENENDEZ. That, in fact, in the political context, the national government does not act as a national government but looks at it in its own sectarian interests.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think that's been a challenge. I think that has been difficult for the Prime Minister but I do think that there are some encouraging indicators in that regard, that there has been very little effort to promote national reconciliation as a result of those sectarian viewpoints. Again, I think that—I'm hopeful of some progress in that area, that corruption is pervasive within the existing Iraqi Government. Corruption is a serious problem.

Senator MENENDEZ. My concern, Ambassador, is that while we have focused on the escalation of the war the President promotes, a whole host of things critical to the very success in Iraq that you say in your opening statement that is so important to the Nation, to our Nation, are not about an escalation of the war but are about a whole host of diplomatic efforts to achieve the Iraqis moving forward and it seems to me that without benchmarks that have a real consequence to them, which I have seen the administration reject so far; certainly when the Secretary was here, I asked her those questions and she largely rejected them. Without benchmarks to have a real sense that we are moving forward on all of these different categories, among others: oil, distribution of resources for the nation. It seems to me that all of that is a much more monumental challenge at the end of the day and that's the very essence of what the State Department should be at the forefront of and I think largely we have failed to see significant progress in that respect and my question is, therefore—I heard your statement but my question is therefore what is it? Give the outline of when you're confirmed, what you'll be doing with the Secretary to change the very essence of moving the Iraqis in a much different direction that they have been recalcitrant to move. Because before sending 20,000 more of our sons and daughters on the roll of a dice and the hope that some of these things would move in a different direction, it seems to me we have to know what your plan is to actually accelerate the pace and the surge of diplomacy that will move the Iraqis to a better place than they are now because without that, none of this is going to succeed.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. First of all, Senator, I think there is an enormous amount of diplomacy that already goes on with the Government of Iraq, starting with frequent conversations between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister and then of course, the Secretary and our ambassador out there. I think you're right to say that we are very challenged but I do think that there are benchmarks, if you will, that ought to be pursued and I think you've alluded to a couple of them. One is certainly the national reconciliation process and the passage of a law regarding de-Baathification. Another has to do with oil revenues—and these are all issues that are being worked in the Iraqi National Assembly at the moment. Then I think another important one is that we hope

that local elections and regional elections will be carried in the country of Iraq during the course of 2007, where hopefully some of the different groups that have been underrepresented, such as in the Sunni areas, can regain some of their representation in those elections that take place during the coming years.

Senator MENENDEZ. So those are examples of some of the kinds of benchmarks that we'll be looking at—I hope we'll consider consequences to benchmarks and last, since my time is about to expire—this is on a different topic—I do hope that with your experience in Latin America, that while you're obviously going to be spending a great deal of your time on Iraq, that we look to expand what is our view of United States policy in Latin America. Trade is important and narcotics interdiction is important but when half of the people in the hemisphere live below the poverty level, it creates a whole host of challenges for us here, domestically. The things we debate about often relate to that and when we have—the only place in the world that we have, for the last 3 years, cut development assistance to under the budget of the administration is Latin America and the Caribbean—not in the national interests of the United States, not in the national security interests of the United States—and I hope we can have a more robust policy because it's in the vacuum of having a more robust policy that the Chavez's of the world get to play a bigger role than they should be playing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. With permission of the committee, I'd read on page 60 of the Iraq Study Group report—there's a line—"It should be unambiguous that continued U.S. political, military, and economic support for Iraq depends on the Iraqi Government demonstrating political will and making substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance."

Senator.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate it. Ambassador, it is great to have you here with your family. I know your son and daughters have probably had a most unique life not without sacrifice. I'm sure they're thinking about a lot of things right now other than our questions and are looking for this to end, and thank you to your wife for being here and supporting you in this way.

I know that your role as Deputy will be to really generally supervise the Department of State, and that you, in your opening comments, talked about transformational diplomacy. I was with Secretary Rice earlier today and I know that came up. Could you articulate for us, since you will be making that, if you will, work throughout the Department, exactly what transformational diplomacy is in your mind?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I think the principle feature of it, Senator, is to redeploy if you will, adjust the deployment of our diplomatic efforts and our diplomatic establishments around the world, more toward some of the hot spots and the more challenging geographic areas of the world. I think that there has been a tendency, over the years, to be overrepresented, if you will, diplomatically in the highly developed countries of the world and less represented in

the less developed parts. There is the additional fact that you have a lot of new states in the world, particularly on the periphery of the Soviet Union. So I think that the main notion of Secretary is to get our people out into these difficult hot spots. In addition to that, to try to increase our representation through having these so-called presence posts, which would be very small, maybe one officer in some locations of interest around the world. And I think the Secretary felt that my type of Foreign Service career, where I spent virtually all of it serving in less developed parts of the world, in the Third World, if you will, was one of the qualifications that interested her in my background.

Senator CORKER. What exactly does that mean to the Department as far as upheaval, change—when you talk about transformational—what does that really mean throughout the entire State Department?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I haven't looked at the details of what it would mean. What I do know is that at the present time, there is the thought of moving a couple of hundred positions from Western Europe, for example, to other diplomatic posts in the farther reaches of the world but I haven't had an opportunity to study in detail all the implications that these moves would have.

Senator CORKER. You were in intelligence, obviously are still today, as a matter of fact. You've been in the State Department, have been around the world, and I think are very qualified to address an issue that has come before this committee and that is, in looking at the things that have occurred over the last 4 or 5 years and some of the breakdowns that have occurred that have caused judgments to be made based on information, based on things that may or may not have been the case. There tends to be a concern about just our country's readiness, if you will, to deal with the world as it is today—the State Department, the Department of Defense, Intelligence. I know that this has really maybe not so much to do with your confirmation but you are in a unique position to assess that and I'm just wondering what you might say as it relates to our country's readiness to really deal with the world that really is transforming, that does no longer—we're no longer in the cold war and obviously, the types of challenges that we have are most unique. How do you assess our readiness in general?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. If you were asking me that question from a point of view of intelligence and whether we're prepared sufficiently with regard to the threats that are out there, Senator, I would say that there have been substantial improvements since 9/11 in terms of our preparedness, in terms of having increased our intelligence capabilities, of having integrated our efforts better and of having improved information sharing between the different agencies. If you ask me the question, is our diplomatic establishment as well prepared as it can be, with the greater variety of problems that we have to deal with in this world, when you think about the fact that we no longer face just one monolithic threat, if you will, as we did during the cold war, that we face a wide range and diversity of problems on this planet, I think there is still a lot of work to be done.

Senator CORKER. It seems to me that as it relates to actually a number of comments, that the activities that we have on the

ground through civilians, through the State Department, are equally important to what we're doing, maybe more so, to what we doing militarily in Iraq right now. It seems to me that one of the big issues we've had is a real lack of working together, of communicating, of having a coherence there on the ground. I'm wondering if you can address that and how you think that might be changing with what is occurring at present in Iraq—the ability to get money out, the ability to really coordinate efforts in an appropriate manner, to lessen our need for military involvement down the road.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I mean, I do think our efforts are fairly well coordinated in terms of ambassadors and military commanders working well in the field. I think there is an issue of resources. It is, as a general rule, it's probably easier to obtain resources that are directly supportive of our military, whereas sometimes investment in foreign assistance or support for the security forces of another country, for example, could be a more cost effective way of going about things. So I guess what I would say in reply to you, Senator, is that as we carry out our policies in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, we need to be mindful of the important contribution that the civilian component of our national security effort can make.

Senator CORKER. You've had an extensive background in the Western Hemisphere and South America and we see a lot of developments taking place there. I know our country fixates a great deal on the Middle East, just in reference to oil and energy supplies and how that affects the world but in many ways, South America is equally or more important to us in that regard. I'm wondering if you can just give a general assessment of the developments you see taking place, socialism, anti-Americanism that is there and the type of efforts you think need to be undertaken in the State Department to make sure that our economic security down the road as it relates to energy supplies and trade, stay intact.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Senator. I think Latin America has been a mixed picture in the past couple of years. There have been a lot of elections, I think, in a number of places—democratic regimes have been elected. I think that in Mexico, in Peru, they were recently elections—Ecuador and Nicaragua and so forth. I think that one of the trends that we need to be concerned about is kind of a frustration among some of the populations of Latin America that democracy is not necessarily delivering the kinds of results that people had hoped for and that has, in turn, given rise to a certain amount of populism. I guess that is most clearly symbolized by Mr. Hugo Chavez, the president of Venezuela and I do not think he has been a constructive force in the hemisphere so I think countries like Bolivia, among others, have been under the influence of Mr. Chavez, who has been trying to export his kind of radical populism and I think that his behavior is threatening to democracies in the region but by and large, I think that democracy is doing quite well in the hemisphere and I guess the last point I would make is that the situation in Columbia is a critical one to our interests and I think it is very, very important that we continue to support the Government of Columbia and its efforts to bring that country under control and to finally put an end to the guerilla activity that is taking place in that country.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you. I look forward to your continued service and I suspect, more time before this committee over the next couple of years. I've got two very different sets of questions.

The first relates to Iran. There has been a lot of speculation in the press lately with regard to United States policy toward Iran. Administration sources, although unnamed, have been fairly explicit in indicating that the administration is attempting to send some shots across the bow with respect to Iran, both regarding its interference in Iraq but also its nuclear program. You've got carrier groups being amassed in the region. You've got a policy that appears to be purposely somewhat ambiguous in terms of how the administration is going to pursue Iranians who are on Iraqi soil.

This has led to grave concern on the part of many observers that we are stumbling into a more aggressive posture with respect to Iran. I would like to get some sense from you as to what exactly our Iran policy is right now and are we coupling the issue of Iraq with the very legitimate concerns with respect to Iran's nuclear program—do we see those as related? Do we see those as separate? Because I know the chairman has talked about this. I think it's very important from this committee's perspective that there is clarity and transparency in terms of U.S. policy so that we don't repeat some of the mistakes that have been made in the past with respect to our Middle Eastern policies. So do you want to address that very briefly?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think first I would start from the premise I mentioned earlier that Iran has been emboldened in its behavior during the past couple of years and has played a more assertive role and that certainly manifests in Iraq where we have increasing evidence that they have been providing lethal assistance to extremist Shia groups in that country and that's destabilizing behavior as far as Iraq is concerned. With respect to their nuclear program, of course, they have been adamant, it seems, in their desire to pursue an enrichment program and the intelligence community's assessment is—continues to be and it has been for a couple of years, that Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons. I would characterize our policy as desirous of resolving any issues we have with Iran by peaceful means, but at the same time we don't believe that their behavior, such as supporting Shia extremists in Iraq, should go unchallenged. So it's a balance, if you will, but if they feel that they can continue with this kind of activity with impunity, that will be harmful to the security of Iraq and to our interests in that country.

Senator OBAMA. Let me just be clear. I think it is entirely appropriate for United States forces to do whatever we need to do to protect United States troops and if there are Iranian aggressors inside Iraq that are aiding in attacks on United States troops or making our troops more vulnerable, then within Iraq, I think, action is appropriate. I also think that with respect to the nuclear program, I don't know anybody on this panel who does not believe that that would create great danger for the region and the world and that we should take every step possible to make sure that they don't ob-

tain nuclear weapon capability and that we should keep all options on the table in pursuing that. What I think many of us are concerned about is that we stumble into active hostilities with Iran without having aggressively pursued diplomatic approaches, without the American people understanding exactly what is taking place and so, I just want to suggest that in your important role as Deputy Secretary of State that you, Secretary Rice, and others are mindful that this committee is going to be paying attention and that we do not want to see precipitous actions that have not been thought through, have not been discussed, have not been authorized.

Let me just change the subject real quick in the time that I have remaining. This is an issue that actually seems somewhat parochial but I think, as you'll see, is of concern across the world. About a year ago, the Chicago Tribune ran a three-part investigative series on mercury contamination in the fish that we eat and the Tribune series found a stunning level of mercury in fish, not just in saltwater fish like tuna or swordfish but in fresh water fish that our constituents, particularly around the Great Lakes region, might catch in their favorite local lakes. As I'm sure you know, mercury is a potent neurotoxin, particularly for pregnant women and children. The problem is that with respect to mercury, it doesn't matter where on the globe it is used because while half of it dissipates locally, the other half can deposit itself on the other side of the world. So no matter how vigilant we are in the United States about mercury use, we need to monitor what's happening abroad. Currently, the U.S. sells large quantities of mercury to the developing world where tracking and environmental laws are lax and where mercury is still used in thermometers and thermostats and gold mining, although there are plenty of affordable substitutes for mercury. There is no real reason for developing countries to switch as long as we keep selling our mercury overseas, which brings me to the matter I want to raise with you.

Next week, the State Department representatives will attend a U.N. meeting in Kenya to decide the next steps in worldwide mercury reduction strategies. The European Union has already committed itself to stop selling mercury overseas by 2012. Secretary Lugar and I—Senator Lugar and I—I'm giving you a promotion there, Senator Lugar.

The CHAIRMAN. From a legislative standpoint, that doesn't sound like a promotion.

Senator OBAMA. Senator Lugar and I sent a letter last month to Secretary Rice asking about the U.S. strategy for this important meeting. Yesterday, I received a letter. Senator Lugar may have received the same letter that said the State Department still hasn't decided what to do at the meeting. Now these meetings occur every 2 years. The next one is next week. So I was a little stunned that the State Department didn't yet have a plan on this issue. The State Department letter did suggest that it had a preference for using nonbinding voluntary partnerships with other countries instead of binding treaties and agreements to reduce mercury around the world. Now, obviously, the State Department has got a lot on its plate between Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and so on. This is an issue of importance to my constituents though, and I wanted to

find out, No. 1, given the importance of this issue, why the State Department isn't advocating a tougher approach to the problem and second, the European Union has committed itself to stop selling mercury by 2012. Would you support the United States adopting a similar ban on mercury sales abroad? I know you may not have prepared for this question but I'm wondering if you have some thoughts on it and if not, then I'd like to get a formal response from the State Department to follow up on the letter that we've already received.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. We'll certainly arrange for that. I'm not personally familiar with that issue, although I was once a representative on the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission.

Senator OBAMA. So you know a little bit about it.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. And I was Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans Environments so I am certainly familiar with dealing with that type of issue. I'd be pleased to look into it.

Senator OBAMA. Good. I would like you to.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I'd like to thank you very much for your willingness to continue to serve our country at what I consider to be one of the most critical times in our Nation's history in dealing with our national security and in terms of world peace. And I want to thank your wife and your children for the sacrifice that they've made so that your husband and father could serve his country. It's very much appreciated and I'm sure you were all worried when he went into Iraq. I know when he came to the office to talk about it, I said he was taking his life in his hands going in there. Thank you so much.

As you know, Mr. Negroponte, I've been interested in a couple of areas—No. 1, anti-Semitism and Muslim-phobia and we've been trying for 4 years to get the OSCE to fund out of their core budget, the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Resources, which is a part of the OSC in terms of dealing with human rights and religious things.

I would just like to underscore how important I think that decision in putting it in the core budget is, because if you look at the long-term war on terror—and it's going to be with us a long time—how we deal with the human relations infrastructure in the various countries in terms of anti-Semitism and in terms of the Muslim world, particularly Muslims and dealing with modernity, are going to have a big impact on whether or not we're successful or not in the long run on this war on terror.

The second one deals with Serbia and Kosovo. Again, I want to congratulate the State Department in terms of not setting an artificial date for the finishing of those negotiations. I appreciate the outreach to Serbia. They've been—if we're successful, the forces of democracy won but the issue between how—the final status in Kosovo is still something that is up in the air and I would hope that as it moves to the Security Council that we stay on top of it so we don't end up having another conflict in that part of the world.

When you were in the office, we talked about management and I have another hat that I wear, now Ranking Member of the Over-

sight of Government Management and the Federal Workforce, and the fact of the matter is that we have been receiving, and I think Senator Lugar made reference to it in his opening statement, we've got some tremendous management problems today in the State Department, and for the record I would like to have the record of the last 2 years in terms of retirement, in terms of key positions that are open and not filled. I remember when Colin Powell took over. He talked about the team. He really instilled some new esprit de corps in the Department and from what I understand right now, it has sagged quite a bit. And I'd just like to know from you in terms of the role that you've been asked to play, what you are going to do about trying to get a handle on that and see if we can't quiet things down, stabilize it and bring back the feeling in the Department so that we just don't keep hemorrhaging as we have in the past.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, we'll certainly provide the information about the key positions and the vacancies and I think some of this is simply part of a normal rotational cycle that will happen during the course of any 8-year administration, Senator. But as far as how I visualize my own role in the Department, I think I can be of assistance to the Secretary in helping lead the Department, both here in Washington and abroad, the Foreign Service. I would like to think that one particular strength I can bring to the Department is my knowledge of how the Foreign Service works and my relationships with many Foreign Service officers, so I would like to build on that and strengthen the sense of satisfaction and enthusiasm for the work that they are doing. I want to be supportive to the Secretary and her efforts to carry out this transformational diplomacy that we were talking about earlier.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, you are a career Foreign Service person. I suspect that everybody is kind of excited that you're coming back to the State Department. I really think you ought to talk to Secretary Rice about maybe spending a little time there in the Department, bucking people up and letting them know that there is going to be some fresh wind, new water coming into the State Department because the whole operation really depends on the motivation of the people that work in the Department and I think it is really important that it be paid attention to at this time.

[Disruption in background.]

The CHAIRMAN. Would you please cease? I'd ask the police to escort our visitor from the room. I would suggest that proves the acoustics in the room are good. I thank the Capital Police. We're going to have to clear the room. We can talk about this later. I would ask you to please leave the room and let the witness testify.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, will you add a minute and a half to my time?

The CHAIRMAN. No. Yes, I will. Add a minute and a half to your time. So we'll just let you go over a minute and a half. Don't reset the clock.

Senator VOINOVICH. This gets to Iraq. Many of us feel and the Iraq Study Task report came back and talked about engaging people in the region to try and get them to help provide a political solution to the situation. The question I have is, should we be convening a group of people and you've mentioned Saudis, the Syr-

ians—not the Syrians necessarily but the Egyptians and the Jordanians to come together and basically say to them, if we ultimately move out of here and this place blows up, it's going to have a very detrimental impact on the region and you ought to be interested in helping us stabilize the area or stabilize Iraq. The question I have is, why haven't we done that or in the alternative, why hasn't Maliki reached out to these people and called them together and said, hey guys, things are pretty bad here. Some of you are meddling in this situation. If this thing blows up, what impact is it going to have in terms of refugees? Saudis, if Sunnis start to be massacred, you're going to be probably asked to get involved in this and we could have a real blow-up. Where are we with this and why aren't we moving in that direction right now? Or at least, why isn't Maliki moving in that direction?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, first of all, Senator, I would agree with you that the role that countries in the region could play could be positive, although I think in the past, at least, and certainly in the time I was there and in my observation, there has been a reluctance on the part of a number of countries to be proactive with respect to Iraq and certainly been reluctant to establish a diplomatic presence in that country because of the security situation so I think that they've been a bit hesitant. I think today, you're starting to see a shift in that situation and countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, maybe also Egypt—more concerned than they were previously. So I think that could lead to some positive outcomes.

With regard to the Government of Iraq, I think they try. They try quite hard. Both Prime Minister Maliki and President Talabani, and particularly President Talabani, have traveled quite extensively throughout the region and I think that needs to be encouraged.

They've probably not gotten as far as they would like in terms of interest and acceptance and recognition in the region as they would have preferred but they have to continue trying to do that. For example, there are countries that could provide debt relief to Iraq that haven't done so yet. I would say Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as examples of that, but that would be just one example of the kind of contribution they could make to helping the situation in that country.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I'll just finish up that I hope that they understand that there is some real concern in this country about what we're doing and if they look at the tea leaves, we're going to be out of there over a period of time—how much we're still not sure. They'll be some presence and I would hope that somebody underscores to them how necessary it is for them to get involved in the situation. I think it is also very important that the American people know that some attempt has been made at that because from our perspective, it really hasn't been made. I know the Secretary has moved around and talked to this group and that group, but in other instances we've brought together countries that had strategic interests. We did that in North Korea. We've done that, to a certain extent, with Iran. We've done that to a certain extent in Lebanon—you know, bring all the folks together and talk about it. I would really urge you and the Secretary to give serious

thought to formalizing this—maybe not. Maybe we ought not to do it. Okay? But somebody should do it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador, thank you as well and I want to reiterate what a number of my colleagues said about your public service and your contribution and obviously the commitment of your family, which is a big part of what you've done and we're grateful.

I'm going to try to cover maybe four areas, if I can. I'll try to do them rather quickly, starting with, of course, Iraq and Iran. I want to pick up on some of what Senator Voinovich spoke to a moment ago about the region. One of the points the Iraq Study Group made, among others, and I think this is pertinent to this afternoon's hearing but I know of your experience in the region and in particular, with regard to Iraq.

At one point, the Iraq Study Group made the following assertion. It said, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, for the most part, have been passive and disengaged. And I wanted to get your perspective on that. A, whether you agree with that assessment and B, if you do agree, how you think this country and this State Department, under your leadership and Secretary Rice's leadership, can change that dynamic, if you believe that to be true, on being passive and disengaged.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think that I perhaps would state it slightly differently. I think they've not been as engaged as we would like them to be. I think the possibility of them being more engaged is increasing as they watch developments in the region, namely both the situation in Iraq and also the emboldened behavior of Iran that we've been talking about, which I think is a cause of concern for them. And if I could just add one point, I think, in reply to both Senator Voinovich's and your question, I think regional diplomacy and regional efforts can play an important part—there's no doubt about it—but I do think we need to be clear that the large—the preponderance of the problems that Iraq faces are internal in nature.

Senator CASEY. With regard to Iran, we've heard a lot today and you spoke to it directly. I guess I want to focus on two areas. One is, I'll deal with the press question first. There was a story today in the New York Times about the concerns about the European Union—the European Nations not working with our Government with regard to Iran, and concerns about whether or not they'll agree to any kind of restrictions or policies that will impact economically on how we deal with Iran. What can you tell us about the thrust of that story, A, and B, if the premise of that story is correct in your judgment, what do you think you must do and the Department must do?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I read the story and I haven't had a chance to check back with the office and look at it in depth, but what struck me about the story is that it sounded a little bit premature to me because we're just—we're waiting for a report from the International Atomic Energy Agency. If I'm not mistaken, it's supposed to come sometime during February and it is after that re-

port that then the countries will have to decide what else to do before the Security Council in light of Iran's decision to press ahead with its centrifuge program. So I think it may be a little bit early to talk about what kind of actions countries are prepared to take. Having said that, countries have had differing views on what types of sanctions should be applied. I think the important point is that the last Security Council resolution on Iran was adopted unanimously and I think that from an intelligence community point of view, our assessment is that that resolution had some impact on the internal dynamics in Iran and the dynamics of the debate that is being carried out in the political elite in that country, and some of the people in Iran may now be beginning to wonder what kind of difficulties and what kind of complications is the pursuit of their enrichment program bringing to that country.

Senator CASEY. And just a broader question with regard to Iran, I think what you see today around the country—I certainly hear it in Pennsylvania. We've lost over 140 lives in Iraq. There is a lot of discussion about and speculation about the Bush administration taking steps with regard to Iran that reminds people about mistakes made with regard to Iraq. I realize you can't compare the two, necessarily, but what I think a lot of people need to hear from this administration, and certainly from the State Department, is that when this administration approaches the gravity of the question of Iran, a much bigger country, much bigger threat militarily, obviously than Iraq has been, with all the problems we've had in Iraq, what I need to hear and I think what a lot of people need to hear is what is the—set aside the military strategy—what is the diplomatic strategy in the next 6 months, say. Let's limit it to that—from what you can gather, of this administration and certainly by way of the State Department, to deal just diplomatically with Iran, because I think people need some assurance. It seems to me, this may be only a perception that is not accurate but it always seems to me and to many others, I believe, around the country, that even as the administration says that it has every option on the table, it seems that the military option always is put forth first and seems most of the time the administration spends considering options, most of the time and effort and focus is on a military option instead of discharging or considering every possible other option, including one of sustained and robust diplomacy, but I'd just like to have your thoughts on that.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I guess the first thought I would offer, Senator, is that of course, diplomacy and other elements of national strategy just have to work hand in hand. They don't operate in an isolated fashion, so that for diplomacy to be effective, it is also important that we have a robust national security posture. I don't think there is any doubt about that. But with respect to Iran, first of all, I'd reiterate what I said earlier, which is that we would like to resolve the issues that confront us with respect to Iran by peaceful means. I would state that there are two main concerns. There are others as well but the two principle ones are the enrichment program and there is actually a substantial diplomatic effort underway through both the United Nations and working with the European Union, vis-a-vis Iran, and we've also indicated that we would be prepared to broaden our diplomatic activity with Iran if

they were to take that first step of stopping their enrichment program. And the other main concern is, of course, Iraq and the support that they provide to Shia extremists in that country and they certainly know our position on that score.

Senator CASEY. I have many more but I'm out of time. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, Ambassador, for your willingness to continue to serve, and to your family for their support so that you can do just that. We greatly appreciate it.

Most of the questions this morning certainly and fairly have been focused on the situation in Iraq, a fair amount on Iran, as well, but as we discussed when I had the opportunity to sit down with you for a few moments, your portfolio is quite broad and we had a chance to talk a little bit about the task that you will have in the Far East—China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan—certainly areas that I have been very involved with on the subcommittee that I had chaired and now ranking, on this committee.

Let me ask you about the situation in North Korea, the dual track that is proceeding. I understand that today, in fact, we are resuming the second round of talks on the financial restrictions that the United States has imposed against Pyongyang. Can you just very briefly give me your assessment as to where we are and how you see us proceeding with North Korea in view of the six-party talks?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think the key thing, Senator, is we're of course concerned by the fact that they tested their Taepodong missile last summer and that they also had this—more recently, this nuclear explosion. And our main objective is to achieve a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and we are pursuing that objective along with the other parties to the six-party talks. So our main focus is to try to get North Korea committed to putting a freeze on its nuclear program, which would mean freezing their nuclear reactor and their reprocessing facility and subjecting those activities to international inspection. So that's the main purpose of these diplomatic efforts that are underway at this time.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And in view of the effort that we all agree on, which is a Korean Peninsula free of a nuclear threat there, but also recognizing that we have the United States sanctions issue, the financial sanctions that from North Korea's perspective is saying, that's a different matter, that's a different issue. There are some who have suggested that that is forwarding the efforts for the six-party talks to be successful. I guess my question to you is, in view of how we are doing this dual track, are we on track, in your opinion? Are we making the progress necessary to get to the final goal, which is to see the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, it's a very difficult issue and I wouldn't want to raise false hopes here but I do think there are some grounds for optimism that we can move that issue forward. And as far as the sanctions are concerned, while some might argue that it's a disruptive factor, I think others might make the case and perhaps even equally or more plausibly that those kinds of sanctions can provide a bit of leverage in these discussions. But I think there

are a number of factors at work—that must be at work on the thinking of the North Koreans. There again, I think the United Nations has played a role. The fact that the Security Council adopted a unanimous resolution, which placed North Korea, for the first time, at odds with their traditional friend, China. It must have given them pause about the situation that they have created for themselves. So I suspect there are a number of different facts that are influencing their thinking at this time.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do you support or would you support sending Chris Hill to Pyongyang for the discussions? Do you think that would be helpful?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think that would have to be a tactical decision that the Secretary would have to make in the context of whatever diplomatic development is taking place at that particular time. I certainly wouldn't rule it out.

Senator MURKOWSKI. In several conversations that I have had with some of our friends over in Japan on a multitude of issues, I'm reminded that Japan has been our firm and constant ally for many years and that some feel that relationship can almost be taken for granted. They're not a trouble maker in that corner of the world and there's almost a sense that sometimes, unless you're in a hot spot, you don't get the attention from the United States that they would hope to receive and when issues come up that are perhaps their priority but not a priority of the United States, there can be some issues, there can be some friction there. Recognizing that your portfolio is going to include most of Northeast Asia, do you anticipate that you're going to be spending some time over there? What kind of message do you anticipate that you will bring as you reach out to some of our friends and neighbors over there?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, first, yes I do expect to spend time working on Northeast Asia, including the whole question of the longer-term structures for peace in that region. I think that's a subject that we need to be giving some thought to, although obviously within the time frame of this administration, there is not enough time to bring that to some kind of an end state. But second, also, I would expect to devote an important amount of time to our relationship with Japan and for me, as someone who started my career in East Asia more than 45 years ago, our relationship with Japan has always been a cornerstone of our policy toward East Asia. I don't think we should take the relationship for granted. I think it needs to be nurtured and Japan remains one of our most important allies in the world.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, I appreciate the lengthy relationship you have built over there and I think that will only help us in our efforts.

One more question about the region there. Over the weekend, Taiwan President Chen Shui-Bian called for a new constitution for Taiwan. Do you—what is the State Department's view on President Chen's remarks or comments?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. The State Department view is that we support a one-China policy and the foundation documents that three different communiques with regard to the unity of China and we believe that it would be unwise to do anything that might be in cross purposes with those three communiques.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So do you think that a new constitution would be at cross-purposes?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I would want to study the implications but it certainly strikes me that that would be a distinct possibility.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I've got time for one more quick one. Last week at the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, I heard some testimony about the structure in the world in terms of our oil and gas resources and at that hearing, it was reported that 75 percent of the world's oil and natural gas resources are now controlled by state-owned oil companies. As we recognize our increased dependence on foreign sources of energy, how does this—the fact that we're dealing with state-controlled entities—how does this impact our policy choices, really our relationship with our allies? We're dealing with the countries for an energy source that we deem absolutely critical. What does this mean?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I think it makes access to energy more challenging, particularly for those parts of our private sector that are interested in exploration and exploration because they have to deal with these state-owned corporations who very frequently—more often than not, I think, are not willing to let out exploitation contracts to private investment.

On the other hand, I have noted, certainly in countries that I've served in, such as Mexico, among others, which do have large state-owned oil corporations, that they also confront a challenge, which is how as a state-owned oil corporation, can you mobilize sufficient investment to do the necessary exploration and exploitation. So I think that sooner or later, a number of these state-owned oil corporations around the world are going to have to face up to the reality that private investment from investors around the world can be a very, very helpful factor to them in increasing their production. So there is the basis for some kind of a bargain there, it would seem to me.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador, I have to take a phone call. I expect to be back before the committee finishes but since, at this moment, we only have two more Senators to question, I'm going to ask the chairman, if I am not back by then, to adjourn the hearing. We've consulted very briefly, and it is my hope and intention that we will move to a rapid consideration and executive session of your nomination. I expect that it will be favorable. and I would expect that we'll try to get this to the floor as soon as possible. Seven months is a long time to have this post vacant, so we'll do our best to accommodate that.

I hope to be back before it finishes, but I must take this call so I recognize Senator Webb.

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to have to leave because I've got some people who have been waiting on me so I would like to state for the record that I am very supportive of the nomination of Mr. Negroponte to this position.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, okay, thank you.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be shorter than I thought.

Senator WEBB. Ambassador Negroponte, I'm sorry I missed a good portion of your hearing. We've got two confirmation hearings going on at the same time, one up in the Armed Services Committee, where I also serve. I have a great regard for the contributions that you've made to our country over the years.

[Senator Webb speaks a Vietnamese phrase.]

You don't have to translate that. That was a little bit of Vietnamese. Ambassador Negroponte is quite proficient in Vietnamese.

During this committee's hearing with Secretary of State Rice on January 11, I asked her a very straightforward question on the administration's policy regarding military action against Iran and this is a quote: I asked, is it the position of this administration that it possesses the authority to take unilateral action against Iran in the absence of a direct threat, without Congressional approval? It has been nearly 3 weeks since I asked that question and I followed up with a letter and this is basically a yes or no question regarding an urgent matter affecting our Nation's foreign policy and particularly as we watch some of these incidents that have been occurring over the past couple of weeks. I would pose the same question to you today. Is it the position of this administration that it possesses the authority to take unilateral action against Iran in the absence of a direct threat without Congressional approval?

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Senator, I think you put me in a bit of a difficult position. If the Secretary hasn't sent a reply back to you, I think I'd be reluctant to substitute mine for hers. But let me just reiterate what I said earlier in reply to a number of questions that we wish to resolve any differences we have with Iran by peaceful means. We don't rule out other possibilities but our focus at the moment is on resolving these issues by peaceful means.

Senator WEBB. Would you pass on to the Secretary my request that the written question be replied to in a reasonably rapid manner, like soon. I appreciate that.

I caught the tail end of your response with respect to our relations with Japan and I, like a number of people, including you, I think, have a long relationship with Japan and view Japan as probably our greatest long-term ally in the region with all the things that are going on. I have a pretty strong concern about our relations with China. And I'm concerned principally that because of the attention on the Middle East, we have not paid sufficient attention to China, other than the economic side. There is a whole laundry list that I won't go through in terms of where I believe, as a Nation, we are becoming disadvantaged in our relationships. But specifically, I'm curious as to your thoughts on this relationship, particularly when we see the economic disadvantage on the one hand and, clearly, on the other, an increased build-up to the expansion, which some would say inevitable, of Chinese interests in this hemisphere and also in Africa.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Senator, China is a very important country and it is going to be for the century ahead of us. I think it is in our interests to engage China. I was involved in the first outreach to China, back in the early 1970s. I went with Dr. Kissinger there in 1972, shortly after President Nixon's historic visit there. I think we need to engage China. I think we—on all levels and I think that ought to be our approach to that country, not one of confrontation

but engagement, and Deputy Secretary Zoellick had conducted a senior dialog with them on political matters, which I expect to be able to resume at the level of Deputy Secretary of State. And I look forward to doing that and I look forward to consulting with you about our approach and how we go about that.

Senator WEBB. Would you agree that there is something of a parallel in the sense in the early opening up to China that you participated in. We had a situation rather similar to Iran's today, not a direct parallel but certainly a similar situation where China was a rogue nation with nukes, had an American war on its border, was known to have been providing supplies to people who we were fighting on the battlefield, and yet we did aggressively engage them, diplomatically, and arguably over a period of decades, we have been very instrumental in bringing them into the international community.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I see what you're driving at. The one major difference, of course, is that China is just such a larger factor. It's so much larger a country and it's more than a billion people whereas Iran is 70 or 80 million people so we're not talking exactly about the same kind of dimensions here. But I see your point.

Senator WEBB. But in terms of potential impact, when we look at the emergence of Iran and the difficulties that we're going to be having with Iran in that region, it would seem to me that without giving up any of the deterrent issues that we have and without giving up our position on such issues as recognition of Israel or Iran's nuclear program, that an aggressive engagement with Iran over the long-term could be beneficial in the same way that this relationship with China has been beneficial.

Mr. NEGROPONTE. We've had some discussion earlier about the question of engagement with Tehran and that doesn't seem to be in the cards at this particular point in time, but one other pretty significant difference I think I want to highlight is that Iran, if anything, I'd say is more of a rogue nation. If you think of their support for international terrorism and their effort to prevent reconciliation between the Arabs and Israelis at all costs, and their state sponsorship for terrorism, which they, I think, quite brazenly use as a tool in their national security policy.

Senator WEBB. Well, I certainly wouldn't disagree with you on the nature of the rhetoric and some of the actions that have come out of Iran. At the same time, they did cooperate with respect to Afghanistan, after the 2001 invasion. It just would seem to me that we need to be looking at both ends of the diplomatic scale and I look forward to having further discussions about that and I thank you for your time.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. Do you have any further questions?

[No response.]

Senator LUGAR. Let me just thank you on behalf of the chairman and the committee. We appreciate you being here, your responses to our questions. Let me just say as a matter of business here, all questions for the record should be submitted before the close of business tomorrow and the record will be kept open for that purpose. There have been some questions raised and so we want to complete the record. As the chairman has pointed out, it is his in-

tent and I agree to that, to try to have an Executive Session to take action upon your nomination at the earliest possible moment. We realize the urgency of filling the post and having an Under Secretary on the job.

We thank you very much for your appearance and that of your family and the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. In last week's hearing, Dr. Ed Luttwak emphasized the differences between Iraqi Shiites who are Arab and Iranian Shiites who are Persian. He also said, "The United States is a great power. The Iranians are a puny power. Their importance in that area is temporary based on the fact that the people of that area, the leaders, don't see a coherent policy from the United States of America." Do the Iranians hope eventually to dominate Iraq? Could they prevail, given the natural rivalries?

Answer. Tehran has legitimate national interests related to its neighbor, Iraq. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Iranians, not surprisingly, have attempted to play a role in Iraq's political process. They developed ties with many current Iraqi Government officials who, during their years of opposition to Saddam, lived in Iran.

Iran can and should play a constructive role in supporting Baghdad's efforts to establish security. Unfortunately Tehran's activities have been detrimental to the internal democratic development and security of the Iraqi people. The provision of material support and training to Shia militias and other groups has resulted in the deaths of United States troops, coalition forces, and Iraqi citizens. Iran's motivations in carrying out these actions are not clear, but our experience with similar Iranian involvement with Shia Arab groups elsewhere in the region, especially Lebanon, suggests that the Iranians use local surrogates to advance Iranian agendas at the expense of legitimate local interests.

The United States remains committed to a stable and democratic Iraq, and the Iraqi leadership has affirmed its commitment to discouraging Iranian interference in its internal affairs. The United States has confidence that our partnership with the Iraqi Government, coupled with assistance from friends and allies in the region, will prevail against harmful Iranian meddling.

Question. What is your reaction to another comment of Dr. Luttwak's: "When generals say we don't need more troops in Iraq, it's not that they were patsies or playing along with the administration policy at the time, it's that you don't know how to employ them, because you cannot patrol without intelligence. And, unfortunately, Central Intelligence doesn't provide it. We have raiding forces in Iraq, which are tremendously effective. They're hardly ever used because, to make a raid, you need intelligence . . . That's why, even if you knew nothing of the politics or the strategy or the theater strategy, purely at the tactical level you would say: Don't send me troops. Reduce them."

Answer. I respectfully disagree with the assertion that our military "don't know how to employ" their forces in Iraq because the United States intelligence community does not provide adequate intelligence. The United States intelligence effort in Iraq is robust, and I have devoted considerable attention to this issue as Director of National Intelligence. There is strong civilian-military interagency coordination and cooperation to provide our forces with the best information possible to support their operations. Tactical level civilian-military cooperation has been particularly effective against al-Qaeda in Iraq, as demonstrated by the successful effort against Abu Musab Al Zarqawi last summer, among other operations. I would be pleased to arrange a classified briefing through appropriate channels to provide further details.

Question. How long do you anticipate that the surge of troops will need to be sustained? Many have suggested that the Iraqi military will not be able to do what we expect them to do in the near future. How soon will we have a clearer picture as to Iraqi capabilities and political will?

Answer. The President noted in his January 10 address to the Nation that the Iraqi Government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November of this year.

The transfer of particular provinces to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) and transfer of the Iraqi army to the command and control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) are expected to occur once Iraqi forces and command relationships have developed sufficiently to allow the Iraqis to be in the lead as opposed to a supporting role. To date, three provinces have PIC'ed and five Iraqi army divisions are under IGFC control.

As MNF-I and Iraqi forces achieve success in establishing security for the Iraqi population, a primary goal of the surge, in addition to building their forces and command relationship, the United States would then be in a position to reevaluate its force structure in Iraq.

General Patraeus stated in his Senate testimony that by late summer we expect to have an assessment of the success of the Baghdad Security Plan.

Question. Can a surge in civilian reconstruction and stabilization take place when the security situation is so dire?

Answer. The security situation in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq is serious, and does complicate our efforts to implement programs. We are addressing this concern in two ways.

First, in places like Baghdad and Anbar where security is currently a challenge, Iraqi forces, supported by and embedded with American forces, are working to secure parts of those provinces so that reconstruction and civilian life can resume. The areas that are secured will be expanded and the population protected. This is why it is important to have resources in the Department's budget for civilian programs in order to carry out the programs needed to show Iraqis that they have a stake in their neighborhoods being peaceful and secure.

Second, there are areas that are secure enough for civilian programs addressing long-term political stability to be carried out. These areas include locations in which support for moderates over extremists demonstrates the benefits of working out their disputes through a peaceful political process rather than through fighting. A core objective of the President's new strategy is to empower moderates, defined as those Iraqis who renounce violence and pursue their interests peacefully, politically, and under the rule of law. This will be an important role for our Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Question. State has met its staffing needs in Iraq, but only through the Secretary's involvement and that of other senior officers, including yourself when you were an ambassador there. Other agencies and departments have not been as successful.

(A) Challenges in meeting staffing targets stem from both budgetary (no international emergency line items in their budgets) as well as legal restrictions (the President cannot order civilians to war, they must volunteer, adding to the time it takes to deploy). Is the President seeking changes to these authorities? Will State begin directed assignments?

(B) What is the Department's vision for adding 300 new personnel to the Iraq mission? Will these be contractors, grantees, NGO operatives?

(C) Will the U.N. or other international organizations ramp up? What is the contractor and NGO presence in Iraq today?

Answer. (A) Fully staffing our most critical posts, including Baghdad and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, is one of the State Department's highest priorities. The Department has made changes to its bidding and assignments process and offered a generous incentive package to entice bidders to volunteer for service in Iraq. I am proud to report that State Department employees have willingly responded to these calls for service and have volunteered to serve at even the most difficult and dangerous posts abroad.

In the current assignments cycle, we have already filled 89 percent (156 positions out of 176) of Foreign Service positions in Iraq for summer 2007. For Embassy Baghdad, we have committed candidates for 117 out of 128 jobs. For the Iraq PRTs, we have 39 committed candidates for 48 jobs. The Bureau of Human Resources, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and other senior leaders in the Department are reaching out to potential candidates to fill the remaining positions. We also are looking at qualified civil service employees or eligible family members to fill some positions in Iraq on limited noncareer appointments. I am confident that these positions will be filled.

To date, the Secretary has not had to utilize directed assignments to meet our staffing needs in Iraq. We are prepared to direct the assignment of Foreign Service

members should that become necessary. Our goal, however, is to fill the positions in Iraq and in all of our missions around the world with qualified, willing employees who can carry out our crucial United States foreign policy objectives overseas.

At this time, the Department is not seeking any additional authorities related to assignments. The administration has sought various legislative changes to improve the incentives for overseas service. A number of these incentives were included in H.R. 4939 and passed by the 109th Congress, but others, such as the Foreign Service Modernization provisions in H.R. 6060, were not approved in 2006. The Department will continue to pursue Foreign Service modernization to reduce the 18.6 percent pay gap for overseas service. Indeed, I was amazed to learn that an officer can be paid more for serving in Washington than in many hardship and danger posts. Other proposals may also be forthcoming, as we reevaluate the existing incentives for hardship service and determine if other legislative changes are needed to support and compensate our employees who serve in the most difficult posts overseas.

(B) The Department is identifying an additional 10 senior officers to lead new PRTs in Iraq. These teams will work directly with military brigade combat teams (six in Baghdad, three in Anbar, and one in North Babil). We intend to use a mixture of personnel from DoD, USAID, other civilian agencies, and State, in addition to contractors, to fully staff the PRTs. These civilian specialists will provide the kind of professional knowledge not normally found in diplomatic missions, such as expertise in animal husbandry, small business formation, medical administration, and cooperative marketing.

(C) As of January 16, 2007, there were 320 United Nations staff on the ground in Iraq, including approximately 221 U.N. security guards. Due to security concerns, the U.N. has redeployed international staff from Baghdad to Amman, Jordan, and to Kuwait. We believe that the U.N. has a vital role to play in Iraq's development and want the U.N. to maintain a strong staff and geographic presence to assist the Iraqi people.

The World Bank has two international staff in Baghdad's International Zone and is in the process of strengthening its presence there to enhance the policy dialog with the Iraqi Government and improve donor coordination.

The International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) are the primary recipients of United States funding for NGOs in Iraq. Through staff based in Iraq, both NGOs support political party development and outreach on constitutional issues. Other international NGOs present in Iraq include Community Habitat and Finance (CHF) International, Mercy Corps, the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the International Medical Corps (IMC), International Relief and Development (IRD), Counterpart, ACDI/VOCA (Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance), and the International Red Cross.

Question. Provincial Reconstruction Teams:

- Some PRTs have been very effective, while others have had significant challenges primarily stemming from security and staffing. What is the plan going forward?
- What are the political trends outside Baghdad? Have the PRTs been effective in empowering moderate parties? Is that a part of the mandate?
- There is no PRT in Najaf now, a key location for its prominence in Shia politics. Will one of the new PRTs be placed there?

Answer. Under the expanded PRT program, launched by the President in the "New Way Forward," we will double the number of PRTs from 10 to 20, through a three-phase roll-out program. Nine new PRTs—the immediate priority—will be collocated with Brigade Combat Teams engaged in security operations in Baghdad and Anbar Province.

In the next two phases, we will add a new PRT in North Babil and augment existing PRTs with specialized civilian technical personnel. Security for the PRTs in Basrah, Dhi Qar, Irbil, and Babil will continue to be provided by diplomatic security. Staffing the expansion will be an interagency, fullcourt-press effort. Within the next 3 months, State, DoD, and USAID will deploy nine, four-person core-teams to the new PRTs in Baghdad and Anbar, each including a senior-level State Department team leader. We have identified 10 candidates for these positions. After deployment of the core teams, we will also send specialists to augment the effort. Staffing for the other PRTs is an ongoing process. Most will be specialists in fields such as rule of law, economic development, engineering, and agribusiness and, therefore, may be contractors and temporary excepted civil service direct hire employees with targeted expertise.

The President has decided to expand the size and reach of the PRTs due to their success in building Iraqi capacity and self-sufficiency to-date. Since 2005, PRTs have:

- Conducted extensive training in governance and municipal planning for provincial, district, and subdistrict offices;
- Served as a focal point for coordinating international assistance;
- Worked with Provincial Reconstruction Development committees to improve the provincial governments' ability to systematically identify and prioritize the reconstruction and development needs of their provinces and to improve the delivery of essential services;
- Facilitated better working relationships between provincial leaders and their counterparts in the central government, improving their ability to secure funds from the center to pay for provincial projects; and
- Reached out to local and provincial leaders (including grass-roots groups) who want to make a difference in making Iraq's democracy work.

A core objective of the President's new strategy is to empower moderates, defined as those Iraqis who renounce violence and pursue their interests peacefully, politically, and under the rule of law. The expanded PRT program will be central to that effort. PRTs will support local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted assistance, such as microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs, and develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable manner.

Political trends outside of Baghdad vary from province to province. Parts of Iraq, such as the Kurdistan region, enjoy relative security and prosperity. Ninewa, Tamim (Kirkuk), and Salah al-Din have occasional acts of terrorism, but political life continues despite such acts. In Anbar and Diyala, acts of violence are disrupting political life. In south-central Iraq, sectarian violence is negligible, but there have been sporadic episodes of Shia-on-Shia violence between Badr Organization and Jaysh al-Mandi elements, or involving fringe groups such as the Soldiers of Heaven just outside of Najaf. In Basrah, militias and political disputes have a negative impact on the political development of that province.

I agree that Najaf is a key location. In 2006, the State Department established a Provincial Support Team for Najaf, which is housed with PRT Babil in Hillah. The State Department and the Department of Defense are exploring the possibility of a full PRT based close to Najaf.

Question. What assurance can we have that the \$10 billion in Iraqi funds pledged for reconstruction in the coming year will be forthcoming? How much of it will be spent by the central government versus by the provinces?

Answer. The Government of Iraq (GOI) included \$10 billion in investment expenditure in its draft budget for 2007. This planned level of funding is therefore an Iraqi initiative and reflects the policy goals of the GOI. Over the last 2 years, some Iraqi ministries have had difficulty expending their capital budgets.

The GOI is tackling this problem of budget execution with strong support from an Embassy Baghdad task force that provides technical assistance to Iraqi ministries. As President Bush indicated on January 10, helping Iraq resolve these issues will be one of our top priorities this year. Ambassador Tim Carney, the new Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, will focus in this challenge.

Iraq has already taken some steps. New rules in the Iraqi budget law, if passed, would call for the reallocation of money from underspending ministries per a mid-year review, thereby enhancing near-term incentives to spend. The Ministry of Finance also plans to send a budget execution status update detailing capital expenditure rates of each ministry to the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister, and the media, starting in March 2007. These measures will help ensure that the \$10 billion in reconstruction funding is forthcoming.

Although the 2007 Iraqi budget is still being considered by the Council of Representatives, current versions of the budget allocate \$2.4 billion to Provincial Councils for investment projects. In addition, of the \$4.7 billion allocated to Kurdistan region for government functions and investment, \$1.6 is provisionally destined for investment. Therefore, approximately \$4 billion of the \$10 billion in Iraqi funds for reconstruction will be spent by the provinces, subject to caveat that the Iraqi budget is still being formulated.

Question. The Iraq Study Group and many of our witnesses have emphasized reinvigorated regional diplomacy. Other than statements of concern, what concrete actions steps have we seen from regional actors indicating that they understand what is at stake? What can we expect from Iraqi outreach to its neighbors, especially those the administration is reticent to engage?

Answer. We have urged the Iraqi Government to reach out to its neighbors. While progress has been made in terms of regional engagement over the past year, more efforts need to be made. With respect to Syria and Iran, we support Iraqi direct dialog with Damascus and Teheran—focused on building relationships based on the principle of full respect for Iraqi sovereignty and support for a peaceful, stable Iraq.

Iraq's neighbors have been involved significantly with the United Nations-Iraq sponsored International Compact with Iraq (ICI) from its inception. Under the ICI, Iraq commits to a series of primarily economic reforms that will allow it to become self-sufficient over the next 5 years. In exchange, its international partners will support Iraq through new assistance, debt forgiveness, and investments. The compact provides a framework for Iraq's economic transformation and integration into the regional and global economy.

As members of the Preparatory Group to the ICI, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE have helped shape the ICI. Both Kuwait and the UAE have hosted Preparatory Group meetings.

We have pressed Iraq's neighbors, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council states along with Egypt and Jordan (GCC+2), to enhance the level of their representation in Baghdad and to take further steps to support the Iraqi Government. In particular, Secretary Rice recently traveled to Cairo, Riyadh, and Kuwait, where she met with the GCC and Egyptian and Jordanian foreign ministers. Nevertheless, we need to do more work with Arab states to win their complete endorsement of the ICI and the Maliki government, through such steps as debt reduction and delivering on their assistance pledges. This is a major focus of both the Secretary's monthly engagement with the GCC+2 ministers and with Deputy Secretary of Treasury Kimmitt's work in the region.

Question. As one of the most experienced diplomats in the United States, you know that diplomacy is often about talking with adversaries. There are many things to be gained through such talks even if all points are not resolved in one's favor and full agreement cannot be reached. To what extent does the administration's decision not to bring Syria and Iran into discussions about Iraq reflect a lack of confidence in diplomatic endeavors, in general, and in the Department, in specific?

Answer. We encourage all of Iraq's neighbors to be responsible partners in supporting and assisting the Iraqi Government. Unfortunately, we have seen no evidence that the Iranian and Syrian regimes are willing to abandon their destabilizing policies in Iraq.

Syria continues to harbor former regime elements and has made insufficient progress in dealing with the transit of foreign fighters across the Syrian-Iraqi border. Syria knows what it needs to do to support Iraq, based upon extensive dialog earlier in this administration. The Iraqis recognize this threat, which is why they are trying to implement with Syria a memorandum of understanding to deal with terrorism and border control. Time will tell whether the Syrians will be able to live up to their pledge to the Iraqis.

Likewise, Iran continues its destabilizing activities in Iraq—and indeed, across the Middle East. The Iranian regime remains the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, and there are no indications the regime seeks to abandon its support for extremist actors in Iraq, or elsewhere.

We are not opposed to a wide-ranging dialog with Iran. In fact, the Secretary has stated she would lead such an effort. Our only requirement is that Iran suspend its nuclear enrichment and related efforts, which the international community, IAEA, and U.N. Security Council all fear may be aimed at developing nuclear weapons, during that dialog.

Question. State's Iraq team has been hampered by unfilled vacancies. There has not been a Deputy Assistant Secretary for some months. Where DoD and the military leans forward and provides information for oversight purposes and to inform our opinions, State has taken months to respond to QFRs. When testifying, State officials are not cleared to speak freely on important issues involving judgment and opinions. What can be done to rectify this situation?

Answer. I respectfully disagree that the State Department's Iraq team is hampered by unfilled vacancies. For example, State has filled at present 96 percent of the positions it has in Iraq, with 98 percent of the positions filled for PRTs—all volunteers. In fact, State's job assignment policy in the present assignments cycle was to emphasize filling unaccompanied and limited accompanied posts, including Iraq and Afghanistan, and then turn to assignments to other non-hardship posts overseas. And while we still have some positions to fill for summer 2007, we are well ahead of schedule in making summer 2007 assignments compared to where we were

this time last year. We believe that this policy has been very successful at meeting our staffing goals for Iraq.

Ambassador Lawrence Butler assumed the Deputy Assistant Secretary position this month. In the Department's view, tolerating a vacancy for a limited time in order to assign the best and most qualified person for the job is preferable to simply filling the slot. However, delays in filling key positions are not unprecedented nor are they always unavoidable, particularly given the unique assignment rules of the Foreign Service.

I understand that sometimes our responses to QFRs are not as swift as they should be. On many occasions, the Department must coordinate responses with our embassy and other entities in order to provide Congress with the most accurate account of facts on the ground, which sometimes delays the Department's ability to respond as quickly as it would like. I understand that State has taken internal steps in order to improve its response times.

In the Department's view, our officials do speak their minds and offer their opinions when testifying on the Hill. Most recently, Secretary Rice, as well as the Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq, Ambassador David Satterfield, and Ambassador Khalilzad, provided frank, candid testimony and briefings, and they will continue to do so.

Question. A robust FMS program should be put in place to equip Iraqi forces. This would replace NSPD 36 authorities given to CENTCOM and give full advantage of the services available under FMS and the expertise and capabilities of DoD logistic organizations (and U.S. contractors). Such a change would provide a sound legal framework for the program as well as important Congressional oversight mechanisms. Will State be implementing such a program for Iraq this year? If not, why not? How can the information flow about training and equipping be improved?

Answer. The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is working with the Government of Iraq to move toward a traditional bilateral security assistance relationship. A critical part of this transition is Iraqi participation in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Their participation began in earnest in 2006 when the Iraqis committed over \$2.34 billion of Iraqi national funds to support procurement of equipment for the Iraqi armed forces. As the Iraqi armed forces develop into a professional and modern military, we will consider the appropriate funding and support for its continued long-term development. The State Department fully supports transition of the Government of Iraq to a normalized security assistance relationship when ministerial capacity permits transitioning MNSTC-I responsibilities to an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq.

Question. While United States-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations are ongoing, South Korean officials have not engaged in meaningful negotiations for the full resumption of exporting United States beef products to that country. The major issues to be resolved include: (1) Establishing a tolerance for bone fragments in boneless product; (2) advancing market access for bone-in products; and (3) market access for products from animals regardless of age.

It has been almost a year since the United States and Korean health officials agreed on initial conditions to resume trade. Unless restoration of the beef trade occurs prior to the conclusion of FTA talks, some in the Congress will likely object to a free trade agreement. Many are hoping that resumption of the beef trade is at the forefront of any economic discussion with Korea. What are the prospects for having this problem resolved in a timely way?

Answer. Resumption of normalized trade in United States beef is one of our highest priorities in our economic discussions with Korea. United States beef is safe, and we have made it clear to Korea that while our beef discussions are not technically a part of the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) negotiations, if the beef issue has not been adequately addressed by the time the agreement is considered by Congress, it will be hard to gain sufficient stakeholder and legislative support and could jeopardize the agreement's passage.

USTR and USDA are actively working to find a commercially viable solution to the difficulties our exporters have experienced in trying to get United States beef back in the Korean market. Upcoming technical talks, scheduled for early February, are a positive step toward the normalization of the beef trade with Korea.

Question. During the past 6 years, strongly competing views over North Korea policy within the State Department, and throughout the administration, have contributed to inconsistent actions and mixed messages from United States officials.

As one example, a few days before Assistant Secretary Hill's recent Berlin meeting with North Korean officials, United States administration and other State Department officials were in Paris to discuss proliferation finance with some of our major

allies. On the margins of this meeting, some American officials reportedly raised the prospect of imposing a travel ban on key North Korean leaders, as provided under a United Nations resolution condemning Pyongyang's nuclear test. Please review this report to verify accuracy, determine who was involved, and also, who authorized this issue being raised only a few days before Assistant Secretary Hill was meeting with North Korean leaders?

Separately, State Department officials informed the committee last week that the United States was calling for the suspension of all UNDP programs in North Korea, until an outside audit has been conducted on those programs.

Apparently some in the administration believe that North Korean leaders may be redirecting UNDP funding to other than intended projects, and that the UNDP is not doing enough to account for their funds. Administration officials contend they have to force the issue at this time because the UNDP is in the process of a once-every-3-years review of its programs in North Korea. However, this has reportedly been a matter of long-standing interest to the Department, and a recent letter expressing United States' concern with the UNDP publicly appeared the same week that Mr. Hill was meeting with North Korean officials in Berlin.

Although the President and Secretary Rice have repeatedly affirmed their decision that Assistant Secretary Hill should pursue a negotiated solution with North Korea, actions have been taken that on the surface, appear intended to subvert that process.

What will you do, as Deputy Secretary, to ensure conformity with the President's approach to North Korea on the part of all State Department officials?

Answer. As the President and the Secretary have noted clearly and repeatedly, we seek a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the North Korea nuclear issue, and we believe that the Six-Party Talks are the best vehicle for getting us to such a resolution. At the same time, the President and Secretary Rice have been clear that UNSCR 1718 should be implemented fully and effectively.

Our policy on North Korea involves a dual-track approach in which our efforts at the negotiating table are accompanied and enhanced by defensive measures. These defensive measures, which target the DPRK's proliferation and other illicit activities, are intended, primarily, to defend the United States against the very real threats posed by these activities. Our defensive measures are also intended to make clear to the DPRK the cost of its dangerous and illicit activities in contrast to the benefits it stands to gain through a negotiated end to its nuclear programs.

A dual-track approach, such as the one we have been employing with respect to North Korea, requires the strongest of interagency cooperation and coordination. I intend to ensure that all concerned participants understand and meet the policy goals set by the President and the Secretary.

The Paris meeting appears to be a reference to G-7 meetings the previous week. During a bilateral working-level meeting, United States and French officials discussed developing a common list of individuals for travel ban to submit to the UNSCR 1718 Committee in New York. At that meeting, U.S. officials did not pass any proposed list of names for travel ban under 1718. The United States is not seeking to impose a travel ban on the DPRK's diplomatic officials. United States efforts to implement UNSCR 1718's requirements in reference to travel bans will center on individuals associated with North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and entities previously designated under E.O. 13382.

Regarding UNDP, we welcome UNDP's recent decision to audit its operations in North Korea. Management reform, in particular the establishment of credible and effective systems of internal controls and accountability, is a primary goal of our policy toward the U.N. system. We have repeatedly urged the management of UNDP to improve its internal controls and accountability in development programs worldwide, to include providing greater transparency to member states. We are working with UNDP and executive board members to improve monitoring and management controls to ensure funds for all UNDP programs, not just in the DPRK, are used for their intended purpose.

Question. In view of the recent announcement of a \$10.6 billion supplemental emergency appropriation request for Afghanistan, of which \$2 billion is intended for reconstruction, it is important to understand fully the expectations being set for such a significant request. It is also extremely important that the American people understand why, more than 5 years since our direct engagement following 9/11, the United States is still committed to the purpose of rebuilding the region.

Can you put this supplemental request in context with your efforts to date in Afghanistan and the expectations for our continued engagement there? What are the primary areas of U.S. engagement? What are the expectations of our international partners and the Government of Afghanistan?

Answer. “Rebuilding” is really the wrong word; the right word would be “building.” In 2001, there was no Government of Afghanistan. There were no institutions, and there was no physical infrastructure upon which to build. Our challenge has been helping the Government of Afghanistan to stand up its institutions, build its security forces, and develop the infrastructure it needs to extend its control throughout the country.

Remarkable progress has been achieved in Afghanistan since 2001. For example, 6 million students are now in school, including 2 million girls, and 83 percent of the population has access to healthcare, compared to only 8 percent in 2001. We must now consolidate our gains. Continued security challenges in 2006 demonstrated that the new Afghanistan is still fragile and that the threat of the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other extremist groups has not disappeared. Much more remains to be done to make Afghanistan a stable, democratic, prosperous country that will never again be a safe haven for terrorists. Last year, we conducted a strategic review of our policy which concluded that the international community, including the United States, needs to increase its level of support in the political, economic, and military spheres to defeat the revitalized Taliban insurgency and al-Qaeda terror.

As a result, Secretary Rice announced that the administration will request \$10.6 billion in new assistance over the next 2 years: \$2 billion for reconstruction and \$8.6 billion for the Afghan National Security Forces. This significant funding request comes on top of the over \$14.2 billion the United States has already provided in reconstruction and security assistance since 2001. The new United States commitments—financial, military, and political—do not signal a change in our goals for Afghanistan. Building on the results of our previous efforts they will enable us, through a comprehensive approach, to secure our successes for the long run.

Should Congress appropriate the new funds requested by the President, our primary areas of engagement for stabilizing the country, supporting the economy, and extending the reach of the Afghan Government will be: the Afghan National Security Forces; roads; electric power; rural development; counternarcotics; and governance.

Afghan National Security Forces: In the past 5 years, we have trained and equipped an Afghan National Army which is now about 30,000 strong. We expect the total number of military personnel to eventually reach 70,000. The army has proved its capabilities fighting alongside Operation Enduring Freedom and International Security and Assistance Force troops. The new funding of \$8.6 billion will help us significantly accelerate the military training effort. Police training will also continue to be a priority. Over 49,000 police have been trained and equipped so far by the United States and Germany, expanding toward a ceiling of 82,000. More work remains to be done to improve performance and retention. Developing and sustaining capable Afghan security forces is critical to our success and is essential to eventually relieving the burden on our own forces.

Roads: In the past 5 years, about 75 percent of Afghanistan’s national ring road—1,400 miles long—has been completed by the United States and our allies, and the remainder will be finished by 2010. The United States has also completed over 900 kilometers of secondary and district roads. A United States-constructed two-lane bridge connecting Afghanistan to Tajikistan over the Pyanj River will be completed in 2007. With new funds, we would support further construction on strategic provincial and district secondary roads, particularly in the south and east.

Power: Several multinational projects are underway to build Afghanistan’s hydro and electrical power systems. These include the multidonor Northern Electrical Power System. With new funds, the Northern Electrical Power System is scheduled to be finished in 2009, and is expected to provide Kabul and northern cities with electricity imported from Central Asia. We also intend to push ahead with construction at the Kajaki hydropower dam site and the Southern Electrical Power System to bring more electricity to Kandahar and other areas in the south.

Rural Development: Over the past 5 years, about 5 million boys and girls have returned to school, and hundreds of schools and health clinics have been built or rehabilitated. With new funds, we would invest in rural development through rural roads, credit, improved seeds, basic health services, primary education, irrigation systems, and alternative crops. Continuing efforts to deliver quality basic education would be complemented by programs that will increase the technical and managerial capacity of Afghans in both the public and private sectors.

Counternarcotics: We will expand our efforts to reduce the amount of poppy cultivation and trafficking. After a decrease in poppy cultivation in 2005, Afghanistan produced a record poppy crop in 2006. To fight back, we have started to implement a comprehensive five-pillar strategy that includes: a counternarcotics public information campaign; an alternative livelihoods program; poppy elimination and eradi-

cation efforts coordinated with governors and local officials; law enforcement and interdiction efforts; and reform of the law enforcement and justice systems. This strategy must be pursued rigorously and be given time to work.

Governance: We plan to continue strengthening national, provincial, and local governance through training, construction of district administrative centers, and assistance with drafting and implementing needed commercial and criminal legislation. We intend to work to strengthen the justice sector through training programs for judges and prosecutors, construction of courthouses, and other programs to expand the rule of law.

Our international partners and the Government of Afghanistan expect the United States to lead the way in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The strong, long-term United States commitment that we display is having a significant effect on the morale of our allies and of the Government of Afghanistan. Critical to our efforts, this commitment also creates trust within the Afghan population.

Question. There have been three attempts to rebuild and reform the police sector in Afghanistan. The first was a German program under the multi-pillared international partnership. The second effort, led by State, was designed to train police by the hundreds rather than by the dozens, but was still considered too slow. A third effort by Department of Defense came subsequent to a waiver permitting Department of Defense to run police training as an element of larger security sector reform. This third effort was declared a "failure" by the current commander who revamped it after his arrival early in 2006. The supplemental request of \$8.6 billion contains a sizable sum for security reform: What is the role of the State Department in the latest Department of Defense effort to train police?

Answer. Police training is a coordinated effort with the Department of Defense. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan helps execute police training programs with State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, but all police training efforts fall under the policy guidance and general oversight of the Ambassador.

The senior embassy and military leaders have excellent relations and work together to administer and improve the police program. In fact, contracted Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs trainers and the military often work jointly in the field on police training.

Question. How can we be assured that this effort will meet with greater success than previous programs? Are there unique difficulties to training police in Afghanistan? Do you believe they are finally able to be overcome?

Answer. The program to train and equip the Afghan National Police is generally well-conceived and well-executed, but it is important to recognize that the training is a work in progress. We are building a 62,000-member force and increased Taliban activity in 2006 has made the job even more difficult. Unlike the Afghan army, the police must be dismantled and then rebuilt from the top down in order to extract corrupt leaders and unravel structures based on tribal and ethnic ties, rather than professional criteria. It will take a sustained effort over several years to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program, let alone adequately assess the program.

The interagency security effort has adapted to meet the changing security and relative funding needs to ensure the success of the Afghan security forces. We will further improve that situation with the allocation of \$2.5 billion in new funds for training and equipping the Afghan National Police. This is not just a question of funding training, which remains flat at about \$325 million, but also of ensuring that recruits are equipped with the tools to carry out their mission, which is where the remaining \$2.2 billion in police funds would largely go. Training and equipping efforts augment and enforce each other. Training will not help a recruit who is outmanned, outgunned, and underpaid. We must look comprehensively at all the factors that will lead to success for the Afghan police and move forward on all fronts.

The difficulties establishing the Afghan police are similar to the difficulties in any post-conflict environment with a total breakdown of institutions, law, and economy. We encounter many of the same problems in other countries, such as Haiti, Bosnia, and Iraq: corruption, illiteracy, low pay, and an insecure environment. These difficulties have developed over many years and will require a sustained effort over many years to resolve.

Question. How will this program be monitored? Are there measurements other than number of trainees successfully graduated? Is the professionalism of trainees tracked after they graduate?

Answer. The graduation of trainees is only the first step in the establishment of a professional, competent police force. After that initial training, we use our nearly

400 U.S. police officer mentors on the ground to monitor the police at both the unit and individual level to determine if they are using the skills they have been taught. When deficiencies are found, the mentors act to correct them, whether this means additional training, correcting substandard behavior, or, in extreme situations, changing personnel.

Question. When the NATO International Security Assistance Force assumed control of security throughout Afghanistan they made clear their intent to increase the reconstruction effort as a key to progress.

Is there political support within NATO countries to increase support for reconstruction? What will that mean for NATO forces deployed throughout the country? What percentage of international assistance flowing to Afghanistan is non-United States and what recent new commitments have been made?

Answer. At both the Riga Summit in November 2006 and at the informal NATO Foreign Ministerial in January 2007, NATO International Security Assistance Forces allies reaffirmed their strong commitment to the mission in Afghanistan and to the reconstruction and development of that country. All allies have embraced the concept of a “comprehensive approach,” where security operations are coordinated with reconstruction and development. Due to International Security Assistance Forces allies’ support for this comprehensive approach, NATO forces deployed throughout Afghanistan are encouraged to coordinate with the U.N. and Government of Afghanistan-chaired Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board to ensure that security efforts are followed-up with reconstruction and development initiatives.

Since 2001, the United States has provided over \$14.2 billion in aid: nearly \$9 billion in security assistance and \$5.2 billion in reconstruction, humanitarian, and governance assistance. This is approximately 45 percent of total donor assistance to Afghanistan. With our request for an additional \$10.6 billion for the next 2 years, we will continue to be the largest contributor to infrastructure reconstruction and the development of the Afghan National Security Forces.

At the informal NATO Foreign Ministerial, several allies announced new donor assistance commitments. To provide a few examples: Canada pledged \$8.5 million for victims assistance, and \$10 million for police salaries (Afghanistan is Canada’s No. 1 aid recipient); Norway has pledged to increase its assistance by 50 percent in 2007 (making Afghanistan the No. 2 recipient of Norwegian aid); and the European Union has pledged €150 million annually over the next 5 years.

Question. A significant amount of information from a variety of sources indicates that continued instability in Afghanistan, especially in the south and east, is due to the unconstrained flow of persons and resources across the Afghan-Pakistan border.

How can the State Department and the supplemental appropriation improve the essential Afghan-Pakistan relationship? Are there new efforts to enlist Pakistani help in engaging and capturing the Taliban? Do the Pakistanis themselves have new ideas that should be pursued?

Answer. To meet the challenge of violent extremism, the administration is advancing a three-pronged strategy that leverages political, military, and economic tools. The administration supports the Pakistan Government’s new Frontier Initiative, a developmental, security, and governance strategy to deny safe haven to the Taliban and al-Qaeda along Pakistan’s Afghan border—including in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and parts of Balochistan. The Pakistani Government has already planned and allocated resources to this effort and has asked the United States for additional support for the security, services, and development sectors required to transform this region. Immediate United States technical assistance and training for the Tribal Area Development Authority and the Tribal Areas Secretariat would greatly increase Pakistani capacity to design, plan, manage, and monitor programs in the tribal areas, and would bring immediate benefits in the form of nonterrorist alternatives for employment to the population at risk for recruitment by al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

The State Department is exploring ways to support two initiatives designed to strengthen Pakistan’s capability to eliminate terrorist safe havens and strengthen control of the border with Afghanistan. The first initiative will enhance the capacity of local security forces such as the Frontier Corps, the Frontier Constabulary, and tribal levies. The second initiative, Pakistan’s Sustainable Development Plan for the tribal areas, is a program of economic and social development and governance reform intended to meet the needs of the local population and render them more resistant to the appeal of violent extremists such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Robust support for these two initiatives is expected to improve the security environment in

the frontier areas, whose Pashtun population spans the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and to contribute greatly to creating an environment inhospitable to violent extremism.

The United States has strongly encouraged Pakistan and Afghanistan to strengthen their bilateral relationship. We have actively facilitated cross-border communication through military and civilian channels. Military communications are facilitated through radio communications and face-to-face meetings by tactical commanders along the border, as well as Tripartite Commission (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the International Security Assistance Force/U.S. military) working groups and meetings at both the operational and strategic levels. On the civilian side, we have encouraged Pakistan to host talks on border security management and a conference for civilian law enforcement agencies of both countries. U.S. diplomats are also facilitating initiatives to establish institutionalized parliamentary exchanges and to promote media exchanges.

To facilitate economic development in Afghanistan and the border areas of Pakistan, President Bush announced his intention to seek Congressional approval for the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones program. The Reconstruction Opportunity Zones are a critical economic component of our development strategy and offer a vital opportunity to improve livelihoods, promote good governance, and extend and strengthen the writ of the Afghan and Pakistani Governments. Establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones will help to kick-start industrial production and bring benefits to these targeted economies along with greater cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consultations with Congressional staff and industry as well as the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently on-going and the State Department and United States Trade Representative will present an outline of legislation to Congress soon.

The International Security Assistance Force-led military coalition in Afghanistan works closely with the Pakistani military through the Tripartite Commission. On their side of the border, Pakistani security forces are engaged in denying al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other militants safe haven on Pakistani territory. Raids by Pakistani security forces on hideouts and training areas have disrupted the insurgents' operations, prompting retaliatory strikes that have killed and wounded Pakistani forces, government officials, and civilians. The Government of Pakistan currently maintains more than 900 monitoring posts along the 2,300 km border with Afghanistan. The Pakistani Government recently announced stringent new measures to tighten security along the border. Pakistan has also announced plans to close several lawless refugee camps in the border region, repatriating the residents to Afghanistan.

Question. How has the justice sector been incorporated into a coherent reconstruction and reform plan to improve basic governance across Afghanistan from the ministry to the local police?

Answer. Justice benchmarks were incorporated into the Afghanistan Compact agreed to in London in January 2006. Reforming the justice sector—in the context of competing formal and informal systems, widespread corruption, and an active insurgency—is a formidable challenge. By creating a Rule of Law Coordinator on the U.S. Embassy staff, we plan to intensify and focus our engagement on justice sector issues with Afghan officials and the international community (led by Italy) on meeting these benchmarks.

President Karzai's appointments of an activist Attorney General and a reformist Chief Justice of the Supreme Court offer a window of opportunity for United States and international efforts to bear fruit in improving the delivery of real justice to the Afghan people.

Our ongoing commitment to support justice, governance, and the rule of law in Afghanistan is reflected by the \$2 billion administration request in new assistance announced January 26. Those funds will help strengthen governance at all levels (national, provincial, and local) through a comprehensive and coordinated web of U.S.-supported programs. Some examples include construction of district administrative centers, assistance with drafting and implementing commercial and criminal legislation, training and mentoring of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, police-prosecutor training programs, nationwide corrections training and infrastructure support, and other programs to expand the rule of law. Provincial reconstruction teams will provide training, infrastructure, and equipment required to improve provincial and district governance. Parliamentarians will be trained in legislative research, drafting, and constituent outreach. Civil society groups, including the media, will receive training and other support.

Police training is a coordinated effort with the Department of Defense, so there are no separate efforts. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan helps execute police training programs with the Department of State's Bureau of Inter-

national Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, but all police training efforts fall under the policy guidance and general oversight of the ambassador. Senior embassy and U.S. military leaders work together to administer and improve the police program and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs-contracted trainers and the military often work jointly in the field on police training.

The interagency effort has been underfunded relative to the challenge. The allocation of \$2.5 billion in new funds for training and equipping the Afghan National Police will improve the situation. This is not just a question of funding training, which remains flat at about \$325 million. The remaining \$2.2 billion in police funds would largely ensure that recruits are equipped with the tools to carry out their mission. Training and equipping efforts augment and enforce each other. Training will not help a recruit who is outmanned, outgunned, and underpaid. We must look comprehensively at all the factors that will lead to success for the Afghan police and move forward on all fronts.

Question. The United States has provided significant resources to Pakistan as a partner in countering terrorism. This assistance has included economic, development, and security assistance. The embassy is a hardship post and under great pressure from a security standpoint, as seen on Friday by the terror bomb attack at a hotel in Islamabad and the rough treatment of a New York Times reporter in the Frontier Territories.

Due to the high level of security for United States officials and the necessity for extreme care in the conduct of business, what measures is State taking to ensure that such a significant level of assistance to Pakistan is being effectively managed and monitored? How is the impact of this assistance being measured given limited access to parts of the country where it is being carried out?

Answer. Embassy officials take exceptionally strict security measures in Pakistan, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas; they are able to access most, but not all, projects and sites. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement's Narcotics Affairs Section programs are regularly visited and monitored in the border areas by the Narcotics Affairs Section team, which includes Foreign Service officers, Foreign Service nationals, as well as international and domestic contractors. Ambassador Crocker and Assistant Secretary Patterson have also visited border outposts.

Projects monitored directly by the section team include road construction projects and the construction of border outposts. Embassy officials have not been able to monitor programs firsthand in North and South Waziristan and parts of Khyber Agency in the tribal areas, but have established reliable alternate verification procedures to continue a limited number of programs. Narcotics Affairs Section programs, for example, are very successful in the tribal areas.

In addition to programmatic visits to the tribal areas and Balochistan, there is a Narcotics Affairs Section team dedicated to monitoring the use of the millions of dollars of commodities provided to Pakistani agencies. The agencies have been grateful for these commodities and are meticulous in monitoring their use. Each agency provides quarterly reports that list the condition of each set of night-vision goggles, Motorola radios, and vehicles, and also provides specific examples where this equipment was used. For example, the night vision goggles have been used in investigating drug syndicates and tracking Taliban fighters in the tribal areas. Through interagency ground monitoring and aerial surveys, Pakistan and the United States Government confirmed that Pakistan's poppy cultivation levels continue to decline. It is expected that Pakistan will achieve poppy-free status in the next few years.

Agreements applicable to the transfer or sale of defense articles to Pakistan allow for United States officials to access such articles whereby the officials may check both inventory controls and technical security measures. Despite the difficult security environment, the embassy's Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan is able to monitor the use and storage of all such defense articles transferred to Pakistan. The Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan also monitors and validates expenses reimbursed by Coalition Support Funds.

With respect to economic and development assistance, the USAID mission employs a variety of approaches to ensure accountability. USAID works closely with approximately 40 partner organizations that have direct responsibility for implementing USAID-funded programs in the field, including regular office visits and periodic site visits. While security constraints are sometimes formidable, United States and local staff can travel to many parts of Pakistan where activities are underway. Access is most limited in parts of Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan. To a large extent, the monitoring of projects in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is done with the help of

USAID's Pakistani counterparts. In contrast, access is very good across the entire earthquake-affected region, where USAID makes frequent helicopter visits even to the most remote construction sites.

As is typically the case at USAID missions across the world, monitoring and evaluation concerns are addressed through a variety of mechanisms, including annual reports to Washington, periodic (usually quarterly) contractor and grantee reports, and site visits. A highly skilled national staff makes an important contribution toward managing and monitoring programs in the field. USAID's staff of 10 Foreign Service officers and 5 other long-term American employees is occasionally supplemented by short-term expatriate staff. At least one-third of the long-term United States staff presently stationed in Islamabad speak Urdu, providing an important level of knowledge and understanding of the local situation.

Disbursement of annual budget support (2005–2009) is guided by the Shared Objectives, a set of goals mutually agreed between Pakistan and the United States, focusing on Growth and Macroeconomic Stability, Investing in Human Capital and Private Sector Development, and Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction (including ensuring transparency of funding). Providing Pakistan with balance of payments, budget, and policy reform support has been critical to Pakistan's stability in a time of increasing demands on Pakistan for cooperation in the war on terror and in support of coalition activity in Afghanistan. Pakistan provides the United States embassy a summary of the relevant portions of its current overall budget for the fiscal year, and states how its spending will be modified with the addition of the Pakistani rupee equivalent of \$200 million. USAID in Pakistan monitors these funds at the national budget level to help verify United States Government contributions are used in accordance with the contract agreements. The United States Government meets annually with the Pakistani Ministry of Finance to review Pakistan's progress on the Shared Objectives.

Question. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, is a 5-year program that faces reauthorization next year. What is your assessment of the program's successes and challenges thus far? How is the administration working with other governments and multilateral efforts to maximize our ability to fight the AIDS pandemic?

Answer. The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (Emergency Plan/PEPFAR) is a \$15 billion, multifaceted initiative to combat HIV/AIDS around the world. Established in 2003, PEPFAR is the largest commitment ever by any nation towards an international health initiative dedicated to a single disease.

The emergency plan's 5-year global strategy focuses on implementing bilateral programs in 15 of the most affected countries (Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Viet Nam, and Zambia), which together comprise 50 percent of the global pandemic. PEPFAR also consolidates and coordinates initiatives in more than 100 countries where the United States has bilateral programs, and amplifies the effects of other global interventions by partnering with and contributing to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund). Additional international partners include the World Bank, the United Nations Joint Program on HIV/AIDS (JUNAIDS), other national governments, and a growing number of businesses and foundations in the private sector.

All U.S. Government bilateral HIV/AIDS programs therefore are developed and implemented within the context of multisectoral national HIV/AIDS strategies, under the host country's national authority. Programming is designed to reflect the comparative advantage of the United States Government within the host government national strategy, and it also leverages other resources, including both other international partner and private sector resources. For example, given the magnitude of the United States Government investment in the Global Fund (in the first 3 years of PEPFAR, the United States contributed \$1.9 billion to the Global Fund or approximately 30 percent of all Global Fund resources) and the commitment of the United States Government to working collaboratively with other international partners and multilateral institutions, bilateral programs provide support to Global Fund grantees; help to leverage Global Fund resources, when necessary; and bring successful programs to scale.

Recognizing that country ownership is key, PEPFAR works closely with host governments, program partners, and people living with HIV/AIDS in the local communities, to implement evidence-based HIV interventions that meet locally identified needs and conform to each country's national priorities. PEPFAR also focuses upon the needs of women and families, including orphans and vulnerable children. Through an expanding network of integrated, multisectoral programs, the emergency plan has positioned itself to reach its goals of supporting treatment for 2 mil-

lion HIV-positive people, preventing 7 million new infections, and supporting care for 10 million people living with and affected by HIV/AIDS.

When President Bush unveiled the emergency plan in 2003, only an estimated 50,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa were receiving treatment for HIV/AIDS. Through September 2006, 822,000 people in PEPFAR's 15 focus countries were receiving treatment supported by United States Government bilateral programs.

Treatment services are being scaled up at a carefully monitored but rapid rate. In 2006, across PEPFAR's 15 focus countries, on average 93 new antiretroviral therapy (ART) sites came online and the number of sites providing treatment has increased from 800 in fiscal year 2005 to 1,912 in fiscal year 2006. By the end of fiscal year 2006, 50,000 more people were put on life-saving ART every month. In order to ensure that treatment is being provided for children and women, PEPFAR tracks ART clients by age and gender. These records indicate that approximately 61 percent of those receiving PEPFAR-supported treatment in fiscal year 2006 were women and almost 9 percent were children.

Through fiscal year 2006, PEPFAR provided care for nearly 4.5 million HIV-positive people around the world, including approximately 2 million HIV orphans and vulnerable children. This is a good start—but countless more HIV-positive people are not receiving the treatment and care they need, in part because they do not know they are HIV-positive. One major barrier to identifying HIV status is the absence of routine testing in medical settings; to address this problem, PEPFAR supports provider-initiated “opt-out” testing in selected health care settings. In pilot studies, implementing the opt-out policy raised HIV testing rates dramatically.

HIV/AIDS also places a growing strain on already stressed health care systems and workers in PEPFAR countries where systemic weaknesses in areas such as health networks and infrastructure are persistent obstacles to building human resource capacity and expanding health systems. In response, in fiscal year 2006, at least 25 percent of PEPFAR's total resources were devoted to capacity-building in the public and private health sectors—such as supporting physical infrastructure, healthcare systems, and workforce development. Eighty-three percent of PEPFAR partners were indigenous organizations, and the emergency plan supported training or retraining for more than 842,600 service providers (with individuals being trained in multiple areas in certain cases) and supported approximately 25,100 service sites in the focus countries.

Moreover, the emergency plan and its host country partners support national strategies with innovative approaches to training and retention; broadening of policies to allow for task-shifting from physicians and nurses to clinical officers, health extension workers, and community health workers; and the use of volunteers and twinning relationships to rapidly expand the number of local service providers required to respond to this disease. This focus on strengthening networks provides a base from which to build institutional and human resource capacity, in order to rapidly expand prevention, treatment, and care services.

In order for comprehensive HIV/AIDS programs to be sustained, a continuous inflow of high-quality medicines and supplies is needed. In concert with in-country partners, the United States Government is supporting host nations' efforts to build the necessary supply chain systems. In 2005, the emergency plan partnered with leaders in the international supply chain management field, including four African organizations, to establish PEPFAR's Supply Chain Management System (SCMS). The mission of SCMS is to strengthen supply chain systems to deliver an uninterrupted supply of high-quality, low-cost drugs, lab equipment, testing kits, and other essential medical materials that will flow through a transparent and accountable system.

While PEPFAR's focus is and will remain HIV/AIDS, program implementers coordinate with a number of international partners with related global health programs, including global TB and malaria initiatives. In addition, PEPFAR's capacity-building initiatives have positive spillover effects: Upgrading health systems and strengthening the health workforce serve to improve healthcare delivery overall. In addition to strengthening infrastructure, expanding health services, and stimulating economic growth, such improvements also enable developing countries to cultivate good governance and build freer and more stable societies. It is a mistake to think of HIV/AIDS in terms of health alone. It is among the most serious economic development and security threats of our time—precisely why the President and PEPFAR host nations have made addressing it such a high priority.

Question. In September 2005, President Bush announced the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, and the Department of State has hosted international conferences with representatives of foreign governments on avian flu. Can you please tell us about the latest activities of the international partnership?

How many countries have joined this initiative? In addition, how much money has the United States pledged to combat avian flu and prepare for a possible pandemic? On what programs is this money being spent?

Answer. The International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza met in Washington, DC, on October 6–7, 2005, and again in Vienna, Austria, on June 6–7, 2006. Representatives from 93 country delegations, 20 international organizations, and some nongovernmental organizations attended the Vienna meeting. The Government of India will host the next meeting of the international partnership in the last quarter of 2007.

President Bush's initiative, which emphasizes core principles such as transparency and sharing of flu samples, has served to raise high-level political awareness, to galvanize nations both to combat the spread of avian influenza and to prepare for a possible human pandemic, and to help coordinate donor spending plans.

At international pledging conferences in Beijing, China (January 2006) and Bamako, Mali (December 2006), the United States Government led all bilateral donors with pledges totaling \$434 million in international assistance for avian and pandemic influenza. Funds pledged by the United States are going to a variety of activities to prevent and respond to avian and pandemic influenza threats, including the following:

- Nearly \$138 million for bilateral assistance activities;
- Almost \$64.5 million for regional programs including regional disease detection sites;
- Close to \$44.5 million for support to international organizations;
- \$66.6 million for stockpiles of non-pharmaceutical supplies;
- More than \$40 million for international technical and humanitarian assistance and international coordination;
- Over \$9 million for wild bird surveillance and international research (including vaccines and modeling of influenza outbreaks);
- \$8.6 million for global communications and outreach;
- \$5.7 million for global contingencies, including emergency response; and
- \$10 million for building vaccine production capacity.

The collective efforts of the U.S. Government, foreign governments, and international organizations have reaped results. For example, the United States has helped train 15,000 animal health workers, 3,000 human health workers, and nearly 500 veterinarians in outbreak response. These workers will strengthen the emergency response capabilities of many nations and will enable the world to have better information on animal outbreaks and an actual pandemic, should it occur.

Question. The wars in Afghanistan and especially Iraq have diverted State Department and USAID resources and personnel from the rest of the world. Does the Department have a means of measuring the impact of what is being called in the Foreign Service “the Iraq tax?” Is it having a negative effect on the Secretary's “transformational diplomacy” initiative? Is this a problem that you see as one of your responsibilities to address?

Answer. To meet our staffing needs in Iraq, the Department used many positions originally intended to fund language proficiency training as part of our Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. These positions would have created a “training float” to allow for long-term training, without creating staffing gaps overseas. Our fiscal year 2008 budget submission includes 104 positions to help close the training gap due to positions that were diverted to Iraq. In addition, in order to fully staff the positions in Iraq, we have removed some lower priority positions from the bid list. Approximately 140 domestic and overseas positions were affected in the current assignments cycle.

While some lower-priority positions have not been filled and some training has been deferred, our efforts to shift internal resources and positions to quickly ramp up our operations in Iraq have not had a negative impact on the Secretary's Transformational Diplomacy Initiative and the related global repositioning of State Department personnel. As Deputy Secretary, I would certainly take an active interest in strategic decisions related to the positioning of State Department personnel, be it to support our goals in Iraq or Afghanistan or to implement the Secretary's vision of transformational diplomacy.

Question. The current Foreign Service compensation system provides mid- and entry-level officers stationed in the United States with annual “locality pay” increases that are not given to similarly-ranked officers stationed abroad. Over the years, this has had the unintended consequence of compensating officers at a higher salary when they are stationed in the United States than when they are stationed overseas. Before the 109th Congress adjourned, a bill that addressed this inequity

and, at the same time, instituted a pay for performance system in the Foreign Service, was in the process of final completion. What will be the Department's view on that bill? Will it press for passage in the new Congress?

Answer. Foreign Service modernization for the nonsenior ranks continues to be a top legislative priority in the management area. We look forward to continuing discussions this year with Congress, OMB, the other Foreign Affairs agencies and our colleagues at the American Foreign Service Association to amend the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and modernize the Foreign Service pay system.

The purpose of Foreign Service modernization is to close the overseas pay gap for FS-01s and below and bring all Foreign Service members under a pay-for-performance system similar to the one that exists for the Senior Foreign Service. A crucial component of a pay-for-performance system for personnel who are recruited in one central location and who rotate frequently between overseas and domestic locations is a worldwide pay scale ensuring that performance overseas is not valued less than in Washington. The 18.6 percent difference in base salary when serving abroad undercuts post differentials and allowances, especially those for hardship and danger, and remains a significant financial deterrent to service overseas.

Foreign Service modernization would cover all foreign affairs agencies that are governed by the Foreign Service Act, including Agriculture, Commerce, AID, Peace Corps, BBG, and State. Other agencies that regularly send employees overseas for extended missions, such as the CIA and the Department of Defense, have already dealt with the locality pay disparity and do not face the same pay gap for overseas service. The CIA pays equal overseas and domestic base salaries, and the military never used locality pay at all, awarding their members the full annual pay adjustment without a portion being devoted to locality pay. As we ask our employees to take on more challenging and dangerous assignments overseas, the Department needs Foreign Service modernization to effectively compete with other Government agencies and the private sector and to fully compensate our employees for their service abroad.

Question. We understand that over a million dollars has been collected privately in response to the State Department's request for financial assistance to create a diplomacy center including a museum of the history of American diplomacy. Can you tell us what progress is being made on this project? What is your view of the effort?

Answer. We acknowledge your long-standing support for a U.S. Diplomacy Center (USDC) and museum, one that will be devoted not only to the history of U.S. diplomacy, but also to the immense contributions that current diplomacy makes to our security, prosperity, and freedom.

FUNDRAISING

The Department of State's non-profit partner for the U.S. Diplomacy Center, the Foreign Affairs Museum Council (FAMC), has raised over \$1.3 million toward the museum. Senator Mathias is the chairman and Ambassador Steve Low is President.

SUPPORT

All major Foreign Service organizations including the Council of American Ambassadors and American Foreign Service Association have signed a letter of support.

PROGRESS ON THE MUSEUM

In late 2005, a design team was selected through GSA's Design Excellence program to work with the Department. Throughout 2006, the design team worked to develop a concept plan which was presented to Secretary Rice last September. The next step is to begin a capital campaign.

I share Secretary Rice's enthusiasm for what she termed a "smart" project for the Department.

Question. On January 11, President Bush signed legislation containing provisions that Senator Obama and I authored relating to proliferation interdiction assistance and the safeguarding or elimination of dangerous stockpiles of conventional arms.

Will you work to ensure that funding, consistent planning, and effective implementation are provided to carry out these provisions of Public Law 109-472, the State Department Authorities Act of 2006?

Answer. Yes. The State Department appreciated the cooperative efforts of the Foreign Relations Committee to develop this legislation and take our concerns into account. The new law will support our efforts to develop international cooperation to detect and interdict WMD-related shipments through the Proliferation Security Ini-

tiative (PSI) and other means. Coordinating the variety of U.S. technical assistance programs that help international partners develop relevant interdiction capabilities will be an important aspect of our international capacity building.

The aspects of the bill relating to the elimination of dangerous stockpiles of conventional weapons will advance the Department's efforts in support of humanitarian demining, unexploded ordnance clearance, removal of abandoned weapons, and destruction of excess and obsolete munitions, small arms, and light weapons.

The Department looks forward to cooperating with the committee on these important issues.

Question. Do you believe that all present U.S. interdiction efforts, including through the Proliferation Security Initiative, are effectively coordinated within the interagency? Do our interdiction partners have the necessary equipment and training or access to U.S. assistance to effectively carry out interdiction activities?

Answer. The PSI has been an important organizing principle, not only for the United States, but also for our international partners. All PSI activities are conducted via an extensive interagency coordination process under the overall direction of a policy coordination committee chaired by National Security Council (NSC) staff, with clearly defined strategy documents that describe agency roles, responsibilities, and common goals.

The Department of State is responsible for conducting diplomatic activities relating to the PSI, including interfacing with foreign governments as appropriate to undertake an interdiction. The Department of Defense is responsible for developing operational capacity among PSI states and undertaking interdictions that involve military assets. Interagency communications are well established and continuous. The agencies involved include the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Treasury, Commerce, and Justice, multiple components of the Department of Homeland Security, and the Intelligence community. Such broad interagency cooperation allows the United States to leverage the capabilities and resources of these agencies effectively.

Capacity building and assisting states in developing the political will, legal basis, and capability to undertake interdiction and prevention actions is a key goal of the PSI. The Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program is an important tool in assisting governments to develop capacity to undertake a PSI interdiction. EXBS funds U.S. efforts to work with states to strengthen export controls, improve legal and regulatory frameworks and licensing processes, develop border control and investigative capabilities, improve outreach to industry, and enhance interagency coordination.

In addition, the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) coordinates the U.S. Government response to nuclear smuggling events worldwide and addresses priority antinuclear smuggling needs through a combination of international and U.S. financing and assistance programs, including proliferation detection and interdiction activities.

Question. I sent a number of our staff to some 20 embassies to look at the coordination between the State and Defense Departments in the campaign against terror and report back to me their observations and recommendations. One of the recommendations is that the Secretaries of State and Defense sign a global memorandum of understanding that makes explicit the role of the ambassador in overseeing military activities in-country. Is this something that you agree should be pursued?

Answer. I have reviewed your staff's report and found it quite useful. The report highlights a number of very important issues regarding our embassies' operations and the relationship between the State Department and the Defense Department overseas. I agree with the report's emphasis on the need for ambassadors to exercise strong leadership and oversight of all activities in their country that fall under chief of mission authority.

Our ambassadors overseas generally have a very good working relationship with the combatant commanders in their area in dealing with these issues as they arise. As Deputy Secretary of State, I will support efforts to ensure that chiefs of mission and combatant commanders work effectively together.

As I understand it, the possibility of developing a global MOU between State and Defense to cover in-country military activities has been under consideration but no decisions have yet been made on this issue. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I plan to examine this issue in greater detail. But, in the first instance, I will place emphasis on the importance of chiefs of mission fully exercising their authorities and oversight responsibilities.

Question. Last year, this committee approved the nomination of Ambassador Randall Tobias to be the Administrator of USAID and to serve simultaneously as the

first Director of Foreign Assistance, a newly created position within the Department of State. In this capacity, Ambassador Tobias is charged with managing and coordinating U.S. foreign assistance programs. What is your assessment of the progress of the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance in achieving these objectives? Are further adjustments needed? Will Secretary Rice continue to make this a priority for the Department, as part of her “transformational diplomacy” strategy?

Answer. The Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance is making good progress. In the time since it was stood up, the office has launched fiscal year 2007 operational planning, a fiscal year 2007 supplemental, and has prepared the fiscal year 2008 budget. The fiscal year 2008 budget is transparent, accountable, and justified. I believe that the Secretary will continue to make this a priority for the Department as a part of “transformational diplomacy.” To ensure transformational diplomacy objectives are met, it is essential that we ensure that foreign assistance is used as effectively as possible to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states. If confirmed, one of my priorities will be to become more familiar with the activities of the Director of Foreign Assistance, so as to better enable me to personally evaluate the effectiveness of this new office.

Question. I have opposed the granting of authority to the Department of Defense to organize and implement its own foreign assistance programs. Nonetheless, the Department of Defense has received authority from Congress to pursue its section 1206 train and equip program, albeit with the “concurrence” of the Secretary of State. Do you agree that it is preferable that the Secretary of State maintain primacy in all foreign assistance programs, even in cases where Department of Defense funding is involved?

Answer. The State Department appreciates the need for select new DoD authorities as an essential means of addressing rapidly evolving security challenges posed by, among other things, the global war on terror. This is particularly true in environments where U.S. forces are present. The Secretary has expressed support for such authorities in many cases, contingent upon the explicit preservation of her statutory role with respect to foreign assistance, through DoD’s exercise of these authorities “with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,” and in some cases through joint development procedures. In sum, any new authorities should be tailored toward the common goal of providing for closer integration of the administration’s foreign assistance efforts, consistent with the Secretary’s responsibility for the overall supervision and general direction of U.S. foreign assistance.

Question. With the Director of Foreign Assistance, Randy Tobias, reporting directly to the Secretary, what role will you play in foreign assistance planning in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. The Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, who serves concurrently as Administrator of USAID, has authority over all Department of State and USAID foreign assistance funding and programs in all countries and is charged with developing a coordinated U.S. Government foreign assistance strategy and directing consolidated foreign assistance policy, planning, budget, and implementation mechanisms. The consolidation of these foreign assistance authorities under a single umbrella has heightened accountability and the alignment of activities within countries and across regions, and will ultimately make us better stewards of public resources.

If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I will have the opportunity to work closely with Ambassador Tobias. I am impressed with the work that Ambassador Tobias has done with the fiscal year 2008 budget, and, if confirmed, I do look forward to our close collaboration.

Question. Last fall, Secretary Rice created the new position of International Energy Coordinator at the State Department. It is an action similar to that which Senator Biden and I are calling for in legislation, specifically in the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act.

What authorities in the budget have been given to the new Energy Coordinator? The Energy Coordinator has been placed below the Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, yet energy and environmental programs are also undertaken through the Under Secretaries for Political Affairs, Democracy and Global Affairs, and Arms Control and International Security. Do you believe that placement of the coordinator within EB is sufficient for formulating policy and effectively coordinating the programs spread among the jurisdiction of these four Under Secretaries?

Does the Department support passage of the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act? If not, why not?

Answer. The creation of the position of Special Advisor to the Secretary and International Energy Coordinator did not impact the structure of reporting responsibilities of offices in the Department involved in energy policy, and required no new authorities. Resources for the Special Advisor to the Secretary and International Energy Coordinator are provided by the office of the Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs.

The coordinator reports to the Secretary through the Under Secretary for Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs, who is the senior State Department official responsible for energy issues. The placement of the position is not within EB (now EEB—Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs). The coordinator provides strategic oversight, develops new policy approaches and initiatives, and integrates energy issues into the decision making process at senior levels of the Department. Toward that end, the coordinator works closely with the Department's regional and functional bureaus, and with the offices of the other Under Secretaries, to address the multitude of foreign policy-related energy challenges we face.

The administration shares your concerns over energy security and also recognizes it to be a priority for U.S. diplomacy and national security. The Department appreciates Congressional input into this critical area of foreign policy, and we want to continue to work with you to accomplish this goal. Though the administration does not yet have a formal position on the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act, we note that it lays out thoughtful and useful ideas on how to bolster energy security, and the Department is already pursuing many of these. In addition to the creation of the position of Special Advisor to the Secretary and International Energy Coordinator, through the Department's efforts the International Energy Agency has provided China and India access to its meetings to expose them to greater market-based energy security mechanisms. The Department has chosen to combat the recent wave of resource nationalism in the Western Hemisphere indirectly by supporting, inter alia, Mexico's Mesoamerica energy initiative, which seeks to harmonize Central American electricity grids and promote regional economic and energy integration. The Department has also increased its public diplomacy efforts in the region.

Question. What are the State Department's priorities for international energy activities? Are those priorities shared throughout the Department? How do they differ from priorities pursued by other agencies in the Federal Government?

Answer. State's energy priorities rest on three pillars designed to further the President's energy agenda: (1) Increase and diversify production, sources, types, and security of energy supply and infrastructure; (2) manage energy demand growth; and (3) accelerate the development and deployment of energy technology. Our approach focuses U.S. Government resources, leverages—wherever possible—the capital and management talent of the private sector, and targets those geo-strategic opportunities that will yield the greatest benefit. We are engaged in regional efforts to increase cooperation on biofuels production and technology in Latin America, Europe, and Asia. We continue to diversify and increase global oil and natural gas supplies in West Africa, North America, and the Caspian. We are pursuing an ambitious United States-European Union agenda to accelerate the development and deployment of alternative energy technology across the Atlantic and into the developing world. We continue to engage bilaterally and multilaterally with China and India to improve their energy efficiency, accelerate their adoption of renewable energy technology, and expand their use of civilian nuclear power. We also continue to make progress through the International Energy Agency (IEA) toward a cooperative relationship with China on emergency response and market-based energy strategies. In addition, we have planned nearly 100 collaborative activities with China, India, Japan, Korea, and Australia through the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate.

Our efforts are coordinated within the Department, and we work closely with other agencies, especially the Department of Energy, on these initiatives. Our energy priorities are coordinated with and consistent with those of other agencies. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I will ensure that this remains the case and devote further senior-level attention to international energy issues.

Question. Do you believe that current global energy trends pose a threat to U.S. national security? If so, do you believe that current U.S. programs are sufficient to meet that threat? As Deputy Secretary, what would you do to enhance programs related to energy security?

Answer. From 2003 to 2006, we witnessed unprecedented growth in world demand for oil, which, coupled with a lack of world excess production capacity, resulted in an increase in the world price of oil over the same period. We are starting to see

some relief given demand growth levels in the OECD. However, high revenues associated with high prices have emboldened some producing countries to pursue foreign policies that conflict with our national security interests. The physical security of critical energy infrastructures is also of concern.

I do believe that current U.S. programs are sufficient to meet these concerns. The Secretary has taken important steps to increase the Department's focus on energy policy and capacity to address energy security concerns. Last October, the Secretary established a new position of International Energy Coordinator and Special Advisor to the Secretary, reporting through the Under Secretary for Economics, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs. The coordinator is working to provide strategic oversight, to develop and promote new policy approaches and initiatives, and to better integrate energy policy considerations at the highest levels of Department decision-making. He is working closely with the Department's regional and functional bureaus and other agencies involved with energy policy. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I would maintain the Secretary's emphasis on this issue and seek further initiatives to enhance the security of supply as well as the investment climate and transparency of oil producers.

Question. Do you believe the prospect of global climate change poses a threat to U.S. national security? If so, do you believe that current U.S. programs are sufficient to meet the threat? As Deputy Secretary, what would you do to enhance programs related to climate change?

Answer. I believe it is critical that our efforts to address climate change are undertaken in the context of overall national interests, including promoting economic growth and increasing energy security, as well as reducing pollution and providing access to energy. These objectives affect the security of our people and all nations.

The United States has a comprehensive set of policies and programs in place that generate tangible results in both the short and the long term to address climate change at home and abroad, and the United States is collaborating with countries around the world in that effort. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I would work to strengthen that cooperation.

A core element of President Bush's international engagement on climate has been an emphasis on the creation and commercialization of transformational technologies that will help countries address climate change while maintaining economic growth. An example of this is our Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). APP is one of our most important programs because it generates results where they matter most—in the countries that are the world's major emitters of greenhouse gases. In each APP country, governments and the private sector have forged partnerships to develop and deploy clean, efficient energy technologies.

The APP is just one of the many international partnerships that the United States has initiated since 2002 to promote development and deployment of new, cleaner technologies. They include partnerships to collect and reuse methane—a powerful greenhouse gas; to capture and safely store carbon dioxide; to develop and deploy clean, safe nuclear energy technologies; and to develop cost-effective hydrogen and fuel cell technologies.

In addition, we have launched 15 bilateral climate change partnerships with countries and regional organizations that, together with us, represent over 80 percent of the world's emissions.

The United States is also addressing climate change at home. In 2002, the President set an ambitious goal to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy by 18 percent by 2012. We have a diverse portfolio of policy measures—and results to show for them. Our emissions performance since 2001 has been among the best in the OECD.

Question. Please describe the division of responsibility between the Departments of State and Energy in formulating and implementing international energy policy. How does the need to reduce our dependence on foreign oil for national security reasons get factored into interagency discussions on energy? Should the role of the State Department in interagency discussions be strengthened?

Answer. The Department of State is responsible for the foreign policy aspects of U.S. energy security. Energy security is inextricably linked to foreign policy and State ensures that these aspects are fully reflected in the policy making process and in our overseas diplomacy. State cooperates very closely in this with the Department of Energy, which brings great technical resources and expertise to help formulate and implement international energy policy, as well as with other agencies on related issues of climate change and sustainable development. State is the face of energy policy interaction with the governments of most countries through U.S. embassies around the world. The Department of Energy works with State in representing

United States positions in multilateral bodies including the International Energy Agency, Asia Pacific Economic Community, Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate, and the International Energy Forum, among others.

Interagency discussions of ways to reduce domestic U.S. dependence on foreign oil include scientific research and technical and regulatory issues, which are largely the purview of the Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture, and a number of other domestic agencies. The Department of State provides guidance on the international aspects of these discussions. The impact of oil imports on U.S. national security also depends significantly on reducing oil dependence in other major oil consuming countries, as well as on cooperative relations with major oil producing countries. These international relationships are areas of State lead in close cooperation with the Department of Energy and others.

Question. Do you believe that all present U.S. international energy and environment efforts are effectively coordinated within the Department of State?

Answer. Yes. Energy and environmental policies and programs are largely managed by the Bureaus of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs (EEB) and Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs with support from the Department's Special Advisor to the Secretary and International Energy Coordinator. These actors work together closely, permitting the Department to carry out a wide array of activities designed to fuel the engine for global development and prosperity that is the U.S. economy, while at the same time promoting environmental protection and the sustainable use of the world's natural resources.

Question. Do you believe that all present U.S. international energy and environment efforts are effectively coordinated within the interagency?

Answer. The interagency community is working more closely together than ever in executing the President's energy and environmental policies and programs. From the working level to the most senior decision makers, representatives of the Departments of State, Energy, Treasury, Defense, Transportation, Commerce, Agriculture as well as the EPA, USAID, NSC, CIA, Council for Environmental Quality and other agencies meet and communicate regularly to coordinate their efforts in addressing complex international energy and environmental issues.

Question. Will the President's call in his State of the Union speech for the creation of a civilian response corps be reflected in the President's budget for the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department?

Answer. We are requesting 57 positions in the fiscal year 2008 budget for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to help regularize current temporary, detailed, and contracted staff, and to augment them. This is critical to improve State's civilian surge capacity.

In the State of the Union, the President also called for the development of a Civilian Reserve Corps. The corps would provide the country with a vital resource—trained civilian experts with skills the U.S. Government does not currently have in adequate numbers for reconstruction and stabilization efforts, such as police trainers, prosecutors, economists, health practitioners, and urban planners—and in a way that is more cost-effective and flexible than bringing on full-time government employees. How this corps would be designed, established, and funded needs to be determined, following close consultation with Congress and with key interagency partners.

Question. The President did not mention the State Department's lead role in this effort (the civilian reserve corps)—are alternatives being considered?

Answer. We believe that it is key for the State Department to have the lead role in developing this effort, which would follow the December 2005 Presidential Directive empowering the Secretary of State to improve U.S. Government preparation of, planning for, and conduct of post-conflict operations. The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has made progress strengthening civilian response capacity, including laying the groundwork for a civilian reserve. That said, the administration would like to consult closely with Congress on this issue, and welcomes your ideas on how to most effectively move this initiative forward.

Question. Describe the diplomatic efforts taken by the United States to prevent an escalation of tension between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq over Kirkuk and the PKK. Has the United States made any inquiries or statements to Turkey about these issues? What role is General Ralston playing? How is this being coordinated? Is he reporting through the ambassador, or through the CENTCOM Commander?

Answer. General (Ret.) Joseph Ralston, appointed as the Secretary of State's Special Envoy for Countering the PKK last August, is leading the State Department's diplomatic efforts to fight the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The General is working closely with his Turkish counterpart, General Baser, and Iraqi counterpart, Minister al-Waeli. Since his appointment as Special Envoy, General Ralston has traveled repeatedly to the region and has engaged productively with both sides.

General Ralston reports directly to Secretary Rice, but he has also coordinated each step of the initiative with officials at the Department of Defense, National Security Council, and other Washington agencies, as well as our embassies in Baghdad and Ankara. He has kept in close touch with both the U.S. European and Central Commands.

General Ralston has engaged the Turkish and Iraqi Governments as well as officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government. His conversations have focused on building confidence between Turkey and Iraq and obtaining cooperation to fight against the PKK, which is using northern Iraq as a base of operations for attacks against Turkey. He has not addressed the status of Kirkuk in his conversations. The status of Kirkuk is an issue for the sovereign Government of Iraq, and the process for resolving the status of Kirkuk is codified in the Iraqi Constitution. That being said, we support all efforts that will lead to a peaceful resolution of Kirkuk's future.

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Your response to my question on how long the surge will need to be sustained included an assertion made by President Bush that the Iraqi Government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November of this year. This runs contrary to an assessment of the intelligence community, which stated: "Iraqi society's growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides' ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006."

In light of the NIE, how long do you estimate that surge level reinforcements are going to be needed in Iraq? How does this affect your civilian manning estimates?

Answer. There are four major factors that the Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)—Iraqi Joint Committee for Transfer of Security Responsibility (JCTSR) takes into consideration when recommending whether or not a province/city transfers to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)—the security situation is one of these factors, but there are other factors as well, such as the capacity of provincial governments to deliver services. All must be viewed together and weighted according to the situation in that province. The final decision on transfer is made by the Iraqi Prime Minister via the Ministerial Committee for National Security.

The four factors are: (1) Provincial threat assessment; (2) Iraqi Security Forces capability assessment; (3) Iraqi Provincial Governance assessment; and (4) MNF-I capability to support the ISF and respond to requests for assistance.

This is the process that has led to the transition of three provinces (Muthanna, DhiQar, and Najaf) from MNF-I control to Provincial Iraqi Control over security. We expect other provinces will follow this same process.

The end date for the surge is dependent upon the security situation on the ground in Iraq and will be determined by the President in consultation with General Petraeus and his military commanders. Civilian manning is only partly driven by the surge; we continue to plan for a civilian presence in Provincial Reconstruction Teams for as long as there is a demonstrated need, cooperation from the Iraqi Government, and funding from Congress.

Question. Is part of a PRT's function to empower moderate political forces in the provinces? As we look to possible provincial elections in 2007, do we have a sense of what political sea changes will be solidified? While they are provided for under the Iraqi constitution, is this something we are advocating, as well as prepared to support with financial and logistical resources?

Answer. A core objective of the President's new strategy is to empower moderates, defined as those Iraqis who renounce violence and pursue their interests peacefully, politically, and under the rule of law. The expanded PRT program will be central to that effort. PRTs will support local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted as-

sistance, such as microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs, and develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable manner.

Provincial elections provide another key means of empowering local leaders and ensuring more representative local government. It is too early to say what political trends or changes will solidify in the lead-up to those elections. However, we support the idea of holding provincial elections later this year, and will continue to target our assistance toward the development of the necessary institutions. To that end, the President's 2007 supplemental and 2008 budget includes requests for continuation and expansion of existing democracy programs, implemented by the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute and new programs such as the National Institutions Fund, the Political Party Participation Fund, and media reform programs, as well as for programs to support civic advocacy and democratic development activities, business associations, labor unions, and other political actors. The central goal of all these efforts will be to empower moderates and counter the destructive influence of extremists who are using violence to achieve their aims.

Question. This fails to provide an understanding about what the MoD is capable of now, or when such a program will be put in place. One of our concerns is our ability to oversee these transfers in a traditional fashion. How can the information flow about training and equipping be improved? Please be specific and cite examples.

Answer. The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is working with the Government of Iraq to move toward a traditional bilateral security assistance relationship. A critical part of this transition is Iraqi participation in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system which began in earnest in 2006 when the Iraqis committed over \$2.34 billion of Iraqi national funds to support procurement of equipment for the Iraqi armed forces. The information flow on equipment for the Iraqi security forces procured through FMS has already begun, such as with the congressional notification of the sale of a \$250 million logistic support package for helicopters, vehicles, and weapons in September 2006. In December, congressional notification was made for the sale of 522 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), light armored vehicles, light utility and cargo trucks for an estimated cost of \$463 million. However, due to the urgency of the Iraqi Security Forces requirements, neither of the sales were included in the calendar year 2006 Javits report due to the time criticality of the events. Similarly, the 20-day notification requirement is occasionally waived to expedite the sale of U.S. manufactured material. During his nomination hearing, General Petraeus stated his intent to increase the information flow to Congress regarding the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces through monthly briefing updates. As Iraqi procurement practices mature and the security environment improves a more normal processing of FMS cases should be possible. For further details regarding the training and equipping of the ISF, the State Department defers to the Department of Defense.

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR NORM COLEMAN

Question. Hmong graves issue: A large group of Hmong refugees living in the ground of the Wat Tham Krabok in Thailand were recently resettled in the United States, including about 5,000 in Minnesota. The U.S. Government did, in my opinion, the right and honorable thing in finding a home for the living members of the Hmong community in Wat Tham Krabok. Now we need to treat the deceased members of this community in a similarly honorable fashion.

For some time, the Thai Government has been exhuming and cremating these bodies. While I understand the Thais supposedly have health concerns relative to these bodies, the current situation is not tenable. The Thais have reportedly offered to transfer bodies to their family members (for a fee), but these are refugees who cannot travel, there are problems with identifying bodies, and it is not difficult to imagine disputes over bodies. Cremation is also a big problem from a Hmong cultural standpoint. Unfortunately, it is difficult to chart a path forward. One possibility would be for the Hmong community in the United States to coalesce behind a group of individuals who could travel to Thailand in their name and relocate the remaining bodies to a more agreeable location.

If confirmed, will you work with me, the Hmong community, and the Government of Thailand to resolve this matter in a culturally respectful manner?

Answer. I look forward to working with you to resolve this matter. The State Department was made aware of the exhumation and cremation of Hmong remains bur-

ied in the Wat Tham Krabok in Thailand and subsequently took steps to help resolve this matter. The U.S. embassy was first informed of this situation in November 2005, by which time most of the exhumations had already taken place. Nonetheless, the United States embassy in Thailand reached out to the Royal Thai Government to explain the concerns of the United States Hmong community and to encourage a mutually agreeable solution. We understand that the Thai authorities, including temple officials, are willing to work with the families of the deceased that wish to claim exhumed remains that have not yet been cremated. If confirmed, I will continue the State Department's efforts to work with all interested parties to reach a mutually acceptable solution.

Question. Restoration of democracy to Thailand: On a somewhat related note, 14 years of democratic rule in Thailand came to an end last September with a military coup. The military-installed government insists that it is committed to restoring democracy, but it continues to impose martial law in much of the country, restrict press freedom, and limit activity by political parties.

Are you satisfied that the military government is moving fast enough to restore democracy? Are you considering any additional measures to encourage the government to move faster to restore democracy?

Answer. The Thai interim government continues to take concrete steps to restore democracy, although the pace of lifting martial law has been more deliberate than we would like. The senior Thai military leader reiterated in an interview with western journalists on January 31 the leadership's strong commitment to hold democratic elections before year's-end, which we welcome. Nonetheless, the State Department and our embassy continue to urge Thai authorities to move as expeditiously as possible to return Thailand to democratic rule, including full restoration of civil liberties.

In immediate response to the September 19 coup, the U.S. Government suspended \$29 million in bilateral assistance to Thailand and continues to carefully review all significant interactions with Thailand, including military exercises, on a case-by-case basis. In discussions with the Thai Government, we continue to strongly emphasize that a full restoration of bilateral relations, to the excellent levels we enjoyed prior to the coup, is contingent upon Thailand's quick return to democracy. If confirmed, I will emphasize the importance of restoring democracy in Thailand.

Question. Recent events in East Africa have created a window of opportunity to bring security and humanitarian relief to the impoverished and war-weary people of Somalia.

If confirmed, how will you seek adequate troops to replace the Ethiopians who currently occupy the capital?

What steps must the United States take to foster political stability and how will you implement a strategy for Somalia if confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State?

Our ability to craft a productive Somalia policy is limited by the lack of a United States ambassador in Mogadishu. I have called for the appointment of a special envoy. Will you dedicate State Department resources to day-to-day management of this situation?

Answer. The rapid deployment of an African stabilization force in Somalia is one of three priority United States initiatives in Somalia. While supporting efforts to achieve rapid deployment of this stabilization force, the United States continues to encourage a process of inclusive political dialog between the leadership of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and other key Somali stakeholders, as well as to work with its international and regional partners to mobilize donor assistance to help build the governance capacity of the TFG.

Our most immediate objective is to stabilize the situation in southern Somalia and help establish a secure environment for political dialog through the deployment of an African stabilization force to Somalia. Uganda has offered to deploy 1,500 troops to Somalia pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1725. The African Union (AU) is also planning for a broader AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was approved by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on January 19, and is actively engaged in seeking additional troop contributions for this effort. In January, Kenyan Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju traveled to several African countries to explore additional troop contributions. Following the recent African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, other African countries, including Ghana, Nigeria, and Burundi expressed a desire to offer troops. The United States is actively supporting this effort. We have made \$10 million available immediately to provide airlift and equipment for the Ugandan deployment and we are taking steps to make additional resources available.

Most important is the path to peace, reconciliation, and stability. The key to long-term stability in Somalia now lies in a process of inclusive dialog and reconciliation. To a great extent, the ability to achieve reconciliation will be determined by the willingness of the TFG leadership to reach out and create an inclusive political process. As part of the administration's strategy to promote political stability in Somalia, the United States continues to urge the TFG leadership to move forward with a process of political dialog leading to a sustainable political solution and the formation of an inclusive government of national unity based on the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, I will ensure that the United States' strategy for Somalia continues to emphasize the need for a lasting political solution and that United States representatives are actively engaged in supporting a Somali-led process of inclusive dialog.

Adverse security conditions currently prevent the establishment of a full-time United States diplomatic presence or any formal international diplomatic presence inside Somalia; however, the United States continues to engage with Somali interlocutors through the United States embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, which is responsible for United States engagement in Somalia. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, I will seek dedicated resources to support effective United States engagement in Somalia.

Question. One of my constituents, Ms. Bree Schuette, has been fighting a custody battle with her former husband, a Russian citizen, Mr. Mikhail Yurievitch Slobodkine. After many years of abuse and the death of their son under mysterious circumstances, Ms. Schuette fled Russia for the United States, leaving behind her daughter, Veronika, a dual Russian/American citizen. On April 29, 2005, Ms. Schuette won from Russian courts full custody and place of living for Veronika, and the custody decision was upheld by the Russian Appeals Court in August 2005. Despite all of Ms. Schuette's legal victories, her rights under Russian law continue to be violated. Mr. Mikhail Yurievitch Slobodkine, Veronika's father, has refused to obey the court order and give up Veronika. Ms. Schuette has not seen Veronika in 2 years, and her ex-husband has essentially vanished with the child, possibly to the Volograd region. Monday was Veronika's seventh birthday.

If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, will you raise this case with appropriate Russian officials and press them to seek the return of Veronika to her mother?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will pursue this case with appropriate Russian officials. Senior United States Government and State Department officials, including Attorney General Gonzales, Ambassador William Burns, Assistant Secretary Harty, and the Principal Officer in St. Petersburg have raised this case with the Russian Government on repeated occasions. We will continue to press the Russian authorities to locate Veronika and enforce the Russian court order awarding custody to Ms. Schuette.

Question. Due to the military engagement last summer, the United States embassy in Lebanon remains backlogged in its consular section. Because of instability last summer, many relatives petitioned for immigrant visas. Their petitions are now approved, but not scheduled. My understanding is that the consular section is fully scheduled for the entire month of February and still has 400 cases in the queue for an appointment. With the continuing potential for instability in that region, we would be well advised to work through this backlog in the near-term, so we can assuage families who have done everything according to the rules so far.

How does the State Department intend to work through this visa backlog at the United States embassy in Beirut?

Answer. The consular section in Beirut has been working hard to address the backlog of immigrant visa cases in the queue. Between September and the end of 2006, Embassy Beirut successfully reduced the immigrant visa appointment backlog by nearly half. At the same time, the embassy also eliminated the 2-month build-up of missed appointments caused by the suspension of services during the war.

Recent changes in the immigrant visa process will likely allow Embassy Beirut to permanently increase its appointment capacity by 25 percent. Based on current workload assumptions, we anticipate eliminating the backlog of cases held domestically at the National Visa Center within approximately 12 weeks. Once cases arrive in Lebanon, they should be processed in a matter of weeks. We are hopeful that Lebanon will be current in its processing of IV cases by the summer. I will be sure to look into this situation again after I am confirmed.

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR BARACK OBAMA

Question. Why isn't the State Department advocating a tougher approach to reducing mercury contamination around the world?

Answer. The United States is advocating a partnership approach that we believe fosters the most effective use of human and financial resources to address risks associated with international mercury pollution. We believe that partnerships are a positive and effective way to engage countries that might otherwise be unresponsive to approaches that put them immediately on the defensive. Partnerships enable us to tailor our approach to immediate problems in priority areas and countries and achieve near-term results. In our view, partnerships are more practical and effective than protracted treaty negotiations that may or may not produce future results—but impose significant opportunity costs here and now.

Question. The European Union has committed itself to stop selling mercury by 2012; would you support the United States adopting a similar ban on mercury sales abroad?

Answer. The issue of a ban on mercury sales abroad is multifaceted, and we need to know more than we do today about the potential impacts, particularly the unintended impacts, of such a ban. For example, those who support an export ban argue that it would increase the price of mercury and thereby decrease demand, particularly in developing countries. Others argue that a ban on exports could lead to an increase in primary mining of mercury in developing countries, whereas United States mercury exports come from environmentally preferable sources (recycled mercury or mercury obtained as a by-product from mining other metals such as gold). Still others are concerned that long-term storage options for quantities of mercury from decommissioned chlor-alkali plants and State recycling programs have not yet been adequately addressed, such that an export ban now would not be pragmatic.

Any effort to restrict trade in commodity mercury thus should carefully consider all potential impacts so that conditions among the world's most vulnerable populations are not exacerbated. We believe that further study is needed of the potential impacts, particularly unintended impacts, of such a ban, and that the issue of long-term storage needs to be addressed.

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

Question. When you were in the office, we talked about management. And I have another hat that I wear; I'm now ranking member of the oversight of Government management and the Federal workforce. And the fact of the matter is that we have been receiving—and I think Senator Lugar made reference to it in his opening statement—we've got some tremendous management problems today in the State Department. And for the record, I would like to have the record of the last 2 years in terms of retirement, in terms of key positions that are out—open and not filled.

I remember when Colin Powell took over. He talked about the team. He really instilled some new esprit de corps in the Department, and from what I understand right now it's sagged quite a bit. And I'd just like to know from you, in terms of the role that you've been asked to play, what you're going to do about trying to get a handle on that and see if we can't quiet things down and stabilize it and bring back the feeling in the Department so that we just don't keep hemorrhaging as we have in the past.

Answer. Following, per your request, is a list of key personnel vacancies at the State Department. As I noted during my confirmation hearing, filling these vacancies will be a personal priority and I look forward to working with the Secretary, Congress, and the White House on this issue.

Position	Vacated	Status
Deputy Secretary of State	June 2006	Deputy Secretary Designate Negroponte had his hearing on 1/30/07; awaiting confirmation.
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)	Jan. 2007	Vacant.
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (T).	Feb. 2007	White House has announced intent to nominate John Rood.
Assistant Secretary Political-Military Affairs (PM).	Jan. 2007	Vacant.

Position	Vacated	Status
Ambassador-at-Large To Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP).	Dec. 2006	Vacant.
Permanent Representative to the United Nations.	Dec. 2006	White House has announced intent to nominate Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.

And I think some of this is simply part of a normal rotational cycle that will happen during the course of any 8-year administration, Senator.

But as far as how I visualize my own role in the Department, I think I can be of assistance to the Secretary in helping lead the Department, both here in Washington and abroad—the Foreign Service. I would like to think that one particular strength I can bring to the Department is my knowledge of how the Foreign Service works and my relationships with many Foreign Service officers. So I would like to build on that and strengthen the sense of satisfaction and enthusiasm for the work that they are doing, and I want to be supportive to the Secretary in her efforts to carry out this transformational diplomacy that we were talking about earlier.

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

Question. Is it the position of this administration that it possesses the authority to take unilateral action against Iran, in the absence of a direct threat, without congressional approval?

Answer. In the President's January 10 address to the Nation on The New Way Forward in Iraq, he made clear that Iran was providing material support for attacks and interrupting the flow of support from Iran and Syria and that such action is unacceptable. The President also noted our intention to seek out and destroy the networks that are providing the advanced weaponry and training that threaten our forces in Iraq.

The administration believes there is clear authority for United States operations within the territory of Iraq to prevent further Iranian-supported attacks against United States forces operating as part of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) or against civilian targets. Such attacks directly threaten both the security and stability of Iraq and the safety of our personnel; they also continue to undermine the region's security and stability. United States military operations in Iraq are conducted under the President's constitutional authority and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107-243), which authorizes the use of armed force to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. The United Nations Security Council has authorized all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of Iraq's security and stability, which encompasses MNF-I conducting military operations against any forces that carry out attacks against MNF-I or Iraqi civilian and military targets.

This question asks what authority might be relevant in connection with a hypothetical military operation in Iran. As the administration has said, we are not planning to invade Iran. For over 2 years, we have actively pursued a diplomatic strategy to address Iran's nuclear program, and we remain committed to resolving our concerns with Iran diplomatically. Of course, the Constitution charges the President to protect the United States and the American people. As Commander in Chief, he must be able to defend the United States, for example, if U.S. forces come under attack. Whether and how to do so in any specific situation would depend on the facts and circumstances at that time. Administration officials communicate regularly with the leadership and other Members of Congress with regard to the deployment of U.S. forces and the measures that may be necessary to protect the security interests of the United States and will continue to do so.

Question. Do you agree with Under Secretary of State Burns that the United States is "upping the ante" to send a message to Iran with the President's military deployments?

Answer. The United States remains committed to a diplomatic solution in the standoff with the Iranian regime, and we continue to call upon the regime to fully and verifiably suspend all nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities as a precursor to direct talks. The passage of United Nations Security Council resolutions

1696 and 1737 reflects our efforts to encourage international diplomatic cooperation in applying pressure on the Iranian regime to change its destabilizing behavior. Together with our partners in the international community, we have moved against Iranian banks that are aiding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and financing terrorism.

Likewise, in response to Iran's threatening behavior in the region, as evidenced by Tehran's call for the complete destruction of Israel and its support for Hizballah, Hamas, and Iraqi militant groups, we have moved a second carrier battle group into the gulf. Our regional allies support this move, which is not to provoke the Iranian regime, but to reinforce a longheld United States foreign policy objective: gulf security. Our expanded military presence in the gulf helps ensure the free flow of oil and other resources, protects our interests in Iraq, reassures our regional allies, and helps stabilize the Middle East.

We are also responding to illegitimate and destabilizing Iranian action in Lebanon and Iraq, and calling attention to Iran's involvement in multiple terrorist attacks across the globe. These various steps are all fully integrated components of our often stated "priority to diplomacy" policy in dealing with the threat Iran poses.

Question. Does the United States have a concerted strategy to make Iran suffer consequences for its actions?

Answer. Our strategy with Iran is aimed at pressuring the regime to: (1) Abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons; (2) end support for terrorism; (3) end destabilizing activities in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and throughout the Middle East; and (4) respect the rights of its citizens who would like to see greater democratic freedoms. Our most urgent task lies in curbing the regime's nuclear ambitions.

On June 6, 2006, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States presented Iran with a generous package of incentives providing economic, political, and technological benefits for the Iranian people following a successful conclusion of negotiations aimed at resolving international concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program. Equally significant, Secretary of State Rice announced on May 21, 2006, that the United States would join our European allies in directly engaging the Iranian regime if it verifiably suspended its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. In announcing this offer, Secretary Rice also reaffirmed the United States' support for the Iranian people's right to enjoy the benefits of peaceful, civil nuclear energy. The Iranian regime, however, rejected this historic opportunity to reintegrate into the international community, and has instead continued along a path of confrontation and isolation by refusing to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Following Iran's failure to comply with UNSCR 1696, which required that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities by August 31, 2006, the United States engaged in several months of consultations with the other permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, which culminated in the unanimous passage of UNSCR 1737 on December 23, 2006. Resolution 1737 requires Iran to suspend its proliferation-sensitive activities and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve all outstanding issues related to its nuclear program. It imposes sanctions under article 41 of chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and obligates member states to freeze assets of several entities and individuals who are listed in the resolution's annex due to their association with Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs. We are working with other nations—including the U.K., France, Germany, India, Egypt, Brazil, Japan, and Australia—to promote and ensure swift implementation and monitoring of UNSCR 1737. The IAEA Director General will report back to the UNSC by February 21, 2007, regarding Iran's compliance with UNSCR 1737. Following receipt of his report, the UNSC may pursue additional chapter VII actions directed at the Iranian regime if it is found to be in continued noncompliance.

Outside of the United Nations, we are also increasing pressure on Tehran. In November 2006, we successfully convinced the IAEA Board of Governors to reject an Iranian-requested technical cooperation project that may have aided its construction of a heavy-water research reactor at Arak capable of producing significant quantities of high-quality plutonium.

As part of our efforts to stymie Iranian progress toward improved ballistic missile delivery and other military capabilities, we are taking measures to strongly enforce the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).

Efforts to block Iranian access to the international financial system are perhaps our best tool for pressuring the regime. Under Executive Order 13382, the United States has designated 11 individuals and entities associated with Iran's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs. Once designated, entities cannot

conduct business in U.S. dollars and assets currently held by U.S. banks are frozen. Citing ties to WNIID proliferation activities, the Department of the Treasury has also used domestic authorities to terminate the access of Iran-based Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International to the U.S. financial system.

The international community has affirmed that an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is unacceptable. As we go forward, we will seek to maintain international consensus regarding the steps that Iran must take to comply with its obligations.

Question. Do you agree that by taking such actions in the Persian Gulf, the United States creates conditions that are dangerously unpredictable?

Answer. Our current and any future actions in the gulf do not and will not create conditions that are dangerously unpredictable. It is precisely the Iranian regime's behavior that creates instability and unpredictability in the region. The U.S. presence in the region is seen by all the gulf countries as stabilizing, as shown by their manifold concrete support for our military presence. Our policy of supporting gulf security has been a cornerstone of our Middle East engagement for over six decades, and the Iranian regime must understand that it cannot destabilize the region without a reaction from moderate Arab states and the United States.

Question. Would it not be preferable for the United States to carry out its diplomatic initiatives beyond today's half measures by seeking a broader international diplomatic resolution of the war in Iraq that would include participation by all nations in the region, including Iran and Syria?

Answer. We encourage all of Iraq's neighbors to act responsibly in supporting and assisting the Iraqi Government. To that end, we continue to call on Iran and Syria to suspend their destabilizing activities. Unfortunately, we have seen no evidence indicating that they wish to play a responsible role. Like Iraq's other neighbors, Iran and Syria must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and act in a manner that supports a stable and democratic future for the Iraqi people. We support Iraqi direct dialog with Damascus and Teheran—focused on building relationships based on the principle of full respect for Iraqi sovereignty and support for a peaceful, stable Iraq.

We have made many efforts in the past to engage the Syrian Government. Former Secretary Powell visited Damascus in May 2003 to discuss post-conflict Iraq. Following that, in September 2004, then-Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, William Burns, met with President Asad; former Secretary Powell met again with then-Syrian Foreign Minister Shara'a at the UNGA in late September and in Sharm el Sheikh in November 2004; and former Deputy Secretary Armitage visited Damascus in January 2005. In each of these efforts, the Syrians promised to take action against the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, end its support for former regime elements living in Syria, and end its sponsorship of terrorism. We have yet to see any response to our efforts to engage in the last 4 years, and believe this track record does not demonstrate Syria to play a positive role in the region.

The President made clear in his January 10 speech to the American people on the administration's New Way Forward in Iraq, that Iranian support to armed groups who want to harm United States forces and perpetrate violence in Iraq would not be tolerated. The President also noted our intention to seek out and destroy the networks that are providing the advanced weaponry and training that threaten our forces in Iraq, including those involving Iranian assistance. As well, during recent meetings in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait, regional partners expressed their strong concern over the growth of negative Iranian involvement in Iraq and al-Qaeda terror.

We are actively pursuing a comprehensive diplomatic strategy to address Iran's nuclear program and destabilizing activities throughout the region. As the President, Secretary Rice, and other senior officials have publicly stated, we are committed to resolving our concerns with Iran diplomatically, but have yet to see the same commitment by Iran.

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. How do you see your role as Deputy Secretary? Have you discussed your role with the Secretary? How do you expect to divide your time between organizational and policy issues? Are there specific issues or regions on which the Secretary expects you to take a lead role?

Answer. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, I will assist Secretary Rice in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and function as the Chief Operating Officer of the

Department. The Deputy Secretary position has many varied responsibilities, including administrative oversight of the Department, coordination and supervision of U.S. Government activities overseas, representing the Department's position before Congress, and managing key foreign policy issues on the Secretary's behalf. How I might divide my time among these responsibilities would depend on the circumstances and most pressing issues of the moment, but I expect to focus on all of these critical areas.

In my discussions with Secretary Rice, we also have discussed the need for me to devote considerable time and effort to the implementation of our policies in Iraq. In my previous assignment before becoming Director of National Intelligence, I volunteered to serve as United States Ambassador to the newly sovereign Iraq because I believed—and still believe—that it is possible for Iraq to make a successful transition to democracy. Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the Iraqis, for our friends in the region, and for the United States. I anticipate devoting a considerable amount of time to this complex, challenging, and vital national security issue, if confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State.

If confirmed, I would hope that, in addition to Iraq, I could make a strong contribution to our foreign policy in those parts of the world where I have spent the most time in my career—Asia and Latin America. The Secretary and I have specifically discussed my taking responsibility for diplomacy related to security in North Asia and for our political dialog with China. We have also talked about how I could help her advance our agenda in this hemisphere. Moreover, I expect to help Secretary Rice promote America's economic, business, and energy interests overseas as well as the transformational diplomacy that is the cornerstone of her leadership at the Department of State.

Question. Based on your extensive experience in the State Department, what initiatives do you believe are necessary to improve management at the Department?

Answer. As a career Foreign Service officer, I am intimately aware of the sacrifices and benefits of Foreign Service life. A Foreign Service career is much more than a 9 to 5 job; it's a commitment to devote your life, and that of your family, to advancing U.S. interests abroad. The same principle holds true for the Department's dedicated civil service employees and the 37,000 locally employed staff in U.S. missions overseas, many of whom work for the U.S. Government at great personal risk.

This level of commitment and sacrifice from employees requires an absolute pledge from the Department's senior leaders to support and defend the needs and interests of State Department personnel. As Deputy Secretary, I will reinforce the Secretary's efforts to bolster the Department's resources and secure the funding we need to train, protect, and reward our employees. Our highest priority should be taking care of our people.

In particular, I look forward to working with the Congress and the White House to minimize vacancies in senior positions at the Department. While some vacancies are an inevitable result of our nomination system and political cycles, the number and length of those vacancies should be kept to a minimum.

Question. During President Bush's first term, Secretary Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense were widely perceived as having played a prominent, if not dominant, role in shaping U.S. foreign policy in critical areas. Do you believe there has been a significant expansion of the role played by the Defense Department in foreign policy? If so, what impact do you believe this has had on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy? How would you help Secretary Rice in ensuring that the State Department takes the lead on important foreign policy issues?

Answer. We are at a critical juncture in our foreign relations with key and potential allies, faced with challenges in all corners of the world from terrorists and insurgents. All agencies of the U.S. Government are working together to best meet these challenges. Bureaucratic barriers between agencies do not serve our interests, and collaboration between U.S. agencies on planning, budgeting, and operations results in stronger foreign relations overall. In this regard, the Defense Department has an important role to play in the development of our national security policy and on our interactions with foreign governments, although the Secretary of State is the President's lead advisor on the development and execution of U.S. foreign policy and the cabinet official responsible for the day-to-day conduct of U.S. foreign relations.

Having said that, in my last two assignments as Ambassador to Iraq and as Director of National Intelligence, I developed excellent working relationships with the Pentagon and the uniformed services. If confirmed, I expect to build on my extensive past experience in dealing with the Department of Defense.

Question. What steps is the administration planning to take to address the continued conflict in Darfur? Has the administration begun to implement the so-called "Plan B" that the special envoy to Sudan described to committee members last year? What exactly does Plan B entail? Do other partners in the international community support this plan?

Answer. One of the top diplomatic priorities of the United States in Africa is the peaceful end to the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Part of our strategy is the rapid transition of the African Union Mission in Sudan to a more robust U.N./A.U. hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur. Such a force is vital to our effort to stabilize the security situation, ensure access for humanitarian assistance, and protect internally displaced persons and refugees. There are also ongoing discussions about complementary U.N. peacekeeping forces in Chad and the Central African Republic to protect refugees and other civilians. We are working closely with our partners in the A.U., U.N., and especially with those with influence on Sudan such as Egypt, Russia, China, and the E.U., to support the U.N. effort. The special envoy to Sudan recently traveled to China to explain the United States' position on Darfur and to encourage the Chinese to use their influence to stop the atrocities.

We are also working actively to bring those rebel groups that did not sign the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement into negotiations to join an enhanced agreement. In doing so, the special envoy recently traveled to Chad where he met with many rebel leaders from varying parties, heard their views, and pushed for their united participation in a peaceful political process led by the U.N. and the A.U.

On peacekeeping in Darfur, we have been pressing Sudan and the A.U. to finalize agreement with the U.N. on the three-phased peacekeeping plan reached on November 16, 2006 in Addis. On December 23, 2006, the U.N. began implementation of the U.N. light support package to the African Union Mission in Sudan (phase I). The A.U. and U.N. have reached agreement on the elements of the heavy support package (phase II), and have sent a letter to President Bashir requesting his full cooperation for the deployment. Detailed discussions between the A.U. and U.N. on the modalities for the hybrid force are ongoing. We are encouraging all the parties to move rapidly, and are reaching out to encourage countries to contribute personnel and troops to these efforts.

If, however, we determine that the regime in Khartoum is deliberately acting to prevent peace from being achieved in Sudan, including efforts to delay or otherwise deter implementation of the Addis Agreements, we will adopt a more coercive course of action. We cannot discuss Plan B publicly, but Andrew Natsios, the President's special envoy to Sudan, would be happy to meet with you to discuss the plan privately. Our goals remain the deployment of a robust U.N./A.U. hybrid force with the authority to use force to protect civilians, the achievement of a peaceful political process that ultimately brings all rebel groups into the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), and continued access for necessary humanitarian work.

Question. How would you evaluate the status of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan? Is there any cause for concern? What should the U.S. Government be doing to support improved implementation of the peace agreement?

Answer. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005, much has been accomplished. The Government of Southern Sudan (GOBS) has been fully established, over \$1.5 billion in oil revenues has been transferred to the GOBS, and the U.N. reports that the redeployment of northern troops from the south is on schedule. However, the issues that remain are some of the most challenging.

The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has failed to introduce transparency in accounting for oil revenues, and the GOBS is likely entitled to much more than it is currently receiving. The overall progress on withdrawing northern troops from the south masks the nearly complete lack of redeployment from the oil-rich Upper Nile region. The NCP has also moved slowly to support the work of demarcating the North-South border.

Meanwhile, northern backed militias continue to operate in the south and create instability. In Abyei, home to Sudan's most productive oil field, the NCP has refused to accept the Abyei Boundaries Commission report.

Moving forward on CPA implementation will require continued high-level engagement from the United States. Our diplomatic missions in Khartoum and Juba, the special envoy to Sudan and the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs have dedicated extensive efforts to the CPA, including recent trips by the special envoy to Juba, Malakal, and Abyei in the south. The United States has helped to establish the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and we are its most vocal member. We have taken the lead on efforts to turn the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/

Army (SPLM/A) into a responsible political party capable of governing, with a regular army that can ensure peace and security. We also work with United Nations Mission in the Sudan (LTNMIS), which plays an important role in supporting the CPA. The United States was the first country to establish a full-time diplomatic mission in Southern Sudan, and we continue to be the largest donor to the recovery and development of the region. The United States will continue to help the south create a more level playing field within the Government of National Unity (GNU) and demand full implementation of the CPA. This is the only way to foster the establishment of a strong and united Sudan that is stable and at peace with its neighbors.

Question. What, if any, supplementary medical coverage and long-term disability benefits do PRT members in Iraq and Afghanistan receive? What about contractors? Is the Department working on improving these health benefits?

Answer. Both civil service and Foreign Service employees of the State Department employees serving in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan are eligible a generous package of medical and disability benefits. State employees can choose from 10 group health insurance plans available to all Federal employees. Employees assigned to the PRTs can utilize the medical units at the embassies in Kabul or Baghdad, if needed. Embassy Baghdad has a full-time social worker who has traveled extensively to the PRTs as well. An Amman-based regional psychiatrist also visits Iraq periodically and has visited employees stationed outside of Baghdad.

Employees in PRTs also have access to mental health services, if requested, through the State Department's Office of Medical Services Employee Consultation Service. Employees and eligible family members can also take advantage of a 24 hour-a-day, 7 day-a-week support hotline coordinated by the Department's Family Liaison Office and offered through the Managed Health Network.

State employees are eligible for workers' compensation benefits, should they be injured in the line of duty. Long-term disability benefits are offered under worker's compensation. Generally, Personal Service Contractors (PSCs) are eligible for Federal Government workers' compensation benefits. Independent contractors are not eligible for benefits and would apply for workers' compensation benefits through their employers.

We are continuously evaluating the existing incentives for hardship service and determining if changes are needed to further support and compensate our employees who serve in the most difficult posts overseas. The Department does not have any plans at this time to propose changes to the existing health benefits package.

Question. As you know, Senator Lugar and I have introduced S. Res. 30, which calls for the United States to take an active role in international climate change negotiations under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, with the objective of securing U.S. participation in binding agreements that establish commitments by all major emitters of greenhouse gases and further achieve a significant long-term reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions. Does the administration have a position on our resolution, and what is the administration's current position on negotiations under the Framework Convention, on an agreement to cover the period after 2012, post-Kyoto? Shouldn't we be working now on those next steps?

Answer. The administration shares your views that engaging developing countries, implementing clean energy technologies, and protecting U.S. economic interests are of paramount importance to addressing climate change.

The United States is taking an active role in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In addition to vigorously engaging in the issues negotiated under the convention, we are also its largest donor nation. Regarding an agreement to cover the period after 2012, the United States does not support an approach that would harm our economy, and we believe that a prescriptive targets and timetables framework is inconsistent with the need for a global response to climate change since developing countries reject binding emissions caps.

The United States believes that international climate actions must accommodate diverse national circumstances and approaches, and that climate actions should be considered in tandem with economic and other sustainable development goals. Countries in the developing world are focused on economic growth and providing for the needs of their citizens.

We believe that climate policies should recognize and complement these priorities. We are pursuing an approach through a range of collaborative approaches that focus on practical results.

Our flagship climate initiative, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), is one example of this approach. The APP is one of our

most important programs because it generates results where they matter most—in the countries that are the world’s major emitters of greenhouse gases.

The APP brings together Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States to tackle complementary energy, economic, and environmental goals. In each partner country, governments and the private sector are collaborating to implement clean, efficient energy technologies and practices.

The APP is just one of the many international partnerships that the United States has initiated since 2002. They include partnerships to collect and reuse methane—a powerful greenhouse gas; to capture and safely store carbon dioxide; to develop and deploy clean, safe nuclear energy technologies; and to develop cost-effective hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. In addition, we have launched 15 bilateral climate change partnerships with countries and regional organizations that, with us, represent over 80 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

Our emissions performance since 2001 has been among the best in the OECD. From 2000 to 2004, for example, U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide emissions increased by only 1.7 percent, while those in Europe grew by 5 percent. The results of our climate policy underscore the fact that there are diverse yet complimentary approaches to addressing climate change.

Question. Given your January 11 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that al-Qaeda operates from “their leaders’ secure hide-out in Pakistan,” what new approaches toward Pakistan will you pursue to end half a decade of safe haven given to Bin Laden and his cohorts?

Answer. While we do not know Osama bin Laden’s precise whereabouts, al-Qaeda continues to exploit parts of the tribal areas of western Pakistan. It is not accurate, however, to say that the Pakistan Government is granting them safe haven as a matter of policy. In fact, Pakistan has been a vital partner in our fight against al-Qaeda. Pakistan’s military operations against al-Qaeda and other foreign militants in the tribal areas since 2004 have cost it hundreds of casualties but have not succeeded in breaking foreign extremist networks in areas that are essentially outside government control. Militant extremism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province is perceived in Islamabad as a major threat to Pakistan’s internal security.

We are pleased that the Government of Pakistan continues to take forceful measures against all terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, but we recognize that purely military solutions are unlikely to succeed. While President Musharraf remains committed to rooting out violent extremist elements from Pakistan, we support his efforts to adopt a more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism and countering insurgency.

The State Department is exploring ways to support two initiatives designed to strengthen Pakistan’s ability to eliminate terrorist safe havens and strengthen control of the border with Afghanistan. The first will enhance the capacity of local security forces such as the indigenous Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, and tribal levies groups that carry most of the responsibility for security in those areas. The second, Pakistan’s Sustainable Development Plan for the tribal areas, is a program of economic and social development and governance reform intended to meet the needs of the local population and render them more resistant to violent extremists such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Robust support for these two initiatives would improve the security environment in the frontier areas, whose population spans the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and contribute greatly to creating an environment inhospitable to violent extremism.

Meanwhile, I believe it is essential that the situation in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area be the subject of constant high-level dialog between us and the leaders of both countries.

Question. Some administration figures seem intent on playing Sunni and Shia Muslims against each other, in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. Do you approve of this, or do you see such a policy as presenting grave dangers to America from both Sunnis and Shia?

Answer. Our foreign policy toward the Middle East is not based on religion or ethnicity, but seeks to encourage moderation and minimize extremism. The United States has worked hard to promote reconciliation and national unity—across the historical divide of Sunni-Shia relations—in places like Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Today those governments are more multiethnic and confessionally mixed than ever before. Playing off religious or ethnic differences is a recipe for increasing, not taming, violence in this region.

We are concerned about Iranian regime’s support for terrorism throughout the region, specifically its support for both Shia and Sunni extremists (Hizballah and

Hamas, respectively) and its destabilizing activities in Iraq. However, our differences with Iran lie with illicit behavior and dangerous ambitions of the Iranian regime, and not with the legitimate aspirations and interests of the Iranian people, or the Shia in general. Our strategy is to counter the threats posed by the Government of Iran while expanding our engagement and outreach to the Iranian people. More broadly, we support the empowerment and dignity of all the people in the region, regardless of ethnicity or religious belief, and we condemn extremism in all forms.

Question. The administration has proposed \$2 billion in reconstruction funds for Afghanistan. Two billion dollars spread over 2 years does not represent an increase in reconstruction funding, despite the fact that General Eikenberry and General Jones have requested a significant increase in reconstruction funding. Is the proposed amount of funding sufficient? What is our strategy for strengthening the implementation of reconstruction programs?

Answer. The amount of funding is sufficient given the limited capacity in Afghanistan to implement projects quickly. What is important is that we maintain a consistent and substantial level of funding over a period of time long enough to enable the Afghan economy to gain traction on its own.

Our strategy for strengthening the implementation of our reconstruction programs centers around capacity building in both the public and the private sectors, to increase the quality of Afghan firms and the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to provide basic services, effective governance, and efficient administration of public funds.

Building capacity of Afghan firms to deliver goods and services is critical. Where applicable, our programs incorporate private sector capacity building components. In the infrastructure sector, for example, we are training Afghans to build and maintain the road assets United States assistance has funded. A vocational training program currently underway in Nangarhar is providing construction, electrical, plumbing, and other building trade skills to improve the skills of the local workforce employed by Afghan firms. We also provide credit, business skills training, and other assistance to enable Afghan firms to increase their competitiveness and profitability. This assistance, combined with regulatory, administrative, and other technical assistance is helping the Government of Afghanistan become an enabler of private sector activity.

For the government's line ministries in Kabul as well as the provincial capitals, we will be implementing the Afghan Building Capacity program, which provides technical training in public administration skills and scholarships for advanced degrees and technical training in Afghanistan and abroad. We will concurrently improve the quality of education delivered by Afghan universities to help build the technical skill base needed for a modern economy and state.

Question. The administration has proposed \$8.6 billion in security funds for Afghanistan. Both General Karl Eikenberry and General James Jones have noted the need for an improvement in the use of security funding (according to the Inspectors General of State and Department of Defense, current police training has already cost \$ 1.1 billion dollars, yet it has resulted in a nonfunctional police force). What will be done with the \$8.6 billion that addresses this concern? Do your plans for using this money represent a true change of course?

Answer. The \$8.6 billion requested for security assistance will be used to further train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces. Our plans for using these funds reflect an urgent need to augment our work to train effective and legitimate security forces that can protect the Afghan people from extremists and insurgents.

For the police, the course is well-charted regarding training, and we expect it to remain the same. We expect, however, to increase emphasis on police equipment and infrastructure. Training and equipping efforts augment and reinforce each other. We must look comprehensively at all the factors that will lead to success for the Afghan police. It will take a sustained effort over several years to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program, let alone adequately assess the program.

We also intend to boost our efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Army. In fiscal year 2007, we plan to intensify our efforts to train this force so the Afghan Government can address security concerns. The Afghan army is currently fighting alongside NATO International Security Assistance Forces, and is an integral component of our efforts to take on the Taliban and extend the reach of the Government of Afghanistan's authority. At the moment, the army is in need of more soldiers and more equipment to meet the current security challenges. The \$8.6 billion in re-

quested security assistance funds will help us reach our goal of a well-trained and effective Afghan army.

Question. In addressing the illicit opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, does the administration intend to press the Government of Afghanistan to accept a program of aerial eradication of poppy?

Answer. The Government of Afghanistan has decided not to use spraying of herbicides to eliminate poppy cultivation this year, but will implement a robust manual and mechanical eradication program to eradicate illicit poppy fields. We will focus on making manual and mechanical eradication efforts as effective as possible, without ruling out the future use of other options, such as ground-based or aerial spraying of herbicides.

The United States remains prepared to assist the Government of Afghanistan—in using herbicides to eradicate poppy. For many years the United States has assisted the Government of Colombia and other governments around the world in using herbicide to control illicit narcotics crops. Herbicide offers a safe and effective method for eliminating illegal crops, and it may be an appropriate tool for Afghanistan to use in future years.

The United States Government will continue to provide assistance to Afghan law enforcement institutions that eradicate poppy crops, including the Ministry of Interior's Afghan Eradication Force.

While President Karzai did not approve the use of herbicide, he recognizes that poppy cultivation poses a grave risk to Afghanistan's security. We welcome his renewed focus on developing a strong eradication program this year and will continue to work with Afghanistan to eliminate poppy cultivation.

Question. In the next few months, the issue of Kosovo's future status will likely come before the United Nations Security Council. If, as has been threatened, Russia uses its veto to block Security Council approval of Kosovo's independence, would you still support the United States recognizing Kosovo as an independent state?

Answer. We strongly support the settlement terms prepared by U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. This package creates the conditions under which Southeast Europe can have stability and certainty in its future, Kosovo can govern itself democratically, and Kosovo's minorities can receive generous protection. We expect that Ahtisaari's proposal, once finalized, will be discussed in the U.N. Security Council and that we will consult closely with Russia and other Security Council members on the best way forward. We are working to ensure a successful conclusion to the Kosovo status process established by the UNSC and believe we should refrain from speculating about hypothetical developments in the Security Council.

Question. What do you see as the proper role for NATO in promoting global peace and security? As the alliance moves forward, how inclusive or exclusive do you believe it should be in its mission and membership?

Answer. NATO plays a vital role in promoting peace and prosperity and advancing freedom and democracy. We strongly support the aspirations of countries within the Euro-Atlantic area that seek membership.

NATO remains the essential forum for action and dialog on transatlantic security and its primary responsibility is to provide security for its members. September 11 and the Madrid and London train bombings demonstrated that the key security issues facing the allies have changed fundamentally since the cold war. NATO has evolved with the times. The alliance is increasingly outward looking because the challenges to our common security are increasingly transnational and global—for example, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and insecurity of energy sources.

Our partnerships with non-NATO countries leverage and enhance NATO's effectiveness and benefit the alliance. In Afghanistan, for example, in addition to all 26 NATO Allies, we have over 11 contributing countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, and Finland.

At NATO's Riga Summit in November 2006, the allies agreed to support a partnership initiative that will ensure that non-NATO countries that share our values and are willing to commit personnel and resources to a common purpose with NATO will have a more structured operational relationship with the alliance that facilitates seamless planning and execution.

This is not the same as saying that the alliance has no borders or that its collective defense provisions apply to partners. The alliance is anchored in the North Atlantic Treaty and the Article 5 commitment. The Riga declaration is recognition by allies of the vital role being played by NATO's partners who are committing troops and resources in places of mutual concern like Afghanistan and Kosovo.

Question. Policy analysts and scholars have noted that Latin America has not received the attention that was anticipated at the beginning of President Bush's first administration. Given your experience in the region, what recommendations do you have for the administration to increase attention toward the region? What specific issues need to be addressed more effectively? How would you work in your capacity as Deputy Secretary of State to do this?

Answer. The administration has, in fact, devoted considerable attention and resources to the region. In the area of foreign assistance, resources dedicated to the Western Hemisphere have nearly doubled from 2001 to 2007—even without including the Millennium Challenge account funds that already have been made available to Nicaragua and Honduras, and that are about to be made available to El Salvador.

The President himself has traveled through the region 10 times since taking office, and his visits have been complemented by numerous visits by cabinet-level officials from a variety of Departments. He is planning another trip to the region in March.

All that is not to say that we should be content with the status quo. While all but one of the governments of the hemisphere were elected democratically and economic indicators have been positive, democratic institutions remain weak and under assault in several countries, in part because governments have not been able to deliver on the promise of democracy that is security and prosperity for all citizens.

We aim to focus our efforts and our resources to help governments respond to their citizens by consolidating democracy, promoting prosperity, investing in people, and helping protect the security of the democratic state. If confirmed, I look forward to my own involvement with the region as Deputy Secretary, if confirmed, and the opportunity to draw on my many years of experience dealing with our hemisphere.

Question. Given the wave of presidential elections that have taken place in the region over the past year, can you discuss the status of democracy in the region? How can United States democracy and foreign assistance programs be more effective in supporting political stability in Latin America? What was the level of support that we provided to Latin American countries in the previous fiscal year for democracy promotion?

Answer. Some two decades have passed since Latin Americans in country after country rejected authoritarian models in favor of democracy. Every country except Cuba has held national elections to elect its President. On the whole, these have been relatively free elections resulting in unprecedented continuity in the region as leaders have served out their terms and handed power peacefully over to the next elected leader.

The wave of elections in the Americas (17 in total) over the last year is testimony to the durability of this process in most countries. However, democracy can be challenged where a personalistic populism threatens to overwhelm democratic institutions in countries where those institutions are weak. If citizens perceive that democratically elected regimes fail to address their most important needs, then democracy itself may be imperiled. That is why we are working to strengthen democratic governance so that citizens receive the benefits of good governance. Latin Americans have a right to expect their democratic governments to be responsive and accountable. Access to economic opportunity and the social mobility that it creates are fundamental components of social justice and are necessary to ensure that democracy continues to flourish.

Our democracy and foreign assistance strategy recognizes the transformational power of democracy. Both bilaterally and in collaboration with such entities as the Organization of American States (OAS) and other institutions of the Inter-American System, we are working to attack inequality, political marginalization, and exclusion. In order to consolidate democracy, the United States will continue to work together with our regional neighbors throughout the hemisphere. We support efforts to create competitive and inclusive political systems so that all citizens have access to political power. With greater competition, less corruption, greater accountability of elected officials, and better stewardship of state resources, citizens of the region can enjoy an improved quality of life. To achieve this, we will strengthen judicial independence and capacity, internal controls, and effective prosecution of corruption and other complex crimes. We will seek to strengthen institutions of representative democracy, such as political parties, legislatures, executive agencies, media, and civil society.

The United States provided \$174,698 million in foreign assistance to Latin American countries in fiscal year 2006 to contribute to the objective of governing justly and democratically.

Question. How do you anticipate that the new U.N. Secretary-General will address reform at the United Nations in his first year? In your role as Deputy Secretary, do you anticipate working on U.N. reform?

Answer. The arrival of Secretary-General Ban and his new team offers member states an opportunity to reinvigorate the U.N. management reform process and foster a climate of ethical conduct. We are pleased that Secretary-General Ban led by example by making public his own financial disclosure statement. We are also pleased that he has called for a system-wide audit of U.N. funds and programs. In the near future we would like to see Secretary-General Ban take the following steps:

- Ensure full operational effectiveness of the U.N. Ethics Office;
- Effectively exercise his budgetary discretion;
- Implement International Public Sector Accounting Standards; and
- Achieve greater efficiencies in the use of existing resources.

While there are some actions the Secretary-General can take independently, most of the burden for reform falls on the member states themselves and in the coming months, we expect member states to consider the following items:

- Progress on review of U.N. mandates;
- Activation of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee;
- Strengthening the Office of Internal Oversight Services and ensuring its operational independence;
- Strengthening U.N. procurement processes; and
- Improving U.N. human resources management policies and practices.

If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, I will work with my colleagues in the Department and at our mission to the United Nations to emphasize the continued importance of high ethical standards at the U.N.

Question. United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased markedly in the past few years, now totaling over 80,000 troops globally with new missions in countries such as Lebanon, Liberia, Sudan, and Haiti. Can you comment on the value of U.N. peacekeeping operations in supporting and advancing U.S. interests? Beyond paying the dues assessed by the United Nations, does the United States provide any other support to U.N. peacekeeping missions? Do you know of areas in which we should be providing such support?

Answer. U.N. peacekeeping serves U.S. national interests. We have a stake in the outcome of events in every region of the world. U.N. peacekeeping missions engage and commit the international community to seek solutions to violence and instability. Through our ability to draw upon global resources through a U.N. peacekeeping mission, we are able to address urgent international needs without committing U.S. forces. U.N. peacekeeping operations cost the U.S. approximately a quarter of what we would pay if we were asked to deploy American forces. I am personally a very strong believer in the utility of U.N. peacekeeping operations and was impressed by the demonstrated effectiveness of these operations during my tenure as ambassador to the U.N. in countries such as Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Liberia.

In the U.N. Security Council and through our contributions to the U.N., the United States ensures that U.N. peacekeeping mandates are clear, credible, and limited to what is achievable. We use our voice and vote to ensure that these missions are consistent with U.S. national interests. The United States has been in the lead in efforts to ensure that U.N. peacekeepers are properly prepared and equipped to defend themselves and to fulfill their mandate.

Direct U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations is limited but important. The U.S. currently has 298 police officers and 26 military officers deployed in 8 U.N. peacekeeping missions. In addition, the United States from time-to-time provides direct support for U.N. operations. For instance, the Department of Defense arranged for the November 2006 deployment of an Indonesian battalion to participate in the U.N. mission in Lebanon.

Given even greater force generation requirements for peacekeeping in the foreseeable future, an important area of United States support for peacekeeping is through our Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), including its African sub-component, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. GPOI programs enable willing partners to build the capabilities to help meet the growing U.N. demand for competent peacekeepers. U.N. and African Union missions in Africa and Lebanon already benefit from ACOTA-trained units. In addition, GPOI initiatives are helping Indonesia, Mongolia, and several Central American countries build their capacity to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Continued GPOI support is essential to help the international community as a whole meet the increased demand for peacekeeping.

NOMINATIONS

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Crocker, Ryan C., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq
Wood, William B., to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:19 a.m., in room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Jr., Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Isakson, and Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KERRY. This hearing will come to order.

Good morning, everybody, thank you for being here.

We have a couple of votes at 10:30, and so we're going to try to move as expeditiously as possible. Senator Lugar will be here in a little while.

It's my privilege to convene this hearing. We welcome both Ambassador Wood and Ambassador Crocker here to take part in it.

Needless to say, you've both been nominated for incredibly challenging, and important, posts. And I'm absolutely convinced, and indeed comforted by the fact that both of you have extensive experience. We're lucky to have individuals with your depth of background who are prepared to undertake these kinds of difficult tasks and in dangerous and complicated places. And we all, on this committee, trust the experience that you bring to the table, will serve you and the country well.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are obviously vital to America's national security interests. Certainly the war in Iraq, if not initially so, now is because of the implications on the down side.

Many of us on this committee have expressed opinions, and feel very strongly that the war in Iraq has had disastrous consequences for our national security. We've seen more than 3,000 of our bravest young men and women make the ultimate sacrifice, and we've spent over \$350 billion of taxpayers' money on a war that, it is hard not to conclude, has made us less safe, has made the region more volatile, has, in fact, strengthened some of our antagonists,

and particularly made more complicated the relationship with Iran, Hamas, and radical Islam.

The administration's mistakes and miscalculations have made a difficult situation in Iraq even more complicated. But the fact is, that we now owe it to our troops, to their families, and most importantly, to the country to find, not just a new way forward in Iraq, but the right way forward.

That will start with recognizing that there is no military solution to the violence in Iraq. The only hope for stability is a sustainable political solution that resolves the fundamental differences between the primary stakeholders.

The Sunni-Shia conflict that has erupted into civil conflict in Iraq, and now spread throughout the region, and beyond the region—it goes back over 1,300 years. As we discussed, Ambassador Crocker, right now both sides believe that they can win, and that's a dangerous equation.

The Sunni have to recognize that they will no longer be running the country in the way that they were, and agree to put down their arms and join the political process. And the Shia must move beyond their longstanding fears of Sunni domination and agree that they have to share power and come to some agreement with respect to the resources and the fundamental structure regarding the country.

The issues of oil revenues, federalism, de-Baathification, and the militias are essential to ending the violence.

In the absence of this political solution, I think it's the majority view of this committee, and the majority view of the Senate, and Congress when ultimately expressed, that sending more than 21,000 additional troops is not going to solve the fundamental problem. It may provide a little more security, it may not. But it is not going to solve the fundamental problem.

And so, we need to encourage that political solution, and I know that members of the committee will have questions regarding that as we proceed forward.

We also have to recognize that we cannot solve the problems in Iraq alone, I know, Ambassador, you share that view. Any sustainable solution has to involve Iraq's neighbors, and the international community. And, perhaps most incomprehensible is the failure of this administration to engage in the broad-based international diplomacy, and also the regional diplomacy.

In each of the trips I've made in the last several years, I have been struck by the plea of leaders of the neighboring countries for a more robust diplomatic effort on our behalf, which has yet to materialize. Iraqis need to take responsibility for Iraq, and your challenge, Ambassador, will be obviously, to help encourage that, and to try to help create the framework and structure to empower it.

I happen to believe that a deadline is essential. Because there's been a lack of accountability in their behavior. And, I think it was 6 months ago that General Casey, and Ambassador Khalilzad both said that the Iraqi Government had about 5 or 6 months to make the critical decisions, or else.

The "or else" has come, and passed. The 5 or 6 months has come, and passed. And the violence is higher, and the situation more grave. So, clearly there is an enormous challenge in front of us.

In addition, we've reached a critical juncture in Afghanistan. For several years now, I—and a few others—have been arguing that we needed a more robust presence in Afghanistan, and that we were taking our eye off the real conflict, which was in Afghanistan, where Osama bin Laden launched the attacks, and the Taliban is now somewhat resurgent.

So, there is an additional challenge there—the accumulated affects of violent terrorist insurgent attacks, corruption, inefficient social resources, and growing income disparities are taking their toll. A point could be reached at which the government becomes relevant to the people, and that is, indeed, the greatest challenge that we have is to maintain the credibility of the government that we helped give birth to.

So, America is facing extraordinary challenges in both Iraq and Afghanistan. And the coming months are going to be critical to both countries, and critical to our country as well, in terms of our larger interests in the region.

So, I had hoped that Senator Lugar would be here—he's not here yet. When Senator Coleman gets here, he's the ranking member on the committee, I'll recognize him for an opening statement, but we'd like to proceed—given the vote pressure—to your statements, and then we'll get around to questioning as rapidly as we can.

So, if you would like to start off, Ambassador Wood.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. WOOD, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN**

Mr. WOOD. I thank you very much, Senator Kerry.

I am grateful to the Senate for having confirmed me to be Ambassador to Colombia, and I am honored to appear before you again, as President Bush's nominee to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

The United States has been closely involved in Afghanistan since 2001, and rightly, since the Taliban regime served as the launching pad for al-Qaeda's savage attack on our cities that year.

Afghanistan is struggling to find its way to the path of responsive popular government and economic development that was interrupted in 1978 by a coup, then by invasion, then by internal strife. In Afghanistan, the United States is pursuing a comprehensive solution that combines the push of security and law enforcement, with the pull of economic opportunity, humanitarian aid, and peaceful reintegration.

Since 2001, the United States has provided \$14.2 billion in assistance, of which \$9 billion was to train and equip Afghan security and police forces, and \$5.2 billion was for reconstruction. If confirmed, my job would be to support every aspect of this comprehensive strategy.

Our assistance already has produced an impressive record of accomplishment. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, in Berlin last month, compared to last year and previous years, this year there is more army, more police, more government, more roads, more development, more economic opportunity, more legitimate economy, and more pressure on the Taliban from all sides, including Pakistan.

Now, the administration is seeking assistance of \$10.6 billion over 2 years, of which \$8.6 billion is for police and security assistance, and \$2 billion for reconstruction, and other economic aid.

The major categories of our economic and reconstruction assistance include economic growth, democracy, governance, roads, electricity, health and education, and food aid.

Special programs are aimed at the south, traditionally the poorest region in Afghanistan, and a center for opium poppy cultivation, and insurgent activity.

An estimated one-third of the Afghan economy is based on the heroine trade. That share is declining steadily as legitimate economic activity grows faster. But poppy cultivation is well-defended by those who profit from it, including the supposedly spiritual Taliban.

Techniques to fight the drug trade differ from country to country, but continuation of the violence and corruption of the drug trade feeds the Taliban and puts a low ceiling on everything the Afghans and their friends can hope to accomplish. My job would be to try to forge a consensus, both inside and outside Afghanistan, about how to end the drug trade, and then make it work.

One challenge is the probability of increased violence in the spring by the Taliban, as there has been for the last several years. Although the Taliban probably poses no strategic threat to the Government of Afghanistan at this time, it is important that the Afghan Government, local leaders, internal security forces, and ISAF forces prepare for such attacks. I would consider it a critical part of my job to support them, however possible. These are impressive challenges, worthy of our best efforts.

For my part, I bring 30 years of experience in the Foreign Service to the task. In my current assignment, I have led one of our largest embassies in the world, with more than 2,200 personnel, and 40 offices and agencies in an environment of terrorism and narcotics trafficking.

I am enormously proud of the work of the embassy team over the last few years, and of the accomplishments of our partnership with the government of President Uribe. In this regard, I would like to note that 2 days ago, February 13, marked the fourth anniversary of the capture by the FARC terror organization of Mark Gonsolves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howes. They are America's longest-held hostages. In the embassy, we think about them every day, as we think about their families. Their safe return is not just a matter of policy for us, it is personal. We are grateful for the splendid cooperation of the Uribe Government in the matter, and we hold the FARC responsible for their well-being and immediate safe return.

Although the issues and solutions are different in Afghanistan, I would hope to bring to our new assignment the same focus on mission, teamwork within the embassy, and with our military colleagues, on international cooperation, and on partnership with the government of President Karzai.

Finally, I would like to renew the promise I made in my confirmation hearings in 2003, to embrace a full dialog with this committee, and with the Congress as a whole, to answer your questions fully and honestly, to welcome your visits, and above all, to cooperate to achieve our common goals in Afghanistan.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wood follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. WOOD, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

I am grateful to the Senate for having confirmed me to be Ambassador to Colombia and I am honored to appear before you again as President Bush's nominee to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. I want to thank the President and Secretary Rice for their confidence in me.

In both countries we have a completely positive agenda, helping governments that deserve our help to overcome decades-long problems and provide peace, rule of law, economic opportunity, and responsive government to their people. In both countries, we and our allies also face an acute threat from insurgency, terrorism, and illicit narcotics trafficking.

The United States has been closely involved in Afghanistan since 2001, and rightly, since the Taliban regime served as the launching pad for al-Qaeda's savage attack on our cities that year.

Afghanistan is struggling to find its way to the path of responsive popular government and economic development that was interrupted in 1978 by a coup, then by invasion, and then by internal strife.

After the ouster of the Taliban by Afghan forces in 2001 with strong United States support, in January 2004 Afghanistan adopted a liberal constitution that opened the door to national healing and effective, honest, inclusive government.

In October 2004 the Afghan people elected President Hamid Karzai in open, popular elections with the participation of some 15 candidates and more than 10.5 million registered voters. After his victory, President Karzai, who had been interim President since December 2001, named a multiethnic cabinet to confront the challenges and opportunities of the new Afghanistan, and to develop a new cooperation between the central government and local leadership. In 2005, a multiethnic, nationally representative Parliament was elected into office by the Afghan people. Twenty-seven percent of the Parliamentarians are women.

In Afghanistan, the United States is pursuing a comprehensive solution which combines the "push" of security and law enforcement, with the "pull" of economic opportunity, humanitarian aid, and peaceful reintegration. Since 2001, the United States has provided \$14.2 billion in assistance, of which \$9.0 billion was to train and equip Afghan security and police forces, and \$5.2 billion for reconstruction.

That assistance already has produced an impressive record of accomplishment. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State Boucher in Berlin last month, ". . . compared to last year and previous years, this year there is more army, more police, more government, more roads, more development, more economic opportunity, more legitimate economy, and more pressure on the Taliban from all sides, including Pakistan."

Now the administration is seeking assistance of \$10.6 billion over 2 years, of which \$8.6 billion is for police and security assistance and \$2.0 billion for reconstruction and other economic aid. If confirmed, my job will be to spend all funds effectively and transparently, to achieve the ends they were destined to serve in the best possible way.

The major categories of our economic and reconstruction assistance include economic growth, democracy and governance, roads and electricity, health and education, and food aid. Special programs are aimed at the south, traditionally the poorest region of Afghanistan and a center for opium poppy cultivation and insurgent support.

If confirmed, I expect to have the satisfaction of marking the completion of the road system from Kabul to Herat, which will open up new commercial possibilities and help knit the country together. The United States Government has completed 715 kilometers of the ring road, and has constructed almost 2,300 kilometers of secondary and tertiary roads. I would also expect to see major improvements in the power system. The Kajaki dam hydropower system and the southern power grid should come fully on line in 2008, to get electricity to Kandahar and the south.

I would work to accelerate provision of alternative livelihoods to opium production, including agricultural, livestock, and business assistance, particularly to the southern provinces that are the center of both poppy production and the insurgency. Part of my job would be to coordinate and advance this assistance, and a host of other projects that are moving forward under the auspices of the "Afghanistan Compact" adopted by Afghanistan and more than 60 donor countries and international organizations in London a year ago.

An innovative aspect of international work in Afghanistan is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which provide a local international presence, advance provincial development, governance, and security, and help ensure these efforts are coordinated at the national level. U.S. diplomats and USAID field officers work side by side with their military colleagues at 12 U.S.-led PRTs and 10 PRTs led by other ISAF countries. The United States is playing an important role in these teams and I would expect to make that a big part of my work.

An estimated one-third of the Afghan economy is based on the heroin trade. That share is declining steadily as legitimate economic activity grows faster. But poppy cultivation has existed in Afghanistan for years, and is well-defended by those who profit from it, including the supposedly spiritual Taliban.

Techniques to fight the drug trade differ from country to country. But one thing is clear: Continuation of the violence and corruption of the drug trade feeds the Taliban and puts a low ceiling on everything the Afghans and their friends can hope to accomplish there. In this regard, my job would be to try to forge a consensus both inside and outside Afghanistan about how to deal with the drug trade, and then make it work.

The region is a critical, difficult one, filled with hopeful news and with daunting challenges. If confirmed, my job will be to help a developing and democratic Afghanistan serve as a bridgehead of stability for its neighbors, and be part of their solution, not part of their problem. In return, the United States will expect that Afghanistan's neighbors do everything in their power to isolate that Taliban, dismantle its insurgency, and counter its support for the heroin trade. I would intend to continue the practice of my predecessor and Ambassador Crocker to maintain the closest possible dialog and cooperation between embassy Kabul and Embassy Islamabad. I note that Secretary of Defense Gates had successful talks with the Pakistani Government last weekend, in which the subject of Afghanistan figured prominently.

One challenge is the probability of increased violence in the spring by the Taliban, as there has been for the last several years. It is important that the Afghan Government, local leaders, internal security forces, and ISAF forces prepare for such attacks. I would consider it a critical part of my job to support them however possible. But it is also important that we not overemphasize what the Taliban is capable of. As General Eikenberry, outgoing commander of the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan, said last month in Berlin: "The enemy is not strong. The challenge of Afghanistan is that the institutions of the state remain weak. . . . There have been no areas of Afghanistan where this extremist enemy has been able to take an existing presence of the Government of Afghanistan—with good security, with good social services—and push that out. There are no examples of that. It's the areas of weak governance where the enemy has been able to gain strength." I agree.

If confirmed, my job—more than any other—will be to cooperate with ISAF to maintain security, and to advance as rapidly as I can the strengthening of national and local Afghan institutions and the provision of new economic opportunity to the Afghan people.

These are impressive challenges, worthy of our best efforts. For my part, I bring 30 years of experience in the Foreign Service to the task. In my current assignment, I have led one of our largest embassies in the world—with more than 2,200 personnel and 40 offices and agencies—in an environment of terrorism and narcotics trafficking. Our core task was to support Colombia's popular government and strengthen its democratic institutions in order to better confront these challenges. The fight is not over and there is much more to be done. I am enormously proud of the work of the embassy team over the last few years, and of the accomplishments of our partnership with the government of President Uribe.

In this regard, I would like to note that 2 days ago, February 13, marked the fourth anniversary of the capture by the FARC terror organization of Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howes. They are America's longest-held hostages. In the embassy we think about them every day, as we think about their families. Their safe return is not just a matter of policy for us; it is personal. We are grateful for the splendid cooperation of the Uribe Government in the matter. And we hold the FARC responsible for their well-being and immediate safe return.

Although the issues and solutions are different in Afghanistan, I would hope to bring to my new assignment the same focus on mission, on teamwork within the embassy and with our military colleagues, and on cooperative partnership with the government of President Karzai.

Finally, I would like to renew the promise I made in my confirmation hearings in 2003: To embrace a full dialog with this committee and with the Congress as a whole, to answer your questions fully and honestly, to welcome your visits, and above all to cooperate to achieve our common goals in Afghanistan.

Thank you.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Crocker.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ**

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the committee——

Senator KERRY. Let me, excuse me Ambassador Crocker, I see Senator Lugar has joined us. Let me turn to Senator Lugar and see if he has an opening statement first, and then we'll proceed.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I do have a short opening statement. Let me deliver a part of it, and then leave the rest for the record.

I just simply wanted to join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming our distinguished nominees, Ambassadors William Wood and Ryan Crocker. The posts they will soon occupy are among the most consequential ambassadorships in American history. They will be at the epicenter of our efforts to secure and reconstruct Afghanistan and Iraq, and help provide those governments with the best opportunity to achieve nationhood.

What happens in these countries in the coming months will deeply affect, and perhaps, determine whether the Middle East will move forward more productively and in peaceful conditions beyond the grip of terrorist influences and sectarian violence.

Two weeks ago, before this committee, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recalled a half-century of United States involvement in the Middle East. He argued that this history was not accidental. We have been deeply involved in the region, because we have enduring vital interests at stake, and protecting those interests cannot be relegated to a political timeline. We may make tactical decisions about the deployment or withdrawal of forces, but we must plan for a strong, strategic position in the region for many years to come.

We need to be prepared for a whole array of United States forces to defend oil assets, target terrorists, deter adventurism by Iran, provide a buffer against regional sectarian conflict, and generally reassure friendly governments that the United States is committed to the Middle East and South Asian security.

With so much at stake, I am pleased the President has nominated veteran diplomats and experienced managers to lead the American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the rest of my statement be entered in the record, and I thank you for giving me this opportunity.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Without objection, it will be made part of the record.

Ambassador Crocker, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

I join in welcoming our distinguished nominees, Ambassadors William Wood and Ryan Crocker. The posts they would occupy are among the most consequential ambassadorships in American history. They will be at the epicenter of our efforts to secure and reconstruct Afghanistan and Iraq and to help provide those governments with the opportunity to achieve nationhood.

What happens in these countries will deeply affect—and perhaps determine—whether the Middle East will move toward more productive and peaceful conditions beyond the grip of terrorist influences and sectarian violence.

Two weeks ago, before this committee, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recalled a half-century of United States involvement in the Middle East. He argued that this history was not accidental. We have been deeply involved in the region because we have enduring vital interests at stake. Protecting these interests cannot be relegated to a political timeline.

We may make tactical decisions about the deployment or withdrawal of forces, but we must plan for a strong strategic position in the region for years to come. We need to be preparing for how we will array U.S. forces to defend oil assets, target terrorists, deter adventurism by Iran, provide a buffer against regional sectarian conflict, and generally reassure friendly governments that the United States is committed to Middle East and South Asian security. With so much at stake, I am pleased that the President has nominated veteran diplomats and managers to lead the American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is also vital that the Bush administration move quickly to fill the ambassadorial post in Pakistan being vacated by Ambassador Crocker. Our relations with that country also are important to U.S. national security. Ambassador Wood's efforts in Afghanistan will be heavily impacted by what happens across the border, and we must ensure that there is no prolonged absence in Islamabad at such a critical time for the region.

Today, we look forward to a thorough discussion with Ambassadors Wood and Crocker about their perspectives on Afghanistan and Iraq and their plans for providing leadership to our embassies. We recognize the deep personal commitment necessary to undertake these difficult assignments, and we are grateful that leaders of their stature and experience are willing to step forward.

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, may I begin by introducing members of my family who are with me today?

Senator KERRY. Absolutely.

Mr. CROCKER. My wife, Christine.

Senator KERRY. Welcome, delighted to have you here.

Mr. CROCKER. Christine and I met in Baghdad in 1979, and we've deployed together ever since. To Beirut twice, to Afghanistan, and now to Pakistan.

Sitting next to Christine are my sister-in-law, Cindy Hall, and my niece, Cameron Hall. They have been our home front throughout these many years, and I'm delighted they're here today.

Senator KERRY. Well, we're delighted to welcome them, thank you.

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, it's an honor and a privilege to appear before you today as the President's nominee to be Ambassador to Iraq. I thank you for this opportunity, and for your consideration.

Mr. Chairman, the picture is not a pretty one. Iraq today is in the grip of terrorist, insurgent, sectarian, and criminal violence that threatens the country's future. This violence, particularly in Baghdad, has spiraled out of control. Daily life for ordinary Iraqis in Baghdad is dangerous and difficult.

The only way to give political and economic progress in Iraq a chance, to give the Iraqi people a chance, is for the Iraqi Govern-

ment, with our help, to wrest the power on the street away from violent groups.

In an ideal world, the Iraqis would be able to do the job themselves. However, it takes time to build this capability, and this is why the United States needs to help.

But it is the Iraqis, Mr. Chairman, who must lead this effort, and Prime Minister al-Maliki has pledged to go after anyone who perpetrates sectarian or political killing, regardless of sectarian affiliation.

There are other problems as well. The hard political reality is that the average Iraqi still does not feel that the government's actions have brought about an improvement in security or the quality of life. They say much the same thing about the actions of the Coalition.

Not enough jobs is a problem, corruption is a problem. So are the lack of electricity, and the inability of the government to spend its own budget.

Despite all of the problems Iraq faces, there are also some encouraging developments. Iraq, since 2005, has held two national elections. The Iraqi people drafted and approved a constitution. Iraq is moving toward local and provincial elections, which should legitimize local political leaders, and broaden the representation of groups that did not participate in the past.

On the economic front, Iraqis are debating a hydrocarbon law that we hope will create new investment, and most important, reinforce the principle that all Iraqis will share in the future wealth of the economy. Iraq has made progress toward concluding an international compact, which, when completed, will commit Iraq to a comprehensive economic reform package and return for assistance and incentives by the international community.

All of this said, Mr. Chairman, it is security that remains the greatest challenge that Iraq faces. The President has laid out a new way forward. Containing the violence, particularly in Baghdad and Anbar, is the immediate imperative, but it is not the full solution.

The President's plan to augment our forces by more than 20,000 troops, also calls for a doubling of the number of provincial reconstruction teams, and PRTs, as well as strengthening the existing 10 PRTs to help with economic and political development at the provincial and local level.

A successful strategy for Iraq, as you've said, Mr. Chairman, must go beyond military operations. The two efforts, military and civilian, go hand-in-hand. The one cannot succeed without the other.

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken to General Petraeus, and I can assure you that if I am confirmed by the Senate, there will be full unity of effort by the civilian and the military components of the government.

Iraqis must see that military operations are accompanied by visible and enduring improvements in their lives, and to do this, we need resources. Our military has to be resourced to support Iraqi forces to clear and to hold. Adequate funding for the civilian agencies is equally important, if we are to accomplish the critical third element of that equation, to build.

Mr. Chairman, as the President has told Prime Minister Maliki, the patience of the American people is not unlimited. It will require hard work, and hard decisions on the part of the Iraqis. If you confirm me, I intend to deliver that message clearly to Iraq's leaders. The Iraqis have to make some tough choices, and then follow through on them. We need to help them to do so.

Their success will be ours, in Iraq, in the region, and beyond. But similarly, failure would feed the forces of terror and extremism well beyond Iraq's borders. We would all pay the price.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pay tribute to the extraordinary men and women of the State Department, USAID, and the other civilian agencies who join our military forces in serving our Nation. They have volunteered for difficult duty in Iraq, and elsewhere, as we fight this long war, at a cost to their family lives and often at great personal risk.

We have no shortage of volunteers for Iraq, a tribute to the loyalty and patriotism of those who serve the State Department and its sister agencies.

Mr. Chairman, without question, we are in a very hard fight. The one assurance I can give you is that, if I am confirmed, I will draw on all of my experience, and all my ability, to provide the best leadership I can for our mission in Iraq, and in support of the Iraqi people.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crocker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, distinguished committee members, ladies and gentlemen,

It is an honor and privilege to appear before you today as the President's nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq. Thank you for this opportunity and for your consideration. It is an honor to have the chance to continue to serve our great Nation. And it is a particular privilege to have the opportunity to work with the brave men and women of the U.S. State Department and our other civilian agencies who serve alongside our military personnel.

Mr. Chairman, I first served in Iraq in the late 1970s when Saddam Hussein consolidated his hold on power. I next worked on Iraq issues from 2001 to 2003, when I was Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. In 2003, I was the first Director of Governance for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.

Mr. Chairman, Iraq today is in the grip of insurgent, terrorist, sectarian, and criminal violence that threatens the country's future. The central provinces of Baghdad, Anbar, and Diyala, in particular, face violence from many sources: Al-Qaeda in Iraq, sectarian Shia militias, Sunni insurgents, foreign jihadists, organized criminals, and groups backed by Iraq's neighbors that seem intent on spreading harm and chaos. This violence, particularly in Baghdad, has spiraled out of control. Daily life for ordinary Iraqis in Baghdad is dangerous and difficult.

The only way to give political and economic progress in Iraq a chance—to give the people a chance—is for the Iraqi Government, with our help, to wrest the power on the street away from these violent groups by directly confronting the sources of the violence. In an ideal world, the Iraqis would be able to do the job themselves. Unfortunately, it takes time to build this kind of capability. And this is why the United States needs to help. The Iraqi people need friends and allies to help them stop those in Iraq who are using violence to win power, but as the President and the Secretary have said repeatedly, we must see the Iraqis themselves leading this effort and delivering on their promises with concrete action.

Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has pledged to go after anyone who perpetrates sectarian or political killing, regardless of sectarian affiliation. As he said himself last week, progress is slower than he—or we—would like. The leaders of some networks of insurgents and militias have been detained or killed. However, there is

much, much more that needs to be done by the Iraqi Government. The government must also deal with corruption as well as its inability to spend its own budget for reasons that make sense to individual Iraqi bureaucrats but make no sense in the face of the urgent need to provide security, develop an economy, and reestablish the Rule of Law. Security is, and will remain, the greatest and most immediate challenge we will face.

Mr. Chairman, on the economic and political fronts, we also face some very real challenges. The reality of Iraqi politics is that the average Iraqi still does not feel that the government's actions have brought about an improvement in security or the quality of life. They say the same thing about the actions of the coalition. The lack of jobs is a problem. Corruption is a problem. So is the lack of electricity. The legacy of more than 20 years of Saddam's misrule is coupled with a violent insurgency that began in April 2003 to increase the tribulations of the people of Baghdad and Iraq.

Despite all the problems Iraq faces, there are signs of hope. It is no small feat that Iraq since 2005 has held two national elections. The Iraqi people drafted and approved a constitution. In 2006, they formed a National Unity Government. And Iraq is moving closer to holding local and provincial elections, which could take place as early as this fall. Such elections should legitimize local political leaders and broaden the representation of groups that did not participate in the past. Although steps have been taken to start a process of reconciliation, visible progress remains to be seen. Iraqis have taken steps forward on reforms to the de-Baathification laws—but there is a long way to go before there is a law that everyone can accept.

In the region, Iraq's top leaders are now reaching out to their neighbors to normalize diplomatic and economic relationships. Iraq is also openly and directly confronting and engaging Syria and Iran on their unhelpful interference in Iraq's political and security situations, and trying to urge them to play more constructive roles.

On the economic front, Iraq is also moving toward a hydrocarbon law that we hope will create new investment that will benefit the Iraqi people and the world economy as well as reinforce the principle that all Iraqis will share in the future wealth of the country. Iraq has made steady progress toward concluding an international compact, which, when completed, will commit Iraq to a comprehensive economic reform package in return for assistance and incentives by compact donor countries. Again, like everything else, there will be massive amounts of work to be done, which will require the full commitment of the Iraqi Government to achieve.

Mr. Chairman, in support of these efforts, the President, on January 10, laid out a new way forward in Iraq. Containing the violence, particularly in Baghdad and Anbar, is the immediate imperative, but it is not the full solution. This is why the President's plan to augment our forces by 21,500 troops also includes a considerable civilian support reinforcement of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams—PRTs—to help with economic and political development at the provincial and local level. The President's plan calls for a doubling of the number of PRTs as well as strengthening the existing 10 PRTs. A successful strategy for Iraq must go beyond military operations. The two efforts—civilian and military—go hand in hand. The one cannot succeed without the other. Iraqis must see that military operations are accompanied by visible and enduring improvements in their lives. To do this, we need resources. Our military has to be resourced to clear and hold. Adequate funding for the civilian agencies is equally important if we are to accomplish the critical third element of the equation—building.

Mr. Chairman, as the President told Prime Minister Maliki, the patience of the American people is not unlimited. It will require hard work—and hard decisions—on the part of the Iraqis. If you confirm me, I intend to deliver that message clearly to Iraq's leaders. At the same time, the United States is not the kind of country that abandons its friends in their darkest hour. To do so now in Iraq would unleash a series of destructive consequences not just in Iraq, but for the entire region and for our own vital interests. The Iraqis have to make some hard choices and then follow through on them. We need to help them do so.

Mr. Chairman, before I close, I would like to pay tribute to the extraordinary men and women of the State Department, USAID, and the other civilian agencies serving our Nation. They have volunteered for difficult duty in Iraq and elsewhere as we fight this long war, at a cost to their family lives and often at great personal risk. We have no shortage of volunteers for Iraq, a tribute to the loyalty and patriotism of those who work for the State Department and our sister agencies. I would also like to take the opportunity to express my profound respect for our Foreign Service Nationals who help staff our embassies worldwide. They are dedicated, courageous colleagues who deserve a great deal of recognition. In Iraq, many of our local staff work under hardship, including threats to themselves and their families, in support of building a better world for them and for us.

Mr. Chairman, without question, we are in a very hard fight. The one assurance I can give you is that if confirmed, I will draw on all my experience and ability to provide the best leadership I can for our mission in support of the Iraqi people.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Ambassador Crocker.

Let me just say to my colleagues, that we're under the gun, here, in terms of a vote coming up, so I'm going to limit everybody—myself included—to a 5-minute question period. I hope, I know we all chafe under the time we get, and it's difficult. Normally, I'd love to do more, but during the votes, for those who have extended questions, we can cycle through in a way that will give people a little more time to be able to ask questions if they want to.

Again, let me emphasize how lucky we are, I think, to have professionals of your caliber willing to take on this task. You are taking on probably two of the most important posts in the entire diplomatic field today, and certainly, two of the most challenging. And, so it's really important to us to be able to have the right people there.

Three of us here on this committee—Senator Webb, who's not here, Senator Hagel, and myself—were once young soldiers, plunked down in the middle of a civil war. And we learned, firsthand, how really difficult it is when you don't speak the language, and you're trying to sort through culture and history. And, so I think we're particularly sensitive to what our young soldiers are being asked to do over there. And we understand their enthusiasm, and their courage, and their commitment to the mission.

The issue really is, Ambassador Crocker, no matter what we do on the ground militarily, the fundamental struggle there is a struggle for power, with deep cultural and historical beliefs on both sides.

Sunni have mostly run the country. Not always, there have been some instances of a kind of, you know, meeting of the minds, but by and large they've run it, and the most modern history, the Shia uprising of the early 1990s was met with a brutal—tens of thousands of Shia murdered—response. That memory, and my conversations with Shia over there, when I've been over there, is large.

The Sunni, on the other hand, are not only fearful in the neighboring countries—King Abdullah, President Mubarak, the Saudis—about the rise of Shiism, and the connection to Iran, but they are also, within Iraq, operating with a deep-rooted belief that they were born to run the show. And they believe they're going to return.

Those of us who have been watching this struggle now for these past few years are confounded by the absence of an Iraqi commitment to resolving those fundamental differences. We're now 4 years into it, we're several years into a sort of diplomatic, quote, effort. We still don't have an oil law. We still don't have a resolution of the fundamental structure of the federalism, and how that would play out.

So, would you share with the committee your vision of, sort of, the order of priorities, and what you see as the possibilities of your ability to affect that, and leverage it, and do you agree that that is the essential ingredient? Not what General Petraeus does, but in fact, Prime Minister Maliki's conference—which we have yet to see materialize—and the diplomatic, political resolution?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I agree completely, that the core of the problem—and therefore the core of any possible solution—is political. Military—successful military action—can provide the space, and set the stage for political solutions, but it is only political solutions that can resolve the conflict.

That said, sir, the violence that we see every day on our TV screens, and that the Iraqis live through every day, has now dominated, in my view, the political discourse. It is hard for me to see how Iraqis can act on some of the other critical elements that you identified, in this atmosphere of violence.

And, that is why—in my view—the Baghdad security plan, led by Iraqis, supported by us, is a critical undertaking.

Senator KERRY. But, let me just ask you about that, quickly. In Israel, where the security has been intense, where for years the military has had super-training, there's a cohesiveness, there's a national state—there's been little to prevent somebody from walking into a restaurant, or a crowded bus, and blowing it up. It seems to me that, unless you, sort of—I mean, would you speak to that? I mean, isn't there even—with less security, less cohesiveness, greater divergency of different interests and militias, that ability to create violence, absent the political solution—no matter how many troops you put in, it seems to me—is going to loom large.

Mr. CROCKER. And that would lead me, Mr. Chairman, to approach this issue with the sense that we don't start with a list of priorities, one, two, three—we've got a series of urgent priorities.

If the surge effort is able to bring down violence, then that will quickly have to be reinforced, first on the ground, in these neighborhoods where it's taking place. That is the importance, I think, of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We've already chosen the core leadership for those teams. They will be going through training beginning in a couple of weeks and they will be on the ground before the end of March.

The hope, Mr. Chairman, would be that a combination of a dampening down of violence, reinforced by political and economic activity on the ground, could then create an atmosphere in which we and the Iraqis are able to leverage some of the more strategic issues that you mentioned. Getting the hydrocarbon law through, reforming the de-Baathification process, moving ahead with a constitutional reform process. On the economic side, moving toward budget implementation, so that Iraqi resources are actually expended by the Iraqi people. I see this as all linked together.

I think we have to see if a dynamic can be started there. Prime Minister Maliki's initiative for a regional conference that Iraq would host, I think, is an excellent step in this direction, to bring in all of Iraq's neighbors. Some have been supportive, some have been neutral, some of have been destructive. They all play a role, and that role needs to be shaped to be better.

So, I think this is a good initiative, and if this kind of regional diplomatic activity is accompanied by some positive steps on the ground, I think it will be more possible to get Iraq's neighbors to step forward in a constructive way.

Then one can take it a final circle out, to the international effort. The international engagement, through the international compact with Iraq can reinforce all of this, and be reinforced by progress at

the center. So, I would see these as interlocking imperatives—we've got to move on all of them, we've got to do it, pretty much in real time, but the violence is—if there was one that stands out, it is the violence, and the need to temper that down. And, I think we're starting in the right place.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Ambassador. I have other questions, but I'll wait until we come back for the next round.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Wood, I have two areas I'll ask, to begin with, and then let you use up the—my allotted time.

First of all, you have mentioned experience in Colombia with the drug trade. Would you trace what parallels there might be between that experience in Colombia, and what you may find in Afghanistan? And, furthermore, how involved can the American ambassador, or the American presence be in governing and bringing to a halt the drug trade? Or, is the situation so self-sustainable that, regardless of our efforts, or of others, it is bound to be, and you simply try to temper it and live with it?

Second, arguably, the new supplemental that we're seeking has a sizable portion for security reform. Now, this would be the fourth attempt at police reform in Afghanistan, one by the Germans, two by us—none very sustainable thus far, or very comprehensive. And yet, this is tremendously important for the governance of the country, leaving aside the drug trade, governance in general, and the presidency of Hamid Karzai.

Would you give your thoughts—as you reflected upon the drug trade and police training in Afghanistan?

Mr. WOOD. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Regarding, there are some parallels between the situation in Colombia, but there are also many differences. From a technical point of view, the predominant drug in Colombia is cocoa, which is a shrub, which is difficult to eradicate, because you have to get the root system, as well as what's above the surface. And in Afghanistan, the predominant drug is opium poppy, which is a flower which you can kill simply by breaking the stem.

Colombia has a year-round growing season, Afghanistan only has one growing season a year. Possibly, for me, frankly, the principle difference is that virtually all of the cocoa grown in Colombia goes to the United States. Which means it directly affects our citizens, and a conservative estimate is that 3,000 United States citizens die a year from cocaine produced in Colombia. That's more Americans than died in the World Trade Towers. So, Colombian drugs represent a World Trade Tower tragedy every year.

In Afghanistan, only about an estimated 10 percent of the heroine reaches the United States, and the other 90 percent is in Europe, and Russian, and elsewhere.

That said, as I said in my statement, one thing that was completely clear in Colombia was that illicit narcotics trade corrupts everything it touches—good governance, clean governance, honorable livelihood in the countryside are all impossible where there is a flourishing drug trade. We think of terrorists as the lowest form of human life, because they target innocents. In Colombia, we've

seen terrorists corrupted by the drug trade, to give up even the vestige of ideology, in favor of serving that perverse industry.

So, as we support the Government of Karzai, as we support good governance, both centrally, and in the provinces, and where the people live—more local level, and sort of a valley-by-valley governance, destroying the opium poppy cultivation and the drug trade inside of Afghanistan is absolutely fundamental to achieving all of other goals—security, political, social, economic, developmental, humanitarian.

I think the United States can play a role—a very important role—in forming a consensus which currently does not exist, either inside Afghanistan, or amazingly, among the countries whose citizens are the primary victims of the heroine trade from Afghanistan. Again, the techniques may be different from those of Colombia, but it's absolutely crucial that we reach a consensus, and move out against this corrosive cancer.

Senator LUGAR. How about police reform?

Mr. WOOD. Police reform—police reform is absolutely fundamental. Policemen talk about the golden thread, which unites policemen with the communities they serve. And, if the communities don't trust the police, if the police don't feel a sense of responsibility to those communities, then it's not a police force, it's an internal, repressive force.

We are working very hard, I am having meetings with our—I have had meetings with our, our—people in charge of our police-training program, both on—in the State Department and in the Defense Department, which has the lead in the program for us. It's not easy. I think we can do it, and I can only say that it's one of my highest priorities.

Senator KERRY. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for being here today. You're both going to be, obviously, taking on some of the most challenging assignments in our government. And I want to join the Chairman and all our colleagues in thanking you for your service.

I'd like also to take this opportunity to share with you my admiration and appreciation for the men and women who are serving in our embassies in Kabul and Baghdad, and for those serving in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout each country. These are incredibly brave and committed individuals, and we so rarely hear about the sacrifices they make and the dangers they face as they do their work. So, I hope you'll both communicate that to the many people that you'll be working with.

Ambassador Crocker, it was good to see you this week, and I want to ask you if you're confident that sending more United States troops to Iraq—according to the President's new plan—will help address the increasing sectarian violence, as civilian fatalities, bombings, strengthen the sectarian militias, and the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq.

Mr. CROCKER. I think that the Baghdad security plan is an essential endeavor, if the tide is going to turn in Iraq. It will not, in itself, be sufficient, as I said earlier, but it is necessary, in my view, if the Iraqis are going to get to a better place in a number of areas.

The Iraqis are the main force in this effort, and I—as I look at the situation at this time, if I do go to Iraq, if I am confirmed by the Senate—I see this as an important transition period, in which the Iraqis simply must take the lead. They must take the lead in security, they must take the lead in doing what only Iraqis can do, which is broker political solutions—they must take the lead in driving their own economy.

Senator FEINGOLD. I certainly agree with that, but let me get back to the question of whether the troop surge will help. The data this committee has reviewed shows that regardless of the size of United States troops' presence in Iraq, Iraqi civilian fatalities, estimated strength of the insurgency, strength of the Shia militias, daily average of interethnic attack and the estimated number of foreign fighters have all risen during the past 3 years, without fail. Given that we can't, from this data, draw a connection between U.S. troop levels, and any of these important indicators, how can you be confident that sending in more U.S. troops will actually have a positive impact? And, I've heard your other disclaimers, but, what is it about this particular troop increase that you have any confidence in believing it will affect those factors?

Mr. CROCKER. There are several factors. First, and again, the most important is the commitment of Iraqi forces. As I understand it, 18 brigades of Iraqi forces committed to the Baghdad security plan. Previous efforts, again, as I understand it have not succeeded as had been hoped, because of limited forces. This time, the Iraqis are committed to providing very substantial forces.

That said, it seems to me that our role in support is going to be fairly crucial. They are not yet ready to undertake something as enormously challenging—and you've described the challenge—on their own. So, the—approximately five brigades of U.S. forces that we would commit to this, I think, play a critical, supporting role in increasing the chances for success of this entire endeavor.

And, this is a different mission than we have seen in the past. In this case, the explicit mission statement is to provide security for the Iraqi people. That's the “hold” part of the operation, clear and then hold. In the past, we have not had the forces, or even necessarily the mission, to do the hold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Ambassador, thank you.

Mr. CROCKER. There's no guarantee of success, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me quickly—I understand you wanted to answer more, but I only have a few more seconds to ask questions of Ambassador Wood, but I obviously enjoyed our conversation.

And, I also enjoyed our meeting, Ambassador Wood. Given that security conditions have continued to deteriorate, particularly in southern Afghanistan, tell us what specific changes the United States Government is making to react and respond effectively to the new conditions on the ground. What are we going to do differently?

Mr. WOOD. As you know, Senator Feingold, we've just had a change of command, and a restructuring of the ISAF leadership in Afghanistan. We recently decided to ask a brigade of the 10th Mountain Division to extend its stay, and the Pentagon announced yesterday that the 173rd Airborne Division—Airborne Brigade—would be moving to Afghanistan.

We are, and the President has requested \$10.6 billion in new funding. So, we in the United States are trying to do our part to beef up security, and beef up the social, economic, and other programs that form the counterpart of security, and a necessary counterpart. At the same time, Secretary Gates met in Seville with our NATO allies, urging them to increase their participation, and equally importantly, increase the aggressiveness of their deployment. More than 60 nations are contributing on the economic, and developmental, and humanitarian side—I think that we are sharpening our efforts. I don't think we're changing our efforts, but I think we're sharpening them, and focusing them better.

Certainly, the first thing, the first question I will be asking myself, if confirmed, upon arrival in Kabul is, "Is the mix right?" It looks to me like it's right at the moment, it looks to me like it's a good balance. But certainly, I think over the last month, just last month, we've seen a substantial refocusing and reenergizing of our efforts in Afghanistan. Thank you.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Ambassador.

Thank you, Senator Feingold.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Gentlemen, welcome. We are grateful that each of you has agreed to take on a new assignment, a difficult assignment, but has been noted here this morning, the two of you represent two of the most highly regarded, experienced diplomats we have in our Government. And again, we are grateful that you agreed to take on new challenges.

Christine, thank you for your continued role in all of this, and we are very mindful of the fact that you began your career alongside the Ambassador, and it will be, what, 28 years since you met in Baghdad. I'm not sure it's a reunion, but nonetheless, you will be going back together, and thank you for doing what you're doing.

I'd like to focus on Iran with each of you for a moment. Headlines for papers across the world today are filled with headlines like the Washington Post, "Iranian Aid Forces in Iraq, Bush Alleges," "President Denies Seeking Pretexual War With Iran," there's another story, "Eleven Elite Iranian Troops Killed in Bombing, U.S. Role Alleged." It has been much the topic, Iran, our role, Iran's role in Iraq the last few days. And I want to get your, each of you, your sense of a couple of things.

One, I'm sure you both are aware of a July 2004 report that was offered by now-Defense Secretary Robert Gates, as well as the former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who just recently testified before this committee. They cochaired this report, underwritten by the Counsel on Foreign Relations, entitled, "Iran, Time for a New Approach." And they says some things, as I'm quoting from the Gates-Brzezinski report, "The current lack of sustained engagement with Iran harms U.S. interests in a critical region of the world." They went on to say, "Iran could play a potentially significant role in promoting a stable, pluralistic government in Baghdad." They went on to say, "It is in the interest of the United States to engage selectively with Iran to promote regional stability."

Since Iran is going to dominate much of your lives, as already it does with you, Ambassador Crocker, as you are Ambassador, currently, to Pakistan, and certainly Ambassador Wood will be dealing with Iran in his new capacity. My question to each of you—do you agree with what Secretary Gates and Dr. Brzezinski said in their report, that we should engage Iran, and I would also note—as you have both read, the 79 recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton report, which they also focus on new diplomatic initiatives with Syria and Iran.

We'll start with you, Ambassador Crocker.

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

I began my career in Iran, before the Revolution and I have some lingering sense of the complexities of that country and civilization.

Sir, I believe that Iran should be engaged. I think, in the context of Iraq, that engagement should focus between Iraq and Iran—I think, that's where the emphasis needs to be. The Iraqi Government has reached out to Tehran and, as you know, the Prime Minister and the President have visited, and there have been senior Iranian visitors in Baghdad. We, in no way, oppose this.

Similarly, Prime Minister Maliki's initiative to convene a conference of neighbors that would include Iran, I think, is important. Iran is a neighbor. Iraq's largest and longest land border is with Iran, that geography doesn't change. Iran is currently playing a, not only unhelpful, but I think a deeply disturbing role in Iraq. We would obviously like to see that change. At this juncture, I am not persuaded that we, ourselves, could be the agent of that change.

The Iranians understand us, I think, pretty clearly. Perhaps through engagement in a regional context they will take another look at what their long-term interests in the region are, and vis-a-vis Iraq are, and shift course. But, my own view is that this is the vector on which we should proceed.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. If I could ask Ambassador Wood to respond.

Thank you, Ambassador Crocker.

Mr. WOOD. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Just very briefly, of course, Iraq and Afghanistan bracket Iran, so for both of us, Iran is an important—fundamentally important issue. And, in the case of Afghanistan, the United States and Iran have a number of interests in common. There are a number of areas where we could, profitably, work together if we could begin a process of engagement. Iran is strongly counter-drug, for instance. They have one of the highest numbers of heroine addicts in the world. And their efforts to fight the heroine trade is extraordinary.

At the same time, we have to get past the issue of weapons of mass destruction, solve it, and we—indeed, if, as some reports are indicating—there is some involvement by Iran in providing weapons to people who are shooting at Americans, that becomes an enormously complicating factor.

I completely agree with Ambassador Crocker, and engagement—a constructive engagement with Iran would be to everyone's benefit. But I think the decision lies in Tehran more than it does in Washington.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just say, I am reticent to support either one of you. Not because of your abilities, or your qualifications—I think you're imminently qualified. But it seems that every time we support one of the President's nominees for one of these critical positions in Iraq or Afghanistan, then we hear from the President that—he uses it as a criticism for us not supporting his policies. And, as far as I'm concerned, if I do end up supporting your candidacies for these nominations, it won't be because I support his policies. And I would urge the White House to reconsider that tact, because I think they're going to put some very imminently qualified candidates, that would serve the country well, in peril, if that continues to be the course under which the administration criticizes those of us who vote for their nominees that are qualified, but ultimately is used as a criticism, subsequently, for not supporting the President's policies.

Having said that, let me ask both of you, when you take your oath, who is it to?

Mr. WOOD. The Constitution.

Mr. CROCKER. To the Constitution of the United States; to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, sir.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. WOOD. Exactly, the Constitution.

Senator MENENDEZ. And that means, being honest and forthright when you come before the Senate, is that not true? As part of that oath?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Absolutely.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, because I ask that question, because I think we need some honest and straightforward talk, particularly from those who are going to be our ambassadors in Iraq, in Afghanistan, because I'm not particularly sure that we've always heard that.

Let me ask you, Ambassador Crocker, when you were in Baghdad from May to August in 2003 as the first Director of Governance with the Coalition Provisional Authority, helping to create Iraq's governing council, there was an article in the Washington Post which read, "Crocker has spent the summer of 2003 helping to form Iraq's governing council, left the country, frustrated, at the CPA's reluctance to reach out to the minority Sunnis.

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. CROCKER. Not exactly, sir. First, I in no way contributed to that article.

Senator MENENDEZ. It's not quoting you. I'm asking you whether the paraphrasing of the statement, is that correct?

Mr. CROCKER. It is not correct.

Senator MENENDEZ. Is the Sunni population adequately represented in the current Iraqi Government?

Mr. CROCKER. No, sir. I was frustrated by our inability to identify in that period of time, Sunnis that had the leadership stature that we could find in the other communities. It was not that any-

one prevented me from making that effort. It was, in those initial months, the tangle of post-Saddam/Sunni politics—was such that it was very, very difficult to identify Sunni leaders of weight and consequence. That I found frustrating. And I still do.

Senator MENENDEZ. Isn't it essential for greater Sunni participation, if we're to have any hope of the type of government with national unity that we hope for?

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, it is one of a number of essential steps that have to be taken. It's really two things, the Sunnis have to be permitted to play a full role, and they have to be prepared to step forward to do it. And I'm not sure that either is the case right now.

Senator MENENDEZ. In the same article, it says, "Even before the invasion, he"—referring to you—"wrote a blunt memo for then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, warning of the uncontrolled sectarian and ethnic tensions that would be released by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein." Can you tell me about that memo?

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, what I can say is that as serving as a Foreign Service Officer of more than 35 years now, I consider it my obligation to offer the best advice I can to my superiors, to argue my points of view, whatever they may be, whatever the issue is. And then, once decisions are taken, it is my obligation to support those decisions. That would be my answer.

Senator MENENDEZ. Was the memo appropriately characterized by that statement that I read to you?

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, again, in this period, I put forward a range of views. I'd really prefer not to characterize the internal advice that I give to my own superiors. Decisions were taken, and I supported those policies.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, let me just close by saying, that's why I asked you who your oath is to. We would appreciate the essence of your candid advice. And that's far more helpful than deviating from answering the question. And it's in that context that I hope—that if you ultimately achieve these positions, I know you've got to respond to the administration—but when you're here before the Senate, I hope you're going to give us some candid advice, not colored by what you feel you have to say because of the administration's policies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to say, I'm thrilled to support these nominees. I had the pleasure of serving as Chairman of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee, my first 4 years in office here, and worked closely with Ambassador Wood in Colombia. He's an extraordinary, extraordinary public official who is—gives so much and takes on tough assignments. Colombia was very tough. And, I think we've seen transformation there, I think Uribe's been a great leader. A lot more to be done, but I am deeply impressed with the ability, the integrity, the energy that Ambassador Wood brings to the process.

Ambassador Crocker and I had a chance to be in Pakistan. I was in Pakistan when he served there—another tough, tough, tough assignment. And now, moving over to a tougher assignment. And, I

think the President has really picked among the best and the brightest and the most talented to take on what is a challenge.

Iraq is a challenge. Iraq is a mess. And we've got to change things. Afghanistan, which when I was in Kabul a couple of years ago, it was bustling. Very different from Baghdad, it was bustling. And now we see challenges. And so, I want to applaud the President for his leadership and vision in choosing these ambassadors. These are some very tough assignments.

Let me focus on two issues, I do want to follow up from my colleague from Nebraska. Ambassador Crocker, you've indicated, and I think your quote was that you were, that Iran is playing a deeply disturbing role in Iraq. They're also playing a deeply disturbing role in Lebanon, aren't they?

Mr. CROCKER. Without question, sir. It's a role they've played since 1982.

Senator COLEMAN. And they're playing a deeply disturbing role, I think, in Gaza, with Hamas?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, sir.

Senator COLEMAN. And our allies, I believe that—one, I believe we have to have a realistic assessment of what we get out of discussion with Iran. I think we should be talking to the Iranians, particularly in the context of a regional discussion. I don't think we should be negotiating with them, unless they recognize that they are playing a deeply disturbing role, and are prepared to change that.

But one of the concerns I have is our allies—the Egyptians, the Saudis, the Jordanians—they have a stake in stability in Iraq, don't they?

Mr. CROCKER. Very much.

Senator COLEMAN. And is it fair to say that Iran's involvement there is one of the barriers, and one of the challenges we have to more fuller engagement from some of our other allies to play the kind of role that we need them to play in Iraq?

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, that's a very important observation. I'd just make two points. First, as I understand it, the reasons put forward by some of our Arab friends in the region for not engaging more fully with the current Iraqi Government is their concern that it is sectarian in nature and in action. Clearly, the Maliki Government needs to show the contrary—that it is a government of all of the Iraqi people, and that's why their performance in the security plan is going to be so closely watched, and so critical.

It is also the case, in my view, that if Iraq's Arab neighbors are concerned over Iranian involvement and influence in Iraq, then they are far better served by engaging themselves, constructively, with the Maliki Government, and with the Iraqi people, being present on the scene, and therefore, being a counterweight to Iranian influence in Iraq.

Iranian influence does not lessen if Iraq's Arab neighbors refrain from playing a constructive role.

Senator COLEMAN. And I would take it, by making that statement here, that that's the same kind of statement you're going to make in discussions with our allies who have an interest in greater stability in the Middle East. They're not playing the roles that need to be played now, and the other side of that is, some of us have

doubts about Maliki's ability to do what has to be done. There is concern that the ties with Iran are such that, is he willing to step forward. And a lot of us are concerned about that. So, I hope that what we're hearing here is what you will be expressing with great passion when you're confirmed.

Mr. CROCKER. That would be my intention, sir, again to both audiences, the Maliki Government, and Iraq's Arab neighbors.

Senator COLEMAN. Ambassador, how important is it that Musharraf fulfill a commitment he made to us when we were in Pakistan, with Senator Frist, leader at that time, a number of my colleagues, he met us, I think it was in uniform, but he said he was going to take off the uniform in a couple of years. There's an election supposed to be taking place, and he made a commitment to democratic principles. He talked about the importance of moderation in the Middle East, and he wanted to be a voice for that. How important is it for him to fulfill that commitment? To, in fact, move from military with a uniform to nonuniform, and have some measure of democracy, in fact. How important is it for civilian Afghanistan for that to occur in Pakistan?

Mr. WOOD. Senator Coleman, first, thank you very much for your kind words with reference to me, and I look forward to continuing to work with you.

Second, I think that the concept of democracy, the concept of civilian democracy, the concept of responsive government, the concept of government that is accountable directly to the voters is a central issue, everywhere in the world. And, obviously, we support it completely.

Frankly, regarding a more detailed answer to your question, I'm a little reluctant to answer a question about Pakistan, sitting next to the sitting Ambassador in Islamabad. So, Ryan, I don't—

Mr. CROCKER. Feel free. [Laughter.]

Mr. WOOD. I don't know if you'd like to elaborate on my answer.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. I do hope that both of you have a lot of conversation. Obviously, what happens in Pakistan is critically important to stability in Afghanistan.

Senator KERRY. Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And let me also take this opportunity to thank both of you for your career of service to our country. You have served our country with distinction, and we're proud of your service. And you're prepared to take on a very challenging assignment.

I just want to underscore what Senator Menendez said, I think it's extremely important that, in the information that you give to us individually, and to our committees, that you be as candid as possible. Because it's important that this country speak with the strongest voice possible on foreign policy issues, with the executive branch and the legislative branch working as closely as we can together. And, I think you can play a critical role in that regard.

I'm one of those who believe that in Iraq, the United States did not give diplomacy the appropriate attention before using military force in Iraq. I mention that because Senator Hagel brought up Iran, and Iran has been in the headlines, and I think many of us are concerned as to whether the use of force will be an opinion used

in Iran, prior to exhausting the diplomatic arena. And, that concerns many of us. Iran's a very—it's a country of great concern to America. It's a great concern to us for many reasons that have been mentioned here today. And it certainly will effect both Afghanistan and Iraq, whatever happens in Iran.

So, I just want to get your view as to the risk that we run? Obviously, we need to deal with Iran's support for terrorism, its support of nuclear weapons program, and we need to engage internationally and I agree with Senator Coleman, there are different ways of engaging internationally. It does not—and we have to be very careful in the manner in which we use engaging Iran. But, I do think that we need to be extremely active on the diplomatic front in that region, and with our allies, as it relates to Iran, and I would like to get your views as to the risks that we had in our foreign policy judgments as it relates to Iran.

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, if I could begin.

Iran is a central issue, there is no question about it, Iraq and Afghanistan, regionally and internationally, as they pursue a nuclear weapons program. The President, the Secretary of State, and other senior officials, I think, have all been clear—we, in no way, seek a military confrontation with Iran on any of these issues. These are problems to be solved politically, but it will require a different course of action on the part of Iran.

I think that statements such as you've seen in the last couple of days where we've brought forward the evidence that the government has of the Iranian involvement in supplying weapons and munitions that are being used to kill our soldiers, is an important part of this process. To make it clear to the Iranians that we know what they're doing, that, in my view, is probably the best way to get them to consider the consequences of their actions, and choose different courses.

But again, I would emphasize, I've been around the Iran issue now for a number of years—it is not the intention of the administration to seek conflict with Iran, it is precisely the opposite.

Senator CARDIN. Ambassador Wood, if you want to comment briefly, I want to ask one more question, so if you could be brief.

Mr. WOOD. I would only add that in my work in New York at our mission before the United Nations, I had the opportunity to work with Iranian diplomats. We didn't agree often, but when we agreed we were able to put those agreements into operation for the benefit of both countries.

The question is can—right now, Iran doesn't seem to want to work with us. And, right now, Iran seems to be taking positions in some really fundamental areas—weapons of mass destruction, and support for—or at least tolerance of support for groups—that are, that don't contribute to stability in a large part of the world, an important part of the world.

So, we have this sad dichotomy on the one hand—we know that if we could find a bridge, through acceptable policies in Iran, both Iran and the United States could benefit. But, we have this gap in the bridge. And the gap in the bridge is on some very fundamental things.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin.

Let me just say to everybody, we've got three votes now, coming up shortly. So, if we can, I think, stay on this schedule, we ought to be able to get every Senator in before we're under the gun there. So, Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank both of you for your service. I know you're extremely qualified, and I look forward to supporting your nomination. I want to thank your families, too, for being here, and for what they do.

I met with General Petraeus, like many of us did individually when he was being confirmed, and I think a lot of us look to him to be someone who will have the strong leadership and the enterprising ability to actually do the things that need to be done on the ground in Iraq.

But, as I was talking with him, he said, "Look, you can confirm me and I'm important. But the most important person that needs to be in Iraq is Ambassador Crocker. He needs to be confirmed, and needs to be on the ground there, because what is happening on that side of the equation actually, in many ways, is more important than what we're doing militarily."

So, I have two questions. One is—and one of the things I asked General Petraeus was—Are you fully supported by the Administration? Are you getting everything you need? And will you tell us if you're not? Because, I think many of us wonder whether there's somebody here, in Washington, waking up every day, making sure that that is the case.

And I guess my first, my first question to you is, do you feel totally supported and explain to us a little bit the line of communication and who you work with daily, here, to make sure that you have the things on the ground there that are most important in solving our problems in Iraq.

Mr. CROCKER. In terms of communications, Senator Corker, I expect I will have direct access to the Secretary of State, to the National Security Advisor, among others, and direct access to the President, as necessary. There is no higher priority for this administration. It's been made clear to me in my consultations within the administration that if I am confirmed and go out there, that whatever I see that needs attention, I need to get it back to the the appropriate level, and the phones I call will answer. So, I go out with the confidence that I will have the access I need, and as a result of that, the support I need.

Senator CORKER. The action on the ground, and you know, you obviously are involved in diplomacy, but obviously there's tremendous operational aspects to what you're doing, and rebuilding a country there, and I heard you mention about the core leadership groups being selected, and that people are being trained, and at the end of March many of them will be on the ground.

One of the things that truly is hard to understand. Unemployment is a huge factor there. One head of household there supports 13 people in Iraq, so it's much different than here in America, and ultimately, maybe even more important, in some ways.

But it seems to me the timing—I know that all of us are looking for tremendous changes to occur over the next 6 months. And it seems to me the timing of what you have to accomplish is going

to be slower, possibly, than necessary to tie in, the way it ought to tie in, to the military action today in Baghdad. I wonder if you could respond to that?

Mr. CROCKER. As I understand the timeline, Senator, none of this happens overnight. Not just on the civilian side, but not on the military side, either. This notion of a surge, it may almost be a misnomer, because it implies something big and immediate—this will be phased in over time, as I'm sure you heard when you spoke to General Petraeus. And, in terms of effects, I believe it is his judgment that it's going to be in the late—in the mid- to late-summer period—that we'll see those. So, the clear and the hold part of this operation will be phased in and built up over time. We're just not going to have one of those instant moments when you can say, "It worked, it's a great success," or "It's an absolute failure." That is going to be a judgment based on some period of time.

I'll have to make, obviously, my own direct assessments on the ground if I'm confirmed by the Senate. But my understanding now of the timelines to staff the PRTs, the 10 new PRTs, is that the combination of core staff, and then individuals identified in certain specialties by DoD, largely from reservists, should enable the PRTs to be ready to engage on the ground in the build effort, as soon as that ground is, in fact, held. That's the connection we have to make, and clearly, if I'm confirmed, that will be a top priority in my discussions with General Petraeus.

Senator CORKER. Thank you. I know the time is up. Thank you, sir.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Corker.

It looks like we're going to make it, here, so, Senator Casey.

Thank you.

Senator CASEY. In the short time we have, to both Ambassadors, I want to thank you for being here today. Your extraordinary public service and your valor—people forget that the work that you do involves a risk, a personal risk, as well—and we're grateful.

In the limited time we have, let me just ask about two questions—I hope—two or three.

First of all, Ambassador Crocker, I want to direct your attention to the President's plan, which I think is an escalation. Others use the term "surge," but in particular, I'm concerned about—and I know you are, and all of America is concerned about—the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to do what they must do. Not just long-term, but especially in these early engagements in the streets and the neighborhoods in Baghdad—extraordinarily dangerous circumstances.

I really have my doubts, based upon the history, but also based upon some recent stories. There are several stories in the press—two that I am looking at in the New York Times. I know the Washington Post had one. New York Times, January 25 and January 30, you've seen these. We've referred to these before, but "the air of a class outing, cheering and laughing"—these are Iraqi forces—showing up late, not doing the job. The American forces having to do a lot more than they have to do. When we use the term "embedded forces," that sounds good until you see the reality of these articles.

So, I don't want to dwell on the details of this, but it's clear from some of the earlier reports that it's going to be extraordinarily dif-

difficult for the Iraqi Security Forces to do what they must do, which undergirds this strategy.

And, I'd ask you in the context of your work, but also in the context of what I see in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania is now at the 150-mark. Third highest death toll in terms of soldiers who have perished in Iraq. I just want to ask you about your assessment of that, currently. The ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to do what they must do in this new engagement.

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, you're absolutely right to put the emphasis where you have, that was the point I was trying to make earlier in saying that we are transitioning. This is now a period in which the Iraqis carry the main effort. And that is as true in security as it is anywhere else.

There's a lot of discussion of benchmarks, and I think there are some very important benchmarks out there, along the lines you just described. First, will the Iraqi forces show up for the engagement in the time and in the numbers that they're committed to? Second, will they perform professionally and evenhandedly, going after perpetrators of violence, regardless of their political or sectarian affiliation? These are going to be very key tests that they are going to have to meet and pass.

The command structure that I understand they've established, I find encouraging. The Lieutenant General in overall command, who enjoys a good professional reputation, happens to be a Shia. His two deputies—to Major Generals, one police, one regular army—are both Sunnis. So, it looks to me like they're putting the right kind of balanced command structure in place that would indicate that, at least they understand some of the problems in the past, and are prepared to meet them.

But, ultimately, it will be what happens on the ground.

Senator CASEY. Well, I urge you—and I know you will do this anyway, but I think it's important to repeat it—to hold our government accountable for enforcing the kind of discipline and the kind of benchmarking, and any other measuring tool that we use to make sure Iraqi Security Forces are doing what they must do, promptly.

I know I have, maybe, another minute, but for both Ambassadors, because you both, obviously, play a role in the past and the future of this. The relationship between General Musharraf and Mr. Karzai, in terms of where that relationship is now, and especially in the context of President Bush bringing them together in September of 2006. Where is it, is it a positive relationship, or has it deteriorated? What can you tell us about that?

Mr. WOOD. In the meeting with the tri-apartheid supper with President Bush, plans were made for a jirga, an assembly of some nature, between Afghan and Pakistan leaders. It was hoped that that gathering could be held—would have already been held—it is still very much on the agenda, and we're hoping, we're hoping to see the two sides come together in a matter of months, to exchange their own views.

Going beyond that, I think that the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a complicated one. Both sides are contributing to help the—each is helping the other—each often wonders if the other could be doing more. I think that, I think that this is

a process that will continue, I think it will get better. I can only say that it would be my intention to continue the practice of Ambassador Crocker and, if confirmed, my predecessor, Ambassador Newman to maintain absolutely seamless communication between Embassy Kabul and Embassy Islamabad. So, that we can work together to help President Karzai and President Musharraf work together.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Casey.

Just a really quick question as we wrap up here—and we are going to wrap up—sometimes the Senate stands in the way of progress. Today it's somehow facilitating this hearing and liberating you people early, letting you off the hook.

I'm going to leave the record open for a week, since we're out of session, and that way it won't interrupt our ability to be able to expedite these nominations, which we want to do, but it will also allow for any questions of any colleagues who want to follow up in writing during that period of time.

In addition, let me just ask you, as a matter for the record—do either of you have any conflicts of interest, or issues from which you might have to recuse yourself, with respect to the performance of your responsibilities?

Ambassador Crocker.

Mr. CROCKER. I do not, sir.

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Wood.

Mr. WOOD. I have none, sir.

Senator KERRY. Okay.

And another quick question. Is the criticism of the Afghans of President Karzai—both of you might comment on this, since you're currently there—is it legitimate with respect to the harboring of Taliban fighters within Pakistan, and also, obviously, the question that looms large to every American, is the al-Qaeda refuge? Do you want to both comment on that?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, sir, if I could start.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, Pakistan has been in this fight since right after 9/11. They have lost hundreds of their soldiers, a number of their civilian officials, many progovernment tribal leaders in that tribal belt engaged against both al-Qaeda and a resurgent Taliban. So, in my judgment, their commitment is not in question on this.

The challenge they face, and President Musharraf has acknowledged this, is one of capacity. For example, there are several million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, many of them concentrated in large refugee camps, over which the Pakistani Government has no control, and in some cases, not even access. So, their ability in some cases, particularly against the Taliban, I think, is limited.

But, I've worked with him for over 2 years, closely on these issues. I believe President Musharraf is firmly committed to this fight.

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Wood.

Mr. WOOD. Senator, only to echo what Ambassador Crocker said.

Certainly my briefings here in Washington indicate that there is no intention, no policy of the Government of Pakistan to tolerate

a Taliban presence, to lend support to Taliban or other terrorist groups in that region.

Pakistan also faces an insurgency in Balukistan, which Pakistan has also not been able to resolve, physically. So, there is a parallel example, not related to the Taliban, and not related to Afghanistan, of the lack of capacity of Pakistan to deal directly and conclusively with the problem. But we don't think it's a question of will.

Senator KERRY. Thank you.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Just for the record, I think it was the hope that we could move these nominations forward, perhaps voice vote them today, so that they could be on the ground very quickly.

Does your keeping the record open preclude that? In other words—?

Senator KERRY. Well, it would if we were going to do that. I was not aware that Senator Biden was planning to do that. If he is, obviously, we don't want to interrupt that.

I'm correct, it's going to happen at the next business meeting. So, it'll be the issue of, I think, the 1 week, since we're not here. So, it'll have to be the next business meeting.

In that case, obviously, unless Senator Biden changes—I think these are the last votes coming up—and so I don't think it's going to be possible for us to have a quorum between now and then, which is why I left that open. But I'd make that contingent on—if there were to be a business meeting to be able to be scheduled—then the record will not stay open that period of time.

Senator COLEMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KERRY. I appreciate your calling it to our attention.

Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. You've heard praise from everybody here, for obvious reasons. We're confident you will be confirmed, overwhelmingly, as rapidly as possible, and we look forward to getting you out there.

And again, we want to thank your families. This is not easy on anybody, we understand that, and we're very grateful to everybody for being willing to take this on.

Thank you, we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM B. WOOD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Since the 1947 partition of India, Pakistani and Afghan relations have been at odds about India's activities in Afghanistan. According to the World Food Program, the Government of Pakistan prohibits the transit of Indian aid bound for Afghanistan.

(A) What role do you see India playing in Afghanistan, as well as what role does it play in the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan?

(B) To what degree is a broader regional diplomatic approach necessary to sustainable stability and development in Afghanistan?

(C) How will you and your staff engage with the United States embassy in India?

(D) What other international institutions working in Afghanistan recognize and address India's role in the region?

Answer. (A) I understand that India has played a constructive role in Afghanistan and is considering expanding its activities there. There are four Indian consulates in Afghanistan plus an embassy in Kabul. It is the eighth largest donor overall and

does important infrastructure work, mainly in roads and power. The Indians are also considering assistance to help provide training to Afghan bureaucrats. Three Indians have been killed while working on reconstruction projects. In addition, last November, India hosted the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghan Reconstruction. Both India and Afghanistan consider their relationship to be a close and important one.

The Afghan-Indian relationship does cause tension in the region. The Indians are frustrated by Pakistan's refusal to allow direct overland transit from India across Pakistan and into Afghanistan. The Pakistanis express concerns over Indian's growing presence in Afghanistan.

(B) The United States is pursuing a broad regional approach in Central and South Asia that will bind the two regions together and help secure Afghanistan's future. The objective is to link energy-rich Central Asia with energy-poor South Asia via an Afghan "land bridge" that will encourage stability and promote economic development.

(C) The staff of Embassy Kabul cooperates closely with our colleagues in New Delhi over the variety of issues important to United States' interests as they relate to Afghanistan and India. If confirmed, I will participate fully in this dialog.

(D) A variety of international organizations, including the U.N. and NATO, recognizes India's work in Afghanistan, and work with India to achieve their common goals.

Question. Afghanistan's Governments have never recognized the Durand Line between the two countries as an international border and have made claims on areas in the Pashtun and Baluch regions of Pakistan.

Is the issue of the Durand Line an important element of the current Afghan-Pakistan tension?

Answer. The Durand Line continues to be an unresolved issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The status of the line is not an active issue and neither the Pakistani nor Afghan Governments is pressing for it to be resolved immediately.

Question. Afghanistan has long been considered a "buffer" state to its neighbors who have manipulated politics, commerce, and governance. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Central Asia nations have exerted more influence, although not always independently, as has China.

What significant, positive and negative activities and roles have China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran each taken in regard to Afghan stabilization and reconstruction from the United States' perspective?

Answer. Regional stability, counterterrorism, energy security, trade and economic growth, and antinarcotics production and trafficking are common themes in Afghanistan's relationship with China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, and in this regard these countries have more of a stake in each other's prosperity than at any other time in history. All five of these regional neighbors have participated in the two Regional Economic Cooperation Conferences on Afghanistan, the first held in Kabul in December 2005 and the second in New Delhi in November 2006.

The Afghan Government is in the process of negotiating bilateral power purchase agreements with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as part of Afghanistan's Northern Electrical Power System (NEPS) project, which aims to bring reliable, unimpeded power to Kabul by 2009. Each country involved clearly recognizes the economic benefits that will come from cooperation. We remain confident in the ultimate success of this initiative.

Tajikistan and Afghanistan have a particularly strong bilateral relationship. A United States-funded bridge between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, due to be completed in summer 2007, will revitalize regional trade routes and serve as a symbol of positive change.

Iran and Afghanistan share antinarcotic and border security objectives, and near Herat, Afghanistan's largest western city, Iran has built multilane highways and provided uninterrupted electricity. Iran has invested over \$300 million in Afghanistan over the past 5 years. There are concerns, however, over the influence of Iranian economic assistance in certain parts of the country. We need to remain vigilant about Iranian activities in Afghanistan.

China has also played a low-key role in Afghanistan. Since 2001, China has pledged \$210 million in bilateral assistance for development projects, although we understand that very little has actually been distributed due to security concerns. China shares our concerns about cross-border extremism, narcotics production and trafficking, and the destabilization that Taliban-style radicalism could produce in Central Asia, including in nearby regions of China. China has sponsored the Shang-

hai Cooperation Organization, which is a regional grouping designed to enhance political and economic cooperation.

Question. A significant amount of information from a variety of sources indicates that continued instability in Afghanistan, especially in the south and east, is due to the unconstrained flow of persons and resources across the Afghan-Pakistan border, thus fueling insurgent efforts to destabilize Afghanistan's Government.

How will you and your entire embassy engage with Ambassador Crocker, until he departs, and our United States mission in Islamabad to moderate the negative influences across that border and encourage mutual support?

Answer. The staff at the United States embassy in Kabul is in frequent contact with its counterparts at the United States embassy in Islamabad. I intend to continue that close cooperation, including through regular informal exchanges of views, frequent visits, and occasional joint calls on our host governments. I will work with Ambassador Crocker and his successor to ensure that our messages to senior officials in the Pakistani and Afghan Governments and to our allies in NATO's International Security Assistance Force are mutually reinforcing. In the past, Embassies Kabul and Islamabad have periodically sent groups of their staff to the other capital in order to meet with their embassy counterparts, as well as with host government officials. If confirmed, I will seek to continue this practice.

Question. You have specifically highlighted the importance of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams across the country as a critical link for the central government, and that you intend to concentrate on their activities. It appears that significant resources have been shifted from the north and west to the highly volatile south and east. Though these resources are necessary in the south and east, the rationale to reduce resources elsewhere that are prone to following the same path of increasing violence and instability appears misguided.

(A) Are resources being reduced in the still volatile western and northern regions?

(B) How will you ensure that neglect does not precipitate a target for those being squeezed out of the south and east, as the poppy production has so easily done?

(C) To what degree have NATO nations backed up their call for increased reconstruction funds to accompany their security efforts since taking over security responsibility in November at International Security Assistance Force?

Answer. (A–B) I am committed to protecting the gains made throughout Afghanistan since 2001, particularly in the north and west. There has not been a significant shift of resources from the north and west to the south and east. Rather, we are adding resources—and asking allies to do the same—in the areas where they are most needed to accomplish our mission.

The increase of 3,500 United States troops in eastern Afghanistan, announced on February 9, will not reduce forces and engagement elsewhere in Afghanistan. Together with our allies, we will continue to ensure that the necessary capabilities and resources are allocated to accomplish our mission throughout all of Afghanistan.

Nor are we reducing our commitment to Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the north and west as a result of our efforts to augment efforts in the south and east. Sweden and NATO allies, Norway and Hungary, stepped in to lead Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the north and west when the British and Dutch moved assets from northern Provincial Reconstruction Teams to the more volatile south in 2005 and 2006. Thanks to this coordination among NATO allies, there has been no reduction of Provincial Reconstruction Team presence in the north and west.

(C) The international community—including NATO allies who took responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan in October 2006—has shown commitment and staying power in Afghanistan, both in security and development. Since 2001, NATO allies and others in the international community have made multiyear reconstruction and security assistance pledges to Afghanistan totaling over \$31.8 billion (through 2013), more than enough to cover all recurrent budgetary expenditures and put the country well on its way to meeting the 5-year operating (recurrent and development) target of \$20 billion established in the 5-year (2006–2011) Afghan National Development Strategy.

Question. Significant United States resources have been expended in concert with the international community since 2001 in removing the Taliban government, dispersing al-Qaeda, establishing an elected government, stabilizing, and helping to rebuild Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan has continued to call for the use of a common fund for reconstruction and development that is administered by the Afghan Government in order to empower its ministries and reduce competition for human and financial resources.

(A) Describe how United States funds flow to projects in Afghanistan, bilateral and multilateral assistance. Show these flows for the last 2 years.

(B) Why are the funds provided in this way and what is U.S. policy regarding the common international funding vehicle?

Answer. (A) I am committed to effective, efficient, and timely implementation of all United States and multilateral assistance in Afghanistan. Total United States assistance to Afghanistan stands at over \$14.2 billion from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2007. This assistance cuts across U.S. Federal agencies, with roughly 65 percent coming from the Department of Defense, 30 percent coming from the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, and another 5 percent coming from other Departments (Justice, Treasury, etc.). In fiscal year 2006, total United States security and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan exceeded \$3.3 billion, and in fiscal year 2007 stands at over \$2.7 billion. In February, the administration requested an additional \$6.9 billion (combined Department of Defense and Department of State) in assistance for Afghanistan through a fiscal year 2007 supplemental.

Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development funds—constituting roughly 30 percent of all United States aid to Afghanistan—are implemented through a variety of mechanisms, including procurement contracts, grants to nongovernmental organizations, technical assistance to the Afghan Government, and several U.N. and World Bank-administered programs and trust funds (Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan, Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund, and the National Solidarity Program). If confirmed, one of my first tasks will be to review implementation mechanisms for our projects, and coordination with other bilateral and multilateral donors.

(B) Increasing aid effectiveness was a major theme at the 2006 London Conference and figures prominently in the Afghanistan Compact adopted by over 60 nations. The Afghan Government asked that donors channel foreign assistance directly through it, both to strengthen the role of the government and to provide cost-effective and efficient means of disbursing aid.

Assistance covers a wide spectrum—including institutional reform, policy formulation, human resources management, budgetary preparation and execution, technical expertise, procurement, and other topics. USAID is also performing assessments of line ministries—through the 5-year, over \$200 million Afghans Building Capacity program (ABC) to identify where there are gaps in the ability to execute procurements, manage budgets, and provide effective oversight (internal and external to the ministry)—key elements required for the Government of Afghanistan to be able to more effectively execute projects on behalf of the people. The program will also provide technical assistance to the ministries to help build their capacity.

I am committed to increasing the Afghan Government's ability to efficiently disburse donor assistance, build its physical infrastructure, and develop institutional safeguards against corruption.

In the meantime, we have augmented our long-term capacity-building efforts with contributions totaling over \$500 million to the various international funding vehicles that channel assistance directly through the Afghan Government. The United States is the largest contributor to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, and is the second largest contributor to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. We have also made significant contributions to the National Solidarity Program and Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund.

Question. Nongovernmental organizations have played a significant role in Afghanistan since well before the Taliban arrived.

What will your priorities be with regard to working with the nongovernmental organization community?

Where do you see the nongovernmental organization community in the larger picture of aid to Afghanistan?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to establish a close dialog with nongovernmental organizations on human rights including women's rights, humanitarian issues, and the host of social and technical issues in which they are active. Nongovernmental organizations play a vital role in helping Afghanistan recover from the post-conflict devastation brought on by three decades of war and violence. Many of the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development assistance programs in Afghanistan are channeled through United States and Afghan nongovernmental organizations who are working on the front lines of reconstruction.

Nongovernmental organizations work in all 34 Afghan provinces and help us reach remote corners of the country where our assistance would otherwise be limited. In addition, some organizations have longstanding ties to Afghanistan, providing a critical history of trust in a society that strongly values enduring relationships.

Nongovernmental organizations are also helping local communities strengthen their capacity and move beyond the traumatic Taliban period by emphasizing women's empowerment. Over 50 percent of United States funds provided to local Afghan nongovernmental organizations are either women-led or provide services that directly assist women and girls.

I will continue to coordinate closely with nongovernmental organizations as a priority partner in Afghanistan's reconstruction.

Question. The current supplemental request of \$8.6 billion contains a sizable portion for security sector reform, including a portion for the fourth attempt at police training in Afghanistan. In the November 2006 Inspectors General Report for the Department of State and the Department of Defense entitled "Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness," Appendix J—a letter from Commander CENTCOM—indicated their concern that State did not appreciate their "legal and official role" as the official lead for police train and equip. This ambiguity raises concern over effective oversight and management of the program.

(A) What is the State Department's response to the report and what has State done to ensure the recommendations made have been implemented or considered for implementation?

(B) What recommendations have been adopted by State and other actors in the program?

(C) How will you ensure the State Department maintains its proper role in police training and equipping and assure full and effective oversight and policy guidance?

(D) What measures of effectiveness will be used in this new effort to train police to ensure that reconstruction resources are having more than just a superficial effect?

(E) How will this program be monitored to ensure that the policy of building a security sector capacity is more than just a spreadsheet calculation of output and rather a true measure of its effectiveness in meeting Afghans expectations and its institutional responsibilities?

Answer. (A) The State Department is pleased with the conclusion of the Inspector General Report that the Afghanistan Police Program is a well-executed program. State also agrees with the report's assessment of the challenges involved in effecting reform in an insecure environment.

All of the recommendations made by the report have either already been carried out or are in the process of being implemented. State has already increased the strength of the mentor program by more than 50 percent from 252 mentors at the time the report was drafted, to nearly 400 field mentors, 40 executive and professional mentors, and 80 training advisors present in Afghanistan today. We also continue to work with our international partners to encourage additional contributions and coordinate accordingly, particularly as the European Union (EU) works to develop and implement plans for an upcoming EU mission to Afghanistan. The EU anticipates providing up to 160 police advisors who will complement existing mentoring and reform efforts undertaken by Germany and the United States.

State has also created and filled a permanent Contracting Officer Representative position at Embassy Kabul and provided copies of the relevant contracting documents to both the embassy and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A, the military organization responsible for oversight of security assistance programs in Afghanistan). State is also working with CSTC-A and Embassy Kabul to draft the strategic documents recommended in the report and has already begun implementing the first phase of a regionally based joint justice/police integration project to address the need identified by the report for linkages between the two sectors.

(B) Please see previous answer.

(C) State fully appreciates its leadership role in implementation of the Afghan Police Program and continues to work closely with Defense, Embassy Kabul, and CSTC-A to ensure that all elements of execution of this critical program are well coordinated, executed, and properly monitored. In addition to the contracting personnel mentioned above, State also has dedicated teams of expert police advisors embedded within Embassy Kabul and within CSTC-A to provide oversight for all elements of the program for which State has responsibility.

The CENTCOM letter referenced in the question (Appendix J) states only that the report "should be closely reviewed and amended to ensure that it accurately states the legal and official responsibilities and authorities related to the police train and equip mission," articulating a concern that the report be fully accurate in its description of the roles and responsibilities of each implementer—something both Defense and State had highlighted as a concern.

(D) Departments of State and Defense work closely together to ensure we are monitoring the program effectively using appropriate metrics. While we continue to monitor the number of police trained and deployed, we also work with CSTC-A to assess the capability of Afghan police, unit by unit, to assume responsibility for the internal security of Afghanistan. Such monitoring is accomplished through use of the field mentors who report regularly on the qualitative progress of the ANP they mentor.

(E) Please see previous answer.

Question. International observers and human rights defenders note serious discrepancies between the Afghan Government's declared support for international human rights standards and the activities of Afghan officials at the provincial and district levels.

How would you characterize those observations?

If confirmed, what initiatives would you undertake to help Afghanistan's Government better promote and protect human rights in all regions of the country?

Answer. Although Afghanistan has made important human rights progress since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan's human rights record remains poor. This is mainly due to weak central institutions, a deadly insurgency, and an ongoing recovery from 2½ decades of war.

In its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Afghanistan, the United States Department of State documented numerous cases of arbitrary arrests and detention, extrajudicial killings, torture, and poor prison conditions. Prolonged detention, often due to a severe lack of resources and pervasive corruption in the judicial system, is a serious problem. There are also cases of official impunity and abuse of authority by local leaders.

Afghans also frequently turn to the informal justice system, which does not always protect human rights principles. As reported in the U.S. Department of State's Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, freedom of religion, although provided for by the national constitution, is restricted in practice.

Afghanistan has, however, made historic progress toward democracy and the protection of human rights since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The new Afghan Constitution includes broad human rights protections for all Afghans and recognition of Afghanistan's international human rights obligations. In accordance with the 2002 Bonn Agreement, the government established the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, which now has nine regional offices throughout the country, has resolved numerous complaints of human rights violations, and closely monitors the overall human rights situation, as well as individual cases.

In the January 2006 Afghanistan Compact, the Government of Afghanistan committed to: Strengthen its capacity to comply with and report on its human rights treaty obligations; adopt corrective measures including codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extortion, and illegal expropriation of property; strengthen freedom of expression, including freedom of media; include human rights awareness in education curricula; promote human rights awareness among legislators, judicial personnel and other government agencies, communities, and the public; monitor human rights through the government and independently by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission; and support the commission in the fulfillment of its objectives with regard to monitoring, investigation, protection, and promotion of human rights by end-2010.

The Government of Afghanistan also committed in the Afghanistan Compact to implement the Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice Action plan by end-2008. This transitional justice plan identified five areas for action, including strengthening the credibility and accountability of state institutions.

If confirmed, I will press the Afghan authorities, at all levels, on these issues and emphasize that good governance, respect for human rights including women's rights, and the rule of law are essential. Together with our allies and partners, and the United Nations, I will also encourage initiatives that consolidate a stronger sense among all Afghans that they have a stake in building a democratic government that respects human rights.

Question. The Karzai government has included known warlords and other individuals suspected of criminal activities in its administration. This risks a further loss of credibility for the new Government of Afghanistan and an inability to hold government officials accountable or effectively pursue the rule of law in general.

How is the United States dealing with such appointments? Is the administration (U.S.) looking into this issue?

What steps is it considering to try to address the negative impact this is having on the rule of law?

Answer. The United States is watching closely the historic transition of Afghanistan from civil war and a legacy of severe human rights abuse toward democracy and the protection of human rights. We support the Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice; the reconciliation of insurgents through the Program Takhim-e-Soh (PTS); the work of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission; and reform and strengthening of the judicial system.

Specifically, we strongly encourage the Afghan Government's implementation of the 3-year Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice, adopted in December 2005 and launched by President Karzai on December 10, 2006. The plan has five key elements: Acknowledging of the suffering of the Afghan people; strengthening the credibility and accountability of state institutions; establishing the truth about atrocities committed between the Revolution in April 1978 and the fall of the Taliban in late 2001; promoting reconciliation; and establishing a proper accountability mechanism to investigate and prosecute individuals who committed war crimes and other egregious human rights abuses. All five components are important.

We also encourage a determined fight against corruption inside the Afghan Government. In 2006, President Karzai appointed an Attorney General and a Chief Justice who are focusing intensely on corruption. The Afghan Government has also taken a number of steps against corrupt governors and officials, and several governors have been removed over the past 12 months. Additionally, the Afghan Government initiated rank and pay reform to remove police officers involved in human rights violations and high-level corruption. The reform resulted in the removal of more than 70 senior-level officers. International support for recruiting and training of new Afghan National Police is also conditional upon new officers being vetted in a manner consistent with international human rights standards. We will make sure that these policies are continued and fully implemented.

RESPONSES OF RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. You may remember our meeting during June 2003, on my trip to Baghdad, where we sat in a poorly lit, somewhat air-conditioned conference room meeting with three clerics, a Sunni, a Shiite, and a Christian who waxed at length about their vision for Iraq and how it was under Saddam. Some have suggested the winner-take-all sectarian nature to Iraqi affairs occurred much later, or was created by the United States' unseating of Saddam. What is your view?

Answer. The majority of Iraqis still express gratitude for their liberation from Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime. Circumstances afterwards, however, have undermined the conditions necessary to provide Iraqis with the security and stability they deserve. Since 2003, the combination of insurgent and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)-led attacks on Iraqi civilians, often based on their sectarian affiliation, has led to increased tension between Iraq's Sunni and Shia populations. The most damaging was an attack on one of the most holy Islamic Shia sites, Al-Askariya Mosque, in February 2006. As a result, sectarian tensions burst into the open.

The Government of Iraq is currently committed to a new Baghdad Security Plan that is focused on quelling sectarian violence and protecting the population. A key component of this strategy is Prime Minister Maliki's commitment to pursuing all perpetrators of violence regardless of their sect or party affiliation. We are supporting the Government of Iraq in these efforts.

Question. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) mentioned a "bottom up approach" could help reverse the negative trends. Would you care to comment?

Answer. The NIE defined a "bottom-up approach" to reversing negative trends in Iraq as one which promotes neighborhood watch groups and establishment of grievance committees. It is certainly true that any mechanism that empowers ordinary citizens to solve their problems according to a rule of law process, vice the force of violence, is a step in the right direction as part of a larger process of national reconciliation.

We believe that a coordinated set of actions at both the national and local level need to proceed simultaneously to help reverse the negative trends the NIE identified. At the local level, Provincial Reconstruction Teams are charged with strengthening moderates, marginalizing extremists, and otherwise empowering local governments to deliver goods and services to an electorate that will hold them accountable.

This is one way in which we are implementing a bottom-up approach. Much of the efforts to empower local Iraqis to solve their problems will have to be implemented by the Iraqis themselves. A new provincial powers law is being debated in the Council of Representatives, which will help, though the task of implanting it

will be a challenge. A host of reconciliation initiatives have been proposed. The process of mending frayed relationships will be one of which Iraqis will need to work for many years to come.

Question. I am hopeful Congress will begin meaningful debate soon on 2007 Supplemental Appropriations, which you will need to execute your mission. It has some \$824 million to operate the embassy and PRT's and another \$966 million for economic support programs, rule of law, democracy, migration and refugee assistance, and USAID operating expenses. Will this be sufficient to leverage the Iraqis to action on their budget execution?

Answer. The fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request level of \$2.34 billion is critical to building Iraqi self-reliance and to expanding our current efforts to improve the institutional capacity of key Iraqi ministries to address the needs of the Iraqi people. We will focus on developing the Iraqi Government's critical management capabilities, such as budget formulation and execution, which will improve services and enhance the governance capacity of Iraq's executive branch. With these funds, project management units will be established to help Iraqi ministries execute their budgets. Iraq has signaled its intent to improve its capital budget spending in 2007 by including a provision in the budget law passed by parliament that permits the Ministries of Finance and Planning and Development Cooperation to transfer capital investment funds from those ministries and provincial governments failing to spend 25 percent of their capital budgets by the midpoint of the fiscal year to ministries with better prospects for executing projects with those funds.

This funding will also expand the presence of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). One of the main missions of PRT's is to work with local governments to improve their capacity, including their ability to design programs and request money from the central government. We are encouraged that the 2007 Iraqi budget includes over \$2 billion for regional governments.

On January 10, the Secretary named Ambassador Tim Carney as the Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq. Ambassador Carney, who is based in Baghdad, reports directly to the ambassador and will work closely with Iraqi officials to ensure that Iraq's considerable resources are brought to bear on the task of rebuilding Iraq. One of the issues he will focus on is helping the Iraqis better execute their budgets, particularly on capital spending for investments to improve essential services and promote economic development.

USAID operating expenses are not included in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request, but have been included in the fiscal year 2008 GWOT Costs request.

Question. To what extent can private sector solutions be expanded effectively in Iraq? How can we structure our assistance to improve that effort?

Answer. Private sector solutions can and should be expanded effectively in Iraq. Iraq has a tradition of over 4,000 thousand years of entrepreneurship and commerce. Today, private sector-led growth could energize the Iraqi economy. This is especially true for such critical sectors as banking and microfinance, which could meet an enormous pent-up demand for credit, an economic force multiplier.

We have worked hard to support private-sector solutions in Iraq. Under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), we have supported a program to expand microfinance institutions to provide small- and medium-sized companies with the capital they would not otherwise be able to borrow. The goal of these programs is to help establish these institutions, which will then serve as models for other Iraqi institutions, including commercial banks, to emulate. To date, USG support has enabled six microcredit institutions to extend over 29,000 loans. We are also providing technical assistance programs to help Iraq enact the kinds of laws and regulations that will make it easier to register companies, conduct trade, and access credit. We have requested funds under the fiscal year 2007 supplemental to continue these activities until Iraqi institutions can fill this void.

It is also worth noting that DoD's effort to restart idle State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other manufacturing entities in Iraq has privatization as a long-term goal.

Question. Are our policies encouraging Iraqi Government officials to continue to reduce subsidies, reduce the public distribution system to a means tested entitlement for the poorest Iraqis, and provide the commercial legal framework to stimulate not only agriculture, but canning and other agribusiness?

Answer. As part of Iraq's Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, the GoI has agreed to phase out the PDS and replace it with a targeted, means-tested system to protect Iraq's most vulnerable citizens. We support GoI's efforts to phase out the PDS and have provided the GoI with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the PDS and recommendations for how to eliminate this system. The Iraq Reconstruc-

tion and Management Office (IRMO) has an officer at the Ministry of Trade who monitors the PDS to make sure that food is getting to the various parts of Iraq. Also, the United States Department of Agriculture has an officer in Iraq who monitors food imports, including for the PDS.

In 2003, under the CPA, the Ministry of Trade promulgated a rule stating that anyone could register to receive their PDS benefits at a new location as long as they had their ration card. However, there are reports that the pre-2003 practice of de-registering at one's former food distribution point and registering at the food distribution point in one's new neighborhood is now being reinstated. It is not certain that the GoI is redirecting food from areas with net population losses to areas with net population gains to ensure adequate supplies.

Question. The international community is gearing up to help with the refugee and IDP population, but what is the Iraqi Government doing?

Answer. The response to the IDP situation within the Government of Iraq rests on the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM). The ministry, which was created in 2003, has branches in each of the Iraqi provinces, except the three Kurdish provinces. MODM periodically distributes food and nonfood items and collects data on the number of displaced persons.

For a third consecutive year, the U.S. Government has funded a capacity building program to train MODM staff and assist it to develop its mandate, operating procedures and policies, and its coordinating role with nongovernmental organizations assisting IDPs. The Iraqi Government, United States Government, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations' focal point for refugees and IDPs, will continue to work with MODM to strengthen its capacity to coordinate assistance to IDPs and refugees.

UNHCR is increasing its staff in the region to help with the increased numbers of IDPs and refugees.

The Ministry of Trade provides all Iraqis, including IDPs, monthly food rations. The Ministry of Social Affairs provides rent subsidies to a small percentage of IDPs (around 10 percent).

Question. Who in the embassy will you charge with the refugee and IDP issue? What is the military role in this matter?

Answer. We have a political officer designated as the Refugee Coordinator at our embassy in Iraq. The Refugee Coordinator works closely with counterparts at the State Department, particularly those in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and USAID/OFDA, as well as with counterparts at United States embassies in the region, such as Amman and Damascus. The Refugee Coordinator also works with the Multi-National Force in Iraq to address protection issues relating to Iraqi IDPs and refugees. I would refer you to the Department of Defense for more specific information on the role of the military in this matter.

Question. The old oil-for-food food ration system is still in place—but I understand that Iraqis cannot access it if they have fled from their homes. Can we help the Iraqis construct a more flexible distribution to help feed IDPs?

Answer. To date, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi internally displaced persons (IDPs) have sought shelter with host families. United States Government agencies are actively providing protection and assistance to IDPs and their host communities in Iraq, including distribution of food and other necessities. With additional resources, including funds in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, we will expand our assistance program activities to reach more IDPs and host communities.

Since fiscal year 2003, the Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has contributed more than \$194 million to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations in Iraq. In fiscal year 2006, OFDA's program assisted 175,000 IDPs. In fiscal year 2007, OFDA plans to increase the number of beneficiaries to 300,000.

OFDA's partner organizations fund rapid response mobile teams and provide emergency food assistance and relief commodities, including winterization supplies. OFDA's partners are also improving IDPs' access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities, supporting small-scale community infrastructure, and providing water by tanker truck where necessary. In addition, they oversee livelihood programs providing income generation and cash-for-work opportunities, as well as vocational training.

In addition, the State Department, in partnership with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, provides substantial relief to IDPs in Iraq, including supplying food and household items to 50,000 vulnerable families.

Neither the United States Government nor other entities directly advise the Government of Iraq (GoI) on the Public Distribution System (PDS). As part of Iraq's Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, the GoI has agreed to phase out the PDS and replace it with a targeted, means-tested system to protect Iraq's most vulnerable citizens. We support the GoI's efforts to phase out the PDS. We have provided the GoI with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the PDS and recommendations for how to eliminate this system.

In 2003, under the CPA, the Ministry of Trade promulgated a rule stating that anyone could register to receive their PDS benefits at a new location as long as they had their ration card. However, there are reports that the pre-2003 practice of requiring Iraqis to de-register at their former food distribution point and re-register at the food distribution point in their new neighborhood is now being reinstated.

Question. How much does it cost to train an Arabic speaker to 3:3 capability? What percentage of Arabic speakers in the Foreign Service have served at least a year in Iraq? Please be as detailed as you can in responding to this.

Answer. The Arabic course at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), which is designed to bring an individual from a 0/0 (zero) level of proficiency to a 3S/3R (General Professional Proficiency in speaking and reading), is a 2-year program. The first year, in Washington, DC, is designed to bring an individual from 0 to 2S/2R (Limited Working Proficiency) and estimated instructional costs are about \$28,000 for 44 weeks of training (based on fiscal year 2006 tuition rate). The second year, overseas at FSI's field school in Tunis, typically brings these individuals to a 3S/3R and estimated instructional costs are about \$32,000 (based on fiscal year 2006 cost recovery formulation). Instruction cost estimates do not include nontraining expenditures, such as employee salaries and benefits, post allowances, per diem (in Washington), travel and POV shipping, post-housing and post-support. State Department recruiters specifically target schools and organizations with language programs to increase the recruitment of Arabic and other critical needs language speakers. Since 2004, the Department has given bonus points in the hiring process to Foreign Service candidates with demonstrated proficiency in languages such as Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi, among others. These bonus points materially increase the chance of receiving a job offer for candidates who have passed the written examination and oral assessment.

The Department of State requires Arabic speakers to demonstrate a score of S2/RO (Limited Working Speaking Proficiency/No Reading Proficiency) or above to meet tenure requirements. As of December 31, 2006, there were 676 Foreign Service generalists and specialists with a tested Arabic proficiency of S2/RO or higher, including employees trained by FSI and employees who already spoke Arabic before joining the Department. These Arabic speakers fill critical language designated positions at more than 20 embassies and consulates throughout Near East Asia.

Of the 676 Arabic speakers, 74 Foreign Service employees (11 percent) have served in Iraq for at least 1 year. Twenty-nine of those employees speak Arabic at a proficiency level of S3/R3 or above and 45 employees speak Arabic at a level less than S3/R3. When the initial deployment for Iraq began in 2003, most personnel were sent for 6-month assignments. Eighty-seven of the Foreign Service's Arabic speakers (13 percent) have served in Iraq for a 6-month assignment, with 41 employees at a proficiency level less than S3/R3 and 46 employees at S3/R3 or above. If 6-month and 1-year tours in Iraq are considered together, 161 of the Foreign Service's Arabic speakers (24 percent of the total) have served in Iraq since 2003.

Question. Secretary Gates said that he engaged the cabinet in this issue, but have you had opportunity to engage other cabinet agencies who have been slow to provide needed expertise? What else can be done to ensure we get the most qualified individuals on the job?

Answer. NSPD 36 directed cabinet agencies to encourage their employees to take assignments in Iraq on a nonreimbursable basis. In response, some highly qualified United States Government employees from a number of Federal agencies have served with distinction in Iraq. But, in other cases, equally talented employees have found it difficult to volunteer for Iraq service, because their parent agencies do not have the necessary budget for overseas travel, danger pay, and other extraordinary personnel costs. In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental, we have requested funding to reimburse other agencies for these extra costs for employees going to serve in Iraq. We believe this funding will make an appreciable difference in the ability of all cabinet agencies to contribute directly to our mission in Iraq.

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM B. WOOD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. On December 26, 2006, the Los Angeles Times published an article entitled “Heroin From Afghanistan Is Cutting a Deadly Path.” According to the article, “supplies of highly potent Afghan heroin in the United States are growing so fast that the pure white powder is rapidly overtaking lower-quality Mexican heroin, prompting fears of increased addiction and overdoses.”

Can you please review this article in detail and comment on its assertions? How much Afghan opium has entered the United States each year since 2000? Has it increased on a yearly basis? Is there a significant difference between Afghan and Mexican opium?

Answer. The United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has no reports that can verify the article’s suggestion that Afghan heroin, as a percentage of the United States market, has doubled from 7 to 14 percent. Though DEA does not break down heroin by country of origin (except for Mexico), DEA believes that the United States’ market share of Afghan heroin is approximately 8 percent, and asserts that it has not seen a spike in the United States. Further, the Department of Homeland Security Contraband Smuggling Unit reports that it has not seen anything indicating that there is an increase in Afghan heroin in the United States. The reporter for this article used Heroin Signature Program numbers for Southwest Asian heroin as the basis for his story. This number encompasses more than just Afghanistan and is not the overall measure of heroin in the United States. Moreover, local law enforcement also is not in a position to be able to determine where the heroin is sourced from; only DEA analyzes and categorizes this information through lab analyses and its Heroin Domestic Monitoring Program (ROMP). The HDMP reported that in calendar year 2005, only 3 percent of the samples purchased and analyzed was identified as Southwest Asian heroin. South American heroin accounted for 56 percent and Mexican heroin for 40 percent of the samples purchased and analyzed.

The difference between Afghan heroin and Mexican heroin is in its purity levels. Afghan heroin can have purity levels of up to 90 percent while Mexican black tar heroin is of low quality, with purity levels of less than 35 percent. Mexican brown tar heroin purity can range from 50–70 percent. Many of the deaths due to overdoses have been attributed to Fentanyl, a synthetic heroin with very high purity levels, which may be confused with heroin from Southwest Asia.

The Center for Disease Control’s Epidemic Intelligence Service reports that the increase in the number of deaths cannot be attributed specifically to heroin as the statistics used from the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10 codes) indicate deaths from a broad range of drugs.

Question. S.147—the Afghan Women Empowerment Act—would provide resources where they are much needed in Afghanistan, to Afghan women-led nongovernmental organizations, empowering those who will continue to provide for the needs of the Afghan people long after the international community has left.

S. 147 would provide \$30 million to women-led nongovernmental organizations to specifically focus on providing direct services to Afghan women—services such as adult literacy education, technical and vocational training, and health care services. In addition, it would authorize the President to appropriate \$5 million to the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs and \$10 million to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.

How could such funds benefit the women of Afghanistan?

Answer. In fiscal year 2006, \$50 million was provided specifically to support programs and activities benefiting women and girls. Activities funded include micro-finance, and small- and medium-enterprise loans for women; vocational training and employment opportunities to women, especially in areas of poppy production; comprehensive programs for maternal and child health; community education for girls in remote areas; literacy and textbooks for girls; support to the Women’s Teacher Training Institute and the Women’s Dormitory at Kabul University; access to justice systems for women; gender advisor for economic governance and private sector strengthening; support to the Afghan Women’s Business Federation and Arzu Carpets; capacity building for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs; and support for recurrent operations and maintenance costs related to women programs of the Government of Afghanistan’s budget.

The United States agrees that women-led and women-focused nongovernmental organizations are critical to Afghanistan’s advancement. Should the \$30 million specified in S. 147 be made available, we would provide technical assistance and other resources benefiting women-led nongovernmental organizations, as is planned

under the mission's new, comprehensive capacity building program known as Afghans Building Capacity, or "ABC," which, among other things, focuses on teaching nongovernmental organization-specific skills to develop, implement, and monitor effective projects. Women-led nongovernmental organizations are lacking. This intense capacity building effort will help.

With additional funding we would intend to pursue the following implementation steps:

- **Outreach**—Strengthen and diversify our outreach to women-led/focused organizations. Although we have grants with five women-led organizations today and work closely with the Afghan Women's Network's 80 members, we are looking to include others.
- **Capacity Building**—As noted above, we would provide training and technical assistance to women-led and women-focused nongovernmental organizations as well as to entities that interact with the nongovernmental organizations, such as the various ministries, universities, businesses and local government offices. This training and assistance will specifically target the design, implementation and monitoring of projects. It also aims to build skills among women-focused and women-led nongovernmental organizations so that they may better involve communities in program development, implementation, and monitoring.

Question. Pakistan is currently one of the largest recipients of United States foreign aid. In fact, funding to reimburse Pakistan for its support of United States-led counterterrorism operations is currently estimated at \$80 million per month. However, the Afghan Government and many other experts argue that Pakistan has done little to stop the flow of weapons and fighters into Afghanistan, and in fact may even be aiding the insurgency. What can be done to produce stronger results from Pakistan?

Answer. Pakistan is a vital partner in our fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The Government of Pakistan is committed to the war on terror and is taking strong measures to eliminate the threat posed by both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Pakistan has lost hundreds of its soldiers, a number of its civilian officials, and dozens of pro-government tribal leaders in the tribal belt who have engaged in combating the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

As President Musharraf has acknowledged, Pakistan does not have enough security forces to control the rugged 1,500 mile border with Afghanistan. Several million Afghan refugees live in Pakistan, many of them concentrated in large refugee camps; the Taliban has used these camps as hideouts. The Government of Pakistan also perceives militant extremism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas as a major threat to the nation's internal security. However, President Musharraf has undertaken military operations against terrorists on Pakistani soil in spite of domestic opposition.

We continue to urge the Government of Pakistan to take forceful measures against all terrorist groups, including the Taliban. We also support President Musharraf's efforts to adopt a more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism and countering insurgency.

I understand that the State Department plans to support an initiative to enhance the capacity of local security forces in the border regions, such as the indigenous Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, and tribal levies. We will also support Pakistan's Sustainable Development Plan for the tribal areas for economic and social development and governance reform intended to meet the needs of the local population and render them more resistant to violent extremists such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

For my part, if confirmed, I intend to work daily not only with the Government of Afghanistan but also with our embassy in Islamabad to strengthen Afghan-Pakistani cooperation along the border and effective action against terrorists and their supporters there.

Question. There have been reports that many Afghans feel that their country is not a high priority for the United States. What will you do to change this perception?

Answer. Polling data shows that the United States continues to enjoy the confidence of the Afghan people. Even in less secure areas of the country, a 60 percent majority continues to express confidence in the U.S. mission (ABC News Poll, October 2006). Nationwide, the trend is even better. A large majority of Afghan citizens view the United States' influence as positive, and 74 percent of Afghans have a favorable view of the United States (ABC News Poll, October 2006). The Taliban is facing the opposite scenario. It has a national approval rating of 7 percent—its low-

est since 2004. Over 90 percent of Afghans disapprove of Taliban attacks on Afghan citizens—whether military or civilians (ABC News Poll, October 2006).

Afghans continue to consider electricity, jobs, roads, and security as their top priorities. Our assistance program—over \$14.2 billion since 2001, with an additional \$10.6 billion requested for fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008—is addressing these concerns, which is one reason why a majority of Afghan citizens continue to be hopeful for the future.

If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure that United States efforts in Afghanistan receive the support of the Afghan people and that they in turn understand the extent of their efforts and do their part to ensure success.

Question. International observers and human rights defenders note serious discrepancies between the Afghan Government's declared support for strong human rights and the activities of Afghan officials at the provincial and district levels. Do you believe these characterizations are accurate? If confirmed, what specific initiatives would you undertake as ambassador to help Afghanistan's Government better promote and protect human rights in all regions of the country?

Answer. Although Afghanistan has made important human rights progress since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan's human rights record remains poor. This is mainly due to weak central institutions, a deadly insurgency, and an ongoing recovery from 2½ decades of war.

In its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Afghanistan, the United States Department of State documented numerous cases of arbitrary arrests and detention, extrajudicial killings, torture, and poor prison conditions. Prolonged detention, often due to a severe lack of resources and pervasive corruption in the judicial system, is a serious problem. There are also cases of official impunity and abuse of authority by local leaders. Afghans also frequently turn to the informal justice system, which does not always protect human rights principles. As reported in the United States Department of State's Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, freedom of religion, although provided for by the national constitution, is restricted in practice.

Afghanistan has, however, made historic progress toward democracy and the protection of human rights since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The new Afghan Constitution includes broad human rights protections for all Afghans and recognition of Afghanistan's international human rights obligations. In accordance with the 2002 Bonn Agreement, the government established the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, which now has nine regional offices throughout the country, has resolved numerous complaints of human rights violations, and closely monitors the overall human rights situation, as well as individual cases.

In the January 2006 Afghanistan Compact, the Government of Afghanistan committed to: Strengthen its capacity to comply with and report on its human rights treaty obligations; adopt corrective measures including codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extortion, and illegal expropriation of property; strengthen freedom of expression, including freedom of media; include human rights awareness in education curricula; promote human rights awareness among legislators, judicial personnel and other Government agencies, communities, and the public; monitor human rights through the government and independently by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission; and support the commission in the fulfillment of its objectives with regard to monitoring, investigation, protection, and promotion of human rights by end-2010.

The Government of Afghanistan also committed in the Afghanistan Compact to implement the Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice Action plan by end-2008. This transitional justice plan identified five areas for action, including strengthening the credibility and accountability of state institutions.

If confirmed, I will press the Afghan authorities, at all levels, on these issues and emphasize that good governance, respect for human rights including women's rights, and the rule of law are essential. Together with our allies and partners, and the United Nations, I will also encourage initiatives that consolidate a stronger sense among all Afghans that they have a stake in building a democratic government that respects human rights.

Question. The significant rise in attacks against schools in Afghanistan—particularly against girls' schools—is of grave concern. What more can be done to ensure that children can safely attend school in Afghanistan? Is there any truth to recent reports that the Taliban is working to re-open girls' schools in the south?

Answer. I share your concerns about attacks against schools and teachers in Afghanistan. Education for all young people and training for those who lost their

school years during the last two decades of conflict are key to Afghanistan's future stability and development.

Afghan law makes education up to the secondary level mandatory, and provides for free education up to the college, or bachelor's degree, level. According to the Ministry of Education there were 9,033 basic and secondary schools operating in Afghanistan in 2006. School enrollment increased from 4.2 million children in 2003 to over 5.2 million during the year 2006. Of these, in primary school, approximately 35 percent are girls.

Violence, however, continues to impede access to education in some parts of the country where Taliban and other extremists threaten or physically attack schools, officials, teachers, and students, especially in girls schools. The majority of school-related violence in 2006 occurred in 11 provinces in the south. The Ministry of Education reported that 20 teachers were killed, 198 schools were attacked, and a total of 370 schools were closed temporarily during the year owing to attacks, preventing almost 220,000 students from receiving an education.

The Afghan Government is prosecuting individual cases of attacks against teachers, students, and schools. In some districts, the local population has organized to protect their schools. Full access to education, however, will only be achieved through improved security. The United States is training and equipping Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army troops to help.

We have no reason to believe that the Taliban are working to re-open girl schools in the south.

RESPONSES OF RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. You may remember our meeting during June 2003, on my trip to Baghdad, where we sat in a poorly lit, somewhat air-conditioned conference room meeting with three clerics, a Sunni, a Shiite, and a Christian who waxed at length about their vision for Iraq and how it was under Saddam. Some have suggested the winner-take-all sectarian nature to Iraqi affairs occurred much later, or was created by the United States' unseating of Saddam. What is your view?

Answer. The majority of Iraqis still express gratitude for their liberation from Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime. Circumstances afterwards, however, have undermined the conditions necessary to provide Iraqis with the security and stability they deserve. Since 2003, the combination of insurgent and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)-led attacks on Iraqi civilians, often based on their sectarian affiliation, has led to increased tension between Iraq's Sunni and Shia populations. The most damaging was an attack on one of the most holy Islamic Shia sites, Al-Askariya Mosque, in February 2006. As a result, sectarian tensions burst into the open.

The Government of Iraq is currently committed to a new Baghdad Security Plan that is focused on quelling sectarian violence and protecting the population. A key component of this strategy is Prime Minister Maliki's commitment to pursuing all perpetrators of violence regardless of their sect or party affiliation. We are supporting the Government of Iraq in these efforts.

Question. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) mentioned a "bottom up approach" could help reverse the negative trends. Would you care to comment?

Answer. The NIE defined a "bottom-up approach" to reversing negative trends in Iraq as one which promotes neighborhood watch groups and establishment of grievance committees. It is certainly true that any mechanism that empowers ordinary citizens to solve their problems according to a rule of law process, vice the force of violence, is a step in the right direction as part of a larger process of national reconciliation.

We believe that a coordinated set of actions at both the national and local level need to proceed simultaneously to help reverse the negative trends the NIE identified. At the local level, Provincial Reconstruction Teams are charged with strengthening moderates, marginalizing extremists, and otherwise empowering local governments to deliver goods and services to an electorate that will hold them accountable.

This is one way in which we are implementing a bottom-up approach. Much of the efforts to empower local Iraqis to solve their problems will have to be implemented by the Iraqis themselves. A new provincial powers law is being debated in the Council of Representatives, which will help, though the task of implanting it will be a challenge. A host of reconciliation initiatives have been proposed. The process of mending frayed relationships will be one of which Iraqis will need to work for many years to come.

Question. I am hopeful Congress will begin meaningful debate soon on 2007 Supplemental Appropriations, which you will need to execute your mission. It has some \$824 million to operate the embassy and PRT's and another \$966 million for economic support programs, rule of law, democracy, migration and refugee assistance, and USAID operating expenses. Will this be sufficient to leverage the Iraqis to action on their budget execution?

Answer. The fiscal year 2007 supplemental request level of \$2.34 billion is critical to building Iraqi self-reliance and to expanding our current efforts to improve the institutional capacity of key Iraqi ministries to address the needs of the Iraqi people. We will focus on developing the Iraqi Government's critical management capabilities, such as budget formulation and execution, which will improve services and enhance the governance capacity of Iraq's executive branch. With these funds, project management units will be established to help Iraqi ministries execute their budgets. Iraq has signaled its intent to improve its capital budget spending in 2007 by including a provision in the budget law passed by parliament that permits the Ministries of Finance and Planning and Development Cooperation to transfer capital investment funds from those ministries and provincial governments failing to spend 25 percent of their capital budgets by the midpoint of the fiscal year to ministries with better prospects for executing projects with those funds.

This funding will also expand the presence of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). One of the main missions of PRT's is to work with local governments to improve their capacity, including their ability to design programs and request money from the central government. We are encouraged that the 2007 Iraqi budget includes over \$2 billion for regional governments.

On January 10, the Secretary named Ambassador Tim Carney as the Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq. Ambassador Carney, who is based in Baghdad, reports directly to the ambassador and will work closely with Iraqi officials to ensure that Iraq's considerable resources are brought to bear on the task of rebuilding Iraq. One of the issues he will focus on is helping the Iraqis better execute their budgets, particularly on capital spending for investments to improve essential services and promote economic development.

USAID operating expenses are not included in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, but have been included in the fiscal year 2008 GWOT costs request.

Question. To what extent can private sector solutions be expanded effectively in Iraq? How can we structure our assistance to improve that effort?

Answer. Private sector solutions can and should be expanded effectively in Iraq. Iraq has a tradition of over 4,000 years of entrepreneurship and commerce. Today, private sector-led growth could energize the Iraqi economy. This is especially true for such critical sectors as banking and microfinance, which could meet an enormous pent-up demand for credit, an economic force multiplier.

We have worked hard to support private-sector solutions in Iraq. Under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), we have supported a program to expand microfinance institutions to provide small- and medium-sized companies with the capital they would not otherwise be able to borrow. The goal of these programs is to help establish these institutions, which will then serve as models for other Iraqi institutions, including commercial banks, to emulate. To date, United States Government support has enabled six microcredit institutions to extend over 29,000 loans. We are also providing technical assistance programs to help Iraq enact the kinds of laws and regulations that will make it easier to register companies, conduct trade, and access credit. We have requested funds under the fiscal year 2007 supplemental to continue these activities until Iraqi institutions can fill this void.

It is also worth noting that DoD's effort to restart idle State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other manufacturing entities in Iraq has privatization as a long-term goal.

Question. Are our policies encouraging Iraqi Government officials to continue to reduce subsidies, reduce the public distribution system to a means tested entitlement for the poorest Iraqis, and provide the commercial legal framework to stimulate not only agriculture, but canning and other agribusiness?

Answer. As part of Iraq's Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, the GoI has agreed to phase out the PDS and replace it with a targeted, means-tested system to protect Iraq's most vulnerable citizens. We support GoI's efforts to phase out the PDS and have provided the GoI with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the PDS and recommendations for how to eliminate this system. The Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) has an officer at the Ministry of Trade who monitors the PDS to make sure that food is getting to the various parts of Iraq.

Also, the United States Department of Agriculture has an officer in Iraq who monitors food imports, including for the PDS.

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Question. The international community is gearing up to help with the refugee and IDP population, but what is the Iraqi Government doing?

Answer. The response to the IDP situation within the Government of Iraq rests on the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM). The ministry, which was created in 2003, has branches in each of the Iraqi provinces, except the three Kurdish provinces. MODM periodically distributes food and nonfood items and collects data on the number of displaced persons.

For a third consecutive year, the U.S. Government has funded a capacity building program to train MODM staff and assist it to develop its mandate, operating procedures and policies, and its coordinating role with nongovernmental organizations assisting IDPs. The Iraqi Government, United States Government, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations' focal point for refugees and IDPs, will continue to work with MODM to strengthen its capacity to coordinate assistance to IDPs and refugees.

UNHCR is increasing its staff in the region to help with the increased numbers of IDPs and refugees.

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Question. Who in the embassy will you charge with the refugee and IDP issue? What is the military role in this matter?

Answer. We have a political officer designated as the Refugee Coordinator at our embassy in Iraq. The Refugee Coordinator works closely with counterparts at the State Department, particularly those in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and USAID/OFDA, as well as with counterparts at United States embassies in the region, such as Amman and Damascus. The Refugee Coordinator also works with the Multi-National Force in Iraq to address protection issues relating to Iraqi IDPs and refugees. I would refer you to the Department of Defense for more specific information on the role of the military in this matter.

Question. The old oil-for-food food ration system is still in place—but I understand that Iraqis cannot access it if they have fled from their homes. Can we help the Iraqis construct a more flexible distribution to help feed IDPs?

Answer. To date, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi internally displaced persons (IDPs) have sought shelter with host families. United States Government agencies are actively providing protection and assistance to IDPs and their host communities in Iraq, including distribution of food and other necessities. With additional resources, including funds in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, we will expand our assistance program activities to reach more IDPs and host communities.

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In addition, the State Department, in partnership with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, provides substantial relief to IDPs in Iraq, including supplying food and household items to 50,000 vulnerable families.

Neither the United States Government nor other entities directly advise the Government of Iraq (GoI) on the Public Distribution System (PDS). As part of Iraq's Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, the GoI has agreed to phase out the

PDS and replace it with a targeted, means-tested system to protect Iraq's most vulnerable citizens. We support the GoI's efforts to phase out the PDS. We have provided the GoI with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the PDS and recommendations for how to eliminate this system.

In 2003, under the CPA, the Ministry of Trade promulgated a rule stating that anyone could register to receive their PDS benefits at a new location as long as they had their ration card. However, there are reports that the pre-2003 practice of requiring Iraqis to de-register at their former food distribution point and re-register at the food distribution point in their new neighborhood is now being reinstated.

Question. How much does it cost to train an Arabic speaker to 3:3 capability? What percentage of Arabic speakers in the Foreign Service have served at least a year in Iraq? Please be as detailed as you can in responding to this.

Answer. The Arabic course at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), which is designed to bring an individual from a 0/0 (zero) level of proficiency to a 3S/3R (General Professional Proficiency in speaking and reading), is a 2-year program. The first year, in Washington, DC, is designed to bring an individual from 0 to 2S/2R (Limited Working Proficiency) and estimated instructional costs are about \$28,000 for 44 weeks of training (based on fiscal year 2006 tuition rate). The second year, overseas at FSI's field school in Tunis, typically brings these individuals to a 3S/3R and estimated instructional costs are about \$32,000 (based on fiscal year 2006 cost recovery formulation). Instruction cost estimates do not include nontraining expenditures, such as employee salaries and benefits, post allowances, per diem (in Washington), travel and POV shipping, post-housing and post-support.

State Department recruiters specifically target schools and organizations with language programs to increase the recruitment of Arabic and other critical needs language speakers. Since 2004, the Department has given bonus points in the hiring process to Foreign Service candidates with demonstrated proficiency in languages such as Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi, among others. These bonus points materially increase the chance of receiving a job offer for candidates who have passed the written examination and oral assessment.

The Department of State requires Arabic speakers to demonstrate a score of S2/R0 (Limited Working Speaking Proficiency/No Reading Proficiency) or above to meet tenure requirements. As of December 31, 2006, there were 676 Foreign Service generalists and specialists with a tested Arabic proficiency of S2/R0 or higher, including employees trained by FSI and employees who already spoke Arabic before joining the Department. These Arabic speakers fill critical language designated positions at more than 20 embassies and consulates throughout Near East Asia.

Of the 676 Arabic speakers, 74 Foreign Service employees (11 percent) have served in Iraq for at least 1 year. Twenty-nine of those employees speak Arabic at a proficiency level of S3/R3 or above and 45 employees speak Arabic at a level less than S3/R3. When the initial deployment for Iraq began in 2003, most personnel were sent for 6-month assignments. Eighty-seven of the Foreign Service's Arabic speakers (13 percent) have served in Iraq for a 6-month assignment, with 41 employees at a proficiency level less than S3/R3 and 46 employees at S3/R3 or above. If 6-month and 1-year tours in Iraq are considered together, 161 of the Foreign Service's Arabic speakers (24 percent of the total) have served in Iraq since 2003.

Question. Secretary Gates said that he engaged the cabinet in this issue, but have you had opportunity to engage other cabinet agencies who have been slow to provide needed expertise? What else can be done to ensure we get the most qualified individuals on the job?

Answer. NSPD 36 directed cabinet agencies to encourage their employees to take assignments in Iraq on a nonreimbursable basis. In response, some highly qualified United States Government employees from a number of Federal agencies have served with distinction in Iraq. But, in other cases, equally talented employees have found it difficult to volunteer for Iraq service, because their parent agencies do not have the necessary budget for overseas travel, danger pay, and other extraordinary personnel costs. In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental, we have requested funding to reimburse other agencies for these extra costs for employees going to serve in Iraq. We believe this funding will make an appreciable difference in the ability of all cabinet agencies to contribute directly to our mission in Iraq.

NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Fox, Sam, to be Ambassador to Belgium
Phillips, Stanley Davis, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barack Obama presiding.

Present: Senators Obama, Kerry, Cardin, Coleman, Voinovich, and DeMint.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Senator OBAMA. This hearing will please come to order. This is the hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Today, the committee will consider the nominations of Mr. Stanley Davis Phillips to serve as Ambassador to Estonia and the nomination of Mr. Sam Fox to serve as Ambassador to Belgium.

I welcome both gentlemen and their families to our hearing.

Now, I know we have a busy agenda. There are a number of witnesses who are wishing to present what I will—what I'm sure will be glowing testimony of both nominees. Because we've got a lot of people who wanted to speak, we're going to try to keep things moving, and I ask that everybody try to keep their comments as brief as possible. And I will try to lead by example.

The ambassadorial posts for which Mr. Phillips and Mr. Fox have been nominated are important ones, and there are significant U.S. interests at stake in both relationships. Estonia has been a leader in efforts to establish more democratic, accountable governments in eastern Europe; the country's troops have also served alongside U.S. forces in numerous international peacekeeping missions. Belgium is a founding member of NATO and the European Union, and the host country to both these institutions. Belgium's relationship with the United States provides the diplomatic backdrop for most high-level discussions on transatlantic cooperation, so it's clearly critical that we have capable, qualified individuals in these two positions.

I see that we have a number of Members of the Senate, and former Members of the Senate, who are interested in introducing

the nominee, so, in the interest of time, I will stop here and turn to my good friend Senator DeMint, ranking member of the European Affairs Subcommittee, for his opening statement. And following that, we'll proceed to introductions and opening statements from the witnesses.

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Out of deference to Senator Coleman, since he was here first, if he would like to make an opening statement, I'll yield to him first.

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I'll yield to the ranking member at this time. And I know a number of my colleagues—I'm sure their schedules are full, so I would hold my statement and comments until after the ranking member and my colleagues have had a chance to do their introductions.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I'll try to be brief.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA**

Senator DEMINT. And thanks for holding this hearing and moving the process forward.

Good afternoon, Mr. Fox and Mr. Phillips. I appreciate your being here today and your willingness to serve our Nation as ambassadors.

Today, the role of an ambassador is daunting. Without a doubt, there are many challenges and opportunities in Europe, and you will both be in very crucial positions to help foster the transatlantic relationships between the United States and Europe. Your willingness to be good listeners and advocates are vital to U.S. foreign policy.

Often, we hear European leaders express how the United States and Europe share a common set of values. I agree with them. We have a long history of shared values that include the ideals of freedom and economic opportunity. We're committed to the idea of free markets and free societies. However, if we truly share these values, we all must believe they contain the answers to the challenges that confront us. European societies and their economies currently face many of the demographic problems we will face in the near future. There are lessons we can learn from them, but there are also ideas that we can share. The ideas of free markets and free societies can unleash creative solutions.

I believe European nations have incredible capability and potential to grow and to be more productive; however, it requires a willingness on the part of Europe's leaders to draft policies that unleash their people and trust what they're capable of.

As ambassadors, it's important you share and advocate the values that serve as a foundation to our prosperity. With your influence, Europe can be an even larger driving force in the world, economically and socially, and that would benefit everyone.

I also hope you will spend more of your time outside the embassy and government offices. The American culture is loved in Europe, but the same is not always true of American policy. However, the two cannot be conveniently separated, as many Europeans believe. And successful diplomacy is no longer an activity just between heads of state, but between the people of each nation. Much of this

can be accomplished through and economic ties. If you're committed to changing perceptions and wish to be successful American advocates, you will need to deliver your messages to the people directly.

The best days of Europe are still ahead, and you both can play a role in making this a reality. I thank you both again for being willing to serve.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Senator.

At this point, what I'd like to do is welcome my colleagues from North Carolina who are here to introduce Mr. Phillips. And we're going to go in order of both seniority and attractiveness——

[Laughter.]

Senator BURR. Leave me out of it.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. With Senator Dole, and then we'll proceed to Senator Burr.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH DOLE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA**

Senator DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator DeMint, Senator Coleman. It's a great privilege to introduce Dave Phillips, who has been nominated by the President to serve as the sixth United States Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia.

I'm honored to come before this committee to enthusiastically express my support for this nomination. Dave and his wife, Kay, have been dear friends through many years. Dave is one of the finest government and business leaders that North Carolina has known, and is more than qualified to join the ranks of our diplomatic corps.

Our country is blessed, indeed, to have such talented and experienced people who are willing to serve in our embassies overseas. I'm confident that Dave will serve with great distinction as the primary liaison between the United States and Estonia.

If confirmed, Dave Phillips will be responsible for promoting and protecting United States interests in Estonia, ever more important to the region as a whole since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, the country has been able to develop economic and political ties with western Europe, and, in just the past few years, has joined NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization. Estonia is a success story, how a former Soviet bloc country can transition to a democracy and modern market economy.

Just last September, President Bush visited Estonia to underscore the importance of free-market democracies and what they demonstrate to countries pursuing the same goals. Without question, Dave Phillips is the right person to serve as our chief representative to this country at this time. He's been involved in international commerce his entire professional life. As an international businessman, he promoted American furniture and textile businesses abroad. As Secretary of Commerce for North Carolina, he built relationships with other countries and is responsible for North Carolina's offices in Hong Kong, Tokyo, Mexico City, Frankfurt, and London. He led trade missions around the world and interfaced with business and government leaders, alike.

For all of Dave's international achievements, his most stellar accomplishment may have been here at home. He served as chair of the World Games of the Special Olympics in 1999, which, I'm proud to say, were held in North Carolina. At those games, he was able to bring together represents from 150 countries for a spectacular event.

Mr. Chairman, with his vast business and government expertise, Dave Phillips possesses the critical diplomatic and leadership skills needed to succeed in this important position. He will make a first-rate United States Ambassador.

Before I conclude, let me commend Aldona Wos for her service as United States Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia these past 2 years. Our country's relationship with Estonia, economically, politically, socially, and militarily, is better off because of Ambassador Wos's efforts.

I'd also like to acknowledge Sam Fox, who has been nominated by the President to serve as United States Ambassador to Belgium. Sam has been a close personal friend of Bob and Elizabeth Dole for many years, and I have known him to be unparalleled in his commitment to philanthropy and education. He and his wife, Marilyn, do so much to better communities here at home and abroad. He will make an excellent United States Ambassador.

Mr. Chairman, you have two outstanding nominees before you today.

Thank you very much.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much.

Senator Burr.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA**

Senator BURR. Mr. President—I mean, Mr. Chairman—excuse me—

[Laughter.]

Senator OBAMA. That's okay. [Laughter.]

Senator BURR. That was a good Carolina suck-up there. [Laughter.]

Mr. Chairman, thank you. To my colleagues, thank you for the opportunity for Senator Dole and me to come in and talk about, one, a dear friend, but, two, somebody who's eminently qualified. He's an extraordinary individual. He brings the qualifications that the United States needs in our embassies abroad. And I know he will do an outstanding job as the Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia.

The United States and Estonia have had relations since 1922. That relationship grew into a deep friendship when the United States continued to recognize Estonia's mission to the United States even while their homeland suffered 51 years of Soviet occupation. Indeed, this formed a solid foundation on which the United States and Estonia relations have flourished ever since, and Dave Phillips is the right man at the right time to continue to enhance those already strong ties.

As an accomplished businessman, philanthropist, and father, Dave has, in fact, been performing the duties of an ambassador for

many years, and we, from North Carolina, are so proud to call him our own.

As you heard my colleague say, Dave represented the United States as the chair of the Special Olympics World Games here in Washington, and abroad, as a member of the board of the Smithsonian Institute, meeting and carrying America's message to leaders all over the world.

United States relations in Europe are more important today than they've been since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Once again, we see a familiar Russia seeking to exert its influence throughout eastern Europe and the Baltics. This crucial time is why we need a man like Dave Phillips, with his deep understanding of business and commerce, to cement the United States/Estonia relationship and to reassert the United States support for a free and democratic Europe.

I urge my colleagues strongly to support Dave Phillips' nomination.

I, as my colleague Senator Dole has done, am also here to highlight the great nomination of Sam Fox. I know there are others here to speak for him, but I believe that, when you know somebody well, there are not enough people that can stand up and speak to your character and your ability. Today I am convinced we have two of the finest nominees in front of us that—the nominations could be made—to serve this country in our embassies abroad.

I thank the Chair.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Senator Burr.

We, next, are going to get introductions for Mr. Fox. The senior Senator from Missouri is Senator Bond, but I understand that Senator McCaskill is supposed to be presiding in 15 minutes. Senator Bond, would you be willing to let Senator McCaskill go first?

Senator BOND. It's a pleasure to be here with my current colleague and former colleague, sir—

Senator OBAMA. Absolutely.

Senator BOND [continuing]. And I will pass the microphone delicately over to—

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Bond.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI**

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is an honor to be here today with, also, Senator Danforth. He is—was a incredibly leader for our State and embodies so much of what we should be about in the United States Senate, and that is working across party lines to try to find that elusive middle ground that is good for all America.

I am here today to embrace and endorse Sam Fox as the nominee of the President to Ambassador to Belgium. I think many people would maybe want to dwell on the fact that he is a—at his essence, a self-made man, the sixth child of immigrant parents, grew up in very modest surroundings, with no indoor plumbing. And the fact that he has made a wildly successful business—and, I think, for many in America, that is the American dream—I would like to just briefly credit Sam Fox for the part of the American dream that we don't spend enough time talking about, and that's the way he has

grown his family of five children, and his grandchildren, and the way he has taught them all to look beyond self to the community. Through his foundation, he and his family give to over 150 different charities. St. Louis has been very lucky to receive the generosity of the Fox family in many different ways, whether it's Washington University, the Boy Scouts, or the Art Museum. He really is somebody that understands that we need to give tribute to the country that gives us so much by giving back to other people. And that, I think, is really the essence of the American dream.

It is who he is as a man. He is a good man. He would be a great ambassador. I think he would make our country very proud. I think it is important right now that we send ambassadors around the world that make our country proud. I think Sam Fox would do that.

And I would like permission to put my written statement in the record on his behalf.

And I thank you for allowing me to speak briefly so that I may go do my freshman duty of presiding over the Senate.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCaskill follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

Mr. Chairman and fellow Senators, it is a privilege for me to join you today to present to the committee a distinguished citizen of the great State of Missouri, Sam Fox, who has been nominated by President Bush to be Ambassador to Belgium.

Sam Fox represents much that is good about America and is an excellent choice to represent our country to the state of Belgium. The youngest child of immigrant parents, Sam is the quintessential self-made man. As a small boy, growing up in a home that for many years lacked indoor plumbing, Sam realized that hard work, good ideas, and perseverance could take a person a long way. He put these values to use and worked his way into college, the first in his family to attend, and then worked his way straight through school. Twenty-five years after graduating, he founded the Harbour Group, a business that now has over \$1.5 billion in annual revenues. Many would say that Sam Fox has lived the American dream—I would agree.

But Sam Fox is not just characterized by his business success, but by his embracement of American values—hope, hard work, a sense of duty, an entrepreneurial spirit and—among our most revered values—a dedication to giving back to the community. Sam and his wife, along with their five children, contribute to over 150 charities through the Sam Fox Foundation. He has served as president of the Greater St. Louis Council of Boy Scouts and president of the Board of the St. Louis Art Museum. He has given extensively to his alma mater, Washington University, in St. Louis. He has been recognized with the Woodrow Wilson Award for Corporate Citizenship and the Marco Polo Award for his humanitarian and economic work involving China.

Ninety-three years ago Sam's father, Max Fox, landed on Ellis Island so that he could provide a better life and a better future for his family. I recommend that this committee support Max's sixth child, Sam Fox, for the position of United States Ambassador to Belgium, where Sam can represent the great American story, the greatness of American values, and the great potential of the American dream.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Bond.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. "KIT" BOND,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI**

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator DeMint, Senator Coleman, Senator Voinovich. It's an honor to join with fellow Missourians in supporting the nomination of the President of Sam Fox to be Ambassador to Belgium.

Sam is a wonderful man, as you've heard already. We are delighted that he's accompanied by his marvelous family—his wife, Marilyn, and children, Cheryl, Pamela, Jeffrey, Greg, and Steven—whom I trust he will introduce.

It's already been said, he has a distinguished record of service to the American people at the national, State, and community level, and I've had the pleasure of knowing Sam for many years, and know, as my colleague said, that he is a dedicated man who's spent his life pursuing projects that enrich our communities and our families.

Professionally and morally, Sam is eminently qualified to hold the post for which he has been nominated. He does exemplify the American dream, born in Desloge, Missouri, a small town, he earned a bachelor's degree from Washington University, and proudly served in the U.S. Navy. In 1976, he founded the Harbour Group, a privately owned operating company specializing in the acquisition and development of manufacturing companies. His dedication and hard work has made Harbour Group one of the most successful companies of its kind in America.

He's often frank and candid with his colleagues and his friends, but Sam's optimism and enthusiasm have made him a leader in the business community and will make him a valuable addition to the United States diplomatic corps in Europe.

Sam's best known for his tireless advocacy of those in need. The son of Jewish immigrants, Sam remembers his parent were not wealthy, but they always sought to give back to the community that had given them hope for a new beginning. Following in this tradition, Sam and his wife, Marilyn, created the Fox Family Foundation over 20 years ago. Each year, the Fox Foundation supports up to 150 different organizations in the St. Louis area, to provide—including providing basic human needs, such as food and shelter, to those in need. However, Sam's efforts don't stop there. He's an exemplary citizen who has been extremely active in a wide variety of civic affairs. He's served in key leadership roles with the United Way, the Boy Scouts, the St. Louis Science Center, Civic Progress, and Barnes-Jewish Hospital. The communities Sam supports have recognized his contributions to the common good, as evidenced by the numerous awards he has received, including Woodrow Wilson Award for Corporate Citizenship and the St. Louis Citizen of the Year.

Sam Fox's business achievement and philanthropic work leave no doubt in my mind that he has the ability to represent effectively the best interests of the United States. His understanding of complex issues that impact our national and international interests will stand him and the administration in good stead as we face the endless array of emerging challenges bound to emerge in the days, months, and years ahead.

Sam's a good man, dedicated to his family, his community, and his country. As I stated previously, it's an honor to recognize his many contributions to our common good. Most of all, I'm proud to call him a friend. I know he'll serve the best interests of the United States ably and faithfully.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Senator Bond.

We will proceed, then, with Senator Lieberman, Senator Specter, and we will end with the distinguished Senator Danforth, from Missouri.

Senator Lieberman.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT**

Senator LIEBERMAN Thank you. Senator Danforth can offer not only an endorsement, but a benediction. [Laughter.]

Mr. Chairman, I'm honored to be here to join with Senator McCaskill, Senator Bond, Senator Specter, and our dear friend and former colleague Senator Danforth in urging this committee to report favorably on the nomination of Sam Fox to be Ambassador to Belgium.

I suppose that the array—what I can add to this distinguished group of colleagues is to prove that Sam not only has bipartisan, but tripartisan, support—

[Laughter.]

Senator LIEBERMAN [continuing]. For his nomination, and to say—just to echo, and really speak briefly—Sam Fox represents what America's all about. And that's why he will be, when confirmed, an extraordinary ambassador.

It's been said, but these are wonderful stories. Somebody—child of immigrants, born in very modest means, just had the dream that, in America, if you work hard and play by the rules, you can make it. And that's what he did, and he made it; and, when he did, he gave back to the community and the country in a thousand different ways.

Sam is an extraordinary philanthropic person. If I may be more colloquial, he's one of the softest-touches in America. This guy doesn't say no to somebody who comes and asks for help. And he has given enormous—made an enormous amount of good things happen for people.

I'd say just a word, that I don't mean to be parochial, but I say, as a Jewish American, that I'm proud to be supporting Sam Fox. As a proud Jewish American himself, he will bring that experience to Belgium, to the center of Europe, at a time when there is some division and suggestions of bias rising again. And Sam, from his own experience about the openness and mutual respect that he found in America, and that, in turn, he has given to this fellow Americans, I think, can have an extraordinarily positive effect. I'm honored to call Sam Fox my friend. I appreciate his friendship, and I am honored to ask you to send him to Brussels as our next ambassador.

Thank you very much.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Specter.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA**

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, other distinguished members of this panel, I am proud to join this very distinguished array of introducers.

I would ask unanimous consent that my full statement be made a part of the record, because I'm going to have to return to the Appropriations Committee, which is hearing—

Senator OBAMA. Without objection.

Senator SPECTER [continuing]. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Bob Gates.

I've known Sam for the better part of 20 years, and I associate myself with the remarks which have been made here.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, if you had this much support, you'd be a shoo-in. [Laughter.]

Senator OBAMA. Thank you.

Senator SPECTER. Good luck, Sam.

Mr. FOX. Thank you very much.

Senator SPECTER. I don't think you need a whole lot of luck.

[The prepared statement of Senator Specter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA

I am pleased to attend today's Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in order to provide an introduction for Mr. Sam Fox of Missouri, who has been nominated to be Ambassador of the United States to Belgium.

Mr. Fox was born and raised in Desloge, Missouri. He graduated with honors from Washington University in Saint Louis in 1951 and served in the U.S. Naval Reserve from 1951–1955.

As the founder, chairman, and chief executive officer of the Harbour Group, Mr. Fox has helped the company earn an outstanding national reputation for its record of success in acquiring and building high quality companies.

Mr. Fox has been extremely active in civic affairs, serving in key leadership roles in cultural, educational, and charitable institutions throughout the St. Louis area, including the Saint Louis Symphony Orchestra; the Opera Theatre of Saint Louis; Barnes-Jewish Hospital; the Saint Louis Science Center; Civic Progress; the Boy Scouts; the Saint Louis Art Museum; and the United Way.

Mr. Fox has also been a major supporter of Washington University. From 1999–2001, Mr. Fox served as the vice chairman of the University's Board of Trustees. From 1998–2004 he served as the chairman of the Campaign for Washington University, helping raise over \$1.5 billion. In 2004, he became the only Lifetime Trustee elected in the University's history. In October 2006, the University showed its appreciation for his longtime service and support by dedicating the new Sam Fox School of Design and Visual Arts in his honor.

Washington University is not alone in its praise for Mr. Fox. In 2003, he was named Saint Louis Citizen of the Year, an annual award given to a community leader who demonstrates concern for Saint Louis' growth and vitality. That same year, he was a recipient of the Woodrow Wilson Award for Corporate Citizenship, which is given to those executives who recognize the role they can play in improving society in general, while at the same time advancing the long-term interests of their firms, employees, and shareholders. In 2005, he received the Horatio Alger Award, which recognizes Americans of modest roots who achieve success through hard work, honesty, and perseverance.

I have traveled to Belgium seven times during my tenure in the Senate and have seen the work done by the United States Ambassador in Brussels firsthand. I am confident the embassy will be in good hands with Mr. Fox at the helm. I urge my colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee to report his nomination favorably.

I look forward to casting my vote in favor of Mr. Fox's nomination in the Senate.

Senator OBAMA. And finally, Senator Danforth, who we thank not only for his service to the State of Missouri, but also for his service as United States Ambassador to the U.N., and, particularly timely, his outstanding work as a Special Envoy in Sudan. We very much appreciate your efforts on behalf of the country and the world.

Please proceed.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN DANFORTH,
FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI**

Senator DANFORTH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity of speaking on behalf of my friend Sam Fox.

I am not going to dwell on his biographical information. That is now well-known to the committee. I'm simply going to speak about a person I know, and I know well.

I have been in Sam's home. He has been in mine. My daughter, Mary, is a very close friend of two of Sam's sons and their families. My grandchildren go to school with Sam's children. This is a long family connection, and I can say, if there is any way, Mr. Chairman, that you can wangle an invitation to go fishing with Sam Fox, accept that invitation. [Laughter.]

He, as has been said, grew up in Jefferson County, Missouri. It's the same county that gave us Bill Bradley, as a matter of fact. He is a self-made man. I did not know him in Jefferson County, and I do not know him in the world of business. I simply know Sam Fox as a human being. And I know what he means to me as a person, and I know what he means to my hometown of St. Louis. As a person, he is very bright, he is very energetic and warm. I would call him ebullient. And, above all, as you heard, particularly from Senator Lieberman, he is generous. As I think Senator Lieberman said, he's a soft touch. The other side of that is that after you touch him, he touches you, and you learn, after a while, that, when you get an envelope in the mail from the Harbour Group, your heart sinks, because you can't—

[Laughter.]

Senator DANFORTH [continuing]. Say no to Sam Fox. He has been involved in so many good causes in St. Louis. Washington University, which is such a stellar academic institution, the St. Louis Art Museum, the Boy Scouts, the United Way, and the list goes on and on. And, as Senator Bond pointed out, he's been recognized for what he means to our town by being named Citizen of the Year.

After Sam—after the announcement was made that Sam was—had been nominated for Ambassador to Belgium, I was speaking to my brother, Bill, about the nomination, and my brother said, "You know, this is a huge loss for St. Louis." And I said, "Well, it'll probably only last a few years," and he said, "It's a huge loss for St. Louis." I think it's a gain for our Government and our country and our relationship with Europe. But Sam really means a lot to St. Louis, and there's no doubt about that.

I'd just like to add one other point, Mr. Chairman. Sam is the nominee of a Republican President, and the Senate is no longer Republican, alas. But—so, I thought that I'd just meet head-on, you know, why would a Democratic Senate want to confirm Sam Fox, other than to get him out of the way? But I think that the reason is just the kind of person he is and what he would bring to the job of ambassador. He would bring the same energy, he would bring the same personal qualities, the same spirit of generosity, the same kindness, the same decency that are right at the heart of Sam Fox. And so, he would make an outstanding ambassador.

But I—when I was preparing my thoughts for today's meeting, I thought, well, I won't just—I won't just speak for myself. So, last Friday I spoke on the phone with the leading Democrat in our

State, my former colleague and my good friend, Tom Eagleton. And he started to dictate to me exactly what he wanted me to say about Sam. And then, with absolutely no confidence in my stenographic skill, he put it in writing, and he sent me this following quote, which he asked me to read to the committee. Tom Eagleton said, "I am enthusiastically for Sam Fox to be Ambassador. He is a generous, concerned citizen of St. Louis. He is the epitome of a humanitarian." And, as usual, Senator Eagleton puts it more eloquently than I can.

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to support my friend before this committee.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Senator.

We'd like to now proceed to opening statements.

Mr. Phillips, we'd like you to begin. You can proceed with your opening statement. If you'd like to introduce the members of your family, please feel free to do so. I've had the opportunity to meet them. They seem like a wonderful family.

In the interest of time, if it's possible for you to summarize your opening testimony, that would be wonderful, because what we can then do is include your full testimony in the record. But, obviously, if you feel more comfortable reading the entirety of the testimony, you can certainly do so.

**STATEMENT OF STANLEY DAVIS PHILLIPS, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA**

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Members of the committee—Senator Cardin, Senator DeMint, Senator Coleman, Senator Voinovich—I'm honored to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the next Ambassador of the United States to Estonia.

I would like to express my gratitude to the President and to Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they have placed in me. I would also like to thank Senator Dole and Senator Burr for introducing me, and very much appreciate their help and guidance.

It would be a great privilege for me to be allowed the opportunity to serve the United States. Throughout my life, I have traveled internationally, and think there is nothing more important than to learn about the world and mankind.

I began traveling internationally when I was in high school. In 1961, as a member of one of the first student exchange programs between America and the Soviet Union, I attended the University of Moscow and then, for 2 months, traveled by plane, train, and boat to some regions that have since taken their place as independent countries, such as Georgia and the Ukraine. It was an incredible experience.

I have been involved, for my entire professional life, in international commerce, for more—30 years, I promoted American business by financing accounts receivable of foreign companies by building showrooms for foreign exhibitors in High Point, North Carolina, for the international furniture market, and by manufacturing textiles in North America that were exported globally.

During the 1990s, I served as Secretary of Commerce for North Carolina for Governor Jim Hunt, and had the opportunity to establish trade and business recruitment offices and lead many trade

missions to diverse nations in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. I also had the unique experience to meet with many different heads of state and governments, including Prime Minister Rabin of Israel, Prime Minister Murayama of Japan, President Mandela of South Africa, President Zedillo of Mexico, and even President Mugabe of Zimbabwe.

However, the most exciting international involvement of my life was chairing the World Games of the Special Olympics in 1999. One hundred and fifty countries participated, with 10,000 athletes and coaches visiting North Carolina, and more than 36,000 citizens volunteering their services over 10 days of the games.

Most recently, I was responsible for organizing and leading a trip to India with the Smithsonian National Board. We experienced an incredible country, visiting many different cities and meeting with fascinating people, such as the Dalai Lama.

These cross-cultural exchanges have taught me the vital importance of people-to-people contacts to improve mutual understanding and build trust and friendship.

Now, let me turn now to our bilateral relationship with Estonia. The United States and Estonia have already—are already true partners and close allies. President Bush's visit last November, as the first sitting American President to visit Estonia, highlighted the strength of our relationship. He and his Estonian host discussed how our nations are cooperating around the world to achieve common objectives and promote common values.

A small country of only 1.3 million people, Estonia is nonetheless a world actor with a large footprint. In just 15 years since reestablishing its independence, Estonia made a very successful transition to democracy, and its economy was the second fastest growing in Europe in 2006. It became a NATO member, and a member of the European Union in 2004, and it is now sharing its democratic experience and free-market principles with countries still in transition.

For example, Estonia is helping to train leaders, government officials, and law enforcement officers in the Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia. Estonia has an amazing e-governance program allowing citizens and leaders to communicate and do business easily and quickly. Estonia's cabinet room has gone paperless. Ministers review documents on computers and can even vote and send comments remotely. Estonia has helped many countries understand and implement e-governance projects to improve government efficiency and transparency.

Estonia's vital contributions to peace and stability are not limited to countries in Europe. We stand side by side in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Estonians are serving part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force and helping in Helmand province, a dangerous province in the south, where the Taliban is very active. Estonia has made a long-term commitment to Afghanistan, both by contributing troops and by prioritizing development assistance, including poppy eradication.

The Estonian troops in Afghanistan are serving with no national caveats, meaning that NATO commanders have full freedom to use them when and how they see fit. Estonian troops are also serving bravely in Iraq, having suffered two combat deaths and several

wounded since deploying in 2003. Estonia is committed to the effort, and recently extended its troop mandate for another year.

If confirmed, I would do my best to maintain and develop our close relationship with Estonia.

In closing, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Kay, who is going to be my partner in this endeavor, and thank her for her love and her dedication. I would also like to thank our four daughters, three of whom are with us today—Lil, Bo, and Lucy; and Kate, who now lives in London. We are filled with pride for their accomplishments and want to thank all of them for their love and support.

Thank you for granting me this opportunity to appear before you this—before this distinguished committee. And, Mr. Chairman, I'll be glad to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Phillips follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STANLEY DAVIS PHILLIPS, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the next Ambassador of the United States to Estonia. I would like to express my gratitude to the President and Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they have placed in me. I would also like to thank my Senators—Senator Dole and Senator Burr—for introducing me, and very much appreciate their help and guidance.

It would be a great privilege for me to be allowed the opportunity to serve the United States. Throughout my life I have traveled internationally and think there is nothing more important than to learn about the world and mankind.

I began traveling internationally when I was in high school. In 1961, as a member of one of the first student exchange programs between America and the Soviet Union, I attended the University of Moscow and then for 2 months traveled by plane, train, and boat to some regions that have since taken their place as independent countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine. It was an incredible experience.

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If confirmed, I would do my best to maintain and develop our close partnership with Estonia.

In closing, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Kay, who is going to be my partner in this endeavor, and I thank her for her love and dedication. I would also like to thank our four daughters, three of whom, Lil, Bo, and Lucy, are with us today, and Kate who lives in London. We are filled with pride for their accomplishments and want to thank them for all of their love and support.

Thank you for granting me the opportunity to appear before this distinguished committee. I will be pleased to answer any questions.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you.

Mr. Fox, you can proceed with your opening statement. And, again, if you'd like to introduce your family, feel free to do so. And if you'd like to summarize your testimony, that's—would be terrific; but, otherwise, please proceed.

**STATEMENT OF SAM FOX, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM**

Mr. FOX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee.

At the outset, I'd like to express my personal appreciation to Senators Kit Bond, Claire McCaskill, Joe Lieberman, Arlen Specter, and Jack Danforth, for coming here today to speak in my behalf. I am truly honored by their remarks.

I'm also grateful to you, Senator Obama, for chairing this session today.

I will make my full statement available for the committee record, and I will summarize in as short a period as I can.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, it's a tremendous honor to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to serve as the United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium. I'm grateful to the President and to Secretary of State Rice for their confidence in me, and to this committee for its consideration. If confirmed, it would be a privilege to serve as our country's representative to a valued ally in Europe.

Before I go any further, please permit me, if you will, to introduce a special team, my family, that are here with me today. First and foremost, that beautiful young lady sitting here behind me, Marilyn, my partner for more than 53 years—I might say, my managing partner, at that. And we have here—as I call their names, if you would please acknowledge yourself—I have my daughter, Cherrie, my daughter, Pamela; I have my son-in-law, Allan

Clayman; I have my son, Jeff, his wife, Lota, three children, Elizabeth, Catherine, and Cici; my son, Greg, his wife, Merle, sons, Matthew, Peter, Megan; son, Steven, his wife, Nancy, and their daughter, Sophia.

Now, I'm a little short here. We don't have the team completed, because I'm missing one son-in-law, and I'm missing at least six grandchildren. [Laughter.]

Senator OBAMA. I notice you did that without notes, though, which is very—

[Laughter.]

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. It's very impressive.

Mr. FOX. But ask me for birthdays. [Laughter.]

Senator OBAMA. All right.

Mr. FOX. Mr. Chairman, as this committee knows, our country's relations with Belgium are a vital part of our dealings with all of Europe, and increasingly with the rest of the world.

Belgium is important, not only in its own right but also as the seat of the European Union and of the NATO Alliance. If Europe were to have a capital city, I'm convinced it would most likely be Brussels.

Today, relations between Belgium and our country are robust and highly effective, and it's a tribute to the tremendous work of our most recent Ambassador, Tom Korologos, and the talents of our fine diplomatic staff there. The first responsibility of any American Ambassador in Brussels is to maintain that relationship. And, if confirmed, I would take up this assignment in the only way I know how, by working tirelessly to build on the successes of those who have come before me.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, high on my list of goals as Ambassador to Belgium will be, first, to ensure the safety and the welfare of all American citizens, including the employees under my care and those working and visiting in Belgium; second, to seek Belgium's closer partnership in our fight against international terrorism; third, to strengthen our partnership with the Belgian Government; fourth, to increase Belgium's support of United States positions in NATO and the European Union; fifth, to expand U.S. exports and expand business investment by both nations; and sixth, to be a good and faithful steward of the taxpayers' dollars.

I hope that the committee will find my own life and career have prepared me for these responsibilities. I bring to this position the management skills that have served me well all of my life. I feel that I've been in training for this ambassadorship for a long time. My background has taught me how to emphasize common interests above points of disagreement, how to assert one's own interests while respecting the views and the interests of the others. And, if confirmed, these are some of the skills that I would put to use as Ambassador to Belgium.

Mr. Chairman, I've also learned a few things about hard work, about team work, about running businesses, about managing organizations, and about meeting new challenges. And I'll regard this chance to serve my country as one of the greatest challenges in a life full of challenges. The assignment requires hard work and complete commitment on the part of the American Ambassador in

Brussels. You have my pledge, sir, with the confidence of this committee, with the consent of the Senate, I will give it my very best.

I want to thank all the members of this committee for your very, very kind attention. And now, Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fox follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SAM FOX,
NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee.

At the outset, I would like to express my personal appreciation to Senators Kit Bond, Claire McCaskill, Joe Lieberman, Arlen Specter, and Jack Danforth for coming here today to speak on my behalf. I am honored, sir, by their remarks.

I am also grateful to you, Senator Obama, for chairing this session today.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, it is a tremendous honor to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to serve as the United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium. I am grateful to the President and to Secretary of State Rice for their confidence in me, and to this committee for its consideration. If confirmed, it would be a privilege to serve as our country's representative to a valued ally in Europe.

Before I go any further, please permit me to introduce some very special people who have also joined me here today. First and foremost, the very lovely woman seated behind me is my wife, Marilyn. For the past 53 years, Marilyn has been my partner—my managing partner, I might add. If I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, Marilyn will be a gracious and dignified representative of our country to the people of the Kingdom of Belgium. I am also pleased to introduce my other family members.

Mr. Chairman, as this committee knows, our country's relations with Belgium are a vital part of our dealings with all of Europe and increasingly with the rest of the world. Belgium is important not only in its own right, but also as the seat of the European Union and the NATO Alliance. If Europe were to have a capital city, most likely it would be Brussels. Today, relations between Belgium and our country are robust and highly effective—a tribute to the tremendous work of our most recent Ambassador, Tom Korologos, and the talents of our fine diplomatic staff there. The first responsibility of any American Ambassador in Brussels is to keep them that way. If confirmed, I would take up this assignment in the only way I know how—by working tirelessly to build on the successes of those who have come before me.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, high on my list of goals, as Ambassador to Belgium, will be:

- First, to ensure the safety and welfare of all American citizens—including the employees under my care and those working and visiting in Belgium;
- Second, to seek Belgium's closer partnership in our fight against international terrorism;
- Third, to strengthen our partnership with the Belgian Government;
- Fourth, to increase Belgium's support of United States positions in NATO and the European Union;
- Fifth, to expand U.S. exports and expand business investment by both nations; and
- Sixth, be a good and faithful steward of the taxpayers' dollars.

Most people of my generation first came to know of Belgium and its people in the war years. And it's true that the heroic pursuits and democratic values that made us allies in those days—as well as the memory of the United States relief effort in Belgium during World War I—are still the basis of a lasting friendship. We recall how the Belgian people warmly welcomed American veterans to the 60th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge in Bastogne in 2004. And again in 2006, when Prime Minister Verhofstadt dedicated a Battle of the Bulge memorial provided by the people of Belgium and Luxembourg at Arlington National Cemetery.

But it's much more than nostalgia that makes Belgium the close and valued partner of America today. In the post-war years, Belgium helped to build the framework for the West's lasting security as a founding member of both the European Union and NATO. Today, Belgium is working hard to bring the allies even closer together—at NATO, the European Union, and in many other settings—in defense of our freedom and human rights. Belgium backs up its talk with action—troops on the ground in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Lebanon. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Belgium has also labored hard to end conflict and to build democracy.

Belgium, in short, is a force for good in the world, and as much as ever our nations are joined by great and enduring interests—by ties forged on the battlefield in pursuit of lasting peace, and in our shared commitments to global prosperity. The United States and Belgium are united against terrorist threats that recognize no boundaries. And, if confirmed, I will work to expand this cooperation to protect our country and our friends from this gravest of dangers.

In economic terms, our two nations trade at a value of more than \$30 billion a year, and we share a common interest in expanding both trade and investment. If confirmed, I will encourage Belgium to continue to improve its investment climate to attract business.

As with every other diplomatic outpost, America's Ambassador in Brussels must also be a firm advocate for the fundamental values and ideals of our country—chief among them, freedom.

I have long been in awe of the commitment made by those men and women who choose the Foreign Service as a way of life. We entrust in them the highest of honors—to serve as beacons of democracy around the world. Peace and understanding guide their noble efforts—their successes rarely make front page news.

I hope that the committee will find that my own life and career have prepared me for these responsibilities. I would bring to this position the management skills which have served me well all my life. In fact, I feel that I have been training for this ambassadorship for a long time.

My background has taught me how to emphasize common interests above points of disagreement—and how to assert one's own interests—while respecting the views and interests of others. If confirmed, these are skills I would put to full use as Ambassador to Belgium.

Mr. Chairman, I've learned a few things about hard work—about teamwork—about running businesses—about managing organizations—and about meeting new challenges. And I regard this chance to serve my country as one of the greatest challenges in a life full of challenges. The assignment requires hard work and complete commitment on the part of the American Ambassador in Brussels. And you have my pledge, sir—that with the confidence of this committee—with the consent of the Senate—I will give it my very best.

I thank all of the members of this committee for your very kind attention, and now, Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Fox.

I will start off with some questions, Mr. Phillips. Some of the issues were raised by your testimony.

And, by the way, we're going to—if it's acceptable to the members of the committee we'll do 10-minute rounds, and we'll—if people have additional questions after that, then we'll be willing to extend the time somewhat.

So, let me start with you, Mr. Phillips. You know, Estonia faces a number of challenges with its—with respect to its relationship to Russia. You know, the two countries are on different sides of whether the Soviet occupation of Estonia was illegal. The Kremlin's objected to NATO planes patrolling Baltic airspace. Recently, Estonia has expressed concerns about Russian plans to construct an undersea gas pipeline that would give Moscow greater control over Estonia's energy supplies.

So, I'm wondering if you've given thought to the relationship between Russia and Estonia. If confirmed, what actions would you take to address some of the issues that may be arising between those two countries?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, the relationship between Russia and Estonia is very sensitive and very difficult. It goes back to World War II, where the Soviet troops came in and occupied Estonia. Their version is that they liberated Estonia from Naziism, so this contentious discussion has taken place since that time. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia declared their independence and that—since that time, this debate has continued as to the terminology. It has found its way into all kinds of situations,

even symbolism of the bronze statue, the debate over the border. But the energy issue seems to be the one that everybody is most concerned about, and that is, Can Estonia evolve and deal with their energy requirements? It's interesting to note that imported oil and gas is only 30 percent of their energy requirements. Estonia has enormous resources of oil shale; therefore, they are able to have—approximately 95 percent of their electrical needs are self-produced. It's intriguing that they export electricity. They have recently put a line to Finland. So, they are in very good shape from an electrical standpoint. Oil and gas, they have the strategy of building a nuclear plant in the future, with the other Baltic states and Poland. They have the opportunity of going into liquified natural-gas terminal, where they could receive that type of supply. So, they are well aware, we are well aware, that energy is a major concern in the future of Estonia. But it seems, right now, with 30 percent of their energy needs only coming from Russia itself, that they understand the necessity of diversity, but they are in pretty good shape.

Senator OBAMA. Okay, good. Just a quick follow-up on that, if we can answer this briefly. You know, obviously Estonia's Government's played an important role in consolidating democracy in eastern Europe, the transition from the cold war. And you had mentioned the work that was done on e-government. Do you see the potential for you to support Estonian initiatives in establishing more transparency, greater accountability in their government, and—do you see that as having an influence in what other countries in the region do?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Well, it's a remarkable country. It's ranked seventh in the Heritage Foundation of Freedom—the Freedom Index, higher than United States of America. Their transparency is incredible. They are truly a beacon in Europe, and maybe around the world. They have done an incredible formulating e-governance. The technology that's come out of that country is truly remarkable.

It's interesting to note that Hotmail, a major part of Microsoft's initiative, was created in Estonia. Skype, that was recently bought by eBay here in America for \$2.5 billion, was created in Estonia. So, their technology is truly remarkable, and that they have permeated their government with this type openness and transparency, and they are talking to other emerging countries in the world, and especially in central Europe, to do the same thing.

Senator OBAMA. Good. Thank you.

Mr. Fox, you mentioned your managerial skills. And I think those'll certainly come to play, in part because Belgium is the seat of not only your ambassadorship, but also missions to NATO and the European Union. So, I'm wondering, were you to be confirmed, how would you ensure that all the U.S. missions in the country coordinated their efforts to maximize their impact on foreign policy? And is this something that you've given some thought to?

Mr. FOX. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, we have a United States mission to European Union, and we also have a United States mission to NATO. And both of those have ambassadors, Ambassador Neuland to NATO and Ambassador Gray to the European Union. Both of those missions have the primary responsibility for that—for the respective

relationships. However, I do believe that it is the responsibility of the United States mission to Belgium and the ambassador to help promote and to persuade the Belgian Government toward United States views with respect to both the European Union and to NATO. And if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, it is my intention to have regular meetings with both of those ambassadors, because they're doing very, very important work.

And I'd go beyond that, sir. I would want to make sure that the staff of our embassy at all of their levels and in all of their departments, establish and maintain good relationships with their counterparts in those two missions.

Senator OBAMA. Good. Now, Belgium was one of the leading critics of United States policy during the run-up to the war in Iraq. I'm wondering what your assessment is of the current status of United States/Belgian cooperation on security issues. Belgium doesn't spend a lot of money on defense, is suspicious, at times, of United States military actions abroad. How would you approach those conversations with the Belgian Government?

Mr. FOX. Well, to answer the last question, "How?" I've had a lot of experience, Mr. Chairman, in negotiations and diplomacy. And we've built plants all around the world. We've maintained operations all around the world; as a matter of fact, all across Europe. So, I've had a little bit of experience with that. One of the first things you learn is, there's very little you can do until you build relationships. And it would be very important for the United States Ambassador to first understand the players in Belgium, and then go about systematically getting to understand those players and making sure that there is mutual respect that's created between the United States Ambassador and his counterpart in the Belgian Government. So, that, I think, is step one.

You ask about terrorism. I think that the Belgian Government has done a lot in counterterrorism. First of all, if you go to Antwerp, the Megaport Initiative, and also the Container Initiative, they are No. 1 in the world. They spent something like \$50 million to install the kind of equipment that will pick up weapons of mass destruction or nuclear materials. They've passed a number of laws recently that have got some real teeth in them that—and they've arrested a number of people. They've convicted a number of people. I think they're doing a good job. And I think counterterrorism is high on their agenda. There was a meeting here in Washington in November on that very subject.

Insofar as defense is concerned, as you now, they were one of the founding members of NATO. And during the cold war, they were right there with us, tremendously. They had an armed force of something like, oh, 130,000 troops. One thing that is a little disappointing today is the amount of money that they are spending on defense. NATO's guidelines would be 2 percent of gross domestic product. They presently are 1.1 to 1.3 percent. So, I think one of our goals should be to try to get them to get that budget up a bit.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much.

Senator DeMint.

Senator DEMINT. I want to thank you two gentlemen. And from what we hear, you're both very qualified to represent our country,

and I look forward to assisting you in any way you can—we can here.

I would like to hear both of you just talk briefly about trade and the ability of you, as ambassadors, of encouraging business relationships between our country and those countries that you will be working with. And I know both of you have extensive business experience, but, as you know—as, Mr. Fox, you just mentioned—building relationships is key. Doing business is one way, sports, like Special Olympics, another way, bring countries together so that we can work together beyond what governments do. And that helps us get through government-to-government crises. And we've certainly found that in South Carolina, doing business with BMW and Michelin. It doesn't matter how much Washington fights with France and Germany, we're doing business with them, and it doesn't bother us that much. But I'd love to hear you both talk about how you, as ambassadors, can extend trade relations in this country.

And, Mr. Fox, I'll start with you.

Mr. FOX. Well, your question has to do, as I understand it, about the ability of the ambassador to assist in trade. I'll tell you this, that Belgium is an excellent trading partner. They're only 10 million in population, but yet, they are our 12th largest market, 12th largest trading partner. They're very business-oriented. We've got 900 American companies in Belgium. And our exports to Belgium are \$20 billion. We import \$15 billion for them. We have a \$5 billion trade surplus. And, as a businessman, I would do everything that I could to try to develop trade more by working with the United States Government—United States companies in Belgium, as well as those in America, who have products that they are exporting, or could be exported, to Belgium.

They—the Belgian people are very oriented toward business, and the—they're situated in such a place that 70 percent of their—70 percent of the population of the European Union is within 300 miles of Belgium, and they've got great waterways, roads, and so forth. So, in addition to what we can do with Belgium, there's a lot that we can send through the port of Antwerp to other parts of Europe.

Senator DEMINT. Excellent.

Mr. Phillips.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Presently, there are approximately 100 American companies with a presence in Estonia. I made reference, a few minutes ago, to one that's very high profile, but the impact on Estonia was enormous, that—their creativity of Skype and \$2.5 billion of purchase power going in to Estonia. It shows you what's going on in Estonia.

They still have manufacturing, they still have agricultural as well as manufacturing. There are furniture companies. And being from North Carolina—and the furniture capital of the world is High Point—they are companies that do import furniture from Estonia. They're still in the textile business. We are aware of certain companies in North Carolina dealing with them in the textile business. This is happening all over America. So, these relationships are ones that exist, but I would like very much to nurture and bring in more relationships. I think it's very important. This is

what I did for years for the State of North Carolina all over the world, trying to bring companies, but also to export products to these countries, and that—I would like to do the same thing for Estonia.

Senator DEMINT. Excellent.

Senator OBAMA. Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have two extraordinary nominees here. I was actually hoping that I could participate in the introduction of Sam Fox, but I couldn't find a seat at the table, so I'm—

[Laughter.]

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Glad to be up here.

These are two extraordinary individuals. So, I just want to thank you for your willingness to serve.

I had a meeting this morning with Tim Shriver, from Special Olympics. We did Special Olympics in St. Paul, Minnesota, where I was a mayor for 8 years. And it's extraordinary, the things, by the way, that they are doing. But your service, your business success, has done what—actually, Mr. Fox, I think his quote was that, "My life and career has prepared me well for this experience." I believe that to be true of both of you.

Senator Lieberman said that Sam Fox represents what America's all about. I would say that—I'd change that a little bit, amend it to say Sam Fox represents the best of what America is all about. Father came to Ellis Island from a shtetl in the Ukraine, with his clothes on his back, and—talk about the American success story, Horatio Alger's story, that's really what we have in front of us. And I know Mr. Fox better, but that's what he's all about. He—I had a chance—Senator McCaskill talked about family—I had a chance to be Jerusalem to have dinner with his daughter, and not just his daughter; it was the Sabbath dinner, Mr. Chairman, and there were a number of American students, young Jewish Americans who were kind of tapping into their culture, into their heritage. And it was just—it was extraordinary to be part of that. I think the daughter is a reflection of the father and of the mother and of the family that really understand what it is to give back, what it is to nurture and to grow. I think Mr. Fox adheres to what I call the "manure theory of money." If you just kind of pile it up, it doesn't smell too good, but if you spread it around, it fertilizes and it grows. And Sam has been growing a lot of things in his community, in this country.

And so, I believe the President has made some extraordinary choices, individuals whose life experience has prepared them for this moment, individuals who are learned, who understand this global economy in which we participate. So, I look forward to supporting this nomination, Mr. President—Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much.

Senator Kerry just joined us.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to welcome both our nominees, and thank you very much for appearing here with us today. I apologize for not being here the whole time, but I did hear part of the testimony in my office.

Mr. Fox, you come here with an extraordinary number of distinguished introducers, and some of them good friends of mine and people for whom I have great respect. And I have received a number of phone calls from people who vouch for your tremendous civic engagement, which is obvious for all to see. And I certainly respect the career that you have—that brings you to this position. I think I saw you had won the Horatio Alger Award at some point. And, as one of the introducers said, you really are sort of the quintessential American Horatio Alger story. So, I tip my hat to the life you have led and to the contributions you have made back to the community, which are really significant. And I can understand why St. Louis and Missouri are proud of you, and why those who have come here are proud of you.

I think you know that I have some concerns, which I will touch on a little. But I want to explore a few things, if I may.

Let me ask you a generic question about America's position in Europe, and Europe's view of us that you will be walking into if you were to go into this job. What is your sense of where American foreign policy overall is with respect to the European community? And do you face any particular challenges at this point in time that might be unique to this moment as an ambassador?

Mr. FOX. Thank you, Senator, for giving me the opportunity to address that subject.

I have several thoughts. Well, first of all, as an ambassador, you know, I represent—I would—if confirmed, I would represent the United States Government. And it's the United States Government agenda that I would be expected to carry out. Having said that, I think we have a lot of work cut out for us, particularly in Europe, and—because I think that—I think there's a lot that can be done, and should be done, to improve the image of America in Europe. And I would hope that I would be able to contribute to that.

Senator KERRY. What do you think's happened to the image of America in Europe?

Mr. FOX. Well, I don't know any more than what I read in the papers, but I think that there's a lot of concern about America, and I think the war in Iraq is not well received in Europe, particularly. And I think that has affected opinion about Americans.

Senator KERRY. Are there other issues? What would you say has been the Belgian level of concern about the war on terror itself, the way it's been prosecuted?

Mr. FOX. Well, I don't have any firsthand information on that. The only information that I have is what I have been provided by the State Department. And from what I have received from the State Department, it seems as if their war on terrorism has been very good, very cooperative. I mentioned, before you came in, earlier, Senator, that there was a very high-level meeting here, that you probably know about, in November, on counterterrorism. They've passed a number of laws internally. And there's more coming. They have really taken a very strong position in being able to find terrorist groups and prosecuting them and putting them in jail. I mentioned, also, the wonderful job that they did in Antwerp, the Megaport Initiative and the Container Initiative, which is designed to identify weapons of mass destruction and also nuclear materials and so forth.

So, what—everything I have learned from the State Department is that they're doing a very good job. But, having said that, you know, it's never enough, because we do face a real threat. Terrorism is not just a problem for America, it's a problem for the entire world.

Senator KERRY. So, you have no knowledge, outside of what the State Department's told you, about any concerns or issues that Belgians may have about the way we've prosecuted the war on terror?

Mr. FOX. Other than the newspapers, I haven't, no. I don't believe so.

Senator KERRY. Are you familiar with the SWIFT consortium, the bank consortium?

Mr. FOX. Yes.

Senator KERRY. Didn't they express concerns about privacy issues?

Mr. FOX. Yes. The—as you know, Senator, SWIFT is a private organization that is involved with the financial telecommunication of information, and they're quite large, they're extensive. They represent some 8,000 banks in 200 countries. And with counterintelligence, one of the most important things is to follow the money. And in trying to follow the money, there's a very thin line to follow. And that is, following the money without overstepping it and violating the privacy laws of European individuals, or individuals anywhere. And that has been a concern. And my understanding is that there's a number of high-level meetings taking place at this time in order to really tighten up those controls.

Senator KERRY. Is it also fair to say that there's a tension between the Belgians and us with respect to that flow of information?

Mr. FOX. I have no personal knowledge of that, sir.

Senator KERRY. Do you know of any efforts that are being made to try to harmonize United States and European data-protection standards?

Mr. FOX. I'm sorry?

Senator KERRY. Do you know of any efforts that are being made to try to harmonize European and United States data-protection standards?

Mr. FOX. Not other than the information that I received concerning the SWIFT organization and the negotiations that are taking place in that respect.

Senator KERRY. But the commission made a judgment faulting the government for, in fact, sharing information with us, correct?

Mr. FOX. I'm not sure—I'm not sure what the allegations were. I just know what the issue is. And the issue, sir, has to do with what I said before; that is, on the one hand, trying to track the money, trying to get the information that's necessary, and yet do so without violating—

Senator KERRY. Well, do you know what the state of relationship is between us and Belgium on this? Does the Bush administration dispute the assessment of the commission?

Mr. FOX. I understand from public information that under the U.S. Treasury Department's Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), SWIFT has produced certain financial transaction records in response to lawful subpoenas served on SWIFT's U.S. operating center. European data privacy authorities have raised questions

about SWIFT's practice of maintaining global data in the United States, where it is subject to U.S. Law enforcement authorities. We certainly expect that SWIFT like any other multinational entity would follow the applicable laws in the countries in which it operates. The Treasury Department is working with the European Union and its member states to try to resolve concerns, so as to allow this important counterterrorism program to continue in a responsible way.

Senator KERRY. Do you know when the elections are going to be held in Belgium?

Mr. FOX. Well, they must be held before October of 2007, and there's speculation it may be as early as June.

Senator KERRY. What do you see as potential outcome of that election? And what is the impact of that on our relationship?

Mr. FOX. The—well, it's very difficult to say. I think, from what I have heard, most people believe that the Socialist Party in Flanders and the Liberal Party in Flanders, together with the Socialist Party in Wallonia and the Liberal Party of Wallonia, will continue to form the government. By the same token, the Christian Democracy in Flanders has become more popular, and they're middle-of-the-road, as you know. The Liberal Party is more to the right, and the Socialists are more to the left. The Christian Democracy—Democratic Party is more in the middle. And so, they could have a little bit of an impact. Insofar as the far right political party, Vlaams Belang, I—it doesn't appear as if they're going to have much traction. And, even if they do, it's my understanding that the other political parties there would not be interested in forming a government with them.

Senator KERRY. Do you believe that one outcome or another has an impact on our current ability to cooperate with respect to NATO and European Union issues?

Mr. FOX. I'm sorry, I missed your first—I'm sorry, sir.

Senator KERRY. I'll speak up. Do you believe that the outcome of that election would have an impact on our ability to pursue our interests with respect to either European Union defense issues or NATO?

Mr. FOX. I've not heard anyone express that. No, sir.

Senator KERRY. What about—

Senator OBAMA. Senator—

Senator KERRY. I'm sorry, my time is up.

Senator OBAMA. Your time is up. So, what I'd like to do is—

Senator KERRY. I'll come back.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Give the opportunity for Senator Coleman, if he has a second round of questions. I do not. Senator—

Senator COLEMAN. I'll—

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Coleman—

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Yield to Senator Kerry, let him finish his question.

Senator OBAMA. Okay.

Senator KERRY. I'm happy to—you want to—

Senator COLEMAN. I have no questions at this time.

Senator OBAMA. Good.

Why don't we start a new round.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

In your view, is there a role that Belgium's royal family might be able to play in managing relations between Flemings and Walloons?

Mr. FOX. The—you know, you have a constitutional monarchy there with King Albert II, but that's mostly ceremonial. And to the best of my knowledge, they're really not involved politically and with governmental matters, other than that.

Senator KERRY. So, you would say no role with—

Mr. FOX. Well, I—

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Respect to—

Mr. FOX. I would not be aware of any role.

Senator KERRY. What about the prospect of a split between the two communities? I understand recently there was—I think it was a radio show or something that was meant to be joke, and turned out to send serious alarm bells through the community. What's your readout on that?

Mr. FOX. Right. It certainly did. Well, I think everyone's kind of amazed as to how Wallonia and Flanders can make up a country when they're so different. They're different languages. They have their own parliaments. But yet, it somehow seems to work. And Belgium—or Brussels is right in the middle of all of that.

I—from everything I've heard, there—the consensus of what I've heard is that there is not going to be a breakup. Now, could there be? You know, certainly. But I haven't heard anything that would make it appear that that sort of a breakup was on the horizon.

Senator KERRY. What is your judgment about where we are today in our leverage in Europe, relative to where we were 6 years ago? Would you say it's improved or diminished?

Mr. FOX. I don't—that's difficult to say. I would say that, as I—as earlier, the question about the feeling in Belgium toward Americans, about America, I think that that's probably true across—all across Europe. And I think we've got a lot of work to do. As a matter of fact, Karen Hughes, who is now Under Secretary of State, that's her whole job, to try to develop that. And she's come up with a number of ways to help those relationships. One is to—

Senator KERRY. I think he wants you to pull the mike a little closer, Mr. Fox.

Mr. FOX. Closer?

Senator KERRY. Yeah. Just pull the whole thing. There you go. You can even pull it closer, if you want.

Mr. FOX. Even closer than that?

Senator KERRY. Sure. I think it helps him out here.

Mr. FOX. Okay.

Senator KERRY. Thanks.

Mr. FOX. And I think Karen Hughes' position is that we need to be able to more clearly articulate American views and why, the background. She also feels that we need to try to make other countries know that terrorism is a worldwide matter, and we're all subject to it, and we're really partners. It's a problem for all of us. And she feels, I believe—and I don't want to speak for her, this is just what I've read—that we need to do a better job of articulating that.

Senator KERRY. Have you ever been to Belgium?

Mr. FOX. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator KERRY. How many—for business or—

Mr. FOX. Business and pleasure. As a matter of fact, I—in the middle 1970s, I built an operation in Ireland, in the north of Ireland, and then, in the south of Ireland, we brought a new industry there. And one of our large markets was Belgium.

Senator KERRY. This was under which banner, which company, that—

Mr. FOX. That was Synthetic Industries.

Senator KERRY. Okay. And what do you think—I mean, looking at these challenges that we've just articulated, in terms of where we stand in Europe today and, sort of, the problem of Iraq and the others issues that are extant, you obviously have a lot of community skills. And I don't question your business acumen. But you don't have government experience. Do you believe—or foreign policy experience—do you—sort of, help the committee to understand what special skills you believe you bring to the table at this point with respect to the needs of this relationship.

Mr. FOX. Yeah, well, first of all, as I said before, I've been a businessman all of my life, and it's kind of in my blood. And the—I think managing relationships is not much different than—in the government—than it is managing relationships in business, because human beings are involved, and you have to build mutual trust and understanding between individuals so that you can then communicate. The—I've had a lot of—a lot of experience teaching organizations, you know, how to think as one, how to work as a team. I've had a lot of experience in teaching organizations and people how to think strategically, how to set objectives, how to measure results. And I think I know what it takes to build character and integrity into organizations, and create a reputation for fair dealing. And I think it's the latter that is so very, very important in building a relationship with counterparts in a government.

I've had—because we—our businesses are located all around the world, and have been for a long time, I've had a fair amount of experience dealing with foreign governments and their agencies. So—well, Europe, for instance, I've made more than 100 business trips to Europe. And so, I think that that experience will help me. I certainly hope it will.

Senator KERRY. Well, that's impressive. That's a lot more than some people bring to this table. So, I think it is important.

The Belgian Prime Minister has called for the transformation of the European Union's security and defense policy into a real military force that could cooperate independently of NATO. What do you see as the principal strategic tensions between the ESDP and NATO?

Mr. FOX. Well, I had—again, as a United States Ambassador, I would be looking for this Government to come to their conclusions on that, and it would be up to me, then, to push that agenda.

Senator KERRY. So, you don't want to put forward any independent views on that, at this point.

Mr. FOX. I don't think my independent views are that important in the role of ambassador.

Senator KERRY. What about the charge that you've—have you been specifically charged with respect to that effort? Have you been briefed with respect to it?

Mr. FOX. No, sir—

Senator KERRY. Do you have an opinion?

Mr. FOX [continuing]. I have not.

Senator KERRY. No?

Mr. FOX. No.

Senator KERRY. Let me ask a few questions that go to something that I think is important, which is the question of—both a combination of citizenship and judgment, if you will, is the way I might phrase it. And I want to try to ask these questions as fairly as possible. I'm not trying to play some kind of gotcha game here, I assure you. But it's important to me, in thinking through this issue of judgment, to explore this a little bit.

I assume that you believe that the truth in public life is important.

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir.

Senator KERRY. And might I ask you what your opinion is with respect to the state of American politics, as regards the politics of personal destruction?

Mr. FOX. Senator, I am on record, more than one time—several times—being interviewed by the press, and particularly the St. Louis Post Dispatch. And I am very concerned with the amount of money that's going into politics. And I'm more concerned about the fact that politics has become mean and destructive. And when I was interviewed in 2000, I said that I was very—I was for campaign finance reform, because I felt that if less money was going into politics, it would turn the whole volume down. I want to turn the volume down. I would hope there would be less meanness and destructiveness. When 527s came along, I had the very same thing to say about them. So, I—that's the way I feel.

And, Senator, let me just say this. I'm against 527s. I've always been against 527s. I think, again, they're mean and destructive. I think they've hurt a lot of good, decent people. And, Senator Kerry, I very much respect your dedicated service to this country. I know that you were not drafted, you volunteered, you went to Vietnam, you were wounded, highly decorated. Senator, you're a hero. And there isn't anybody or anything that's going to take that away from you. But you had 527s try to. And, by the same token, on the other side of the aisle, 527s—one 527 went so far as to compare the President of the United States with Adolf Hitler. So, I am on public record as being against 527s because of all the meanness, and I'm against the amount of money that goes into political campaigns, for that reason, the same reason—not once or twice, but three or four times. And I would just—I wish that Congress could find a way to either ban 527s or at least regulate them.

Senator OBAMA. Senator Kerry, I just want to point out, we've gone through another 10-minute round.

Senator KERRY. Yeah.

Senator OBAMA. I'm sure that you want to continue this line of questioning. I don't have any more questions. I feel obliged to make sure that Senator Coleman—

Senator COLEMAN. Let Senator Kerry—

Senator OBAMA. Okay.

Senator KERRY. If I could—

Senator OBAMA. Let's just—

Senator KERRY. Thanks. I apologize to my colleagues.

Senator OBAMA. Thanks. Go ahead.

Senator KERRY. I just want to explore this a little bit.

I certainly appreciate the comments you just made, Mr. Fox. And I'm not looking for anybody to call me a hero. I think most of the heroes died, and do die. And those of us who are lucky enough get out of here are lucky.

But notwithstanding the comments you made, you did see fit to contribute a very significant amount of money in October to a group called Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, correct?

Mr. FOX. Correct.

Senator KERRY. Why would you do that, given what you just said about how bad they are?

Mr. FOX. Well, Senator, I have to put it into the proper context, and bear with me.

Marilyn and I have lived the American dream. There is no question about it. My father came here with the clothes on his back, and the Fox family and the Widman family have truly lived this—the American dream, and it's been very, very good to us.

I heard a couple of—mention here that we gave to 150 charities. I actually went back and had my staff count. In 2005–2006, we made more than 1,000 contributions. More than 100 of those were political, 900-and-some-odd were charitable and to institutions and—of learning and so forth. A great deal of those had to do with basic human needs. I think it was Senator Danforth mentioned, every time he got a letter that had Harbour Group on it, that he shuddered, because it was going to cost him money. Marilyn and I both raise a lot of money for a lot of people.

The point I'm making is this. We ask a lot of people for money, and people ask us for money. And, very fortunately, we've been blessed with being successfully financially. And when we're asked, we generally give, particularly, you know, if we know who gave it.

Senator KERRY. Who asked you to give to the SBVT?

Mr. FOX. I can't tell you specifically who did, because I—you know, I don't remember. I—as a matter of fact, if I—

Senator KERRY. You have no recollection of why you gave away \$50,000?

Mr. FOX. I gave away \$50,000 because I was asked to.

Senator KERRY. But you have no recollection of who asked you to give away \$50,000?

Mr. FOX. No. No, sir. I've given away sums much larger than that to a lot of other places, and I can't tell you specifically who asked me, no.

Senator KERRY. Well, you don't think that it's important, as a citizen who doesn't like 527s, to know where your money is going and how it's going to be spent?

Mr. FOX. Well, I think, with most contributors—and, as a matter of fact, you know, if you go to other side of the political campaign, and we give to individual candidates, we don't know how they're going to use that money and how it's—you know, we don't—

Senator KERRY. Well, at least it's accountable to an individual candidate for whom people have to vote or not vote. As you said, 527 is mean and ugly and not accountable.

Mr. FOX. I agree with that. I absolutely agree with that. And I—

Senator KERRY. So, why would you give—

Mr. FOX [continuing]. Accountability would put it—

Senator KERRY [continuing]. \$50,000 to a group that you have no sense of accountability for?

Mr. FOX. Well, because if 527s were banned, then it's banned for both parties. And so long as they're not banned—

Senator KERRY. So, two wrongs make a right?

Mr. FOX. Well, I don't know. But if one side is contributing, the other side ought to—

Senator KERRY. But is that your judgment? Is that your—

Mr. FOX. I'm sorry?

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Judgment that you would bring to the ambassadorship, that two wrongs make a right?

Mr. FOX. No, I didn't say that two wrongs made a right, sir.

Senator KERRY. Well, why would you do it, then?

Mr. FOX. Well, I did it, because politically it's necessary if the other side's doing it.

Senator KERRY. Well, let me ask—did you ever see, on August 20, 2004, a St. Louis Dispatch editorial wrote the following, "The smear campaign was funded and orchestrated by a coterie of Texans with strong ties to the Bush family and the President's political director, Karl Rove. The President should disown the ads and tell his friends that he wants them to stop. Mr. Bush can't wash his hands of the Swift Boat Veterans smear because of his close personal connections with the principals. The Swift Boat Veterans on Mr. Kerry's boat, including the man he pulled from the river, support Mr. Kerry's version of events. So to the records documenting the medals Mr. Kerry received. The attack ads, by contrast, are riddled with inconsistencies. For example"—and it goes on.

That was in your own newspaper in your hometown. But, a month later, you, nevertheless, contribute to that very group that is smearing and spreading lies.

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir. All of the 527s were smearing lies and—

Senator KERRY. So, you see no responsibility, as an individual citizen, to try to guarantee that you're not going to support that kind of politics of personal destruction.

Mr. FOX. I think if one side is giving to, the other side almost has to. And I think that the real responsibility should rest with the Congress to either ban 527s or to, certainly, curtail and regulate them. That's the problem.

Senator KERRY. So, you do believe "anything goes" in a political campaign.

Mr. FOX. I'm sorry?

Senator KERRY. You do believe that "anything goes" in a political campaign.

Mr. FOX. No, sir, I don't—in fact, I do not involve—

Senator KERRY. Well, if you don't believe it, why would you not—

Mr. FOX. No—

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Not fund it?

Mr. FOX. I'm sorry, sir. I have never gotten involved on the campaign side. I'd raise money, I'd contribute money. I've never gotten involved on the campaign side, and I've never gotten involved in the 527 side of looking at script or any of that.

Senator KERRY. Well, let me ask you, as a matter of judgment, as a citizen, don't you think individuals ought to take some responsibility for making sure they know what they're giving money to?

Mr. FOX. Mr. Senator, when we ask lots of people for lots of money—and we're asked by people for lots of money—we just generally give. I mean, we know generally what it's used for, but that's it.

Senator KERRY. And you don't know who asked you.

Mr. FOX. No, sir, I really don't. I do not know who asked me. I couldn't—if the—if you were to take our thousand contributions and go right down the list, I'd bet you I couldn't give you 5 percent of them—of who asked me.

Senator KERRY. Do you recall whether it was somebody in Missouri or somebody—was it in person? Was it a—by telephone?

Mr. FOX. I have no recollection.

Senator KERRY. No recollection of how that came about.

Mr. FOX. No, sir.

Senator KERRY. Do you recall thinking about it at all?

Mr. FOX. No more than that somebody must have asked, and I gave.

Senator KERRY. Well, no wonder so many people are here to embrace your—what about now? How do you feel about it now, knowing what you know today?

Mr. FOX. Mr. Senator, let me say this. Be it 527 or anything else, if I thought what they were printing was not true, I would not contribute to it. But I personally have no way of knowing, generally, when I give.

Senator KERRY. Well, let me ask you about that. On August 5, 2004, John McCain called the SBVT, quote, “completely nauseating, dishonest, and dishonorable.” McCain pointed out it was “the same kind of deal that was pulled on me” when he ran against Bush in 2000.

On August 15, John Warner, Republican chairman of the Armed Services Committee and former Navy Secretary, said, quote, “I can speak to the process, that we did extraordinary careful checking on that type of medal, a very high one, when it goes through the Secretary, so I'd stand by the process that awarded Kerry that medal, and I think we'd best acknowledge that his heroism did gain that recognition. I feel he deserved it.” He was then, incidently, in the Navy. He signed my award.

August 8, 2004, General Tommy Franks called the smear boat attacks, quote, “vitriolic and hyperbole.”

On August 7, 2004, Mike Johanns, Republican Governor of Nebraska, says the ads were trash.

Now, these are Republican leaders. These are the leaders of your own party. President Bush said that he thought that my service was honorable and they shouldn't be questioning it. Yet, even when your own candidate does that, you saw fit to put \$50,000 on the line to continue the smear.

My question to you is, Why? When you say you couldn't have known, these were people very publicly condemning it. How could you not have known?

Mr. FOX. I just—Mr. Senator, when I'm asked, I just generally give.

Senator KERRY. So, again, I ask you the question, Do you think, now, that you and others bear a responsibility for thinking about where we put money in American politics and what we're saying, what we present to the American people. Is truth important, or isn't it?

Mr. FOX. Senator, if I had reason to believe, and if I were convinced, that the money was going to be used to—in any untruthful or false way, knowingly, I would not give.

Senator KERRY. Well, sir, let me ask you this question. Did you or did you not in any of the public comments being made at the time, which I assume you're following, hear or read of any of the public statements at that point in time with respect to the legitimacy of these charges and these smears?

Mr. FOX. Mr. Senator, I can say this.

Senator KERRY. I mean, did you miss this? In September of 2004, the Vice Admiral Route, the Navy inspector general, wrote a memo to the Secretary of the Navy that was made public—New York Times, Washington Post, every major newspaper of the country carried—saying their examination found the existing documentation regarding my medals was legitimate.

Mr. FOX. Yeah.

Senator KERRY. Did you miss that, too?

Mr. FOX. I don't remember those. But I'm certain, at the time, that I must have read them.

Senator KERRY. Do think this should matter to me?

Mr. FOX. I'm sorry?

Senator KERRY. Do you think this should matter to me?

Mr. FOX. Yes, I do. I do.

Senator KERRY. Do you think it should matter to everybody here, who's a Senator?

Mr. FOX. Absolutely. And, as a matter of fact, going back to the time that—when I said I was on record, when I was interviewed a number of times about campaign finance reform and about less money going in, I said one of the reasons—one of the big reasons was not just the nastiness and so forth associated with it, but the abuse that candidates had to take to run for public office. I think it's disgraceful. I think it's terrible. But that's the world we live in. That's what it's come to. It's unfortunate. I don't know of a campaign—a political campaign or a 527 that's ever had anything but that as part of it. And I think it's terrible. I do. I wish there was some way it could be changed. And I think the best way to change it is to restrict the amount of money that can go into campaigns, and to restrict the amount of money that can go into 527s, and regulate both of them even more.

Senator KERRY. Well, we've been trying to do that for the 22 years I've been here. And one of the most effective ways to do it would be for people like yourself and others who write the checks to know what they're giving to, and to care about it.

So, you know, there's a question here, obviously, of judgment. I'm not going to try and be unreasonable about it. I'm not trying to—you know, sometimes you go to these hearings, and Senators rant and rave and scream. And I'm not a screamer. But I do think this is important. And I know your family is here. I'm sure they're sitting there saying, "Why are they giving my dad a hard time right now?" And I understand that. I'm sympathetic to it. But I hope you know, it's not going to make a difference in the outcome where I am, but it's important to the future. I think it is robbing this country of legitimate dialog, of real discussion of important issues that we face. And, you know, it's a tragedy that the American people have to put up with that. The last week, alone, in the State of Ohio, \$4 million was spent on those ads. Four million dollars.

So, it has profound impact, sir.

Mr. FOX. Yeah.

Senator KERRY. And I think it's a question of judgment, a question of whether we are fighting the status quo or whether we're part of the status quo. So, I'm not sure where this goes with respect to this, but I certainly thought it deserved to be properly vetted.

And, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence, and that of my colleague.

Senator OBAMA. Senator Coleman—

Senator COLEMAN. Thank—

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. You'd like a couple of minutes?

Senator COLEMAN. Just a couple of minutes, Chairman. I just want to note to my colleague from Massachusetts, this should matter to all of us. And it's not just a personal thing with Senator Kerry, but it's ugly out there, and we—I would hope we'd figure out a way to deal with it, because it's hurtful and it's destructive. So, I think it should matter to us.

My concern, as we sit here today, is that I think it would be a terrible shame if we were to disqualify folks from service because they contributed. I presume, at some point in time, there'll be a Democrat President, and, unless we change this, we'll have folks of also great generosity and great accomplishment and great experience who can add much to—in their service to their country, who probably have contributed to similar 527s on the other side. And I hope that—first, I hope that we fix it. If we can't fix it, then we look at those individuals and their life experience and what they've done and what they've built, and then we judge them on that. But clearly, this should matter to all of us.

I just have one question for you, Mr. Fox. Did you have anything to do with the messaging of—any involvement in the messaging of the Swift Boat ads?

Mr. FOX. No, absolutely none. As a matter of fact, the other side—political campaigns—no, I've never gotten involved in the campaign part at all. Only giving money or raising money.

Senator COLEMAN. Again, I could imagine a time when we have nominees from the other party who have also been very generous and contribute a range of things, and I would hope that we'd be able to judge them on their life experience, on what they've built and what they have contributed. And I do think we have before us two outstanding nominees here.

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Coleman.

Let me just take my prerogative as chairman of this subcommittee to just make a comment. I think Senator Coleman is right that we get a lot of ambassadorial nominees before us who have made political contributions. And political campaigns are ugly, and we don't expect every single person who's made a contribution to be held accountable for everything that's said in the course of a campaign.

I have to note that the Swift Boat ads were of a different degree, even in the ugly arena of politics. They were extraordinarily well publicized, that there was essentially a fraud being perpetrated on the American people. It had a profound impact on the election. And I have to say, you know, sitting here, Mr. Fox, I found your statement somewhat unsatisfying, to say that you gave because it's ugly out there and people—somebody asked you to give. I mean, it sounds to me like you were aware that this was not the best of political practices, and you thought it was okay to go ahead and contribute to them. And, you know, I just would like to make a personal note of the fact that—you know, politics is a rough business, and I think we understand that. And no side is pure in this process. There was something particularly insidious and destructive about these ads. By the time you contributed, it was pretty widely noted—it would have been hard for you to miss the fact that there was something particularly nasty and insidious about these ads. It had been well publicized at this point. It strikes me that—I don't think you necessarily crafted the message, but you certainly knew, at that point, what the message was. And, you know, I think it's important for all of us in public life to take note of that and to examine our hearts and to think about what lessons we draw from that.

I would have preferred you saying, you know, "In retrospect, looking back, contributing to this—the Swift Boat campaign was a mistake, and I wish I hadn't done it." That would have been, I guess, the message I would have preferred to hear. I—obviously, I'm not responsible for your statements. But I think it's worthwhile to reflect on that, particularly should you get confirmed to an ambassadorship, because part of our task is, I hope, in the war on terrorism and in our efforts to secure this Nation—part of that task is to project our ideals and our values. And I can say, knowing a lot of people overseas, that those Swift Boat ads did nothing to enhance the world's view of American politics. And, you know, the—I think it's important for all of us to be mindful that when we're given these positions of responsibility, that we're carrying forward not just our own reputations, but also the reputations of the people that we hope to serve.

So, I'd like to thank the witnesses for testifying today. I thank their patience. I thank the families' forbearance. You know, these are always fun, sometimes, but also can be lengthy. I appreciate both of you gentlemen's willingness to serve this country and to present yourselves for these positions.

The record will remain open for 1 day so that the committee members may submit additional questions to the nominees. I ask that the nominees respond expeditiously if any questions are pre-

mented to you. I'm sure that the State Department would provide you assistance in responding to those questions.

If nobody has any additional comments, the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF SAM FOX TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Who asked you to become a member of the Bush Rangers for the 2004 presidential campaign?

Answer. No one asked me to become a member. I became a member of my own volition.

Question. Please identify any individual or organization who contacted you, or whom you contacted, with respect to making a donation to Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.

Answer. I don't recall.

Question. Please describe any and all conversations, meetings, or communications regarding the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth that you had with any of the following individuals: Karl Rove, Ken Mehlman, or any official or consultant of Bush-Cheney 2004 and/or the Republican National Committee; John O'Neill; Ann Wagner; and William Franke.

Answer. I don't know a John O'Neill nor a William Franke. Insofar as any of the others, to the best of my recollection I have never had any conversations, meetings, or communications with any of the listed individuals or organizations regarding Swift Boat.

Question. Did you receive any acknowledgement or thank you for your contribution to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth? If so, from whom?

Answer. To the best of my knowledge I have never received any acknowledgement or thank you for my contribution to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.

Question. Do you have any evidence that any of the allegations made by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth about Senator John Kerry are true? If so, please provide that evidence to the committee.

Answer. I have no personal knowledge or evidence as to the accuracy of the claims made in the Swift Boat ads. As I testified at the hearing, I did not make an attempt to verify the factual basis of the ads at the time I was solicited for my contribution. As I further testified, my wife and I made over a thousand charitable and political contributions in a 2-year period and it's simply impractical for me to do any significant due diligence on that many contributions.

RESPONSES OF SAM FOX TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. You testified that you do not recall who asked you to contribute to Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT). At the time of your donation, what was your understanding as to what your money would be used for? What did you understand SBVT's purpose at that time to be?

Answer. I assumed that my contribution would be used for the SBVT's general purposes, including administrative expenses, fundraising, advertising, but did not have any understanding whatever as to how my contribution would be spent.

Question. At the time of your donation, did you know, for example, that SBVT would be airing TV ads? Did you know that these would attack Senator Kerry?

Answer. I was aware that SBVT aired TV ads and that the content of such ads dealt with Senator Kerry.

Question. You indicated that 527's were supporting "parties" on both sides. What did you mean by this? At the time of your donation, what relationship did you understand SBVT to have had with the RNC, the Bush campaign, or any other Republican party, officeholder, or candidate?

Answer. I meant that I believed that there were 527's that were supporting and opposing the candidates of both the Democratic and Republican parties. At the time of my donation, I did not understand SBVT to have any relationship with the RNC, the Bush campaign, or any other Republican party, officeholder, or candidate, and believed it to be an independent organization operating under section 527.

Question. At the time of your donation to SBVT, what was your understanding as to the purpose of 527 organizations? What was your understanding as to their legality and the place they fit within the campaign finance system?

Answer. At the time of my donation to SBVT, I had a general understanding that 527 organizations legally existed as issue advocates that were permitted to solicit funds for that purpose. I had a general understanding that 527 organizations were separate and distinct from political parties and candidate campaign committees.

Question. At the time of your donation, did you understand that SBVT would use your funds in connection with a particular election? For example, did you understand that it would use your funds to influence the 2004 Presidential election? If not, what did you understand the purpose of the organization to be?

Answer. I had no understanding as to SBVT's use of my donation. I assumed that SBVT's purposes were to do what it could to publicize the issues that it had been pursuing.

Question. Have you ever been contacted, formally or informally, by the Federal Election Commission regarding your donation to SVBT or for any other purpose?

Answer. No.

Question. After the election, were you contacted by counsel or other representatives of SVBT or the Bush campaign regarding your donation to SBVT or any other 527 organization that you may have contributed to?

Answer. No.

With respect to Question 5 of the prior list of Questions for the Record, submitted on March 2, 2007, to wit:

Question. Did you receive any acknowledgement or thank you for your contributions to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth? If so, from whom?

Answer. After my assistant checked my records, we found the attached acknowledgement of my contribution.

[The information referred to follows.]

SWIFT BOAT VETERANS FOR TRUTH,
Alexandria, VA, November 2, 2004.

Mr. Sam Fox
Clayton, MI.

DEAR MR. FOX: Thank you very much for your recent contribution in the amount of \$50,000.00 to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. The only way we can get the truth out about John Kerry is with the help of Americans such as you.

We are proud to have you with us.
Very truly yours,

WEYMOUTH D. SYMMES,
Treasurer.

NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Almquist, Katherine, to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development for Africa
Bonicelli, Paul J., to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development for Latin America and the Caribbean
Chin, Curtis S., to be U.S. Director of the Asian Development Bank, with the rank of Ambassador
Debevoise, Eli Whitney, III, to be U.S. Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Kunder, James R., to be Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development
Lundsager, Margrethe, to be U.S. Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund
Menarchik, Douglas, to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development for Europe and Eurasia

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez presiding.

Present: Senators Menendez and Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

Senator MENENDEZ. This hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

Today, the committee will consider the nominations for four administrators at the United States Agency for International Development, and three U.S. representatives at international financial institutions. I want to welcome the nominees, as well as their families who may be here, to the hearing.

I'm happy to be joined by the ranking member of the full committee, Senator Lugar, and also thank Senator Hagel, who is the ranking member of the Subcommittee on International Development, Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection—I wish I could get a dollar for every time I had to say that, who is unable to join us today.

I know we have a busy agenda, so I will recognize myself for an opening statement.

While today's hearing is technically a nominations hearing, in my mind it also is a forum to discuss the broader issue of U.S. foreign assistance. Yes, we're going to examine the qualifications of all of these nominees, but, in my mind, equally as important, we'll be asking the question, "Is each nominee the best candidate for a position where they will be in charge of a key aspect of our United States foreign assistance program?"

"Why does U.S. foreign assistance matter?" I was asked earlier today in an interview. It's because we care that, globally, 10.6 million children are still dying from preventable diseases every year. It is because we care that nearly 2.7 billion people live on less than \$2 a day. It's because we care that every 5 seconds, a child dies from a hunger-related cause. Yes, it's also because it is in our national interest and our national security interest to help create a stable and secure world around us.

As President Kennedy said when he signed the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961, creating USAID, he said, quote, "In enacting this legislation, Members of the Congress, of both parties, have, again, demonstrated their understanding that it is in our national obligation and in our national interest and security to work for a world in which there is a chance for national sovereignty and national independence." That's why this hearing is so important. That's why I plan to carry out a vigorous oversight of our foreign assistance programs as chairman of the subcommittee. Our subcommittee has been tasked with the job of looking at every aspect of U.S. foreign assistance, from the Millennium Challenge Corporation to USAID and the international financial institutions. Today's hearing will be the first in a series of hearings that take a close look at these programs.

As we talk with these nominees, and as we proceed in the months to come, I hope to examine at least four major concerns that I have with our foreign assistance programs. First, the President has created a vision for transformational development, with the head of USAID also acting as the head of all U.S. foreign assistance inside the State Department. And, while I generally support the idea of coordinating all of our foreign assistance to avoid duplication, I am concerned that there may be unintended consequences from such a reorganization. I am also concerned that the new policy of graduating countries from U.S. assistance, and the new framework with a focus on shorter-term strategic issues, may take away from some of our long-term core development goals, such as poverty reduction.

My second question is, What's the future of USAID? By all accounts, the power and influence of USAID, the principal U.S. agency for foreign development aid, is slowly being chipped away, and I look at that through a series of signs. The head of USAID now sits at the State Department, not USAID. The Millennium Challenge Corporation is clearly taking money, prestige, and power away from USAID. And, if you look at the total foreign aid budget, State and USAID only had about 53 percent of the total budget in 2005, with other agencies managing the rest. It seems to me that we're in the process of decimating an agency that clearly has had bureaucratic problems, but that is also full of many, many qualified and talented people who actually know a great deal about develop-

ment. And these challenges—changes, I should say, warrant greater security.

I am also concerned about the Department of Defense's new role in development. According to the Congressional Research Service, in 2005 the DoD disbursed about 24 percent of the development budget, mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan. I question why the Defense Department is playing such a large role in development, particularly when the record in Iraq and the reports from the special inspector for Iraq reconstruction have shown they have done a poor job of it.

Finally, an issue I plan to examine at great length is the administration's foreign assistance budget. Although I support the general concept and goals of the Millennium Challenge Account, I am alarmed that the core development accounts have been cut as we pursue the MCC. A study last year from the Center for Global Development found that MCA-eligible and compact countries have experienced unequivocal reductions in the development assistance account at the U.S. development aid. We were promised that MCC would be additive, but, once again, the administration has proposed to cut funding for those core development accounts. I know the administration keeps touting the increase in the overall international affairs budget, yet their budget for fiscal year 2008 actually cuts funds from the core development accounts across the world.

In closing, I believe our nominees, if confirmed, will become a key part of the foreign assistance agenda. It is the President's job to propose America's foreign policy agenda, but it is Congress's job to appropriate funding and provide oversight for our development and foreign assistance programs. But it's ultimately going to be your job to implement those initiatives on the ground.

If confirmed to your respective posts, the four of you, as well as the three nominees in the second panel, will have a great responsibility of determining priorities, working with neighboring countries, representing the United States in vital endeavors. And I know none of you take that position lightly. I also would remind each of you that you have a responsibility not only to implement the President's policy, but also to report honestly and completely to Congress.

I look forward to learning more about your past experience. I've had an opportunity to speak to each and every one of you, and I appreciate those opportunities and they were very helpful. Your visions for the future of America's role in these important development programs and financial institutions.

And I will, before I turn to the distinguished ranking member, welcome you all formally so that, after Senator Lugar's statement, we can go directly to your testimony.

Mr. James Kunder is the nominee for the USAID Deputy Administrator. He is acting in that position currently. He previously served as Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East.

Dr. Edward Menarchik is the nominee for USAID Assistant Administrator for Europe and Eurasia, and is acting in that position currently. He previously served as Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination for USAID.

Dr. Paul Bonicelli is the nominee for USAID Assistant Administrator of Latin America and the Caribbean. He currently serves as

the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance of USAID.

And Ms. Katherine Almquist is the nominee for USAID Assistant Administrator for Africa. She is currently serving as the USAID Mission Director for the Sudan.

Let me now recognize the distinguished ranking member, Senator Lugar, for his opening statements.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Chairman, and I add my welcome to two impressive panels of nominees, as well as family members and friends who have accompanied you.

Today, the committee will have discussions with nominees for important positions at USAID. The United States has strong national security and humanitarian interests in alleviating poverty, and promoting development around the world. The efforts of USAID are central to this mission, and each of our nominees will play a key role in formulating policies that will impact U.S. standing in their regions of responsibility.

I would take this opportunity to express my hope that the Senate will move forward quickly on the nomination of Mr. James Kunder to be Deputy Administrator of USAID. Mr. Kunder would be responsible for assisting Ambassador Randall Tobias, the current Administrator of USAID, in executing U.S. foreign assistance programs. In addition, he would be charged with assisting the Administrator in the supervision of all personnel at the Agency in the United States and overseas.

Mr. Kunder currently is the Agency's Acting Deputy Administrator and continues to serve as the Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East. In this capacity, Mr. Kunder oversees some of USAID's largest and most important projects.

Mr. Kunder's nomination came before the committee last September, and he has been patient and thorough in addressing questions from Senators related to his nomination. He was asked to provide answers to nearly 100 detailed questions about reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. In addition, he was asked to provide photographs of clinics and schools being constructed, or reconstructed, in Afghanistan.

Mr. Kunder's responses are contained in three voluminous binders consisting of some 1,500 pages. The responses incorporate photographs and maps of virtually all USAID projects in Afghanistan, including clinics and schools. I appreciate the serious attention that Mr. Kunder and his staff have given to congressional concerns. In fact, I cannot remember a nominee under the jurisdiction of this committee who has provided a greater volume of useful information about the projects and programs under his direction. The materials in these binders provide an excellent tutorial for any Senator who wants to know more about Afghanistan or the functions of USAID. The binders have been deposited with the committee staff and are available to any members or staff who might wish to review them.

Ambassador Tobias needs a deputy who is well-versed in the Agency's workings. He strongly supports Mr. Kunder's nomination

to the position. I am hopeful we will move forward so that Mr. Kunder can more fully contribute to USAID's vital mission.

I would also note that this hearing follows a very interesting hearing on Afghanistan held last week by this committee. There were several points raised at that hearing that I would ask Mr. Kunder to consider.

First, one of the witnesses observed that, unlike in Iraq and Bosnia, there is no civilian contact group in Afghanistan. Such a group might be a useful tool in advocating our goals in Afghanistan.

Second, we discussed whether a coherent United States program could be developed for providing United States foreign assistance directly to eastern Afghanistan and the federally administered tribal areas in Pakistan, including Waziristan. Such a program would acknowledge the ethnic and tribal realities of the area. Obviously, this would not be an easy mission, but we should explore whether United States foreign assistance could make an impact in that region, given its importance to the outcome in Afghanistan.

On our second panel, we will hear from nominees to be U.S. executive directors to international financial institutions. During the past 4 years, our committee has held six hearings on the operations of the multilateral development banks. Those hearings contributed to the committee's understanding of both the value of the banks' work and problems with their operation.

In 2005, building on this work, I introduced Senate bill 1129, the Development Bank Reform and Authorization Act. Most of the provisions of this bill were enacted into law in November 2005. With passage of this legislation, Congress made a strong statement that recognized the critical role of MDBs in achieving development goals around the world, but also that the operations of these banks must be transparent and free of corruption.

The U.S. Government must work hard to ensure that this money is spent efficiently, both because of our responsibility to American taxpayers and because inefficiency and corruption undermine the basic humanitarian and foreign policy objectives of our participation in MDB financing.

I congratulate all of the nominees, and I thank the Chairman for the opportunity to make this statement.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator.

We are pending a vote, and we hope to get through at least your testimony before that vote, before questions. So, we'll start with Mr. Kunder. And the same process, you're free to make your presentation. We'd ask you to limit it to 5 minutes. Your full statement will be included in the record. Should any of you have family members here, please introduce them. And if you summarize your testimony, we'll get through all of you, and then, hopefully, we'll have an opportunity for questions before the vote and be able to move on.

So, we'll go from Mr. Kunder, moving from right to left. That's not an ideological statement, it's just simply physical reality—

[Laughter.]

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. At the table.

And, with that, Mr. Kunder, you are welcome to present your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. KUNDER, NOMINEE TO BE
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTER-
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to be before the committee today as President Bush's nominee to be Deputy Administrator at USAID.

I would like to introduce to the panel my wife, Robbin, who is also a USAID employee, and my son, James, who is here primarily to collect Senatorial autographs for Ms. Eaton's class at St. Stephen's School in Alexandria. He's also the beneficiary—

Senator MENENDEZ. A worthy cause.

Mr. KUNDER [continuing]. Of the Squirms that I picked up in your office the other day.

We very much appreciate this panel's serious attention to USAID, the extensive oversight that the panel has provided, and also the leadership that the Committee has provided to looking at the questions of how the U.S. Government can be better organized to manage conflict and post-conflict situations on the civilian side of the government. This is an area that Senator Biden and Senator Lugar have worked on extensively. We very much appreciate that ongoing work, and, if confirmed, I very much look forward to continuing that discussion with the committee so that we can do the kind of serious work that the taxpayers expect from us when our soldiers are deployed overseas.

I won't go through my biography, sir. I worked at USAID previously, and served as director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance there. I've also served in Afghanistan, deploying there soon after our troops chased the Taliban from Kabul. I also would like to mention that I have worked in the private not-for-profit sector as vice president of Save the Children Federation, so I've had the opportunity to look at these issues of foreign assistance, and U.S. taxpayer support for foreign assistance, from several different perspectives. I've also had the opportunity to serve as an infantry officer in the United States Marine Corps, so that I'm able to, I think, deal effectively with our military colleagues when we work with them, which is often, these days.

I think USAID has very important contributions to make to U.S. foreign policy. First, it is, as the Chairman said, an important tool in our national security arsenal. And, second, it meets the taxpayers' strong interest in a humanitarian presence overseas. I think it's this unique combination of roles that makes USAID an important part of the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

I also want to note that, having worked at USAID now for almost 10 years in two different iterations, that the men and women of USAID are among the most competent professionals and courageous individuals with whom I have had the opportunity to serve. They work in dedicated fashion in some of the most difficult places on the face of the Earth, and they are an extraordinarily important part of the U.S. Government's effort overseas.

I do hope that I have the opportunity to serve in this position, if confirmed, in order to help Ambassador Tobias move his reform agenda forward. We are very interested, as the Chairman has stated, in keeping alive the concept of long-term development—making contributions to long-term human progress. What Ambassador

Tobias is very much interested in doing is establishing a system that shows, in concrete terms, to the Senate and to the American public, that we are making measurable progress toward the human progress for which we all strive.

I just want to make one other personal comment, in closing, sir. I hoped my parents were able to travel from Pennsylvania, but they were not able to come down. I mention in my statement that my father, who's a World War II veteran and a steelworker, has done his duty over the years as a volunteer fireman, as a civic leader. My mother, who is an immigrant from Italy, who came here not speaking a word of English, served in the Pentagon during World War II and also was a community leader in our community in Pennsylvania. And I just noted in my statement that I hope, if confirmed by the Senate, I will be able to carry out my duties as well as they carried out theirs.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kunder follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. KUNDER, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before the committee today as President Bush's nominee to serve as Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID).

I have had the honor to serve as the Acting Deputy Administrator for the past 6 months. This experience has made me acutely aware of the development challenges facing the U.S. Government and the intense interest of the committee in meeting them. I have devoted much of my time as Acting Deputy Administrator to assisting Administrator Tobias administer the foreign assistance reforms—reforms necessary to meet the 21st century's unprecedented challenges and opportunities. I am excited to be part of this change to leverage USAID strengths to support foreign assistance as an element of U.S. foreign policy.

Prior to serving as Acting Deputy Administrator, I was the Assistant Administrator of the Asia and Near East region, which stretches from Morocco to Mongolia, is home to millions of impoverished human beings, and is on the front lines in the global battle against terror, and against those conditions that allow terrorism to flourish. The U.S. Government's foreign assistance programs are an important weapon in the fight against terror, poverty, illiteracy, inequality, and instability. If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge that I will do everything in my power—in full consultation with the Congress—to assist Ambassador Tobias and Dr. Rice in furthering the goals of transformational diplomacy, and to ensure that U.S. Government development and reconstruction programs are carried out effectively, equitably, and with the oversight that the taxpayers have every right to demand.

From 1991 to 1993, I served at USAID as Director of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. In January 2002, I returned to USAID to reopen the USAID Mission in Kabul immediately after the fall of the Taliban. Subsequent to serving as the Director of Relief and Reconstruction in Afghanistan for 5 months, I served as Deputy Assistant Administrator and then Assistant Administrator of the Asia and Near East Bureau, where I had the privilege to work on a wide range of issues in support of Iraq, West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon, and the countries affected by the 2004 tsunami and 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.

From these experiences I have learned that designing and implementing sustainable development and reconstruction processes in transitioning nations is a daunting, but critically important challenge. I look forward, if confirmed, to continuing to benefit from the committee's guidance and consultations in USAID's work.

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will take very seriously my role in representing the agency in the many interagency deliberations in which U.S. support for international economic, governance, and social programs are discussed. Under the direction of Ambassador Tobias, we understand now better than ever the key importance of our relationship with the Department of State, and our respective staffs are making great efforts to ensure optimal coordination. If confirmed, I expect to devote significant time to addressing questions of budget, strategic priorities, and funding levels with colleagues at the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies.

I also recognize that we within the U.S. Government do not have a monopoly on knowledge of what transforms societies. Having worked in both the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, I look forward to a fruitful dialog with all elements in the development community, including but not limited to the NGOs, universities, and the business community, since activities in all these sectors impact human progress.

After 20 years of working in the development and reconstruction field, I remain an optimist about America's role in the world, and I firmly believe in the importance of the role assigned to the U.S. Agency for International Development. Working to build democracy and economic prosperity in the poorest countries in the world, countries that are in the strategic interest of the United States, as well as those countries that are simply deprived, suffering, or experiencing a humanitarian crisis, is one of the most inspiring missions of the U.S. Government. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, other members of the committee, and your staff, in order to help steer this work in the right direction and ensure that each tax dollar is used to make a real impact in the world.

On a personal note, Mr. Chairman, I had hoped that my parents, Jim and Virginia Kunder, from Rochester, PA, would be able to join me here today, but they were not able to make the trip. As they have been an inspiration to me, I wanted to note their contributions. Over 63 years ago, my father was pushing across the beaches at Normandy. Subsequently as a steelworker, volunteer firefighter, and community leader, he has continued to serve his country well. My mother was one of those millions of Americans who came here as a child from a far country, speaking not a word of English. She pulled herself up by her bootstraps, worked in the Pentagon during World War II, forged a career in the nonprofit world, and led numerous civic organizations. I would be proud if I am able to execute my duties half as well as they executed theirs.

This concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any of your or the committee's questions.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.
Mr. Menarchik.

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS MENARCHIK, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA

Dr. MENARCHIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for this opportunity to appear as President Bush's nominee for Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia in the United States Agency for International Development.

I am pleased today to have my family with me, my wife of 38 years, Debbie Menarchik; my son, Lieutenant Commander Jason Menarchik, who has recently returned from a 1-year tour in Iraq, and is about to deploy to the Pacific theater aboard the Blue Ridge; my daughter, Heidi; my sister, Denise Stepanik; my brother-in-law, James Stepanik; and my sister, from Fairchance, Pennsylvania, Dede Cole.

I have submitted a written statement for the record and will provide a very brief oral statement.

I have been confirmed previously before this committee as the Assistant Administrator for Policy and Planning Coordination, about 2½ years ago, and, if confirmed again, I would join this USAID team at a critical time in the global war on terrorism and the critical time for foreign assistance as we work to better synchronize U.S. defense, diplomacy, and development efforts to attain our foreign policy objectives.

Europe and Eurasia remains a critical region in advancing America's frontiers of freedom. USAID has accomplished much there, but much remains to be done, with critical challenges to democracy in

Russia, remaining instability in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and complex development and strategic challenges in Central Asia. I pledge that I will continue to work with Congress to meet these challenges head-on.

These past few years with USAID and international development have been, in many ways, the most challenging and interesting of my 39 years of public service. As Assistant Administrator for Policy and Programs Coordination, I have a unique strategic priority and budget-setting position for transformational development and an understanding of the need to reform our system. My career has been both broad and deep in a variety of sectors—national security, foreign policy, military operations, international development, and executive leadership positions in both academia and business. I have served in the White House, the Pentagon, the National Archives, at USAID, and lived and traveled widely overseas. I have spent much time in the Europe/Eurasia region, and have done much thinking about it.

Many of my graduate students from the Marshall Center are now serving in senior leadership roles. I met with some of them last month on my trip to the Caucasus and Turkmenistan, and discussed international development issues with them.

I am proud to be nominated for this position with USAID, and I'm eager to serve the President and to work with Congress in carrying out our joint State/USAID strategy.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me this opportunity to present my qualifications for this position and my views on the future of the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia.

This concludes my oral testimony, and I would be pleased to answer any questions, sir, you may have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Menarchik follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS MENARCHIK, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for this opportunity to appear as President Bush's nominee for Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (E&E) in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

If confirmed, I would join the USAID team at a critical time for foreign assistance as we work to better synchronize U.S. defense, diplomacy, and development efforts to attain our foreign policy objectives. The Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator, Ambassador Tobias, has instituted major reforms at the Department of State and USAID to more closely align our strategy and budget processes to achieve President Bush's and Secretary Rice's transformational diplomacy goals. USAID is also expanding collaboration with the Department of Defense (DoD) in civil-military planning, training, and operations to assure optimal use of the development tool within the national security framework.

United States assistance is particularly critical to achieving United States Government foreign policy goals and in advancing United States national security in the Europe and Eurasia region and beyond. USAID programs contribute significantly to United States foreign policy goals of consolidating democratic gains throughout the Europe and Eurasia region; furthering integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions; promoting stability in the Balkans; achieving a peaceful settlement of Kosovo's future status without isolating Serbia; encouraging Russia to be a responsible member of the global community, supporting democratic institutions and the rule of law; and, in Central Asia, furthering regional integration through energy, infrastructure, and trade linkages, as well as economic diversity and exposure to democratic values.

As the Assistant Administrator (AA) for the E&E region, I would energetically support the efforts of Secretary Rice and Ambassador Tobias to achieve these goals. In particular, I will assist Ambassador Tobias in implementing his reform agenda

at USAID, ensuring that assistance is focused on the highest priority U.S. objectives and that it is implemented in a cost-effective and efficient manner, both in Washington and in our field missions.

I would also like to build on past efforts at USAID to define a vision and identify the steps and benchmarks that will lead to the eventual phasing out of U.S. assistance in the region, while leaving behind key institutions to ensure that U.S.-assisted reforms are sustained. I recognize that some countries are nearer to this goal than others, but I believe that planning for this eventuality will help us achieve it.

I am also keenly interested in deepening USAID's engagement with the Department of Defense. We need to coordinate our planning to enhance security, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction. Working together, we can ensure that USAID assistance in social, political, and economic sectors contributes as effectively as possible to security, stability, and counterterrorism success in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia.

If confirmed, I will bring to this position a strong background in the foreign and security policy arena that will provide an understanding of the strategic context in which USAID works. My almost 2½ years as USAID's Assistant Administrator for Policy and Programs Coordination gave me a unique strategic priority and budget setting position for transformational development, and an understanding of the need to reform our system. I will also bring the experience and knowledge gained from operating in complex and crisis settings. Building a cooperative working relationship in the interagency process is vital to the success of USAID's mission, and I believe my previous experience will serve me well in this effort.

Mr. Chairman, I have been a public servant my entire adult life. I believe public service is both a noble and high calling. My career has been both broad and deep in a variety of sectors—national security, foreign policy, military operations, international development, and executive leadership positions in both academia and business. In the White House, I served as then-Vice President Bush's military assistant in the 1980s, and was specifically involved in Middle Eastern, African, terrorism, and general Defense Department issues. While at the White House, and later as Assistant for Terrorism Policy in the Defense Department in the 1990s, I helped draft several white papers on terrorism when the public and the Government were less focused on this threat. I believe this background makes me keenly aware of the challenges USAID faces in keeping its employees and partners safe in areas of danger and instability.

In addition, during my 3 years as a professor at the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Germany, I worked with the Partnership for Peace countries of the former Eastern Bloc and those of Central Asia. I taught senior officials from the former Soviet Union how to operate a military in a democratic society. Many of my graduates are now in senior positions in the Europe and Eurasia region. I met with some of them last month on my trip to the caucasus, and discussed international development issues with them.

I have seen the devastation and ruin left behind from failed economic systems and dictatorships. And I have seen firsthand the benefits of training others in democracy and free market systems.

Finally, my post-graduate education in both international relations and religion has prepared me well for work on the world stage. I believe that I have the skills necessary to oversee the allocation of foreign aid budget resources in an efficient and objective manner, while remaining sensitive to a region's religions and cultures. All of these experiences as a military commander, director of a civilian war college at the National Defense University, presidential library director, and senior executive within USAID, have enhanced my leadership skills.

I am well-traveled and have lived and worked in many different areas both in and outside the United States. I have seen the ravages of war in Vietnam as a pilot, and the devastation left behind from fallen political regimes. I know how to start up organizations, how to fix broken organizations, and how to make organizations run effectively, efficiently, and purposefully. I had been specifically hired in my last four jobs to perform these difficult tasks. Should I be confirmed, I believe that my diverse operational, foreign policy, international development, and academic and executive leadership positions would serve me well in this important USAID position.

In conclusion, I am proud to be nominated for this position with the U.S. Agency for International Development, and am eager to serve the President and work with the Congress in carrying out our joint State-USAID Strategy.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me this opportunity to present my qualifications for this position and my views on the future of the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia. This concludes my testimony, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.
Dr. Bonicelli.

STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL J. BONICELLI, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Dr. BONICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's indeed an honor and privilege to appear before you and the committee today, with my colleagues, as President Bush's nominee. I thank you for considering my nomination to serve as Assistant Administrator for the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau at USAID.

In my current capacity as Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, I have become quite familiar with the challenges we, as a government, face in promoting development around the world. Should I be confirmed, I would look forward to returning my attention once again to this hemisphere, as I have in the past during my academic career and during my time here at the Congress working for the House International Relations Committee.

Throughout my career, I have considered this hemisphere to be of utmost importance to the United States. We are neighbors not only because of geography, but also because of the centuries of strong and, even now, strengthening ties of commerce, family, friendships, and, importantly, a shared commitment to the democratic way of life. While the region continues to battle poverty and other development challenges, we have, together, enjoyed many successes, not least of which is that there are elected leaders in all but one country in the hemisphere. Moreover, the region boasts several countries that have made great strides toward self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, I believe that our task is to redouble our efforts, to consolidate gains, and to achieve more in the hemisphere. This is especially true now that democracy is being questioned by those who have not yet seen the material gains that are the very real results of democracy. We should counter that trend toward instability, populism, and isolationism, which is evident in some quarters, with concrete actions that inspire hope for long-term development.

I believe we are better able to do this now, because we are embarking on an historic reform of our foreign assistance program. With the first-ever U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance, Ambassador Randall Tobias, we are crafting the tools to assure that State and AID resources are fully integrated both in Washington and in the field. This is a strategic change that is creating a more rational budgeting process. Having been involved with development and democratization throughout my career, I can say that this is what is needed to help us better fight the scourges of poverty, illiteracy, tyranny, instability, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. If confirmed, I pledge to do everything in my power, and in consultation with the Congress, to ensure that U.S. assistance to our neighbors is carried out effectively, equitably, in coordination with our partners around the world, wherever possible, and with concern for fiscal responsibility that are the taxpayers due.

Over the years that I have been involved with this work, Mr. Chairman, I have come to believe that the goal of our development work must be to assist countries in their transition to stable, well-governed, and prospering democracies. I want to emphasize that I believe all those terms are important, but none more important than democracy. It is the democratic society that can best promote and sustain development. In short, there is no development without good governance, but there can be no good governance without democracy. A government that does not have to worry about losing power will not have to really care whether poverty, inequality, illiteracy, disease, and violence are remedied. To think otherwise, I submit, is to put too much trust in the goodness of a given set of leaders to do the right thing. By saying this, I do not mean that some of our programs are more important than others. For example, promoting democracy without concern for socioeconomic needs is a losing enterprise. I mean only to say that development should be seen as a holistic enterprise founded on the idea that dysfunction in any sector is often caused by, certainly compounds and is sustained by, dysfunction in the body politic.

We can no longer spend our foreign assistance dollars on various efforts without appreciating the need to encourage transformation in all sectors so that improvements in health or education or the rule of law can be sustained for the long term by the societies receiving our aid; indeed, so that citizens who have an interest in these things can demand that they be sustained or get themselves new leadership that is competent and cares about them.

Further, democracy encourages the outside world to have confidence in a particular society, which increases capital flows and mutually beneficial ties between citizens of different countries. Democratization is a catalyst for development, especially when accompanied by assistance in the socioeconomic arena.

I am heartened by the fact that this administration and this Congress appreciate the role that development has in furthering our national interests. We help people around the world, and in doing so, we are part of making the world better for all nations. USAID and its very talented staff of technical experts is the primary implementer of U.S. foreign assistance programs, and therefore has a special role to play, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, where we have been at work for many years and have learned many lessons.

It is a great honor for our country to be asked to aid our friends in the region as they build democracy and economic prosperity, not simply because it's in the strategic interest of the United States, but also because of the many ties between our peoples that I referred to at the outset. We have accomplished much, each nation on its own, and much by working together.

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman and the committee, in order to help continue this work for the benefit of all Americans.

Please allow me to conclude my testimony by taking a moment to honor my parents and grandparents, who sacrificed so much that I might be able to serve our country, Louis and Ernestine Bonicelli, Robert and Dorothy Ramsey, and Elizabeth Patterson. Only my mother survives, and she is not able to be here. They sur-

vived the Great Depression, served in two world wars, and had a son who cost them seemingly endless education bills. They are prime examples of our country's good people who invest in others. They and my brother, Matt, and his family have always supported me.

I'd also like to thank my friends and former students, who have been a constant source of encouragement for me, and many of them are here at the hearing. I imagine the former students will especially like your questioning me. [Laughter.]

I'd be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Bonicelli follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL J. BONICELLI, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Mr. Chairman, it is indeed an honor and privilege to appear before you and the committee today with my colleagues as President Bush's nominee. I thank you for considering my nomination to serve as Assistant Administrator for the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

In my current capacity as Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, I have become quite familiar with the challenges we as a government face in promoting development around the world. Should I be confirmed, I would look forward to returning my attention once again specifically to this hemisphere as I have in the past during my academic career and during my time here at the Congress as a professional staff member of the House. Throughout my career I have considered this hemisphere to be of utmost importance to the United States. We are neighbors not only because of geography, but also because of the centuries of strong and even now strengthening ties of commerce, family, and friendships, and importantly, a shared commitment to the democratic way of life. While the region continues to battle poverty and other development challenges, we have together enjoyed many successes, not least of which is that there are elected leaders in all but one country in the hemisphere. Moreover, the region boasts several countries that have made great strides toward self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, I believe our task is to redouble our efforts to consolidate gains and to achieve more in the hemisphere. This is especially true now that democracy is being questioned by those who have not yet seen the material gains that are the very real results of democracy. We should counter the trend toward instability, populism and isolationism—evident in some quarters—with concrete actions that inspire hope.

I believe we are better able to do this now because we are embarking on an historic reform of our foreign assistance program. With the first-ever U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance, Ambassador Randall Tobias, we are crafting the tools to assure that State and USAID resources are fully integrated both in Washington and the field. This is a strategic change that is creating a more rational budgeting process. Having been involved with development and democratization throughout my career, I can say that this is what is needed to help us better fight the scourges of poverty, illiteracy, tyranny, instability, terrorism, and illegal narcotics trafficking. If confirmed, I pledge to do everything in my power, and in consultation with the Congress, to ensure that U.S. assistance to our neighbors is carried out effectively, equitably, in coordination with our partners around the world whenever possible, and with concern for fiscal responsibility that the taxpayers are due.

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A government that does not have to worry about losing power does not have to really care whether poverty, inequality, illiteracy, disease, and violence are remedied. To think otherwise, I submit, is to put too much trust in the goodness of a given set of leaders to do the right thing. By saying this I do not mean that some

of our programs are more important than others—for example, promoting democracy without concern for socioeconomic needs is a losing enterprise. I mean only to say that development should be seen as a holistic enterprise founded on the idea that dysfunction in any sector is often caused by—and is definitely compounded and sustained by—dysfunction in the body politic. We can no longer spend our foreign assistance dollars on various efforts without appreciating the need to encourage transformation in all sectors so that improvements in health or education or the rule of law can be sustained; indeed, so that the citizens who have an interest in these things can demand that they be sustained or get themselves new leadership that is competent and cares. Further, democracy encourages the outside world to have confidence in a particular society, increasing capital flows and mutually beneficial ties between citizens of different countries. Democratization is a catalyst of development, especially when accompanied by assistance in the socioeconomic arena.

I am heartened by the fact that this administration and this Congress appreciate the role that development has in furthering our national interests. We help people around the world, and in doing so, we are a part of making the world better. USAID and its very talented staff of technical experts is the primary implementer of U.S. foreign assistance programs and therefore has a special role to play, particularly in the Western Hemisphere where we have been at work for many years.

It is a great honor for our country to be asked to aid our friends in the region as they build democracy and economic prosperity, not simply because such is in the strategic interest of the United States, but also because of the many ties between our peoples I referred to at the outset. We know each other as buyers and sellers of goods and services; we know each other as allies in the defense of democracy. But millions of us in this hemisphere know each other on a personal, cultural, and sometimes familial basis, with some of those ties stretching back to our common and successful struggle to win our independence. We have accomplished much, each nation on its own, and much by working together. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee, in order to help continue this work for the benefit of all the Americas.

Please allow me to conclude my testimony by taking a moment to honor my parents and grandparents for all that they sacrificed so that I might be in a position to serve our country: Louis and Ernestine Bonicelli, Robert and Dorothy Ramsey, and Elizabeth Patterson; only my mother survives and she is not able to be here. Surviving the Great Depression, service in two wars, and a son who cost them seemingly endless education bills, they are prime examples of our country's good people who invest in others. They and my brother Matt and his family have always supported me. I'd also like to thank my friends who have constantly encouraged and uplifted me, some of whom attended the hearing today.

Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions that you or the Senators might have for me.

Senator MENENDEZ. Those must have been the anonymous questions I got. [Laughter.]

Ms. Almquist.

STATEMENT OF KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR AFRICA

Ms. ALMQUIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. I'm grateful for this opportunity to appear before you as the President's nominee for Assistant Administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development.

I would like to thank President Bush and Ambassador Tobias for the honor of this nomination.

If confirmed, I will be fully committed to working with this committee and the Congress to ensure greater results and accountability for our programming of foreign assistance resources in Africa.

I'm thrilled to be able to share this occasion today with my parents, Ken and Janell Almquist. I would like to acknowledge their role in raising me to care deeply about the world, to appreciate the

importance of public service, and to understand the responsibilities we shoulder as citizens of this great nation.

I have had the privilege of working at—with USAID for the past 6 years, first as senior policy advisor to former Administrator Natsios, then as Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, and, most recently, as Sudan Mission Director.

I am proud of the efforts and accomplishments of the hundreds of dedicated professionals serving in Africa and here in Washington that I have witnessed during this time; and, if confirmed, supporting their work will be my highest priority.

The perspectives and management experiences that I have gained at both the agency and bureau headquarters level, as well as from the on-the-ground reality of reopening and running the largest bilateral mission in Africa, I believe have prepared me for the challenge of stewarding the agency's bureau for Africa.

In addition, my 7 years of service with one of the world's largest nonprofit international relief and development organizations working extensively on African issues gives me an appreciation for the nongovernmental partners we rely on to implement so many of our programs in Africa.

If confirmed, I look forward to working not only with the non-governmental sector, but also with the private sector and other elements of civil society in the United States that care deeply about Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I have been a student of Africa for the better part of 17 years, and it has taught me many things. Africa has taught me to appreciate the great country that is ours and the freedom that most Americans take for granted. It has taught me the true value of the system of democratic governance that gives us not only the right, but also the ability to hold our Government accountable to the people who elect it. Africans, too, deserve to have leaders and systems of governance that are credible, capable, and responsive to the needs of the people, rather than regimes which prey upon their people and exploit their resources for the benefit of a few.

My experiences in Africa have also taught me to appreciate the depth and breadth of diversity that is Africa, to move beyond stereotypes and cliches, to see wisdom and value in cultures that are foreign to our way of living. The lesson that has perhaps been the most difficult of all, particularly as one coming from a nation used to solving problems, is to accept humility in not always being able to do so. Our responsibility, my responsibility, if confirmed, will be to contribute to marshalling the resources at our disposal, and to use them in partnership with Africans, who must bear ultimate responsibility for solving the problems of Africa.

That said, I firmly believe that we have never known a more favorable time than the present to build upon and consolidate the progress being made on the continent. Africa offers rich development potential, along with huge challenges, including widespread poverty, illiteracy, hunger, disease, environmental degradation, conflict, and poor governance. Addressing the challenges facing Africa is critical to U.S. security and regional stability. It is a region of great strategic importance to the United States, both in terms

of emerging markets and as a front in our efforts to stem and reverse the threat of terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, under the leadership of Secretary Rice and Ambassador Tobias the State Department and USAID have undertaken a series of reforms designed to improve the effectiveness of our foreign assistance programs and make it easier for us to coordinate our assistance and track results. Of course, the nations of sub-Saharan Africa vary widely in terms of their relative state of development. If confirmed, I will ensure that assistance strategies support United States Government foreign policy objectives, are grounded in the context of the specific country in question, are developed collaboratively with those who have the most at stake in their success or failure, our African counterparts, and, most importantly, I will ensure that our programs achieve results and reach the poorest and the most vulnerable.

In the words of President Bush, "We share with Africans themselves a visions of what the continent can become, a model of reform, a home to prosperous democracies, and a tribute to the strong spirit of the African peoples." This vision is necessary, realistic, and already on its way to achievement.

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I would like the committee to know that I will work tirelessly to make this vision a reality. I would look forward to working with the Congress and my colleagues at USAID and other agencies in carrying out our foreign assistance strategy in Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the committee for considering my nomination, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Almquist follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you as the President's nominee for Assistant Administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and I would like to thank President Bush and Ambassador Tobias for the honor of this nomination. If confirmed, I will be fully committed to working with this committee and the Congress to ensure greater results and accountability from our programming of foreign assistance resources in Africa. I am thrilled to be able to share this occasion with my parents, Ken and Janell Almquist. I would like to acknowledge their role in raising me to care deeply about the world, to appreciate the importance of public service, and to understand the responsibilities we shoulder as citizens of this great Nation.

I have had the great privilege of working with USAID for the past 6 years, first as senior policy advisor to former Administrator Natsios, then as Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, and most recently as Sudan Mission Director. I am proud of the efforts and accomplishments of the hundreds of dedicated professionals serving in Africa and here in Washington that I have witnessed during this time and, if confirmed, supporting their work will be my highest priority. The perspectives and management experiences that I have gained at both the Agency and bureau headquarters' level, as well as from the on-the-ground reality of reopening and running the largest bilateral mission in Africa, I believe, have prepared me for the challenge of stewarding the Agency's Bureau for Africa.

In addition, my 7 years of service with one of the world's largest nonprofit international relief and development organizations, working extensively on African issues, gives me an appreciation for the nongovernmental partners we rely on to implement so many of our programs in Africa. If confirmed, I look forward to working not only with the nongovernmental sector, but also with the private sector and other elements of civil society in the United States that care deeply about Africa.

Americans are perhaps more aware than ever of events taking place in Africa, whether as a result of the intense spotlight currently focused on Darfur, or due to the interest of celebrities in improving the lives of African children. The challenges and opportunities present in Africa today are far greater than we can respond to, even with the generous level of official United States assistance to Africa provided by American taxpayers. As a result, working with all sectors of American society with an interest in improving the lives of Africans is a must. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will see my role as Assistant Administrator as one of building bridges between the United States and Africa, working closely with Assistant Secretary Frazer, not only to represent the interests of the United States to the people and Governments of Africa, but also to represent the issues and concerns of Africa to the American people.

Mr. Chairman, I have been a student of Africa for the better part of 17 years, and it has taught me many things. Africa has taught me to appreciate the great country that is ours and the freedom that most Americans take for granted. It has taught me the true value of the system of democratic governance that gives us not only the right but also the ability to hold our Government accountable to the people who elect it. Africans, too, deserve to have leaders and systems of governance that are credible, capable, and responsive to the needs of the people, rather than regimes which prey upon their people and exploit their resources for the benefit of the few. Democratic elections were held recently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Benin, Mali, and Senegal, bringing the total number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa witnessing a peaceful, democratic transition to 33, or about two-thirds of the total. Over the past 10 years, civil liberties have improved markedly in 21 sub-Saharan African countries; and political rights have shown substantial gains in 15 countries. Yet more work remains to be done.

My experiences in Africa have also taught me to appreciate the depth and breadth of diversity that is Africa, to move beyond stereotypes and clichés, to see wisdom and value in cultures that are foreign to our way of living. The lesson that has perhaps been most difficult of all, particularly as one coming from a nation used to solving problems, is to accept humility in not always being able to do so. Our responsibility—my responsibility, if confirmed—will be to contribute to marshalling the resources at our disposal and use them in partnership with Africans who must bear ultimate responsibility for “solving” the problems of Africa. Africa must chart its own course; we must determine how best to partner with the people of Africa to end the unspeakable tragedies and advance the limitless possibilities inherent on the continent.

In this regard, the emergence of the African Union (AU), a considerably more dynamic and forward-looking institution than its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, is one of the most important developments in Africa in recent decades. Along with the Regional Economic Commissions, the Africa Union is providing a forum for the development of African policies, programs, and strategies to address African problems. Africans are also increasingly willing and able to hold themselves accountable, as evidenced by the slow but steady progress of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). These and other institutions are gradually making a major contribution toward assisting African countries to develop the good governance and stability needed to ensure that their people can enjoy the fruits of democracy, peace, and prosperity.

Mr. Chairman, as you are well aware, Africa is a region of extreme need and great promise. I firmly believe that we have never known a more favorable time than the present to build upon and consolidate the progress being made on the continent. Africa offers rich development potential, along with huge challenges, including widespread poverty, illiteracy, hunger, disease, environmental degradation, conflict, and poor governance. Addressing the challenges facing Africa is critical to United States security and regional stability. Africa is the world’s second largest and most populous continent, after Asia, and is a region of great strategic importance to the United States, both in terms of emerging markets and as a front in our efforts to stem and reverse the threat of terrorism.

In addition, the United States shares a unique heritage and cultural bond with the people of sub-Saharan Africa. For these reasons, the United States has assumed a leading role in meeting the commitments to Africa the G-8 nations made in 2005 at Gleneagles, Scotland. The United States is making meaningful progress in several areas critical to the continent’s development such as education, food security, trade promotion, environment, and protection of women. In particular, the United States Government has committed significant resources and support to fight two of the greatest challenges in Africa, HIV/AIDS and malaria.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, under the leadership of Secretary Rice and Ambassador Tobias, the State Department and USAID have undertaken a series of reforms

designed to improve the effectiveness of our foreign assistance programs and make it easier for us to coordinate our assistance and track results. Our shared transformational development goal is to “help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.” Of course, the nations of sub-Saharan Africa vary widely in terms of their relative state of development. Consequently, USAID’s strategies begin by taking country context into consideration in each of our strategic objectives, with the goal of helping countries advance along the road of development in each crucial sector. If confirmed, I will ensure that assistance strategies support United States Government foreign policy objectives, are grounded in the context of the specific country in question, and are developed collaboratively with those who have the most at stake in their success or failure, our African counterparts. Most importantly, I will ensure that our programs achieve results.

While we are making progress, there is still so much to be done in sub-Saharan Africa to build upon our accomplishments; we can do even more to address the startling needs of the continent, while, at the same time, take bold steps to increase the security and well-being of our citizens here at home. In the words of President Bush: “We share with Africans, themselves, a vision of what the continent can become—a model of reform, a home to prosperous democracies, and a tribute to the strong spirit of the African peoples.” This vision is necessary, realistic, and already on its way to achievement.

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I would like the committee to know that I will work tirelessly to make this vision a reality. I would look forward to working with the Congress, and my colleagues at USAID and other agencies to carrying out our foreign assistance strategy in Africa.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would like to thank you and the committee for considering my nomination, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much.

Thank you all for your statements. Since we have a large panel here today, I’m going to start, at least in the first round—I don’t see other members, but we don’t know if they’ll arrive, and the time will expand to 7 minutes, and then if, in fact, there are other questions, I’m sure Senator Lugar will be able to pursue that, based upon how many people show up and—with votes on the floor. So, I’ll start with myself.

Mr. Kunder, I had the opportunity to talk to you about some of the issues I am concerned about, and you have addressed some of them. I want to build upon our discussion and ask you, In the process—you had a unique opportunity in Iraq reconstruction, looking at Afghanistan, as well—in that process, when the reconstruction phase started in Iraq, what role did USAID play in overseeing programs? Was there collaboration between the Department of Defense and USAID? And were USAID officials who had experience in development consulted on these major reconstruction initiatives?

Mr. KUNDER. Well, first of all, as you well know, General Garner went out to Iraq during the early stages, and it was assumed that we were going to have a more or less classic relief and recovery operation, and, during that phase of the operation, the coordination with USAID, I would say, was excellent. Once the Coalition Provisional Authority system was established, the USAID team which was on the ground in Baghdad continued to play some part in that operation, but clearly the central planning was done by the Coalition Provisional Authority, with strong backstopping here from the Department of Defense.

I think our opinions were solicited in many cases, and listened to in some cases, but the model that was established at the time seemed to make sense in the context of the time. This was before

the insurgency really started getting some traction, and the model was that we were going to take a whole-of-government approach. It was not going to be a classic State Department lead, USAID do most of the reconstruction; rather, we were going to get a lot of departments and agencies involved, and it was going to look more like General McArthur's reconstruction of Japan at the end of World War II.

So, I would say we played a role, but it was a relatively small role during the—

Senator MENENDEZ. And the reason I asked you that is because, after having sat down with the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, I'm not sure that that was the appropriate role. What lessons do you think we learned from it?

Mr. KUNDER. We learned the lesson—primary lesson, I believe, sir, is that the civilian side of the U.S. Government needs to have a standing capacity with the kind of technical experts we need to respond quickly if our forces are deployed overseas. We have learned an important lesson, I believe, at USAID, in establishing the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. There was a time when we did not have such a natural-disaster response capability, and the U.S. Government tended to operate on a pick-up basis when there was a natural disaster. Now we have a group of people that are on standby. If there is flooding in Africa tomorrow morning, our teams will deploy quickly and we will draw resources from the warehouses we have around the world. In my view—and this is something that Senator Biden and Senator Lugar have been pushing—we need to have a similar standby capacity to respond in conflict situations. We don't need to be drawing people from the civilian sector right in the middle of the crisis. We need these folks on standby.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me build upon that with a question to you, Mr. Menarchik. In your testimony, you mentioned that you're keenly interested in deepening USAID's engagement with the Department of Defense. And, while I certainly encourage collaboration, I'm concerned, in light of the Department of Defense's reconstruction efforts in Iraq, whether that is always in the best interest. And so, how do you, if you are confirmed, how do you envision that cooperation? How do you envision expanding, specifically, USAID's engagement with the Department of Defense?

Dr. MENARCHIK. Thank you for that question, sir. In fact, USAID and the Defense Department have been working for decades together very closely, especially in humanitarian assistance/disaster assistance activities. Oftentimes, however, these were pick-up games. USAID would arrive, DoD would arrive, bring in the assets and attempt to work together. I argue that we need to be able to set up plans, practice together, work together, train together in the humanitarian assistance and disaster assistance arenas. We have been developing that capability over some time now. I argue it needs to be institutionalized.

Within the conflict and post-conflict situations, as Mr. Kunder has explained, I argue that we need a standing capacity on the civilian side to be able to engage in reconstruction efforts in a conflict and post-conflict area. Again, we have a pick-up game in the midst of a crisis, bringing elements from the civilian community to-

gether, inserting them into a situation in which I believe they are not adequately prepared.

In order to develop this, we should identify folks, train people who are specialized in conflict and post-conflict situations; work with, train with, all elements of the government who would be deployed in these circumstances so that we have a crisis response development capacity.

My own experience was looking back in the days of Vietnam, when we had USAID and the CORDS program, when, in fact, we had 3,000 to 4,000 USAID development folks stationed in Vietnam. They were linguists. They were able to deliver development on the ground in the midst of a conflict. They were able to work with our military counterparts. I would argue that that kind of a model is something we should be looking at.

Senator MENENDEZ. I think our challenge is improving coordination, but, at the same time, not sacrificing independence or integrity in the process. And how one achieves that is incredibly important.

Dr. Bonicelli, I enjoyed when I was in the House International Relations Committee, working with you. The President is in Latin America right now, as we speak, so I won't get into a full discussion of my views about that, in terms of Latin America. But you're going to head a very important part of the world. Our problem is, is that it seems to me the Millennium Challenge Account, while very worthy, moves us in a direction in which it only takes—at least as it relates to Latin America—4 percent of Latin America's poor, which means that nearly 213 million go untouched by the Millennium Challenge Account. And yet, some of our core development funding in this respect continues to get cut. How does one meet that challenge in the process of heading the Latin American and Caribbean division?

Dr. BONICELLI. Yes, Senator. I think the challenge is to respect that the Millennium Challenge Account, that the compacts, make all the difference in the world for sustainability—that is the goal—but to make sure that the core AID budget is focused on those countries that are making gains, making progress, can be ready for threshold programs, can then be ready for compacts. That has been the purpose over this last year for the fiscal year 2008 budget process, is to find where gains have been made, where countries are close to being able to move into another category so that a different kind of targeting of aid can be done, resources can be focused on consolidating gains, and keeping them. In large measure, many of these countries, it is—it's consolidating the gains in democracy more than anything. The OECD indicators have been encouraging in several of these countries, in many areas, except for governance. And so, that's why there is an increase in governance in 2008, a 5 percent increase, to get them ready to go further.

The process has been to look for gaps where they need core development funds to keep moving them.

Senator MENENDEZ. It is clearly an enormous part of the world in which domestic interests on undocumented immigration, on the questions of narcotics trafficking, on the questions of creating greater markets for U.S. services and products, on the question of making sure that we don't continue to see the devastation of the

Amazon and its rainforest, in terms of global warming. Incredibly important part of the world, and we look forward to working with you.

Ms. Almquist, my time is up for the moment, so my lack of a question to you is not out of disinterest. We had a very good conversation and I am very impressed with your background. But I'll yield to Senator Lugar, and then, if we have time, I have a question for you.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kunder, please describe the role of USAID in reconstruction in southern Sudan, and humanitarian efforts in Darfur. I ask this, because I want some idea of how coordination works with the State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, or, for that matter, with other agencies. We have an outpouring of American citizens who are very hopeful that our Government can be successful in bringing relief to the people there. You are in a good position to describe where the procedure is currently, organizationally, because it is multifaceted.

Mr. KUNDER. Specifically as to CRS, sir?

Senator LUGAR. Yes, but—in any other agency that—

Mr. KUNDER. Yes.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. You see intersecting with your mission.

Mr. KUNDER. Well, sir, I feel a little hesitant, because I know you know a great deal about this topic, but—what the U.S. Government recognized when it created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department several years ago was that many aspects of the U.S. Government have contributions to make in a humanitarian crisis or in a post-conflict situation. I mean, clearly we deliver food assistance, but the United States Department of Agriculture has something to contribute. We work on democracy and governance issues, but the Justice Department and its ICITAP police training program has much to contribute, as well—our Commerce Department, our Department of Health and Human Services, as well as, of course, many bureaus within the State Department. And I think the widely held perception was that these organizations came together in a somewhat ad hoc fashion, that there were neither established coordination structures nor standard operating procedures to guide how they came together.

And I should say, in tribute to many dedicated civilian employees of the U.S. Government, in all these institutions it was not always a catastrophe; people found each other in the middle of a crisis, they developed ad hoc, but sometimes effective, ways of working together. But the underlying principle in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was that one entity would be established within the State Department to provide ongoing coordination. The State Department was seen to be the logical place, because that's also where we have the institutional ties to the U.N. and to the international organizations for the diplomatic aspects of crisis management.

I think, at this point, there has been a very great deal of progress made in the last 10 years, in terms of better interagency training, certainly between the civilian and the military side of the

U.S. Government. But I do not yet believe, sir, that we have achieved the objectives and the vision that we had when we created the CRS office several years ago.

Senator LUGAR. Now, how does this pertain to Darfur?

Mr. KUNDER. Specifically in Darfur, now on the ground, we've got excellent—and, of course, I'm sitting next to the expert on Darfur here, Kate Almqvist—but we have excellent coordination between the Africa Bureau of the State Department and our own USAID Africa Bureau, with Kate on the ground in Khartoum. CRS has begun to do some work there, but CRS is not, at this point, providing the overall coordination in Darfur and Sudan that I think was envisioned when it was created several years ago.

Senator LUGAR. Let me ask for the aid of Ms. Almqvist on Darfur. What is happening in Darfur, and what should we do about it?

Ms. ALMQUIST. Well, Darfur continues to be a very grave situation, as the many daily press reports, I think, back here in the United States, tell the story. We are providing massive humanitarian assistance right now in Darfur. We're the largest bilateral donor, by a longshot, and our food assistance and our nonfood assistance are critical to ensuring that the 3 million, or more, conflict-affected people in Darfur continue to survive. We're actually—somewhat contrary to the news reports, frequently we're surprised by the humanitarian indicators in Darfur, which show a better situation for more people in Darfur than in some other parts of the country which don't have the same dynamic going on, in terms of the conflict, but also receives less attention in terms of assistance. Eastern Sudan, for instance, has worse statistics of malnutrition than Darfur does, and that's thanks, in large part, due to this massive international humanitarian response, largely funded by the United States. So, that, of course, is critical to continue for as long as this crisis exists.

But we haven't yet begun the reconstruction phase in Darfur. We are still not post-conflict. And, in fact, we'll have a donor meeting next week, called the Sudan Consortium, where Darfur's reconstruction will be on the agenda, the possibility of it. But the planning has, in essence, been stopped, because of the worsening security situation last summer and through the fall.

As soon as the security situation can be improved—and there is much work being done by the Special Envoy and the State Department on that front—and as well as on the political process in Darfur, then the reconstruction planning can go forward.

CRS has been critical in filling gaps for the Embassy, in particular, in Darfur. They have provided surge capacity in the form of their Active—I think it's their Active Response Corps—ARC, I believe, is the acronym they have. And they have had officers on the ground in Darfur supporting the Embassy's efforts, in terms of covering the political process and the reality, working alongside of our Darfur field officers from USAID. So, we're working very hand-in-hand out in El Fashir and Nyala, on a regular basis in these regions of Darfur, and that will be important as we proceed into reconstruction planning.

But critical right now: humanitarian response, stepping up the political process to bring more people onboard with the Darfur

Peace Agreement, and, of course, solving the security situation through the efforts to improve the peacekeeping on the ground, and to bring all the rebels and parties into the cease-fire. Those are the three main things.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator.

I have one or two more questions. Then, if Senator Lugar has any more after that—Ms. Almquist, I want to pursue Senator Lugar's line of questioning. In a published report last week, "A high-level mission from the Human Rights Council to address the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of the Sudan described a grave and deteriorating situation." And a conclusion—part of the conclusion of their study states, "Even after the signing of the Darfur Peace Accords, war continues, the human rights situation has further deteriorated, millions are displaced, at least 200,000 are dead, and conflict and abuse are spilling over into the border into Chad. Making matters worse, humanitarian space continues to shrink, humanitarian and human rights actors are increasingly targeted, killings of civilians remains widespread, including in large-scale attacks."

Now, you've been the Mission Director in the Sudan, and you've had the unique experience of working with the region firsthand. Do you have the same view as their conclusion?

Ms. ALMQUIST. Senator, I think that's a very accurate depiction of the situation on the ground. I do think that it's very much a roller coaster, and security goes up and down, and we go through phases where it's much, much worse, and then we go through phases where it calms down, for a variety of different factors, whether on the rebel side or the Government of Sudan side. We've just had another visit of the Special Envoy in the past week or so, and we traveled extensively through Darfur. I accompanied him while he was there. And we heard that the situation at that point was calm, but tense. We did intersect with this panel of experts in El Fashir, and had an opportunity to exchange notes with them. I think, overall, they've characterized it very well. But it does fluctuate and move up and down.

The question of humanitarian space for our partners on the ground that we rely on to deliver assistance is vital, at the moment. And so, while we've got a very successful humanitarian operation, if the—this humanitarian space—meaning, the bureaucratic impediments to their working and operating in Darfur—continues to close, that situation will reverse quite quickly, and then we will have a much more significant humanitarian disaster on our hands.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me talk one more dimension of this, with reference to neighboring eastern Chad.

Ms. ALMQUIST. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ. There's over 100,000 displaced Chadians, food assistance is being imperiled by a surge in violence and banditry. Most people in the volatile border area with the Sudan have been completely cut off from aid. And a U.N. statement released said, "If the situation continues, the humanitarian operation and welfare of the population it aims to support will be irreversibly jeopardized." Is that situation truly irreversible?

Ms. ALMQUIST. I'm sorry—

Senator MENENDEZ. Is that situation truly—

Ms. ALMQUIST. In eastern Chad?

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Yes—irrevocable?

Ms. ALMQUIST. It's not truly irreversible, in my opinion. I think, again, things ebb and flow, and if we're not steadfast in pushing back on the different factors that are limiting our ability to get humanitarian assistance out, some things we can affect, like the bureaucratic impediments that the governments impose on humanitarian actors; some things are much more difficult to get at: the behavior of the so-called bandits, the Arab militias, the Chadian rebels, the Darfurian rebels. There's a multiplicity of actors—more and more, it feels like, every day, in terms of who's causing the insecurity in which region, whether it's in eastern Chad, just across the border in western Darfur; the situation in north Darfur and south Darfur each have their own dynamics. I think it is very serious, but I don't think it's hopeless, so we can certainly still get significant amounts of aid to most of the people who need it.

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. With that, we thank you all for your appearance before the Committee, and I'm sure that the Chairman will be holding a business meeting of the committee for the purposes of reporting your nominations out.

We thank you all, and we wish you good luck in the process. Thank you. With that, you're dismissed.

The second panel—let's turn to our second panel, with nominees to serve as U.S. directors at various development banks and multilateral financial institutions.

As we talk about America's role in reducing poverty, we should recognize that our foreign assistance also extends to supporting multinational institutions that will improve the economies of other countries and directly aid in development. And that's why I believe that America has to continue to play a strong part in the major development banks and multilateral financial institutions that work towards this goal.

In this hearing, we look forward to specifically discussing the work of the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank, as well as what our nominees intend to contribute to these institutions.

Let me—as our other nominees leave the room with their guests, let me welcome these nominees: Eli Whitney Debevoise, currently as senior partner at Arnold & Porter, who has been nominated to be the U.S. executive director to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Meg Lundsager, currently the alternative executive director of the International Monetary Fund, who has been nominated to be the U.S. executive director of the International Monetary Fund; and Mr. Curtis Chin, currently working as a managing director for the international communications firm, Burson Marsteller, who has been nominated to be the U.S. director of the Asian Development Bank.

And I would recognize Senator Lugar, if he has any comments he'd like to make at this time.

Senator LUGAR. No, Mr. Chairman, I think we should proceed.

Senator MENENDEZ. Absolutely.

With that, we'll change the process here, and we'll start with Ms. Lundsager. And if you would—you have up to 5 minutes to make a statement. Your full statement will be included in the record. If you have anyone you want to introduce who's with you, we're happy to welcome them. And we will go straight down the line with the panel, in that direction.

Ms. Lundsager.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MARGRETHE LUNDSAGER, NOMINEE TO
BE U.S. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND**

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Lugar.

First of all, I'd like to introduce my family, who's here with me today. My husband, John Baker, and my two children, Andrew and Eva Baker, who are out of school early today to join us here, so they're very pleased with that. My son is home from college. And my sister, as well, is here, Hanne Denney. I very much appreciate that she's taken off from her job to come join me here. And I would also very much like to thank my parents, who brought me to this great country many years ago, as you, Senator, and very pleased that I have now been nominated by President Bush to represent the United States at the International Monetary Fund.

If confirmed, I promise to work with this committee, the full Congress, the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary Paulson, and the rest of the administration, in furthering U.S. foreign economic policy goals.

After many years at the Treasury Department, I am now serving as the alternate executive director at the IMF. In this capacity, I've sought to achieve U.S. foreign economic policy goals, and, if confirmed, will continue to pursue those reforms at the IMF that are a priority for the United States.

As you know, the mission of the IMF is to promote international monetary cooperation and to facilitate the growth of trade in order to generate high levels of employment and income in its member nations. Toward this end, the IMF has an important role in encouraging increased transparency and public policy, supporting market-based reforms to generate sustained growth and development, and advancing sound fiscal and monetary policies to strengthen government accounts and reduce the risk of crisis. With its near-global membership, the IMF is in a position to promote best practices in these areas. A good deal has been accomplished in the past few years. A strong IMF with a firm U.S. voice is important to continuing this work.

At the present time, the IMF is also undergoing fundamental change as it looks to revise its own tools for assessing a country's economic and monetary policies, including a country's exchange-rate policy. The United States strongly supports this effort; and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with my colleagues to realize these important reforms.

Mr. Chairman, throughout my Treasury career I've had the opportunity to see, firsthand, the dedication of administration officials and congressional leaders to strengthening the U.S. economy through our own domestic policies and our global efforts to foster

growth and financial stability in other countries. There is much we can still do to strengthen the global economy, and, if confirmed, I will seek to do my part at the International Monetary Fund to achieve further reforms in IMF policies and practices.

I would be very pleased to answer your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lundsager follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARGRETHE LUNDSAGER, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Hagel, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored that President Bush has nominated me to serve as the United States Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund, and if confirmed, I pledge to work with this committee, the full Congress, Secretary Paulson, and the rest of the administration in furthering U.S. foreign economic policy goals.

After many years at the Treasury Department, I am now serving as the Alternate U.S. Executive Director at the IMF. In this capacity, I have sought to achieve U.S. objectives and if confirmed, will continue to pursue the reforms that are a priority to the United States.

As you know, the mission of the IMF is to promote international monetary cooperation and to facilitate the growth of trade in order to generate high levels of employment and income in its member nations. Toward this end, the IMF has an important role in encouraging increased transparency in public policy, supporting market-based reforms to generate sustained growth and development, and advancing sound fiscal and monetary policies to strengthen government accounts and reduce the risk of crisis. With its near global membership, the IMF is in a position to promote best practices in these areas. A good deal has been accomplished. A strong IMF with a firm U.S. voice is important to continuing this work.

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Mr. Chairman, throughout my Treasury career I have had the opportunity to see firsthand the dedication of administration officials and Congressional leaders to strengthening the U.S. economy, through our own domestic policies and our global efforts to foster growth and financial stability in other countries. There is much we can still do to strengthen the global economy, and if confirmed, I will seek to do my part at the IMF to achieve further reforms in IMF policies and practices. I would be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Mr. Chin.

STATEMENT OF CURTIS S. CHIN, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DIRECTOR OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

Mr. CHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar.

It's really an honor to be here today to be considered for confirmation as the U.S. executive director of the Asian Development Bank. I am, of course, also extremely honored to have been nominated by President Bush to serve our Nation at the ADB.

And I would actually like to take you up on the offer to introduce a couple of members of my family and friends who are here. Specifically, I'd like to recognize my father, Moy. He's a retired career U.S. Army officer, originally from the State of Washington, now working in healthcare. And my mom, Ethel, originally from Maryland, a retired nurse and, of course, long-time military wife and mom, who, with my dad, helped manage our ever-moving house-

hold from California to Arizona to Virginia and overseas U.S. postings in Taiwan, Thailand, and Korea.

Also here are my sister, Lisa, and her husband, my brother-in-law, Sam. Of particular note, Sam is a U.S. Army soldier. He arrived last Wednesday from his deployment with the 19th Engineer Battalion Headquarters Support Company in Iraq. I thank him for taking up one of his afternoons on, no doubt, a well-deserved 2-weeks leave before returning to Iraq next week.

Not here in person is my brother, Mark. He's also career U.S. military, who recently retired as deputy commander for administration at Evans U.S. Army Community Hospital in Fort Carson, Colorado.

Each of them have, in their own way, set an example of service to all of—for our communities and our country.

If confirmed to the post of U.S. executive director of the ADB, I look forward to continuing that tradition of service.

Over the many years that I have lived and worked in Asia, I saw, firsthand, the challenges posed by the tremendous poverty that continues to persist in the region. I also saw, as today's headlines from Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and elsewhere, continue to show, how what happens in Asia can have tremendous consequences across the Pacific here in the United States. Strong continued engagement and involvement in Asia by the United States is vital and underscores the importance of a region that, while growing and dynamic, is still home to the vast majority of the world's poor, and still continues to face daunting challenges ahead.

The ADB's core mission is straightforward: promote sustainable, economic growth and eradicate poverty in the region. It must do this through economic programs that advance human development, private-sector growth, good governance, transparency, and the environment. The impact of the ADB, however, extends far beyond its basic mission of alleviating poverty and promoting economic development. The bank has played a significant role in promoting and financing economic revitalization and institutional development in Afghanistan. With U.S. support, it has also been instrumental in responding to natural disasters, serving not only as a financier, but as regional coordinator of recovery efforts from such devastating events these last 2-plus years as the tsunami in Asia and a major earthquake in Pakistan. In both cases, ADB efforts to rebuild and restore local economic activity have been vital to reconstruction efforts. Additionally, the ADB has provided assistance on anti-money-laundering practices in ways that counter the financing of terrorism. The ADB also has been working to combat human trafficking, especially of women and children.

If confirmed, I will bring the breadth and depth of my regional knowledge and management skills to support and advance the goals of the United States at this important regional financial institution. These goals include ensuring that the ADB is results-oriented, achieving measurable responsible development outcomes, as well as increasing transparency and accountability in the ADB's operations.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank you for the privilege of appearing before the Committee today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you or other members of the Committee have.

Thanks.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CURTIS S. CHIN, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DIRECTOR OF THE
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hagel, and members of the committee. I am honored to be able to come before this esteemed committee to be considered for confirmation as the U.S. Executive Director of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). I am, of course, also extremely honored to have been nominated by President Bush to serve our Nation at the ADB, and I welcome this chance to answer any questions you have.

Before proceeding, and with the Chairman's permission, I wanted to take a brief moment to thank the many family members and friends who have provided me support and guidance through my years in both the public and private sectors. Some of them are here today. In particular, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I wanted to recognize some of my family present. First, my parents: my father, Moy—a retired career U.S. Army officer originally from the State of Washington, now working in health care—and my mother, Ethel, originally from Maryland, a retired nurse and of course longtime military wife and Mom who, with my Dad, helped manage our ever-moving household from California to Arizona to Virginia and overseas U.S. postings in Taiwan, Thailand, and Korea. Also here are my sister Lisa and her husband, my brother-in-law, Sam. Of particular note, Sam, a U.S. Army soldier, arrived last Wednesday from Iraq where he is deployed with the 19th Engineer Battalion, Headquarters Support Company. I would particularly like to thank Sam for joining us this afternoon and giving up a day of his no doubt well-earned leave before returning next week to Iraq. Not here in person but offering support from afar is my brother Mark, also career U.S. Army, who recently retired as Deputy Commander for Administration of Evans U.S. Army Community Hospital in Fort Carson, Colorado. All of them in their own way have set an example of service to our communities and our country.

If confirmed for the position of U.S. Executive Director to the ADB, I look forward to continuing that tradition of service. Over the many years that I have lived and worked in Asia, I saw firsthand the challenges posed by the tremendous poverty that continues to persist in the region. I also saw—as today's headlines from Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and elsewhere continue to show—how what happens in Asia can have tremendous consequences across the Pacific here in the United States. Strong, continued engagement and involvement in Asia by the United States is vital and underscores the importance of a region that while growing and dynamic is still home to the vast majority of the world's poor and still continues to face daunting challenges ahead.

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But the impact of the ADB extends far beyond its basic mission of alleviating poverty and promoting economic development. The Bank has played a significant role in promoting and financing economic revitalization and institutional development in Afghanistan. With United States support, it has been instrumental in responding to natural disasters, serving not only as financier but as regional coordinator of recovery efforts from such devastating events these last 2 years as the tsunami in Asia and a major earthquake in Pakistan. In both cases, ADB efforts to rebuild and restore local economic activity have been vital to reconstruction efforts. Additionally, the ADB has provided assistance on anti-money laundering practices and ways to counter the financing of terrorism. And, the ADB has been working to combat human trafficking, especially of women and children.

If confirmed, I will bring the breadth and depth of my regional knowledge and management skills to support and advance the goals of the United States at this important regional financial institution. These goals include ensuring that the ADB is results-oriented—achieving measurable, responsible development outcomes—as well as increasing transparency and accountability in the ADB's operations.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the privilege of appearing before this committee today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you or the members of the committee have.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.
Mr. Debevoise

**STATEMENT OF ELI WHITNEY DEBEVOISE II, NOMINEE TO BE
U.S. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT**

Mr. DEBEVOISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar. I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I do not have a long list of family members to present. Unfortunately, my wife and children couldn't be here, but my wife's family is represented through Spencer Dickerson, who's an in-law of my wife's.

If confirmed to this job, I hope to continue a tradition of public service in my family. My grandfather worked for John McCloy as his chief legal counsel in the American sector of Germany after the war. And my father served as attorney general of the State of Vermont.

I'm honored to have been nominated to serve as U.S. executive director at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. If confirmed, I will have the great privilege and responsibility to represent the United States at the World Bank Group institutions. I look forward to the opportunity to work with Secretary Paulson, the Treasury Department, and other executive branch agencies represented in and working through the Office of the U.S. Executive Director.

The World Bank Group is a global leader in economic development and poverty reduction both through its loans, credits, grants, guarantees, and investment insurance, and through its development knowhow and policy advice. If confirmed, I intend to strive to hold the bank to high standards, and to help the bank develop a strong institutional framework and ethos to make those high standards sustainable.

In my professional life, I have grappled with the challenges of economic development, whether through the lens of sovereign finance, international trade, cross-border lending and investment, debt-reduction operations, infrastructure finance, housing finance, development of domestic capital markets, or investor/state disputes. I've also worked to combat corruption. For my successful global efforts to recover the ill-gotten gains of corruption, I was awarded a Brazilian medal, the Order of Rio Branco.

Finally, I have experience with the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, an important forum for the resolution of investor/state disputes.

If confirmed, I will apply the lessons learned from these experiences at the World Bank institutions.

At a time when United States leadership in multilateral institutions is an important as ever, I look forward to the opportunity to represent the bank's largest shareholder. I also look forward to building a strong working relationship with this committee as I commit my energy and experience to the mission of economic development and poverty reduction in all corners of the globe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Debevoise follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELI WHITNEY DEBEVOISE, II, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I am honored to have been nominated to serve as U.S. Executive Director at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. If confirmed, I will have the great privilege and the responsibility to represent the United States at the World Bank Group institutions. I look forward to the opportunity to work with Secretary Paulson, the Treasury Department, and other executive branch agencies represented in and working through the Office of the U.S. Executive Director.

The World Bank Group is a global leader in economic development and poverty reduction, both through its loans, credits, grants, guarantees, and investment insurance and through its development know-how and policy advice. If confirmed, I intend to strive to hold the Bank to high standards and to help the Bank develop a strong institutional framework and ethos to make those high standards sustainable.

In my professional life I have grappled with the challenges of economic development, whether through the lens of sovereign finance, international trade, cross-border lending and investment, debt-reduction operations, infrastructure finance, housing finance, development of domestic capital markets, or investor-state disputes. I have also worked to combat corruption. For my successful, global efforts to recover the ill-gotten gains of corruption, I was awarded a Brazilian medal, the Order of Rio Branco. Finally, I have experience with the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, an important forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes. If confirmed, I will apply the lessons learned from these experiences at the World Bank institutions.

At a time when United States leadership in multilateral institutions is as important as ever, I look forward to the opportunity to represent the Bank's largest shareholder. I also look forward to building a strong working relationship with this committee as I commit my energy and experience to the mission of economic development and poverty reduction in all corners of the globe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer the committee's questions.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, all.

Let me start with Ms. Lundsager. The—there have been questions by some countries, suggesting that the IMF have a few richer countries not being responsive to the concerns or needs of other countries. And there's been some initial changes that the managing director has promoted, and others that have been talked about. The administration has said it would support, on an ad hoc—increases, if there's real reform over the overall governance system.

I would love to hear your sense of where future options for change goes, what steps that you think you would support. And do you think the concerns of the developing countries are being addressed at the IMF?

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, we have been seeking to achieve fundamental reform in the IMF. The first step was taken last fall, in late summer—excuse me—in Singapore, where we agreed to an ad hoc quota increase for four of the most underrepresented countries in the IMF. But part of our commitment in doing that was to achieve further fundamental reform in the governance structure of the IMF. And what we are seeking to do is to change the ownership shares, the structure of the board, and the membership to give the fast-growing emerging markets a larger voice, a larger share of the IMF. Doing this, of course, is not an easy process, because when you negotiate with a group of a hundred-and—over 180 members, and you're seeking to increase the shares of some, naturally there will be some whose shares then, out a hundred, will be going down. This is the difficulties—some of the issues we're facing now, as to

how to structure a system for determining membership shares that would fairly represent countries, represent their role in the global economy—we think it's best represented by a nation's gross domestic product—and to have enough countries agree, because we do need 85 percent of the membership to agree to any change in quotas so that we could have a more reflective board of directors, a more reflective set of membership shares. I think that the United States has received a lot of welcome recognition from the developing world for taking this position. Certainly in Singapore, there was much appreciation from many of the other countries, that we were willing to take the step, because, of course, we had to approve this, given our veto power over quota increases. And so, being an early advocate of this, and being a very constructive participant in these discussions last summer—and they will continue this year, as well, as we try and reach agreement among the membership; I hope, sometime this year or by early next year.

Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you about debt relief. Since 1996, the IMF has been participating in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. There are some—that were heralded as a positive thing. There are critics now raising concern about the success of debt-relief programs. What do you believe are the successes and failures of the program?

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Mr. Chairman, I think the program has been a very big success in a number of the countries that have benefited from it, because it has freed up domestic resources that, instead of paying back the international institutions, or paying back bilateral governments, they have used to devote increasing their domestic spending on a lot of basic human needs: health, education, other very important services for their own citizens.

At the same time, as part of the HIPC initiative, we look to countries to undertake a number of reforms. And I think what has benefited a number of them is the measures they have taken along the way as they've been trying to achieve—get to the completion point and achieve the full measure of the debt relief. They've undertaken a number of domestic reforms, in terms of how they prepare their domestic budget. Countries have to prepare a Poverty Reduction and Strategy Program, where they reach out to the various segments of their population to develop a national strategy that various members of the population agree on, in terms of how they will prioritize domestic spending, how they will allocate domestic resources, as well as the resources provided by the major donors. It's also been a vehicle for helping donors to coordinate better. This has been a difficulty in a number of countries, having donors coordinate. And so, it's—I think it's been an anchor for many of us, and I think we have achieved quite a bit.

At the same time, we're facing the challenge now as countries—we have—as we have greatly reduced the debt in a number of countries—is to try and make sure that they don't build up the debt again. Once the debt has been reduced, they certainly appear to be a good credit risk. And so, in many countries, we've tried, through persuasion and, of course, those countries that are still on IMF programs, to greatly limit, if not totally forego, any kind of commercial debt—debt on commercial terms—and also to be very

careful about even concessional debt they undertake so that we don't end up back in another highly indebted situation where we're then asked to reduce the debt again.

So, this is a very complex effort that we have to work with a lot of the other creditors on, so—and the IMF and the World Bank have worked closely together in coming up with an agreed debt sustainability analysis strategy so that countries can more effectively say to other creditors, “No, we can't undertake that project with that kind of financing. Can you please reconsider and make it concessional financing or grant financing?”

So, this is the challenge, going ahead, is making sure that the benefits we've reaped in the HIPC initiative are not lost and countries build up debt again.

Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Debevoise, if you are confirmed, the sole voting position, as I understand it, for the United States at the World Bank, so it's obviously rather important. And this always happens when people who come from the private sector, you know, are asked to perform public service. There are some challenges in that process. I understand that you have performed legal services for many foreign countries and entities. And I also understand you pledge to try to take actions to make sure that all of the ethical and legal processes are cleared in that process. Have you considered how—certainly, as being the only voting member, how you're going to avoid the perceptions of personal biases towards countries which you have a longstanding relationship with? Let's say, Brazil, as an example. Have you given that thought, as you move forward?

Mr. DEBEVOISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yes, I have certainly given that considerable thought. And I think it's important that the nature of the financing work I've been doing for some countries is understood. It basically consists of writing rather detailed descriptions of their economies in disclosure documents that are publicly filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. But, yes, I'm going to abide by all of the requirements. And there is a procedure in place for an alternate to vote the shares of the United States in those few cases where I may still be subject to a restriction.

Senator MENENDEZ. A lot of people may not know that the bank has actually worked somewhat in Iraq. I don't know if you've been briefed on it, but I was wondering about some of the reconstruction projects that the bank has undertaken in Iraq. There's been some criticism about it as being too slow, the bank should be doing more. I was wondering if you had a view of that, if you've had an opportunity to formulate a view on that.

Mr. DEBEVOISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Obviously, that is a critical country, which has many economic development needs. And, if confirmed, I look forward to looking further into what the bank is doing there. My current understanding is that the bank manages a trust fund, which was established to receive funds from donors, and that it is involved in managing those resources, as, in fact, the bank does in many other post-conflict situations.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chin, I have questions for you, but I'm going to yield to Senator Lugar first, and I'll come back afterwards.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lundsager, my understanding is that the IMF currently is running at a loss. What should the IMF do to improve its revenues or reduce its costs? Why does it matter? What is the nature of the IMF with regard to profit or loss or cash flow? Can you describe the current predicament?

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Thank you. Yes, I can, Senator.

The IMF is in a situation where you might say it's a victim of its own success, where, because so many countries that were borrowing from the fund previously, and, therefore, paying us interest, that enabled us to earn the income we needed to pay our administrative expenses to cover our budget. Well, since many countries have greatly improved their debt situations, have been able to re-access capital markets for years now, and turn to more domestic forms of debt, they have paid back the fund. And some of them have paid back early. So, we have very low levels of credit outstanding right now; and, therefore, the income we're taking in from loans is less than our administrative expenses, this current fiscal year. So, we are running at a loss, this fiscal year, a small loss. And, as a result, we are going to be drawing on our reserves.

Now, during the past several years, while the IMF was lending, it built up reserves, retained earnings of \$10 billion. So, we're in a very comfortable position to cover any losses, for the time being, the next or two, while we sort out what the situation is. Will these countries maintain the good policies that have enabled them to avoid borrowing from the fund, or will they come back to the fund in the future? We don't know yet, so we'll have to see how that turns out.

And then, at the same time, we're undertaking a very important effort, a number of the members of the fund, to try and contain the expenditure side. And the managing director has been running a very tight budget. I expect, in the next few years, it'll have to be even tighter so that administrative expenses, the increase, is kept at a very low level. As a matter of fact, they're going to—there's going to be a bit of a real contraction at the fund over the next couple of years. But, for the time being, due to a very high reserves, it won't be a problem, and then we'll have the time to sort out, over the longer term, what the right solution is.

Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. Well, it's an extraordinary situation that most observers had not predicted. For example, the Russians have made extraordinary payments to the IMF, and are very proud of that fact, that revenues from energy resources have changed the whole complexion of that. It is fascinating that because all of this money was paid back unexpectedly, suddenly the revenues you had anticipated from the interest are gone, and your—

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Exactly.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Portfolio has been reshuffled drastically. I appreciate your response regarding the availability of reserves.

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Right.

Senator LUGAR. Let me ask you, Mr. Chin. This committee, as perhaps you know, in discussing the Asian Development Bank, has

cited specific cases in which we believe there had been substantial corruption. Witnesses have traced the situation in which monies would have gone to projects, but, in fact, the road didn't get built or the river was not dredged or whatever. How do you plan to keep a sharp eye out on this? Has the situation materially changed, in your judgment? And, if not, how can leadership from the United States, through your person, make a difference?

Mr. CHIN. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for that question.

Indeed, corruption and fighting corruption are critical issues that we're going to have to continue the push forward. You know, if confirmed, that's clearly an issue that I'm going to keep focused on. You know, today I've been briefed by some of the people at Treasury, as well as the previous positions in the role that, if confirmed, I would take up, including Ambassador Speltz, who clearly spoke about some of the issues that he testified before you and the committee on previously. That's clearly a critical issue. It will remain a priority for me, should I be confirmed for this job.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very, very much.

I'm going to yield to you, Mr. Chairman. I know the vote has commenced on the floor, and perhaps you have additional questions.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Chin, I want to pursue the questions that I pursued with Mr. Debevoise, because I just, for the record's purposes, want to make sure we have it clear. You, in your role—as a managing director in your present role, I understand that you have worked in, and are working, on a team that serves Hong Kong among other items promoting Hong Kong's commercial reputation and encouraging foreign investment. I also understand you are currently registered as a foreign agent for Hong Kong as part of that work. And I also understand that contract's going to close at the end of March and that you're taking steps to deal with both the legal and ethical issues that may be involved with that. And I presume you will do all the correct things in that respect.

Now, having said that, how will your past work, promoting the economy and tourism of Hong Kong, be perceived, in your mind, by others in the bank? And how will you manage the relationship with Hong Kong in order to avoid being perceived as having a bias in that context?

Mr. CHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.

Yes, indeed, I am part of a team now, at Burson Marsteller, serving the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, a contract that does end this March—the end of March. I have been in conversations with both the committee members, staff, as well as the ethics officer, and the steps I'll be taking will include recusing myself for a year on all matters related to the Hong Kong Government. Also, as a further step, my alternate, if confirmed, Paul Curry—we've also spoke—and he will be addressing any issues that would come up related to Hong Kong, should they be—come before the board.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you—I'm glad to hear that—let me ask you, with reference to your very significant resume. I'm trying to see the connection between the development field and your resume. And so, why don't you share with the committee some of your insights as to how you believe you'll be able to meet the chal-

lenges of the U.S. director at the Asian Development Bank, because obviously its mission is to use the bank's wherewithal to create development opportunities inside of Asia.

Mr. CHIN. Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If you look at my resume—and I would—just to share a couple of highlights of what I—the skills I think I will bring, if confirmed to the post, will include a very good understanding of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the management skills that are very important, particularly in pushing our U.S. policy objectives with regards to good governance, anticorruption efforts. Some of the specific efforts I've been involved with in my present job include work, in terms of rollout of codes of conduct, corporate governance issues, and particularly leading our efforts in the area of corporate responsibility, exploring that nexus of public-sector and private-sector goals and needs, and where do they come together. This work has ranged from development issues in Asia to development issues based here in the United States, dealing with Asian issues.

Senator MENENDEZ. And I have one last question for you. In your written statement, you mention the firsthand challenges posed by the tremendous poverty that continues to persist in the region. In your mind, as you move to this position, what's the greatest challenge to addressing the poverty plaguing many of the people leaving—living in Asia and the Pacific? And how do you see the role of the bank coming into play in meeting that challenge?

Mr. CHIN. Clearly, Mr. Chairman, any dollar that, because of corruption, does not go to help address some of these development issues, is a dollar wasted, a dollar lost. And I think the—a key role of the exec director, if I were confirmed for that post, is really to drive that issue. Where is the money going? And is the ADB being accountable to where that money goes? Really, I think that will be my—one of my key focuses, if I were confirmed as this position.

Senator MENENDEZ. So you see that as one of the major challenges for development taking place in the region?

Mr. CHIN. Absolutely. Absolutely. A dollar wasted, you know, does not get to where we want it to be, in terms of either spurring private-sector investment or ensuring a system in place that will allow for development dollars to go—

Senator MENENDEZ. And after that—

Mr. CHIN [continuing]. Where they need to be.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. What would you say is the next biggest challenge?

Mr. CHIN. One of the challenges also is the issue of cooperation across borders. And one of the things that the United States has been pushing for is greater regional integration initiatives in the region so that, again, that money isn't spent to duplicate issues, whether one institution is funding something and another one could also be funding.

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Lugar, do you have anything else?

Senator LUGAR. No, thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. All right.

Let me thank you, all, for testifying before the committee and, of course, your willingness to serve the country. These are important positions.

The record will remain open for 2 days so that committee members may submit additional questions to this panel of nominees, as well as to the previous panel of nominees. And we would certainly ask, if any member chooses to submit such questions, that the nominees would respond expeditiously to those questions.

Senator MENENDEZ. With that, with no additional comments, the hearing is adjourned. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

RULE OF LAW

Over the past decade, we've seen massive human rights violations across sub-Saharan Africa. With some notable recent exceptions, these crimes have gone uninvestigated—much less prosecuted—leading to a climate of impunity that encourages future abusers.

Question. What can USAID do to strengthen the rule of law in Africa? What type of support are we providing in the justice and rule of law sectors in countries to enhance their capacity to investigate and prosecute crime?

Answer. Rule of law is essential to democracy and representative government. Laws provide the infrastructure that limits the absolute power of the state, ensure equal treatment of all citizens, and guarantee rights, such as freedom of speech, that are essential to the democratic process. For these reasons, USAID focuses on strengthening the rule of law in several key African countries. In Liberia, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, for example, USAID works with local universities and bar associations to expand legal education for judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, as well as supporting mobile courts and legal resource centers to provide citizens with greater access to justice. In South Africa, USAID has facilitated public-private partnerships between key companies and the court system to crack down on white-collar crime. USAID also supports the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights in providing legal protection and counseling for hundreds of victims of torture, violence, and other forms of state-sponsored intimidation by the Mugabe regime.

In addition, USAID collaborates closely with other United States Government agencies to deliver rule of law programs in Africa. Most notably, USAID is implementing components of the Women's Justice and Empowerment Initiative (WJEI), under the leadership of the Department of State and in collaboration with the Department of Justice. The WJEI seeks to raise awareness about gender-based violence, strengthen legal frameworks and judicial systems to enforce women's rights, and provide care and treatment for victims of violence and abuse in four African countries: Benin, Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia. USAID expects to issue competitive solicitations for the awareness raising and victim support components in April. USAID also collaborates with the State Department to combat trafficking in persons in Africa, as well as administer the Democracy and Human Rights Fund, a small grants program that provided financial support to approximately 200 African human rights organizations in fiscal year 2006.

RESPONSES OF JAMES R. KUNDER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. In your current role as Acting Deputy Administrator, what are your major responsibilities?

Answer. The Office of the Administrator sets the policy and management agenda for the U.S. Agency for International Development's economic and humanitarian assistance programs, and ensures successful implementation of the agency's goals. The office is responsible for providing leadership, strategic direction, and management for the agency, which is managing more than \$14 billion in United States foreign assistance programs in Latin America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific region. My specific responsibilities as Acting Deputy Administrator are to assist the administrator in day-to-day management of USAID. In my Acting capacity, I represent the agency at interagency meetings, such as National Security Council meetings on

issues ranging from Sudan, Kosovo, and Afghanistan to avian influenza and PEPFAR. Representing the administrator, I chair the Senior Management Group, which oversees the selection and placement process for Senior Foreign Service officers at USAID. At the direction of the administrator, I convene senior managers to discuss agency priorities and mechanisms to implement these priorities.

Question. What are the most important management concerns facing the agency, and how are you trying to address them?

Answer. The U.S. Agency for International Development must both respond to major reconstruction and humanitarian challenges, like Afghanistan and the Sudan, while maintaining a high priority on sustaining long-term development programs in more stable environments. At the direction of the administrator, I have been engaged in ensuring that program and personnel resources are correctly balanced between these two priorities. USAID is also reorganizing many internal procedures to ensure the agency is structurally aligned to meet the new foreign aid priorities established by the administrator in his role as Director of Foreign Assistance. In this regard, I have been working closely with Ambassador Tobias to examine, in consultation with the Congress, the optimal structures for human resources, budgeting, and office structure overseas. Finally, it is likely that USAID will continue to be called upon to manage humanitarian, reconstruction, and stabilization activities in conflict countries, and ensure the agency has the staff capacity and skill sets to meet these challenges. I have been working closely with colleagues at the Department of State (including the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization), the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations, on how best to meet the challenges USAID faces in conflict and post-conflict environments.

Question. How would you rate morale at the agency? If you consider that it is not good, what measures are being taken to improve morale?

Answer. After 20 years of working in the development and reconstruction field, I remain an optimist about America's role in the world, and about the importance of the role assigned to the U.S. Agency for International Development. Most of my USAID colleagues feel the same way. According to the 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey, 88.8 percent of USAID respondents believe the work they do is important, and 83.3 percent like their work. There is, however, a certain level of anxiety among agency employees at this time, related to the many changes the agency is experiencing in the context of ongoing foreign assistance reforms. One of my first areas of emphasis since being appointed Acting Deputy Administrator has been, at the administrator's direction, to focus on human resources (HR) reform. Upgrading USAID's major HR systems is a priority, both to improve morale and to build the agency to better meet the challenges of the 21st century. In addition to institutional reforms, I have been focused on better communicating to USAID personnel, both in Washington and overseas, information on the current reform process, and its impact on planning, designing, budgeting, and monitoring foreign assistance programs.

Question. What are your strengths and weaknesses as a manager? What steps are you taking to improve areas where you consider that you have weaknesses?

Answer. In terms of strengths, I would bring, if confirmed, nearly 20 years of development and international crisis management to this position. Eleven of these years are with USAID, 3 years with an international nongovernmental organization, and 3 years as a consultant to international organizations. This diverse experience provides useful perspectives on the problems I am likely to encounter. In addition, my service as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps provides useful background for the frequent contact USAID encounters with U.S. military forces. Among my management strengths, I care deeply about USAID's mission as part of the U.S. foreign policy process, and about USAID's staff, many of whom work in most trying circumstances. In terms of weaknesses, I need to understand more thoroughly the financial accountability systems in place at USAID, to ensure the taxpayers' dollars are being carefully programmed and accounted for. I have been working diligently to understand these systems in more detail and, if confirmed, plan to devote additional effort to mastering these systems. In addition, although I believe I appropriately delegate responsibilities, I need to ensure I provide clearly documented work objectives to subordinate managers. If confirmed, I plan to invest additional time in utilizing USAID's annual evaluation form system to ensure work objectives for those I manage are clear, achievable, and measurable.

Question. In the past decade, the agency has become more reliant on contractors and had fewer direct hires. Is this a positive development, in your judgment? What

measures is the agency taking to ensure that contractors are fulfilling administration and congressional policy objectives?

Answer. As noted in the question, USAID has limited direct hire resources. In the early 1960s and 1970s USAID's budget and staffing were aligned to allow the direct hire workforce to actually implement programs in developing countries. More recently, realignment of U.S. Government budget and program priorities has led to a reduction in our direct hire workforce implementing programs, and the increased use of contracts, grants, and American Personal Services Contractors. USAID aims to strike a balance between limited resources and required expertise with our mix of direct hires and contract staff. Our contractors provide cutting edge technical knowledge and surge capacity to address increasingly complex and urgent problems in increasingly dangerous areas. Our direct hire workforce continues to be responsible for inherently governmental duties, such as policy making and spending decisions.

USAID follows broader Federal procedures on rule-making and policy development that assure transparency and consultation with the public. Policy is promulgated to our workforce through general notices and training, reinforced with vigilance from general counsel, contracting officers, controllers, and our technical and program staff. Contractor compliance is assured by the monitoring of contractor performance and compliance. We also follow up and assess through an Evaluations Division in our Office of Acquisition and Assistance. Our ombudsman is available to contractors and grantees to respond to their concerns. As a final check, auditors review costs incurred and compliance as part of an annual review and through the close-out process.

In implementing OMB Circular A-76, USAID is examining whether specific outsourcing arrangements continue to effectively and efficiently serve our implementation needs. The administrator has recently required a review of Washington-based institutional contracts and is requiring implementation of efficiency measures as these contracts come up for renewal.

Question. What do you believe is the role of labor programming in advancing the promotion of democracy?

Answer. Labor programming can promote democracy in the following ways:

- By building the capacity of civil society organizations such as labor rights groups, legal advocacy networks, trade unions, and labor nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to promote and monitor core labor standards, which strengthen the rule of law and access to justice.
- By strengthening the capacity of government institutions such as labor ministries and inspectorates, and labor courts to promote and monitor core labor standards and adjudicate labor grievances, which contributes to good governance and the rule of law.
- By strengthening the capacity of democratic, independent labor unions and organizations for policy analysis, advocacy, organizing, coalition-building, internal democratic governance, and membership representation and services; and improving organizational and financial capacity to ensure sustainability of these capacities.
- By supporting the mobilization and organizational activities of trade unions to empower people to take their own decisions, ensuring that the voice of the working poor is heard when decisions which affect their lives are made, and empowering workers to be active citizens with rights, expectations, and responsibilities.
- By strengthening the democratic culture of labor unions to act as incubators of democratic values, practices, and behaviors, including tolerance, inclusion, electing and holding accountable union leaders, demanding and exercising voice in policy, and other decisions which affect the membership.
- By supporting free and fair elections and political processes through workers' awareness and voter turnout campaigns, disseminating information, education, and promoting public debate, especially among women and other disenfranchised groups; participating in observation, monitoring, and external oversight of elections and other political processes; communicating with, contacting, and interacting with political parties toward gaining their endorsement of workers' interests.
- By supporting the interaction of democratically elected trade union leaders with national and local government officials in representative and participative processes (especially tripartite processes) designed to effectively identify and respond to workers' preferences for government services and policy positions.

Question. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2008 shifts funds from the DA account to the ESF account, and also shifts alternative development funding in the Andean region from the ACI account to the ESF account. What is the rationale for this shift? What will be the effect of the Nethercutt amendment related to the International Criminal Court, if it is enacted as part of the fiscal year 2008 appropriations act?

Answer. In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, we sought to maximize the use of account authorities and establish clear priorities in support of effective implementation of foreign assistance programs. We, therefore, matched accounts with country circumstances and the priorities the county categories are designed to address.

This means that, overall, funding for Development Assistance (DA), which has traditionally supported poor countries that demonstrate performance or a commitment to development, has been prioritized to Developing and Transforming countries. Economic Support Funds (ESF), which focus primarily on providing economic support under special economic, political, or security conditions, has been prioritized to support activities in the Rebuilding and Restrictive Country Categories.

The intent in shifting funds from DA to ESF is to draw cleaner lines around their use, as identified by country characteristics. These cleaner lines allow us to justify to Congress why we have requested amounts for each account. The shift is in no way reflective of a reduced prioritization of development activities. To the contrary, total funding in the three objectives supporting long-term development increased by approximately \$100 million from fiscal year 2006 levels in the fiscal year 2008 budget request.

In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, we have allocated \$192.5 million in ESF for Alternative Development, which was previously funded with the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) account. This shift provides a clearer distinction between the uses of funds for "hard side" (ACI-funded) and "soft side" (ESF-funded) activities in support of our counternarcotics objectives in the Andes.

If the Nethercutt amendment appears in the fiscal year 2008 appropriations act, we will carefully examine programs that might be affected and we will make recommendations to the President to waive this prohibition where necessary. In accordance with this provision, we will notify Congress of the exercise of any waiver authority.

Question. What is your view on the importance of competition in contracting? Please provide information on the percentage of contracts that were subject to full and open competition in fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006.

Answer. Full and open competition is the standard for USAID contracting. Competition ensures that USAID programs benefit from the best products and services offered at competitive market prices. On occasion, the standard of full and open competition cannot be met due to the urgent nature of the technical program requirement. However, in all such cases, USAID requires justification for the level of competition used, most frequently accompanied by review and approval by higher management in accordance with law and regulation.

The percentage of contracts, expressed in percent of total dollars, subject to full and open competition in fiscal year 2004 was 93 percent, and in fiscal year 2005, 94 percent. We are still gathering data on figures for fiscal year 2006.

RESPONSES OF KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REFORM

There has been considerable effort to positively transform the foreign assistance budget process in the last year. This effort, spearheaded by Ambassador Randall Tobias—the administrator for the Agency for International Development as well as the Director of Foreign Assistance—is intended to ensure the experience and assessments of our embassy staff in the field is effectively incorporated in the budget development cycle. Given that this is a new and ongoing reform process:

Question. What has been your experience with the transformation and reform effort from the field? How might it be improved?

Answer. Senator Lugar, as Sudan Mission Director during these early stages of the reform process, I have already witnessed better policy coherence and budget integration as a result of the foreign assistance reform effort.

United States Charge d'Affaires in Sudan, Cameron Hume, appointed me as the overall coordinator of the fiscal year 2007 Sudan Operational Plan. In that capacity, I managed the integration of most State and USAID resources into one plan—in-

formed by one set of priorities—that the Embassy Khartoum country team shaped in detail and ultimately the Charge and I both approved. The process helped to identify what United States Government assistance is doing in Sudan (the vast majority of which is programmed by USAID or State). We have already seen further efficiencies in program management and more strategic targeting of assistance around the overall objectives of consolidating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and stabilizing Darfur.

This is the first time both Washington and the field have gone through this operational planning exercise, and there is still room for improvement. In my experience, the foreign assistance reforms provide Washington an opportunity to shape country strategies and put in place country programs that better promote our foreign policy and foreign assistance goals and objectives. At the same time the country teams at Post have a greater voice in determining what assistance is given, whether Washington- or field-managed, and to what end. In the case of Sudan, and I believe many other countries in Africa, this first round of fiscal year 2007 planning brought the country teams in Washington and the field closer together in understanding the issues and priorities for United States Government assistance. I believe the process can be refined and expanded to ensure that our assistance is targeted, but still responsive to locally identified priorities and realities.

Question. How do you expect this reform to affect United States development initiatives in Africa over time?

Answer. I fully expect that the reforms we are undertaking will increase the effectiveness of our investments. We are already seeing a greater focus on strategic priorities, a more rational way of allocating resources toward those priorities, and a more comprehensive and comprehensible system for tracking and reporting results.

Because the new integrated budget planning model is based on the totality of USAID and State Department resources, it allows us to be more strategic and targeted in our assistance decisions. For example, I believe that the reform further enhances our ability to focus our resources on key rebuilding countries, like Sudan, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which are emerging from long periods of conflict, and key regional anchor states like Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria.

We must tailor development programs to the unique needs of each recipient country in reaching the transformational diplomacy goal. This focus on country circumstances is important as we implement programs around the continent. As I discussed in my testimony, I believe that Africans must bear the ultimate responsibility for “solving” the problems of Africa. I am, therefore, encouraged by the focus on individual country progress. The ultimate goal of transformational diplomacy is to support recipient country efforts to move from a relationship defined by dependence on traditional foreign assistance to one defined by full sustaining partnership status. To achieve that goal under the new Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance, resources were allocated to the areas that would best support individual country progress. The result was a country-driven allocation for the fiscal year 2008 budget. Africa is not homogenous, and I greatly look forward to working in partnership with other donors and African nations as we move forward with our development programs.

Question. How has USAID mobilized to ensure this reform effectively addresses recognized weaknesses in the coordination and cooperation of U.S. Government agencies in the implementation of our foreign assistance?

Answer. Under the leadership of the Director of Foreign Assistance, we have developed an integrated budget and operational planning system that brings all USAID and State Department players together to program resources and plan and coordinate our implementation efforts.

In most cases, I believe that ambassadors turned to USAID mission directors for guidance and advice in planning and implementing assistance. In the field, mission directors were recognized as the experts and were given an opportunity to shape our strategic plans in each country.

To improve coherence across all U.S. Government foreign assistance, the fiscal year 2008 budget submission was formulated in consultation with the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Office of Global Aids Coordinator. We took their estimated fiscal year 2008 disbursements into account in our country levels to ensure that our activities complement theirs.

With respect to the rest of the U.S. Government, Ambassador Tobias has been working with the Department of Defense (DoD) to improve communications and coordination. In addition, our field missions have just finished writing their fiscal year 2007 operational plans, which describe how they will spend their fiscal year 2007

funding and the results they expect to receive. Posts have been requested to account for all U.S. Government resources in-country in these plans, which gives us the first-ever comprehensive look at U.S. Government programs in a given country. In Washington, as the operational plans are undergoing reviews, DoD is participating on a case-by-case basis.

As the reform solidifies, it is my hope that the interagency coordination will increasingly focus on our common goal, using a common framework and common definitions.

AFRICOM

Question. The Department of Defense has directed that their agency begin to develop a new regional command called AFRICOM. Although its ultimate home is yet to be determined, the makeup of this command is mooted to be more innovative—to include expertise from other non-DoD agencies.

What coordination has occurred between USAID and DoD/LTSAID and State on the development of AFRICOM? What is planned?

Answer. The Department of Defense invited USAID to participate in the planning for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in November 2006. I understand that within several days, the agency dedicated several staff to work with the AFRICOM Implementation Planning Team in Washington, DC. At present, we have several staff working on the AFRICOM Transition Team in Stuttgart, Germany, and we have additional staff providing “reach back” support from Washington. The Department of Defense has been very supportive of USAID participation. I believe that our staff has been able to effectively represent development issues and objectives in Africa.

This process builds on ongoing cooperation with DoD in the areas of humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and security sector reform.

Question. How might the establishment of an AFRICOM facilitate or hamper your assistance efforts in African countries?

Answer. As the principal United States agency extending assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms, USAID recognizes that AFRICOM can play a supporting role for foreign assistance objectives in Africa. We also recognize that the establishment of such a command and USAID engagement is consistent with the U.S. National Security Strategy (March 2006), which clearly reiterates that, “Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.”

In particular, it is our understanding that an established AFRICOM will include interagency civilian positions of substance and responsibility to ensure future coordination and collaboration. Although the planning is still in the early stages, our staff is working closely with our colleagues in the Department of Defense and Department of State to ensure that the eventual command has an efficient integrating mechanism for interagency staff. An effective organizational structure and full-time opportunities for USAID staff can provide an opportunity to enhance coordination in Africa; increase overall coherence; leverage resources for greater impact; improve communication; and share best practices. For example, when fully capable, AFRICOM will provide an ideal platform, when needed, for USAID regional disaster officers to coordinate military support to humanitarian crises on the continent resulting in a more rapid and focused U.S. Government response.

If confirmed, I will work closely with AFRICOM to ensure that our activities are coordinated as we all work together toward the goal of transformational diplomacy in Africa.

RESPONSES OF JAMES KUNDER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN REGIONS

Question. Given the limited development on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, what United States development and humanitarian assistance is targeted at the border regions including the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan?

Answer. The United States has developed an integrated strategy for the development of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

The U.S. mission in Islamabad believes very strongly that all new development assistance focused on FATA should be consolidated as part of the “peace and security” objective within the current operational plan. However, despite the close co-

ordinating with the GOP on the current program, USAID has been careful not to lay down an overly prescriptive set of requirements, as these would adversely affect our broader strategic aims. The GOP is central to the success of these initiatives. The attached fact sheet gives an overview of current activities in the FATA.

[NOTE. The information referred to appears at the end of this set of questions and answers.]

In addition to these activities, USAID believes an additional amount of \$150 million a year will be available for the next 5 years—pending Congressional approval. If so, the following interventions in the FATA, with the exception of item four, will represent major expansions of our current development activities in that region. The capacity building of the FATA Development Authority and FATA Secretariat would be new activities to facilitate more efficient and transparent provision of services to the FATA by the GOP.

- Education.—Increasing scholarships and expanding the school construction program.
- Health.—Expansion of current maternal and child health interventions and HIV/AIDS as appropriate.
- Economic Growth.—Expansion of the current micro-credit programs and small-scale economic activities such as horticulture or jewelry manufacture.
- Capacity Building of the FATA Development Authority and FATA Secretariat.

Question. Does it make sense to consolidate United States assistance in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas to more realistically address cross-border infrastructure requirements such as roads, and greater area development in what is a very ethnically homogenous zone?

Answer. Although the border region is ethnically Pashtun, there are a number of fissures within this group—based along tribal and clan loyalties, as well as regional perspectives. Even the language spoken on both sides of the border is different—Pakistani Pashto shows a strong Urdu influence, while Afghan Pashto incorporates that country's lingua franca, Dari. The language also has two major dialects—eastern and southern variants. Thus, what may appear to be a homogenous group of people is often subtly or very obviously fractured. Although there are people who have relations or connections on both sides of the border, one cannot assume that this is true for the majority of the population.

Political considerations—especially the strained relationships between the countries—are also a factor in mounting effective cross-border programs. Differing customs and regulatory laws as well as competing national agendas may preclude undertaking certain economic activities.

Despite these social and cultural challenges, USAID, in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, is maximizing the effect of its development programs by implementing, on each side of the border, activities in education, health, economic growth, and capacity building. The practical effect is that these programs complement each other.

Based on lessons learned over the last several years about implementing development programs in the region, USAID is working to maximize the effect of the U.S. Government effort in the current circumstances, and we are anticipating that this approach will help to pave the way for consolidation of the region's development effort. This is our goal.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REFORM

Question. What has been your experience with the transformation and reform effort from Washington? How might it be improved?

Answer. In my time as assistant administrator (AA) for the Asia and Near East Bureau (ANE), and then as acting deputy administrator, I have observed increased policy coherence, budget integration, and an elevated seat for development at the policy table. For the first time under the reforms initiated by Ambassador Tobias, State, and USAID officials sat at the same table to plan each stage of the fiscal year 2008 budget. Input was sought at both the staff and senior management levels. Secretary Rice herself ran the final reviews of the budget by region. In my previous experience in leadership roles at USAID, the level of involvement of USAID staff and leadership has never been as integrated as it was in setting the fiscal year 2008 budget request.

As one would expect, the first time around in any process has kinks and areas that can be improved. A thorough “after-action review” is currently underway to assess areas where the process may be improved for fiscal year 2009. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Ambassador Tobias and members of the committee to improve the process.

Question. How do you expect this reform to affect U.S. development initiatives in general around the world and over the long-term?

Answer. One of the primary goals of the reform is to focus on country progress. It is my hope that, in the future, U.S. development initiatives will be more grounded in country need, expected results, and sustainability. One of the ways we are working to achieve this is through the development of the Foreign Assistance Framework, the standard program structure and definitions, and the common indicators. These tools will allow us to track consistently across USAID and State the outputs of our foreign assistance efforts. Our ability to provide details about who is spending U.S. Government funds, what they are spending it on, and what results we expect to achieve will allow me, if confirmed, to have greater oversight of our programs around the world and to measure what is working, what isn't, and the opportunity costs of shifting funds among programs.

Our end goal is to work ourselves out of a job. As Ambassador Tobias often says, "It is about them, not about us."

Question. How has USAID mobilized to ensure this reform effectively addresses recognized weaknesses in the coordination and cooperation of U.S. Government agencies in the implementation of our foreign assistance?

Answer. Interagency cooperation is essential to the success of implementing foreign assistance. Certainly, we have come a long way in the past couple of years. Under Ambassador Tobias' leadership, the fiscal year 2008 budget request was developed as an integrated process (both USAID and the Department of State) and in consultation with the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

One of the primary tools we are using to improve coordination and ensure accountability under the reform is the operational plan. Our field missions have just finished writing their fiscal year 2007 operational plans, which describe how they will spend their fiscal year 2007 funding and the results they expect to receive. Missions have been requested to account for all U.S. Government resources programmed by all U.S. Government agencies in-country in these plans, which gives us the first-ever comprehensive look at U.S. Government programs in a given country. MCC is also participating in the reviews where they have key programs, with the intent of assuring linkages.

USAID has an Office of Military Affairs, created to liaise with the Department of Defense (DoD). As an agency, we are trying to ensure that, despite many organizational and cultural differences, we are able to communicate effectively and coordinate with our colleagues at DoD. Additionally, Ambassador Tobias has been working with DoD very closely on a number of issues at a high level.

One recent development that I believe will greatly enhance the coordination among U.S. Government agencies is the strategic alignment of S/CRS and the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA). The alignment of S/CRS and DFA is an opportunity to streamline roles, reduce duplication, and strengthen the mandate of S/CRS. By combining the S/CRS coordinator's reconstruction and stabilization planning and operational mandate with the funding authorities of the DFA, he will better ensure that activities and programs are appropriate and coherent.

Question. How will this process affect the ability of Congress to conduct its oversight of foreign assistance, particularly that assistance administered by USAID?

Answer. Under the leadership of Ambassador Tobias, we have developed one standard "development dictionary" that links activities to Secretary Rice's goal of transformational diplomacy. Common indicators have been developed for each of the programs defined and these indicators track, for the first time, consistently across USAID and State the outputs of our foreign assistance funds.

The definitions and indicators are captured in one system that tracks funding, programs, and indicators that will be able to tell us who the implementing partner(s) are, what program is being implemented, and what result USAID expects.

It is my hope, and that of Ambassador Tobias, that these new systems and new transparency of information will allow the Congress to more easily perform its oversight role.

Question. How is the fiscal year 2008 budget different from previous foreign assistance budgets because of the new strategic framework utilized by the Office of the Director of Foreign assistance? How do you think these changes will improve our ability to meet our foreign assistance goals?

Answer. The fiscal year 2008 request reflects a different approach to building the budget from previous years' methods. Most notably, for the first time ever, the \$20.3 billion of U.S. foreign assistance under the authority of State and USAID were integrated into one joint budget submission. This year, USAID delivered its complete

justification to the Hill just one week after the President released the budget. There are six principles that governed the prioritization of the fiscal year 2008 budget request.

We integrated planning based on the totality of U.S. Government resources

Over 100 interagency teams, organized by country, were tasked with ensuring that all State and USAID resources were coordinated, mutually supportive, and targeted to the achievement of shared objectives. Every member of each team had a clearly laid out goal: To allocate funds to programs that would best advance the transformational diplomacy goal—to help build and sustain well-governed states that meet the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.

The teams looked at the totality of resources available to a country's budget and made determinations about appropriate and fiscally responsible use of funds to support priorities. Investments from the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Account were taken into account when allocating resources.

We focused on country progress

The ultimate goal of transformational diplomacy is to support recipient country efforts to move from a relationship defined by dependence on traditional foreign assistance to one defined by full, sustaining partnership status.

In past budget years, much of the budget was built not by country, but by sector. Therefore, what drove many country programs wasn't the specific country need as much as a set global amount for a sector that needed to be met. This year, the country teams were given an overall target number for each country, rather than by account or sector.

These teams had at their disposal data on the status of country progress against independent indicators assessing poverty, human capacity, life expectancy, governance, and barriers to economic growth. They had the new strategic framework for U.S. foreign assistance, which outlines interventions according to countries' common development situations. They were asked to allocate funds for objectives and programs that would best advance individual country progress. The result was a country-driven allocation for the fiscal year 2008 budget.

We invested in states critical to long-term regional stability and prosperity

In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, 51 percent of Department of State and USAID program assistance resources are concentrated in rebuilding and developing countries. These are the countries that are farthest away from sustaining partnership status as measured by instability, poverty, human capacity, life expectancy, governance, and barriers to economic growth. These states can be either critical barriers to regional stability and success in the global war on terror or states that, with continuing progress, can serve as anchors for regional stability and prosperity. We need to work with these governments to help them strengthen their institutions to make their progress permanent.

We focused on demand-driven interventions that are critical levers for sustainable progress and transformation

Funding is increased to programs targeted to improving governance and democratic participation, programs mitigating diseases that threaten the human and economic capacity of countries to progress on their own, programs that expand access to and improve the quality of education, and programs that enhance economic opportunity and the skills needed to participate in the global economy. The request is the result of a demand-driven process that asked experts to prioritize limited resources on the basis of the most significant levers that will help countries progress—and to focus our resources so we can achieve real impact. When we can focus our resources, we enhance the ability of a country to gain enough strength and stability in one area to sustain further progress on its own.

We allocated funds intended for country programs to country-level budgets

To empower our mission directors and ambassadors to design and implement programs that would have an effective and sustainable impact, the reform process maximized resources implemented at the country level into country-level budgets. Resources within global or regional budgets that had been planned for specific countries were accordingly shifted to those countries' budgets and planned together with other country-based support.

Recognizing that not all foreign assistance is most effectively implemented on a country basis, and that issues that transcend a single country's borders are best addressed as part of a global or regional strategy, significant funds remain in regional

and global accounts, but, across State and USAID, these accounts see an average 35 percent decrease from this process.

We matched accounts with country circumstances and the priorities the country categories are designed to address

In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, we sought to maximize the use of account authorities and establish clear priorities in support of effective implementation of foreign assistance programs.

This means that, overall, funding for development assistance, which has traditionally supported poor countries that demonstrate performance or a commitment to development, has been prioritized to developing and transforming countries. Economic Support Funds (ESF), which focus primarily on providing economic support under special economic, political, or security conditions, have been prioritized to support activities in the rebuilding and restrictive country categories.

The intent in shifting funds from DA to ESF is to draw cleaner lines around their use, as identified by country characteristics. These cleaner lines allow us to justify to you why we have requested amounts for each account. The shift is in no way reflective of a reduced prioritization of development activities. To the contrary, total funding in the three objectives supporting long-term development increased by approximately \$100 million from fiscal year 2006 levels in the fiscal year 2008 budget.

In summary, the fiscal year 2008 budget request reflects a more integrated, systematized approach to the budget than that developed in previous years. I believe that the result will significantly enhance our ability to both identify and meet foreign assistance goals.

Question. Although the Director of Foreign Assistance has authority over all State Department and USAID aid programs, some programs, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), remain outside the scope of the Director's responsibility. How does USAID coordinate its efforts with those of the MCC? To what extent will USAID country objectives and projects change in MCC compact countries? How have they changed in the past?

Answer. In the fiscal year 2008 budgeting process, State and USAID country teams took into account projected fiscal year 2008 MCC Compact disbursements when considering the totality of individual country budgets and to make determinations about appropriate and fiscally responsible use of funds to advance the transformational diplomacy goal.

In countries with MCC Compacts, USAID resources have been reprioritized to ensure complementary programs with the MCC Compact and amplify results. The process is specific to each country. For example, in Honduras, funds for economic growth activities have increased, particularly in trade, investment, and private sector competitiveness in order to complement the MCC program. In Ghana, funds have been shifted to enhance the capacity of local government responsible for implementing MCC compact programs.

In countries that qualify for the MCC Threshold Program, USAID plays the leading role in the design and implementation of programs approved by the MCC Board of Directors, in close coordination with MCC. USAID and MCC work very closely and collegially throughout this process and are currently implementing 11 Threshold Country Programs together.

Question. I am concerned about the decline in funding for development-oriented food aid under Public Law 480 title II, and about our priorities for food assistance overall. How will the new strategic framework implemented by the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance affect our food assistance programs?

Answer. Due to the unpredictable, but large number of major emergencies, we have not always been able to fund fully ongoing Public Law 480 title II non-emergency programs. However, in fiscal year 2006 we increased funding for Public Law 480 title II nonemergency programs. The new foreign assistance framework will help achieve these goals by bringing U.S. foreign assistance resources together in a strategic and integrated fashion at the country level, thereby helping to better integrate Public Law 480 title II with other U.S. foreign aid funding sources, allowing for more effective and multisectoral interventions that address the overlapping themes of poverty and hunger and the underlying factors that cause them. The broader set of development programs can thus be more comprehensive in scope and complementary in nature, with food aid serving as only one tool of many working together to address the chronic causes of poverty and hunger in the most food-insecure countries.

WOMEN'S JUSTICE AND EMPOWERMENT INITIATIVE

Question. In 2005, President Bush announced the launch of the Women's Justice and Empowerment Initiative, which would set aside \$55 million over 3 years to fight violence against women in four African countries. What is the status of this initiative? How much money has either been obligated or expended for this program?

Answer. The Women's Justice and Empowerment Initiative (WJEI) is overseen by the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs (AF) with support from the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), and implemented by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and USAID. For the first year's implementation, \$21.9 million has been identified from prior year reprogrammed funds. USAID and the DOJ are making progress on solidifying their program designs and strategic priorities in the four WJEI countries of Benin, Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia.

INL and DOJ have begun expending WJEI program funds in support of joint assessments to all four WJEI countries. INL is finalizing bilateral letters of agreement with host countries on criminal justice and prosecutorial assistance and training programs developed as a result of these assessments.

USAID expects to issue competitive solicitations for increasing awareness and victim support in April. The \$5.4 million currently available to USAID will be obligated once the competitive solicitation is complete in early summer.

We are confident that all of the program components will soon be in place to meet WJEI program expectations for fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008.

OVERVIEW OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN THE FATA

EDUCATION

School construction and furnishing

USAID is helping increase school enrollment by constructing and furnishing 65 primary, middle, and high schools in five agencies within the FATA. With 21 schools completed, 31 schools are currently under construction in the agencies of Khyber, Bajuar, Kurram, Mohmand, and Orakzai. Construction of 13 remaining schools is scheduled to begin in April 2007. Sanitary and drinking water facilities are added by a grant from the U.S. Department of Defense for \$800,000. The Embassy of Japan has partnered with USAID and is responsible for constructing an additional 65 schools using USAID's design. USAID has provided \$6.5 million to the Pakistani firm, Associates in Development, to construct and furnish these boys and girls schools. (Beginning Date: May 18, 2004–End Date: May 31, 2007)

Scholarships for pre-service teacher education

Forty scholarships are being awarded to females from the FATA to attend a 1-year pre-service teacher education program in Khyber agency. This program is expected to help provide trained teachers for girls' schools located in the FATA. The Research Triangle Institute (RTI) was awarded \$60,000 to administer the 2006/2007 scholarship program. Last academic year, 17 USAID-financed female teachers graduated the 1-year program. (Beginning Date: September 1, 2005–End Date: September 30, 2007)

ECONOMIC GROWTH

Micro-credit

Through Khushalibank (KB), USAID is establishing stand-alone bank branches in all seven agencies within the FATA. To date, two bank branches are operational, one in Khyber agency and one in Kurram agency. KB's expansion into the FATA is a 5-year, \$4 million program that also includes the provision of approximately 80 small infrastructure schemes as community development projects valued at approximately \$2,500 each; higher education opportunities through the provision of 30 scholarships for master's degrees in business and/or management; and, the provision of 50,000 loans valued at approximately \$250 each. (Beginning Date: September 30, 2005–End Date: September 30, 2010)

Competitiveness support

USAID is providing technical support to private sector-led working groups in the marble and granite sector to improve production and increase profits. The program also helps the industry identify and implement workforce development initiatives through Common Training Facility Centers. Khyber and Mohmand agencies are

benefiting from the project which is implemented by the U.S. firm Nathan/J.E. Austin. (Beginning Date: February 8, 2006–End Date: February 6, 2008)

Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs)

An assessment to help inform decision makers on the possible scope and feasibility for future ROZ opportunities in the FATA has been completed. ROZs are proposed to bring investment, employment, and economically viable livelihoods to Pakistan/Afghanistan border areas (FATA, Azad Jammu Kashmir, Balochistan, and North West Frontier Province). ROZs may also provide an incentive for Pakistan to contribute to regional stability while providing a unique opportunity for the two governments to work collaboratively on economic investment.

HEALTH

Child health

USAID is improving the quality and availability of child health services throughout all seven agencies within the FATA by enhancing the knowledge and skills of health care providers as well as strengthening existing facility-based and community-based child health facilities. Additionally, USAID is increasing community knowledge and acceptance of key child health services and behaviors through introducing behavior change and communication strategies. Resource centers at agency headquarter hospitals will be established in the agencies of Mohmand and Khyber beginning in March 2007, with roll out to remaining agencies over the coming months. In September 2006, Save the Children, U.S. was awarded \$11.5 million to implement this 3-year program. (Beginning Date: October 1, 2006–End Date: September 30, 2009)

Water/sanitation

USAID is improving water and sanitation facilities in 190 girls' schools in Khyber and Mohmand agencies. In addition, activities are underway to provide hygiene and sanitation education to community members and parent teacher associations to increase knowledge, attitudes, and practices at the school and household levels. In October 2005, UNICEF was awarded \$400,000 to implement this 2-year program. (Beginning Date: October 1, 2005–End Date: December 31, 2007)

USAID is also partnering with the Government of Pakistan to implement President Musharraf's Clean Drinking Water Initiative in the agencies of Bajaur, Mohmand, and Kurrum. With the government responsible for construction of water treatment plants, USAID will support these efforts through capacity building and training in operations and management of the plants, water resources management, cost-recovery schemes, water quality testing technologies, and the promotion of good hygiene behavior and safe sanitation practices. In October 2006, Abt Associates was awarded \$16.5 million for this nationwide, 3-year program. Implementation within the FATA is anticipated for mid-2007. (Beginning Date: October 1, 2006–End Date: September 30, 2009)

Infectious disease control and prevention

As part of a national polio eradication program, USAID supports both UNICEF and WHO to implement their polio immunization campaigns and surveillance in all seven agencies of the FATA.

RESPONSES OF JAMES R. KUNDER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET REQUEST

Question. In your last hearing, you said that you believed Ambassador Tobias had “a clear cut understanding of both the need to meet immediate U.S. foreign policy challenges, but also long-term development challenges” in the USAID and State restructuring process. Since your hearing, the President has released his budget request for USAID and State and we have seen what the new budget structure actually looks like. Do you believe that the budget adequately addresses the immediate and long-term investments that need to be made to enhance our national security?

Answer. I believe the fiscal year 2008 budget attempts to strike an appropriate balance among development objectives to address immediate and long-term investments to enhance our national security.

As you are aware, the new Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance categorizes each country receiving U.S. foreign assistance based on common traits and places them on a trajectory to measure their development progress against stand-

ardized indicators. The country categories are largely explained by their category name: rebuilding, developing, transforming, sustaining partnership, and restrictive.

In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, 51 percent of Department of State and USAID program assistance resources are concentrated in rebuilding and developing countries. These are the countries that are farthest away from sustaining partnership status, as measured by instability, poverty, human capacity, life expectancy, governance, and barriers to economic growth—all critical barriers to regional stability and success in the global war on terror.

We have seen the risks that “ungoverned spaces” can pose to our national security and to their regional neighbors; we are also very aware of the costs of these “ungoverned spaces” to their own citizens. States like Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are among the poorest in the world. Their citizens are among the least able to access basic needs—including security.

At the same time, to transform the development landscape, we need to focus on developing states such as Nigeria, Ukraine, Georgia, Pakistan, Jordan, and Indonesia—states that are on the cusp of transitioning to economic, political, and social self-sustenance, and that, with continuing progress, can serve as anchors for regional stability and prosperity. We need to work with them to help them strengthen their institutions to make their progress permanent.

Question. How is USAID preserving the humanitarian and poverty alleviation focus of its work while under the new budget and structure?

Answer. The focus of the Secretary’s transformational diplomacy agenda is to concentrate our diplomatic and foreign assistance resources on helping to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. Explicit in the goal is the United States’ commitment to reducing widespread poverty and addressing other barriers to fulfilling human potential, while recognizing the central role that good and responsive governance plays in addressing these concerns sustainably. In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, funding for the three objectives that support long-term development—governing justly and democratically, investing in people, and economic growth—increases by 20 percent over fiscal year 2006 levels, the last year for which we have completed allocations. When humanitarian assistance is added, the collective goals represent 65 percent of the fiscal year 2008 budget, whereas in fiscal year 2006, they represented only 61 percent of the fiscal year 2006 foreign assistance budget. We are doing more than preserving the humanitarian and poverty alleviation focus of our work under the new budget and structure; we are enhancing it.

TOP-DOWN VS. BOTTOM-UP DESIGN

Question. The fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget Justification states that USAID intends to focus on demand-driven interventions, but also lists five strategic priorities to guide U.S. assistance. How will you reconcile the desire to pursue U.S. objectives with a respect for each individual country’s own main concerns?

Answer. Outsiders cannot, with sustainability, secure citizens’ health and safety, educate a critical mass, or create the conditions needed for economic growth—all of which are necessary for development, and all of which are primarily the responsibilities of a nation’s own government. The transformational diplomacy goal’s emphasis on sustainability heightens the necessity of the on-the-ground coordination that is done every day by our embassies and missions with the host government, other donors and local groups. Based on the new country-driven process, we have prioritized resources to the areas that we believe will promote and sustain long-term country progress. In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, funding is increased to programs targeted to improving governance and democratic participation, programs mitigating diseases that threaten the human and economic capacity of countries to progress on their own, programs that expand access to and improve the quality of education, and programs that enhance economic opportunity and the skills needed to participate in the global economy. These resource allocations reflect the wisdom of our interagency teams of country experts.

In areas where there is not agreement between the U.S. foreign assistance goals and the host government priorities, most notably in restrictive countries in democracy programs and media freedom programs, an effort is made to work with local community groups to build host country capacity.

POST-CONFLICT ASSISTANCE

Question. During your nomination hearing in the 109th Congress, you said that we need to strike a balance between State, USAID, and the Department of Defense

in the area of post-conflict work. I would be interested to hear more about what you think that balance looks like. Specifically, what does USAID need to do to remain an equal partner in post-conflict assistance efforts?

Answer. USAID is pleased that development is receiving the emphasis it deserves in the post-conflict arena. This is in recognition of the fundamental role of economic, social, and institutional development in promoting stability and combating conflict, including insurgency. To remain an equal partner, it is critical that USAID participate at all levels of the U.S. Government civilian-military assistance effort from budget formulation and strategy development through operational planning in the field. USAID has a particular perspective on economic and social reconstruction as well as institutional strengthening that we can only leverage if we are at the table where these decisions are made.

AGENCY OVERLAP

Question. The House report of the fiscal year 2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 5522) expressed concern that the Office of Military Assistance's (OMA) responsibilities would "overlap . . . with other components of the United States Government, including the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the Department of State." Please comment about this concern and what you'll do to ensure OMA efforts don't overlap with other offices.

Answer. USAID is part of the overall U.S. Government response that may be coordinated by S/CRS. Per the guidance of the Secretary of State, S/CRS has primary responsibility among the civilian agencies for coordination with the Department of Defense, particularly with regard to larger-scale crisis response. However, USAID has a particular requirement for day-to-day coordination with the DoD in program implementation.

The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) was created to focus on specific tasks: training of USAID personnel in preparation for assignment to conflict areas where there is a significant military presence; adapting USAID policy and guidance to serve the requirements of National Security Presidential Directive-44 spell out; coordinating USAID participation in military exercises and joint training; and facilitating DoD linkages with field missions in program implementation. Each of these tasks is carried out in close coordination with our S/CRS colleagues and the functions of the two offices do not overlap.

OTI

Question. As I've mentioned before in this committee, I am a strong supporter of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). It provides fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs and in my mind delivers a significant value for the small level of resources we give it. I'm concerned that we don't use OTI enough, though, particularly given the nature and number of countries facing transition. What will you do to make sure OTI—and other parts of USAID—can respond to opportunities to facilitate successful transitions to stability around the world?

Answer. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has played a crucial role in the United States Government response to urgent political transitions in countries all over the world, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti.

When it was created in 1994, it was meant to be a small and agile mechanism through which the United States could positively influence transitions in key countries. It has lived up to its mandate, and we are seeing growing utilization of OTI and the creative programming it has developed. In addition to managing the Transition Initiatives account, OTI itself has been asked to manage three times more program dollars, on average, over the past 5 years—from accounts including the Economic Support Fund, Development Assistance, and International Disaster and Famine Assistance, among others. This should be seen as a reflection of substantial reliance on this critical office.

With regard to the larger USAID response to democratic transitions around the world, there has been a united approach to bolster the agency's overall capacity to respond to these new challenges. As part of this effort, OTI created effective programming (we need an example—see below) that the USAID missions have highly valued and adopted into their own portfolios upon OTI's departure. In fiscal year 2006, for example, OTI handed over six programs or mechanisms it had created to USAID missions, allowing the work to continue in post-conflict environments. In Iraq, the OTI program included targeting community improvement work projects in poor neighborhoods that had been fertile grounds for recruitment by insurgents. The program design, which engaged susceptible youth in productive activity and thus re-

duced the likelihood of them participating in violence, was adopted as a general strategy by the mission when OTI left in 2006. In Haiti, OTI programming focused on Port-au-Prince neighborhoods that had experienced high rates of gang-related violence. The OTI activities fostered better community ties among local citizens and with the government, and had a direct impact on reducing local violence and buying time for democracy to take root. The USAID mission adopted the OTI program upon its completion in 2006, and continues community-building activities in order to reduce gang-related violence in vulnerable neighborhoods in and around Port-au-Prince.

RESPONSES OF KATHERINE ALMQUIST TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR AFRICA

Question. While I am pleased that this administration is following through on its promise to substantially increase United States assistance to Africa, I am concerned that nearly all of the almost \$2 billion increase between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2008 is going toward health initiatives, specifically PEPFAR and the President's Malaria Initiative. These additional funds come at the expense of other "investments in people" as you call them—such as education, social and economic services, and protection for vulnerable populations. How will you ensure that United States assistance remains balanced to meet the needs of specific African countries and populations?

Answer. One of the primary goals of the foreign assistance reform is to focus on country progress. We must tailor development programs to the unique needs of each recipient country in reaching the transformational diplomacy goal. The aim of transformational diplomacy is to support recipient country efforts to move from a relationship defined by dependence on traditional foreign assistance to one defined by full sustaining partnership status. To achieve that goal under the new Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance, resources were allocated to the areas that would best support individual country progress. The result was a country-driven allocation for the fiscal year 2008 budget.

In past budget years, much of the budget was built not by country, but by sector. Therefore, what drove many country programs wasn't the specific country need as much as an overall funding level for a sector that had to be met. This year, the country teams were given an overall target number for each country, rather than by account or sector. As you have noted, some programs like the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) have established funding levels designed to achieve specific important public health targets. Most funding, however, was subjected to the new, country-driven allocation process so that the mix of sectors deemed most suitable by those in the field could be identified for programming.

Question. Similarly, health investment in Africa will be unsustainable if it does not include local capacity-building. How will you support the development of national health programs and infrastructure?

Answer. USAID views local capacity building as a critical part of all USAID programs. In the new Foreign Assistance Framework, all health program elements contain sub-elements that focus on the development of national health programs and infrastructure. All USAID missions support capacity building by promoting workforce training, strengthening procurement distribution and management information systems, promoting quality assurance, improving financing and financial management, and strengthening surveillance systems. The PMI, for example, works to strengthen national malaria control programs, within the context of Ministries of Health National Health Plans, and builds capacity for country ownership of malaria control efforts. The PMI will soon launch the Malaria Communities Program to build independent, sustainable malaria-control projects in Africa by providing grants to African Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and faith-based groups to support their malaria-control work. PEPFAR supports similar programs.

INTERAGENCY ROLE

Question. You have expressed a commitment to interagency cooperation to ensure that U.S. assistance is consistent and productive. What do you see as USAID's comparative advantage within this structure and what potential threats do you foresee to USAID's effectiveness in these areas?

Answer. Under the leadership of the Director of Foreign Assistance, we have developed an integrated budget and operational planning system that brings all USAID and State Department players together to program resources and plan and coordinate our implementation efforts.

In most cases in the field, ambassadors turned to USAID mission directors for guidance and advice in planning and implementing assistance. Mission directors were recognized as the development experts and were given an opportunity to shape our assistance plans in each country.

With respect to the rest of the U.S. Government, Ambassador Tobias has been working with the Department of Defense (DoD) to improve communications and coordination. In addition, our field missions have just finished writing their fiscal year 2007 Operational Plans, which describe how they will spend their fiscal year 2007 funding and the results they expect to receive. Posts have been requested to take into consideration all U.S. Government resources in-country in these plans, giving us the first-ever comprehensive look at U.S. Government programs in a given country. In Washington, as the Operational Plans are undergoing reviews, DoD is participating in many Africa reviews, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation is also participating in the reviews where they have key programs, with the intent of assuring linkages.

As mentioned above, I believe USAID's comparative advantage is our experience on the ground as the premier development agency of the U.S. Government. It is imperative that USAID stays on the cutting edge, remains committed to results, and continues to change and develop with world events. If confirmed, I intend to commit the Africa bureau to these goals.

BENEFICIARY CONCENTRATION

Question. Fifty-six percent of the fiscal year 2008 budget request will go to just eight African countries; please explain the reasoning behind this rising concentration of U.S. assistance to a few countries singled out as being "critical to long-term regional stability and prosperity?"

Answer. Senator, as I understand it, the fiscal year 2008 budget request was indeed prioritized to states critical to long-term regional stability and prosperity. In Africa, the budget request reflects a strategic focus on rebuilding states that are emerging from crisis, that present critical barriers to regional stability, and that have strategic importance to the region and to the U.S. Government. After Sudan and Liberia, other key rebuilding states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia were given priority. Additional focus was given to regional anchor states: Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria. These eight countries, as you note, make up 56 percent of the budget request.

I believe that foreign assistance in the past has been too diffuse. With a thousand agendas embedded in our foreign assistance programs, our development impact was often diluted and unfocused. It is important to note that we do a great deal of good with our development portfolio. Someone, some community, always benefits from the services we provide. But that is not the point. The real question is, whether we are achieving sustainable impact. We are attempting to give people what they need to sustain further progress on their own.

Question. Do you expect this trend to continue?

Answer. In consultation with Congress, we've made a strategic decision to focus our resources for maximum impact. I believe it is appropriate for us to channel the greatest proportion of our assistance toward countries that are key U.S. Government priorities, ensuring that we achieve significant results in those key countries.

GOOD GOVERNANCE

Question. In countries where the ruling government is corrupt and/or undemocratic, how do you intend to balance the competing priorities of fulfilling humanitarian needs while encouraging good governance?

Answer. USAID distributes humanitarian assistance to save lives in emergency situations without regard to the political performance of the government of the affected country. Through USAID and its partners, the U.S. Government remains the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Africa. For example, in fiscal year 2006, USAID distributed over \$1.043 billion in emergency food aid to Africa, including more than \$370 million to Sudan. USAID channels most of its humanitarian assistance through reputable international NGOs or through U.N. disaster relief agencies, such as UNICEF and the World Food Program.

Over the longer term, USAID also works to improve governance and promote democratic reforms in many of the same countries that receive humanitarian assist-

ance. Often operating against a backdrop of civil strife, USAID programs have provided support for the development and restoration of civil liberties and human rights by strengthening the role of civil society, political parties, independent media, and other nongovernmental actors to advocate for reform and hold their governments accountable. These goals are compatible with the delivery of humanitarian assistance through NGO or multilateral partners. Humanitarian assistance sometimes creates opportunities for dialog with the host country, and allows the U.S. Government to operate in countries where our good governance activities would not otherwise be welcomed.

SUDAN

Question. After being involved in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, you were tasked with supporting the monitoring and implementation of this accord on behalf of the USAID. While there has been notable progress, many of the most central premises of the agreement remain unfulfilled due to the obstinacy of the National Congress Party. How have you sought to press officials in Khartoum to abide by their commitments under the CPA?

Answer. Although the Department of State has the lead in handling diplomatic initiatives with the Government of Sudan and the National Congress Party (NCP), as the United States Government representative to the Assessment and Evaluation Committee (AEC), I, along with other donor representatives on the committee, have sought to hold the NCP to its commitments under the CPA by engaging in frank discussions with representatives of the government on the committee, and by using the AEC as a means to openly and regularly discuss delays in implementation and other challenges to continued progress in CPA implementation. In addition, the international community has used the annual convening of the Sudan Consortium to take stock of progress on the CPA.

The consortium met last week for the second time, bringing together 38 delegations from the international community and civil society. At the meeting, participants raised concerns over the slow pace of CPA implementation, specifically pointing toward the lack of clarity with respect to the border separating North and Southern Sudan, and the national elections in 2009. Through USAID's assistance program to Southern Sudan, we have sought to strengthen the ability of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to be a viable partner in the CPA and to be an effective advocate for the agreement in its role both as the party of the Government of Southern Sudan and in its power-sharing role with the NCP in the Government of National Unity. While the international community, including the United States, can and will continue to highlight violations, obstructions, and other challenges to the implementation of the CPA, in the long run the most effective force for change will be the Sudanese people themselves. We believe that it is critical to strengthen countervailing forces such as the SPLM, helping them to fulfill their role and bring peace to Sudan.

**NOMINATION OF HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD
TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED
NATIONS, WITH THE RANK AND STATUS OF
AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, AND TO BE REPRESENTA-
TIVE TO THE SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DUR-
ING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS REP-
RESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Khalilzad, Zalmay, to be Representative to the United Nations, with the rank and status of Ambassador, and the Representative in the Security Council on the United Nations, and to be Representative to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations during his tenure of service as Representative to the United Nations

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson presiding.

Present: Senators Nelson, Kerry, Feingold, Obama, Menendez, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, DeMint, and Isakson.

Also present: Senator Lieberman.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA**

Senator NELSON. Welcome to the nomination hearing for Ambassador Khalilzad to assume the extremely important post of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

We want to welcome you, Mr. Ambassador, and your family. He's again being called by his country to serve in a critical post at a critical time. The United Nations is so important that we have the best and the brightest to represent us. With all of the international challenges that we have today, his diplomacy will be essential as

we tackle all of the things that are facing us in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan, as well as the transnational threats of terrorism, poverty, global warming, and you can go on down the list.

We've moved quickly to fill this post that he is vacating in Baghdad. Ambassador Crocker is assuming that. In the meantime, we're going to turn our attention to the United Nations, now in its 61st year under the leadership of the new Secretary General. And this Ambassador is going to be at the forefront of our efforts to defuse international crises, not the least of which are the challenges facing us with a nuclearized North Korea, and a nuclear-ascendant, Iran. The Security Council's actions contributed to North Korea's recent decision to return to the negotiating table. We're finally seeing progress in these negotiations.

Iran is a huge challenge, but it's essential that we are successful, and it's going to take a round of tougher sanctions from the Security Council, and our Ambassador's going to be right in the middle of that, with all his diplomatic skill, bringing pressure on Iran to come to their senses.

Recent controversies, such as the Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme, the allegations of sexual abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, the instances of waste, fraud, and abuse by U.N. staff, have led many in the international community to support reforms in the United Nations. Progress has been slow, but I expect this Ambassador to continue that push for a reform agenda as an urgent priority. The United Nations is limited by its own internal inefficiencies and failures. And, until these are corrected and reformed, the U.N. is going to be hampered.

We are the No. 1 contributor to the United Nations, paying 22 percent of the regular budget. It's just under a half a billion dollars in fiscal year 2008. Obviously, our voice should carry significant weight. We have a big responsibility to the American taxpayer to ensure that that money is spent wisely. And that's just another one of the challenges, Mr. Ambassador, that you will assume.

There are currently 100,000 U.N. peacekeepers deployed in more than 18 countries, and despite this presence, the U.N. peacekeeping operations face serious challenges. I just returned from Haiti, where we have another one. It is finally having some of the success that we wanted, but it's taken a long time. It's been over a year with that U.N. peacekeeping force. And we expect you, Mr. Ambassador, to focus on improving the quality of those peacekeepers and furthering their effort to be successful in this time of crisis. I believe that you are the best and the brightest to be representing us in this world community of nations. And I think you're a nominee that we can be proud of.

We want to have a thorough discussion of the nominee. I want to turn to our ranking member before we turn to our colleagues who will make the introduction.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in, once again, welcoming our friend, Zalmay Khalilzad, who's been nominated by President Bush to be our Ambassador to the United Nations.

This post is unique among diplomatic assignments, in that its occupant is responsible not only for conducting diplomacy on many of the most critical foreign policy issues of the day, but also for U.S. stewardship of a multilateral institution, and plays a central role in global affairs.

This committee and others in Congress have spent much time examining how the United States can work cooperatively with partners at the U.N. to streamline its bureaucracy, to improve its transparency, make it more efficient as it undertakes vital missions. We all hope for a United Nations that can fulfill its potential as a forum for international problem solving and dispute resolution.

Often, the United Nations has fallen short of our hopes, but we cannot afford to be discouraged. The new Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, of South Korea, has an opportunity to implement reforms outlined by the Gingrich-Mitchell report and countless other studies. To date, Secretary General Ban has put forward some important reforms that would raise the accountability of the organization and better enable the United Nations to shift resources and personnel to initiatives requiring immediate attention. Additionally, he has set an early example of transparency by releasing his personal financial documents. But, as the Foreign Relations Committee knows well, United Nations reform is not an easy task, and many diplomats and bureaucrats in New York see almost any structural reform of the U.N. as an attempt to diminish their prerogatives. The next U.S. Ambassador must be dedicated to building on President Bush's efforts to support meaningful reform at the U.N.

Performance of the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva continues to be a source of concern in the Congress and among the American people. Regrettably, recent sessions of the Council have focused almost exclusively on Israel. The United States rightfully continues to seek modifications to the Human Rights Council. Much less well-known is the role of the United Nations Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Affairs Committee in New York, which has voted to condemn the deplorable human rights situations in Iran, North Korea, Belarus, and Burma, countries which the Human Rights Council in Geneva has inexplicably ignored. I would be interested in knowing what options the nominee sees at this stage for improving the structure and the credibility of human rights advocacy at the United Nations.

Even with these difficulties, the United Nations remains a key component of U.S. foreign policy. In particular, United States peacekeeping missions are a cost-effective method of enforcing peace and helping shattered nations rebuild. The ability of U.N. peacekeeping missions to be a force-multiplier was underscored by a 2006 Government Accountability Office analysis of the U.N.'s peacekeeping mission in Haiti. The GAO concluded, and I quote, "The U.N. budgeted \$428 million for the first 14 months of that mission. A U.S. operation of the same size and duration would have cost an estimated \$876 million." The report noted that the United States' contribution to the Haiti peacekeeping mission was, in fact, \$116 million, roughly one-eighth the cost of a unilateral American operation.

With this in mind, I was perplexed to see that the administration's fiscal year 2008 budget request for approximately \$300 million less for peacekeeping than in the previous year has been put forward. Little evidence was presented to explain why the current 16 missions would suddenly require less funding than in previous years. Moreover, additional peacekeeping missions may arise in Chad and Darfur, further straining the peacekeeping budget. I would welcome the nominee's thoughts on this situation, which require further explanation by the administration.

The diplomatic challenges that face our nominee include the nuclear confrontations with Iran and North Korea, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, refugee crises related to Iraq, to Darfur and other locations, and numerous problems that confront the United Nations every day. I am pleased, and I join the Chairman in saying, that the President has nominated a diplomat with such wide experience to be our next Ambassador to the United Nations. Ambassador Khalilzad has been in charge of two of the toughest assignments in American diplomacy, our embassies in Kabul and Baghdad. His experiences in these posts will enhance our ability to work with the United Nations on issues pertaining to Afghanistan, Iraq, and bolster our international diplomacy aimed at stabilizing those nations.

I welcome the nominee and thank him for his continued distinguished service to our country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. I'd like our two colleagues to introduce the nominee, and since Senator Hagel is also a member of the committee, Senator Hagel, you go first, and then we'll have Senator Lieberman.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA**

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to you and all of my colleagues on the committee.

It is my privilege to introduce Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, along with my friend and colleague Senator Lieberman. This time, for me, is a third time to introduce Ambassador Khalilzad. In October 2003, I introduced the Ambassador as the President's nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. In June 2005, I introduced him as the President's nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. As has been noted, two easy jobs. Today, following his distinguished service in Kabul and Baghdad, Ambassador Khalilzad returns to the committee as the President's nominee to be the next U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

It is not surprising that the President has chosen Ambassador Khalilzad to lead our efforts at the United Nations at this most critical time. In recent years, he has filled two of the most difficult diplomatic posts in our Nation's history. As Ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan, Ambassador Khalilzad served under conditions that could have easily overwhelmed even the most gifted diplomat. Instead, he has earned a reputation as an agile and credible mediator in a region complicated by tribal, religious, and sectarian divisions. His deep understanding of the Middle East has been a vital

asset to this country and the world, and we are grateful for that past service.

Though the challenges of Iraq today are daunting and in—its future still deeply uncertain, Ambassador Khalilzad's tenure in Iraq was marked by important milestones. And I think, Mr. Chairman, it is important that we review a couple of those accomplishments.

After arriving in Baghdad in June of 2005, Ambassador Khalilzad led our efforts to help the fledgling Iraqi Government move forward in the political reconciliation process. He was central in facilitating the tough compromises that led to the ratification of Iraq's constitution in October of 2005, and a successful national election in December of that same year.

At the end of his tenure, Iraq's Council of Ministers approved a national oil law that, if adopted by the Iraqi Council of Representatives, will play a key role in Iraq's future. Ambassador Khalilzad's accomplishments in Afghanistan were equally impressive. During his tenure, Afghanistan held its first national free and fair elections in the nation's history and established a new government. He led United States efforts to help establish Afghan security forces and oversaw United States reconstruction assistance, allowing the Afghan people hope for new economic opportunities.

Ambassador Khalilzad will now fill a critical role as Ambassador to the United Nations. As members of this committee are much aware, having been noted already this morning, the United Nations has its limitations and is imperfect. Over the past year, some improvements, such as stronger internal oversight capacity and the establishment of a U.N. Ethics Office, have been made. But further reform is needed. Institutional reform, with the goal of making the U.N. more effective and credible, should be one of the top priorities of our new Ambassador. It will require building durable consensus among member states. This is difficult. It's hard work, and it takes time. But it will not be accomplished without strong, wise, determined, and respected U.S. leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I am also very proud of the fact that the Ambassador's oldest son is here today, and he will be introduced by the Ambassador, I'm sure, but I take some pride and personal privilege in recognizing him, as well, since he served as an intern in my office a few years ago, and he has gone off to do astounding things. I take no credit for his shaping and molding. I think his parents had much more to do with that than any of us here.

But I am proud of this nominee, as we all are. I am proud of his family. I am proud of his accomplishments. We are also pleased that his living conditions will be significantly improved—

[Laughter.]

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. As to the new position he takes in New York.

So, Mr. Chairman and my fellow committee members, I strongly, enthusiastically endorse Ambassador Khalilzad's nomination to be the next U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and enthusiastically recommend him to this committee.

Thank you.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Senator Lieberman, we welcome you to the committee. Thank you very much for taking the time to offer your comments.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT**

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee.

It really is a great personal honor and privilege to join my friend and colleague Chuck Hagel in introducing Ambassador Zal Khalilzad to this committee and to urge the committee to favorably consider President Bush's nomination of Zal to be our Ambassador to the United Nations.

It has been said that the American Ambassador to the United Nations is, in effect, America's Ambassador to the world. And I cannot think of anyone more qualified or more appropriate to serve in that role than Ambassador Khalilzad, because he represents the best of America. He is a true American-Dream success story. Born in Afghanistan, in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif. When he finished 8th grade, his family moved to Kabul. By the 10th grade, so I hear from reliable sources, he was the top student in his class. I have not been able to personally verify that, but—[Laughter.]—I have it on pretty good source.

He was given, as a result, a chance to be an exchange student in a small town in California, not far from Modesto. He went back home, and eventually enrolled in Kabul University. He, while there, attended a Fourth of July party at the home of the American Ambassador to Afghanistan, and was urged to take a test to enter the American University in Beirut. He claims that he did that partly as a prank, and intended not to go. He took the test, he was accepted, and completed his undergraduate education in Beirut, at the American University. He then went from there to pursue a doctorate in political science at the University of Chicago. Quite a remarkable story. Stayed in America, and became an American citizen in 1984, going on to serve with great distinction and effect. This is in the Reagan administration. Zal is no stranger to difficult assignments. While serving in the Reagan administration, he had an important role in American policy, both with regard to the Iran-Iraq war and with regard to the war going on in Afghanistan as a result of the Soviet invasion, and managed both with remarkable skill. He then spent some period of time at RAND, and then was called back into public service.

Over the 5 years since the September 11 attacks, Ambassador Khalilzad has been, in my opinion, quite literally America's indispensable diplomat. In assignment after assignment, he has demonstrated that diplomacy is about more than just talk. It is about building personal relationships of trust that lead to concrete accomplishments that advance America's security and American ideals.

I have heard it said very often that, in the struggle that we are involved in today in the world against Islamist extremism, ultimately our best weapon is America, is the American ideal, American values, the American way of life. And Zal, as a Muslim American, as an immigrant who came here, and, by virtue of his own extraordinary skills and hard work, has achieved such success, is

the personalization of the best response to the challenge we face today, and, if I may also add, is a shining example of the increasingly important role that Muslim Americans are playing in all phases of American society.

He has shown, in the words that Ben Bradley once used to describe President Kennedy, "special grace," which is to say courage under pressure and under fire, performing, as has been said, in two of the most difficult and most dangerous diplomatic assignments in the world today, in Kabul and in Baghdad. At the time of—at this time, in our country, of bipartisan divisions and disagreement over America's role in the world, Ambassador Khalilzad has won the respect and admiration of foreign policy doers and thinkers and politicians across the political spectrum. He is quite a remarkable human being, a great intellect, an informed sense of history, tremendous interpersonal skills, and on top of all that, a wonderful sense of humor, which, believe it or not, is occasionally necessary in the life of a diplomat.

I just leave you with this impression that I share. The last time I was in Baghdad with a congressional delegation, we were honored at a dinner hosted by President Talibani. There are the dinner were representatives of all the various factions of Iraqi Government and political and societal life. And it was quite something to watch Zal, if I may use a term from our political world, as opposed to the diplomatic world, "work the room." It was obvious that, not only did everybody know him, everybody trusted him, everybody liked him, everybody was glad to interact with him, as America's Ambassador, quite a remarkable range of talents that he will now bring to the United Nations. I hope that the President and the administration will keep Zal as he—when he goes to the U.N., at the center of the administration's foreign policy operation and occasionally, if I may respectfully offer some counsel, which I probably don't have to offer, call on him to perform special missions, because he has developed a range of personal contacts and trusting relationships around the world, and particularly in the most significant and combative parts of the world today, that I don't think any other American has.

So, it is really a great honor, and with a sense of gratitude to Zal Khalilzad for all that he has contributed to our country, and a sense of confidence about all that he will contribute to America in the years ahead, that I proudly urge this committee to confirm him as our Ambassador to the United Nations.

Thank you very much.

Senator NELSON. Thanks to you, Senator Lieberman and Senator Hagel, for your personal comments.

Mr. Ambassador, we have your statement. We will enter it as a part of the record. We would, of course, prefer that you give us a condensed version, so that we can get right to the questions. I understand you have a member of your family here, and I'd like you to introduce that member.

Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD, NOMINEE TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE RANK AND STATUS OF AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members. Good morning.

I would like to introduce my older son, Alex. Alex is my joy and pride. He is a law student at Stanford, second year. Unfortunately, my wife, Cheryl, and my other son, Max, could not be here with us today. But I'm delighted that Alex could make it.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, it's a great honor to come before you as the President's nominee to serve as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I want to thank the President for his confidence in nominating me for this mission. I wish to thank Secretary Rice, and look forward to continuing to work with her, should I be confirmed.

I also want to take a moment to express my deep gratitude to the many great Americans, civilian and military, and coalition partners, who have served at all levels in our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. I have been inspired by them. I wish to honor their sacrifice, particularly of those who have been wounded or lost their lives.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Cheryl, and my two sons, Alex and Max, for their love and support, as well as their patience during the past 4 years that I've spent abroad.

Mr. Chairman, the United Nations is an important and valuable institution. It has been the most successful collective security body in history. Standing up to aggression in Korea in 1950, undertaking scores of peacekeeping operations, endorsing decisions—endorsing decisive action to liberate Kuwait in 1991, and supporting the toppling of the Taliban Government after the attacks of September 11. An effective United Nations is in America's interest.

From my experience as U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan, I personally know that the United Nations can make a profoundly positive impact if it has the right mandate and if it is properly employed. Our partnership with the United Nations supported the Afghans as they created an interim government at the Bonn Conference, convened two Loya Jirgas, adopted a sound and enlightened constitution, and held national elections for president and parliament. None of this was easy, yet all of it was under—all of it was made easier by working in partnership with the United Nations.

Compared to its role in Afghanistan, where it ran the Bonn process to establish the new government, the United Nations played a more limited role in the political reconstitution of Iraq. Nevertheless, when I arrived as U.S. Ambassador, in 2005, I consulted with the U.N. Special Representative, starting during the drafting of the Iraqi constitution, and extending through the national elections in 2005, the formation of the Government of National Unity and the negotiations of key internal agreements on the path toward na-

tional reconciliation. I believe that changing circumstances are creating opportunities for the United Nations to play a larger role in contributing to progress in Iraq.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, the United Nations has limitations. When members of the Security Council cannot come to agreement, action is stymied or watered-down. The United Nations has struggled to cope with new realities that put respect for state sovereignty in tension with the imperative to address security threats emanating from failed states or transnational networks or the humanitarian consequences of massive violations of human rights by the governments on their own people. There has been a lack of appropriate dealings, with massive human rights violations, by the United Nations Human Rights Council. Also, the United Nations itself has had recent failures, including the Oil-for-Food scandal, instances of peacekeeping forces sexually abusing members of the local population that they are supposed to protect, and weaknesses in management and accountability.

The challenge for the international community is to strengthen the United Nations in those areas where it has proven effective, and to address shortcomings in the areas where its performance has been poor. If confirmed, I will work with the representatives of other countries and the new Secretary General to increase the contributions of the United Nations, to addressing the central security issues of our time, and to make the U.N. itself a more effective institution through much-needed reforms.

The United States, like all countries, faces the challenge of how best to make common cause with others in support of our goals. No one should doubt the legitimacy of U.S. decisions to act unilaterally when taken through our own democratic processes and in accordance with our rights under international law. Yet, collective action is often the preferable course to take, particularly to achieve burden sharing. Also, we can enhance the legitimacy of our actions in the eyes of others by enlisting friends and allies to work with us and/or by securing endorsement of our actions through the United Nations.

Though events will drive a good deal of the work of the United Nations, I will place priority on five key issues, Mr. Chairman.

First, increasing efforts to stabilize and strengthen Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon as immediate objectives in the longer-term transformation of the broader Middle East, which is the defining challenge of our time.

Second, achieving compliance with Security Council actions with respect to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs.

Third, ending the massive humanitarian crisis in Darfur in order to save the lives of innocents and fulfill the commitment of the United States and the international community to a responsibility to protect peoples from atrocities and genocide.

Fourth, strengthening the capability of the United Nations to undertake and manage peacekeeping operations effectively.

And fifth, promoting effective approaches to address climate and clean energy objectives in a way that supports economic growth in the coming decades.

If confirmed, I will pursue these objectives through two means. The first is through the formal channels of U.N. decision making.

I believe that there is great scope for constructive, collaborative action through results-oriented partnership involving allies and other countries, as well as the U.N. Secretariat. I will explore ways to increase cooperation among the world's democracies through the Democracy Caucus. I will also reach out to friends, as well as encourage like-minded countries to reach out to their friends, in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 to discuss how we might make common cause on issues of mutual importance.

The second means to advance our national security goals with regard to these issues comes by the virtue of the presence of the representatives from around the world, a setting that enables extensive informal engagement in an opportunity that I will take advantage of to work selected key issues proactively.

I would now like to turn to the issue of U.N. reform. If confirmed, one of my principal goals will be to promote effective, efficient, transparent, accountable, and ethical management of the United Nations. I wish to applaud the key role that members of this committee, as well as members of the House of Representatives, have played in identifying needed reforms and in supporting our mission at the United Nations as it pursues change. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you in pursuing further reform.

It is vital for the U.S. taxpayers to have confidence that we are receiving value for the money we pay in dues and assessments. I believe that the United States should pay its dues in full and on time. However, unless the United Nations takes affirmative steps to overcome the legacy of corruption from the Oil-for-Food scandals, and improves its accountability and transparency, the U.N. will lose support among the American people. Reform is imperative.

I am gratified that the Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, has pledged to make U.N. reform its prime goal. We should support him to make the changes he believes are necessary. I look forward to working with him in partnership to advance an ambitious reform agenda.

I will also, Mr. Chairman, take a fresh look at our mission, the USUN mission, and come back to you for assistance for the changes that might be needed to make our mission an effective partner in multilateral discussions and negotiations to advance our interests in the United Nations. If confirmed, I'll take an approach at the United Nations that's similar to the way I've worked in Kabul and subsequently in Baghdad. I'll focus sharply on the interests of the United States; at the same time, I am ready to engage, to listen, and to work with others in a cooperative spirit. I will pursue our goals by understanding the interests and the concerns of others and by working patiently and persistently and in common to find a way forward. I will be results-oriented, and I will give it my all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Khalilzad follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD, NOMINEE TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE RANK AND STATUS OF AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, it is a great honor to come before you as the President's nominee to serve as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I want to thank the President for his confidence in nominating me for this mission. I wish to thank Secretary Rice and look forward to continuing to work with her, should I be confirmed. I would like to express my appreciation to the leaders of Afghanistan and Iraq, with whom I have worked during the past 4 years in the pursuit of our common interests.

I also want to take a moment to express my deep gratitude to the many great Americans, civilian and military, and coalition partners who have served at all levels in our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. I wish to honor their sacrifices, particularly of those who have lost their lives or have been wounded. I also want to recognize the sacrifices of their families, who have to endure long separations and the worries of having their loved ones deployed in dangerous circumstances.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Cheryl, and my two sons, Alex and Max, for their support, as well as their patience, during the past 4 years that I have spent abroad.

THE VITAL ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is an important and valuable institution. Historically, the challenge of creating an effective collective security organization has bedeviled mankind. The United Nations, which was a signal achievement in the great period of international institution building after the Second World War, stands as the most successful collective security body in history. No other such organization has been able to undertake peace enforcement actions comparable to the one in Korea in 1950, to lead scores of peacekeeping missions over the course of decades, to achieve consensus on endorsing such strong actions as the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 or the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In light of this record, I agree with the view of the Gingrich-Mitchell report that an effective United Nations is in America's interest. As one of the principal architects of the United Nations, the United States placed at the foundation of the U.N. certain fundamental purposes and values—preserving peace, promoting progress, and advocacy of human rights. It is therefore vital for the United States to enable this institution to make the greatest possible contribution to advance those founding objectives.

From my experiences as U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan, I personally know that the United Nations can make a profoundly positive impact if it has the right mandate and if it is properly employed. I worked closely with the U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, and his successor, Jean Arnault. We continuously consulted and worked out common approaches as we advanced an ambitious agenda, with the United Nations supporting our interests in stabilizing Afghanistan and helping Afghans set out on a path toward democracy. Our partnership supported the Afghans as they created an interim government at the Bonn Conference, convened two Loya Jirgas, adopted a sound and enlightened constitution, and held national elections for president and parliament. We worked with the Afghan Government on such key steps as the disarming and reintegrating of militias. The United Nations played a central role in enabling the return of millions of Afghans to their homeland in what has become the largest voluntary repatriation of refugees in history. It also helped Afghans establish a human rights commission. None of this was easy. Yet, all of it was made easier by working in partnership with the United Nations.

In Iraq, the United Nations played a more limited role, due to the history of the United Nations and the Iraq issue—rooted in disagreements among the members of the Security Council—and the resulting narrow mandate for U.N. operations in Iraq. Nevertheless, when I arrived as U.S. Ambassador in 2005, I frequently consulted with the U.N. Special Representative, Ashraf Qazi, starting during the drafting of the Iraqi constitution and extending through the national election in 2005, the formation of the government of national unity, and the negotiation of key internal agreements on the path toward national reconciliation. Tomorrow, the Iraqi Government and the United Nations will take another step toward concluding the International Compact for Iraq, an agreement under which Iraq commits itself to key reforms and international donors commit to needed support. I believe that

changing circumstances are creating opportunities for the United Nations to play a larger role in contributing to progress in Iraq.

At the same time, the United Nations has limitations, resulting from the nature of the U.N. Charter, the failure of the members of the Security Council to come to agreements on all issues, and the unwillingness or inability of the U.N. system to confront the problems of corruption and inefficiency. When members of the Security Council cannot come to agreement, action is stymied or watered down. The organization, formed at a time when direct aggression was the principal security concern, has not always found effective means to deal with aggression undertaken through insurgency or terrorism. It has also struggled to cope with new realities that put respect for state sovereignty in tension with the imperative to address security threats emanating from failed states or transnational networks or the humanitarian consequences of massive violations of human rights inflicted by governments on their own peoples. The U.N.'s actions have sometimes been driven by coalitions with a myopic focus on a single issue or applying double-standards in judging the actions of states, particularly in the area of human rights. Also, the United Nations itself has had recent internal failures, including the Oil-for-Food scandal, instances of peacekeeping forces sexually abusing members of the local populations that they are supposed to protect, and weaknesses in management and accountability.

The challenge for the international community is to strengthen the United Nations in those areas where it has proven effective and to address the shortcomings in areas where its performance has been poor. If confirmed, I will put the weight of U.S. influence toward this end. Working with the representatives of other countries and the Secretary General, I will seek to increase the contribution of the United Nations to addressing the central security issues of our times and to make the U.N. itself a more effective institution through needed reforms.

EFFECTIVELY ADVANCING U.S. OBJECTIVES THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS

The United States, like all countries, faces the challenge of how best to make common cause with others in support of our goals. No one should doubt the legitimacy of U.S. decisions to act unilaterally, when taken through our own democratic processes and in accordance with our rights under international law. Yet, collective action is often the preferable course to take. Some problems cannot be solved alone. Others are too costly to solve alone. In still other cases, when we could act alone, we can take advantage of the possibility for burden sharing. Also, we can enhance the legitimacy of our actions in the eyes of others by enlisting friends and allies to work with us. We can strengthen this legitimacy still further if decisions taken through the United Nations endorse our actions.

Though events will drive a good deal of the work of the United Nations, I will place priority on several political and security issues:

- Increasing efforts to stabilize and strengthen Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon as immediate objectives in the transformation of the Middle East, which is the defining challenge of our time.
- Achieving Iran's compliance with Security Council and IAEA requirements regarding its nuclear programs and supporting international efforts to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear programs, thereby preventing the spread of dangerous weapons and associated technologies to other state or non-state actors.
- Ending the massive humanitarian crisis in Darfur in order not only to save the lives of innocents but also to fulfill the commitment of the United States and the international community to a "responsibility to protect" peoples from large-scale atrocities and genocide.
- Strengthening the capability of the United Nations to undertake and manage peacekeeping operations effectively.
- Refocusing the U.N. commitment to human rights—one of its core precepts enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—to address the most egregious cases of human rights violations.
- Promoting effective approaches to address climate and clean energy objectives in a way that supports economic growth in the coming decades.

If confirmed, I will pursue these objectives through two means. The first is through the formal channels of U.N. decision making in the Security Council and other fora. I believe that there is great scope for constructive, collaborative action through results-oriented partnership, involving allies and other countries as well as the U.N. Secretariat. I will also explore the possibilities of new ways of working within the United Nations. The world's democracies could increase their influence if they work more closely together through the Democracy Caucus. I will engage those democratic countries that see promise in this approach and develop with their

representatives a common agenda and political strategy to achieve our shared goals. I will also reach out to friends, as well as encourage like-minded countries to reach out to their friends, in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 to discuss how we might make common cause on issues of mutual importance. Finding new ways of working with the countries in these blocs will be a priority during my tenure.

The second means to advance our national security goals with regard to these issues comes by virtue of the presence of representatives from around the world—a setting that enables extensive informal engagement and that represents an opportunity that I will take advantage of to work selected key issues proactively. Because most countries send senior representatives who have substantial authority to transact business, we can engage in discussions at the United Nations in ways that the obstacles of time and distance make more difficult in other channels, particularly when resolving issues requires regional approaches. I will seize the opportunity inherent in the setting of the U.N. to explore how we might make progress on these issues.

INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.N. THROUGH REFORM

As we discuss the need for reform, it is important to recognize that many organizations and agencies within the United Nations system carry out vital work and produce results. U.N. vaccination programs have helped to stem the spread of diseases such as polio and measles. The World Health Program led the global effort to eradicate smallpox, helped contain SARS, and focused early on the threat of a human pandemic of avian flu. The World Food Program is at the forefront of combating hunger and malnutrition and was instrumental in providing relief supplies to millions of victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquakes that have recently struck South Asia. In Darfur, U.N. agencies are providing food, water, shelter, and healthcare. The U.N. Democracy Fund has made a promising start in supporting democracy promotion and civic society organizations.

At the same time, we should recognize that every organization needs to adapt in response to a dynamic environment. This typically requires adjustments to ensure that the organization maintains mastery of its core business, which involves defining the mission in the right way and keeping a sharp focus on performance. It also means ensuring that the organization has the right means to achieve its mission, particularly in terms of personnel, management practices, decision making processes, and creating an appropriate balance between ends and means. Only then can an organization produce the expected results and use resources in the most efficient possible manner. In this regard, the United Nations is no exception: It needs to evolve in order to keep its focus on the most pressing challenges and to reform internally to improve its efficiency and effectiveness.

Adapting to a changing environment. The world has changed tremendously since the founding of the United Nations. While the core mission continues to be security, the nature of the principal security challenges has changed. Today's threats emanate less from the risk of wars among the great powers but rather from instability in the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the consequences of state failure, and the rise of non-state actors. Though the United Nations has made significant adaptations to meet these challenges, its evolution must continue to ensure its relevance to the most pressing challenges of the day. In terms of structural change, the United States is open-minded about considering adjustments in U.N. structures to ensure that these reflect current realities, particularly in terms of the distribution of effective power.

Reforming internal processes. If confirmed, one of my principal goals will be to promote effective, efficient, transparent, accountable, and ethical management of the United Nations. In preparing for this appointment, I have read many well-documented and -reasoned critiques of the United Nations. These highlighted problems in its personnel system, ethics and internal oversight, management structure, mission as expressed in mandates, and professionalism and discipline in the area of peacekeeping. I wish to applaud the key role that members of this committee, as well as members of the House of Representatives, have played in identifying needed reforms and in supporting our mission at the U.N. as it pursued change. If I am confirmed, I look forward to working with you in pursuing further reform.

It is vital for the U.S. taxpayer to have confidence that we are receiving value for the money we pay in dues and assessments. I believe that the United States should pay its dues in full and on time. However, unless the United Nations takes affirmative steps to overcome the legacy of corruption from the Oil-for-Food scandals and improves its accountability and transparency, the U.N. will lose support among

the American people. In turn, this will understandably erode their willingness to remain one of the principal funders of the organization. Reform is imperative.

The optimal approach, in my view, is to focus on two or three discrete but meaningful reforms, build consensus for these changes, and implement them before moving on to the next ones, rather than to pursue a long list of major changes all at once. If confirmed, I would seek to consult with interested members of this committee with respect to the best starting point and would continue to seek your advice as we proceed. In this sense, reform should be viewed as a continuing, rolling process, not an action taken at a single point in time.

My initial thinking is that we should select our first priorities for action from the following areas:

- Ensuring that professional merit is the standard by which candidates are chosen within the personnel selection processes, while continuing to ensure geographic diversity;
- Strengthening ethics rules and oversight to root out and deter corruption and to establish accountability and transparency;
- Bringing U.N. management practices up to modern standards, particularly in terms of structuring decision making, strategic planning, and measuring and assessing performance;
- Streamlining U.N. mandates to focus the organization on its core missions and to avoid diffusion of effort and resources; and
- Strengthening professionalism and discipline in U.N. peacekeeping forces, particularly by building on the preliminary steps taken over the past 2 years to eliminate the sexual abuse of members of local populations by soldiers serving in those forces.

I am gratified that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has pledged to make U.N. reform his prime goal. He has made welcome initial statements, including his willingness to make a personal financial disclosure and his intent to authorize an external audit of U.N. funds and programs. He will have a particularly good chance to follow up on these statements with strong actions during the first months of his tenure. We should support him to make the changes he believes are necessary. I look forward to working in partnership to advance an ambitious reform agenda.

If confirmed, I will engage like-minded countries to develop political strategies that will achieve results. We should examine the lessons, or underlying logic, behind the successful performance of many U.N. agencies and explore how these might be carried over in other areas. We should examine the reasons motivating some countries to oppose needed changes and explore ways that their legitimate interests can be addressed in the context of reform. Progress will require persistent efforts at persuasion and coalition-building, as well as a willingness to bargain for incremental steps.

The question will inevitably arise about whether and how we should use the leverage we have as a major contributor to the U.N. budget. There is a tension here. On the one hand, there are missions that we wish the U.N. to perform, which means that paying our dues is not only our obligation but in our interest. On the other hand, we cannot be indifferent to a failure to step up to needed reforms. This is particularly true because the support of the American people for funding the U.N. will diminish unless changes take place. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to examine how we can best use our leverage, financial and otherwise. I will also work to find the right balance between supporting U.N. activities through assessed and voluntary contributions.

INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. MISSION

If I am confirmed, I will take a fresh look at how we conduct business at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations—how well we are organized to engage in multilateral diplomacy, what priorities we have set, whether we are attracting the most talented personnel, and other issues. I will ensure that we are setting clear goals, prioritizing among them, developing realistic strategies, and funding those strategies adequately. I may need the help of the committee, as well as your counterparts in the House of Representatives, to take steps that make service at the United Nations more attractive, thus ensuring that we get the best possible personnel for the mission.

If confirmed, I will take an approach at the United Nations that is similar to the way I worked in Kabul and Baghdad. I will focus sharply on the interests of the United States. At the same time, I am ready to engage, to listen, and to work with others in a cooperative spirit. I will pursue our goals by understanding the interests and concerns of others and by working patiently and persistently—and in common—

to find a way forward. I am hopeful that this approach can also produce results at the U.N.

If confirmed, I will work hard to advance the values of the American people. In my previous assignments, I have found that while cultures differ, people around the world yearn for certain universal values. I will seek to advance an agenda to promote those common interests—a world in which we can take collective action against threats to security, in which freedom and democracy are expanding, in which the rule of law becomes more widespread, and in which all nations enjoy economic prosperity. I will seek to make the United Nations as effective as possible in this mission. I will be results-oriented and give it my all.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

As a courtesy to my colleagues, I will defer my questions until the end.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, could I just—I can't—I don't—I'm not able to stay and ask any questions. Could I just have 60 seconds?

Senator NELSON. Of course.

Senator KERRY. I appreciate it.

I just wanted to welcome Ambassador Khalilzad. I wanted to thank him and congratulate him on his service in two, now, of the toughest posts in the diplomatic service. And, while I can't stay to ask questions, I appreciate the time he took to come and visit personally. I think he is going to be a terrific representative of our country at the United Nations. For all of us who have traveled to Iraq, and it's most of the people on this committee, I'm confident my colleagues have had the same experience I've had. He was always direct, up front, candid about the difficulties, honest about his assessments. And I think that's exactly what we need in the Diplomatic Corps in our representatives abroad. So, I'm very grateful to you for that.

Yet, while we disagreed, in many cases, on policies that you have to implement, I think you did a very skilled and able job of carrying out those policies, and we look forward to working with you at the United Nations. And I thank you for your service, sir.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator. I very much appreciate that.

Senator NELSON. Let's do 7 minutes in the first round.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, I want to ask you to discuss what is reasonable to expect that the U.N. can do in playing a role in Iraq, Afghanistan—and as you have mentioned, also, the importance of the U.N. in Lebanon? And, although the Security Council is still wrestling with Darfur, that seems to be on the horizon. Four extraordinarily difficult situations in which the U.N., for a variety of reasons, has not been a major factor, although you, from your experience, could probably illuminate the role that it's played, and you—give credit to that. But just following along your term, “results-oriented partnership,” and you will be engaged with the members of a Security Council, the Group of 77, with others. One of the great hopes, I think, of all of us for your ambassadorship is your unique experience as our Ambassador in Afghanistan, and Iraq, most recently—but, likewise, the engagement that you have had in thoughts about Lebanon and the rest of the Middle East, and, increasingly, as we take a look at Africa—that your diplomacy here may fulfill numerous roles. As has been suggested, we already have you out doing

special diplomacy, well beyond this ambassadorship, simply because of your unique qualifications.

Now, having said all of that, I added, in my opening comment, that our Government, at least initially, appears to be calling for less money for the peacekeeping budget, at the very moment that we're discussing with you how the United Nations might become more successfully engaged. The peacekeeping budget also then raises the question, once again, of how rapidly we pay our bills to the U.N., what kinds of disputes you have behind the scenes among others who you're calling upon to become engaged in ways they have not been, multilaterally, and their suggestion that it would be very helpful if, in fact, we paid on time, or we paid more. And that, of course, intersects in the business of management. But I'll not go into that, for the moment. I think the American people would also like to know if more nations would be involved in the stability of Iraq and Afghanistan and likewise in Lebanon and Darfur. While you're trying to get to that situation, what kind of budget support are you going to require? And if you want budget support, are you prepared to come to us, to help as advocates of this? In other words, how, within the administration, can you make these foreign policy goals real, but, at the same time, have the resources to be convincing with your colleagues?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, with regard to resources, I believe that in order to be successful, not only we need to have clear goals, not only we need to have a strategy, and not only we need to have a plan, but we need the resources to be able to be successful. And with regard to the United Nations peacekeeping operations that you mentioned, we vote for those. Without our support, affirmative support, they cannot go forward, given our role in the Security Council. So, therefore, I believe that we ought to take a close look at each of the proposed—looking to the future—peacekeeping operations, making sure that the goals are clear, that there is a good strategy, there is a good plan, that the tasks that need to be performed are clearly identified, and then that there is a good relationship between the means and the end. And I believe that we want—we should pay our fair share of that.

And, therefore, I favor the removal of the cap, of the 25-percent cap that has been imposed, and I favor asking for the resources by the administration in relation to those peacekeeping operations, since we have supported them.

So, I will be careful about selection of the operations. I'll be careful about how the plans are being put together. But I also, once we support that, I'll be an advocate for the resources that are needed.

Now, with regard to Iraq—of the other issues that you mentioned, I will comment on Iraq—I think there is great opportunity for the U.N. to do more. I want to point out that tomorrow the United Nations is hosting a meeting, along with the Iraqi Government, of the Iraqi International Compact, bringing people—countries together to move forward with the International Compact, where the Iraqis are committed—committing themselves to a set of reforms on the economic, political, and security track in exchange

for support from the international community. I applaud the U.N. for that.

But I think they could do more, in the coming weeks and months, with regard to the constitution. There was an agreement on a frontloaded amendment process. The U.N., based on its experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere, can bring Iraqis together. They need to make progress on the constitution to make that constitution a true national compact for success in Iraq. And the U.N. is, I think, the right instrument to assist with that. They are already involved. I think they could do more. They can do more on the issue of the local elections. They can do more with regard to dealing with militias. They have a lot of experience. I worked with them in Afghanistan in a decommissioning demobilization and reintegration program there. They can also, with the agreement of others, play an important role in the area of Kirkuk, which is an important issue, and the constitution recognizes a potential role.

So, I believe the circumstances are moving in the direction where they can play an important role. And, if I have the opportunity, I will comment on some of the other issues that you raised, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much. My time is consumed, but I just thank you for your answer, because, in my illustration at the beginning, we're paying about one-eighth of the cost of Haiti. If we did not have international partners, it would be eight-eighths, \$700 million more. Now, that's—could be applied again and again in these basic situations. And the burdens upon our taxpayers, if we are involved in a unilateral situation, are going to be exorbitant. And to the extent to that your diplomacy is able to bring others to help us, that could be a significant difference.

Thank you very much.

Senator NELSON. Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, as you know, this is an enormously busy time in the Congress right now, and many of us do have other hearings we have to go to, but I wanted to make sure that I was present here to convey my congratulations to you for this appointment, and my appreciation for all the service that you have given. You're truly a national asset, with your background and with the positions that you've held.

I was also really gratified to hear your comments about your commitment to bringing a more positive tone to our representation at the United Nations, and also the way that you described your approach to advancing national security goals through constructive, cooperative acts, along with other national leaders. Given your two positions, one thing that occurred to me as you were talking was the difference in the diplomatic approaches that have been taken immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan, as opposed to Iraq. In Afghanistan, we did convene regional consortia, including the participation of Iran; but we postponed this for quite some time, in the Iraqi situation. And mindful of your experience in both areas, and also that we did make what I was gratified to see as some of the first efforts with respect to dialog, bringing in Iran and Syria in this conference last week in Baghdad, how you see the difference

in approaches that we made, and what your thoughts are about the follow-on to the conference that took place last week.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you, Senator. I appreciate what you said about me.

With regard to the two approaches, in the case of Afghanistan, as you know—and I was involved right from the beginning—after the overthrow of the Taliban, we supported the effort to form a government, an Afghan Government, immediately. And I was there, in Bonn, and worked closely with the U.N. Representative to bring the various Afghan factions together, as well as interested countries with influence and concern with regard to Afghanistan. And within a couple of weeks of that—convening that meeting in Bonn, we succeeded—the Afghans succeeded, with our support, to form an interim government led by President Karzai. And I think the Afghans selected well. President Karzai played a—and continues to play—a very important role in unifying Afghanistan, and at representing Afghanistan well. And so, that was the approach that was taken.

With regard to Iraq, I was involved there at the beginning, as well, and I convened a set of meetings in London, in Salah al-Din, in Iraq, and then in—right after our forces went to Baghdad and Iraq, arranged for meetings in Nazariah, and then in Baghdad. But then, of course, a decision was made that, rather than going for an interim government form, to go for an alternative model, declaring our presence/occupation, and sending Ambassador Bremer as the CPA, Coalition Provisional Authority; in effect, us becoming the government for a period, making decisions. So, that was a different model, and I was then, before—when Ambassador Bremer was appointed, I was sent as—nominated to go to Afghanistan as Ambassador, since I was heavily engaged in the—with the effort there, as well.

With regard to the conference that we had a few days ago, and I participated in that, it was a good conference, from my perspective, as a conference, with the Permanent 5, neighbors, U.N. And three committees were formed, as you know, working groups to prepare for a ministerial meeting. We have concerns with regard to the behavior of some of the neighbors. We'll have to see, on the ground, what happens. I was frank with regard to our concerns. But I believe that a combination of pressure with regard to issues of concern, with an openness to engage, with the intent to change behavior, to affect behavior, is the right mix, and those two elements of pressure and engagement don't have to be equal in weight. They can vary, depending on the circumstances that is available. But I believe those are among—in the toolbox of diplomacy, and we need to have as many tools as we can have, so I believe that engagement is one tool. And, as I said, doesn't have to be tools to other tools, but it can be—I don't think it needs to be taken off the table.

Senator WEBB. Well, I would agree with you that engagement is one tool, but I would also venture that, in that particular situation, you can have a lot of tools in your toolbox, but if you don't have that one, we are never going to have harmony in that region, and we're never going to get our combat troops out of Iraq. It's sort of the ultimate tool, in my opinion.

I'm running out of time. I want to wish you the best. And I hope that we can, in fact, have the right kind of cooperative and harmonious relationships in the United Nations from this point forward that are equal to the way that our reputation has historically been around the world.

Thank you very much, and good luck.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator.

Senator NELSON. Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And, again, Mr. Ambassador, welcome. I have expressed myself, earlier, on my feelings about your nomination, and about your service to our country, and my enthusiastic support of this nomination, and thank you again.

I'd like to pursue the line of conversation you were having with Senator Webb on the regional security conference last week. What can you tell the committee specifically about interaction that you, representatives of our Government—Ambassador Satterfield, anyone else who represented us at that conference—interaction with Iran and Syria?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

We did have across-the-table discussions on issues, the agenda of the conference, with the Iranian representatives. We did shake hand and had short conversation with them, in—conversation of a general nature. We did—there were groups of representatives at informal discussions when there was a disagreement on the issue of the next set of meetings that—the language of the final statement, or the Chairman's statement, we—the Iranians were there, as well as our representatives, myself and others, saying, "What about this?" kind of considering different options. So, my overall comment is that, as a meeting—as far as a meeting goes, a first meeting, it was a good first step.

But I want to emphasize that, while this was a good first step, what we will be looking for is—in terms of the impact of the conference and subsequent meetings, is the impact on the ground. Will they stop supplying EFPs to Iraqis, extremists who use those against our forces? Will they stop supporting militias, training them, providing them with resources? Will they encourage the groups that they have influence over towards reconciliation? Those will be the kind of indicators that I would look to, in terms of the real impact.

But, I think, at the meeting, I think, it was a good first step.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Where do we go from here with Iran and Syria, as to the follow-on from that conference? Are we looking at bilateral follow-on meetings? I know we are looking at a ministerial level, a follow-on conference, which, if you have some specifics on where we are on that, we would welcome that information. But I'm particularly interested in where we go now, in context of Syria and Iran.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, with regard to Iran, as you know, Senator, the President granted me the authority that I had in Afghanistan last year, which is to engage Iran in discussions bilaterally in the presence of, perhaps, Iraqis, if we thought it was going to be useful to advance the agenda for success in Iraq. And we are

open-minded on that issue. If we think it would be useful, we're willing to consider that.

With regard to the conference itself, the next step is the ministerial meeting, in a formal sense. But there will be preparatory steps before the ministerial conference, in terms of the meetings of the working groups to prepare for issues—with regard to security, borders, with regard to energy, oil and electricity, with regard to refugees—for the ministers, so there will be discussions among the neighbors and—who are the statutory members, if you like, of this group, and we could get invited to participate in those by them. But the next step is the working groups.

Senator HAGEL. What about Syria?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, on Syria, we did talk with them, as well.

Senator HAGEL. Did they indicate that they had interest in a follow-on or a follow-up—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. They did express—they did express—of course, they're a member of the regional grouping—they did express an interest, should we be interested, in a bilateral set of discussions, as well.

Senator HAGEL. And are we?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, that—I have not had an opportunity to discuss this issue with the President and with the Secretary of State. I mentioned the issue of Iran, because that is an issue that was dealt with last year, when I asked for the authority, and that authority has been there.

Senator HAGEL. Do you believe it's important that we see the—whether it's bilateral or multilateral—engagement in a complete arc, a comprehensive arc, of interests in Syria, Iran, the regional concept, when we are talking about Iraq?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, yeah, I—I know the Secretary of State—

Senator HAGEL. Which would include Syria.

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. And the President approved this regional engagement in the follow-up to the Hamilton-Baker recommendations to do this regional conference with P5, plus, now, in the next one, the possibility of adding some—the G-8 countries to it, as well, and to engage with neighbors, other regional countries, other P5 countries, U.N., and G-8, with regard to helping Iraq succeed.

Senator HAGEL. But you're saying that that would include the Syrian area and Iran—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes, they are—

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Relationship.

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. If you like, statutory members of the regional—the neighbors group. Yes, Mr. Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Okay. If you wouldn't mind—and I know you are going to be focusing on other interests, but, for the time being, as we all know, you're still our Ambassador to Iraq, and you have a most capable successor coming behind you—but if it would be—if it would be important to you—and I think it is to the committee—if you could provide the committee an answer to the question on where we are with follow-up on Syria, especially in regard to my particular question, “Did the Syrians ask us for bilaterals for fol-

low-ups?" And you mentioned you had not yet had an opportunity to visit with the President on this. But we would appreciate a follow-up, when you have that.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes, sir. But I can tell you right now that they did express an interest in a bilateral, should we be interested.

Senator HAGEL. No, I—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I can say that.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. But I'm interested in what our response is.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. Yes, sir. Yes, Senator.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. When was that talk with Syria that you just mentioned to Senator Hagel?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. This was on Saturday, last Saturday, Senator, in Baghdad, in a—the conference that was at the initiative of the Iraqis, inviting the neighbors, plus regional countries. The reason I say "regional," because Egypt was also there, and, as you know, Egypt is not an immediate neighbor. And Bahrain was also there, and Bahrain is not an immediate neighbor. So—and the Permanent 5—permanent members of the Security Council and the United Nations, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, they were all there. And, in that context, the discussions involving us and others, including Syria and Iran, took place with regard to helping Iraq succeed. And the three committees that I mentioned were agreed to working groups on those three issues that I mentioned.

Senator NELSON. Was that the first time that you or your office had had contact with Syria?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. With regard to Iraq, since I've been Ambassador to Iraq, in a—in Baghdad, yes, that is—that's right.

Senator NELSON. Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to applaud the President for offering this nomination. Ambassador, you have provided this country with tremendous service, skilled service. You have a unique ability to generate, I think, kind of, the highest level of credibility for America in dealing with a very tough region. And I've watched you in action in Baghdad, and I've been with you at the United Nations. And I've—strongly support this nomination and look forward to working with you when you are confirmed.

I have three areas, during the short time I have, that I want to touch upon. One is U.N. reform, which—I think the steam has gone out of that. Second has been Darfur, in which the U.N. has been rather toothless in the face of genocide, and we need to move forward more aggressively. And third is the question of Iran and how we deal with that.

Both at the U.N., and perhaps in addition to the U.N., are there other, kind of, layers or avenues in which we can deal with the Iranian situation? You mentioned, for instance, Egypt being at the conference. Clearly, a number of the Sunni countries in the region have as deep a concern about Iran's hegemony and their activities as we do, as anyone else does. And so, in addition to the United Nations, are there other avenues?

Let me just touch upon the U.N. reform. First, I appreciate your strong statement in—opening statement, where you said, “Unless the United Nations takes affirmative steps to overcome the legacy of corruption from the Oil-for-Food scandals and improve its accountability and transparency, the U.N. will lose support among the American people. In turn, this will understandably erode their willingness to remain one of the principal funders of the organization. Reform is imperative.” Yet reform doesn’t seem to be happening. The Secretary General has stepped forward, but the G77 does not—at this point, is clearly not committed to reform. So, when you have an organization structurally which has that one country, one vote, but G77 has great power, and they have consistently resisted a vote that Secretary General Annan’s as well as Secretary General Ban’s efforts to reform, can you move them forward without the hammer of funding? And, second—two questions—should we be clear about the hammer of funding, to say what you just said, so that the G77 understands that, whether it’s us or the Brits or others, that unless reform takes place, there are going to be consequences?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, first, Senator, I will work very hard with the Secretary General, who—as the new Secretary General has an opportunity to persuade members, this period of honeymoon and—it could be—it should be, in my view, used to advance the reform agenda. Two, I will work with the like-minded nations, especially the democratic allies, the democratic Caucus, to see how we can work together to influence the Group of 77, and work with friends within the Group of 77—not only our friends, but friends of the other democracies—to use their influence, as well as the Secretary General, to advance the agenda of reform. I believe absence of reform is a mortal threat to the United Nations, and United Nations is a common interest to all of its members. I believe that the issue of funding, based on analysis, facts of the situation with regard to the American people, if there is no reform, the attitude could change in a way that will make funding increasingly difficult, and that’s not in the interest of the institution. And, therefore, I believe the issue of funding had to be on the table, but it has to be, in my judgment, a kind of last resort, to—but the reality of the connection between reform and funding is a reality that I will be pointing to and making use of in my interactions with others. But, as I said, this is something that I would look at as a kind of a last-resort issue.

Senator COLEMAN. Well, I agree with the ranking member, of the cost-effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping. We need multilateral support. The U.N. should be a forum for doing that, but—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. We haven’t done anything, and mandate review—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. A thousand U.N. mandates, and move forward on that—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Oversight accountability, procurement—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Sure.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. You've got a full plate, Ambassador.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Sure. May I say something?

Senator COLEMAN. Please.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I'm sorry to interrupt. But I do think that, while quite a long list of reforms have been identified, I also will do one other thing. And I will be very much in touch with you, Senator, in particular, on this issue. If we could choose two or three to go after first, and, having accomplished those, then to agree to another two or three that we ought to go after, might also be useful as part of our approach to advance the reform agenda. Sorry to interrupt you.

Senator COLEMAN. No, I appreciate it. And I do believe, by the way, Secretary Ban is a breath of fresh air. And I'm hopeful that his intentions can be converted into action.

Short time left. Talk to me about Darfur. It is very frustrating. Genocide is going on. We've said that. The Secretary of State has said that. And the U.N. seems incapable of overcoming Darfur—Sudan's resistance. Can we get something done? What's it going to take?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, it may take other—additional more coercive measures, vis-a-vis the Government in Khartoum, to get it to cooperate. I think it is unacceptable, the position that government has taken, the back-and-forth with regard to its commitment to cooperate. So, I believe that this is very important that progress is made on this front. And I will—should I be confirmed, will work with the Secretary of State and others here, as well as other nations and—to look at options for increasing the pressure with the intent to change the attitude of the government.

Senator COLEMAN. My time is just about expired. Just one comment, and that is, the prospect—I believe that the prospect of Iran getting a nuclear weapon is the single greatest threat to peace, to stability in the Middle East and the world. And they keep moving in that direction, and the U.N., at least, is one form, Security Council. But, if not, there needs—we cannot allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. So, I—at some other time and some other place, we need to have that conversation.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes, sir. I look forward to that.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you.

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. What are some of those pressures that you can place on the Government of Sudan with regard to Darfur?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, the range of options, of course, is considerable. There are the sanctions with regard to the people in the government, sanctions with regard to institutions in the government, as—sanctions with regard—more broadly, and so on. We can slice it in a variety of ways. But I don't want to be too specific, in terms of which ones I will work for, because, as you know, I've been very focused on Iraq. I just got back. And, if I am confirmed, I'd like to have the opportunity to go up there and talk to others, consult with others. But I think, having said that, there is absolute need to consider additional options to bring about a change in the

attitude. And that is my judgment with regard to the situation, Senator.

Senator NELSON. In your opinion, why haven't we done that before?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I—as I said, in that—from what I have read, the State Department, the Secretary of State and others, have stated that we need to look at additional options to bring about a change in behavior. And the government has been, sometimes, sending positive signals, the Khartoum Government, and, therefore, delaying the consideration of additional options. And I think now the signals are going in the opposite direction, pointing to going back on commitments made before. So, I think, we, in turn, need to look at our options for increased pressure to bring about compliance.

Senator NELSON. Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

And I want to say, it was quite an opportunity for me to meet with you and Deputy Prime Minister Salih in Iraq, about 3½ weeks ago. And, upon hearing that you were going to the United Nations, I will say that, on one hand, I knew we were going to be represented very, very well; at the same time, I kind of hated to see you leave, when you were actually causing things to happen. I know you're entering a different arena where that may be a little bit more difficult.

So, I have two questions. The first is, we're focusing a lot right now on General Petraeus and what's happening in Baghdad. And there have been a lot of dates talked about. Midsummer we'll know whether we've been able to turn what has been a downward spiral into an upward spiral. And yet, so much of that is dependent upon what happens by the government there, by Maliki, Salih, al Zawbai, what happens there on the ground. I'm wondering if you could help us think through, with the tremendous experience you've had on the ground there, just what the timetables you think are—what the realistic timetables are, as far as the actual implementation of the hydrocarbons agreement and money actually hitting the streets, if you will, the actual spreading around of the \$10 billion that's going to help create jobs there, and the actual real final agreements on de-Baathification reform.

And then, second, if we have time, I'd love for you to talk about—you're obviously going into a different arena, much like I've just done, and—talk a little bit about how you truly cause, as one representative going to the U.N., the type of things to occur there. You've been in a different position, where you've been able to hands-on negotiate and really create the energy behind the things that are happening in Iraq on the ground. Talk to us a little bit about how you actually go about implementing some of the changes that my colleagues at the U.N. have referred to.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator, for what you said about me. I appreciate that.

With regard to the decisions by the Iraqi leaders, I think one of the challenges that remain is how to incentivize them to do the right thing for themselves. And I know that they are facing very, very big and difficult issues. And their sense of time is not the same as ours, really. We tend to be very impatient. And these proc-

esses and issues that they are dealing with, by historic standards, takes—take a long time. If you look at the history of other nations, Europe, when you've had different groups coming together for the first time to try to figure out how to put a nation and a state together. So, while I appreciate the difficulties—the enormity of the challenges that the Iraqi leaders face, I do believe that we need to continue to incentivize them to move at a faster pace.

Now, on—there have been, in recent weeks, some progress. I think the budget was passed by the Assembly, of \$40 billion. This is one of the good things about Iraq. They have a lot of resources. Where, in Afghanistan, unfortunately, where I served beforehand, they didn't have that, the amount of resources that Iraq has. They have put \$10 billion into the development account. They have given, I am advised, the—10 percent of the budget already has been disbursed, I am advised. They have—we are helping them to do better, in terms of budget execution. They have been good at executing the budget with regard to paying salaries and retirement and subsidies, but not as good with regard to investing in projects and—in development projects.

Now, on the hydrocarbon law, they have agreed, in the Cabinet—it was a very important agreement, and it was a—it's a good law, in my view. They have—the Assembly has to approve it. And I believe the timeline for that is the next—they have said until May 31 is the timeline they have given themselves for approval. So, our encouragement that they are setting deadlines and targets to be—to incentivize them to move forward.

De-Baathification, that's the issue I was working on with them when I left, to get them to—the presidency representing Kurd, Shia, and Sunni—the president, two vice presidents—to come to a compromise agreement to balance reconciliation with accountability, and to adjust the de-Baathification law that Ambassador Bremer had imposed, was—which was, in my judgment, too draconian and too broad to refer those who have committed crimes to a judicial process, and then to turn and—to reconciliation with regard to the rest. And I hope that, in the coming couple of weeks, the presidency will offer that compromise agreement. But it will require us to work with them, continue to encourage them to make the compromises that they need to make with each other. And ultimately, of course, it's the constitution and issues such as what to do with militias—those are also critical issues that remain for the government and the Iraqi leaders to deal with. And, as I said, it will take effort to continue to incentivize them to move in the direction that they need to move.

Senator CORKER. Do the people on the ground in Iraq feel a sense of forward movement that's causing them to be encouraged that their government is actually going to deliver on making these things happen?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe that there is some optimism—increased optimism in recent weeks with the combination of the new security plan for Baghdad—the indications are, in the conversations from others talking to Iraqis from the mission, and my own conversation with some of the leaders, that there is a more positive attitude. And if the security situation improves, if the government makes the decision that they need to make, that would ob-

viously further increase optimism. But people are wary and uncertain, and they've heard a lot of declarations before, so they want to see changes on the ground. So, I don't think one can say there is a groundswell of optimism that has happened, but there is increased—I think I would say, compared to 2 months ago or 3 months ago, there is greater optimism on the streets in parts of Baghdad than was the case earlier.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Senator Feingold, I understand you have a time problem?

Senator FEINGOLD. I certainly appreciate being—having the chance to speak, and I'll try to be brief.

Thank you, Ambassador Khalilzad, for your service and for your willingness to work in some of the most challenging and difficult positions in the U.S. Government. I am pleased that the administration has chosen such a qualified and talented candidate for this position.

As you are well aware, should you be confirmed, you'll be taking one of the most visible ambassadorships in the United States and the world. Your leadership in the U.N. not only affects how the American public views the U.N., but how the world perceives the United States.

Unfortunately, I fear that your predecessor did little to advance international understanding of the United States or American of the U.N. The U.N. is facing major challenges right now as it tries to reform itself to meet new global objectives and overcome emerging threats that are beyond the reach of any single country. At this pivotal time, strong leadership from the United States is more important than ever. I had hoped that the Human Rights Council could bring about a new era of accountability for human rights crimes and abuses, and I have been disappointed in the lack of U.S. commitment to ensuring that it is robust and effective. We are also failing to provide adequate financial support for U.N. peacekeeping missions at a time when the United States is relying more and more on multilateral cooperation to act as a force multiplier in ending and resolving conflicts throughout the world. So, it strikes me as contradictory that the United States should call for more and stronger U.N. peacekeeping missions, but fail to provide the necessary financial resources to ensure that these missions, which are in our national interest, are successful.

So, I strongly encourage you, Ambassador, to make these issues a priority as soon as you are confirmed. Of course, these are only a few of the many issues facing you that are important to the long-term security of the United States. I do look forward to working with you again in this context to improve the U.N. while protecting U.S. foreign policy and our national security interests.

Ambassador, as the long-time chairman and ranking member of the Africa Affairs Subcommittee, I've been—become increasingly aware of the impact that developments in Africa can have on American interests and national security, as well as regional security there. Recognizing that your focus has been on the middle—on Middle East issues, I would like to hear what you, at this point,

consider to be the U.N.'s top immediate and longer-term priorities on—in the African continent.

Ambassador.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you, Senator Feingold, for your comments about me.

With regard to Africa, the immediate focus will be on, dealing with the situation in Darfur and connected with Chad and Central African Republic, to bring about a change in the behavior of the Government in Khartoum to allow for the U.N., the hybrid force that has been discussed to be deployed to stop the killing of the innocent in Darfur and to contain the conflict from spreading.

There are other priorities, as well, of course. We need to, based on our conversation yesterday, look at the mandate for Congo and see how that needs to be adjusted. There is issues with regard to—HIV/AIDS issues that some U.N. organizations—international organizations are involved with. That remains a consistent concern, as does the whole issue of development of the continent.

But, security-wise, I would think that the two immediate areas of focus, with Somalia also being there very much, is Sudan, Somalia, and the post-election period in Congo, whether, and how, the mandate and the presence of the forces might change. So, those would be—

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. My response, Senator.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you for that answer, Ambassador.

You've already mentioned, a couple of times, the U.N.-sponsored 2001 Bonn Agreement that established a framework for post-Taliban Afghanistan, that included Iran, Russia, Pakistan, and India, as well as the United States. Doesn't Bonn provide lessons about how, through diplomacy rather than bluster, we can get the U.N. to act in our best interests?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I think that the U.N., as I said in my statement, can play, and has played, an important role, in several crises, that have served our interests. So, I believe that it's in our interest for the U.N. to be effective and for us to strengthen the U.N. and to work with it in dealing with problems. I mentioned—

Senator FEINGOLD. But specifically on Bonn, though, were United States interests compromised by negotiating with Iran at Bonn?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. No, they were not.

Senator FEINGOLD. How did the U.N. framework for post-Taliban Afghanistan help you as U.S. Ambassador?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Oh, I—we were—along with the U.N., the architect of the Bonn framework—I was, myself, in Bonn at that time, from the National Security Council, there, working with Lakhdar Brahimi. So, it was very much of a good road map that was developed, a good interim authority, led by a good leader, President Karzai was selected in Bonn. And the U.N. played a very, very positive role—

Senator FEINGOLD. So, it helped you, it did not hinder you.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. It helped me—

Senator FEINGOLD. Well—

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. It helped the United States a great deal, yes.

Senator FEINGOLD. I hope that your involvement in these efforts in Afghanistan mean that you will—that you understand, as I think you do, that we can negotiate with Iran and other nations with which we have serious disagreements, and that, notwithstanding what the administration told us in the lead-up to the war in Iraq, our national security interests are often best served through multilateral efforts.

As you know, we held a hearing on Afghanistan last week and examined United States efforts to stabilize the country. And, given your tremendous familiarity with Afghanistan, which I've seen in person in Afghanistan, I would like to hear your thoughts as to whether the United States is providing enough assistance, and where the U.N. needs to increase its security, stabilization, and reconstruction assistance. What do we need to do?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I believe success in Afghanistan is critical. And I believe we—along with our European allies, particularly the NATO allies, who will also now have a lot at stake, with their own forces being engaged, and their reputation and, one might say, even the future of NATO being engaged, do all that we can to help the Afghan Government succeed, not only in the military domain, but also in terms of building their economic and—situation improving that—building the capacity of the government, rule of law, extending the authority of the government. But, at the same time, I think it's critical for success that we work together to improve relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to pursue that in a persistent way. I think that's in our interest.

With regard to details of how much we ought to do more of, if you would permit me, I will be glad to come back after I've had time to reengage. I've been focused on Iraq, and I've not followed, in detail, the level of our assistance in—with regard to particular areas in the budget. So, I'll be more than happy to get back to you on that.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, again, Mr. Ambassador, and good luck.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, we want to thank you for your testimony today, and especially for your public service. You've taken on tough assignments, and we're grateful for that commitment to the country and to public service.

When you were in my office the other day, we had a chance to cover a couple of different areas, one of them being a question, which I guess speaks more to the person and the environment within which they're working—in any field of government, at any level—and that was the question of personal leadership style and how you approach the opportunity that you'll have to serve as U.N. Ambassador. The question I have is, even as you—in that position—even as you support, obviously, and uphold, broad principles of American foreign policy and our diplomatic strategy and tactics, I would hope that you'd also remain flexible to be able to implement a strategy that'll be best for the country, even if it deviates from a preordained or even an ideological point of view. And I think we've had, in the past, unfortunately, too much of the latter,

more of a unilateral go-it-alone approach. And I think it's high time those days end and that we have a different approach.

And I know, from your experience, and from your service, that you've approached problems that way, and I just wanted to have you comment on that, in terms of leadership style, especially with regard to this important position, which is on a world stage, in more ways than one. If you could just comment on that, and how you approach that.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you, Senator.

Based on on-the-ground experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, I believe, to achieve our goals, engagement with others, finding common ground to advance our agenda, and listening to others, being in the mode of seeking to solve problems that we face, not assuming that we always have the answers, that others may come up with approaches that can also work, have been the guideline for me—the way I operate. As you say, very much committed to the objectives that we seek. And that would be my style in the United Nations, as well. I'm going there to—with the aim of making progress on issues of concern, both in terms of dealing with real security problems of this new era, but also to help the institution be more effective in carrying out its mission, and to engage together with others, be respectful, and to listen, but also not shy away from pointing out why we think the way we do, and to be persistent, not to give up, not to be discouraged in the face of complexity and difficulty. And I hope to have a team with me—because, you know, I'm just one person—to—that would be able to be effective contributors, along with me, in advancing our agenda, and that's why I would come back to you, as I mentioned to you when we met, and that I would like to go take a look at our mission and see how we could organize ourselves or attract the kind of talent that we need to attract to be as effective as possible, because I think there is a great opportunity, if we are effective in the United Nations, to advance our agenda, generally.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

And with regard to your two previous assignments, both in Iraq and Afghanistan—first of all, Iraq, when you look forward—and I know—you're looking to be confirmed and to be at the United Nations, but I'd ask you to look forward, in terms of Iraq, and, in the next 6 months to the next year—what do you think is the main diplomatic objective when it comes to doing everything possible, not just to have a military strategy that works, but all—and a political strategy—but also just in terms of diplomacy? What would—if you were remaining the next 6 months or the next year—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Senator, it's critical that we can incentivize the Iraqis to do the right thing, to make progress on the political issues that divide the Iraqis. The agenda will be completing the oil law, because we're talking about trillions of dollars of resources which Iraq has. How would they share that, develop that in a way that unites the various communities? I think a positive step was taken in the Cabinet's approval. That needs to be brought to completion within the timeframe that you talked about.

There has to be a good reform of de-Baathification, accountability, and reconciliation—accountability going to a judicial process, taking away from a political process, which is—which it is

now—to a judicial process, but also reconciliation, welcoming people who have not committed crimes and were not very senior in the hierarchy of the Baath Party, into the fold. Also, to deal with—to have a demobilization, decommissioning, reintegration plan put forward by the government with regard to militias, and set a date for the election of—provincial elections, and amend the—to be ready with amendments to be voted on in the constitution, to make the constitution a true national compact.

Each of the other things that I talked about, the—if they are done, that will make the constitutional referendum—making the constitution a compact will be made a lot easier, because those are the issues that the Iraqis, with additional one or two issues, are the key issues on which they are divided. So, I would think that is very important.

Also, I believe we have—another diplomatic challenge is how to get the neighbors to play a positive role, to be helpful to Iraq, not to seeing the difficulties of one's neighbor opportunities, but, rather, to think in new way with them pursuing common—developing a set of relationship where they are more helpful than some of them have been. And that will be the other big challenge, I think, a diplomatic challenge for us.

Senator CASEY. I am over time, but, just very quickly, if you can address this briefly. In light of what you just said about Iraq, going forward, what do you think, if any—of an expanded role by the U.N., what should that be, if you can define that quickly?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I think the U.N. can play an important role with regard to the constitution, with regard to elections, with regard to the issue of Kirkuk, I mentioned, that's also a timeline beyond the 6 months. I think it's—by the end of the year, there has to be a referendum, see the preparations with that referendum, that it takes place in a way that is successful, in terms of keeping Iraqis together, that that doesn't become another fault line, this one between Arabs and Kurds. So, I think the situation is evolving in Iraq, in terms of issues that are becoming important, that is a great opportunity for enhanced U.N. role, and that will be one of my objectives, if I am confirmed, when I go up to New York.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome, and thank you for your service to our country. You have taken on some tough assignments, and we appreciate that.

I'd like to lay out my questions and then hear your answers, so I can get them all in. There are four different ones.

One is about Iraq. It seems to me that unless we have a date—certain that the Iraqis understand that they have to make the hard choices, compromises, negotiations necessary for a Government of National Unity to be achieved, that it is possible—and the rest other world understands that we are not there indefinitely; it continues to be seen as America's war, not the world's interest—and so, in your new role that you will hopefully have, the question is, How do we get—the tipping point has not seemed to come in which other countries believe that they have to be engaged, in meaningful

ways, in trying to create stability in Iraq, both regionally and beyond the region—how will you pursue that, as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations?

Second, with reference to Iran, I am glad to see that among your priorities is compliance with Security Council actions. You know, the greater the success that you and we have at the United Nations, through the multilateral efforts, the less likely that we will ever have to consider military options. The less success that we have at the United Nations, the greater the chances come for that. The question is, How do we move other countries to more fully enforce the existing Security Council actions? And, as we try to make those actions more pervasive, how do you intend to try to use all of the resources—your diplomatic skills, of course, whatever persuasiveness, showing other countries their own interests in pursuing this, but also other options we have; we have economic levers here to pull, as well—how do we get them to understand that containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions is one in which there is common cause and we have greater success in its enforcement?

Third, last year I was successful in working with others—Senator Obama and others—at getting—Senator Brownback—an additional \$60 million included in the supplemental appropriations to fund a peacekeeping mission in Darfur. I’ve heard some of the answers you’ve given to that previously. But I’d like to see how do you intend to, again, and use the wide array of options that exist for us to actually get President al-Bashir to submit to what he has gone back on, which is a hybrid A.U./U.N. peacekeeping force. People continue to die. We talk about it, we anguish about it, but we seem to not be able to move forward. I find it incredible.

And then, lastly, we haven’t had a lot of discussion on this, but this is one of my major concerns, and that is the Human Rights Council. I know that the Council was supposed to be an element of reform. When Cuba and China, some of the biggest human rights abusers, are on the Council, I just quite can’t understand it. But I am concerned that our absence from it at the same time, while a statement that we don’t believe it has reformed the way it should, also leaves—cedes the ground to others in some of the most consequential issues, people who languish in countries in the world, who look to the United States as a beacon of light, of freedom and democracy, and of respect for human rights—when that voice is absent in that respect, I’m not quite sure that we’re promoting our interests or giving those people who we want to see take the chance to struggle in their own countries to move toward democracy in their own countries, and human rights, a type of hope and opportunity that they want. And so, I’d like to hear how you’re going to be pursuing that course, as well.

It’s a big agenda, but that’s what the U.N. job is all about, and I look forward to your answers on those four topics.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator.

With regard to Iraq, I believe that that is a delicate balancing that—in our approach—that needs to be considered, in my view. On the one hand, I think it’s imperative that we incentivize Iraqis to move forward, to take on more responsibility and to make the decisions that they need to make. And that means there are benchmarks. On the other hand, I also believe we need to be careful that

we don't do things that could unravel the situation altogether. And, therefore, not to tie our force levels to a particular event happening, or not, in a particular time. So, impatience and—a sense of direction, I think, is good. Timeline with regard to benchmark is good. But I believe that some flexibility so that we—whether we can judge that this—if a timeline has not been met, it's not because of a set of other things that brings us to a judgment that they are not going to make the decisions that are needed, and, therefore, that will lead one to one conclusion, that perhaps we ought to be looking at some other way of doing business with them. But if, on the other hand, they are making progress, but yet, they have missed a deadline because of good reasons—I mean, we all are familiar with missing deadlines—because of the complexities of the process, because the issues are difficult, then I wouldn't, sort of, judge that we ought to enforce what we said we would do because we have set a deadline earlier. So, I would like to give the people who are in a position of responsibility, such as yourselves, a sense of why the progress has not been made. Is it on a single item, or is it part of a pattern?

And I also want you to—want us to be aware that—and take into account—that if we—we shouldn't do something that gives control to people who want us to fail, and they say, “Aha. If we can cause a particular deadline not to be met, then the United States will do certain thing that brings about a less desirable situation.”

I appreciate the—what you all have to go through and—to balance things, as political leaders, representing our people, and the impatience of our people out there. So, I appreciate that. But from my experience, I'd like to also think—for your consideration, I would put forward that the complexity, in terms of the balancing that needs to be taken into account.

Now, I'm sorry I've taken a long time on your first question.

Senator MENENDEZ. Actually, you commented on what was a comment. My question was, How do you get other countries in the world—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. To understand that it is their interest to engage in Iraq.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Oh. I'm sorry. I thought you said in setting a date-certain—

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I—

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. So I was—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Mentioned that—

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. I was talking to—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. As an observation—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Of my own.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ. But my question was—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. How do you get other people—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In the world—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, other—I think we have to engage them. We have to take their interests into account. We have to use our friends that work with us to also engage on our behalf. That's why, within the U.N., I'm very much—the preparations that I've done in the past few days has intrigued me with the concept of working and operationalizing the Democratic Caucus there. I will be very focused on how we can get that caucus to be effective. And I believe that we ought to also use our friends and relationship of our friends with—our friends in the NAM and G7. I will engage with them. I think the engagement is a tool. It's not an end in itself, but it's a tool that can shape behavior. But you have to take interests of others into account. And in Iraq, I believe, in particular, there is a lot that we—of countries that should have common interests with us there, because Iraq is a rich country in a critical region of the world, and its oil resources is of a global interest for the future of energy security. And making sure that Iraq doesn't become a place where terrorists can use to operate against the world is a common interest of everyone. Keeping Iraq together as a single nation is a common interest of others. So—and this Shia/Sunni conflict, not spreading to engulf the entire region, is a common interest of others and ourselves. So, I think what we have done, in terms of this regional conference with P5 and now bringing G-8, is a—it's a good adjustment to engage others. And I will, in the United Nations, work through the Security Council, with other colleagues, and with the regional states, to continue to seek cooperation of others, based on common interests, but also listening to others' ideas and suggestions, as well.

Senator MENENDEZ. Very good.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Ambassador, you talk about—

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may, could I—

Senator NELSON. Yes. I want to follow up on that point.

Senator MENENDEZ. Sure.

Senator NELSON. You talk about the engagement with the other nations, but we have been hearing this for 4 years. So, what are you going to do different for engagement?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I told you one, in that I'll try to—with—in the U.N., should I be confirmed—work proactively with the Secretary General, the new one. He's new, and I will be new, and we both have a task of looking around, seeing what's wrong, what's working, how do we move forward on fixing things that are not right.

Two, to get the group of democracies that are there to activate that, to make it an effective instrument.

And, three, to also engage with the NAM and Group of 77.

I also believe that the presence of the diplomats from around the world, and many of whom come very well regarded and well connected, provide an opportunity not only to deal with issues in a formal sense with—that are on the agenda of the U.N., but, otherwise, also provide an opportunity to advance our agenda, otherwise. For example, on how to help the Afghan/Pakistan relationship, because that's critical for success of Afghanistan; or how to get the regional countries to be more positively engaged in Iraq.

These are ideas, at this point, Mr. Chairman. And, should I be confirmed, I'll go and see which ones I think, of these options, will

be the most effective. And I have promised that, if you will give me the opportunity, that, after I spend a bit of time there and I've had my mind engaging the problems and tactics and the strategy that work, that I'd be more than happy to come back, should I be confirmed, a month or 6 weeks later, to tell you, now, based on kicking the tires around, talking to people, what I think is going to be likely to be more effective. At this point, I—

Senator NELSON. We'll take you up on that, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I know I asked the Ambassador four questions. And I know Senator Obama's waiting. So, if you could give us, in writing, your answers to the other three—I asked you about Iran, Darfur, and the U.N. Human Rights Council—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I'd be happy to.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In an expeditious fashion, so—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I'll do it right away.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Before I have to cast a vote. But I—

Senator NELSON. Senator Menendez, if you want to, let's let Senator Obama go, and we'll continue with your questions.

Senator MENENDEZ. If I can, Mr. Chairman—I have a Budget Committee markup that's marking up the budget, and I may have to be there to cast some votes, so I will hang as long as I can.

Thank you.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, good to see you again. I'll try to be relatively brief. I know a lot of the issues that I was interested in have already been discussed, and I won't have you repeat them. I'll look at the transcript of the hearings.

Senator Menendez, who's been very active on issues of human rights, has raised some important questions about Darfur. There actually is, right now, an unfolding crisis. It's a—it's been an ongoing crisis, but one that's been in the news recently, and that's the situation in Zimbabwe. You know, President Mugabe's regime has been repressive for some time, has been divisive for some time, but, since Sunday, what we've seen is not even the pretense of respecting the rights of opposition leaders. You've got 50 Zimbabweans, who were attending a peaceful prayer meeting outside Harare, being brutalized; a protester, shot and killed. You've got the leader of the Movement for Democratic Change being badly beaten and severe head injuries. So, I'm wondering whether the administration has some plan in the United Nations, what other countries are thinking about how we might put more pressure on the Mugabe regime. And this speaks, I think, to a larger question, and that is, you know, what's the appropriate role for the United States in advancing human rights issues at a time when our stock around the world appears to have fallen?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator. It's great to see you again.

One, with regard to human rights, generally, this is one of the core missions of the United Nations. Security, conflict prevention, being number one. Number two being progress, economic development. And third being human rights. And I said, before you came, with regard to Darfur, that we need to look at options for incentivizing the government in Khartoum to cooperate, including more forceful options, from sanctions against elements in the—people in the regime, to institutions, to government as a whole, to other issues. Which ones of those I would favor, again, if you would allow me, Senator, I've been back 3 or 4 days from Iraq, I promise to get back with you, if I am confirmed, as to, among the options, talking to our experts, see what would produce the desired results, and which ones we can do effectively, because some of these will require cooperation from others, as well.

On Zimbabwe, I believe that there is important human rights and other considerations with regard to Zimbabwe. As to what the administration is doing, if you permit me, I—to provide that for the record, as to what the approach is at the present time, and if you permit, again—

Senator OBAMA. I'm going to be—

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. I have been—I go up there, and engage my own mind, and then I look forward to having a conversation with you.

Senator OBAMA. I'm happy to get responses in writing to those questions, after you've conferred with the State Department and others in the administration.

Senator OBAMA. You may feel the same way about this next question, because it's a broad one, but, I think, one that's vital and that touches on the other—one of the other core missions of the United Nations, one you've mentioned, and that's security. It's my view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the structure that we've set up in the past, is fraying rather badly. I think everybody's in agreement that the NPT needs updating. We've got regional proliferation problems, like Iran and North Korea, but we've also got some broader questions arising out of the treaty with India, the desire for a variety of nations to look at nuclear power as an option to deal with their energy needs. We still need to make more progress on securing nuclear materials and enhancing international interdiction efforts. So, I'm just wondering, do you have, at this stage, any thoughts, in terms of how the administration would approach strengthening that regime? Is it something that you've already discussed? Is it something that you'd like to get back to us on?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I would like to get back to you with regard to initiatives that the administration may be considering. But I believe that the issue of proliferation is one of the defining—another defining challenge of our time. And the relationship between peaceful nuclear activity—civilian nuclear program and military nuclear program, is an issue that I have had a lot of experience with earlier in my career. I worked a lot on how to prevent countries to get legitimately very close to nuclear weapons without violating any rules, because of our earlier Atoms for Peace programs. And I think some adjustments were made in our approach, on a bipartisan basis. But, moving forward from here on with adjustments

to the NPT or other nonproliferation regimes on the nuclear issue, in terms of the administration's thinking or approaches, if you don't mind, I will provide that for the record, Senator.

Senator NELSON. And when you do, Mr. Ambassador, give us information on your opinion of China and Russia, supportive of your efforts in the U.N. Security Council on sanctions.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe—with regard to Iran, I will do that, but I was briefed that good progress has been made in the last 24 to 48 hours with regard to the next step in relation to Iran, in New York. But I'll be happy, Mr. Chairman, to provide a more detailed answer for the record.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, sir.

Senator NELSON. Well, speaking of that, do you support the agreement recently reached with North Korea on the steps toward lessening proliferation?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I know that the administration supports it, and—I know that the administration, Chairman, supports it, and I have not examined the document in detail, but I don't see any reason why I would not support it. Yes, I associate myself with the administration, of course.

Senator NELSON. Why would the former Ambassador be opposed to it?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I'm—I wanted to make sure that you know that I have not read the details of the agreement, but the administration supports it, and, therefore, of course, I support it, as well.

Senator NELSON. Well, I think it's just curious that the former Ambassador to the United Nations is now coming out opposing the very agreement that the administration has reached.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I—you will have to ask him, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. Let me quote—you had made reference to the Iraq Study Group Report that had been embraced by the administration in a answer to a previous question. And let me quote from page 16 of the executive summary, "By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection should be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special-operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid-reaction and special-operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq."

Do you generally support that statement by the Iraq Study Group?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. In my view, Mr. Chairman, the desire to get the U.S. role in combat, sectarian combat between Iraqi groups, and to have Iraqis to take on more of a responsibility in that area, is a desirable goal, but it has to be done in a way that is workable. And, therefore, while I support the sentiment, my concern is that not making that condition-based, but making it absolute, is potentially risky, because the circumstances may be such

that they're—that the Iraqis might not be able to do that, and I'd rather give our leaders the flexibility to see—to evaluate the circumstances. But the—but I know what's motivating them, is to provide incentives for Iraqis to increase their capability in this area as quickly as possible. As the recommendation of a study group, I appreciate that. But, as a policy embraced by the President, and by our congressional leaders and the administration together, I would want, in my judgment at least, for it to—there has to be some flexibility for evaluating, rather than sort of tying our hands a year ahead of time, in terms of circumstances that we may not be able to anticipate at this time.

Senator NELSON. And, of course, that was one of the qualifiers that I just read—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yeah.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Here. But, as a general road map, that's a pretty good road map.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. To—as I said before, it's very important for us to continue to incentivize Iraqis to take on more responsibilities, to do the things that they need to do. I'm—as a diplomat, being in Baghdad, I have often made use of such recommendations and statements by congressional leaders, to communicate to the Iraqis that they need to move. But, as I said, at the same time, I would like to maintain the flexibility for the—for our military leaders—of course, the Commander in Chief—to be able to make decisions, adjustments, based on the circumstances.

Senator NELSON. Well, as a diplomat, you have a unique background and experience with which to advise us.

Reflect upon the United States entry and subsequent withdrawal, in the early 1980s, in Lebanon, as to how we may draw upon that experience in what we are experiencing now in Iraq.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I believe, Senator, that that was not handled well—Lebanon—as a student of the history of that region, and a student of strategy. On the one hand, I believe we declared Lebanon to be vital, which meant that we would do whatever is necessary to succeed; and, on the other, in face of terrorist attacks, we were—we had to withdraw—we decided to withdraw, which, unfortunately, encouraged some of our opponents in that region to assume that we cannot take casualties, and, therefore, behave in a way that made our diplomacy less effective, and, therefore, had to cause the use of force, because they miscalculated, thinking we would not use force, that we would not be—given the pattern in Lebanon. So, I believe it's very important that we are careful in how we pronounce ourselves, and that when we—that that is a—objectives are clear and there is a good relationship between ends and means, and the strategy is a good one, and the planning is good one, tasks are specified, the resources, political resolve, and all that, is there. So, I regard the Lebanon incident as a—as having had a very negative effect, in terms of subsequent developments, in terms of assessment of U.S. resolve and staying power in that region.

Senator NELSON. So, the experience of the U.S. in Lebanon, back in the early 1980s, we did not succeed.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe that defining in the way that I did, it—I would say that that was not a successful exercise and use of force on our part, I agree with that.

Senator NELSON. Would your conclusion be drawn, in part, from the fact that the United States was perceived to have sided with one faction, one sector, in the use of its force? In Lebanon.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I will have to provide that for the record, now, because so long ago. But I was just—what remains with me as a kind of a—as an overall strategic sense was the declaration of Lebanon as being vital for us, and then the attacks and the withdrawal that happened, and the perception that I—as it clearly remains with me, around that region, that we cannot take casualties, we cannot sustain. And, therefore, I think, encouraging people to draw the wrong lessons that—I think that's the one that I recall. But, in terms of in the politics of Lebanon at that time, how we were perceived with the—and the role of Syria and Israel and the various Lebanese factions, if you don't mind, I don't want to say something without checking on the situation at that time, so I'll be happy to provide that for the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. Well, I think that the reading of history would show that it was when we started using our firepower on behalf of one particular group, it was—I can't remember the name of the group—that the perception of the United States as being a neutral party went out the window in Lebanon. And I would be curious about your ideas, from the experience of that, in and around 1984 Lebanon. Are we getting into a situation now, in Iraq, where we're being perceived of basically doing the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis for the dominant Shiites?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I understand your point, Mr. Chairman. You have to know—I think I agree with your point, if I understand it correctly, that you know—you have to know what is the situation, what's the mission. And if the mission is one—as it is, in significant part, now in Iraq—one of sectarian conflict, particularly in Baghdad and some of the other areas, that we understand that they are sectarian, and I think we do, because that, we think, is the biggest issue, competition over political and economic power with regard to the future of that region, of that—of Iraq. We understand that. And if we didn't understand that, in a situation that that existed, and we thought it was a situation of extremism versus moderation, but, while, in fact, it was a situation of sectarian and ethnic rivalry, then our remedy may be not the right remedy. But I think we understand, in the case of Iraq, that—that is not the exclusive issue, because it is also al Qaeda that continues as a problem, then there is the issue of insurgents who are against the presence of the coalition, then there is the issue of Shia-on-Shia issues. But I think a core—perhaps the most important issue is the sectarian issue. And that's why we're working very hard, during the period that I have been there, to get an agreement, that compact between them, on political and economic power, oil issue, as I've described, the constitution issue, the de-Baathification issue, and that we have got an agreement from the Prime Minister that he will be enforcing the law in a balanced way against all those who break the law. But this is an issue that's important, and I understand your point quite clearly, that we need to be very attentive

to and make sure that that complexity informs our objectives and our strategy and our plan. And I appreciate that.

Senator NELSON. With regard to the sectarian strife, you are uniquely qualified, by virtue of your background and experience, to explain to the committee how, given the schism that occurred in the battle of Karbala of 680 A.D. and the hostilities that have occurred over the centuries between Sunnis and Shiites, of which we see that playing out, as we speak, today, in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, how the United States is suddenly going to get all of these groups to lay down their arms and participate in democracy, when they've been at it for 1,327 years?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe, Senator, that, doctrinally, there has been, as you say, a difference, dating back over 1,000 years. And you're absolutely right about that. But I believe that Sunnis and Shias across the Middle East, for the most part in the history since Karbala, have lived relatively harmoniously, although there have been periods of discrimination of one by the other. And in recent past, there has been a period of Shias asserting themselves, and that has been linked with the rise of Iran. But, in the case of Iraq, Mr. Chairman, there has been a history of intermarriage between Sunni and Shia. There are tribes that are half Sunni, half Shia. But, in the current circumstances, there have been a concerted effort to exploit that fault line that exists, sectarian-wise, for political purposes. The terrorist al-Qaeda saw that as a fault line and exploited that successfully, especially after the attack on Samarra mosque, to increase sectarian tension, and then to offer itself as a protector of Sunnis. I believe the countries in the area are concerned, on the one hand, about the rise of Iran, but also worried about the sectarian tensions that exist, and that's one of the issues that could bring people together, because if they don't come together on this, there is a danger that it could destabilize and fragment the entire region, and that, I think, is an area for diplomacy on our part.

Working with others, I don't think this is something we can do alone, given what you mentioned. It's something that we can assist, but it has to be largely done by the leaders of the area and the sort of a regional engagement that takes into account Lebanon, takes into account Iraq, takes into account the other countries of the area we need to focus on. I believe, as I've said repeatedly, that what happens to this region is now the key issue for the shape of the future of the world, as the European balance of power was in the early 20th century, and the containment of the Soviets. So—and it's going to take time, and it's going to require a concerted effort on our part and on the part of others to assist this region that's going through a difficult crisis, to come out of it in a way that is good for them and good for the world, as Europe came out of its crises in a way that now it's good for them and good for the world. This is the issue that is the defining issue for us at the present time.

Senator NELSON. In other words, you're going to have to be Merlin the Magician—[Laughter.]—as Ambassador, to help bring this about. What do you think would happen if we had a phased redeployment out of the cities into a perimeter, say, more into the

countryside, still doing these things that the Iraq Study Commission—if we did that, and pulled out of Baghdad—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. As an example, what do you think would happen between the Sunnis and the Shiites?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, it depends in what context. If the Iraqi forces were able to control the situation, and all sides considered those forces to be neutral and enforcing the law, then that's a very natural adaptation and adjustment that you've described—in an orderly fashion, and that's what we ought to consider doing. But if the security forces are not able to control the situation, or—and they are seen as being motivated by a sectarian agenda, then what you described, should it happen in that context, it would escalate the level of violence. And, frankly, it's a personal observation that is at the—the risks of kind of things happening that I, frankly, do not know whether we and others would be able to look the other way to let it happen, in terms of humanitarian crises, the level of violence inflicted. Given our role, particularly in terms of the situation in Iraq with the change, I think we have geopolitical issues from an intensified sectarian violence regionally, but also I believe that we have a moral responsibility, given our role, that we do what we can to avoid that.

And so, I would say my comments would depend, in terms of the context, what's going on otherwise, Senator.

Senator NELSON. Well, as our Ambassador in Iraq, what is your observation of the Iraqi Government being able to be successful over the course of the next 6 to 9 months in such a redeployment out of the city?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I believe that within the next few months, I think the—it would be difficult for it to cope with it by itself. Now, I believe if they make the political decision that we discussed earlier in the next few months, and the Iraqi forces are—increase in numbers and capability, which is part of the plan, and the government continues with its commitment to treat all Iraqis the same and no preferences because of sectarian identity or political affiliation, then the prospects for implementing this plan that you talked about in a few months would improve. But it very much depends on what happens in the next few months, on the political calendar, and also in terms of the capabilities of Iraqis to make the improvements that we are committed to helping them make.

I am cautiously optimistic, but it's a very contingent optimism, assuming on these decisions that I talked about, that these decisions are made.

Senator NELSON. In your opinion, do you think there is political will in the Maliki government to get such a unanimity of purpose so that the various factions can come together? Do you think Maliki has the will?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe that he would like to do that—Mr. Maliki. I see an improvement in his approach in the last several months. And it's not only him, however, because it's a parliamentary system that they have, and the government's a unity government. Other leaders also have to rise to the occasion, and that's why I keep repeating our role, to keep incentivizing them to do the right thing, work with them. Ambassador Crocker will have

his work cut out for him to keep being very proactively engaged with them. And, at the same time, I think the regional role is important, because some of these groups are also influenced by some of the neighbors. And that's why I support this adjustment of the last week, to get a more active diplomatic engagement, keep pressing the neighbors to do what's needed, to be a forceful, encouraging compromise, rather than encouraging extremism, militancy, and sectarianism.

Senator NELSON. I don't want to belabor the point, and, of course, you're constrained on a number of things as to what you can say, but you bring a rich background of experience to the committee, and we appreciate it very much. You have said that you think, in the next few months, it would give us the indication of whether or not, to put it in the vernacular, the Maliki government is getting it together.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. Now, that's what Secretary Gates said to us in his confirmation hearing, in January.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. And now it is the middle of March.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. He also said, and—not in January, in December, his confirmation hearings, and then his testimony to us again in January, as the Secretary of Defense—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. He said 2 months, that we ought to know. Well, we're at the 2-months point.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yeah.

Senator NELSON. And we keep hearing statements like yours and other people, "Well, in the next several months."

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. So, when are we going to know?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well—

Senator NELSON. Against the backdrop—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Obviously, the American people are losing patience with the Iraqi Government getting it together.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. Right. I very much appreciate that factor, the patience, the lack of patience, patience running out. My message and response, Senator, is twofold. One, that the Iraqis are facing very difficult issues, and they're not an island, unfortunately; they're also in a very difficult neighborhood, where there are people who do not wish them well and do not want them to succeed. Second, that the last couple of months, things have improved politically, in my view, although big challenges remain. So, that's why I'm—I evaluate the last 2 months, positively. A key issue, the government decision to treat all sides on an evenhanded way, even allowing movement against Jaysh al-Madhi, which had been an issue, a problem, in an earlier phase. Second, the agreement on hydrocarbon among the political groups, this is a very big issue—as I said, trillions of dollars involved for them to agree. Passing the budget, a 40-billion-dollar-plus budget, 10 billion for economic reconstruction, spend—already, I am informed, spending—10-percent distribution of that. So, I—and I think if this momentum is main-

tained, and the decisions—the oil law is ratified by the Assembly next, de-Baathification is done. Constitutional amendment process is done. A date is set. Then, I think, we can build. But I think if there—if you wanted to take these 2 months, whether it's discouraging or encouraging, I would put the 2-months evaluation as encouraging, cautiously optimistic, and it's—again, I would also emphasize that it's not only Maliki, but others, too, have to be reminded, other leaders, because it's a parliamentary system, it's a unity government made of four or five different forces. We need to engage all of them, because sometimes we overstate how much Maliki alone can do, thinking perhaps it's like our system, with our President is—has got the kind of authority based on our political system. Their political system is a little different, and it—for him to succeed, it requires cooperation of some of the other key blocs in the government.

Senator NELSON. Over and over, we hear the statement that, "It's going to take a political solution, not"——

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. "A military solution."

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. One of the items on the table is a political solution that the regional powers would all support——

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Which would basically be to start segregating——

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. The very—communities, and let them have autonomy in the conduct of their own affairs.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON. Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the middle, Shiites in the south. What do you——

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. You think of that?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, the issue of federalism is an issue that is available as an option for Iraqis, based on their constitution. The Kurds have exercised that option. They have their—three provinces have become a region and a federal unit, and they have a—the constitution allows for substantial degree of authority at the regional level. It foresees for Iraq a decentralized system, a federal system. There is an issue between the Arabs—among the Arabs of Iraq. Some support the idea of federalizing the rest. Everyone agrees on decentralization, broadly. Some favor federalism, some do not. And this is one of the issues with regard to building this compact, and I think that's an option of federalizing the rest of Iraq for Iraqis to decide on.

Where I would be cautious, Mr. Chairman, would be that it shouldn't be seen as an American imposition for them, how to organize their units inside Iraq. There are some who see that are—that suspect our motives as having come in to divide Iraq, an important Arab country, into mini states. That's why I would be wary of us saying, "Well, this is what we think is the solution, and we're going to impose it." But this is an option that's available to them. They are talking about it. They're discussing it openly and behind the scene among the leaders as to where they will come out. I would

not rule that out as a possibility for them, assuming they come to that decision themselves.

Senator NELSON. For those who criticize that concept by saying, “Well, you can’t do it. You have these mixed neighborhoods,” as a practical matter, are the mixed neighborhoods now segregating because of the violence?

Ambassador KHALILZAD. There has been a degree of segregation that has happened, unfortunately, during the past several months. But the government is very much committed to bringing—encouraging people to come back to the areas from which they left. We will have to see what happens, but one of the key features of the new Baghdad security plan is to encourage a return of refugees to their homes.

Senator NELSON. You described the constitution as a “true national compact.”

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Not yet. It has to become so. And for it to become so, I believe, Senator, these amendments that they are discussing among themselves, they are—has to be in agreement with regard to those.

Senator NELSON. And the amendments could accommodate the federalism that we have just been talking about—

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. In general.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. An agreement on that.

Senator NELSON. Uh-huh.

Ambassador KHALILZAD. As one of the issues. And there is oil. I think that pillar of the amendment process has been agreed to now, at the Cabinet level. The constitution kicked the can down the road on that one, so—and left it to future agreements, and that’s what we have.

Senator NELSON. I have a number of other questions which I’m not going to go into, and I’ll submit them for the record, with regard to Venezuela, with regard to the United Nations peacekeeping force in Haiti. I would just suggest to you, as you go to your new post, that we just have a handful of American police officers who are Creole-speaking on that force, and they are as valuable as gold, and that there ought to be some increase of that capability in the MINUSTAH force there. I’ll submit comments with regard to the peacekeeping forces in other parts of the world—and Darfur and so forth.

You’ve been very, very kind in all of your questions here, and very thorough, and I appreciate it. And I appreciate the delicacy of your answers, which have been most diplomatic, which our Representative in the United Nations has to be. So, I want to thank you very much.

The record is going to remain open for 2 business days so that members of the committee can submit additional questions. And, naturally, we would like for you to respond quickly to those.

Senator NELSON. Thank you very much. And the meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

Question. Did the Syrians approach the United States in the context of the March 10 regional conference in Baghdad? Did the Syrians indicate what issues they would like to discuss? What was the U.S. response at the time? Did any bilateral discussion occur during the conference? If so, what was the substance?

Answer. During the Iraq Neighbors Conference hosted by the Iraqis in Baghdad on March 10, the Syrians expressed interest in holding bilateral discussions with the United States in Damascus. There were no bilateral discussions during the conference itself. We responded that we would get back in touch regarding the possibility of bilateral meetings.

Question. What are the administration's intentions for following up on Syria's stated interest for bilateral discussions? When and at what level would such discussions occur?

Answer. Whether or not we will meet with the Syrians in a bilateral forum is yet to be determined. We have made clear that we wish to see the Syrian Government cease its destabilizing policies in the region and demonstrate a serious behavior change with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, terrorism, and domestic civil society.

Question. What would be the primary issues the United States would raise in such discussions?

Answer. No decisions have been made on the content of any such discussions. Our Charge and Embassy in Damascus communicate presently with the Syrian Government on a range of issues. Assistant Secretary of State Sauerbrey was recently in Damascus for bilateral discussions with the Syrians limited to the subject of assisting the Iraqi refugee population.

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Question. What, in your view, are the major factors influencing effective U.S. participation in the United Nations? What, in your view, is the perception of the U.S. at the U.N.? Can you talk about how you intend to build coalitions, and work with other member states to advance U.S. interests?

Answer. Collective action is often the preferable course to take, particularly to achieve burden sharing. Also, we can enhance the legitimacy of our actions in the eyes of others by enlisting friends and allies to work with us, or by securing endorsement of our actions through the United Nations. The United Nations offers a forum where diplomats from around the world are present, including many who are very well regarded and well connected. This provides an opportunity not only to deal with issues in a formal sense, if they are on the U.N. agenda, but also an opportunity to advance our agenda in a setting that enables extensive, informal engagement.

For the most part, other countries' perceptions of the United States at the U.N. reflect the nature of our relationships with those countries generally. There are exceptions to this, mainly involving countries that take leading roles in the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which claim to speak for a wide array of countries. I will make a point of working with like-minded nations, especially democratic allies, to see how we can work together to influence the Group of 77 and the NAM. Finding new ways of working with the countries in these blocs will be a priority during my tenure.

My guidelines for building coalitions and working with other member states to advance U.S. interests include: engaging with others to find common ground to advance our agenda, being respectful and listening to others, but not shying away from pointing out why we think the way we do, and being open to others who might come up with approaches that work. If we do this, we will be perceived accurately as offering leadership. I intend to be persistent, not to give up, and not to be discouraged in the face of complexity and difficulty. Specifically, I will engage democratic countries to increase their influence by working more closely together through the Democracy Caucus, and develop with their representatives a common agenda and political strategy to achieve our shared goals. I intend to try to help the U.N. be more effective in carrying out its mission, in ways that help us achieve our objectives.

Question. I recently visited Haiti and met with the leadership of the U.N. mission there—MINUSTAH. Will the United States continue to support MINUSTAH and its elevated force levels? How many Americans participate in MINUSTAH?

Answer. MINUSTAH remains critical to the establishment of a stable and secure environment in Haiti, one of the highest peacekeeping priorities for the United States. On February 15, 2007, the United States supported a United Nations Security Council Resolution renewing the mandate of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for an 8-month period with no change in the authorized force levels of 7,200 troops and 1,951 U.N. police. Given the ambitious 5-year U.N. plan to reform the Haitian National Police (HNP) that commenced in December 2006, it is essential that we, along with the other 44 troop-contributing countries in MINUSTAH, continue to assess the mission's force level and mandate in accordance with Haiti's progress in assuming greater control over its security. Our goal and that of our international partners remains to field a credible U.N. force to assist Haiti in consolidating its restored democracy.

Fifty-three American military and police officers currently serve in MINUSTAH. Three U.S. military officers currently serve on the MINUSTAH military staff and 50 U.S. police officers serve as United Nations police. In addition, a number of American citizen civilians are hired directly by the U.N. to serve on the MINUSTAH staff.

Question. I would like to support more American participation in MINUSTAH—particularly Creole-speaking United States police officers. Will you support me in this effort?

Answer. The United States is committed to continued participation in the civilian, military, and police components of MINUSTAH and will continue to work to meet requests from the United Nations for candidates for any of these functions. Working through our contractor for the recruitment and deployment of U.S. police officials in U.N. peacekeeping operations, the United States would certainly welcome expressions of interest from qualified Creole-speaking officers.

Question. How does the United States leverage U.N. peacekeeping operations, such as MINUSTAH in Haiti, to address our foreign policy concerns? In your view, what is the value of U.N. peacekeeping missions to supporting U.S. interests? Could the U.N. do more in places like Haiti to promote stability and address humanitarian concerns?

Answer. U.N. peacekeeping can, and often does, serve U.S. national interests. We have a stake in the outcome of events in every region of the world. U.N. peacekeeping missions engage and commit the international community to seek solutions to violence and instability. They cost the United States a quarter of what we would pay if we were asked to deploy American forces. In the Security Council and through our contributions to the U.N., the United States ensures that U.N. peacekeeping mandates are clear, credible, and limited to what is achievable, and that peacekeepers are properly prepared. We use our voice and vote to ensure that these missions are consistent with U.S. national interests.

Demands for U.N. peacekeeping have grown substantially in recent years. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations is currently responsible for around 100,000 peacekeepers (military, civilian, and police) deployed in 16 peacekeeping operations and two political missions around the world. Since October 2003 the Security Council has authorized five major operations—Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi, and Sudan—and has substantially expanded the missions in Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

During the same time we have seen increasing responsibilities for post-conflict programs built into peacekeeping mandates, with experts in elections, rule of law, human rights, disarmament, security sector reform, and other such critical elements being added to what were once mainly military operations in support of peace agreements. This multidimensional approach is in close step with the creation of the new Peacebuilding Commission. The mission in East Timor is a good example of the new integrated mission, bringing a number of U.N. functions under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and serving a post-conflict need, which is a step farther than traditional peacekeeping responses to crisis. Mandates are often extended at least a year past elections to allow new governments to establish roots. There is a growing trend to following a peacekeeping mission with a political mission to ensure continuing international attention to countries emerging from crisis.

Question. In our March 13 meeting, you said you were not certain that all the forces dedicated to the surge would be used, but mentioned GEN Petraeus's preference to have them there.

(a) What do you think about the 20,000–30,000 additional troops we are talking about today?

(b) How long do you give the surge to succeed? What are the benchmarks or milestones that we should expect to be met in the next 2 months?

(c) How can we better leverage the interests of Iraq's neighbors?

Answer. (a) In addition to the build-up of 21,500 troops (approximately five brigades) announced by the President in January, Secretary of Defense Gates announced on March 7 his request for approximately 2,400 military support personnel and 2,200 additional U.S. military police to assist with detainee requirements. The last of nine additional Iraqi battalions and the second of the five U.S. brigades are now operating in Baghdad. These additional forces are needed to partner with Iraqi units in this Iraqi-led operation. The purpose of this partnership is to increase the capabilities of ISF through combined operations and mentoring. Over 45 Joint Security Stations are being established among the 10 security framework districts to facilitate cooperation between Coalition and Iraqi forces and to build trust and confidence with the local population. This Iraqi-led effort is clearing focus districts and, with Coalition support, is working to provide a 24-hour presence in the city to protect the population from hostile reinfiltration. This represents a critical shift away from operating out of forward-operating bases. We fully support the Department of Defense in its decisions about troop levels to ensure the success of Operation Fardh al-Qanoon.

(b) While some initial results from Operation Fardh al-Qanoon have been favorable, it is too soon to assess or extrapolate a timeline for the military operation only in its second month. We are closely monitoring Iraq's progress. Factors being assessed include trends in violence, whether Iraqi army units are showing up and performing in a nonsectarian manner, whether or not there is Iraqi political interference in military decisions, and whether or not Iraq is making progress on key political issues, such as passage of a national hydrocarbon law, preparations for provincial elections, and reform of the de-Baathification laws. We also are examining the extent to which Iraq is investing its resources in its own economic future and taking the steps necessary to effectively execute its budget.

While the United States Government will continue to help Iraq, we have made it clear to the Iraqi Government that our commitment is not open-ended. That said, while we expect to see progress in the aforementioned areas, we are not setting deadlines. To do so would in some cases give a veto power to political forces in Iraq that are opposed to progress in some of these areas. Thus, while we can encourage the Iraqi Government and make our views known about the importance of making continued progress, and we are confident progress will continue, we are not in a position to set arbitrary deadlines, nor should we.

(c) As part of the President's New Way Forward, and in line with the Iraq Study Group recommendations, we have been engaged in a robust "diplomatic offensive" to boost international and regional support for Iraq. To this end, the United States participated in the subministerial Neighbors Conference in Baghdad on March 10, and the Secretary intends to participate in a follow-on ministerial in the region in April. The March 10 Neighbors Conference established working groups, which will give the United States a seat at the table alongside Iraq's neighbors in negotiating concrete assistance to help Iraq deal with pressing issues such as refugees, fuel supplies, and security (including border security).

Furthermore, our diplomatic efforts include Secretary Rice's intensified dialog with the Gulf Cooperation Council through GCC+2 (Egypt and Jordan) at the Foreign Minister level. We have similarly stepped up our dialog with the Arab League to garner more support for the Iraqi Government. We also note our positive engagement and progress on the International Compact with Iraq, which the Iraqi Vice President finalized and presented to U.N. ambassadors on March 16 in New York. The Compact enables the Iraqi Government to work directly with its neighbors, the international community, the World Bank and U.N. institutions on a 5-year economic development plan that will bolster civilian reconstruction and development efforts crucial to Iraq's success. Finally, we continue to engage with Iraq's neighbors and other regional players to ensure that Iraq receives the support it needs to succeed.

Question. Venezuela barely lost its bid to win a seat on the U.N. Security Council. How can the United States increase our influence in the U.N. and counteract President Chavez's influence? What will you do to prevent him from derailing multilateral diplomatic efforts with his antics?

Answer. The best way to counteract the obstructionist policies of Venezuela is through constructive, collaborative, and results-oriented partnerships with allies and other countries as well as the U.N. Secretariat. I will work with other democ-

racies to increase our influence, and the influence of other responsible democracies, through a reinvigorated Democracy Caucus. I will work with representatives of democratic countries that see promise in this approach to develop a common agenda and political strategy to achieve our shared goals. I will also reach out to our friends and encourage like-minded countries to reach out to their friends in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 to discuss how we might make common cause on issues of mutual importance. Finding new ways of working with the countries in these blocs will be critical to minimizing the disruptions caused by Venezuelan antics.

Question. Do you support the agreement reached in February with North Korea? Why would your predecessor oppose the deal?

Answer. I support our North Korea policy. President Bush has said that the Six-Party Talks represent the best opportunity to use diplomacy to address North Korea's nuclear programs and reflect the common commitment of the participants to a Korean Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons.

I am not in a position to speak for Mr. Bolton, except to note that as a private citizen he is entitled to his opinion.

Question. What is the status of negotiations at the U.N. Security Council on a new resolution with tougher sanctions? Are China and Russia supportive of these efforts?

Answer. Last week, the governments of the P-5 (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany reached agreement on a draft second sanctions resolution, which imposes additional sanctions on Iran. The resolution was introduced to the full U.N. Security Council for its consideration on March 15; member states are now consulting capitals. We look forward to the rapid adoption of the resolution by the full U.N. Security Council and are confident that the U.N. Security Council will continue to make clear to the Iranian regime that there are costs for its continued defiance.

As Secretary Rice has reiterated many times, the generous P5+1 package remains on the table, including the United States' offer to engage in direct discussions with Iran. Iran's continued refusal to suspend enrichment—despite the generous incentives package—is a missed opportunity. We urge the Iranian regime to abandon its current confrontational course, comply with its international obligations, cooperate fully with the IAEA, suspend its enrichment-related activities, and enter into constructive negotiations.

Question. You agreed that United States intervention in Lebanon in the 1980s was not a successful exercise. I suggested the failure was due to a perception of U.S. bias in siding with the Maronite Christians at the time.

What lessons can we take away from our historical experience in Lebanon? How can we avoid a similar situation in Iraq, as regards sectarian rivalries and allegations of United States complicity in ethnic cleansing?

Answer. While there are major differences between Lebanon in the 1980s and Iraq in the 21st Century, our Lebanon experience makes clear that while military intervention may sometimes be necessary in the face of a crisis, long-term stability can best be achieved through development of a strong, functioning democracy in which every individual has a voice. Applying that lesson to Iraq, it means that we must build on our military successes and press all sides to engage in meaningful reconciliation, compromise, and mutual understanding to ensure that the disaffected recognize the ability of Iraq's democratic system to secure their safety, rights, and legitimate participation in the political process. In this effort, the United States Government does not side with any sectarian or ethnic group in Iraq against any others, and is morally opposed to ethnic cleansing in all its forms, whether in Lebanon, in Iraq, or in any other country.

Question. What will the United States do in the U.N. to help the people of Darfur?

Answer. The appointment of Special Envoy Natsios, intensified diplomatic engagement at the U.N. and in Khartoum, and our efforts to encourage a political solution in Darfur while working towards a more robust peacekeeping operation demonstrate continued United States commitment to Darfur. Our first objective in Darfur is to achieve a durable peace through a political settlement that is agreed to by all parties voluntarily, and then is actually implemented. The United States believes that the U.N. and the African Union, under Special Envoys, Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim, should take the lead in mediating a political agreement between the rebels and the Sudanese Government, and the United States will do everything possible to support them in this process. We also will continue to push for the deployment of the three-phase plan for U.N.-led peacekeeping in Darfur and also support the

potential deployment of U.N. peacekeepers in Chad and the Central African Republic.

The United States Government remains the leading international donor to Sudan and as of March 2007 has contributed over \$2 billion for humanitarian programs in Sudan and eastern Chad. In fiscal year 2007, the United States will provide more than \$1.2 billion in funds for the provision of humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping assistance to Sudan. In fiscal year 2008, we have requested a comparable level of funding, and thus look to provide more than \$2 billion in assistance over the next 2 years. We have contributed over \$350 million to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) since its inception, including base camp construction, equipment, logistics, and airlift, in addition to the provision of training and logistical support.

We will continue to impose domestic sanctions and support U.N. sanctions against the individuals (Government of Sudan and rebels) responsible for the violence or for impeding the peace in Darfur, and against the entities that are owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan. We are engaged diplomatically with the Sudanese Government to urge its full acceptance of the A.U.–U.N.-hybrid force under U.N. command and control, which the Government of Sudan agreed to in Addis Ababa. We have also continued discussions of “Plan B,” which would be a series of more coercive measures aimed at pressuring the Government of Sudan, with our international partners, and made clear to the Sudanese Government that we are prepared to use stronger measures in the event the Government of Sudan continues to defy the will of the international community.

Question. How will the United States delegation deal with Chinese and Russian opposition to sanctions and denunciations against the Sudanese Government?

Answer. We have begun a dialog with Security Council members on next steps. We hope that President Bashir will, despite his March 6 letter to the Secretary General, back the heavy support package and the U.N.-led hybrid force in Darfur and cooperate with its deployment immediately. Absent such an indication, we believe President Bashir has made it clear to the international community that it is time to consider coercive actions to pressure Sudan to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and accept deployment of the vitally-needed U.N. peacekeeping operation in Sudan. We believe that Security Council members have found common ground, together with the A.U., in collective impatience with President Bashir’s intransigence, to call for new measures. We will impose additional domestic targeted sanctions against those who are impeding the peace and encourage our international partners to speedily support U.N. sanctions against the offending parties until there is peace in Darfur. We will continue working with China and Russia to pursue tough and effective measures in Darfur, since they are aware that the international community and world opinion expect effective leadership from the Security Council and its members.

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. And then last—and we haven’t had a lot of discussion on this, but this is one of my major concerns, and that is the Human Rights Council. I know that the Council is supposed to be an element of reform. When Cuba and China, some of the biggest human rights abusers, are on the Council, I just quite can’t understand it. But I am concerned that our absence from it at the same time, while a statement that we don’t believe it has reformed the way it should, also leaves—cedes the ground to others on some of the most consequential issues. People who languish in countries in the world who look to the United States as a beacon of light, of freedom and democracy, and of respect for human rights—when that voice is absent in that respect, I’m not quite sure that we’re promoting our interests or giving those people who we want to see take the chance to struggle in their own countries to move toward democracy in their own countries and human rights the type of hope and opportunity that they want. And so I’d like to hear how you’re going to be pursuing that course as well.

Answer. We will continue to be a forceful advocate in the promotion of human rights around the world and will bring attention to those areas where respect for human rights is lacking. We will work to promote human rights in all U.N. bodies, such as the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) Third Committee, and where appropriate, the U.N. Security Council.

The Human Rights Council (HRC) has been a disappointment. The HRC has dealt repeatedly with the one issue of Israel, and only weakly with Sudan. The HRC has

not proven a capacity—as called for in UNGA resolution 60/251—to address urgent and serious human rights situations without bias. As you note, we did not run for the Council last year and recently announced we will not run again this year, but remain as a highly active observer in Geneva, led by our Permanent Representative, Warren Tichenor. We believe that the Council should expand its focus from beyond issues related to Israel and examine continuing situations of real concern, such as Sudan, Burma, North Korea, and Cuba, or the recently emerging crisis in Zimbabwe.

In the final months of its first year, we are committed to building a more effective institution. We will continue working with our democratic allies in Geneva to change the course of the Council. This means pushing firmly for: (1) a balanced agenda that does not include a permanent item singling out Israel and not any other nations; (2) any experts appointed to roles in the Council to be unbiased and chosen based on their qualifications and not elected by the HRC; (3) renewal of the mandates of all of the country-specific Special Rapporteurs; and, (4) increased emphasis on the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights' field activities rather than politicized conference work in Geneva.

Question. How do we move other countries to more fully enforce the existing Security Council actions? And as we try to make those actions more pervasive, how do you intend to try to use all of the resources—your diplomatic skills, of course, whatever persuasiveness, showing other countries their own interests in pursuing this, but also other options we have? We have economic levers here to pull as well. How do we get them to understand that containing Iran's nuclear ambitions is one in which there is common cause and we have greater success in its enforcement?

Answer. We are responding to Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, hegemonic aspirations, support for terrorism, and destabilizing activities with a comprehensive strategy that relies on American diplomatic leadership and a strong multilateral coalition. First and foremost, we have made clear to Tehran that its provocative and destabilizing policies will entail painful costs, including financial hardship for its leaders, diplomatic isolation, and long-term detriment to Iran's prestige and fundamental national interests. Second, and equally important, we have worked to alter the regime's behavior and to convince it that a cooperative, more constructive course that would better serve its interests is available.

In December 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1737, imposing Chapter VII sanctions targeting Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and demanding that Iran completely and verifiably suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities, heavy water-related projects and cooperate fully with the IAEA. In light of the IAEA Director General's February 22, 2007 report confirming Iran's noncompliance with UNSCR 1737, we worked with the permanent five members of the UNSC and Germany on a second draft U.N. sanctions resolution to signal to Iran the costs of its defiance. That resolution is now before the full Security Council, with adoption expected soon.

We are also working bilaterally with major governments to curtail business transactions with Iranian companies and individuals tied to Iran's nuclear activities and support for terrorism. The Department of the Treasury has used its authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to sanction Iranian Bank Sepah for providing support and services to entities involved in Iran's missile programs. Additionally, the Department of the Treasury cut Iranian state-owned Bank Saderat off from all access to the United States financial system because of its support for terrorism. Banks worldwide have begun to recognize the serious risk associated with Iranian business with some beginning to scale back their Iran portfolios.

We are also working with France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and others to signal our strong support for Prime Minister Siniora's democratically elected government in Lebanon and to prevent Iran and Syria from rearming Hizballah. We have stationed two carrier battle groups in the Gulf to reassure our friends in the Arab world that it remains an area of vital importance to us. And at the regional level, Secretary Rice last autumn launched a series of ongoing discussions with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners, as well as Egypt and Jordan, regarding issues of shared concern, including Iran.

While we are acting vigorously to isolate the Iranian Government, we are also offering to it a diplomatic way forward. Secretary Rice has agreed to join her P5+1 colleagues in direct discussions with Iran regarding the nuclear and other issues "at any place and at any time," provided Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

If we continue our skillful diplomatic course and have the patience to see it play out over the mid- to long-term, we are confident we can avoid conflict with Iran and

see our strategy succeed. Our strong hope is that Iran will accept the offer to negotiate with the United States and our P-5 partners so that we can achieve a peaceful end to Tehran's nuclear weapons ambitions.

Question. But I'd like to see how do you intend to, again, use the wide array of options that exist for us to actually get President al-Bashir to submit to what he has gone back on, which is a hybrid A.U.-U.N. peacekeeping force?

Answer. We are strongly encouraging the international community, including Sudan's major allies, to pressure Sudan for full acceptance of a hybrid A.U.-U.N. peacekeeping force. Sudan agreed to this force in November, although in a March 6 response to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's letter, President Bashir backed away from this commitment. The United States and other members of the international community found the response letter unacceptable and expect Sudan to honor its prior commitments. The letter is an affront to the A.U. and the U.N., as it reneges on agreements with both groups. We, therefore, are moving forward to implement additional sanctions against individuals and entities, and will continue to examine other coercive options. We will work closely with the international community to ensure maximum pressure on Khartoum. We continue to call on Sudan to immediately reverse its position on U.N. deployment, end bureaucratic constraints that hinder the critical efforts by international humanitarian workers, and fully cooperate with the A.U.-U.N. led political process.

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR BARACK OBAMA

Question. I'm wondering whether the administration has some plan in the United Nations, whether other countries are thinking about how we might put more pressure on the Mugabe regime.

Answer. We are deeply concerned about the tragic events that are occurring in Zimbabwe. The United States has strongly condemned the recent atrocities committed by the Government of Zimbabwe against a leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change and other opposition activists.

We are seeking action on the Zimbabwe situation at the U.N. Human Rights Council and support the British request at the U.N. Security Council for the Secretariat to provide a report on Zimbabwe. We have discussed the issue with the African Union, which has issued a strong statement. We are encouraged that so many nations and organizations around the world have condemned the atrocities in Zimbabwe and have called on the Zimbabwean Government to respect the rights of its own people. We are also exploring means for broadening our financial and travel sanctions, which are targeted at those leaders who are oppressing the people of Zimbabwe.

Question. You may feel the same way about this next question, because it's a broad one, but I think one that's vital and that touches on the others. One of the other core missions of the United Nations—well, you mentioned—and that's security—it's my view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the structure that we've set up in the past is fraying rather badly. I think everybody's in agreement that the NPT needs updating. We've got regional proliferation problems like Iran and North Korea, but we've also got some broader questions arising out of the treaty with India, the desire for a variety of nations to look at nuclear power as an option to deal with their energy needs. We still need to make more progress on securing nuclear materials and enhancing international interdiction efforts. So I'm just wondering, do you have at this stage any thoughts in terms of how the administration would approach strengthening that regime? Is it something that you've already discussed?

Answer. President Bush has a broad strategy for nuclear nonproliferation, as set out in the National Strategy to Combat WMD Proliferation. The National Strategy to Combat WMD is the first of its kind—a broad strategy uniting all the elements of national power needed to counter the full spectrum of WMD threats. Previous U.S. approaches had focused almost exclusively on nonproliferation. The Bush administration has dramatically expanded U.S. nonproliferation efforts to prevent acquisition of WMD, related materials, and delivery systems by rogue states or terrorists. The three pillars in the National Strategy of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management do not stand alone, but rather come together as seamless elements of a comprehensive approach.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, provides the international legal basis for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons

and is the essential foundation for global nuclear nonproliferation. Additionally, the United States supports many programs to increase our ability to prevent, detect, and deter the proliferation of nuclear materials. U.S. assistance to other countries to reduce and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery vehicles—through DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the Department of Energy's nuclear nonproliferation programs, and the smaller but nonetheless important State Department programs—has been at record funding levels. The President has committed an average of \$1 billion a year to these critical efforts; we greatly welcome the consistent, strong support of the committee for these essential programs. Moreover, with the proposal in 2002 for the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the President successfully called on our foreign partners to commit their fair share to the effort to meet what is a global responsibility.

The United States also has led the way to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to detect nuclear proliferation. We instituted a successful effort to increase the IAEA's safeguards budget. We have strongly supported the IAEA Additional Protocol, to strengthen the agency's ability to uncover clandestine nuclear programs. The President also successfully urged the creation of a new special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to examine ways to strengthen the agency's safeguards and verification capabilities.

In addition to the President's proposals to strengthen the IAEA institutionally, he challenged the international community to rectify the greatest weakness in the nuclear nonproliferation system: the ability of states to pursue nuclear weapons under the cover of peaceful energy programs. The lesson of Iran and North Korea is clear: Some states will cynically manipulate the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to acquire sensitive technologies to enable them to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities—the very capabilities the treaty is intended to deny. To close this loophole, the President has proposed that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities—the two primary paths to acquiring fissile material for nuclear weapons—be limited to those states that already operate full-scale, fully-functioning facilities. In return, he called on the world's nuclear fuel suppliers to assure supply, in a reliable and cost effective manner, to those states which forego enrichment and reprocessing. We are working with other fuel provider states and with the IAEA to put in place assurances that will convince states with power reactors that their best economic interest is not to invest in expensive, and proliferation risky, fuel cycle capabilities.

The Department of Energy plays a critical part in developing these Presidential initiatives and working with other nations to bring them to fruition. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), led by DOE, offers the promise for the longer term of enhancing global access to nuclear energy while strengthening nonproliferation. An important emphasis of the initiative is to provide a basis for states to benefit from civil nuclear power while avoiding the costs and challenges of enriching fresh fuel on the front end of the fuel cycle and disposing of spent fuel on the back end. The Department of State is working closely with DOE to engage international partners to participate actively in GNEP.

In addition, the United States has led the way in the U.N. Security Council to broaden the international requirements on nonproliferation. The United States spearheaded United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. In adopting UNSCR 1540, the Security Council—for only the second time since its founding—invoked its Chapter VII authorities to require nations to act against a general, as opposed to a specific, threat to international peace and security. In particular, UNSCR 1540 requires all states to prohibit WMD proliferation activities, such as we witnessed with the A.Q. Khan network. It further requires that states institute effective export controls, and enhance security for nuclear materials on their territory. We also have led the U.N. Security Council in adopting U.N. Chapter VII resolutions 1718 and 1737, targeting North Korea and Iran, respectively.

We have worked to strengthen our counterproliferation efforts to ensure that we have the capability to work with states around the world to interdict shipments of proliferation concern, and to impede the finances of proliferation. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, has been endorsed by more than 80 nations. This global initiative seeks to have all nations use their existing legal authorities—national and international—to defeat proliferation and applies intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, and other tools at the disposal of nations to impede transfers of WMD-related items to countries and entities of concern.

Additionally, we have worked closely with the Department of Treasury to enhance our ability to prevent proliferators from accessing the international financial system. President Bush augmented U.S. efforts in this area when he issued in July 2005

a new Executive Order 13382, which authorizes the U.S. Government to freeze assets and block transactions of entities and persons, or their supporters, engaged in proliferation activities. Currently, entities from North Korea, Iran, and Syria have been the focus of our efforts under the Order. These actions have assisted in further isolating these regimes from the international community.

Another key effort of the United States has been the development of international cooperation to combat nuclear terrorism. President Bush has described this threat as the central national security challenge of our era. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, launched last year by Presidents Bush and Putin, is the first initiative of its kind, one that takes a comprehensive approach to dealing with all elements of the challenge. The initiative is consistent with, and builds on, existing legal frameworks such as the Nuclear Terrorism Convention and U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1373. It provides a flexible framework that will enable sustained international cooperation to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism. The central objective of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is to establish a growing network of partner nations that are committed to taking effective measures to build a layered defense-in-depth that can continuously adapt to the changing nature of the threat. While many individual programs and efforts have approached one element or aspect of the nuclear terrorism threat, the Global Initiative provides a capacity building framework for establishing new partnerships with those nations that wish to take similar action. In carrying out this new initiative, we will also cooperate with the IAEA and invite them to participate.

NOMINATION

THURSDAY MARCH 22, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Fraker, Ford M., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Kerry presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Lugar, Sununu, and Isakson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KERRY. This is a hearing to hear the views of Ford Fraker to be Ambassador of the United States of America to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And we welcome you, Mr. Fraker. Thank you very much for being willing to do this, and we look forward to a conversation this morning that shouldn't take that long.

We understand that this post is unaccompanied, and I gather that unaccompaniment has already begun this morning. [Laughter.]

The members of your family are scattered around with spring vacations and other obligations. We understand that, but we're grateful to them for their willingness to see you go off to this complicated part of the world for a year or so. And, we understand, obviously, and are grateful for the sacrifices that families make in this process.

Needless to say, the position that you've been nominated for, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, is a very important one to our country, and a very challenging one. Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is one of the most significant, and complex relationships that we have anywhere in the world.

I was personally gratified to hear that you have such extensive experience in the region, that you speak the language, which is an enormous benefit to any ambassador going anywhere, but particularly, this part of the world.

Saudi Arabia, obviously, has played and continues to play a vital role in our relationship and throughout the region. When it comes to stabilizing Iraq, when it comes to dealing with radical extremism within Islam, when it comes to dealing with global terrorism, conflict in Lebanon, or forging a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, no country is more important than Saudi Arabia.

In all of these areas, Saudi Arabia has made important contributions and significant progress, but we all understand there's also more that can be done, and must be done. Iraq is at the top of everybody's agenda, at this particular moment, and for rightful reasons, but it is also part of a larger and complicated series of concerns in the region. The Saudi Government, I might say, made it clear at the beginning that they did not support the decisions, the administration's decision to invade Iraq. And the Iraq Study Group concluded that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States have been, "passive and disengaged since then."

I have personally traveled to the region, while not to Saudi Arabia in the last couple of years, but other countries in the region and that is indeed the conclusion that I would also come to.

Regardless of what's happened in the past, we all share an interest in bringing stability to Iraq. Any successful strategy is going to require strong support from other countries in the region, and Saudi Arabia must play an assertive and positive role in that effort.

We need to help them and they need to help us in convincing Sunni politicians to make the tough compromises necessary for the political solution. That is the only solution to the violence. And also, their help in cracking down on support for Sunni insurgents coming into Iraq from their country. We must also encourage them to step up in terms of debt relief and reconstruction assistance.

But, it's important to remember that Iraq is only one part of the broader Sunni-Shia rift that goes back some 1,300 years. We're all aware of the concerns expressed by the Saudis, and other Sunni leaders about the Shia revival and Iran's growing influence. The Saudis can play a key role in our emerging efforts to create a regional security structure that will help to contain Iran and, to that end, the administration has approved over \$9 billion in potential arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

At the same time, we need to work with our Sunni allies in a way that does not exacerbate the Sunni-Shia conflict or give support to Sunni extremist groups, who may one day, turn against us and everyone else.

We've recently seen the Saudis step up their efforts to play a mediating role in resolving conflicts throughout the Middle East. They've worked to bring about a peaceful resolution to the impasse in Lebanon. I know that's been constructive because I was recently in Lebanon and heard first-hand from different leaders there of the role they were playing. And, that is a crucial assistance in promoting democracy and strengthening the moderates in the region.

Also, the Saudis willingness to try to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians through the Peace Initiative proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah in March of 2002, now King Abdullah, which has been getting renewed attention, both in Israel and the United States, is commendable.

At the same time, the recent Mecca agreement, that laid the groundwork for the new Palestinian Unity Government, we must note, failed to meet the key requirements of the quartet and Israel. And we know that Saudi Arabia continues to participate in the primary boycott of Israel.

When it comes to fighting terrorism, the Saudis, have again, made some important progress, but more remains to be done. The 9/11 Commission put it this way—Saudi Arabia has been, “A problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism.” We know that counterterrorism cooperation has increased significantly since Saudi Arabia was itself attacked in 2003, and that’s not gone unappreciated. But, concerns remain, especially about the role of Saudi money in financing terrorist organizations and exporting and extremists’ ideology. One area of particular concern, was the role of Saudi-based charities funding groups that were linked to al-Qaeda and terrorist organizations in the Middle East, including one prominent charity that apparently used Arab bank branches in the Palestinian territories to provide funds directly to the families of suicide bombers.

The Saudis have taken steps to address this problem, including creating National Commission to ensure that charitable contributions don’t wind up in the wrong hands. But, that has not yet become operational and the Saudis still need to follow through on pledges to crack down on contributions from individuals.

So, finally, Saudi Arabia’s made steps toward democratization, including holding municipal elections in 2005. We do have to note, however, that women were not permitted to vote in those elections and the State Department’s report on international religious freedom, still lists Saudi Arabia as a country of particular concern.

So again, while there has been progress in bringing about reforms, there is still a distance to travel.

So, Mr. Fraker, as Ambassador, these are most of the difficult important challenges that you’ll be facing. I look forward to discussing them with you here this morning and hearing what your thoughts are and what the State Department’s thoughts are now, about how you should approach them.

Let me turn to Senator Sununu, and I note the ranking member, Senator Lugar is here, so, I’ll let you guys sort out who goes first. Senator Sununu.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE**

Senator SUNUNU. By previous agreement, Senator Lugar has allowed me to go first, but I’ll try to condense my remarks so that he has ample time.

I’d like to welcome Mr. Fraker. As you’ve indicated, Mr. Chairman, this is an important—a very important—position of great significance, not just to the United States, but to the region, because of the role Saudi Arabia plays in regional economics, in politics, the influence that they have on all the moderate and leading Arab States in the region.

There are a series of challenges that Mr. Fraker will have to deal with in his post as Ambassador. But, I would like to note and underscore a few of the items that you mentioned.

In particular, the recent leadership role played by the Kingdom and trying to move a framework and a process forward on negotiating peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians, support for participation in recent meetings in Iraq of all of the regional players that have a responsibility to help ensure territorial integrity in

Iraq, and the movement of weapons, and financing for terrorists in the region. And, I hope that that regional framework can continue to play an increasing role in improving the situation, not just in Iraq, but throughout the region.

And the third issue I would underscore is that of terrorism financing. I think Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries in the Gulf have played a very constructive role in dealing with some of the principal institutional mechanisms through which financing has moved terrorists throughout the region. But, there's obviously more opportunity for improvement and, in particular, the experience that Mr. Ford Fraker brings to this role, coming out of the financial services community, coming out of the banking community, having extensive experience in both global banking and in the Middle East region, provides a great opportunity to further improve the degree to which we've been able to stop the flow of funds to terrorists in the Middle East, and around the world.

So, I think by background, by experience, we have a great candidate here, maybe even a slightly unconventional candidate, but given the frustration many of us have felt about progress, and process in the Middle East, I think that a different approach, different experience, different perspective will be, would be very welcome, not just as a member of the diplomatic corps, but also welcome within the region.

I look forward to the testimony of Mr. Fraker and I'm happy to yield the floor to the Senator from Indiana.

Senator KERRY. Thanks, Senator.

Senator Lugar.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I thought your opening statement was very important as a comprehensive compilation of the many ways in which our relationship is so important. And, likewise, Senator Sununu has added to that.

I would just echo the thought that this is an extremely important relationship. Our committee has had testimony that is, that resources in the hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent for decades, largely to make certain there was security for oil resources that would come from Saudi Arabia and adjoining countries to the rest of the world, indeed, to ourselves. That relationship has had profound significance in terms of war and peace throughout the area. Your sophistication on the ground has informed you of much of that, and your personal history.

But, the current situation is one, just as my colleagues have pointed out, of intense consultation. A group of Senators met with the President and the Vice-President, Secretary of State yesterday about Latin American affairs, following the President's trip to Latin America. But, the President informed us that, as he was concluding the meeting, that he was going to be visiting with Prince Bandar. And that, obviously we were intrigued about that conversation, as we have been about conversations with Prince Bandar and his intercession in our affairs and of our consultation in the past.

I mention this because this is a time in which Secretary Rice's trip to the area is, once again, crucial. Not only in the Israeli-Palestinian process, but given Saudi diplomacy, and the very large role the Saudis have played in trying to find other openings. Is there going to be help from Saudi Arabia in perfecting the situation so there can be proper recognition of Israel and some hope for a two-state solution?

So, we look forward to your testimony and the opportunity for questions this morning. We welcome you to the committee.

Senator KERRY. Senator, thank you, for all of those observations and also your wisdom and leadership on these issues. We appreciate it.

Mr. Fraker, it's your chance now, to share with the committee your statement. We welcome it, and you can either put the whole thing in the record and summarize, or go with it as you please.

STATEMENT OF HON. FORD M. FRAKER, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. FRAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I come before you today both honored and humbled by the trust placed in me by President Bush and Secretary Rice. If confirmed as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, I will endeavor to carry out the President's mandate and represent our great Nation to the best of my ability.

For over 30 years, I have been a banker in the Middle East. I have lived in Beirut, Dubai, and Bahrain, and have traveled to the region often and extensively ever since. My experiences as a banker during this time have included being shot at in Beirut, bombed in Riyadh, spat upon in Iran, and interrogated by border guards in Syria.

I have driven the road from Baghdad to Kuwait City, trekked in the mountains of Yemen and Oman, and camped in the deserts of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Over this period, I have come to know and appreciate the countries, cultures, people, and language of the region. More importantly, I have also come to know how to effectively communicate with, and work with, many Arab groups.

At a time when diplomacy becomes increasingly vital for safeguarding and furthering American interests in the region, I believe it is critical that America's diplomats know about the countries, cultures, and people they are working with.

While living in the Gulf as a senior U.S. banker, I met and conducted business with various rulers and royal family members, as well as government officials, bankers, and businessmen at the highest levels. One lesson I learned quickly was, that to be effective, it is necessary to establish relationships on a personal level. Once trust and respect are gained, it is then possible to achieve specific objectives. This is especially true in Saudi Arabia, where we must sustain and deepen a vitally important partnership.

In my 30-year career as a banker, I have developed many personal relationships in the Kingdom. I believe these relationships, and my hard-won knowledge, will strengthen my ability to effectively represent the interests of the United States.

The United States and Saudi Arabia have maintained a strong and important relationship since President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with King Abdulaziz aboard the USS *Quincy* on his way back from Yalta in 1945. Though tested since the tragic events of 9/11, our relationship has remained strong, as together we confront the threats of violent extremism, international terror, and regional instability.

Saudi Arabia has been, and will continue to be, one of our key regional partners as together we face the challenges in the region. Securing and maintaining Saudi support will be critical to our success in realizing many of our regional objectives.

In recent years, our cooperation in military, law enforcement, and security has deepened. We have supported the Saudis as they have confronted their own domestic terror threat from al-Qaeda. The Saudis have made, and continue to make, substantial progress fighting terror. Hundreds of terrorists have been arrested and killed in the last 3 years. I believe the Saudis have come to understand the need to address the roots of extremism that underlie terrorism; especially the need to aggressively deny financial support for terrorist organizations.

If confirmed, I will be committed to expanding and deepening our efforts in these critical areas.

We continue to be concerned with the restrictions on religious freedom in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is proud of its responsibility as custodian of Islam's holy sites of Mecca and Medina. However, it must also work to ensure that moderation and tolerance triumph over extremism and hatred. Working closely with Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom, John Hanford, Ambassadors Jordan and Oberwetter have both made the promotion of religious freedom a priority, and progress has been achieved. If confirmed, I am determined to build on their efforts and to press for more improvement.

To defeat extremism, it is important that Saudi Arabia take the lead in pursuing economic, political, and social reforms to ensure long-term stability. These include the pursuit of increased opportunities for Saudi citizens—especially women—to participate in government and all aspects of society; economic reforms that will make the private sector an engine for growth and job creation; and education reforms that prepare Saudi youth for the demands of a modern society. If confirmed, I look forward to working on these critical issues.

The United States-Saudi Strategic Dialog has become an effective mechanism for promoting America's regional and bilateral interests, including reform, and, if confirmed, I will work to strengthen this important partnership initiative.

Saudi Arabia has approximately 25 percent of the world's oil reserves. In order to sustain U.S. and global economic prosperity, a steady and reliable supply of energy is essential. Saudi Arabia plays a key role in ensuring the stability of world oil markets. Saudi Arabia is also an important trading partner for the United States in many other areas, and I will be a strong advocate for United States business in all sectors.

There is no responsibility more important in the work of our missions abroad than assisting American citizens in distress or need.

If confirmed, I will place the highest priority on the security of the personnel at the United States mission, and on protecting the safety and welfare of all our citizens in Saudi Arabia. I will also work to ensure that American children who have been wrongfully taken from their parents may return home, and that any adult American woman may freely depart from Saudi Arabia, at any time.

In conclusion, if confirmed as Ambassador, I will use the skills and knowledge I have developed during my career in the Middle East to serve the best interests of my country. I will keep your concerns and questions firmly in my mind while I carry out my responsibilities. I hope you will visit the Kingdom, so that together we can continue to strengthen this vital strategic relationship.

Thank you for considering my nomination.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fraker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FORD M. FRAKER, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

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For over 30 years, I have been a banker in the Middle East. I have lived in Beirut, Dubai, and Bahrain, and have traveled to the region often and extensively ever since. My experiences as a banker during this time have included being shot at in Beirut, bombed in Riyadh, spat upon in Iran, and interrogated by border guards in Syria. I have driven the road from Baghdad to Kuwait City, trekked in the mountains of Yemen and Oman, and camped in the deserts of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Over this period, I have come to know and appreciate the countries, cultures, people, and language of the region. More importantly, I have also come to know how to effectively communicate with and work with many Arab groups. At a time when diplomacy becomes increasingly vital for safeguarding and furthering American interests in the region, I believe it is critical that America's diplomats know the countries, cultures, and people they are working with.

While living in the Gulf as a senior U.S. banker, I met and conducted business with various rulers and royal family members, as well as government officials, bankers, and businessmen at the highest levels. One lesson I learned quickly was that to be effective it is necessary to establish relationships on a personal level. Once trust and respect are gained it is then possible to achieve specific objectives. This is especially true in Saudi Arabia, where we must sustain and deepen a vitally important partnership. In my 30-year career as a banker, I have developed many personal relationships in the Kingdom. I believe these relationships and my hard-won knowledge will strengthen my ability to effectively represent the interests of the United States.

The United States and Saudi Arabia have maintained a strong and important relationship since President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with King Abdulaziz aboard the USS *Quincy* on his way back from Yalta in 1945. Though tested since the tragic events of 9/11, our relationship has remained strong as together we confront the threats of violent extremism, international terror, and regional instability. Saudi Arabia has been, and will continue to be, one of our key regional partners as together we face the challenges in the region. Securing and maintaining Saudi support will be key to our success in realizing many of our regional objectives.

In recent years, our cooperation in military, law enforcement, and security issues has deepened. We have supported the Saudis as they have confronted their own domestic terror threat from al-Qaida. The Saudis have made, and continue to make, substantial progress fighting terror.

Hundreds of terrorists have been arrested and killed in the last 3 years. I believe the Saudis have come to understand the need to address the roots of extremism that underlie terrorism; especially the need to aggressively deny financial support for terrorist organizations. If confirmed, I will be committed to expanding and deepening our efforts in these critical areas.

We continue to be concerned with the restrictions on religious freedom in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is proud of its responsibility as custodian of Islam's holy sites of Mecca and Medina. However, it must also work to ensure that moderation and tolerance triumph over extremism and hatred. Working closely with Ambassador at

Large for Religious Freedom, John Hanford, Ambassadors Jordan and Oberwetter have both made the promotion of religious freedom a priority and progress has been achieved. If confirmed, I am determined to build on their efforts and to press for more improvement.

To defeat extremism, it is important that Saudi Arabia take the lead in pursuing economic, political, and social reforms to ensure long-term stability. These include the pursuit of increased opportunities for Saudi citizens especially women—to participate in government and all aspects of society; economic reforms that will make the private sector an engine for growth and job creation; and education reforms that prepare Saudi youth for the demands of a modern society. If confirmed, I look forward to working on these critical issues.

The United States-Saudi Strategic Dialog has become an effective mechanism for promoting America's regional and bilateral interests, including reform, and, if confirmed, I will work to strengthen this important partnership initiative.

Saudi Arabia has approximately 25 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. In order to sustain U.S. and global economic prosperity, a steady and reliable supply of energy is essential. Saudi Arabia plays a key role in ensuring the stability of world oil markets. Saudi Arabia is also an important trading partner for the United States in many other areas, and I will be a strong advocate for United States business.

There is no responsibility more important in the work of our missions abroad than assisting American citizens in distress or need. If confirmed, I will place the highest priority on the security of the personnel at the United States mission and on protecting the safety and welfare of all our citizens in Saudi Arabia. I will also work to ensure that American children who have been wrongfully taken from their parents may return home, and that any adult American woman may freely depart Saudi Arabia at any time.

In conclusion, if confirmed as Ambassador, I will use the skills and knowledge I have developed during my career in the Middle East to serve the best interests of my country. I will keep your concerns and questions firmly in mind while I carry out my responsibilities. I hope you will visit the Kingdom so that together we can continue to strengthen this vital strategic relationship.

Thank you for considering my nomination.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Fraker. We appreciate it and again, I think you are enormously qualified on paper, and certainly in experience. And, we hope you're able to have an impact on each of the areas that you've talked about.

Let me begin by asking you, has the Department, has the Secretary of State, or the administration, specifically charged you with respect to any one component of the portfolio? Have they said to you, "This is our first priority," or "Here's where we'd really like you to put your major focus?"

Mr. FRAKER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the statement that my No. 1 priority and concern is the safety and welfare of Americans in the mission and American Saudi Arabians in general, is top of the list and that is emphasized in all the meetings that I have.

Senator KERRY. That's a normal—every ambassador in every place is charged with that. Is there something special, with respect to the peace process, or with respect to Iraq and the regional security that has been articulated to you?

Mr. FRAKER. Not specifically, other than to say that there are a range of highly important issues, all of which I will be expected to address, with counterterrorism being the one that comes up most frequently in discussions.

Senator KERRY. You mentioned in your testimony, you say that the threats of violent extremism, international terror, and regional instability are things we need to work on together, and you hope to advance the relationship with respect to those issues. How do you anticipate doing that?

Mr. FRAKER. Working very closely with our Saudi colleagues—regional stability and security is critical to both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The attacks in Kingdom in 2003 and 2004 made that crystal-clear to the Saudis, and I believe cooperation in this area has been intense and effective.

Having said that, there's more to be done. We've touched on the area of terrorist financing. That's a particular area, given my background, I believe I can add value to, if confirmed, and look forward to working with the Saudis on that, specifically.

Senator KERRY. Do you have an area where you have a sense from your own experience that there's a particular opportunity for progress?

Mr. FRAKER. I do, I have a particular area that I'm focused on, have been throughout my career and, if confirmed, would like to spend a lot of time on, and that's the area of education. I firmly believe that, that we best address the underlying issues of extremism and radicalism by, by getting to the students at an early age. And, encouraging exchange programs amongst young students, Saudis coming here, Americans going there, I think is the best way to address that. And, if confirmed, that is an area I'll be focusing on.

Senator KERRY. How would you describe the degree to which the Saudis have concerns about Iran, and how do you see them, how do see that particular component of their relationship and ours also, sort of dovetailing, or not, over the course of the next months?

Mr. FRAKER. Historically, the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia—they've been adversaries. And, I think that continues. The Saudis have publicly decried the Iranian efforts to, their nuclear program, they've publicly said that they're against that. They've criticized the Iranians for meddling in Iraq and Lebanon. I think the Saudis will prove to be a good partner for us in those issues and in facing off against Iran.

Senator KERRY. Do you believe that if Iran pursues its nuclear ambitions, the Saudis are likely to also?

Mr. FRAKER. I don't know. I do know that the GCC has publicly stated their interest in exploring the possibility of developing peaceful nuclear technology. I don't know if that's a shot across Iranian bows or not. It's something that I'd like more information on.

Senator KERRY. What do you make of the meeting in Mecca, which obviously left the Quartet feeling less than satisfied, but on the other hand, within the Arab world, the word I hear is, sort of, don't make too much noise about it, this can help begin to move the process forward.

Mr. FRAKER. I believe that the United States and Saudi Arabia both believe that the Palestinians should be speaking with one voice, if ever there's going to be a chance of reconciliation. And, that the Mecca conference was an important step towards trying to get a one-voice Palestinian, heard.

The State Department position is that it's probably still early days yet to judge exactly how this unity government will behave. Obviously, we were disappointed that the Quartet principals weren't embraced. But, I think many people in the Middle East will see this, actually, as a constructive first step in a process to achieve this one-voice from the Palestinians.

Senator KERRY. If the Saudis are, indeed, intent on trying to advance that process, why do they continue the boycott of Israel?

Mr. FRAKER. Well, there's a long history here and I think that the Saudis should be judged on their efforts to encourage the moderate Palestinian element, in playing a constructive role in this whole process. And, I think that we will, we'll have some success in that area and if confirmed, that's very much an approach I would like to take with the Saudis. To have them continue to play this moderate role and encourage the moderates on the Palestinian side.

Senator KERRY. And a couple of pro-forma questions. Is there any interest that you have, financial or otherwise, that might require you to recuse yourself from any issue dealing as an ambassador?

Mr. FRAKER. The only, the only issue is with regard to a letter of undertaking I've signed because I have a pension plan that is managed by a bank in London, actually by a U.K. pension fund in London where the Saudi Government has a 40 percent interest in the bank, even though the bank has no interest in the pension fund.

Senator KERRY. Is there any interest you have or asset that you have that might present a conflict of interest with respect to any of the positions you have to represent in Riyadh?

Mr. FRAKER. No.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Fraker, I appreciate it.

Senator Sununu.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

You spoke a little bit about education. You mentioned a good mechanism for improving that level of education and exposure are exchange programs. Any other mechanisms that—or opportunities that you see—to improve that exposure, education to a broader set of ideas?

Mr. FRAKER. the United States-Saudi Strategic dialog has presented a very useful framework for dealing with a whole range of issues. One of them is, is reform and under that heading, education, as well. There's significant focus on the schools and the mosques, in terms of trying to eliminate extremist language, and in the schools, specifically the textbooks. And, that's a—that's an effort and an initiative that we should pursue very vigorously and one that, if confirmed, I would like to spend a lot of time focusing on.

Senator SUNUNU. What about the American institutions in Lebanon and Egypt, specifically, American University of Beirut, Lebanese-American University, and American University in Cairo? Those are institutions with very lengthy histories, in which I assume, in different ways you've come across in your work, both in Lebanon, and throughout the region.

What has been your personal experience with students from those institutions, and to what extent have students from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia taken advantage of their strengths?

Mr. FRAKER. In fact, when I lived in Beirut, I lived right next door the American University in Beirut, so I almost feel like I went to college at AUB. I got to know a number of the students there.

Senator SUNUNU. But, my first question was really an opportunity for you to, for you to emphasize the strength of the institutions. Obviously, you've got great personal experience. Go ahead.

Mr. FRAKER. Just to say, these are terrific institutions for furthering dialog and interaction between Americans and Arabs, whether they're Egyptians or Lebanese, or wherever. All this, in my view, should be significantly encouraged.

Senator SUNUNU. Do you know to what—they have students from all over the region—do you know to what extent their student body includes students from Saudi Arabia, and, can that be improved?

Mr. FRAKER. I don't know precisely. I do know that there are Saudi students at AUB, and also American University in Cairo. It's been a traditional college destination for many of them.

Senator SUNUNU. In the area of terrorist financing, are there any particular areas of the Saudi Arabian or Middle East banking system that you think are particularly vulnerable, right now?

Mr. FRAKER. We're—I think we're in the early days, to some extent, given the number of initiatives that have happened recently. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis have increased oversight over charities in the Kingdom, but there are real gaps in terms of their ability to manage and oversee the foreign branch operations of many of these charities. Similarly, foreign charities with branches in Saudi Arabia—there are difficulties in oversight there, so, that's a specific area where things can be tightened up.

They have recently enacted some money-laundering laws, and laws that target cash transfers, as well. All of this needs to be, to be looked at very carefully and tightened up. It's only just begun to happen.

So, there are a whole range of areas that, good first steps have been taken, but we should be on them and very aggressive in pursuing how they, how they enact the laws they've passed.

Senator SUNUNU. From your perspective, or your experience in banking and finance, how would you assess the strengths and the weaknesses in the current economy in Saudi Arabia?

Mr. FRAKER. Well, the Saudi economy at the moment is booming. Oil prices where they are have generated enormous amount of liquidity and cash. Locally, the Saudis are investing that in local industry. They have an infrastructure that's now, maybe 20 years old. They're going to have to reinvest a lot of money upgrading that. So, it's quite an exciting time in terms of being a member of SAMO, or the central bank, trying to manage, manage this economy because it is booming.

Senator SUNUNU. What has been the recent posture of the Saudi Arabian Government toward United States investment in the country and which sectors of the economy, do you think, hold the most promise for investment by U.S. firms?

Mr. FRAKER. The government has recently opened up the economy for, for more outside investment. And this is a significant event. And we've recently seen two major U.S. financial institutions, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, enter into joint venture arrangements in the Kingdom, JP Morgan, Chase as well. So, I think you will see a rush of financial institutions into the Kingdom.

I think on the manufacturing side, as well, there will be real opportunities, and it's one of the areas, if confirmed, I will, I envision myself spending a lot of time on, because I think there'll be terrific opportunities for trade and business.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You bring extraordinary qualifications in the banking area to this position. And, my questions really come down to, really the special talents that you have here.

You've touched upon the fact that there is greater oversight, presumably by the Saudi Government on contributions to charities, contributions coming from others to charities, and money laundering. One of the great questions about Saudi wealth and banks and transfers, and so forth, is the degree of distribution to al-Qaeda or to others who are associated with terrorism, not only in the Kingdom, but elsewhere, and the ability of the Saudis, or the willingness, the political will to monitor this, and indeed to stop it.

As an American banker, you may have had some experience in your previous calling with this type of activity, but what do you believe you are going to be able to do, from the standpoint of the United States working with strong Saudi allies to curtail these flows, which are critical to the support of terrorist groups?

Mr. FRAKER. Thank you, Senator.

As I've said, some important steps have been taken—initial steps have been taken—both in terms of laws that have been passed, and a focus on a greater oversight in a number of areas. The Saudi economy, traditionally, has been a cash economy. And, regulating cash is a difficult, is a difficult process. Also regulating—any country has difficulty regulating their private sector. And if you have a private sector running around with lots of cash, it's even more difficult to regulate.

Having said that, one of the laws they have recently passed addresses, specifically, the issue of cash in and out of the country. And, it really comes down, as you said, to their willingness, the political will to really address the problem, as well as the practical problems in a country with enormous borders and enormous traditional trade traffic back and forth across these borders. So, it really comes down to pressure, applying the laws that are in place, and following through on them.

From my standpoint, the big plus here is that, the laws are in place. So, you do have a mechanism for measuring performance. You can hold them accountable to a set of criteria, and I think that's a big step. And, if confirmed, that's an area that I have experience in and would relish the opportunity to focus on.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that's why I raised the question. I think it is a special qualification that you have and it comes at a time in which our diplomacy has been informed a great deal by such situations. For example, the North Korean negotiations, many feel, have progressed largely because of a treasury situation with the Macao Bank, and the interdiction of funds or pursuit of fraudulent activity there.

Likewise, it is suggested that this may be one of the more effective sanctions available when compared to cutting off vast amounts of trade in the banking system. The flow of, for example, money from China to Sudan has been suggested as maybe a critical area, unlike almost any other.

That brings me to the second part of my question. Do you have a personal acquaintance with members of the royal family, with the previous Saudi Ambassador to the United States, or with any of these figures who have come back and forth through our public life informing our Presidents, Democratic and Republican, over many years?

Mr. FRAKER. I have met a number of the members of the royal family as a commercial banker in the region. However, we were taught at a very early age to stay away from most of them, for commercial reasons. But, I look forward to developing those relationships, if confirmed.

I should also say, that in the last few weeks I've had the opportunity to meet with Secretary Polson, National Security Advisor Hadley, and FBI Director Muller, specifically, to address the terrorist financing issue. And, I was pleased to be able to hear some of the testimony yesterday from Undersecretary Burns and Levey to the Banking Committee, where they specifically addressed their efforts with regard to Iranian financing, as well.

Senator LUGAR. Please, while you are still here in Washington, enlarge even that circle so that all of the players in our Government are well acquainted with you, and you with them, and therefore the team effort is likely to be enhanced.

On the other hand, have you also been briefed or have you had experience with the many different agencies that work for you in the Embassy there in Saudi Arabia? Presumably, as well, you are confident that as the ambassador, you are going to have a look-see into all of that activity as the management principal on behalf of our interests.

Mr. FRAKER. I've just finished the two-week Ambassadorial seminar where I was introduced to the range of agencies and activities in the Embassy, and have had a chance to have meetings outside that environment, as well, with people. So, I'm looking forward, again, if confirmed, I'm looking forward very much to getting on the ground and really understanding how things are operating, on the ground.

Senator LUGAR. Well, this committee has been helpful, I think, to Ambassadors and to the State Department in suggesting that activities of our Government ought not proceed independently of our ambassadors, and their knowledge of those activities in whatever context they may be. I think there's a recognition of the importance of that principle, but I was curious as a new ambassador in the meetings that you've had, that this came through.

Mr. FRAKER. I've been assured by all the agencies that as chief of mission, these are my responsibilities.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator Lugar very much.

Just following up on Senator Lugar's line of inquiry with respect to these efforts on the money, a long time ago I was on the Bank-

ing Committee and this was a major focus of mine. In fact, I wrote some of the laws requiring some of the transparency and accountability.

It seems to me that unless the Secretary of State and the President make it clear, and are prepared to leverage, that your ability as an ambassador is going to be somewhat limited, frankly, to lift. I mean, you can go in and you can deliver a demarche, or you can have these conversations with your ministries and they will sit there, look at you, and say, "Yes, you're right, we have to do this." And the heads will nod, but the situation won't change that much, to be honest with you, unless you have assurances that the administration's really going to back you, and that this is real. Do you have that sense? I mean, has this been put to you in a way that you're convinced that you're not going to be, sort of, you know, sense of us pushing the rock up the hill.

Mr. FRAKER. I believe I do. I've had discussions both with the President and the Secretary of State and they've assured me of their support, specifically in these areas. My meeting with National Security Advisor Hadley, was a result of the previous discussions with a clear intent to have me onboard with the effort.

Senator KERRY. Good. And, that's obviously very important. Do you believe we have some levers, beyond those that we've used, in order to help guarantee the kind of response that we need to get?

Mr. FRAKER. One of the things that I believe is that my value-add in this process is very much in the private sector and with the financial institutions. I know the bankers, I know the banks, I know most of the major merchants. And, I believe that an outreach to them, very specifically, could pay real dividends in this effort. I believe, up until now, most of the, most of the focus has been getting government signing on to do what's needed to be done. But, again, it's what's happening on the ground that will determine our success in this area and, if confirmed, that's very much where I'd like to be focused.

Senator KERRY. We certainly wish you well with that. You're about to enter a different world. We obviously hope that those relationships produce something, and in some cases they may produce information and they may produce some efforts here and there, and everything to the plus is positive.

But, the bottom line is, and I think my colleagues would join me in saying this, you're about to enter a world where there are some big cultural and historical and even political motivations at play. And, the best intentions will not move some of those, unless they feel it's in their interest.

So, we wish you well on it, but I think that it's going to be important for you to quickly report back to the State Department and to this committee, the reality of your perceptions about those responses, because nothing is more critical than trying to cut off the terrorist funding and begin to send a message of the serious alternative course, that'd be important.

Just very quickly, I don't want to prolong this, but a last question. Do you have any sense of how the Saudis view the Iraq situation, at this point, and what play they might, you know, whether you can have an impact on that?

Mr. FRAKER. Well, the Saudis, as you know, are a charter member of the Iraq Compact. And, the price to join that elite group is a commitment of \$450 million to Iraq. The Saudis, I believe, have stepped up with a commitment of \$1 billion. There's also about \$39 billion worth of debt to be negotiated. The Saudis have indicated a willingness to forgive that debt. So, I believe there's a real, there's a very positive impact they can play on the financial side with regard to helping Iraq. And, I know also, that they have encouraged the Sunni elements to participate in the political process in Iraq from a regional stability standpoint. It's been made clear to us and clear to them, it's in nobody's best interest to have a fractured Iraq on their border. And, so I think they will be a positive force in helping that.

Senator KERRY. Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In light of my tardiness, I'm not going to run the risk of being repetitive in questions, but I welcome the nominee here today and appreciate the opportunity to come, albeit late.

Senator KERRY. Well, we're glad to have you here. We appreciate it. Thank you very much.

Senator KERRY. Do any other colleagues have any other questions?

Mr. Fraker, this could prove unbelievably easy to get over there, and difficult once you get there. So, we appreciate your coming before the committee. I think it's a tribute to the qualifications you bring to the table that people are anxious to get you over there. And, I'm confident the Senate will move as rapidly as possible to confirm you. And, so we look forward to getting you there, and we look forward to seeing you over there.

Mr. FRAKER. Thank you very much.

Senator KERRY. Good luck to you, sir. Thank you. We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

**U.S.-SAUDI DISCUSSIONS ON RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND TOLERANCE SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.**

U.S.-Saudi Discussions on Religious Practice and Tolerance	
<p>Over the past year, the United States and Saudi Arabia have engaged in ongoing discussions on religious practice and tolerance. Through these discussions, the Saudi Arabian Government has identified and confirmed its policies on a number of key issues. Specifically, the Saudi Arabian Government has confirmed that it is pursuing and will continue to pursue the policies outlined below.</p>	
<p>Halt the Dissemination of Intolerant Literature and Extremist Ideology within Saudi Arabia and around the World</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Revise and update textbooks to remove remaining intolerant references that disparage Muslims or non-Muslims or that promote hatred toward other religions or religious groups, a process the Saudi Government expects to complete in one to two years. ❖ Review revised materials to expunge any remaining intolerant references about any religion or religious groups that were not removed in previous revisions. ❖ Prohibit the use of government channels or government funds to publish or promote textbooks, literature, or other materials that advocate intolerance and sanction hatred of religions or religious groups. ❖ Thoroughly review and revise educational materials and other literature sent abroad to ensure that all intolerant references are removed, and where possible, attempt to retrieve previously distributed materials that contain intolerance. ❖ Ensure Saudi embassies and consulates abroad review and destroy any material given to them by charities or other entities that promote intolerance or hatred. ❖ Control distribution of Saudi educational curricula to ensure that unauthorized organizations do not send them abroad. ❖ Retrain teachers and principals of boys and girls schools to ensure that tolerance of all peoples, and religions is promoted. ❖ Revise teacher manuals to include promotion of tolerance. ❖ Counsel and hold accountable teachers who deviate from the approved curricula through the Committee for Teacher's Affairs. ❖ As part of the broader reform of the Saudi education system, and in addition to the extensive review within the Ministry of Education, review textbooks through the Higher Commission for Education (HCE) in order to remove intolerant references and promote tolerance. (The HCE, which reports to the King, is chaired by the Crown Prince and includes the Ministers of Justice, Islamic Affairs, Education, Higher Education, and Labor, as well as two members of the Shura Council, the Secretary General of the Islamic League, and a representative of the Supreme Council of the Ulema). ❖ Promote tolerance and combat extremism in sermons and teachings. ❖ Retrain and, when necessary, reassign imams who continue to espouse intolerance. ❖ Incorporate human rights education into the standard educational curricula, consistent with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. ❖ Expand mutual exchanges of leaders and educators from both countries. 	<p>Protect the Right to Private Worship and the Right to Possess and Use Personal Religious Materials</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Guarantee and protect the right to private worship for all, including Non-Muslims who gather in homes for religious practice. ❖ Address grievances when this right is violated. ❖ Ensure that customs inspectors at borders will not confiscate personal religious materials. ❖ Address complaints of violations through the Human Rights Commission, the Interior Ministry, and, when appropriate, the Foreign Ministry. ❖ Work with Saudi missions abroad to ensure that foreign workers are aware of their right to private worship and the right to bring in materials for individual worship. <p>Curb Harassment of Religious Practice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Ensure that members of the Commission to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice (CPVPV, also known as the <i>Mutawwa'in</i>) do not detain or conduct investigations of suspects, implement punishment, violate the sanctity of private homes, conduct surveillance, or confiscate private religious materials. ❖ Permit only authorized individuals to work for the CPVPV. ❖ Require all members of the CPVPV to wear identification badges with their pictures and names. ❖ Continue to retrain members of the CPVPV to ensure that rights of Muslims and non-Muslims are protected and hold accountable members of the CPVPV who overstep their role. ❖ Require all future members of the CPVPV to be trained at a special institute. ❖ Hold accountable, in accordance with Islamic Shar'ia, Saudi laws, and the Convention against Torture, any official who commits acts of torture. <p>Empower the Human Rights Commission</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Address all human rights complaints through the Commission's authority. ❖ Educate the public and Government about human rights and promote a human rights culture in all government bodies, including religious and security institutions. ❖ Determine the Commission's jurisdiction in accordance with international human rights standards. ❖ Bring the Kingdom's rules and regulations into compliance with human rights standards. ❖ Ensure compliance with and implementation of international human rights treaties. ❖ Assist Saudi citizens, foreign workers and visitors whose religious rights have been violated by any public or private agency or individual. ❖ Provide the Commission's opinion on international treaties under consideration for accession, such as the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. <p style="text-align: right; font-size: small;">July 2006</p>

**RESPONSES OF FORD M. FRAKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.**

Question. If confirmed, what will you do to encourage religious freedom in Saudi Arabia and ensure that the country's religious minorities are protected?

Answer. I plan to make religious freedom a priority during my tenure and will encourage visits by U.S. officials to press for improvements in tolerance and religious practice. The policies put forth by the Saudi Arabian Government regarding

religious practice and tolerance are public policies, and if confirmed, I will assess the government's record on promoting religious freedom and tolerance based on its record on implementing its stated policies.

If confirmed, I look forward to hosting a planned visit by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom in late spring. I will also continue the practice of raising our concerns over the plight of both non-Muslim and Muslim religious minorities with senior government officials. Additionally, I will continue the program of exchanges that brings Saudis to the United States to experience first-hand American institutions, societies, and values, including religious freedom.

Question. To date, what progress has been made in each of the three areas: (a) stop using government channels or funds to export or promote textbooks, literature, or other materials that advocate intolerance globally; (b) remove intolerant elements in its textbooks and curriculum inside the Kingdom within 1 to 2 years; and (c) protect private worship by curbing interference by the religious police?

Answer. We continue to raise all of these issues at the highest levels of the Saudi Government.

The Saudi Government has told the Department of State that it has ceased sending materials around the world, even when countries ask for such materials, except to the 20 official Saudi Academies located in various countries. Textbooks used at these schools are undergoing a complete revision along with the textbooks used in the Kingdom. Teachers will be retrained and screened for extremist ideologies.

The Saudi Government has said it is also implementing a regulatory system for all of the 72,000 mosques in the country. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs requires all imams to undergo training to ensure they have a proper religious education, or in some cases, retraining if they are currently espousing intolerant messages.

We continue to press the Saudi Government to guarantee and protect private worship, and to ensure that the religious police do not interfere with people's right to worship. There were several incidents of apparent violations of this policy in the latter half of 2006 which we learned of early this year, and we have expressed our concern to the Saudi Government. There is some indication, based on the decreased number of arrests last year, that the Saudi Government is taking steps to curb violations of private worship by the religious police.

Question. What do you plan to do to make sure that the Saudi Government complies with its commitments? How do you plan on monitoring these reforms? Is there a timetable for implementation?

Answer. I intend to monitor Saudi policies to improve religious freedom closely and press for their implementation. In this effort I will work closely with Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, John Hanford, to continue our serious discussions with the Saudi Government on improving religious freedom. Our interest and goal is to achieve sustained progress toward religious freedom. The policies put forth by the Saudi Arabian Government regarding religious practice and tolerance are public policies, and if confirmed, I will also encourage others concerned with the state of religious freedom in the Kingdom to assess the government's record on its stated policies. Additionally, the Department will continue to monitor the government's actions through the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, and the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

Question. How will the Saudi public be able to determine if genuine progress is being made?

Answer. The opinions of Saudi citizens living in the Kingdom are the best indicator of whether the government is making progress on religious freedom. The United States Mission regularly reaches out to Saudi citizens and will continue to make public diplomacy and outreach on this issue an important part of its presence in the Kingdom. One positive sign is that the level of debate about religious freedom or sensitive religious topics in Saudi newspapers has increased over the last few years. For instance, parts of the 2006 Annual Report for International Religious Freedom on Saudi Arabia were printed in Al-Watan newspaper. The full report on Saudi textbooks by the Center for Religious Freedom was also featured in Al-Watan.

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to promote the equality of women?

Answer. Women's inferior status, including restrictions on their rights and opportunities, is a serious problem in Saudi Arabia, and a key issue on the United States Government's human rights agenda with Saudi Arabia.

If confirmed, I will press the Saudi Government to increase opportunities for all Saudi citizens, including women, to participate in the political process. I will also urge the Saudi Government to increase private sector opportunities for women, and

remove legal obstacles that prevent women from fulfilling their potential. I will also look for opportunities to mobilize expertise from the U.S. public and private sectors in support of women's empowerment.

Question. In 2004, Saudi Arabia held a "National Dialog" on women's issues which made a number of recommendations, endorsed by then Crown Prince Abdullah. Which if any recommendations have been implemented?

Answer. The third meeting of Saudi Arabia's National Dialog took place June 12–14, 2004, in Medina, and focused on women's rights. Since that event, there has been progress in opening new employment and educational opportunities for women, and in creating greater public awareness and discussion of the challenges Saudi women face.

The Saudi Government has allowed women to play a more active role in business, and has opened new job sectors to women, such as law and engineering. Women's empowerment is a key part of the Saudi Government's 2005 5-year plan. In 2005, women participated in the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce elections, winning two elected seats and being appointed to two others. However, they were not allowed to participate in municipal council elections.

On March 19–20, 2007, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia held its first conference on women's empowerment, under the patronage of the King's daughter, Princess Adela, and with the involvement of Saudi Arabia's best-known businesswoman, Lubna al-Olayan. One thousand women participated in the meetings, which highlighted challenges women confront in education, employment, and the legal system. Princess Adela urged that more economic sectors be opened to women, and that women be given a greater role in "the decision-making process."

Much more must be done. Indeed, according to the 2006 World Economic Forum Gender Gap Report, Saudi Arabia ranked last in a group of 115 countries in terms of economic opportunity and participation, and political empowerment. Our human rights report highlights the continuing legal and societal discrimination and violence against women.

Question. Have there been instances in your banking career in the Middle East where considerations of human rights and/or democracy have influenced your decisions? What were the impact of these decisions?

Answer. I believe that Americans and American companies doing business abroad play an important role in representing America's values. As bankers, we take many factors into consideration when setting country credit policies, evaluating business proposals such as loan applications, and making business decisions. One factor is an evaluation of the overall political situation, which implicitly includes human rights and democracy issues as these bear on the political future of a country.

Question. Beyond women's rights and issues of religious freedom, what are the most pressing human rights issues in Saudi Arabia? What are the most important steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Saudi Arabia? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Since coming to the throne in 2006, King Abdullah has pursued incremental reforms that have led to some improvements on key human rights issues. However, as noted in the Department's 2006 Human Rights Report, there continue to be substantial problems with human rights in Saudi Arabia. Several of the most pressing human rights issues include reports that some authorities practiced physical abuse and torture; a lack of popular participation in Government; denial of fair, public trials; lack of a transparent and consistent judicial system; and significant restrictions on civil liberties.

I will forcefully advocate for reform and convey the message that the United States places the highest emphasis on improvements in human rights and holds the Saudi Government accountable for its commitment to improve human rights. The United States Government has an active exchange program with Saudi Arabia that brings Saudis to the United States for firsthand experience on many issues, including religious and press freedom, human rights, and more. I will continue efforts under the United States-Saudi Strategic Dialog to promote political, economic, and legal reform.

Some elements of Saudi society are conservative and have strongly resisted efforts at modernization and reform. However, the Kingdom continues to slowly change from the inside, and it is important to strengthen actors that support reform. To this end, I will promote programs that expand and strengthen civil society in Saudi Arabia, encouraging efforts to expand Saudi political participation and compliance with international human rights standards.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges will you face in Saudi Arabia in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. While there are reform-minded individuals, both in government and in society, some elements of Saudi society have historically been uncomfortable with and suspicious of change. In the past, the Saudi Government has implemented new policies, such as girls' education, often in the face of strong protests from conservatives. This opposition has led the Saudi Government to move slowly and cautiously, strive for consensus across different societal groups, and avoid policies that might provoke a negative reaction.

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia must pursue reform and improve its record on human rights if it is to defeat extremism and achieve genuine stability and security over the long term. It will be my challenge to engage with Saudi society to demonstrate that human rights and reform are not a threat to Saudi society or traditions but, rather, will strengthen society by offering more opportunities to wider sections of Saudi society. Such change will also enable Saudi Arabia to meet the challenges of the 21st century with the goodwill and active support of the international community.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post/bureau activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. The advancement of human rights has been, and will continue to be, a priority for the U.S. Government. I will ensure that advancing human rights in Saudi Arabia remains a key goal in our annual Mission Strategic Plan, which will guide our in-country activities throughout the year. The mission will identify goals, strategies, and benchmarks for improving human rights in Saudi Arabia through increased and positive engagement with the government, civil society, and the Saudi public. This process allows an objective review of the mission's relative success in achieving our goals. We will also continue to use the Human Development Working Group of the United States-Saudi Strategic Dialog as a framework to engage the Saudi Government on human rights and reform-related issues.

The mission will also continue to devote substantial efforts to the production of required annual reports on various human rights issues, including the Human Rights Report, the International Religious Freedom Report, and the Trafficking in Persons report. Across the mission, there are several officers with primary responsibility for monitoring and reporting on human rights issues, but reporting on human rights issues is an important element of the annual work effort of many other officers of the mission, including mission leadership. Those who perform well in their duties receive recognition in their annual evaluations, and for exceptional performance, the Department offers a variety of awards. I will continue to encourage the best use of our existing administrative tools to recognize and reward superior performance of duties, including on issues related to human rights and reform.

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with activists, reformers, and non-governmental organizations in the United States and in Saudi Arabia who are working to promote human rights?

Answer. The United States continues to strongly promote respect for human rights around the world, and I fully support our efforts in doing so. It has always been the policy of the United States Mission in Saudi Arabia to meet with a broad range of individuals on all aspects of the United States-Saudi bilateral relationship, including advocates for human rights and reform. Staff from the embassy and the Consulates General meet regularly with concerned individuals and organizations on the topic of human rights. Department officials also meet with human rights activists and NGOs in the United States. I support this policy, and it will continue to be the policy of the mission in the future.

Question. In the aftermath of the May 12, 2003, terrorist attacks in Riyadh which killed more than 30 people, including at least eight American citizens, did Saudi Arabia establish a victims compensation fund?

If yes, are American victims and other foreign nationals eligible to participate? Would we consider urging the Kingdom to establish a fund similar to the September 11 Victims Compensation Fund?

Answer. The Department of State has no information regarding the existence of a victim's compensation fund for those killed in the May 12, 2003, terrorist attacks in Riyadh. There have been no discussions between the United States Government

and the Government of Saudi Arabia on this issue, and none are planned at this time.

I believe the tragic events of May 12, 2003, were important in pushing the Saudi Government to recognize that extremism in general, and al-Qaeda in particular, represented a major domestic threat in Saudi Arabia. It also led to much closer United States-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation—cooperation that continues today.

RESPONSES OF FORD M. FRAKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR F. JOHN KERRY

Question. What specific programs has the U.S. Government implemented to prevent the use of financial institutions to finance terrorist organizations and prohibited activities by foreign governments?

Answer. The U.S. Government has a variety of tools at its disposal to combat terrorism finance under authorities provided in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), E.O. 13224, and the USA PATRIOT Act, among others. Under these authorities, the Departments of State and Treasury have established a list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, whose assets are blocked, thus preventing U.S. persons, including financial institutions, from conducting transactions with designated individuals.

Question. Is it the U.S. Government's position that any financial institutions and/or other private entities that have aided and abetted terrorist organizations or prohibited activities by foreign governments should be sanctioned, and that private parties should be able to pursue all available legal remedies against such entities?

Answer. Sanctions are one of several tools available to punish and deter abuses of the international financial system in support of terrorist organizations. Others include diplomatic pressure and law enforcement action. The decision on which tool or combination of tools to use depends on a variety of factors, and is based on a thorough review of the circumstances of each case. The availability of legal remedies to private parties depends upon the particular claims and circumstances of each case. This issue can involve complex legal issues, and some of these issues have been raised in cases now working their way through the courts. As it would be inappropriate for me to comment on pending litigation, I don't think I should comment further on the last part of your question.

Question. Is it true that no Saudi Arabian financial institutions have to date been designated by the United States Government for Office of Foreign Asset Control sanctions?

Answer. The Department of State believes that this statement is correct, but would refer you to the Department of the Treasury for a definitive answer.

Question. What is the United States Government's policy regarding Saudi Arabian nationals in cases where the United States Government has solid intelligence that such persons have given donations or otherwise provided financial support to al-Qaeda or affiliated organizations? Have all such persons been designated for OFAC sanctions?

Answer. The United States and Saudi Arabia have an ongoing and robust dialog on a full range of counterterrorism issues, including regular high-level discussion and working-level collaboration on terrorism finance issues. When appropriate, we pursue designations of Saudi nationals under pertinent domestic and international laws. The United States and Saudi Arabia have cooperated on over 20 designations of terrorist supporters at the United Nations.

Question. When the United States Government has solid information that a Saudi Arabian Government official has condoned or ignored the activities of Non-Governmental Organizations and/or NGO representatives that support terrorist or extremist groups, are such individuals always designated for OFAC sanctions? In cases where they are not sanctioned, what are the policy reasons for not listing them?

Answer. United States-Saudi terrorism finance cooperation is generally good, and encompasses a wide range of activities, including designations when appropriate. We regularly raise information on terrorism finance issues with all levels of the Saudi Government, and press for action on a number of fronts. When the U.S. Government comes into possession of solid information that an individual or organization has acted to support terrorism, we can draw from a number of options, such as designation or law enforcement actions.

Question. When the United States Government has solid information that a Saudi Arabian financial institution has repeatedly acted to handle funds for Islamic terrorist or extremist groups is it United States policy to impose sanctions on that financial institution? In cases where the institution is not sanctioned, what are the policy reasons for not listing it?

Answer. Our strong cooperation with Saudi Arabia on terrorism finance issues has resulted in numerous examples of public designations of individuals and entities, as well as less public actions to address our concerns. When the U.S. Government comes into possession of solid information that an individual or organization has acted to support terrorism, we can draw from a number of options, such as designation or law enforcement actions.

We note that in August 2004 the executive director of the Eastern Province (Saudi Arabia) Branch of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), as well as IIRO branches in Indonesia and the Philippines, were designated as terrorist supporters by the United Nations and the United States.

NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Carter, Phillip, III, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea
Garvey, Janet E., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon
Marquardt, R. Niels, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar and the Union of Comoros

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold presiding.

Present: Senator Feingold.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you all for being here. This will be interrupted in a few minutes for a couple of votes and I'll go as quickly as I can, come back and we'll continue the hearing.

In any event, I'd like to begin by thanking our three nominees for being here today and more importantly, for you many years of service and for your willingness to work in some of the more demanding positions in U.S. Government. The countries to which you have been appointed, Guinea, Cameroon, Madagascar, and Comoros, face distinct, but equally difficult challenges.

There are also many opportunities, that—if confirmed—I hope you'll be able to seize upon and develop. If you are confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you and hope you look to the Senate as a resource and to this committee as a source of support and guidance during your tenure at your respective posts. I'd also like to offer a warm welcome to you families and friends who have stood by you and whose ongoing support will be necessary as you set off to these new positions.

As an Ambassador to the United States, you will undoubtedly have to juggle conflicting priorities. Security will be a top concern, and growing awareness of Africa's strategic significance means facilitating national and regional counterterrorism will be an important element of your job. It is essential, however, that these security concerns are not used to justify or exacerbate restrictions on civil liberties or violations of human rights. The principals of democracy and rule of law are not always entrenched in many African countries, including those you have been assigned to. So, you

will need to be consistent and persistent advocates of good governments and human rights.

As you are all aware, diplomacy is an essential component of our efforts to define and defend America's interests and ideals abroad, particularly in countries where the United States does not have a long history of engagement or much institutional knowledge. Building solid relationships, not just with government officials, but also with business, religious, civil society, and other community leaders is critical to forming and implementing an effective U.S. policy. If confirmed, I trust that each of you will take that responsibility very seriously. I'm looking forward to hearing your testimonies and engaging each of you in a brief discussion about your qualifications and expectations going into these important positions.

So, I think we will start the testimony. If Senator Sununu comes, he will make his opening remarks. He may be choosing to vote first and then come here. But, let's begin with Mr. Marquardt, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar and Union of Comoros.

Mr. Marquardt.

**STATEMENT OF HON. R. NIELS MARQUARDT, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR AND THE
UNION OF THE COMOROS**

Mr. MARQUARDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I begin, I'd just like to introduce my daughters, Kaia and Kelsey, who have come up from the University of Tampa to join me today. Some dear friends, Ambassador Ruth A. Davis directly behind me, Ambassador Linda E. Watt, John and Jean Lang, and the Ambassador of Cameroon, who's become my friend over the last several years.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Welcome all.

Mr. MARQUARDT. Mr. Chairman, I am deeply honored to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar and the Union of the Comoros. I am grateful for the confidence and trust that the President and Secretary Rice have placed in me.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed by the Senate, my highest priority will be the protection of Americans and American business interests, including mission personnel, living and traveling in Madagascar and the Comoros. We will open a new Embassy compound in 2010. Until then, I will work to make our existing Embassy as safe as possible.

Under President Ravalomanana's leadership, Madagascar, while starting from a low baseline, stands out among African countries in making simultaneous progress in consolidating democracy, developing as a free market economy, combating corruption and trafficking in persons, fighting HIV/AIDS before it takes hold, and protecting its unique environment. In recognition of these accomplishments, Madagascar was the first country to sign a compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC, exactly 2 years ago today, and was selected in 2006 as a target country for the President's Malaria Initiative. Madagascar also has benefited significantly from trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, AGOA. However, all of these advances are fragile and susceptible to setbacks in a country of heartbreaking poverty and shallow-rooted democratic traditions.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will continue to bolster good governance in Madagascar. I will also continue our leadership in protecting the environment. I think we all know that Madagascar is a global biodiversity treasure and the United States must help to preserve it.

Madagascar is also a supporter in the war on terrorism and needs continued assistance to prevent exploitation by terrorist networks.

As a returned Peace Corps volunteer myself, I'm proud that Madagascar has one of the most successful Peace Corps programs in the world. The Malagasy people embrace the volunteers in their communities, reflecting the deep friendship between our two countries. Should I be confirmed, I will continue to support a strong Peace Corps presence in the region.

The Union of the Comoros is a small, poor island country that has recently embraced democracy. Its government and people appear determined, finally, to overcome the country's history of instability. Last May, President Sambi won a free and fair election, while campaigning on a platform of economic development and clean government. He is interested in working with the United States to improve the quality of life for his citizens. The Comoros' balance between the hope of emerging as a responsible member of the Community of Nations and the risk of slipping back into instability. If confirmed, I will seek to help the people of Comoros achieve the former outcome.

The Comoros is notorious as the birthplace of Harun Fazul, the alleged mastermind of the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. If confirmed, I will work with the Government of Comoros to combat terrorism as a top priority and play a positive role in this fragile, but friendly, Muslim nation.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that my prior experience, over 27 years in the Foreign Service, has prepared me well to serve as Ambassador to Madagascar and the Union of the Comoros. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely with you and with all the other members of the committee and the Senate and would hope to welcome you to my region during my tenure.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Marquardt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. R. NIELS MARQUARDT, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR AND THE UNION OF THE COMOROS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am deeply honored to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar and the Union of the Comoros. I am grateful for the confidence and trust that the President and Secretary Rice have placed in me.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed by the Senate, my highest priority will be the protection of Americans and American business interests, including mission personnel living and traveling in Madagascar and the Comoros. The security of our personnel has a direct impact on our ability to represent the United States, protect other Americans in the country, and advance American interests in Madagascar and the Comoros. We expect to open a new embassy compound in early 2010. Until then, I will work with the members of the embassy's security team to make our existing embassy as safe as possible.

Under President Marc Ravalomanana's leadership, Madagascar, while starting from a low baseline, stands out among African countries in making simultaneous progress in consolidating democracy, developing as a free market economy, combating corruption and trafficking in persons, fighting HIV/AIDS before it takes hold, and protecting its unique environment. In recognition of these accomplishments,

Madagascar was the first country to sign a compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2005 and was selected in 2006 as a target country for the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI). The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) program is already assisting the rural poor by providing titles to their land, easier availability of credit, more diverse agricultural products and better access to markets. The PMI will be formally launched in Madagascar at the start of the next fiscal year, but energetic preparations are underway to ensure its success. Finally, Madagascar has benefited from trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. However, all of these advances are fragile and susceptible to setbacks in a country of heartbreaking poverty and shallow-rooted democratic traditions.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will continue to bolster good governance in Madagascar as one of our top priorities, seeking funds to support anticorruption efforts, civic education, and reform of the electoral code. I will also continue our leadership in protecting the environment: Madagascar is a global biodiversity treasure and the United States must help to preserve it.

Madagascar is also a supporter of the global war on terrorism. Like many developing countries, it needs continued assistance to build the law enforcement and military capacity required to prevent exploitation by terrorist networks.

As a returned Peace Corps volunteer, I am proud that Madagascar has one of the most successful Peace Corps programs in the world with over 130 volunteers working in health, education, and the environment. The Malagasy people embrace our volunteers in their communities, reflecting the friendship between our two countries. Should I be confirmed, I will continue to support a strong Peace Corps presence in the region.

The Union of the Comoros is a small, poor, island country that has recently embraced democracy. Its government and people appear determined, finally, to overcome the country's history of instability. Former President Azali Assoumani came to power in the Comoros' 19th coup in 1999, but he later won election and last year oversaw the first democratic transfer of power in the nation's history. In May 2006, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi won a free and fair election while campaigning on a platform of economic development and clean government. He is interested in working with all countries, including the United States, to improve the quality of life for his citizens. As an impoverished developing country with a long history of instability and only recent signs of promise, the Comoros is balanced between the hope of emerging as a responsible member of the community of nations, and the risk of slipping back into instability. If confirmed, I will seek to help the people of the Comoros achieve the former outcome.

The Comoros is notorious as the birthplace of Harun Fazul, the alleged mastermind of the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. However, the people of the Comoros widely reject Fazul and his extremist ideology. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Government of the Comoros to combat terrorism as a top priority, including maintaining our cooperation in the Rewards for Justice Program. The Comoros offers few opportunities for its young people; if confirmed I look forward to working with the Government of the Comoros to play a positive role in this fragile but friendly Muslim nation.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that my prior experience over 27 years in the Foreign Service has prepared me well to serve as Ambassador to Madagascar and the Comoros.

If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely with you and other members of the committee, and would hope to welcome you during my tenure. I welcome your questions.

Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Marquardt, very much.

And, now we will turn to Janet E. Garvey, who's been nominated to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JANET E. GARVEY, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON**

Ms. GARVEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to appear before you as the President's nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon. I am pleased to be joined here today by my friends and colleagues.

Unfortunately, my family could not join us today, but my Foreign Service career has been as important and special to them as it has been to me and they will be supporting me fully.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has important interests to protect and to advance in Cameroon. These include: Promoting democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, protecting American citizens, advancing American business, promoting sustainable economic and social development, protecting the tropical environment, combating infectious diseases, especially malaria and HIV/AIDS, ensuring our energy security, and fighting terror.

If confirmed by the Senate, and following in the footsteps of my colleague and esteemed predecessor, Mr. Marquardt, I will seek to expand and improve our bilateral cooperation and dialog. Relative to much of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, Cameroon has been stable and it has a fairly educated population, a decent infrastructure, natural resources, strong agriculture, a growing business base, many environmental treasures, and a government which wishes to have even closer ties to the United States. If confirmed by the Senate, I will work to deepen existing relationships and seek energetic new partnerships in government, business, and civil society.

Cameroon has parliamentary and local elections scheduled for July. These elections offer a new opportunity to prepare for the important Presidential elections in 2011. After these July elections, and during my entire tour in Cameroon, should I be confirmed, we will continue to encourage a democracy that is inclusive, pluralistic, transparent, and free of intimidation.

The Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline has been in operation for some years now and is continuing to contribute to government revenues. This, along with debt relief savings, was evident in the latest government budget, probably the most transparent ever. As public awareness about revenues and expenditures grows, so will budget planning and transparency.

If confirmed, I will encourage this process, to help Cameroon eradicate its endemic corruption. Transparency will materially improve the business and investment climate, particularly for American firms. We want to be certain that American companies investing in Cameroon can compete in an open environment under the rule of law that respects contracts and can, when necessary, seek redress through the courts.

Cameroon is rich in natural resources and biodiversity, and its ancient tropical forests are home to unique plant and animal species. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue opportunities to support local and regional environmental issues within the Congo Basin Forest Partnership and as part of USAID's regional programs.

Mr. Chairman, I have spent most of my career serving as a public diplomacy officer. I am convinced that people-to-people diplomacy is among the most important task for our embassies and is something that I would strongly continue to pursue. I look forward to learning more about Cameroonian culture and working to strengthen ties between cultural and educational institutions in the United States and Cameroon.

Finally, I look forward to ensuring that the United States Embassy in Cameroon will provide the best possible service on behalf of the American people, and I am honored and excited about the

prospect of applying my experience and knowledge to my new assignment.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Garvey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANET E. GARVEY, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you as the President's nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon. I am pleased to be joined here by my friends and colleagues. My family could not join us today, but my Foreign Service career has been special to them as well as to myself, and they will be supporting me fully.

The United States has important interests to protect and to advance in Cameroon. These include: promoting democracy; respect for human rights and the rule of law; protecting American citizens; advancing American business; promoting sustainable economic and social development; protecting the tropical environment; combating infectious diseases, especially malaria and HIV/AIDS; ensuring our energy security; and fighting terror.

If confirmed, following my esteemed predecessor, I will seek to expand and improve our bilateral cooperation and dialog. Relative to much of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, Cameroon has been stable, and it has a fairly educated population, a decent infrastructure, natural resources, strong agriculture, a growing business base, many environmental treasures, and a government which wishes to have even closer ties to the United States. If confirmed by the Senate, I will work to deepen existing relations and seek energetic new partnerships in government, business, and civil society.

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I have spent most of my career serving in public diplomacy. I am convinced that people-to-people diplomacy is among the most important tasks for our embassies. I look forward to learning more about Cameroonian culture and working to strengthen ties between cultural and educational institutions in the United States and Cameroon.

Finally, I look forward to ensuring that the United States Embassy in Cameroon will provide the best possible service on behalf of the American people, and I am excited about the prospect of applying my experience and knowledge to my new assignment.

Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Ms. Garvey.

And, finally we turn to Phillip Carter, III, to be the Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea.

**STATEMENT OF HON. PHILLIP CARTER, III, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA**

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the honor of appearing before you today. In addition to my two colleagues sitting with

me at this table, I am also here with my wife Amanda, and my two sons Justin and Andrew. Their love and support has been a source of strength for me professionally, as well as personally. I can think of no better time or occasion than now to thank them for putting up with me as I've dragged them around the world for the last 26 years.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the President and Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence placed in me as the nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea. I am both humbled and honored by the prospect of this assignment and the challenges it represents.

I am aware of these challenges because in my current position, as Director of the Office of West African Affairs, I work closely with our Embassies in the subregion to promote democracy, good governance, economic growth, and socioeconomic development.

I've also had the privilege to work with the excellent team at the United States mission in Conakry to ensure a peaceful resolution to the crisis that gripped Guinea during the first part of this year. Though the general strike and civil unrest brought Guinea's economy to a halt and security forces responded with violent repression, there is cause for cautious optimism. These tumultuous events signal, in my opinion, the beginning of a democratic political transition, a journey in which the Guineans have taken their first steps.

It is the task of the United States and mine, if confirmed as Ambassador, to support their efforts. A key part of this task will be to continue to work with the regional and broader international community to maintain attention on Guinea at this critical juncture. As a result of the Guinean people's historic movement, the new government under Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate, was, for the first time, formed through consultations with that country's unions and civil society.

Looking forward, we hope to work with the new government on its stated priorities of promoting youth employment, judicial independence, macroeconomic stability, political dialogue, and good governance. I believe that engaging Guineans as friends and coequal partners in their democratic journey has been the key element to our successful diplomatic efforts in Guinea. And, if confirmed as Ambassador, I would continue that partnership.

Despite the recent political turbulence, Guinea has seen some welcome economic developments over the last few years, however. The recent investments by the United States and other international companies represent both opportunities to develop that country's long-ailing economy, as well as support U.S. business and economic interests. With rich reserves of bauxite, gold, diamonds, and timber, as well as tremendous agricultural and hydroelectric potential, even greater opportunities to further our common goals remain.

If confirmed as Ambassador to Guinea, I would continue the mission's efforts to help the new government meet the demands of the people for more representative, democratic, and transparent governance. In addition, I would reinforce our efforts to help the people of Guinea benefit from the fruits of broad-based economic growth. Finally, I would stand ready to help Guinea harness its

rich natural resource base in a sustainable way to serve the needs of current and future generations.

Thank you again, Chairman Feingold, for today's hearing. And, with your permission, I would like to submit my fuller written testimony to the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILLIP CARTER, III, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee—thank you—Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Sununu, and the members of the committee for the honor of appearing before you today. I am not alone. With me are my wife, Amanda, and my sons, Justin and Andrew. Their love and support has been a source of strength for me professionally as well as personally. I would also like to thank the President and Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence placed in me as the nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea. I am both humbled and honored by the prospect of this assignment and the challenges it represents.

Over the course of my 26-year career as a Foreign Service officer, I have had the distinct privilege and pleasure of representing the people and Government of the United States in Mexico, Canada, Malawi, Bangladesh, Madagascar, and Gabon. In my previous Washington assignments, I have had the opportunity to promote U.S. economic policies bilaterally and multilaterally, working with colleagues at Treasury, USAID, the World Bank, and the IMF on such issues as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt program. In my current position as Director of the Office of West African Affairs, I have worked closely with our embassies in the subregion in the promotion of democracy, good governance, economic growth, and socioeconomic development. I have also had the privilege to work with the excellent team in the United States mission in Conakry to ensure a peaceful resolution to the recent crisis that can move Guinea toward greater democratic governance.

Though the general strike and civil unrest brought Guinea's economy to a halt, and the security forces responded with violent repression, there is cause for cautious optimism. These tumultuous events may signal the beginning of a democratic political transition which has also created an opportunity for transformational diplomacy—that is to use “America's diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own futures.” Guineans have taken the first steps on this journey. It is the task of the United States and mine—if confirmed as Ambassador—to support their efforts. A key part of this task will be to continue to work with the regional and broader international community to maintain attention on Guinea at this critical turning point.

Until the recent political unrest, Guinea was often described as a “bulwark of stability” in a volatile subregion. Guinea opened its borders to refugees from neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone, both of which are only now emerging from bitter civil conflicts. Guinea's achievable challenge is to regain its previous reputation for stability and to ensure long-lasting peace in the subregion.

In the 49 years since independence, Guinea's leadership has failed to mobilize the country's abundant natural resources to the benefit of its people. Guinea's history of autocratic rule under Presidents Sekou Toure and Lansana Conte has left the country without strong democratic institutions that can address the rampant corruption and mismanagement, which have decimated the economy.

For the first time since independence Guineans have organized en masse to demand political change from the nation's leadership. As a result of their historic movement, the new government under Prime Minister Lasana Kouyate was—for the first time—formed through consultations with that country's unions and civil society. Looking forward, we hope to work with the new government on the stated priorities of promoting youth employment, judicial independence, macroeconomic stability, political dialog, and good governance. I believe that engaging Guineans as friends and coequal partners in their journey toward achieving these goals has been the key element to our successful diplomatic efforts in Guinea. If confirmed as Ambassador, I will continue this partnership.

Guinea faces a tough road ahead as the economy recovers from the unrest and 2-month standstill. To halt the violence temporarily, the previous government agreed to economic concessions on rice and fuel which may further skew Guinea's terms of trade. If Guinea is to succeed in normalizing its strained relations with the international financial institutions, Guinea's international partners must engage the country's leadership in a frank, open, and honest discussion about the impact of

such policies. The recent crisis has also highlighted the fragility of Guinea's delivery systems for health, food, and physical protection. If confirmed, I will build upon the excellent efforts of my predecessor to help build the capacity of Guinea's authorities to deliver the benefits of economic and political good governance to the people.

Despite a turbulent political environment, Guinea has seen some welcome economic developments in the last few years. The recent, and in some cases long-term, investments of United States and United States-invested companies such as Alcoa, Global Alumina, Hyperdynamics, and others represent both opportunities to develop Guinea's long ailing economy, as well as to support United States business and economic interests. With rich reserves of barite, gold, diamonds, and iron, as well as tremendous agricultural and hydroelectric potential, even greater opportunities to further our common goals remain.

If confirmed as Ambassador to Guinea, I will continue the mission's efforts to help the new government meet the demands of the people for more representative, democratic, and transparent governance. The United States has an important role to play in Guinea, as a friend, to help the people benefit from the fruits of broad-based economic growth. Moreover, we stand ready to help Guinea harness its rich natural resource base in a sustainable way that serves the needs of current and future generations.

Thank you again, Chairman Feingold and Ranking Member Sununu, for today's hearing. I will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection. All of you can submit longer statements if you wish. Thank you very much, all of you, for your testimony. I'll begin the questioning with Mr. Marquardt.

Mr. Marquardt, what experiences and lessons from your tenure as Ambassador to Cameroon will you take with you to your new post?

Mr. MARQUARDT. Well, during my time in Cameroon we focused a lot on building democracy and promoting good governance, particularly fighting corruption. Cameroon has been an aspiring Millennium Challenge Account country. We've used that, I think, as leverage to reinforce changes that the government would like to promote, in any case. And, I think they're moving forward on all of these different issues.

Madagascar seems to be in a different place, with respect to most of these issues. Democratization, of course, is a success story with the President having been elected twice, most recently in December. And, so I would say that my experience in Cameroon has given me some insights into the difficulties involved in these, in these issues, but in a different environment.

With respect to fighting corruption, I think, again, Madagascar is further along, having established institutions that are in place that have a proven track record that we can support.

Senator FEINGOLD. Excuse me. Have you ever visited Madagascar or Comoros?

Mr. MARQUARDT. No, I never have.

Senator FEINGOLD. As you know, unlike in Cameroon, the United States mission in Madagascar is responsible for a large USAID mission, as well as United States programs funded by the President's Malaria Initiative and the Millennium Challenge Account. Do you have experience overseeing and coordinating such diverse projects?

Mr. MARQUARDT. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, that you've identified the single greatest challenge that awaits me if I am confirmed, in Madagascar. Indeed, we do have a large and diverse aid program. I think tallying up all the different programs that we have, including the Millennium Challenge Account Program, it comes to over \$60 million a year.

Cameroon has a much more modest program, but I was very much engaged in overseeing the activities of USAID, of the Ambassador Self-Help Program, the Girls Scholarship Fund, and every other program that we had in Cameroon. But, I do see this as a challenge to, kind of, go up to the next level and engage with my AID Director and the Millennium Challenge Corporation people that are on site. I look forward to that challenge.

Senator FEINGOLD. How will you ensure that U.S. resources contribute to key U.S. policy objectives and do not fall prey to mismanagement or corruption?

Mr. MARQUARDT. One of the first things that I'll be paying attention to is how the new foreign assistance coordination process that Ambassador Tobias has put into place will play out in the ground. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the objective of this new approach is to better align foreign policy objectives with the development objectives. It's new and, of course, in Madagascar we have the very first MCC country. So, there will be certain, certain experiences there that will be playing out for the first time anywhere in the world, in Madagascar, and I'll be doing my best to make sure that we do that successfully and carefully.

With respect to the challenge of preventing—avoiding corruption and making good use of resources, I think it's a matter of vigilance, asking questions, holding people accountable, turning over the rocks, if you will. You can count on me to do that if I'm confirmed.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

As you know, the suspected mastermind behind the 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was from Comoros. Could you please provide a brief overview of the cooperation between the United States and Comoros and can you discuss what Comoros' geographic location means for this cooperation? Would you like to alter or amend this cooperation?

Mr. MARQUARDT. Well, I think we are in a period of opportunity with respect to the Comoros. It is a new Muslim democracy. The country is, I think, 99 percent Muslim. The President was elected in a free and fair election. He has reached out to us here in the United States and in his capitol. In fact, this week, we have our very first-ever bilateral policy dialog going on between the Ambassador and the Director of East African Affairs on the one hand and, I believe, one of the President's key advisors on the other, to discuss opportunities.

Presently we have—our assistance is limited to a \$280,000 education program, and then we also have FMF support that's designed exactly to bolster their capacity to deal with counterterrorism challenges in the Mozambique Channel between Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar. I've become aware that the combined Joint Task Force of the Horn of Africa is operating across the lines of PACOM, UECOM, and CENTCOM very effectively in the area, including involving Comoran officials in understanding, sort of, the state of the art of combating terrorism on a regional basis.

So, there's a start there, but I'm afraid that we're going to have to do a lot more with, in view of the potential for other countries that don't share our democratic and free market values, stepping in if we do not.

Senator FEINGOLD. Fair enough. What potential is there for the growth of a radical militant Islam in Comoros?

Mr. MARQUARDT. Well, it's a deeply impoverished country and to the extent that terrorism has its roots in poverty, there's definitely a need to engage in health and education programs that the population will see as responsive to their most, most pressing needs. I don't think, however, that Harun Fazul is representative of the people of the Comoros. He seems to have, as many Comorans that have sought education have done, he's left, he left the country at an early age and his radicalization took place elsewhere.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much.

The committee will stand in recess until I'm able to return from the votes and resume questioning.

Thank you.

[Recess at 9:50 a.m.]

[On the record at 10:25 a.m.]

Senator FEINGOLD. I call the committee back to order and thank you for your patience as we got through those two votes. And, thank you, Mr. Marquardt.

Now, I'll turn to Ms. Garvey. I see that you have extensive experience working in public diplomacy for the United States and you spent a lot of time in former Soviet countries. Can you explain to me how that experience will assist you in managing the United States mission in Cameroon?

Ms. GARVEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that my experience will be helpful in a number of ways. First, most of the countries I have been in have gone through or are going through transitions. They are countries that, as you said, do not have deeply established roots of democracy, countries that need to work harder on promoting human rights and transparency in government, countries that are in need of improving their attractiveness to foreign investors. I think these are the kinds of things that will be important, should I be confirmed, in Cameroon as well.

I also have had the great good fortune of serving in South Africa during the time when President Mandela became President, and I remain deeply inspired by that experience. Watching Africans take control of their destiny and a commitment to democracy that I think exceeds many other countries where I have served.

I did run an Embassy in Budapest that was lucky enough to have USAID mission and other programs that will also be present in Cameroon. So, I believe that experience will help me as well.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

Although Cameroon, as you've indicated, is relatively stable, its neighbors, particularly Chad and the Central African Republic, are decidedly less so. In fact, the unrest in Chad and the CAR has sent an estimated 30,000 refugees fleeing into Cameroon whose shared border with the two countries stretches 125 miles. What skills and experiences do you have that could assist you in dealing with the humanitarian needs and conflict-related situations should the circumstances in CAR and Chad persist or worsen?

Ms. GARVEY. First, I would seek to work with the Government of Cameroon to make sure that they have the ability and the resources at hand to help, should they need to house these refugees.

I know that UNHCR has been involved in setting up some facilities for refugees.

I have in the previous post, in Bosnia for example, worked with displaced persons and with refugees and believe that, although the situation is very different for these particular people, that the trauma of being forced to leave your home and having to live, for sometimes a very long time, in these makeshift facilities is very hard. And, I believe that I will be able to work with our colleagues in Cameroon and also the international community to do what we can to help alleviate some of that suffering.

Senator FEINGOLD. How could Cameroon play a positive role in the region? What initiatives will you undertake to help Cameroon achieve its potential as a stabilizing force?

Ms. GARVEY. I think that is a very good question, Mr. Chairman. I believe that Cameroon is ready and I would like to see us encourage Cameroon to step up to play a more active role. I would like to see us working with the Cameroonian Government and military to place a larger role in peacekeeping in Africa. I believe that we have some resources where we can help with training to make sure their, their troops are able to carry out that process.

I also believe that the experience Cameroon has had with Nigeria in solving the Bakassi Peninsula issue peacefully, is a good model and a way for them to show to their neighbors that there are ways to resolve differences peacefully.

Senator FEINGOLD. To what degree do you believe that public sector corruption—which has long been reported to be a problem in Cameroon—still persists?

Ms. GARVEY. I believe that the problem has not been solved. I believe that there is still a lot of work to be done. I have been very inspired by Ambassador Marquardt's work at raising that issue. I think that the Government of Cameroon itself has acknowledged that this is an issue. They are working to establish institutions and agencies that will help address this problem. I also think it's important that we work with the media to help develop skills to uncover this, these issues and to make sure that they do it in a way that represents responsible coverage of public officials.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, how effective has the government's anticorruption efforts been and what is the impetus behind these efforts?

Ms. GARVEY. A couple of things, I think, Mr. Chairman. I think that it's a good start. I don't think that we can say that we are, have completed the process yet. I think we have seen some good first steps. I would like to see the government continue with some of the prosecutions that it has begun. I think that that sends an important signal to, both the people of Cameroon and to other potential officials who might think of corruption as a way to enrich themselves.

I also think that we need to continue to hold out the possibility of joining the Millennium Challenge Account Program. These, this gives us some standards that we would like to see Cameroon reach. And, I know that they're interested in achieving that so, I think it's a good way for us to encourage them to continue on this path.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your answers, Ms. Garvey.

Mr. Carter, can you outline for me the current United States priorities in Guinea and whether they've changed with the recent appointment of Prime Minister Kouyate? Do you think his appointment was a step in the right direction, and if so, why?

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. Essentially, our priorities in Guinea are rather clear cut in light of what we see with the events over the past several months. Primarily, our focus is to improve governance, to improve the sense of political dialog that is developing in the country, and to reinforce the momentum that has been developed over the past few months as a result of this movement by the Guinean people to address problems of corruption, poor governance, and the inability of government to deliver services. Our priority will be and has been to reinforce that, has been to reinforce that process. And, if confirmed, I would continue that, that effort.

In addition, it's the, tying the issue of governance to other sectors is also what we are looking to do. For example, regarding the provision of health services, the poor service delivery has constrained what that country can achieve, in terms of reducing problems of illness, child morbidity, and infant mortality. The problem of poor education, the lack of infrastructure or transportation, are all of these things, these problems are derived from the lack of governance that has existed in that country for a number of years.

We'll also look at improving husbandry of the country's natural resources, looking toward greater accountability by the Government and the private sector in the utilization and exploitation of those resources, as well as looking at environmental protection.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. I feel very strongly that the United States has to be more forward-thinking in developing strategies to prevent, or at least respond, to crises abroad. What steps will you take as ambassador to proactively address growing public dissatisfaction in Guinea and help officials here in Washington think through what might be needed to assist Guinea at this pivotal time?

Mr. CARTER. That's a difficult question. If confirmed as Ambassador, I would look to open the channels of communication. What I have seen in the context of crises, not just within Guinea, but in other parts of West Africa and East Africa, is that much of the challenge in resolving these conflicts is the lack of communication. An American Ambassador can play a pivotal role in making sure that all parties in a conflict understand and appreciate the objectives of the other side. That is something that I would, if confirmed, would try to, try to foster.

In addition to that, communicating back to Washington, providing a three-dimensional picture of the situation there that goes beyond what people may pick up from local or international media and press. The three-dimensional image is important to convey because, as you understand, if we look at questions of human rights violations, they have to be addressed within a context that also looks at the capacity of the Government to respond, the ability of civil society to engage, as well as the ability of the people themselves to communicate through an unfettered media.

Senator FEINGOLD. What do you see as the worst-case scenario that could befall Guinea.

Mr. CARTER. Well, Guinea is in a period of transition right now, Mr. Chairman. The greatest crisis would be if the momentum of the reform movement that is present now would be stalled. The result of which would be an eruption of violence, and probably, a military coup that would simply halt any further political dialog in the country.

Senator FEINGOLD. And of course, related to that, the neighborhood in which Guinea is located is extremely fragile, with Sierra Leone and Liberia recently emerging from brutal civil wars, while instability continues to plague Cote d'Ivoire. What mechanisms exist for you to monitor regional stability and what would you like to see put in place?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I think I bring somewhat of a unique perspective to that, having served as the Director for West African Affairs at the State Department. I see the issues as they interconnect. What I would like to do is foster greater communication with colleagues at the other American Embassies in the region. I would look not just in the Mano River Union Region, but also Mali, for example, as well as places which do not necessarily share a border, such as Senegal, to gain a greater sense of perspective of what my colleagues in other Missions are facing, and to try to see if there is a common thread. In that way perhaps, via in my engagement with Washington, if confirmed, I could provide a clear justification of the kind of resources that can be brought to bear within the context of Guinea which also has a regional impact.

Senator FEINGOLD. I know that for several years now, the United States Mission in Guinea has managed a military assistance program and that more than \$330,000 has been allocated to support military training for the Guinean Army in 2007. Given the inexcusable brutality the Army displayed in response to the strikes earlier this year, I'd like to know more about the scale and nature of United States military assistance to the Guinean armed forces and whether this includes human rights training? Do you think you could talk a bit about that?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the question. We have been looking at this issue quite closely, particularly following the violence that occurred in January. Our IMET International Military Education and Training program is there to assist and to develop a better understanding of civil-military relations.

The type of seminars and training that we've provided to the military have been to underscore the importance of a military that remains apolitical, that remains in their barracks, and does not necessarily see itself as a political institution. Believe it or not, that type of, those seminars over the past 3 or 4 years have been increasingly important within the military. We've been seeing a greater participation, increased interest by the military, to participate in these seminars.

In addition, we have provided professional training to military officers. Within that context, human rights training is fully integrated, both in terms of the civil-military relations seminars and in terms of some of the professional training that we provide under

IMET. The program is limited to about \$500,000 currently, but one of the things we will continue to do—and what we are taking stock within the Bureau of African Affairs and my office particularly, and what our Embassy is looking at—is how do we move forward, given what has happened in January? To ensure that participants are fully vetted, and that those individuals who perpetuated the violence are held accountable.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Carter.

I thank all of you for your answers to my questions, and your patience, and I congratulate you on your nomination. We will try to move this along as quickly as we can and wish you well in your new posts, should you be confirmed by the full committee and the U.S. Senate.

That concludes the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF PHILLIP CARTER, III, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Increasingly frequent reports have revealed that Guinean security forces are responsible for widespread abuses against the civilian population, including rape, robbery, torture, and more than 110 killings from mid-January to mid-February 2007. The Guinean Government seems either unable or unwilling to control the country's security forces. If confirmed, what steps will you take to see that the Guinean security forces respect the country's obligations under international law and that appropriate action against perpetrators of abuses is taken?

Answer. The response of the Guinean security forces to the recent public protest was unacceptable and the Department of State joined the international community in condemning those actions publicly. If confirmed as Ambassador, I would continue the efforts of the United States mission in Conakry to push the Government of Guinea to conduct a credible and transparent investigation into the violence and to hold accountable those individuals responsible for the violence, irrespective of their position in the security forces or civil administration. I would also give attention to broader allegations of abuse and impunity by members of Guinean security forces.

The recent events have demonstrated the need for continued and increased United States engagement with Guinea's military. If confirmed as Ambassador, I would continue to emphasize the need for Guinea's security forces to heal the rift in civil-military relations, which the recent events have created. Since 2004, the U.S. mission has held a series of seminars to promote civil-military dialog. The objective of United States military assistance in Guinea is to encourage the development of a military leadership that manages operations honestly and effectively and that understands and promotes the appropriate role of the military in a democracy. Through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the U.S. mission is providing Guinean military officers with training that encourages professional development, leadership, and transparent personnel/resource management, and emphasizes appreciation for rule of law and human rights.

Question. Civil society was once thought to be a weak voice for change in Guinea, but that seems to be changing. Since last February, the country has been paralyzed on three occasions by nationwide general strikes initiated by trade unions and other civil society groups against corruption, bad governance, and deteriorating economic conditions, culminating most recently in the appointment of a new Prime Minister. What steps can you take to further strengthen civil society in Guinea and its ability to serve as a watchdog against the corruption and impunity that plague the country?

Answer. The appointment of Prime Minister Kouyate was a victory for Guinea's nascent civil society, which successfully articulated the demands of the Guinean people for government transparency, accountability, and effectiveness. However, civil society in Guinea continues to lack the capacity to participate actively and effectively in governance. If confirmed as Ambassador, I would increase the mission's focus on democracy promotion and continue to integrate democracy and

anticorruption efforts with the mission's work in the education, health, and natural resource management sectors. By focusing on anticorruption and consensus building mechanisms at the local, regional, and national levels, the mission will have the flexibility to support programs relevant to the changing political environment in Guinea. Depending on the evolving circumstances, these efforts may involve support for multistakeholder dialogs and institutional development assistance for executive, legislative, judicial, and independent institutions. Specific actions the mission may take would include leadership and management training for civil society leaders, strengthening the National Communication Council, providing technical assistance and start-up grants to community radio stations and supporting national advocacy campaigns that promote citizen participation and democratic governance. In 2006, the U.S. Government trained and strengthened over 748 community-based organizations. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts and increase the number of community-based organizations trained.

Question. When he recently came into office, Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate indicated that one of his highest priorities was strengthening the judicial sector, a sector that has traditionally lacked independence from the executive and suffered from allegations of widespread corruption. Indeed, the judicial sector is in very bad shape. Most courthouses lack a single computer. The accused often languish for years in prison while waiting for a trial. In many cases, those waiting for trial are being held based on a confession extracted under torture. What steps can you take to help strengthen the judicial sector, this fundamental pillar of the rule of law?

Answer. Guinea's judiciary is subject to rampant corruption and undue executive influence. It was President Conte's interference in the legitimate judicial proceedings against alleged corrupt public officials that helped spark the recent protests. Moreover, the government and the judiciary have yet to hold accountable those responsible for the bloody response of the security forces to the public protest in June 2006 and early 2007.

To maximize the impact of U.S. assistance on the judicial system, I would focus the mission's efforts on anticorruption to support activities such as technical assistance and training for civil society and government agencies in advocacy and oversight, institutional strengthening for the national anticorruption agency; and capacity-building for judicial institutions focused on corruption.

If confirmed as Ambassador, I would also continue the mission's work to combat torture and other human rights abuses in prisons. The mission has funded programs, which focus on the judicial process. Through our partnerships with local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), under my leadership the mission would bring attention to the plight of individuals in the prison system and develop partnerships between the Ministry of Justice, prosecutors, attorneys, and judges to improve case load administration and accelerate the adjudication of cases involving pretrial detention.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in the Republic of Guinea? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in the Republic of Guinea? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in the Republic of Guinea in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. Guinea's human rights situation remains poor. Security forces unlawfully killed, abused, and arbitrarily arrested civilians. Despite continued efforts to improve its capacity to combat trafficking in persons, the problem remains. Though the government took significant steps to improve freedom of the press by implementing a 2005 media liberalization decree, private media was targeted during the recent violence of January and February 2007. While the new government has expressed a commitment to human rights, they have yet to hold accountable those members of the security forces responsible to the January/February losses of life.

If confirmed as Ambassador, I would continue to call publicly and privately for the restoration of democracy and the respect for human rights. The United States mission in Guinea is uniquely positioned to approach the Government of Guinea, as a friend, in a frank, open, and honest dialog about the human rights deficiencies

and successes in Guinea. As Ambassador, I would continue the efforts of my predecessor to further the political dialog among the government, opposition, civil society, and the military. Through USAID Development Assistance, the Democracy and Human Rights fund, and military assistance, the mission should build upon the progress Guinea has made in media freedoms and focus efforts on improving Guinea's judiciary, accountability, and provision of basic services.

Despite the installation of the new government, significant challenges to human rights remain. The United States mission must continue to encourage that Guinea's political transition remain democratic, civilian-led, and peaceful. Through our dialog with the government, opposition, civil society, and unions, we must work to show Guinea's political elite that sustained and substantive political reform are in the best interests of all Guineans. Of particular concern in this regard is to ensure that Guineans' political rights, including their right to choose their own government, are protected.

As Ambassador, I would ensure that the Mission Operational and Mission Strategic Plans continue to reflect an integrated, multisectoral approach to promoting democracy, human rights, and accountability. To ensure that all of the relevant personnel in the mission are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service, I would include a focus on human rights and democracy promotion in the work requirements of Foreign Service officers as well as certain locally employed staff. To recognize outstanding achievements in the promotion of democracy and human rights, I would work to ensure that qualified candidates in the mission received the fullest consideration for the awards the Department offers.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. Between 1989–1992, I served in Malawi during the last years of President Hastings Banda, a dictator who had run the country as a one-party state since its independence. Using State funding, I helped develop that country's legal aid society and several local democracy NGOs. I also supported the development of underground opposition parties and helped initiate a movement that led to multiparty elections in 1994.

As Charge d'Affaires at the United States Embassy in Antananarivo, Madagascar, I was the lead foreign diplomat that urged the government of President Ratsiraka to hold free and fair presidential elections. When his regime attempted to manipulate the election, I led a group of donors to respond in a coordinated manner. When Ratsiraka refused to accept his loss and sought to split the country via civil war, I led the donor community in its efforts to mediate the crisis. Ratsiraka finally accepted the polls' results and fled the country the day after the U.S. Government recognized Mark Ravalomanana as the legitimate head of state. When the Ravalomanana administration held parliamentary elections the following year, I led the U.S. Government mission in a multidonor support effort that provided financial and technical assistance.

As Director of West African Affairs, I have supported the effort to have democratic elections in Liberia, Benin, Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. I also participated as an observer in the Liberian presidential runoff election that brought Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Africa's first female President, to office.

RESPONSES OF JANET E. GARVEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. There continue to be reports of slavery and trafficking of children for the purposes of forced labor in the Republic of Cameroon. If confirmed, what concrete steps will you take to address these issues? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Cameroon has criminalized child trafficking for all purposes and child slavery since 2005, and police have made some arrests in the past 2 years. But statistical data is lacking, and prosecution and conviction efforts are weak. Local and national police agencies lack professionalism and investigative capacity. The government operates shelters in all 10 provincial capitals and has an ongoing prevention campaign, though its funding is sporadic. If confirmed, one of my key goals will be to maintain pressure on the government to continue its prevention campaign and to step up enforcement, particularly by increasing its efforts to protect victims and encourage them, where appropriate, to cooperate with law enforcement to track down their traffickers. As noted above, prosecution efforts are weak and I will encourage the government to accept training and education programs for the judiciary

to improve sensitivity to trafficking issues. I also believe it necessary to find ample funding, including U.S. assistance, to continue and augment the level of awareness campaigns aimed at potential victims and their families. Ultimately, this may prove more effective in the long run, although short-term results may be obtained by investigating plantation abuses of children.

I believe such prevention efforts, coupled with constant, steady pressure on the government to step up its enforcement mechanisms will ultimately generate real and measurable decreases in child trafficking.

Question. Beyond the issue addressed in the previous question, what do you view as the most pressing human rights issues in the Republic of Cameroon? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in the Republic of Cameroon? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Fortunately, the embassy's current Mission Performance Plan has promoting and strengthening democracy and human rights as its top objectives. This gives me the advantage of stepping into an area to which the embassy staff is already committed. The most pressing human rights issues are the government's lack of consistent support of free speech, including freedom of the press, and its intolerance of political opposition. If confirmed, these would be my highest personal priorities in the area of human rights.

Also, the Cameroonian Government has not always given its minority populations equal rights, and I would push officials, both publicly and privately, as my predecessor has done, to realize that this cannot continue if Cameroon is serious about seeking closer relations with the United States. The government must consistently respect the rights of a free press. I will continue the embassy's programs providing information and training sessions to local reporters and editors, focusing on building capacity and improving journalistic professionalism, accuracy, and impartiality.

I firmly believe that, if I am confirmed, I will have some success in moving the Government of Cameroon to be more tolerant of the basic civil rights of free speech and free press. This will, in turn, help the battle against corruption and lack of transparency in overall governance.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous answers? What challenges will you face in the Republic of Cameroon in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. If confirmed, I believe my biggest obstacles in implementing better efforts to fight child trafficking will be twofold: The lack of professionalism and investigative capacity of law enforcement agencies, and the lack of consistent funding to support government prevention and victim protection efforts. As for promotion of democracy and human rights, there is the difficulty of overcoming the unwillingness of the Biya administration to take controversial actions, even when the President sincerely believes they are the right thing to do. Another major obstacle is the government's tendency to view press reporting as irresponsible, libelous, or seditious, and hence seeks to repress freedom of speech and press.

With regard to democracy and human rights in general, I believe my biggest challenges, if I am confirmed as Ambassador, will be to achieve cooperation from the government to loosen its constant unwillingness to take risks that are necessary to actively advance human rights and democracy. My predecessor has done this very well, and I will continue in his tracks, adapting my approaches as the situation dictates.

I also believe that there are more direct efforts we can make to overcome resistance to free and fair elections in Cameroon, possibly the biggest obstacle to democratic progress. The upcoming July elections are important, but there are indications that only about one-half of the voting age population is registered, and they are mostly in areas considered friendly to the current administration. If confirmed, I will make sure that the embassy does everything in its power to take the lessons learned from the upcoming elections to assure a better Presidential election takes place in 2011.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. As for the first question, I am fortunate that the Embassy in Yaounde is already solidly grounded in the importance of human rights promotion, and the concept of strengthening democratic systems is the No. 1 goal as formally outlined

in the Mission Performance Plan. If confirmed, I will ensure the problems and issues remain high on the agendas for appropriate team and individual meetings.

To ensure that all of the relevant personnel in the mission are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service, I would include a focus on human rights and democracy promotion in the work requirements of Foreign Service officers as well as certain locally employed staff. To recognize outstanding achievements in the promotion of democracy and human rights, I would work to ensure that qualified candidates in the mission received the fullest consideration for the awards the Department offers.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. Human rights promotion and protection has been a vital part of my career in the Foreign Service.

In Hungary, I supervised our efforts to promote Roma integration into Hungarian society. Roma remain subject to significant discrimination, and we targeted much of our small assistance program and some of our public diplomacy funding to help improve the status of Roma in Hungary. As a result of programs funded and run by the embassy, we promoted training for young Roma journalists to help ensure that the image of Roma in Hungarian media was fair and accurate. We also worked, through USAID grants, to improve the health conditions for Roma women and children.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, I implemented a wide-ranging program of civic education, CIVITAS, throughout the school systems. We created a program that helped introduce students to their rights as citizens of a new democracy. We used the CIVITAS program to promote interethnic cooperation and to encourage young Bosnians to lobby their governments—at all levels—to ensure greater transparency and more responsible government.

In South Africa, we implemented a wide range of programs in townships to promote local democratic efforts. We supported local radio and other media to help promote a free and independent press. We encouraged educational reform to enable all South Africans to benefit from economic opportunities through education. We also worked with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to support its efforts to document the true history of the apartheid regime. We brought a number of legal and judicial experts to work with the commission as it completed its important work.

RESPONSES OF R. NIELS MARQUARDT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. The 2006 Country Report on Human Rights Practices noted several areas in which civil rights are routinely violated in the Republic of Madagascar. These violations include the use of excessive force by security forces to disperse demonstrators, the arbitrary arrest of demonstrators, and harsh prison conditions. If confirmed, what actions will you take to encourage respect for freedom of speech and the rights of demonstrators in the Republic of Madagascar?

Answer. The embassy already hosts a monthly Human Rights Working Group with civic organizations to provide a regular forum to discuss human rights topics. The group includes several NGOs and community leaders. The embassy often invites Malagasy officials to participate, thus improving communication between government and civil society.

If confirmed, I will continue my predecessor's practice of privately and publicly making clear to the Government of Madagascar that the United States expects it to honor its obligations to protect civic rights including freedom of speech and assembly. In my contacts with the President, Prime Minister, and cabinet, I will emphasize that human rights abuses damage Madagascar's international reputation as a democracy. In public speeches and written statements, I will call on the Malagasy public to hold their leaders to a high standard on human rights.

The State Department's annual Human Rights Report already catches the attention of Malagasy authorities; I am told the Office of Good Governance at the Presidency includes progress in key human rights areas, as covered in our report, to be performance indicators for their work. If confirmed, I will reinforce this powerful and explicit advocacy tool, both calling attention to chronic problems and highlighting successes when they are accomplished.

Question. Beyond the issue addressed in the first question, what do you view as the most pressing human rights issues in the Republic of Madagascar? What do you view as the most pressing human rights issues in the Union of Comoros? What are

the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in both of these countries? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. In Madagascar, while force and detention directed at demonstrators are significant human rights violations, I would identify prison conditions as the most pressing human rights issue. Overcrowded prisons are in deplorable conditions; many prisoners are malnourished and some actually die of starvation. More than half are incarcerated in pretrial detention, denied due process. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had to suspend its work in prisons in 2006 due to inadequate cooperation from the government. Political “will” and statements are not sufficient. Concrete actions to provide humane conditions for all prisoners must be taken on an urgent basis. The backlog of pretrial detainees must be cleared to reduce overcrowding and to provide due process to alleged criminals. As a democracy and a responsible nation, Madagascar must meet its responsibilities to its citizens who have been accused of breaking the law.

I have learned that Malagasy public opinion does not support efforts to improve prison conditions; that traditionally prisoners “get what they deserve in the popular view.” If confirmed, I will embark on a public diplomacy campaign, with our Human Rights Working Group and via the media, to educate the population as to why it is important to treat criminals (and the accused) with decency and within the rule of law. A domestic constituency for prisoner’s rights, NGOs, and church groups, will reinforce the international community’s pressure on the government.

In Comoros, fragile democracy has just begun to take hold since the May 2006 inauguration of President Sambi. The basic human right to a stable, representative government has been elusive for most of Comoros’ 30-year history since independence. Given adequate bilateral resources, I will work, together with multilateral organizations like the United Nations and World Bank, with the Comorans to establish and strengthen basic democratic institutions that are accountable to the people. President Sambi has already identified the fight against corruption as a top priority for his administration; U.S. assistance and advocacy must support his efforts.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in the Republic of Madagascar and in the Union of Comoros in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. In both countries, abject poverty, inadequate government resources, and lack of capacity are routinely cited as a justification for inaction. While partially true, these claims also reflect insufficient political will to take tough steps to reform entrenched practices, demand accountability, and insist that all government officials from Minister to clerk and police officer, be held to a high standard.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. The only Superior Honor Award granted in Madagascar in recent years went to an officer in recognition of her work advancing human rights and combating trafficking in persons. The award acknowledged the effectiveness of that officer, but also reflected the high priority the mission assigns to all work in promoting human rights objectives. Beyond formal awards, I will create professional development opportunities for staff in promoting human rights. These would include a range of public outreach activities, public speaking, and travel throughout the country.

If confirmed, I will also lead by example, dedicating a significant amount of my own time to advancing human rights issues. I can take part in outreach activities at the launching of Human Rights and Trafficking in Persons Reports. With small grants for human rights and combating human trafficking, we support local NGO efforts—I will participate often in these events with my staff.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. The promotion of human rights has been an important activity throughout my career. As Ambassador to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, my team and I consistently raised human rights issues publicly and privately, including at the highest levels of both governments. Direct results included strong, new laws on trafficking in persons in both countries.

As Special Coordinator for Diplomatic Readiness 2001–2004, I contributed indirectly but measurably to our capacity to advance human rights and other key policy

objectives by overseeing the largest hiring program in State Department history. Without this effort, we simply would not have had the human resources necessary to promote human rights.

As Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs in Germany 1996–1998, I contributed significantly to securing German support for the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which now governs member country anticorruption standards vis-a-vis the developing world.

As Labor Attache in Bangkok 1987–1990, I was the embassy's point person in combating child labor and sensitizing the Thai Government and public opinion to worker rights issues. As Thailand at that time had the fastest growing economy in the world, it was important to signal publicly and privately the importance of appropriate balance between promoting economic growth and protecting human rights.

RESPONSES OF R. NIELS MARQUARDT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. As Ambassador to Cameroon in October 2006, you participated in a EUCOM regional ambassadors' conference for Africa in Stuttgart, Germany. Please describe the purpose and value of this conference to United States foreign policy coordination and your role as ambassador.

Answer. The conference was an opportunity for Chiefs of Mission (COMs) in West and Central Africa to meet and coordinate with newly-arrived General William Ward, the Deputy EUCOM Commander, and key senior EUCOM staff; to exchange ideas and perceptions both with EUCOM leadership and with regional counterparts; and to help shape EUCOM plans and capabilities. Both my Defense Attache, who also attended the conference, and I found the conference valuable in meeting these and other objectives.

Question. Is there any comparable conference or other vehicle for regional discussions held by the Assistant Secretary for Africa, or another office or bureau in the State Department? What are they, where are they held, and how often do they take place?

Answer. Since 2004, I have attended an annual Africa Chiefs of Mission (COM) Conference each October in Washington hosted by the State Department Africa Bureau Assistant Secretary.

Question. Is there any comparable conference or other vehicle for regional discussions of interagency actors in the region held by any other U.S. Government agency? What are they and how often are they held?

Answer. The annual Africa COM Conference has also been the venue for sub-regional discussions, such as among Gulf of Guinea or Central African COMs, on policy issues of common concern. Speakers from other agencies are frequently invited to the COM of conferences.

Question. As Ambassador to Cameroon, did you have the resources to participate in this conference or was your participation funded by the Department of Defense?

Answer. The Africa COM and EUCOM Conferences were coordinated and sequential, allowing me to attend both during a single trip from Cameroon. Travel was funded from the State Department budget.

Question. Describe the video-teleconferencing capacity you had in Cameroon and the ability to VTC with other embassies in Africa, with the State Department, or with other agencies. Will you have the capability to VTC when you arrive in Madagascar?

Answer. Embassy Yaounde has a nonsecure video-teleconferencing capability, which we use for communication both with Washington and within the region. In Madagascar, Embassy Antananarivo provides secure video-teleconferencing capacity.

Question. As Ambassador to Cameroon, how would you characterize the resources available to most effectively support and implement United States policies in the region?

Answer. In Cameroon, I found I had adequate staffing and operational funds (including travel and representation) to achieve our mission with distinction. However, I could have utilized additional program funding to exploit fully opportunities to advance key objectives, such as promoting democratization, the rule of law, the fight against corruption, and advancing human rights. Any additional funding made available could easily be put to effective use within the overhead constraints of the mission, without requiring any additional staffing.

Question. Since 2001 there has been a significant increase in attention to Africa by the United States Government, for a variety of reasons, including dealing with United States interests in international security, economic, and social development, as well as health and humanitarian response.

Given your long experience in Africa, including as Special Coordinator for Diplomatic Readiness, how would you describe the overall changes in the level of attention devoted to Africa across the United States Government?

Answer. The overall level of United States Government attention being devoted to Africa clearly has increased dramatically over my 30-year association with the continent. Presidents, Secretaries of State, and other cabinet members regularly visit Africa today. United States Government resources devoted to Africa have increased threefold during the Bush administration alone. In terms of staffing, I am pleased to report that Mission Cameroon is 100 percent staffed at the authorized level with qualified, at-grade personnel. I believe that this change reflects, in part, the positive impact of the 2001–2004 Diplomatic Readiness Initiative funded by the U.S. Congress.

Question. Have the resources available to the State Department and the allocations within the State Department adequately met the level of increased United States interest and policy implementation in Africa? Are they appropriate to the leadership/partnership role expected by other agencies engaging in Africa?

Answer. In Cameroon, I found that staffing and program resources were adequate to meet fully the leadership/partnership role expected of me and my staff by other agencies. Where I would argue for more resources is in our small but effective assistance programs—such as the Ambassador’s Self-Help Fund and the Democracy and Human Rights Fund, and with respect to ESF for policy objectives like democratization and conservation.

Question. Can you identify areas that you would consider underserved or under-resourced that would otherwise improve State Department leadership in our foreign policy-making, interagency coordination, or policy implementation in Africa?

Answer. Additional staff resources and the flexibility to place staff in emerging priority areas would enable the State Department to bring its expertise to bear more quickly and effectively. Funding to permit travel with appropriate security support to dangerous yet priority environments would improve United States leadership in Africa.

RESPONSES OF PHILLIP CARTER, III, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. As Director of the State Department Office for West African Affairs in October 2006, you participated in a EUCOM regional Ambassadors’ conference for Africa in Stuttgart, Germany.

Please describe the purpose and value of this conference to United States foreign policy coordination and your role as Director of the Office for West African Affairs.

Is there any comparable conference or other vehicle for regional discussions held by your current office, the Assistant Secretary for Africa, or another office or bureau in the State Department? What are they, where are they held, and how often do they take place?

Is there any comparable conference or other vehicle for regional discussions of interagency actors in the region held by any other U.S. Government agency? What are they and how often are they held?

As Director for West Africa, did you have the resources to participate in the EUCOM conference or was your participation funded by another office or agency? If so, which one?

Describe the video-teleconferencing capacity in your office and that of the African Affairs Bureau, as well as at each United States Embassy in West Africa. How does the availability and capability to VTC in West Africa compare with other United States Embassies in Africa as well as other United States Embassies around the world? Are you aware of the ability of EUCOM to teleconference?

Answer. The EUCOM conference for American ambassadors assigned to West and Central African states served as a forum for EUCOM to present its perspective toward developments in Africa and to outline a variety of proposed programs in Africa. The conference was extremely useful in working toward integration of EUCOM operations even more closely into United States foreign policy priorities for West and Central Africa. The conference resulted in much greater communication between my office and EUCOM at both the policy and operational level. As Director,

I utilized the travel budget resources allocated to the Office of West African Affairs (AF/W) by the Africa Bureau's executive directorate. Only State funds were used for my travel and per diem to this useful conference.

The Africa Bureau (AF) holds digital video conferences on a routine basis (every 4–6 weeks) at the working level with EUCOM and West African posts that are part of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The Office of West African Affairs (AF/W), the Africa Office for Regional and Security Affairs (AF/RSA) and the Office of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (S/CT) participate in those DVCs. In addition, AF and S/CT have cohosted a meeting in Dakar, Senegal with our ambassadors in TSCTP-participating countries and plan to host a similar meeting in June. Moreover, the Africa Bureau hosts an annual Chiefs of Mission conference with interagency participation. AF/W also chairs a weekly interagency discussion group on issues pertaining to West Africa. I am unaware of any other interagency forum on West Africa that is held by another agency.

The Africa Bureau has VTC capacity with most of our posts in West Africa. VTC equipment is located within my office. The quality of VTCs varies from post to post and is largely dependent on telecommunications infrastructure in the country. EUCOM has provided virtually each ambassador in West Africa with a teleconference device, though this device does not function fully at every post.

Question. Since 2001 there has been a significant increase in attention to Africa by the United States Government, for a variety of reasons, including dealing with United States interests in international security, economic and social development, as well as health and humanitarian response.

Given your long experience in Africa, both in the field and here in Washington, how would you describe the overall changes in the level of attention devoted to Africa, and West Africa in particular, across the United States Government?

Have the resources available to the State Department and the allocations within the State Department adequately met the level of increased United States interest and policy implementation in Africa? Are they appropriate to the leadership/partnership role expected by other agencies engaging in Africa?

Can you identify areas that you would consider underserved or under-resourced that would otherwise improve State Department leadership in our foreign policy-making, interagency coordination, or policy implementation in Africa?

Answer. Having worked on African issues for nearly 20 years, I know of no other occasion when Africa has drawn so much attention from the United States Government and our leadership. The Bush administration has tripled United States assistance to Africa and is a major, if not the principal, bilateral donor on important health issues such as HIV/AIDS and malaria prevention. The creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has brought significant economic resources to several well-performing African countries. The ongoing development of the Africa Command (AFRICOM) is another example of how Africa looms much larger on America's foreign policy agenda than ever before.

The foreign assistance resources for Africa reflect the increased attention to this continent. However, the tripling of United States assistance to Africa has not witnessed a concomitant increase in personnel (both domestically and in the field). United States missions in Africa tend to be small posts with relatively junior staffs. To take full advantage of increased attention and assistance to Africa, greater human resources are required.

Improved technological resources and capabilities to facilitate communication between the bureau and posts as well as among posts would be helpful. For example: The ability to conduct classified and unclassified instant-messaging discussions among ambassadors in a particular region would prove very helpful. Greater attention and resources for language training in specific African languages (Hausa, Ligala, Somali, Swahili) as well as Arabic would help increase our ability to engage local populations and civil society throughout the continent.

NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Hughes, Miriam K., to be Ambassador to the Federated States of
Micronesia
Hume, Cameron R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia
Huso, Ravic R., to be Ambassador to the Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Keith, James R., to be Ambassador to Malaysia
Klemm, Hans G., to be Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer presiding.

Present: Senators Boxer and Feingold.
Also present: Senator Murkowski.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

Senator BOXER. Good morning. The hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. We are very pleased today to consider five excellent nominees for U.S. Ambassadorial posts throughout East Asia and the Pacific.

As chairman of the subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I am very pleased to have this opportunity to chair this full Committee hearing and congratulate each of our nominees for making it to this point, and I predict smooth sailing for each of you.

Because of our many interests and deep longstanding ties in the region, it's critical for the United States to be fully engaged throughout East Asia and the Pacific. Coming from California, I absolutely feel very strongly about this.

If we are to remain the region's leading power, the effectiveness of our diplomatic efforts must match our strong military presence. As we've learned in Iraq, even our most powerful military leaders say that diplomacy is the answer, so we cannot turn our back on our diplomatic efforts anywhere in the world.

On Sunday, foreign policy expert James Mann wrote in the Washington Post: "Over the past decade, U.S. foreign policy has been dominated by a school of thought that emphasizes military power, and has tied the spread of democracy to the use of force.

Not only has this failed, it has also undermined support for democracy.”

He went on to say that, “As the United States has been bleeding popularity and influence around the world, China has been gaining both.”

So in order to compete with the growing influence of China, it seems to me the United States must employ a diplomatic surge in East Asia and the Pacific to win the battle of ideas and reassure our allies that we are truly committed to the region.

So I am pleased that the administration has nominated five individuals with impressive credentials to serve as U.S. Ambassadors.

Cameron Hume, the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, has more than three decades of diplomatic experience, most recently as the Charge in Khartoum. That’s not an easy assignment. Prior to serving in Sudan, he was the Deputy Inspector General of the Department of State.

James Keith, the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia, is the current Deputy Special Representative on Avian and Pandemic influenza. Prior to this assignment, he served as the U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong. Mr. Keith has been working on matters relating to East Asia for more than 25 years.

Miriam Hughes, the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia, currently serves as U.S. Deputy Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the U.S. Mission to the U.N.

Prior to this, she served as Director of the Office of Policy, Public, and Congressional Affairs in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs at the State Department. Earlier in her career, she served as Chief of the Consular Section in Mexico City.

Hans Klemm, the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to East Timor, currently serves as the Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. He joined the Foreign Service in 1981.

Finally, Ravic Huso, the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, currently serves as Political Advisor to the Commander of the United States Pacific Command.

Prior to this, he served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Bangkok, Thailand. Earlier in his career, he served as Senior Director of the National Security Council.

I want to thank each of our nominees for their willingness to serve our Nation, and I look forward to hearing their testimony.

This is where I will stop. Now, when Senator Murkowski joins us, and perhaps Senator Feingold, I’m going to give them an opportunity to make an opening statement, if they so choose. But in the meantime, I’m very interested in hearing from all of you.

Let’s see. Why don’t we start with the Honorable Cameron Hume to be Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia? Again, to all of you, my deepest thanks for your commitment to our country.

Ambassador?

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much.

Senator BOXER. I already called you Ambassador. That shows you where I am on this hearing. Go ahead.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CAMERON R. HUME, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA**

Mr. HUME. It's a great honor to be here this morning as the nominee of President Bush to be Ambassador to Indonesia, and if confirmed by the Senate, I promise to serve to the best of my ability.

I think those qualifications are those of a career Foreign Service officer. After university, I was in the Peace Corps in Libya, and then I joined the State Department, and I had a number of assignments, both in the Arab world and in Italy.

I picked up several languages along the way. I consider myself fortunate to have had those experiences. I've since served three times as Chief of Mission in Algeria in the late 1990s, when that country was turning away from exceptional violence and toward greater respect for the rule of law.

Then in South Africa, which again was a country which I think was on the mend, I spent a lot of time there working on HIV/AIDS and trying to promote saner policies in that area. Now, for the last 18 months in Sudan, which I think was a difficult and challenging place to serve.

Indonesia is a vast and strategically important country. I approach this opportunity with a sense of considerable humility. It's a country that has known a tumultuous past, but fortunately, over the last 10 years, gradually its record has gotten better.

Economic growth has gone back to about 6 percent currently. They've had a series of elections which Freedom House considered to be free and fair. They were able to broker an apparent solution to the problem in Aceh, which is so far being respected.

So I think one looks at that—I'm fortunate at this time to be going to a country which is on the mend. The United States has important interests there, whether it's a cooperation in the war on terrorism, an area where, again, Indonesia's made some progress.

We have supported the formulation of a group in the police called Detachment 88, which has done good work in arresting people involved with terrorist acts.

We also have interest in seeing their economy and growth and stability continue. We have an aid program of about \$150 million in a number of different areas.

I think Indonesia, as the world's largest Muslim population nation, is a key when we look at solving some of the geopolitical problems that we confront. How are we able to cooperate with a government which is now formed by a free election, and a majority Muslim, and spreading influence, both in its region and elsewhere?

They contributed a battalion to the peacekeeping operation in Lebanon this year. So those are the—that's sort of a general abbreviated picture of the issues that will have my concern. I realize some of them will be difficult to deal with. Questions of rule of law, questions of trying to calibrate the right balance in what relationship we have with Indonesia in the security area.

But I promise that if confirmed, you'll get my best efforts.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hume follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CAMERON R. HUME, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Thank you, Madame Chairman, and members of the committee. It is a great honor to come before this committee today as nominee for Ambassador to Indonesia. I would like to express my appreciation to President Bush and to Secretary Rice for the trust they have placed in me by making this nomination. If confirmed by the Senate, I promise to represent this country to the best of my abilities.

My qualifications for this position are those of a career Foreign Service officer. Immediately upon completion of university studies, I joined the Peace Corps as a volunteer and taught in Libya, my first experience in a developing country with a Muslim population. Shortly after departing Libya, I joined the Department of State. Early assignments gave me the opportunity to learn several languages and to serve in interesting posts, including Italy, Syria, Tunisia, Lebanon, and the Holy See. For several years I worked at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, first with responsibility for human rights and then for work in the Security Council.

Since 1997 I have been fortunate to represent the United States as chief of mission three times. Algeria was a country suffering from a tragic conflict in which the victims were ordinary civilians rather than the protagonists in the Islamist dissident forces or in the Algerian military. In part because the United States promoted reconciliation, democracy, and respect for the rule of law, the situation gradually improved. Service in South Africa brought new challenges. In particular, finding ways the United States could encourage South Africa to confront the scourge of HIV/AIDS. I would like to pay tribute to many colleagues in USAID, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, and the Department of Defense for the ground-breaking work they did to put in place programs that helped South Africa to confront this challenge.

For the past 2 years I have served as Charge d'Affaires in Sudan. Again I had the chance to witness, and a unique opportunity to participate in, the programs of the United States Government that aim to consolidate the peace in southern Sudan, to end the killing and to bind the wounds of the people of Darfur, and to support the emergence of a New Sudan. I cannot and would not claim more than partial success in any of these efforts, but I know that resources and efforts from the United States are having a significant, positive impact.

With these experiences in mind, I approach the challenge of representing the United States in Indonesia with a sense of humility. Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation and the third largest democracy. It has the world's largest Muslim population. It is a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement and of ASEAN, and it is currently a member of the U.N. Security Council. It is a vast country sitting astride strategic sea routes. By any standard, the relations between the United States and Indonesia are of vital importance.

Since independence, Indonesia has enjoyed years of encouraging growth and suffered years of tumult. The political and economic indicators are all rising, particularly since the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004, and Indonesia is becoming a real success story. Problems and challenges remain, and, if confirmed, I would give them my priority attention. But it is worthwhile to recall some of the positive indicators:

- Economic growth has been gradually rising toward the level of 6 percent annually, a substantial improvement since the Asian financial crisis of the last decade but not enough to create the jobs needed by an expanding workforce.
- Following the 2004 national election and subsequent elections at the regional and municipal levels, and substantial gains for civil society and the media, Freedom House has moved Indonesia into the category of Free.
- Government and military reform have moved forward, including such steps as the separation of the Indonesian National Police from the armed forces, the adoption of anti-corruption measures, and the devolution of power to regional and local governments.

Today bilateral relations are improving. Indonesia is playing a more assertive role on the world stage, and is working as a force for international peace and stability; its commitment of troops to the UNIFIL deployment in Lebanon and vote for Security Council Resolution 1747 on Iran are notable recent examples. If confirmed, I'll work to enhance Indonesia's support for our key foreign policy priorities, including ensuring Iran does not develop nuclear weapons, advancing the Middle East peace process, and promoting a democratic transition in Burma. Indonesia's leadership is committed to the fight against terror within its borders, as the arrests and prosecutions of hundreds of terrorists in the past few years demonstrates. There have been no major terrorist incidents in Indonesia since October 2005, a huge achievement for a country that had been devastated by attacks every year since the Bali bombing

in 2002. Working with the United States, Indonesia is vastly improving its ability to protect vital sea lanes from terrorists and piracy.

Perhaps most remarkable this past year was the election of a former rebel leader as governor in Aceh, a province that had been wracked by armed separatist conflict for decades. Today we are helping the Acehnese ensure a lasting peace and to recover fully from the deadly tsunami that struck its shores in December 2004.

While we still have serious concerns with human rights in Indonesia, I would be remiss without acknowledging the dramatic and broad progress the country has made here too. Notably, in November of last year, a court sentenced the ringleader of the deadly attack that killed two Americans and one Indonesian in 2002 in Timika, Papua, to life in prison. In this case Indonesia's criminal justice system worked closely with our own law enforcement in building and prosecuting the case, and the sentence was just. Despite encouraging developments in Indonesia's efforts to build a strong criminal case in the murder of human rights activist Munir, this crime has not been fully resolved. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to continue to press the government for a fair accounting of past human rights abuses committed by security forces in East Timor and elsewhere.

U.S. partnership and friendship can help this critically important country in the medium- and long-term. The assistance funds Congress provides address some of Indonesia's greatest needs, such as education, so tomorrow's generation will have the critical thinking skills that democratic citizens need. Our dollars go to economic and justice sector reform because Indonesia still needs to attract more investment, provide more jobs, and build the institutions and respect for rule of law that we hope will provide its democracy with a rock-solid foundation. They improve health care critically by reducing the spread of infectious diseases. The new Millennium Challenge Corporation program launched this year aims to strengthen the anticorruption efforts Indonesia has underway and to provide immunizations. And we are providing security assistance that aids in the fight against terror and contributes to the creation of a professional, civilian-run force.

In less than 10 years, Indonesia has travelled an astonishing distance: from the ruin of the Asian financial crisis and fall of a dictatorship to a vibrant democracy with solid economic growth. In many ways, though, these gains are fragile. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Congress and the full array of U.S. Government agencies to promote the success of our policies and of Indonesia's democracy.

I would welcome the opportunity to answer questions.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Hume. I really respect your history, and I think you gave us a very insightful look at what you're going to do.

I think it's summed up very well in your testimony in the last paragraph, where you say: "In less than 10 years, Indonesia has traveled an astonishing distance, but in many ways, these gains are fragile, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with the Congress to promote the success." I think that gives me a sense that this is an important time there, and you get that, and I appreciate it.

If you notice, we do have a 5-minute clock we're all living by, so try to keep your statement under that limit. You left us with plenty of extra time. At this point, I would ask Senator Murkowski if she'd like to make an opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA**

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Madame Chair. I don't have an opening statement this morning, other than to welcome each of you gentlemen and Ms. Hughes, welcome you to the subcommittee this morning, and to thank you for your willingness to serve in the respective areas.

Very impressive backgrounds and credentials that we have in front of us this morning, certainly in some very key parts of the

globe, as we look to whether it's political activities that are taking place in the region or just the economic activities.

So again, I welcome you to the subcommittee, and thank you for your willingness to serve in this capacity.

Thank you, Madame Chair.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Senator Murkowski. You know, I neglected to ask each of you to introduce the relatives that you may well have brought with you. So why don't I go back to Mr. Hume. Would you like to introduce anyone?

Mr. HUME. No, I'm here alone today.

Senator BOXER. Okay.

Mr. Keith, before you start, do you have anyone you'd like to introduce?

Mr. KEITH. Madame Chairman, I do, thank you. Since my whole family isn't here, I'll be able to keep to the 5-minute rule.

Senator BOXER. Okay.

Mr. KEITH. I'd like to introduce my wife, Jan, who's—

Senator BOXER. Jan, stand up, please. We want to see you. Yes.

Mr. KEITH. My son Andrew is sitting to her left, and my son John is to her right.

Senator BOXER. Hi.

Mr. KEITH. My daughter Elizabeth and my daughter Emily are all here today. I have two other sons, Jason and Scott, who can't be here. Jason is a Staff Sergeant in the U.S. Army, serving at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, married to an Army veteran, Annie, and our granddaughter, Lily, 5 weeks old.

Senator BOXER. Congratulations on that.

Mr. KEITH. Thank you.

Senator BOXER. Well, Mr. Keith, why don't you proceed for up to 5 minutes? We'll put all of your statements into the record.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES R. KEITH, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO MALAYSIA**

Mr. KEITH. Madame Chairman, thank you. I'm honored to be here, and thank the committee for considering my nomination. Because you have my statement, I'll just briefly summarize.

I'm looking forward, with high aspirations, to going to Malaysia. High aspirations for what we can achieve with a country that has come a long way, but still has, in many respects, a distance to go.

I'm pleased to report that we have very good cooperation with the Malaysians from both law enforcement and military perspectives in countering terrorism in the region. Like Indonesia, Malaysia is a majority Muslim country, and it's important that we share objectives, both in the region and in multilateral fora, including in the U.N.

I also have very high aspirations for what we can achieve in Malaysia with regard to balancing the benefits of our trade. I think that the American market is absolutely critical to Malaysia's economic success, and I believe we have opportunities to further our trade, given the market-oriented focus in Malaysia.

Our American business opportunities, financial opportunities, in particular, in the services sector, I would hope that we would be able to expand our interaction and cooperation.

I think we have not only important security and trade interests in Malaysia, in particular, given its strategic location on the Strait of Malacca, but also important people to people ties, which I'll do my best if confirmed to advance.

About 150,000 Malaysians, more than 150,000, have studied in the United States over the years. That number has gone down year by year, and I'd like to find ways for us to increase our interaction along those lines.

For example, in many areas in Asia, American educational institutions have local programs, such as MBA programs. Others are doing this in Malaysia. The American institutions are not there yet, but I'd like to promote that.

We have six American corners throughout Malaysia also. These are the areas of focus for our people to people interaction. I'd like to make sure that, if confirmed, that both I and my staff at the embassy take advantage of those centers so that we can get outside the capital and increase people to people exchanges.

I think America and Malaysia share a lot, but we have some differences, too, and I certainly will be forthright, if confirmed, in speaking about some of those differences, and helping the Malaysians, whether it's more in the technical areas, such as export control, where we can help with training courses and model legislation, or on a broader cultural front and political front, including electoral reform.

So I look forward to a very exciting time. This is a dynamic region, and Malaysia is part of the fluid situation and change there, and could be, I think, more a part of leadership, both in regional organizations, as well as globally.

So I thank you for your consideration of my nomination, and would be happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES R. KEITH, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO MALAYSIA

Madam Chairman, members of the committee, I am deeply honored to appear before you today. It is a privilege to be the President's nominee as the United States Ambassador to Malaysia. I am grateful to the President and Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they invested in me as the nominee for this position. I am also honored to be in the company of a group of distinguished nominees for important posts in the East Asian and Pacific region.

Madam Chairman, I am a senior member of the Foreign Service with the rank of Minister-Counselor. I have, over the course of my 27 years of public service, held senior positions at the State Department and the National Security Council in Washington, including as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs dealing primarily with China. Overseas I was our Designated Chief of Mission and Consul General in Hong Kong and I have served at embassies in Northeast and Southeast Asia.

Prime among the resources that the Department of State and other agencies and departments have to offer in any embassy abroad is our people. I look forward, if confirmed, to working with a capable and experienced country team at our embassy in Kuala Lumpur. We have an active and productive Mission comprising eight U.S. Government agencies and Departments working together to cement ties between our two nations. We are establishing a one-officer American presence post in Kota Kinabalu in Malaysian Borneo and have expanded our embassy staff in several key areas over recent years to advance our shared security interests. If confirmed, I will take as a priority directing this dedicated team in support of American citizens traveling, working, and residing abroad.

Malaysia is prominent in the region and globally. It will celebrate, later this year, the 50th anniversary of its independence from Britain as well as the 50th anniversary

sary of United States-Malaysia diplomatic relations. It is an important voice for key constituencies that matter to the American people. Malaysia is a moderate majority-Muslim democratic state and has successfully managed economic globalization and a multifaith, multiethnic society. It has served over the years in leadership positions in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, among others.

The United States and Malaysia have sometimes had policy differences that required public expression in strong terms. In recent years, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi has set a path forward that promises an increasingly productive relationship and greater congruence between the interests of America and Malaysia. If confirmed, I will devote my energies to improving and strengthening United States-Malaysia relations, while openly discussing issues on which we differ.

One example of our differing perspectives involves our respective views of Iran. We remain opposed to foreign investment in Iran's oil and gas sector, as a matter of law and policy. If confirmed, I will continue to make clear our concerns about such investment, and to emphasize that we are vigorously opposed to business as usual with Iran and want other nations to join us in dissuading Teheran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

Far too few Malaysians hold positive views of the United States. One of my goals, if confirmed, would be to build on the embassy's ongoing public outreach throughout the country to provide an accurate basis from which the Malaysian people can form opinions about the American people, our values, and our goals in the world. It will be critical, in this context, for my country team and for me to speak forthrightly about our commitment to fundamental values, including those enunciated in the U.N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We want to be Malaysia's essential future partner, and we need to communicate effectively that sentiment to the Government and people of Malaysia. We should deepen and broaden mutual understanding by promoting people-to-people contacts, expanding upon the more than 175,000 Americans who visit each year, and increasing from 5,500 the number of Malaysians who study in the United States. These direct personal interactions represent an invaluable platform for advancing U.S. interests.

Our trade and investment ties, already a key component of the relationship, offer great promise for further development. We are and have been for more than 40 years Malaysia's No. 1 market and we lead the world in total foreign direct investment in Malaysia. Malaysia buys more than \$13 billion of American exports each year. We are seeking to deepen these trade ties even further through a Free Trade Agreement and other mechanisms. Our agenda is ambitious, as befits a relationship with our 10th largest trading partner. We have much work to do, but remain committed to promoting the best interests of all Americans. Agriculture, the environment, labor, intellectual property—these are complex sectors that will engage our best efforts. If confirmed, I will work closely with our cabinet members and their senior advisors to ensure the most productive possible outcomes for the American people.

One clear area of common interest is the growing cooperation between our officials working on security and law enforcement issues. Southeast Asia is an important front in the war on terror and we depend on Malaysia to be an effective and cooperative player in the region's vital counterterrorism programs. Malaysian authorities have responded vigorously to the threat posed by Jemmah Islamiya and Abu Sayyaf groups, contributing to the security and prosperity of both our nations.

Our bilateral military cooperation is growing and includes exchanges of visits and training, equipment sales, combined exercises, and, increasingly, naval ship visits. Our attention in the region is focused in particular on the Strait of Malacca, an area of vital national interest as it is a major conduit for the world's commercial shipping. We need to assist littoral states through intelligence sharing and capacity-building to take on the primary task of protecting the strait. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with our senior uniformed and civilian military leaders, including my colleagues at the Pacific Command in Hawaii, to advance our security ties with Malaysia.

I would also like to mention the "Heart of Borneo" initiative and related bilateral environmental programs. The island of Borneo, shared by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei, is one of the most biologically diverse habitats in the world. We are working with those three governments, NGOs, and others to preserve vast tracts of forest and promote sustainable development in Borneo.

Madam Chairman and members of the committee, I will not attempt an exhaustive list of every priority in United States foreign policy that is embedded in the United States-Malaysia relationship. I will commit to you, however, that if confirmed I will do my utmost to ensure that you are kept informed and that your con-

cerns are addressed. If confirmed, I would be delighted to greet you and your staff members in Kuala Lumpur to further our work together to advance the interests of the American people.

I am convinced our longstanding relationship with the Malaysian people will continue to flourish in the years ahead. If confirmed by the Senate, I will commit myself to promoting United States interests by deepening ties to the leadership and people of Malaysia to the benefit of both our nations.

Thank you again for granting me the honor of appearing before you today. I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Keith.

Now, Ms. Hughes, do you have anyone you'd like to introduce before you make your opening statement?

**STATEMENT OF MIRIAM HUGHES, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERATED STATE OF MICRONESIA**

Ms. HUGHES. Yes. Thank you very much, Madame Chairman. My daughter, Jordana Hughes Tynan, has driven down from New York to be with me today. I'm very, very honored.

Jordana has been with me in all of my Foreign Service assignments, including Mexico City, Santo Domingo, Quito, Bangkok, London, and Thessaloniki, at some sacrifice. It's always a little bit harder for the dependents. So it's a huge honor today. Thank you.

Regarding—I thought maybe mine would be better as a 3-minute rule, since, if confirmed, I'll go to the littlest country, and I've just chosen to highlight a few parts of the statement that will be entered for the record.

Madame Chair and Senator Murkowski, it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss my nomination. In my current assignment at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, I head a section that is dedicated to the full range of economic, social, and humanitarian affairs that consume more than 70 percent of the U.N.'s regular budget.

The global issues that we debate and negotiate particularly concern developing countries. If confirmed, I would look forward wholeheartedly to leading our efforts in Micronesia, to implement and practice key objectives that we discuss conceptually at the U.N., including sustainable development, good governance, and environmental protection and management.

On a map, the Federated States of Micronesia appear as specks of far-flung islands in the vast Pacific Ocean. This is one of the smallest countries in the world. Nevertheless, it has sovereignty over more than a million square miles of ocean in a strategic region.

The United States has committed to defend Micronesia as if it were part of our own territory. Micronesians serve in the U.S. military, and many have made the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq and Afghanistan. The friendship, above all, of this nation is vital.

If confirmed by the Senate, I would look forward to working with the members of this committee, and others in the Congress, who seek to invigorate our relationship with Micronesia across a range of interests. Our ties go back over centuries.

We have recently entered into a challenging new phase in U.S./Micronesian relations. To promote self-reliance, the U.S. Congress approved an amended compact of free association, which went into effect in 2004. This amended compact, or Compact 2, targets U.S.

resources on key areas that are building blocks for economic self-sufficiency, including education, health care, infrastructure, environmental protection, and private sector development.

The U.S. Embassy in Kolonia has a special responsibility to work with the Department of Interior to ensure that this compact is well-implemented. Strong leadership and management skills are essential. The embassy needs to coordinate with some 40 other U.S. Government agencies.

Many of them are legacies from the days of trust territory status, and their programs continue to touch every aspect of Micronesian life. Respect and partnership will be the cornerstones of our success.

Madame Chairman and Senator Murkowski, it would be a profound honor to represent the President and people of the United States of America in the Federated States of Micronesia. If confirmed, I would work diligently to promote friendship and a comprehensive partnership to build capacity in a unique and valuable region.

You can be assured of my full cooperation with the Congress, and of course, I would be happy to answer your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hughes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MIRIAM K. HUGHES, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

Madam Chairwoman and members of the committee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss my nomination to serve as United States Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). It is also an honor to introduce my daughter, Jordana Hughes Tynan, who came from New York to be with me on this momentous day. Jordana accompanied me on all my overseas assignments, which was not always easy for a child. She made many sacrifices and adjustments on my behalf.

During a 29-year career in the Foreign Service, I have learned, worked, and grown through assignments at our United States posts in Mexico City, Santo Domingo, Quito, Bangkok, London, and Thessaloniki. My specialty has been consular management, but I additionally sought broader experience. In Bangkok, I monitored and reported on conditions in U.N. refugee camps for Cambodians and Vietnamese. The post I headed in Thessaloniki, Greece, focused on efforts to promote United States business opportunities and analyze the human rights mosaic in the Balkans.

In my current assignment at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, I head a section that is dedicated to the full range of economic, social, and humanitarian affairs that consume more than 70 percent of the U.N. regular budget. The global issues that we debate and negotiate particularly concern developing countries. If confirmed, I would look forward wholeheartedly to leading our efforts in Micronesia to implement in practice key objectives that we discuss conceptually at the U.N., including sustainable development, good governance, and environmental protection.

On a map, the FSM appear as specks of far-flung islands in the vast Central Pacific Ocean. Although this nation is tiny and scattered, its impact is significant. We share a deep connection. Micronesia's 600 islands encompass a total area of just 270 square miles. It is one of the smallest countries in the world. Nevertheless, it has sovereignty over more than a million square miles of ocean in a strategic region. The United States has committed to defend Micronesia as if it were part of our own territory. Micronesians serve in the U.S. military at twice the per capita rate of Americans, and many have made the ultimate sacrifice for freedom in Iraq and Afghanistan. The friendship of this nation is vital, particularly as we expand our engagement in the Pacific to meet today's transnational challenges.

If confirmed by the Senate, I would look forward to working with the members of this committee and others in the Congress who seek to invigorate our relationship with Micronesia across a range of interests. Although an ocean separates us, this recently independent nation has a special place in the hearts of Americans. Our ties go back over centuries.

In the 1800s, American whalers and missionaries entered this region. The American author Jack London found inspiration for some of his most gripping tales in the remote Pacific islands. His stories of voyages and adventures capture the translucent beauty of the islands as well as the hazards of typhoons, disease, and poverty. The inhabitants who London brought to life demonstrate extraordinary skill in indigenous methods of navigation. They are ingenious, loyal, and resilient. These are people who we want to keep as firm friends.

Soon after the second world war and following severe bombing of some of the occupied islands of Micronesia, the United Nations established the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands under the administration of the United States. Although discontinued in 1991, the trusteeship system remains enshrined in the U.N. Charter as a means to promote peace, progressive development, and eventual self-government. Under American tutelage, Micronesia fulfilled these aims. The FSM adopted a constitution in 1979. The nation emerged as a sovereign democracy in 1986. A Compact of Free Association with the United States helped Micronesia make a smooth transition. This month, Micronesians chose their seventh President in a free and fair electoral process.

We have entered a challenging, new phase of United States-Micronesian relations. To promote self-reliance, the U.S. Congress approved an Amended Compact of Free Association, which commenced in 2004. The Micronesians themselves participated in compact negotiations, and they help review its annual performance. The amended compact targets U.S. resources in key areas that are building blocks for economic self-sufficiency, including education, health care, infrastructure, environmental protection, and private sector development. Compact aid will decrease progressively every year and transfer to a capitalized trust fund, which is intended to ensure Micronesia's transition to economic independence in 2024.

The United States' Embassy in Kolonia has a special responsibility to work with the Department of Interior to ensure that this compact is well implemented. Strong leadership and management skills are essential. The embassy needs to coordinate with some 40 other U.S. Government agencies—many of them legacies from the days of the Trust Territory—whose programs continue to touch every aspect of Micronesian life. Respect and partnership will be the cornerstones of our success.

From my experience as a Foreign Service consular manager in some of our largest and most complex overseas consular sections, I learned to improve efficiency and accountability based on collaborative strategies. One must engage and train the participants, ensuring that they become part of the process, buy into the goals, and indeed refine and adapt them and make them their own. Once engaged, they will dedicate their best efforts, teaching a leader in return and finding creative, new ways to achieve mutual objectives.

If I am confirmed, I will devote my energies to fostering relationships of equality and pragmatism with our Micronesian friends. I would also strengthen cooperation with regional and multilateral partners and civil society representatives. Such a comprehensive approach must be based upon a clear vision of how to nurture a sustainable future in a small island nation that is isolated and potentially vulnerable. To be effective at the United Nations, one learns to listen carefully and to focus on priorities. The majority of U.N. members are developing countries. They teach us the paramount importance of respect for diversity and principles of national ownership. At the same time, the United States has led efforts to establish global acceptance of the responsibility of governments to meet the needs of their own people by creating an enabling architecture for a just rule of law and growth that is stimulated by economic freedom.

Madam Chairwoman and members of the committee, it would be a profound honor to represent the President and people of the United States of America in the Federated States of Micronesia. If I am confirmed, I would work diligently to promote friendship and a comprehensive partnership to help build capacity in a strategic region. You can be assured of my full cooperation with the U.S. Congress.

I will be happy to answer your questions.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Klemm, would you like to introduce any family here before you speak?

Mr. KLEMM. Regrettably, Madame Chair, my wife, Mari, could not join us today—

Senator BOXER. Okay.

Mr. KLEMM [continuing]. Due to her professional responsibilities.

Senator BOXER. I understand. Send our best.

STATEMENT OF HANS G. KLEMM, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE

Mr. KLEMM. Thank you. Madame Chair, Senator Murkowski, I'm very honored to have the privilege of appearing before you today as President Bush's nominee as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. I'm grateful for the trust and confidence that President and Secretary Rice have shown in nominating me.

I would also like to thank your staff. They have been especially helpful and gracious to me during this process.

Madame Chairman, as you mentioned, I joined the Foreign Service some 25 years ago, and have directed large programs, as well as management offices, at the Department here in Washington, as well as serving at our missions abroad in Germany, Korea, and in other small, developing, oil-rich country, Trinidad and Tobago.

East Timor achieved its independence on May 20, 2002, becoming the first new nation of the 21st century. As a friend of long standing, the United States wants East Timor to succeed in its transition to a stable democratic state.

The United States supports the strengthening of multiparty democracy in East Timor on a foundation of security and the rule of law. We support the protection of human rights, including freedoms of speech, press, and assembly.

We support the development of a free-market economy. We support our allies in the United Nations, who have committed both human and financial resources to assist East Timor's democratic development, and to recover from the turmoil of the past year.

We welcome the progress that East Timor has made in recent months toward consolidating its democratic institutions, including its organization of the first sovereign national election for president.

The East Timor Government must now redouble efforts to ensure that parliamentary elections, to be held next month, are free, fair, and transparent, and provide the Timorese people with an opportunity to choose a new government with a mandate to move the country forward.

Security remains essential to restoring political stability and building a foundation for a more prosperous future. The police and armed forces need to become cohesive, accountable organizations that earn the trust of the Timorese people.

If confirmed, I will work with other donor nations and organizations to provide training and assistance to these institutions to promote professionalism in accordance with principles of human rights.

The violence and unrest that engulfed East Timor last year underscored the urgent need to foster good governance. The crisis flowed from institutional weaknesses, such as politicized security forces, an inadequate system of justice, widespread absence of reliable information, and a disaffected population.

If confirmed, I will work with the government and the international community to remedy these serious shortcomings. I will also continue to press for addressing accountability for the violence of 2006 and the crimes against humanity committed in 1999.

Recent events also highlight the need to promote economic growth, with a particular focus on job creation. If confirmed, I will

assist the government of East Timor to improve its economic policy environment and best utilize the country's potentially significant natural resource wealth.

Madame Chairman, I firmly believe that the successful establishment of democratic institutions and vibrant free markets in East Timor will send a tremendously important signal to the world.

East Timor is a country that inspired the global community with its longing for self-determination, freedom, and democracy. This shared commitment to the highest ideals for government makes East Timor a natural friend of the United States, and an example to others around the world.

Madame Chairman, Senator Murkowski, thank you again for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be happy to answer any questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klemm follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HANS G. KLEMM, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE

Madame Chairwoman, members of the committee, I am honored to have the privilege of appearing before you today as President Bush's nominee as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (East Timor). I am appreciative of the trust and confidence the President and Secretary Rice have shown in nominating me and grateful for the opportunity to serve in this position.

Madame Chairwoman, I am a member of the Senior Foreign Service currently assigned as Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs at our embassy in Tokyo, Japan. I have previously served overseas at our missions in Germany, Korea, and Trinidad and Tobago. At the Department of State, I have served as the director of large management and policy program offices within the Bureaus of Human Resources and Economic and Business Affairs. If confirmed by the Senate, I will work to the best of my ability to advance United States' interests in East Timor and the Southeast Asian region and look forward to working with the members of this committee and others in Congress to achieve our objectives.

East Timor achieved its independence on May 20, 2002, becoming the first new nation of the 21st century. With the firm backing of the international community, the Timorese people set out on a path toward freedom and democracy. Even at that time, everyone understood that the country would have to overcome many obstacles.

Fortunately, East Timor has many partners willing to assist in times of need. As a friend of long standing, the United States wants East Timor to succeed in its transition to a stable democratic state. The United States has supported both the deployment of international forces and the establishment of the U.N. Integrated Mission in East Timor (LJNMIT) in response to the political crisis and violence of 2006. The United States also supported the international community's humanitarian efforts by providing food and non-food assistance to address the immediate needs of the tens of thousands of internally displaced persons, many of whom remain in camps around the country.

We support the strengthening of multiparty democracy on a foundation of security and the rule of law. We support the protection of human rights, including freedoms of speech, press, and assembly. We support the development of a free-market economy. We believe that democracy, good governance, and economic growth offer the best chance for East Timor to succeed. We support our allies in the region who have committed both human and financial resources to assist East Timor to recover from the turmoil of the past year. A stable and prosperous East Timor will not only fulfill the aspirations of its people arising from the country's long struggle for independence; but it will also serve as an inspiration to other peoples around the world.

We welcome the progress that East Timor has made in recent months toward consolidating its democratic institutions. The Government has completed the first step, organizing its first sovereign national election for president, with assistance from the U.N. Integrated Mission in East Timor and other donors. Our Embassy in Dili supported these efforts by publicly promoting peaceful, free, and fair elections in coordination with other diplomatic missions in-country. The parliamentary election scheduled for this summer should provide a farther opportunity for the Timorese people to choose a government with a mandate to move the country forward. I look

forward to continuing our support for the Timorese in their effort to put democratic government on a solid footing.

Security remains essential to restoring political stability and building a foundation for a more prosperous future. The police and the armed forces need to become cohesive, accountable organizations that earn the trust of the Timorese people. We are working with other donor nations and organizations to provide training and assistance to these institutions to promote professionalism and functional expertise in accordance with principles of human rights. If confirmed, I will continue to press the Timorese Government and international donors on the need for security sector reform that is achievable and results in the growing stability of the state and its institutions.

The violence and unrest that engulfed East Timor in 2006 underscored the urgent need to foster good governance. The crisis flowed from institutional weaknesses that will continue to generate problems if left unremedied. These include weak state institutions, politicized security forces, an inadequate system of justice, widespread absence of reliable information, and a disaffected population. The challenge in addressing these issues goes beyond restoring peace and requires laying a solid foundation for good governance in the future. I look forward to supporting our foreign assistance programs that seek to redress these root causes. More must also be done to promote the rule of law. If confirmed, I will continue to press for addressing accountability for the violence of 2006 as well as the crimes against humanity committed in 1999.

Recent events also highlight the need to promote economic growth, with a particular focus on job creation. Democracy is often at risk when there is no economic opportunity, and lackluster economic performance underlies much of the popular frustration in the country. We will assist the Government of East Timor to improve the economic policy environment and best utilize the country's potentially significant natural resource wealth. For example, if confirmed, I look forward to supporting ongoing initiatives to improve the security of property rights, vitalize the private sector and increase economic opportunity. These programs promise to encourage private investment and improve private sector agricultural performance, where 80 percent of Timorese make their living.

The Government of East Timor has done commendable preparatory work since the country became eligible to propose a compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2005. The Government could complete its compact proposal as early as the end of this calendar year, if the Timorese are able to complete detailed analyses on program elements, maintain compact eligibility, and conduct serious consultations with civil society and other stakeholders. Early drafts of the proposal suggest that it will focus on much-needed infrastructure projects. I understand that after MCC completes due diligence on the proposal, a compact could be signed and implementation could begin as early as 2009.

I look forward to continuing our efforts to reach out to like-minded international partners to reaffirm to the Timorese authorities what they must do to lay the foundation for a better future. Australia leads the military peacekeeping force in East Timor. Other nations, such as New Zealand, have also contributed. We have close working ties with the U.N. Mission in East Timor, which includes over 1,600 U.N. police. Portugal, Japan, the European Union, Brazil, Malaysia, and other nations also have a significant diplomatic presence in East Timor.

Madame Chairwoman, I firmly believe that the successful establishment of democratic institutions and vibrant free markets in East Timor will send a tremendously important signal to the world. East Timor is a country that has inspired the global community with its longing for self-determination, freedom, and democracy. This shared commitment to the highest ideals for government makes East Timor a natural friend of the United States and an example to others around the world.

There are many ways the United States, and particularly our Mission in Dili, can help East Timor. Currently over 140 people make up the Mission staff, including 14 Americans, and over 120 Foreign Service nationals. I look forward to leading this team as we meet the challenges ahead.

Madame Chairwoman and members of the committee, thank you again for granting me the honor of appearing before you today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so very much.
Mr. Huso.

**STATEMENT OF RAVIC R. HUSO, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**

Mr. HUSO. Madame Chair, thank you very much. My wife, Barbara, who I met when we were both Peace Corps volunteers in Senegal a number of years ago, unfortunately could not come today. She's home with my daughter, Natalie, in Hawaii. I do have some dear old friends, Sherman and Jill Hinson, who are standing in for my family.

Madame Chair, Senator Murkowski, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. It's a great honor to be nominated by President Bush to be the U.S. Ambassador to the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

If confirmed as Ambassador to Laos, I look forward to working with the committee and other members of Congress to advance United States interest in Laos.

The United States and Laos have many shared interests, and have cooperated closely in a number of key areas, such as the recovery of the remains of our service members missing in Laos during the Vietnam War, and removing unexploded ordnance leftover from that fighting.

In recent years, our bilateral cooperation has broadened to include combating international threats, such as the traffic in drugs, the traffic in persons, and avian influenza, more recently. We're also slowly seeing increased opportunities for some trade and investment between our two countries.

The United States Government has made a solemn commitment to achieving the fullest possible accounting for the Americans still missing from the war in Southeast Asia. I deeply respect that commitment, and if confirmed, I will devote my full attention to this important humanitarian endeavor.

Despite the recent progress we've made in our relationship, we do have significant concerns regarding the Lao Government's inability to fully adhere to internationally recognized standards for human rights and religious freedoms.

I appreciate and I share the concerns of the many thousands of Americans who trace their origins to Laos, in particular, the Hmong Americans, over the Lao Government's treatment of ethnic minorities. I will make it a priority, if confirmed, to encourage the Lao Government to protect the rights of its minority ethnic groups.

Finally, Madame Chair, the welfare and safety of American citizens traveling or working in Laos will always be a top priority, if I'm confirmed.

In conclusion, I believe that sustained engagement with the Lao Government, supported by a strong public diplomacy program, offers the best prospects for achieving progress on the array of issues important to United States interests and to the Lao people.

Madame Chair, Senator Murkowski, thank you again for the opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Huso follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAVIC R. HUSO, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Madam Chairwoman and members of the committee, it is a great honor to be nominated by President Bush to be the U.S. Ambassador to the Lao People's Demo-

cratic Republic. I am grateful for the President's confidence and to Secretary Rice for her support of my nomination. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee and other interested Members of Congress to advance United States' interests in Laos.

Madam Chairwoman, I have served my country as a Foreign Service officer since 1980 and before that as a Peace Corps volunteer. As the son of a Foreign Service officer, I was brought up with a deep sense of the responsibilities associated with representing the United States abroad and pride in being afforded that opportunity. I also developed a profound appreciation for the characteristics that make the United States a beacon of democratic freedom and economic opportunity.

As a Foreign Service officer, I have always looked for the most challenging assignments, those that offered the most opportunity to make a difference. If confirmed, I will devote myself to encouraging the Lao people and their Government to pursue a path of positive engagement with friends and neighbors leading to enhanced respect for individual freedoms and rights and shared economic prosperity.

The United States' relationship with Laos has developed steadily since the restoration of full diplomatic relations in 1992. The United States and Laos have many shared interests and have cooperated closely in a number of key areas, such as the recovery of the remains of our service members missing in action from the Southeast Asia war, removing unexploded ordnance from the war, and in reducing the scourge of drugs. In recent years, bilateral cooperation has broadened to include combating avian influenza and trafficking in persons. We are also slowly seeing increased opportunities for trade and investment. However, despite the recent progress in our relationship, we still have significant concerns regarding the Lao Government's inability to fully adhere to internationally recognized standards for human rights and religious freedoms.

If confirmed, I pledge to devote myself to strengthening our existing partnerships and exploring new opportunities for cooperation. I also am prepared to address our differences directly and constructively. I believe that sustained engagement with the Lao Government—supported by a strong public diplomacy effort—offers the best prospects for achieving progress on the array of issues important to United States interests and the Lao people.

I am encouraged by progress in several important areas. The United States Government has made a solemn commitment to achieving the fullest possible accounting for the Americans still missing from the war in Southeast Asia. I deeply respect that commitment and, if confirmed, I will devote my full attention to building on the long history of successful cooperation on this important humanitarian endeavor that has been at the foundation of our bilateral relationship. I believe that we can achieve even more through increased flexibility in the conduct of joint field recovery activities and renewed efforts to examine all available sources of relevant information.

This collaborative work has also laid the foundation for taking the first steps in a process of building military-to-military ties through English-language training, educational exchanges, and civic action projects. I believe a phased and graduated approach to greater contacts between our militaries has the potential to improve mutual understanding and also benefit the Lao people.

The Congress took a major step in 2004 toward helping Laos to achieve sustainable, free market-based economic development by approving normal trade relations (NTR) status. Laos is among the poorest nations in Asia but also has significant economic potential and untapped natural as well as human resources. American investors and companies can play an important role in helping Laos to prosper and to diversify its economic and trade relations. If confirmed, I will not only assist United States businesses seeking to trade with or invest in Laos but will also look for ways to help the Lao Government fully implement our Bilateral Trade Agreement and undertake the reforms necessary to strengthen the essential underpinnings of a market economy: good governance and rule of law.

I also assess a commitment by the Lao Government to work together toward solving challenges of mutual concern. The United States and Laos have a common interest in combating transnational threats such as terrorism, trafficking in narcotics and persons, money laundering and other financial crimes, pandemic diseases and environmental degradation. Laos has made great progress in reducing the production of opium and the illicit cross-border trade in heroin but is faced with a rapidly growing new threat—the use and trafficking of methamphetamines—known locally as yaa baa or “crazy drug.” I will do my utmost to sustain the progress made against opium and while also broadening our focus to address the methamphetamine challenge.

Earlier this year, Laos suffered an outbreak of avian influenza, resulting in its first-ever human infections and deaths from this disease. I will pay close attention to bolstering United States and international efforts to assist the Lao to develop their capabilities to detect, isolate, and control such outbreaks and reduce the threat of human pandemic influenza.

Porous borders and weak state institutions make Laos potentially vulnerable to terrorist activity. I will also urge the Lao Government to work closely with the United States and other partner countries, as well as within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) framework, to take concrete measures to reduce the threat of international terrorists using Laos as a base or a target for their crimes.

If confirmed, I would undertake this position with an overall sense of real opportunity to interact with the Lao Government to effect positive change and further expand the solid basis for cooperation. At the same time, I am attuned to and intend to forthrightly address the Lao Government's poor record regarding human rights.

In particular, I appreciate and fully share the concerns of the many thousands of Americans who trace their origins to Laos—in particular, the Hmong-Americans—over the Lao Government's treatment of ethnic minorities. Many of the Hmong in Laos, especially those who live in remote areas in often difficult conditions, are regarded with suspicion and sometimes hostility by officials who suspect they may be associated with antigovernment activities. Significant numbers of Hmong have entered Thailand in search of economic opportunities or, in some cases, out of well-founded fear of persecution, and are now in detention awaiting a determination as to their future. I will make it a priority, if confirmed, to work with the Lao and Thai authorities and appropriate international agencies to find durable solutions to the plight of the displaced Hmong. I will also work steadfastly to encourage the Lao Government to respect the rights of its minority ethnic groups and provide those who may return as well as those who have stayed with the protection and assistance they need to integrate fully into Lao society. At the same time, I will be guided by longstanding United States policy that we do not support or condone groups or individuals who advocate or take actions aimed at overthrowing or destabilizing the Lao Government.

More broadly, if confirmed, I intend to sustain the United States commitment to human rights and democratic principles as my primary vehicle for encouraging positive change in Laos. I will press the Lao Government on human rights issues and encourage them to adhere to international human rights standards. I will also devote particular effort to building on the progress made in recent years by the Lao Government in meeting international standards for religious freedom and tolerance.

Finally, the welfare and safety of American citizens traveling or working in Laos will always be a top priority if I am confirmed. I will ensure that the United States mission in Laos provides accurate and timely information on any risks American may face in Laos along with advice on precautions they should take. I also intend to see through the construction of a new embassy that meets current security standards and provides a safe working environment for the dedicated and highly capable American and Lao staff of the United States mission.

Madam Chairwoman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to address you. I am prepared to respond to any questions you may have.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much.

I think I will ask unanimous consent to go with seven minutes of questions, and then give the same to Senator Murkowski. If Senator Feingold joins us, then he'll be recognized for an equal amount of time.

First of all, I want to thank all of you for your very good, to the point testimony, and as you know, I'm supporting all of you, so there's no trick questions here.

But I do have one question that I think sort of shows in another light what I was trying to get at in my opening statement about the need for very aggressive, strong diplomacy and not a reliance on the military as a way to make friends. It's not working.

One of the things, Mr. Keith, I'd like to discuss is something you touch on in your writings. I've read some of your writings. They're very strongly supportive of the war in Iraq in as late as 2003, and I'm not asking in any way to debate that with you. That was your

right, and you did rely on Colin Powell's very aggressive testimony at the U.N., which he has since disavowed.

But what has happened to us in the world as a result of this military-centric policy, and neglect, in my view, of diplomacy, is that we're more unpopular than we've ever been in the history of our Nation, as far as I can tell, just looking through all the past polling results.

I want to talk about something wonderful that this country did in 2006, and give you a sense of what I'm talking about. In mid-2006, the U.S. Naval Ship, *Mercy*, a floating hospital ship, was deployed on a 72-day humanitarian mission to Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste—countries home to some of the largest Muslim populations in the world.

The Navy worked closely with the State Department and NGOs to identify and treat approximately 61,000 patients. Everything from dental and eye care to surgery for sick patients was provided.

The effort was undertaken, in part, to win the hearts and minds of the local populous. It appears to have had an impact. Shortly after the trip, an organization known as Terror Free America—excuse me, Terror Free Tomorrow conducted polling. Fifty-three percent of Indonesians said that the activities of the *Mercy* made their opinion of the United States more favorable.

Terror Free Tomorrow also conducted polling in Indonesia after United States aid was delivered to tsunami victims. The percentage of Indonesians who reported an unfavorable view of the United States dropped from a high of 83 percent in 2003 to 41 percent, and the percentage of Indonesians expressing confidence in bin Laden dropped from 58 to 12 percent.

These results were clearly noticed by the Department of Defense. Officials involved in drafting the 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the war on terrorism said that "The American military's effort to aid tsunami victims in Southeast Asia did more to counter terrorist ideology than any attack mission."

This is the military, folks. So I guess what I'd want from each of you is just a response to this. I'm trying to get at how strongly you agree with that statement of the U.S. military, that when we get out there and we really help people, not at the point of a gun, but it works. Even though I would say sometimes we have to use a military approach.

I'm not—I voted to go get bin Laden. I voted to go to war in Afghanistan. So where I'm coming from is, yeah, sometimes you clearly have to go strongly in that direction.

But that aside, the fact that we're not being attacked, all else being equal, can you comment on this amazing comment by the American military, that it did more to counter terrorist ideology than any attack mission?

I'll start with you, Mr. Hume.

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much. First, I'd say that my initial takeaway from that is a positive one, and it is that, yes, we do have some problems out there, in terms of public diplomacy and public relations, but also, yes, we can do things about it.

I've been fortunate enough to spend a fair part of my career in places where we've had real difficulties, and I've been able to see that by engaging people, we've been able to get a positive view of

the United States. I can tell you that in the last 18 months, every time I went to Darfur, every person I met with thanked me.

Senator BOXER. Thank you. No, that helps, because, well, you've obviously chosen to go into diplomacy, because I'm sure you share these sentiments, but I just wanted to get them out.

Mr. Keith.

Mr. KEITH. Thank you, Madame Chairman. I think you raise a critical point, and recalling a phrase you used earlier, I think a diplomatic surge is the kind of thing that we've been talking about in Asia and that is necessary. Looking back, you raise the public diplomacy environment over recent years.

I think we all run the risk of having to take a step back and realize that we might have used platforms that, as you mentioned with then-Secretary Powell, we have to explain.

I think we're better off taking that risk and managing the public environment than allowing others to put words in our mouth. So it was my commitment and remains my commitment that we need to be out in front of the camera, so to speak, in print, and making our case to the world as best we can.

We certainly need to be forthright, if we've taken a step in the wrong direction. I think that's part of how I dealt with this when I was Consul General and Designated Chief of Mission in Hong Kong, was to explain to people, when bad news came up, that the American way of handling this was transparent, that we would never say that we don't make mistakes, but that we handle them in a way that I think encourages people to see the best of America, and that when we make a mistake, we are quite open and honest about it, and therefore, can learn by it.

I certainly believe, looking forward, that in Asia, as we anticipate the coming Olympics in China and a number of diplomatic events that will appear, including in Malaysia, the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations with the United States, as well as the 50th anniversary of Malaysia's independence, that we have opportunities and we need to use them to convey our fundamental beliefs, and to use everything at our disposal to try to advance American interests.

I would enlarge also on the point that you made with regard to the *Mercy*. I think clearly, the pollings show that across Asia, we did very well after the tsunami not to dwell on something that was clearly tragic for those involved, but we responded in a way that showed, I think, the best of America.

My commitment to you and to the committee would be to try to follow-up on that momentum in every way I possibly can.

Senator BOXER. Good.

Yes, Ms. Hughes.

Ms. HUGHES. Madame Chairman, I think most of us joined the Foreign Service because we felt we had a mission of friendship. In some countries, that's not always easy. It's not always easy at the United Nations, quite frankly, where we're dealing with 191 other countries and a lot of power politics.

But even when we disagree, if we can listen and engage, that's what's exciting about our work. I am fortunate to be going to a country, Micronesia, if confirmed, that already has a very deep bond of friendship with the United States, but it's going to enter

a difficult time, because we're trying to nudge it toward modernization.

In that sense, we look at the military for what it can do in a very constructive and practical way in a country like this. That can be search and rescue missions by the Coast Guard, training of the people so they can develop better law enforcement techniques of their own. The Pacific Command can do humanitarian assistance projects. That's how we relate to the military, I hope, and that would certainly be my intention, if I'm lucky enough to go to Micronesia.

Senator BOXER. I think that's a good point, how we can use the military, which clearly, we did in these cases.

Yes, Mr. Klemm.

Mr. KLEMM. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. You mentioned the *Mercy* visit to the Southeast Asia region last summer. The stop in Timor was actually added at the end of its stay in the region. It took place just after the breakdown in law and order that occurred in April and May of last year.

Not only was the visit very, very welcome because of the assistance that the ship was able to provide the Timorese people, who suffer from very, very serious health problems across the population, but also, given the timing, it showed the United States commitment to East Timor to our continued intent to assist that country as it consolidates its democratic institution, and gets its economy started, as well as ensuring security and political stability there.

We have a pretty robust aid program in East Timor, due to the generosity of the Congress and the people of the United States. Our aid is focused on improving East Timor's governance, as well as improving economic conditions in the country, where the Millennium Challenge Corporation continues to negotiate with East Timor and hopes once the elections are completed this summer to redouble the negotiations on a possible Compact Agreement with the country.

All these things, in terms of the soft power tools that we have available, I think we've used them very effectively in East Timor. Our popularity there, as I understand it, is very, very strong.

I don't want to draw too tight of a correlation on this, but as you're aware, our military to military relationship in East Timor is actually at a very, very low level, largely due to the accountability problems that arose, both in 2006 and 1999.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Klemm, thank you for your answer. I don't want to get too far afield from the question, which is the way we can use diplomacy. I think you've laid out a series of issues to boost our popularity in the region. I think you did touch on that.

Mr. Huso, I just—because this is really my only question. I'm going to throw you a little curve here. Answer that, but also, if you will, in December 2005, reports surfaced that a group of 26 ethnic Hmong children and their adult guardian had been detained by Thai authorities, and forcibly deported to Laos, a country that has committed horrific human rights violations against the Hmong people for the past three decades.

In response to significant outcry on the issue, including from my home State of California, I wrote Secretary Rice in 2006 and asked our Government to take all appropriate steps to secure their re-

lease, and to work with the United Nation's High Commission of Refugees to identify a durable solution for the children.

So could you please provide a report on the current status of these Hmong children? What is being done? If confirmed, will you provide me periodic updates on this and other issues related to human rights abuses against the Hmong?

Mr. HUSO. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. With your permission, I'll answer the first question.

Senator BOXER. Surely. Surely.

Mr. HUSO. As you pointed out, I'm currently the Political Advisor at U.S. Pacific Command, and I was present during the tsunami.

When the U.S. Pacific Command responded to that disaster, it was clearly recognized that we were facing a disaster on a scale that was unprecedented, and that only a quick military response was going to be able to deliver the relief and the assistance that was necessary in a timely manner.

There was also a recognition, but it wasn't the primary motivation, that a U.S. military-led effort of that nature could, in fact, provide benefits to us, in terms of how the U.S. military was perceived. But in essence, it was a humanitarian endeavor.

After the fact, of course, as you pointed out, the polls indicated there was a great deal of support for the action that we took, and views of America were changed.

I see this opportunity to cooperate with other countries in the region on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as a very important one. It's one way that the military can support our diplomatic efforts in the region, and begin to change perceptions of how we operate there.

To answer your second question, Madame Chairwoman, my understanding is that of the 26 individuals that you mentioned, 21 of them were returned to their villages by the Lao Government in April of this year. There's a remaining five, who I believe are all boys, and one adult, whose whereabouts I do not know. As far as I know, the State Department has not been able to ascertain it.

I certainly will keep you and your staff informed of any developments that may take place in this case, and will follow-up diligently if confirmed.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Huso.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Madame Chair. I will kind of pick up a little bit with the public diplomacy theme that you have started here. It was a very good question, and I appreciated the responses from each of you.

This is directed to you, Mr. Keith, and to you, Mr. Hume, recognizing that Indonesia and Malaysia, as two moderate Islamic nations, can play an important role in being a bridge to the Islamic community for the United States.

What steps have you seen from these countries that they are willing to be that bridge, and how can we work to improve the relationships, work with these nations to do so? Any suggestions or thoughts, Mr. Keith, Mr. Hume? Go ahead.

Mr. KEITH. Senator, if I may, I'll go first. Thank you for your question. I think it's one of the most important issues that I'll have to think about on my way to post and after I'm there.

I know that within the Department, Karen Hughes has designated Malaysia as one of the pilot countries where we need to focus our resources in public diplomacy, precisely for the reasons that you've raised.

I think what we see with Indonesia and regional—I'm sorry, with Malaysia, and regional for, in particular, in ASEAN, in APEC, and in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the voice that you spoke of a moderate forward-looking perspective influenced by a market-oriented perspective on the economy at home is one that we can work with, and that we ought to be able to find a way to amplify and in some ways accelerate.

I think the opportunities will come, and we need to be alert to them and take advantage of them. For example, I mentioned a moment ago the upcoming 50th anniversary of Malaysia's independence and our diplomatic relations.

This is the kind of opportunity, it seems to me, where we ought to, for the Malaysian people and through them, to other members of ASEAN, find ways to communicate our fundamental themes in the region.

I think also, working with Malaysia in multilateral for, such as the U.N. and its organizations, we can find ways to bring that moderate perspective to bear in the World Health Organization, in the Food and Agricultural Organization.

These are all areas where north-south and third-world kinds of issues do arise. We can be working with Malaysia ahead of time and throughout the development of breaking or developing perspectives on issues including avian influenza and how samples are shared, or biodiversity and how genetic resources are taken care of.

These kinds of cutting-edge issues, I think, lend themselves to Malaysia's pragmatic approach, which we see in many instances.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

Mr. Hume.

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much, Senator. I think I would start from a hope that the Indonesian Government is successful at home as a democracy, helping to meet the needs of the Indonesian people. I think in that kind of a context, with respect for the rule of law, Indonesia will be a stronger partner for us, dealing with the questions of extremism and issues elsewhere.

I look at the progress that's been made recently. The dispatch of a battalion, for example, to be part of the peacekeeping force in Lebanon is a positive example.

In the briefings I received over the past several weeks, one of the points that was talked about that sticks in my mind, we have a very active exchange program with Indonesia, and the Voice of America began a program of interviewing some of the students who were in the United States, and then sharing those programs with local stations in Indonesia, which has become a positive and popular program to listen to for many Indonesians.

I think that that type of mixed exchange and outreach and sharing against a backdrop of a country which is generally improving is the right track, in order to be sure that we have a partner for counteracting extremism and a kind of rage and dissatisfaction.

Thank you very much.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. I'm going to direct a question to all of you here this morning, as it relates to energy needs, the ability to provide for energy. We've had some very interesting hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee on energy and national security and that perspective.

In your—the respective country to which you have been nominated to fill this post, can you just very quickly tell me how you see energy issues, the needs and demands impacting each of the nations that you work with? I recognize that we don't have much time on this, so if you can try to be brief.

Mr. Huso, we'll start with you here.

Mr. HUSO. Senator Murkowski, thank you very much. Laos is a very small, very poor country, and does not have a lot of economic activity, but they do have a lot of hydropower potential. As a consequence, there are a number of dam projects under construction in Laos that will provide electric energy to neighboring countries, primarily Thailand.

So I don't see energy requirements as being a serious issue in Laos. To the contrary, Laos will be a net exporter of energy.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Klemm.

Mr. KLEMM. Thank you, Senator. East Timor sits on substantial oil and gas reserves that lie along the border with Australia. It's a large net exporter of energy at the present, and I don't see that reversing probably for the next couple of decades.

American companies are involved in developing the energy and oil resources in East Timor.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Are you seeing interest from countries such as China, perhaps, coming—offering roads infrastructure, looking to perhaps tie up some of that energy reserves?

Mr. KLEMM. To be very brief, yes, Senator. The Chinese have diplomatic relations with East Timor. They have undertaken to build a new foreign ministry for the government. They're also building a new presidential palace in Dili, the capital.

I'm not aware that they're branching out to other infrastructure projects, which are desperately needed in the country. But the Chinese certainly are, of course, aware of East Timor's oil wealth, and probably have that in mind as a result of their activities.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

Ms. Hughes.

Ms. HUGHES. Thank you for raising a question, Senator, that is absolutely critical for Micronesia. Micronesia has no fossil fuels. Everything is imported. When it was a trust territory, we used to pay for their fuel. We don't now, under the new compact. Their very viability, in my opinion, depends upon developing other sources of energy.

If I'm confirmed, I would hope to make this a priority. Certainly, they have ample solar radiation, wind, water. It is a key to their sustainable development.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do they have geothermal, do you know?

Ms. HUGHES. There appear to be some very, very rudimentary projects. The only thing I have come across in my reading are some solar energy projects in outlying islands.

But in my opinion, this underpins everything that we're aiming for, in the way of economic developments. The small island states have a very particular need in this regard.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

Mr. Keith.

Mr. KEITH. Thank you, Senator Murkowski. Very briefly, Malaysia is a supplier nation, of course, and American firms are also involved in Malaysia in a partnership arrangement.

I guess the one point I would emphasize, in addition to pursuing our commercial interests there and helping increase the stock of supply globally, is sustainable development.

We're deeply engaged with the Malaysians in a project called the Heart of Borneo, which is an environmental protection project or program, in its essence, but we're also, as part of that, working in particular with regard to palm oil and its application as a biofuel, working with the Malaysians to ensure that their perspective is one of a country that is committed to sustainable development, in particular, as it's a transit country for logs that are brought to China across Malaysia.

So there are a number of areas where natural resources are key to Malaysia's future economic growth, and we'd like to find a way to ensure that this perspective of sustainable development is included in their ambitious modernization plans between now and 2020.

Thank you.

Senator MURKOWSKI. We appreciate you bringing that part of it up.

Mr. Hume.

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much, Senator. Again, briefly, Indonesia's the one OPEC member that has become a net importer of fossil fuel. So I think there, we see a number of issues. The one that stands out above the others is the 10 years of turmoil that Indonesia has seen has also been accompanied by underinvestment in the kind of infrastructure that leads to a healthy energy industry.

I know that during President Bush's visit last fall, he and President Yudhoyono talked about cooperation on biofuels, but this is obviously an area that needs more attention.

Thank you very much.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. Thank you, Madame Chair.

Senator BOXER. Senator Murkowski, I think that was a very good amount of questioning from you.

Senator Feingold, we're so happy to see you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN**

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I thank the Chair for holding this hearing, and I'd like to begin by thanking our five nominees for being here today, but more importantly, for your many years of service, and for your willingness to work in some of the more demanding positions in the U.S. Government.

The countries to which you've been nominated—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Democratic Republic

of Timor-Leste, and the Lao People's Democratic Republic—face distinct, but equally difficult, challenges.

There are also many opportunities that I hope you'll be able to seize upon and develop if you are confirmed, and I do look forward to working with you closely. I hope you'll look to the Senate as a resource and to this committee as a source of support and guidance during your tenure at your respective posts.

I would also like to offer my warm welcome to your families and friends who have stood by you and whose ongoing support will be necessary as you set off to these new positions.

In the time I have, let me begin with Ambassador Hume, who was kind enough, I think, to make both of my trips to South Africa a success, and just did a wonderful job of briefing me and helping us along. So it is very good to see you again.

I understand you were most recently the Charge in Sudan. Welcome back from what must've been quite a difficult and rather unforgiving post. Is there anything you'd like—anything you will take with you from your time in Sudan—and apply, if confirmed, to your post in Indonesia—in terms of running an embassy?

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much, Senator. Pleased to see you. Well, I think there are a lot of things that take away from Sudan. In terms of running an embassy, you're dealing with people who are also in a difficult circumstance. You look first to your people, and being sure that they're safe and that they can get a sense of satisfaction from their work.

In general, I think Sudan is an example to never give up. I know that there are huge frustrations here, not to mention the frustrations in Sudan at the difficulties, but I think it is a truth that the United States has had an enormous positive impact in that country over the last number of years, helping to negotiate the peace agreement with the South.

People are no longer being killed in the South. That war went on for 25 years. We, I regret to say, we have not had the same success in Darfur that we had in the South, and that's business that remains to be done.

Those are the type of lessons that I'd take away.

Senator FEINGOLD. In justifying the national security waiver that ended restrictions on military assistance to Indonesia in fiscal year 2006, the State Department wrote, "as a matter of policy, the quality and quantity of our assistance will continue to be guided by progress on democratic reform and accountability, and carefully calibrated to promote these outcomes." Which elements of accountability and democratic reform would you assign the most weight when assessing progress, and what steps will you take to ensure that this kind of "calibration" actually ensures real progress?

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much, Senator. First of all, I've become aware during my time in Washington that this is an issue which has to get my immediate and personal attention.

First of all, we vet all of the—as required—all of the people who would get IMET training. Second, we have a number of proposals to try to encourage the Indonesians in the right path on military reform.

Some steps have been taken. The separation of the police from the military was a positive step. The withdrawal of the military

from civilian positions in the government was a positive step. But other programs, we still have to continue to work on. One is a question of eventual accountability for the problems, particularly in East Timor, but elsewhere, as well.

The second one is to try to get the Indonesian military on budget, and on a budget that is reviewed and approved by their civilian authorities. That's something we're working on with them on. It hasn't gone far enough or fast enough, and that's something I'd hope to encourage.

Senator FEINGOLD. Are there any forms of military assistance that the United States will not provide?

Mr. HUME. I'm sure there are many forms of U.S. assistance we wouldn't provide, but—

Senator FEINGOLD. As a matter of policy?

Mr. HUME. I would have to take that question. I wouldn't want to guess.

Senator FEINGOLD. Fair enough. I'm extremely interested in Indonesia and its role in particularly our post-9/11 circumstances, so I look forward to working—

Mr. HUME. Yes.

Senator FEINGOLD. Ambassador, please.

Mr. HUME. If I could just say something. One, I know that you visited fairly recently in Indonesia, but I'd like to say this to other members of the committee, as well. Particularly in an area like military reform and human rights, that's a message that it's important to be carried not just by the people in the embassy, but also by people in Congress.

I would welcome, as I did in Sudan, visits by Members of Congress who I think could help us get that message across.

Senator FEINGOLD. Now, every ambassador nominee says this, but I want to highlight what he just said. We have members—I'd say to my Chair and I'd say to the Senator from last—we have members who have talked about having been to Iraq 15 times, which is good. But when I went to Indonesia, I was told I was the second senator to have visited there in 3 years. The other one was Senator Bond. It is the largest Islamic country in the world, the fourth largest population in the world, and we need to go there more. There's just no question. It is a fascinating critical place, and I wish you well. I also have strong feelings about Timor. Fifteen years ago, this was the first issue I ever sort of sunk my teeth into, fighting for the independence of East Timor on this committee, so I'm awfully pleased to see that the independence exists, that you're going there, but I know that there are difficulties.

Despite its independence in 2001, security continues to be a critical issue in Timor-Leste, especially in relation to the crisis which erupted there a year ago. As I'm sure you're aware, the Australian-led International Stabilization Force is not part of the U.N. Mission, but remains in country. Having separate military forces results in a lack of accountability, unclear lines of responsibility, and poor coordination. If confirmed, Mr. Klemm, would you support placing the ISF under a unified U.N. command and would you push for this directly?

Mr. KLEMM. Well, thank you, Senator, and before I answer your question directly, let me also welcome you and other members of

the committee and any other Member of Congress to Dili, as well. If you're in Indonesia or any place else in the region, it's not that far away, and your presence—your diplomatic presence there could be of great, great assistance in getting our message across.

I want to—regarding the work that the Australian forces are doing in East Timor, their liaison and coordination with the Blue Helmets there under U.N. auspices, and our policy on both their ability to coordinate and their presence in East Timor, I would like—I probably should be prudent and take that question back and confirm our policy.

It is my understanding that last summer, when the current U.N. resolution placing police forces—U.N. police forces—in East Timor was approved by the Security Council at U.N. We supported this division of U.N. forces and Australian forces.

It's my understanding, if my understanding is correct, that continues today—that the administration's view is that the Australians are playing a constructive role in the capacity under which they're there today.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I look forward to your response when you're able to give it. My time's already gone. If I could—

Senator BOXER. Would you like to have another minute?

Senator FEINGOLD. I just want to ask one more question.

Senator BOXER. I'll give you three more minutes, then.

Senator FEINGOLD. I just want to ask Mr. Huso a question, because just like the Chair, I have a very strong personal interest, as well as constituent interest, in the relations with the country that you are to represent—the country that you're going to represent us at.

As you're aware, the Hmong have been moving across the border to Thailand for years because of continued persecution by the Lao Government. You mentioned in your testimony that you will work with the Lao and Thai Governments to find “durable solutions” for this population.

Would you expand on what this means? I'm specifically interested to hear about your plans to work with the Lao Government, given that they have a longstanding record of persecuting the Hmong.

Mr. HUSO. Thank you very much, Senator, for the opportunity to comment on that very, very important issue. As I mentioned in my testimony, I share your concerns. I share the concerns of your constituents, and many of your other Senators and Congressmen have constituents who are Lao Americans, and particularly, Hmong Americans.

You're absolutely right, Senator. I have no illusions about the difficulty of the challenge of working with the government on this particular issue. It's one of great sensitivity to the Lao Government. But nonetheless, I'm committed to work on trying to do what I can to encourage the Lao Government to protect the rights of all its citizens, including the ethnic minorities.

In terms of a durable solution for those who cross the border into Thailand, I think one of the key principles that we need to keep in mind is to provide those individuals access to the type of screening necessary to determine who among them has a legitimate fear of persecution.

If that well-founded legitimate fear is established, then a durable solution could conceivably include resettlement in the United States or other countries willing to accept refugees, and potentially, for those who may not be found to qualify for refugee status, some sort of assurance of their protection in the event that they are returned to Laos is also extremely important, so I would work to achieve that goal.

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you foresee a successful resettlement of the Hmong back to Laos, and if so, by when?

Mr. HUSO. Historically, sir, that has happened. There have been in the past, U.N. monitored programs for the return of Hmong to Laos, with some success. I don't know at this point whether that would be possible with the group that's currently there now.

I know this is a topic of discussion between the Government of Thailand, the Government of Laos. Its a topic of great interest to the United States, and also, to the international community.

Senator FEINGOLD. You've probably already figured this out, but I can assure you if you see any Member of Congress from Wisconsin, Republican or Democrat, this is not a passing interest.

Mr. HUSO. Yes, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. This is dead serious. We're interested in the details. We're very concerned about this as a delegation, so I wish you well. I thank you for the—

Senator BOXER. Senator, thank you, because, of course, you and I are experiencing similar issues in our States. I wanted to thank you, Mr. Huso, because my understanding is that you said to my staff you'd be willing to meet with some of the leaders of the Hmong community in California.

Mr. HUSO. Senator, that is my intention, to meet with the leaders of the community there and other States, so that I can understand their concerns and better inform myself, if confirmed.

Senator BOXER. Very good. I'm going to ask unanimous consent to keep the record open for additional questions. Since I'm the only one voting, I think we will do that.

Senator BOXER. There were two things I wanted to say to two of you before you leave, just to put some things on your radar screen. You don't have to respond to them, but they're just concerns coming from me.

Mr. Keith, we do know about Malaysia's investment in Iran's oil and gas sector, and I share your concerns that it is something we have to keep our eye on. It looks like the total trade between Malaysia and Iran rose from \$224 million in 2000 to over \$765 million in 2005.

I just want to put on your radar screen that we will be having, as you know, the bilateral free trade agreement between the two countries, Malaysia and America. I just want you to know that there may be some amendments regarding this increasing relationship.

Also, on antipiracy, that the Congressional International Antipiracy Caucus released its annual report on international property rights protections and found Malaysia was one of five countries placed on its priority watch list, singled out for not doing enough to protect intellectual property rights.

So I put that on your radar screen, because you may have colleagues calling you and saying, “Are you raising this issue?”

Ms. Hughes, even though you are going to a small country, I think you have an opportunity to do some really good things.

You mentioned one of them in response to the question of my colleague and friend, Senator Murkowski, in terms of energy—and I want to read to you that last fall, the Vice President of the Federated States of Micronesia said the following: “The sad irony is that those of us who have little to contribute to the causes of climate change and sea level rise are the first in line to suffer the consequences.”

He went on to say, “Exposed to the effects of extreme weather events, our livelihood and traditions as island people. In fact, our whole civilization are under greater threat than ever before.”

So I know that in conversations with my staff—and by the way, my staff was so impressed with all of you—you had mentioned that we’re building an embassy in Micronesia, and that you had suggested perhaps putting a solar roof, for example, on that building.

I wanted to just push you a little more on that, because I think, as you pointed out, the abundance of the sun and the wind there can really be of great help to this little country, and, by the way, to our big country. There’s no question about it.

I think a few simple steps that you could take just in being a role model in that building of the embassy, once you’re confirmed—I know you can’t do much at this stage, but once we move these nominations, and I hope it will be very soon, if you just take a look at the roofs and the bulbs and fixtures and insulation and heating and air conditioning systems, we can cut so much energy use, and therefore, our carbon footprint, but also, save money for the taxpayers. It’s a win-win for everybody.

Then the other issue in Micronesia that came to my attention is that according to the most recent State Department human rights report, “cultural factors in the male-dominated society limited women’s representation in government and politics.”

So I think your going there is a wonderful message to that country, a wonderful message. I can just see by your demeanor, you will win them over. I think in doing that, you have a tremendous responsibility, I think, because the women there will at first look at you and think, “Gee, I wonder if she can really do this.”

Of course, you will be able to do it, and I think it’s going to send a strong message to the women, empowering them, as well as to the men.

Now, another down side is that reports of spousal abuse, often severe, continued during the year. This is in the State Department human rights report. Although assault is a crime, there’s no specific laws against domestic abuse, no governmental or private facilities to shelter and support women in abusive situations.

So I am just laying these issues out there for you. Ms. Hughes, you have these two challenges—the energy challenge, which presents as opportunity because we’re building an embassy there, and the fact that you’re a woman, it seems to me, is an opportunity on this other front.

Am I putting too much on your shoulders, or are you excited about this challenge?

Ms. HUGHES. I thank you, Madam Chairman, for such an inspirational message. It's great. I would really look forward to working in those particular areas, among many others.

Regarding the notion of solar energy for the new embassy building, it's my understanding that ground was just broken on the new building last month, so it's in an early stage.

Senator BOXER. Good.

Ms. HUGHES. What I would propose to do, if confirmed, would be to call on the head of the Overseas Building Office at the State Department, General Williams, and explore this possibility.

Everything we do, but particularly in a small environment, is a model. I think there's a lot we can do. The Peace Corps, for example. There are nearly 50 volunteers in Micronesia recently adapted all their vehicles to use coconut oil.

Senator BOXER. That's great.

Ms. HUGHES. Setting an example is a wonderful opportunity. Women may be one of the best hopes for building leadership in Micronesia, so I'm inspired. Thank you very much for that.

Senator BOXER. Well, thank you. Thank you very much.

Well, what we'll do is we'll put a call in to the General, and say that I raised it with you and encouraged you to move forward, and see if we can get some interest there so that you're not fighting that battle alone. Because sometimes, they say, "Well, we've already done the plans." So let's see what impact we can have.

I read an editorial the other day just saying that there is a lot of talk about global warming, and what are we doing? We're just talking about it. We have to start using the technologies we already have, instead of putting it off for another day. Because it's a problem that's going to come to a head very soon, and we have a window of 5 to 10 years if we don't act.

So to all of you, these are little things, but you're going to be managers of a lot of people, and you'll have opportunities to do little things. If you do them, let us know about them, because we'll make certain that my colleagues know.

Just in America, buildings are responsible for 39 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions. Buildings, 39 percent. So even though it may seem like a simple thing to open the curtains in this room and shut off these lights, apparently, we can't, because of the cameras. But in some cases, we can.

There are new technologies now that as the sun comes in, the lights dim in the office. We're doing that in all my offices here as a test case. So we hope maybe you can consider that in all of your responsibilities, just as a—always have it in your mind that you can do that.

Well, again, we're just really pleased with this group that sits before me. We thank you for your service, for your love of country, for your dedication, and we thank your families and your friends who have been behind you every step of the way.

I know I couldn't do what I do without that support, and whether they're here or whether they're working or they're doing other things, we know that they're rooting for you, and you all accorded yourselves so beautifully, and we wish you every good wish.

I will report to Senators Biden and Lugar that I hope we can move these nominations very, very quickly. Thank you very much, and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF CAMERON R. HUME TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LUGAR

Question. What is the status of the United States Peace Corps establishing a presence in Indonesia? Do you envision a future Peace Corps presence as a helpful contribution to the overall development of Indonesia?

Answer. The United States Peace Corps sent an assessment mission to Indonesia in February 2007. That mission concluded that the establishment of a Peace Corps presence in Indonesia would be fully in keeping with the mission of the Peace Corps and would be highly beneficial to Indonesia's overall development. The Department of State shares that view. The assessment mission also concluded, however, that security concerns in Indonesia precluded establishing a program at this time. The Peace Corps plans to revisit the results of the assessment in the near future, with the hope of achieving more positive results.

RESPONSE OF CAMERON R. HUME TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FEINGOLD

Question. Are there any forms of military assistance we do not provide to Indonesia?

Answer. We continue to pursue a calibrated approach as we increase our engagement with the Indonesian military, as part of our broader effort to support Indonesia's reform effort and to build a strategic partnership with this critically important country.

Our assistance and training has focused on developing a professional military, supporting the reform of the military, and on enhancing the Indonesian military's capacity to respond to natural disasters, to provide maritime security, and to engage in international peacekeeping efforts. To date, we have not provided lethal assistance. We have provided spare parts for previously-purchased F-16 fighters and we have provided technical assistance for previously-purchased Harpoon missiles to ensure the safety and success of those programs. We also have not engaged in any unit training with the Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS).

As Indonesian democracy continues to move forward, we expect to expand our engagement with the Indonesian military, and will keep Congress informed.

RESPONSE OF HANS G. KLEMM TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FEINGOLD

Question. Would you press to put the International Stabilization Forces (ISF) deployed in East Timor and led by Australia under direct United Nations command?

Answer. On October 27, 2006, then-Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta publicly expressed his government's view that the Australian-led international security force continued to be the best fit for the situation in East Timor. We concur that the Australian-led security force is the most appropriate. Under the U.N. military proposal considered in August, 2006, East Timor would have had only about 350 U.N. troops, half of whom would have been assigned to protect U.N. staff and assets.

In contrast, Australia has deployed about 1,000 troops to secure East Timor. Australia's contribution to restoring stability in East Timor underscores the importance of our alliance for maintaining peace and security in the region. If confirmed, I would engage vigorously with all parties to maintain clear lines of command and accountability for the conduct of all security forces deployed in East Timor.

**NOMINATION OF HON. REUBEN JEFFERY III
TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
ECONOMIC, ENERGY, AND AGRICULTURAL
AFFAIRS**

TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Jeffery, Reuben, III, to be Under Secretary of State for Economic,
Energy, and Agricultural Affairs

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:25 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez presiding.

Present: Senators Menendez and Lugar.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

Senator MENENDEZ. Today, the committee meets to consider the nomination of Mr. Reuben Jeffery. The President has nominated Mr. Jeffery to be the Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs.

We want—as he approaches the witness table, we want to congratulate you on your nomination. We look forward to hearing from you this afternoon. I know we're, shortly, going to welcome our colleague Senator Chambliss, who has joined us, to—who will be joining us, was here a few minutes ago, and is wrapping up, in the Intelligence Committee, some questions that he has in that venue—to introduce Mr. Jeffery.

And, as we wait for him to come back, since I know we have a busy agenda, let me recognize myself for an opening statement, then I'll recognize Senator Lugar, and, by then, we should have Senator Chambliss here.

Mr. Jeffery, you've been nominated to serve as the Under Secretary for Economics, Energy and Agricultural Affairs. If confirmed, you would be the senior economic official at the State Department, and you will have the challenge of helping to lead the Department on a wide range of issues, including investment, finance, agriculture, trade, energy, telecommunications, aviation, and transportation. This broad portfolio requires you to work with Secretary Rice and others to analyze how our current policies and

our relationships with other countries can best serve our common goals in the areas I've just mentioned.

This position as Under Secretary would give you jurisdiction over many important issues facing the Congress and the country today. And so, I'd like to take a moment to touch on a few of these matters.

In this era of globalization, the stability of our economy is intrinsically linked with our trade practices. As transnational business continues to expand, the Congress and this administration must work to establish trade policies that not only support our economic interests, but also ensure that vital labor and environmental protections are secured. It's my hope that, if you are confirmed, you will use your position in the State Department to help achieve these goals.

As an economic powerhouse, the United States must use its economic weight wisely. The position that you have been nominated for would include work with our sanctions program in dealing with countries like Iran and Sudan. I am a strong supporter of economic sanctions as a tool of diplomacy, and I would expect the next Under Secretary to be actively engaged in this crucial issue as you work with your colleagues at the Treasury Department.

Over the next 2 weeks, the Senate plans to examine new ways to increase our energy self-reliance and promote the development of alternative energy sources. As the Under Secretary who has jurisdiction over that area, you would have the responsibility of addressing the economic and political challenges facing our energy security. During this era of record gas prices and conflict in the Middle East, the complexity and importance of this task cannot be overstated. I know that the distinguished Senator, full member of—ranking member of the full committee, Senator Lugar, has been very involved in this issue, and I know that he shares my concern that the United States must do more to promote our energy security.

And, finally, earlier today this subcommittee examined the issue of U.S. foreign assistance and the challenges facing the current reform process, referred to as the "F" process. If confirmed, you would work in collaboration with other State officials on matters such as developing the annual foreign assistance budget, setting America's development agenda, and advising Secretary Rice on the Millennium Challenge Corporation issues. The issue of U.S. foreign assistance is of importance to many members of this committee, certainly to me, and I am hoping that greater leadership will be taken on this issue in the future than we have seen in the past.

Important—it's very important to reduce poverty as part of the work of Multilateral Development Banks, such as the World Bank and the IMF. These institutions face many challenges, and I plan to take a critical look at the role of these and other multilateral institutions in the near future.

The issues that my subcommittee handles overlap greatly with the work of the Under Secretary for Economics, Energy and Agricultural Affairs, and, should you be confirmed, I hope that we would have a fine working relationship so as to address some of the issues I've just discussed.

And, finally, Mr. Jeffery, I know that you've had a successful career in the private sector. You've spent the past few years in the public sector, and I want to thank you for your service. This hearing will provide an opportunity to not only examine your past work, but to learn more about your goals and vision for the position which you have been nominated. I appreciate having had the opportunity to speak with you in the past about your nomination to this post, and I look forward to exploring more of the issues that we previously discussed.

With that, let me turn to Senator Lugar for whatever statements he may have.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I join you in welcoming Reuben Jeffery to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As a member, and former chairman, of the Agriculture Committee, and as a farmer, I've had an intense interest in the performance of the agency he currently heads, the Commodity Future Trading Commission. I applaud the work Chairman Jeffery has done on that post, and I am encouraged that President Bush has nominated a candidate with such diverse experience to be Under Secretary of State for Economics, Energy and Agricultural Affairs.

The State Department post requires a range of managerial and substantive experience that very few candidates possess. The nominee would be the principal advisor to the Secretary of State on matters of economic energy, business, and agricultural policy, and would coordinate and supervise implementation of that policy. I've often spoken of the need to draw talented individuals from the private sector into public service, and, given the potential loss of privacy, the reduction in pay, the financial restrictions, the other complications, government service often holds little attraction for men and women who have built thriving careers in the private sector. As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the nominee before us is one who has made personal and financial sacrifices to pursue difficult assignments in the service of our Nation, including time spent in Iraq.

Chairman Jeffery entered Government service from the partnership of Goldman Sachs, where his achievements included managing the London and Paris offices. He served as special advisor to the president for Lower Manhattan Development, then went to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, before returning to Washington as the senior director for International Economic Affairs on the National Security Council.

Chairman Jeffery's impressive experience in the private sector, and the versatilities he demonstrated in his public service, led the President to nominate him for this position. In my conversations with Chairman Jeffery, he has demonstrated a facility for the broad range of topics related to international economic policy. In my judgment, United States strategic objectives in the world are unlikely to be achieved if progress is not made on the policy issues that Chairman Jeffery would oversee. We need progress on expanding trade relationships, improving the performance of the multilat-

eral development banks, and bolstering international agricultural cooperation. These are areas where the United States should be leading the world to new accomplishments that strengthen global economy.

Of particular importance is the energy component of the job. During the past 2 years, this committee has examined rigorously the national security threats associated with the U.S. dependence on foreign energy sources, and testimony from 13 hearings in the 109th Congress pointed to the inescapable conclusion that our energy vulnerability threatens a broad range of United States foreign policy goals, including preventing weapons proliferation, overcoming terrorism, promoting international development. Governments control as much as 79 percent of the world's oil reserves, and production-and-supply decisions are often made for political reasons. Meanwhile, high oil prices are emboldening hostile governments. This Congress continues to debate our future role in the Middle East, yet our options are limited by the fact that our economy is dependent on steady supplies of oil from that region.

Despite the centrality of energy to our diplomacy, State Department capacity in this area has often suffered from inattention and split authorities across the Department. Yet, there is reason for optimism. I'm encouraged that the full Senate is now set to consider legislation I introduced in March 2006, the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act, which aims to reinvigorate U.S. energy diplomacy and strengthen our security. Already, Secretary Rice has taken the initiative to implement a new international energy coordinator position contained in my legislation, and has embarked on valuable initiatives with Europe and Brazil. The next Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs must play a major role in addressing the risks and opportunities presented by the energy challenges that confront us.

I appreciate Chairman Jeffery's enthusiasm for this part of the portfolio, and his eagerness to work with our committee. I'll look forward to an excellent partnership that advances United States energy security and diplomacy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. I'm pleased to welcome Senator Chambliss to the committee, and recognize him now for his introduction of Mr. Jeffery.

**STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA**

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez and Senator Lugar. I appreciate the opportunity to come here today to introduce Reuben Jeffery III, nominee for Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs.

I've known Reuben for several years now, and I cannot think of an individual who is more prepared for this position than is Reuben Jeffery.

He has—as both of you have alluded to, has had many positions in this administration, both in very high-profile positions, as well as just getting out there and getting work done, as he did with Ambassador Bremer in Iraq. And what a terrific job he's done everywhere he's been asked to serve.

He was nominated to the chairmanship of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission by President Bush on May 17, 2005. This nomination was considered by the Senate Agriculture Committee, which I chaired at that time. I'm very pleased to say that Mr. Jeffery's nomination sailed through the committee, and he was confirmed by the Senate June 30, 2005. Senator Lugar, obviously, as a member of that committee, supported his nomination there. I'm certain this committee will also find every reason to move forward expeditiously to confirm this nomination.

In addition to the issue—to the background that you have both alluded to, Mr. Jeffery also spent 18 years working for Goldman Sachs, where—and he was managing partner of Goldman Sachs in Paris.

Now let me tell you about Mr. Jeffery, what he did, and the way he approached his chairmanship at CFTC.

He had a background in the financial community, but CFTC operates in a very unusual way because of the commodities and the issues that come before the CFTC. What this guy did was to do his homework like no other public servant I've ever seen. CFTC is extremely complex, and—it doesn't deal with buying and selling stocks and bonds, it deals with commodities, and commodities, some of which Senator Lugar grows, and he knows how complex this—these issues of commodity trades can be. And not only did he have responsibility for regulating the commodity markets, but also to make sure that the folks who operated on those markets did so in a way that was fair to consumers, because consumers are the ultimate beneficiaries of the regulatory process. And this regulatory process at CFTC is just so complex. But Reuben Jeffery really delved into it immediately. He and I had numerous conversations early on, even prior to his confirmation, and he was already doing his homework then, to be prepared to take over the chairmanship of the CFTC. And I was just extremely pleased of the hard work that I saw going into place before he became chairman.

As we had the opportunity to work together over the past few years, he's always had the best interest of the CFTC at heart, as well as the industry, when considering hearings, rulings, as well as other business. It's been a pleasure working with him, and he'll be missed at CFTC. I'll have to tell you, when he called me a couple of months ago, and told me this was in the works, I wasn't particularly excited about it at that time, because we're in the midst of trying to get CFTC reauthorized, and he has played such an integral role in helping negotiate and move that process through the—through both the House and the Senate.

But to this position he's going to bring a broad-based, fair-minded perspective, serving as the Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agriculture. I recommend him highly to this committee, and I'm just very pleased that you're moving his nomination forward today. And I thank you for the opportunity to say something about a guy who's become a dear friend.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. That was a very strong recommendation.

Unfortunately, Senator Schumer wanted to be here today, but is not able to be here to give his introduction, as well, of Mr. Jeffery,

so I'd like to ask unanimous consent to add Senator Schumer's remarks into the record. Without objection, it will so be entered into the record.

[The information previously referred to appears in the Additional Material Submitted for the Record section at the end of this hearing.]

Senator MENENDEZ. So, it's now time to turn to the nominee.

Chairman Jeffery, you have an opportunity to proceed with your opening statement. If you have family members here, we'd love to have you introduce them to the committee. And, in the interest of time, we'd ask you to keep your testimony to about 7 minutes. We'll include your entire statement, for the record. And the time is now yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. REUBEN JEFFERY III, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC, ENERGY AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Mr. JEFFERY. Perhaps I could—should begin, Mr. Chairman—Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, members of the committee, let me begin by introducing my family members who are here, and recognizing a couple of other people.

I'm not sure where they are, but somewhere in here is my wife, Robin, my son, Ben, and my father, also Reuben, and I thank him for being here. That's three of us here, Reubens.

In any event—and I'd also—I'm also particularly touched to have with me my two fellow commissioners at the CFTC, Commissioner Mike Dunn and Commissioner Walt Lukken, with whom I've worked extensively over the past couple of years, in the context of our ongoing work at the Commission.

With that, I'll begin my statement.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing and inviting me to appear before you today. It's an honor and a privilege to be here as the President's nominee to be Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs.

I'd like to begin by thanking President Bush and Secretary Rice for the honor and privilege of being nominated and for the opportunity to serve the American people in this important position. And thank you also, Senator Chambliss and Senator Schumer, for your remarks and your friendship over the years.

As the committee is well aware, national security and economic well-being are inextricably linked. Helping to develop and promote the conditions for economic opportunity internationally is critical to the creation of stable, peaceful, and prosperous communities around the world. Programs that help the world's most vulnerable and encourage economic and self-reliance must be a core component of U.S. foreign policy. This is especially crucial in vulnerable areas, such as Africa and Latin America, where our strong engagement can help break the cycle of poverty and despair.

Prior to 9/11, I had spent my career in the private sector, including a decade living and working outside of the United States. From that experience, I came to appreciate the transformative power of open and competitive markets and the relationship between good government and economic opportunity. I also learned something

about how to see our country through the eyes of others. Whether resented or respected, awed or envied, the economic well-being of the United States is a standard to which most others aspire. We are a great country, but—to which much has been given, but from which much is expected. As such, we have an obligation not only to advance our own economic interests overseas, but also to support the growth and development of others. Pursued strategically, these two objectives can be mutually reinforcing.

For the past 5 years, I've had the privilege of working in the U.S. Government in a variety of capacities, several of which were referred to by Senator Lugar and Senator Chambliss in their very kind opening remarks. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will draw upon these various experiences in the private sector and in Government in working with my State Department colleagues to focus on three principal objectives:

- First, leverage the resources of the U.S. Government and the private sector to encourage pro-growth economic policies and create the conditions for economic opportunity and poverty reduction around the world.
- Second, promote prosperity and competitiveness through market-expanding trade, investment, aviation, and telecommunications agreements that seek to level the playing field for American workers while enhancing conditions for economic development in the economics of our trading partners.
- And, finally, advance U.S. and global energy security by working with partner countries and the private sector to diversify energy sources, manage energy demand, and promote the development and use of innovative, cost-efficient, and environmentally respectful technologies.

I am acutely aware that time is running short, and my job tenure, if confirmed, will be commensurately brief, but these broad policy objectives, to approve the quality of life and economic standing for Americans and people around the world, transcend party lines and administrations.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, the job of Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs carries important and exciting responsibilities. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Secretary Rice, the State—my State Department, and other U.S. Government colleagues, and with members of this committee. I can assure you that I will need, and welcome, this committee's ongoing support and counsel.

I'm honored to be here before you today. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for giving me this opportunity to be here.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jeffery follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. REUBEN JEFFERY III, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC, ENERGY AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing and inviting me to appear before you today. It is an honor to be here as the President's nominee to be the Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs.

I would like to begin by thanking President Bush and Secretary Rice for the honor and privilege of being nominated and for the opportunity to serve the American people in this important position.

Thank you also to Senator Chambliss for that very kind introduction.

I would like to introduce my wife, Robin, and our son, Ben. Our daughter Jocelyn just started a new job in New York and could not be here today. Similarly, our son, Bob, is away on a long anticipated post-high school graduation outing. I would be remiss in not thanking them all, and Robin in particular, for their inspiration, love, and support over these many years.

As the committee is well aware, national security and economic well-being are inextricably linked. Our children's future depends both on ensuring prosperity at home and encouraging prosperous and growing societies overseas.

Helping to develop and promote the conditions for economic opportunity internationally is critical to the creation of stable, peaceful, and prosperous communities around the world. Programs that help the world's most vulnerable and encourage economic self-reliance must be a core component of U.S. foreign policy. This is especially crucial in Africa and Latin America where our strong engagement and support can help break the cycle of poverty and despair.

Prior to 9/11, I spent my career in the private sector, including a decade living and working outside of the United States. Through that experience, I came to appreciate the transformative power of open and competitive markets and the relationship between good government and economic opportunity.

I also learned how to see our country through the eyes of others. Whether respected or respected, admired or envied, the economic well-being of the United States is the standard to which others aspire. We are a great country to which much has been given, but from which much is expected. As such, we have an obligation not only to advance our own economic interests overseas, but also to support the growth and development of others. Pursued strategically, these two objectives are mutually reinforcing.

For the past 5 years, I have had the privilege of working for the U.S. Government in a variety of capacities. This included helping with the economic recovery of lower Manhattan post-9/11 as a special advisor to the President, working in Iraq and at the Pentagon in support of the Coalition Provisional Authority, providing leadership at the NSC on trade and development issues, and heading the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as it deals with financial market regulatory matters.

In so doing, I have had the opportunity to work alongside an exceptional group of dedicated public servants, both civilian and military. These years have been the most personally and professionally rewarding of my career.

If confirmed as Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs, I would draw upon these varied experiences and perspectives to energize and lead the State Department's team of Foreign Service and civil service officers who are all committed to the core mission of building prosperity and economic security at home and overseas.

If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues to focus on four main objectives.

- First—Leverage the resources of the United States and international business communities to encourage pro-growth economic policies and create the conditions for economic opportunity and poverty reduction in support of U.S. and international assistance programs.
- Second—Promote prosperity and competitiveness through market-expanding trade, aviation, telecommunications, and investment agreements that seek to level the playing field for American workers, businesses, farmers, and consumers while enhancing conditions for economic development at home and in the economies of our trading partners.
- Third—Advance United States and global energy security by working with partner countries and the private sector to diversify energy sources, manage energy demand, and promote the development and use of innovative, energy efficient, and environmentally respectful technologies.
- Finally—Maintain and enhance a stable financial system by working with other major economies and international financial institutions to implement responsible growth-oriented economic policies.

While much progress has been made in these areas under the excellent leadership of Secretary Rice, former Under Secretary, Josette Sheeran, and Assistant Secretary for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, Dan Sullivan, we have the opportunity to build on those successes in the coming months and years.

I am acutely aware that time is running short and my job tenure, if confirmed, will be commensurately brief. But these broad policy objectives—to improve the quality of life and economic standing for Americans and people around the world—transcend party lines and administrations.

While I look at the next 19 months as a sprint, I would hope to pass the baton to the next runner having covered some significant ground.

I appreciate too that this is a team effort, requiring not just the Department to work as one, but also necessitating constructive collaboration among many agencies and branches of Government. No one individual, department, or branch has a monopoly on good ideas, nor the resources to take them from conception to successful implementation.

Mr. Chairman, the job of Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs carries important and exciting responsibilities. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Secretary Rice, my State Department, and other U.S. Government colleagues, and with the members of this committee. I can assure you that I will need and welcome this committee's ongoing support and counsel.

I am honored to be here before you today. Thank you again Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for giving me this opportunity to be here this afternoon.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Chairman Jeffery. And we welcome your family here, as well. I know it's a great day.

And, moving forward, let me start off with some questions, and then I'll turn to Senator Lugar and any other committee member who may appear later.

For the record, I think it's important that, before we get to a final vote—and I—you and I had this discussion when you visited me, and I appreciate that, and I would like to get your responses on the record on some of these things. With reference to the time in which you were the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, in—here in Washington, DC, you held a great deal of responsibility, and you were involved early, under Ambassador Bremer's tenure, in Iraq. And I'm wondering, in—having gone through that experience, looking back, what would you have done differently during those first critical months of the CPA's existence?

Mr. JEFFERY. Senator, thank you for that question.

There are many things, and many lessons learned here, but, within the confines of my lane, so to speak, which primarily involved working at the CPA's so-called Reachback Office at the Pentagon from the period of August 2003 through the duration of the existence of the Coalition Provisional Authority, I'd say there are two particular lessons that—and challenges—that we bumped into, really, on a regular basis.

One, it's critically important—and—that this country have some kind of database or ability to access competent professional individuals who would be available to act in post-conflict reconstruction situations. Thankfully, to many Americans, largely those already within the U.S. Government, and some volunteers from the outside, the effort in Iraq was staffed, but it was staffed pretty much as we were doing—over the course of the endeavor. The legislation that has been passed in the operation of the Department, within the State Department, related to post-conflict stability operations and reconstruction is a very strong initiative in this regard, which I—based on my experience, would wholeheartedly support.

A second issue that we bumped into—and it's a very complex issue for which I have no ready answers, but needs to be studied at length, and that is our contracting procedures in wartime situations. This Congress actively enacted, on a very prompt basis, the supplemental, the 18.1 billion Iraq supplemental in, I believe, September of 2003. It was well into 2004 between—before the funding and the contracting mechanisms under that supplemental could flow. All that was done pursuant to U.S. rules, pursuant to the FAR, the Inspector General who's looked at this situation, has, opined on it, generally favorably, but the speed and flexibility of

the contracting mechanism from time to time did pose problems in the field.

But those are the two areas—personnel reserve and contracting—as to which I think we could learn a lot from the Iraq experience.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that.

Talking about personnel, one of the criticisms that was leveled against the CPA was hiring people on their political affiliations rather than on their relevant experience. And in that regard, could you tell the committee, what was your role in the hiring of staff? And did you think that hiring process was carried out fairly and effectively? And knowing what you know now, is there anything that you would have done differently?

Mr. JEFFERY. Senator, keep in mind that I—my involvement, again, in the Reachback Office, began in August of 2003, after which many of the CPA staff was long since in place. Our office was tasked at the time with, among many other responsibilities, helping with other Departments within—other operations within the Pentagon with organizing and structuring and scaling up and accelerating the CPA deployment process.

Let me put that challenge in context. One fact, which I think is important to keep in mind, is that—is the one I mentioned in the—in responding to your prior question, Mr. Chairman, that there was no ready reserve to call on, there was no preexisting government department and agency that had people ready to do the—act in these sort of situations, or outside—outside source.

Second, in terms of the numbers of—involved, CPA staffing, as best I can recall, total head count was something in the area of 500 people, plus or minus, in the summer, early fall of 2003. That number peaked at something in the area of 1,300 in the early part—the winter of 2004. In the interim, due to a variety of factors, including generally short duty tours and changing—ever changing mission requirements, there was relatively frequent turnover. So, the numbers of people that had to be deployed from their then-existing professional responsibilities, either in government or without, were significant.

I would be remiss, however, in not taking this opportunity to say that, thankfully, there were many competent, professional—in many cases, extremely highly qualified individuals, largely from within the United States Government, but also outside, who volunteered to serve in Iraq during that difficult period.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate your comment about the database, but certainly—the job of reorganizing Baghdad's stock exchange, which had not reopened, was given to a 24-year-old, who sought a job at the White House. That certainly is not the database that we needed, to achieve that goal; and certainly, in pursuit of competency and expertise, without a database even, one can do much better than that. We would agree on that, would we not?

Mr. JEFFERY. Senator, I—it's hard to argue with—

Senator MENENDEZ. Yeah.

Mr. JEFFERY [continuing]. That comment. Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. Let me ask you the last question here on a different topic.

Should you be confirmed, you will have a relatively short time to set and achieve the goals before the administration comes to an end. As the Under Secretary—we've talked about a lot of the spectrum, you're going to have a very big portfolio—what would be your top priorities in the post? And how would you envision your priorities differing from your predecessor?

Mr. JEFFERY. Mr. Chairman, in terms of my priorities, I tried to articulate them in the broadest terms in my statement; but, specifically, development as it relates to working with our in-place foreign assistance process, to work on programs that create economic opportunity and the prospect for economic growth in countries and allies that are important to the United States, where poverty is an issue, where there's a significant need, is a high priority—would be a high priority for me, if confirmed to this position, and with respect to which I would plan on working very closely with those involved directly in the foreign assistance department at—the foreign assistance process—at the State Department, USAID, and elsewhere in the Government, and, in particular, with the members of this committee.

Second—and I'll only comment on two priorities for purposes of answering this question—the notion of energy security, which is front-burner right now on the consciousness of every American, and, I could tell you, every Foreign Service officer with whom I have spoken, is a very important part of the mission of the Under Secretary of State for Energy and Agricultural Affairs. And, in that area, I would plan to play an active leadership role in coalescing the effort in a variety of fronts.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate those answers.

Senator Lugar

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

In the category of your responsibilities for agricultural affairs, would you comment on the impact in the ability of poorer nations to improve their economic conditions that our current agricultural subsidies have? And what impact would phasing out our subsidies have on the economics of those nations and our own international trade relations?

Mr. JEFFERY. Senator, I—talking with a Senator from the farm economy who knows this subject cold is an—daunting prospect, but I would say, Senator, that our agricultural programs, which are rooted in history, are designed to benefit American consumers, farmers, and ranchers. This administration, early in the year, served up a—made a proposal for the—an agricultural farm bill this year, which I know is under consideration in the Senate the committee level, and in the House.

With respect to our international trade policies, the basic principles to which I would try to adhere, if confirmed in this position, working with USTR, working with the Congress, working with our trading counterparties, is to develop free and open and competitive markets on the broadest basis possible, whether it's bilaterally or regionally or ideally in the context of a Doha round, but to do so in a way that preserves, maintains a so-called level playing field for American farmers and workers, but equally so for our trading counterparties, and that firm, specific, understandable, and enforceable rules and sanctions are built in to those agreements.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I don't want to jeopardize your nomination by getting you embroiled in the 2007 farm bill. [Laughter.]

Mr. JEFFERY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator LUGAR. However, the dilemma, in terms of the State Department, is that the Doha round has been in some difficulty. If the Doha round collapses, it could have some tragic consequences. Central to the debate is not only our farm subsidies, but those of European-community friends and, for that matter, other countries in the world. So, I am hopeful that you and your colleagues involved in these multilateral negotiations, will have success, and perhaps our own reforms could be helpful in that respect.

On energy, currently there has been great interest by Secretary Rice in the international aspects of energy. As Secretary Rice and out diplomats visits with substantial international actors—such as President Putin, of Russia, or Hugo Chavez, or others—they witness the use of energy for political purposes. The Department of Energy also has some persons who are engaged in international energy issues. But, recently, my encouragement and that of many members, has been that the State Department really needs to step up to this. And your role, obviously, will be to do that. Currently, there are persons who the Secretary has appointed to work on energy issues, but their duties have always seemed vague. Have you conferred with Secretary Rice, or do you have any idea as to how your activities, or those of your associates, can be reorganized in the Department so that there is a diplomatic impact, particularly vis-a-vis those who have very, sometimes, concrete energy objectives in those negotiations?

Mr. JEFFERY. Senator, the—as you know—and this is, in many respects, thanks to your initiation—the Secretary has established an international energy coordinator who is an overall coordinator for State Department activities in the area of energy and energy security. That coordinator reports to the Secretary through the Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs. Importantly, as you correctly note in your statement, the State Department has to work, and should work, closely with our colleagues at the Department of Energy who have the technological and scientific expertise to deal with and understand some of the complexities of the energy security issues that this country faces.

If confirmed as Under Secretary, I would work closely with the energy coordinator, with the relevant ambassadors around the world, with the interagency community, particularly the Department of Energy, and interested Members of Congress, on three broad fronts:

- No. 1, assuring the ongoing security of traditional sources of energy supply, ongoing bilateral relations with major producing nations, as well as diversifying routes and sources of that supply.
- Second, working with others in the interagency community—again, principally Department of Energy—on energy efficiency-enhancing technologies that help us manage more effectively our energy demand. The President has cited a goal of a 20 percent reduction in gasoline consumption in 10 years. The more we can do on the demand management side, from my personal

perspective and professional perspective, were I confirmed in this position, the better.

- And, third, working through our diplomatic—the diplomatic community at the State Department and elsewhere in the Government in developing alternative sources of energy supply, such as, for example, the innovative United States/Brazil biofuels cooperation, which I won't get into here, but offers a template for Brazil and the United States and other countries to adapt, to reduce their dependence on traditional fossil fuels, produce energy to satisfy their own domestic needs.

Senator LUGAR. I applaud the Brazil initiative, and what that could mean to the entire hemisphere. Likewise, I appreciate the beginnings of work with NATO and the European Union to provide at least some provisions of security for our friends abroad in Europe with regard to energy supplies. These are new areas for the State Department and for our Government, but extremely timely.

So, I appreciate your taking this leadership, because I think you have a very large portfolio ahead, and I wish you every success.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

You've obviously done your homework. As you know, Senator Lugar is the leader in this regard, and has legislation on this. So, I was—it's—sure it's music to his ears.

Let me thank you, Mr. Jeffery, for being here today, for your forthrightness in your answers to the questions, for your willingness to serve our country in this most important position.

The record will remain open for 1 day so that committee members may submit additional questions to the nominee. And, of course, we ask the nominee to be expeditious in response to those questions, should there be any.

Senator MENENDEZ. We look forward to a full-committee vote soon thereafter.

And if no one has additional comments, the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 5:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK

Good morning Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hagel. I would like to welcome my friend, CFTC Chairman Reuben Jeffery. I am proud to have an opportunity today to support his nomination. President Bush has nominated Reuben Jeffery to be the next Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs. I think he is the right choice.

Reuben Jeffery was sworn in as the 10th Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. He has done a good job protecting market users and the public from fraud, manipulation, and abusive practices related to the sale of commodity and financial futures and options. He has also been instrumental in creating policies to foster open, competitive, and financially sound futures and option markets.

I have known Reuben for many years—our daughters even attended nursery school together many, many years ago in Brooklyn. He is a smart, thoughtful, and committed person willing to give up his private sector career to serve his country time and time again.

In addition to knowing him personally, I have had an opportunity as a member of the Senate Banking Committee to work closely with the chairman on capital market and futures issues and market competitiveness issues. And while we will miss

him greatly in the financial services regulatory community, we know he will do an excellent job at the State Department.

Reuben is highly qualified to lead the State Department efforts to formulate sound policies on economic, energy, and agricultural matters. His diverse experience has prepared him well. As you all know, prior to joining the CFTC Reuben was the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for International Economic Affairs at the National Security Council. He was previously the representative and Executive Director of the Coalition Provisional Authority Office (CPA) at the Pentagon, after having served as an advisor to Ambassador Bremer in Iraq. Prior to joining the CPA in May of 2003, Mr. Jeffery served as Special Advisor to the President for Lower Manhattan Development. In this capacity he helped coordinate ongoing Federal efforts in support of the longer term recovery and redevelopment of Lower Manhattan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.

He spent many years working on and off in New York, spending 18 years at Goldman, Sachs & Co. At Goldman Sachs he was managing partner of Goldman Sachs in Paris (1997–2001) and of the firm's European Financial Institutions Group (1992–1997) based in London. Mr. Jeffery has a broad range of international capital markets, corporate finance, and merger and acquisition experience. And, prior to joining Goldman Sachs, Mr. Jeffery was a lawyer with the New York firm of Davis Polk and Wardwell.

It is without question that Mr. Jeffery is a tremendously accomplished man and for that reason it is no surprise that he has once again been selected to serve the country in such an important role.

His significant finance experience as an investment banker, and regulatory and Government experience at the CFTC and the White House, will prove invaluable to the State Department as attempts to create sound economic, energy, and agriculture policies. These experiences will make him a strong and competent Alternate Governor at the various multilateral development banks and as a member of the board of directors of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).

He knows unequivocally that in order to remain competitive globally, the United States must continue to foster their relationships with its trading partners, encourage greater cooperation in the global agriculture and energy community, and improve the functioning of the world's regional development banks.

For this reason I support his nomination. I congratulate him, wish him well, and believe he will be an outstanding Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs.

RESPONSES OF REUBEN JEFFERY III TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Development Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC): The Under Secretary chairs this high-level interagency group and has used it in the past as a vehicle for shaping U.S. development policy. This is an important tool for providing senior-level guidance and direction on critical development issues. How do you plan to use the Development PCC going forward? Do you expect to raise any specific development issues? What is your view of incorporating environmental concerns into U.S. development policy? What will be your priorities for this committee?

Answer. The Development PCC should provide guidance and ensure coordinated U.S. Government follow-up on critical development issues among State, USAID, and other U.S. Government agencies that handle development issues. Key issues that the Development PCC should maintain as a focus are encouraging trade capacity building, investment and innovation, and addressing anticorruption, transparency, and aid effectiveness. These are core cross-cutting themes for our efforts to promote sustainable economic growth in developing economies. Promoting public-private partnerships and business climate reforms, strengthening sustainable health systems, and advancing agricultural reform and food security are also important concerns that the Development PCC should address.

Going forward, development strategy for rebuilding countries, including economic engagement in strategic regions, should be a new focus for the Development PCC. In this context, if confirmed, I would like to see how we can use our total economic engagement approach—private sector trade and investment and public sector assistance and policy dialog—to promote development in these areas.

As for incorporating environmental concerns into U.S. development policy, we are doing this in a number of ways, and I expect the Development PCC, which includes senior representation from State's environment bureau (the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES)), to do so on an ongoing basis. U.S. assistance agencies as a matter of policy adhere to international best

practices in ensuring environmental and social concerns are incorporated into U.S. development efforts. Certainly, any development efforts we undertake must be sustainable.

Question. U.N. Issues: Under Secretary Sheeran took a strong interest in issues related to the United Nations, not only serving on a high-level reform panel but ultimately being named as the new Executive Director of the U.N. World Food Program. Do you intend to maintain a similar focus on U.N. issues? Would you continue to support and champion similar U.N. reform issues, especially those highlighted in the 2006 Report of the High-Level Panel on Systemwide Coherence?

Answer. U.N. reform is a high priority for the administration. Therefore there are many elements of the Department of State working on this issue. If confirmed, I will be working closely with my colleagues to advance this process. Former Under Secretary Sheeran served as a member of the High-Level Panel on Systemwide Coherence in her personal capacity. As part of the State Department's work on development issues, if confirmed I will continue to focus on assuring that aid is cost effective and goes to the people to whom it is targeted. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) has the lead on following up the High-Level Panel Report, and the Secretary General is consulting with member states on next steps. If confirmed, I will be working closely with all my colleagues to continue to ensure that our participation in multilateral development assistance through the U.N. system is effective, accountable, and consistent with our transformational diplomacy goals.

Question. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC): The Under Secretary is the Secretary's alternate on the MCC Board and traditionally attends all board meetings. Under Secretary Sheeran became the principal liaison between the MCC and State Department. Do you plan to maintain that role? What are some areas in which you would like to see MCC focus more attention or put in place policy changes? Are you concerned about the focus of the MCC's compacts? What do you see as the relationship between MCC and USAID?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to maintain the role that the previous Under Secretary played with respect to the Millennium Challenge Corporation. As you know, the MCC is run by a CEO, who reports to a Board of Directors, chaired by the Secretary of State. Board meetings are usually held quarterly, with each board member accompanied and advised by a "plus one" who follows MCC matters closely. If confirmed, I will be the "plus one" for the State Department.

In terms of focus areas, I hope to work with MCC to deepen coordination and collaboration with respect to our dialog with all eligible and Compact partner countries about their policy performance. The MCC board highlighted that MCC should continue to stress that eligibility for MCC funding and ongoing engagement are conditional on countries' maintaining and improving performance.

As to the focus of MCC Compacts, it is important that MCC stand by its core principle of country ownership. MCC should pursue work in areas targeted by host governments in meaningful and comprehensive consultation with their civil societies, while also ensuring that country-initiated proposals stand up to rigorous due diligence, economic rates of return analysis, environmental and social impact assessments, and—above all—are focused on reducing poverty through economic growth. Based on decades of development experience, we have learned that country ownership is critical to effective, sustainable development.

MCC and USAID have worked well together. In the case of Threshold programs, USAID is currently the lead implementing agency for 13 of MCC's 20 Threshold programs and leading the design of all but one of the others. In the case of Compacts, targeted State Department and USAID assistance programs complement and help to augment the impact of MCC's sizable investments. The strategic budget allocation process led by the Director of Foreign Assistance is working to better integrate development principles in, and promote coherence of, U.S. foreign assistance. The Director of Foreign Assistance and his or her staff review MCC programs and plans to ensure they complement and/or support our other foreign assistance objectives to achieve our transformational diplomacy goals.

Question. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was formed to ensure that the necessary preconditions are in place to translate large revenues from extractive industries into economic growth and poverty reduction. EITI supports improved governance in resource-rich countries through the verification and full publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and mining; 26 of 53 resource-rich countries have either committed to or are actively implementing EITI in Africa, Asia, Europe, and South America. Today, however, the initiative is at a critical point to advance to the next stage of implementation and U.S. Government support is crucial to ensure the continued growth and success of

EITI. If confirmed, what diplomatic and bilateral measures would you take to promote and strengthen EITI? What additional steps would you take to ensure transparency in the oil and gas sectors, a critical component of U.S. energy security?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to promote active U.S. Government participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as part of our comprehensive efforts to fight corruption, promote transparency, and enhance international energy security. The U.S. Government also supports bilateral anticorruption efforts, many of them carried out by USAID; multilateral efforts, including through the World Bank and INIF; and international advocacy, such as through the annual G-8 summits. At the recent G-8 summit in Heiligendamm, G-8 leaders committed to provide continuous assistance to strengthen EITI, invited all stakeholders to provide support for the implementation of the EITI, and encouraged further countries to participate in EITI.

Through its seat on the EITI Board, the U.S. Government is working to assist those countries pledging to implement EITI to meet their commitments, and to encourage nations with prominent international hydrocarbon activities, like China and Brazil, to join EITI as supporters.

With respect to additional steps to ensure transparency in the oil and gas sectors, if confirmed, I will work to further strengthen the coordination among our efforts to foster international energy security, our active support for oil revenue transparency through EITI, and the comprehensive work by the U.S. Government to combat corruption and promote good governance.

NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Cook, Frederick B., to be Ambassador to the Central African Republic
Garvelink, William John, to be Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Green, Mark, to be Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania
Nesbitt, Wanda. L., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire
Nolan, Robert B., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho
Parker, Maurice S., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Swaziland
Perry, June Carter, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Sierra Leone

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold presiding.

Present: Senators Feingold, Cardin, and Sununu.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. I'll call this hearing to order.

And I'd like to begin by thanking our seven nominees for being here today. But more importantly, for your many years of service, and for your willingness to work in some of the more demanding positions in the U.S. Government and in some of the most challenging posts in the world.

The countries to which you have been appointed cover all four of sub-Saharan Africa's distinctive regions: East, West, Southern and Central, and are unique in the challenges and opportunities they currently face.

If you are confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you in overcoming these challenges and developing the potential of these countries in an increasingly important part of the world.

I would also like to offer a warm welcome to your families and friends, whose ongoing support will be necessary as you set off on these new positions.

Given the large number of nominees this morning, I will forego an opening statement to allow each of you to present your quali-

fications, and objectives for your appointed position as an Ambassador of the United States.

I'd like to express my sincere gratitude for your willingness to serve this country, and emphasize the significance of the role each of you—if confirmed—will play in U.S. foreign policy. I believe that diplomacy is a crucial element in America's struggle to combat extremism, defend human rights, and promote stability and prosperity abroad, in a way that is consistent with our values and our national—and global—security.

At this time, I'd like to just see if my friend and colleague, Senator Cardin, has anything he would like to add.

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me just also join you in welcoming our distinguished guests today, who all have distinguished careers in public service, and are prepared to serve in an extremely important part of the world for the United States. And I look forward to their testimony, and again, I welcome them to our committee.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Cardin.

At this time, I'd like to invite our first panel of nominees to present your statements, after which I look forward to engaging each of you in a brief discussion about your qualifications and expectations going into these important positions.

Thank you, again, for being here, and for all that you do for our country.

Congressman Green, it's a pleasure to welcome a fellow Wisconsinite and, I might add, a graduate of my older daughter's alma mater, University of Wisconsin Eau Claire. You are welcome to begin.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MARK GREEN, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA**

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, I am honored to be here with you today.

Please let me begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman—and the Committee—for holding this hearing, and for inviting me to appear. Of course, I am grateful to the President, and to Secretary Rice, for the trust and confidence that they've placed in me as nominee for Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take a moment to pay tribute to the commitment that you have personally shown to American policy in East Africa. As a constituent, I'm proud of the many trips that you've made to the region, and I'm proud of the fact that you've taken the time to meet with State Department officers in the field for their on-the-ground assessments.

This region is facing momentous times, and it needs leaders back here who honestly care about its future. Mr. Chairman, I share your great interest in this part of the world. I've been active in foreign policy matters for some years, and I've had an especially strong interest in Africa. I've had the privilege of serving for three terms on the House International Relations Committee. I was a member of the subcommittees dealing with Africa and human rights in both the 108th and 109th Congress. I played a leading role in crafting the Millennium Challenge Account—that historic

commitment to invest in developing nations that are pursuing political and economic reforms. I played an important role in crafting the Global Access to HIV/AIDS Prevention, Awareness and Treatment Act, and the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act.

I worked on legislation covering critically important policy areas like human trafficking. Several years ago, I worked with the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and the State Department as an election observer in Kenya. Before that—along with Congressman Earl Pomeroy, I traveled to West Africa, with the Academy for Educational Development, Oxfam and Save the Children, to evaluate programs related to women's health and education in Africa.

In many ways, though, my interest in East Africa goes back much further. Twenty years ago, my wife Sue—and Sue is with me here today, she's the cheering section—Sue and I had the great honor as serving as high school teachers in Kenya through a program called World Teach Project, which was based at Harvard University. Though we spent most of our time in Kenya, we had the chance to travel in the area of Western Tanzania—rural areas, as well. We lived in a small village setting, and taught each day at a rural school, struggling to provide rudimentary educational opportunities. As teachers, we faced critical shortages, and watched our students' families struggle with malaria, and malnutrition-enhanced diseases. We, ourselves, were afflicted with malaria and typhoid during our time there.

In short, we saw first-hand in Kenya, some of the challenges that likewise face Tanzania. Just as importantly, like you, we saw the strength and the resilience of the people in that region. I know that we have to work closely with Tanzania to help it realize its enormous potential. That means working through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief—to lead efforts to fight the spread of AIDS, and to provide treatment for those who are infected. It also means working with government leaders and NGOs, to bring new development opportunities to all parts of the nation.

As one of the original authors of the Millennium Challenge Act, I look forward to the opportunity to work with the Tanzanian Government, as it hopes to conclude an MCC compact, which would be the largest compact to date. I hope that our experience in Tanzania will serve to help us back here build on the MCA, and make this historic initiative stronger and even more effective.

Mr. Chairman, I know that our dealings with the Government of Tanzania must be approached in a regional context. Tanzania is a crucial partner in our efforts to stop the spread of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism. We must work with our regional partners to provide real economic and educational opportunities for the families there. Hope and opportunity are the best antidotes to extremism.

In addition to its work against terrorism, Tanzania's also played a constructive role in resolving regional conflicts. Its efforts to serve as an honest broker in peace negotiations are making an important contribution to East African development.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, it will be an honor to serve as Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania. I promise to work re-

lently to strengthen and improve United States/Tanzanian relations, as we push toward our common goals. I'm confident that I possess the skills and the experience necessary to lead our embassy in Dar Es Salaam, and to represent and advocate for the interests of the United States in Tanzania and in that region.

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, and I'd be pleased to respond to any questions that you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARK GREEN, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today. Please let me begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, and the Foreign Relations Committee, for holding this hearing and inviting me to appear. And, of course, I'm grateful to the President and to Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as the nominee for Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the commitment you have personally shown to American policy regarding East Africa. As a constituent, I know you have made many trips to the region, and you have made it a priority to meet with State Department officers in the field for their on-the-ground assessments of the situation.

Mr. Chairman, I share your great interest in this part of the world. I have been active in foreign policy matters for some years, and I have had an especially strong interest in our Government's policies toward Africa. I had the privilege of serving on the House International Relations Committee in the 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses, and was a member of the subcommittees dealing with Africa and human rights in both the 108th and 109th Congress.

I played a leading role in crafting the Millennium Challenge Act, America's historic commitment to invest in developing nations that are pursuing political and economic reforms. I played an important role in crafting the Global Access to HIV/AIDS Prevention, Awareness and Treatment Act of 2001, and the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act. I've worked on legislation covering critically important policy areas like international terrorism and human trafficking.

Several years ago, I worked with the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and the State Department as an election observer in Kenya. Before that, along with Congressman Earl Pomeroy, I traveled to West Africa with the Academy for Educational Development, Oxfam, and Save the Children to look at and work on programs related to women's health and education in Africa. I have also traveled with the International Relations Committee to South Africa, Namibia, and Lesotho.

In many ways, though, my interest in East Africa goes back much further. Twenty years ago, my wife, Susan, and I served as high school teachers in Kenya through World Teach Project, a development organization based at the Phillips Brooks House of Harvard University. Though we spent most of our time in Kenya, we had the chance to travel the rural areas in western Tanzania as well.

We lived in a small village setting, and taught each day at a rural school struggling to provide rudimentary educational opportunities for its people. As teachers, we faced critical material shortages, and watched our students' families struggle with malaria and malnutrition-enhanced diseases. We ourselves were afflicted with malaria and typhoid during our time there. In short, we saw firsthand in Kenya some of the challenges that likewise face Tanzania. Just as importantly, we saw the strength and resilience of the people in that region.

I know that the United States has an important role to play in working with Tanzania to help it realize its enormous potential. That means working through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to lead efforts to fight the spread of AIDS and to provide treatment for those who are infected. It also means working with government leaders and NGOs to help bring new development opportunities to all parts of that nation.

As one of the original authors of the Millennium Challenge Act (MCA), I look forward to the opportunity to work with the Tanzanian Government as it strives to move forward from its status as a threshold nation to enter into an MCC compact. An important part of this progress will be the continuation of Tanzania's efforts to liberalize its economy along market lines. I hope that our experience in Tanzania

will serve to help us build on the MCA and make President Bush's historic initiative even stronger and more effective.

Mr. Chairman, I also know that our dealings with the Government of Tanzania must be approached in a regional context as well. Tanzania is a crucial partner in our efforts to stop the spread of radicalism and terrorism. I hope to broaden our efforts at counterterrorism in Tanzania and throughout this volatile region. That includes working with our regional partners to provide real economic and educational opportunities for families there. Hope and opportunity are the best antidotes to extremism.

In addition to its work in counterterrorism, Tanzania has also played a constructive role in resolving regional conflicts. Its efforts to serve as an honest broker in peace negotiations are making an important contribution to East African development.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, it will be an honor to serve as Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania. I promise to work relentlessly to strengthen and improve United States-United Republic of Tanzania relations as we push toward our common goals. I am confident that I possess these skills necessary to lead our Embassy in Dar es Salaam and to represent and advocate for the interests of the United States in Tanzania.

I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Congressman Green, and again, I welcome all of you, but, we're particularly proud in Wisconsin of this appointment. The Congressman and I had an excellent working relationship when I was a Member of the House, and this is a very important post.

I've long thought it was a very important post, given my travels and work in this area, and it turns out that Congressman Green—as he's indicated—has both a personal and a continuing professional interest in this region that is very genuine. So, somebody back home asked me, "What does Mark Green know about this? And why is he appointed?" And I said, "Actually, he knows quite a bit. And, frankly, is far more qualified for this post than the last two who were approved for this particular post." So, I think this is a wise nomination on the part of the administration, and I congratulate you.

Our ranking member, Senator Sununu, has joined us. And I will now move on to Mr. Maurice Parker, Ambassador to the Kingdom of Swaziland.

**STATEMENT OF MAURICE S. PARKER, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND**

Mr. PARKER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you as the President's nominee, as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Swaziland. I sincerely appreciate the confidence the President and Secretary Rice have placed in me.

My wife, Connie, and son, Jeremy, who are here today, have helped me represent the interests of the United States for nearly 33 years.

My Foreign Service career has been diverse. I have protected American citizens abroad, and secured America's borders. I've combated terrorism, justly enforced our immigration law, enhanced U.S. commercial interests, advocated for human rights, and provided disaster relief.

Happily, I am no stranger to the African continent. In college, I participated in a Study Abroad program at the University of Guyana at Lagon. Years later, I served as Council General in Lagos, Nigeria, during that nation's arduous transition to civilian rule.

United States interests and activities in Swaziland currently emphasize three broad areas: Assisting the Government and people of Swaziland in their fight against the HIV/AIDS pandemic, developing democratic institutions, and fostering economic growth.

The Swazi governmental structure restrains these basic goals. The nation is led by a nearly absolute monarchy, which exercises powerful influence over the bicameral parliamentary system. The current judiciary remains untested.

Recently, Swaziland has made progress in the democratization process, by signing a constitution into law in July of 2005. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, one of my highest priorities will be encouraging responsive, inclusive, and democratic government for all of the people of Swaziland, regardless of gender or social station.

Swaziland's HIV/AIDS rate is the highest in the world. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, another major priority will be to help stem the Swaziland's alarming HIV/AIDS pandemic through the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief.

Vital employment and economic opportunities are key to maintaining regional and domestic economic stability. If confirmed, I will also continue to coordinate United States efforts with the Swazi Government, to address issues related to the African Growth and Opportunities Act.

Mr. Chairman, the United States seeks a democratic, stable, and healthy Swaziland. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to the privilege of leading a U.S. Government multiagency approach toward achieving humanitarian, democratic, and economic goals in Swaziland. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I will be happy to address any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAURICE S. PARKER, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor for me to appear before you as the President's nominee to serve as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Swaziland. I sincerely appreciate the confidence the President and Secretary Rice have placed in me by putting forth my name for your consideration.

My wife, Connie, who is here today, has been part of my Foreign Service journey, helping me represent the interests of the United States for nearly 33 years, in six countries: Guyana, Spain (twice), Colombia (twice), Scotland, Mexico (twice), and Nigeria. During my career, I have protected American citizens abroad and secured America's borders; combated terrorism and narcotics trafficking; justly enforced our immigration law; enhanced U.S. commercial interests; advocated for human rights; and provided disaster relief. I have served in leadership positions as Principal Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico—one of the largest Foreign Service posts in the Western Hemisphere; Consul General at Embassy Lagos; and Principal Officer at the United States Consulate General in Barcelona, where I simultaneously served as United States Representative to the nation of Andorra. Additionally, I have had the pleasure of serving at the White House as Director of Consular and International Programs on the Homeland Security Council.

My Foreign Service career has been diverse, and I am no stranger to the African continent. As an undergraduate at the University of California, Berkeley, I participated in a study abroad program at the University of Ghana at Legon. Years later, as previously stated, I served as Consul General in Lagos, Nigeria, during that nation's arduous transition to civilian rule. Our Nigerian experience inspired our son, Jeremy, to join the Peace Corps and serve 2½ years in Niger. I cite these family milestones, because I believe they are an important part of my preparation for the leadership and management challenges I hope to undertake in Swaziland.

An overarching United States policy goal in Africa is the integration of Africa into the global economy by promoting economic development, democracy, and respect for human rights. Within this context, the United States has clear and attainable for-

eign policy goals in Swaziland. United States' interests and activities in Swaziland currently emphasize assisting the Government and people of Swaziland in effectively combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic; promoting the development of democratic institutions in order to protect the human rights of its people; and fostering economic growth by instituting economic reform to generate employment and improve the local investment climate.

The Swazi Governmental structure restrains these basic goals. The nation is led by a nearly absolute monarchy, which exercises powerful influence over the bicameral parliamentary legislative system and local authority of the regional three chiefs. The current judiciary remains untested and the media is self-censoring.

This governmental structure has slowed the nation's march toward democracy. Nevertheless, Swaziland has made recent progress in the democratization process by signing a constitution into law in July 2005. The constitution took effect on February 8, 2006. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, one of my highest priorities will be fostering a more responsive, inclusive, and democratic government for the people of Swaziland, regardless of gender or social station.

At 33.4 percent, Swaziland's HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is the highest in the world. United States-Swazi Government cooperation in fighting this pandemic has been a bright spot in our diplomatic relations. Several sectors of the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland are dedicated to fighting HIV/AIDS following the King's declaration of a national HIV/AIDS emergency in 1999. The United States has provided humanitarian assistance to Swaziland to combat the scourge of AIDS, through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, a major priority will be to help Swaziland stem the alarming tide of its HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Increased employment and economic opportunities for this developing country are vital to maintaining regional and domestic economic stability. Other than its admirable people, Swaziland has not been blessed with vast reserves of natural resources. The local unemployment rate stands at approximately 40 percent. Despite these devastating economic conditions, the GKOS has been slow to take advantage of trade opportunities and regional programs to promote business-friendly economic reforms and to utilize the technical assistance resources available from USAID's regional Trade Hub. If confirmed, I will continue to coordinate United States' efforts with the Swazi Government to address issues related to AGOA and to provide credit and business training to Swazi small and medium enterprises.

Mr. Chairman, The United States seeks a peaceful, democratic, and stable Swaziland with a healthy population. United States-Swazi relations have been strengthened in recent years through the United States Government's commitment to humanitarian assistance programs. The United States' effort is multiagency, combining the talents and resources of the Department of State, USAID, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Peace Corps, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Labor. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to the privilege of leading a cooperative team approach to the pursuit of humanitarian, democratic, and economic goals in Swaziland.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I would be happy to address any questions you may have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Parker.

Now we turn to Robert B. Nolan, to be the Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. NOLAN, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO**

Mr. NOLAN. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I am honored to appear before you today. I am grateful for the trust placed in me by President Bush and Secretary Rice in nominating me to serve as the next United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely with the committee, and others in Congress to advance United States interests in Lesotho.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Nancy Wilson Nolan, as well as my daughter, Meghan, and my friend, Cheryl Hodge, who are here with me today. Their support, and that of my

other children, Ryan and Colleen, and my mother, Mary Nolan, are a source of great strength to me.

Since joining the Foreign Service 31 years ago, I have been responsible for handling a variety of management and policy issues. I came to the Foreign Service at the relatively young age of 24, in large part because of my experiences living overseas with my father, Bernard Nolan, also a Foreign Service officer, who died in Northern Yemen in 1973.

The United States has a wonderful story to tell concerning the significant levels of assistance being provided to Lesotho, a country that is cooperating with us on many regional and global issues. Our assistance will help to reverse the devastation of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, reduce poverty, and achieve sustainable economic growth. It would be an honor for me to be a part of this American story.

Mr. Chairman, Lesotho held in February its second parliamentary elections, since a troubled election in 1998 led to a Southern African Development Community intervention to restore order. International and national observers declared the February election peaceful and free. Parliament was seated, and a new government chosen.

Lesotho has obtained much success from the advantages provided by the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Industries were attracted by sound investment policies, creating 40,000 jobs currently, and making Lesotho the largest African exporter of apparel to the United States. Lesotho anticipates the completion of a compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation in the near future. The compact is currently being considered for approval by the MCC Board. This investment of more than \$300 million for the water, health, and private enterprise sectors will continue economic growth and poverty alleviation.

Mr. Chairman, the news is not as good about public health. Lesotho faces an HIV/AIDS crisis with an infection rate of approximately 23 percent of the adult population, the world's third highest prevalence rate. The United States is transitioning from a regional platform of assistance, to a robust, in-country presence to manage \$12.5 million in fiscal year 2007 for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS relief in Lesotho.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed and privileged to serve as the United States Ambassador to Lesotho, I would look forward to working with you to further strengthening the bilateral relationship, and advance the mutual interests of our governments and citizens.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to answering any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nolan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. NOLAN, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today. I am grateful for the trust placed in me by President Bush and Secretary Rice in nominating me to serve as the next United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely with the committee and others in Congress to advance United States interests in Lesotho.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Nancy Wilson Nolan, as well as my daughter, Meghan, and my close friend, Cheryl Hodge, who are here today. Their support and that of my other children, Ryan and Colleen, and my mother, Mary Nolan, are a source of great strength to me.

Since joining the Foreign Service 31 years ago, I have been responsible for handling a variety of management and policy issues, including most recently, far-reaching reforms of the Foreign Service evaluation, promotion, and assignment systems. I came to the Foreign Service at the relatively young age of 24, in large part because of my experiences living overseas with my father, Bernard Nolan, also a Foreign Service officer, who died in Northern Yemen in 1973.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will be totally committed to promoting even closer bilateral ties and cooperation between the United States and the Kingdom of Lesotho. I will draw upon my experience gained from my previous African assignments in Guinea and Madagascar, as well as living in Kenya and Sierra Leone as a teenager. My years of management experience in Washington, DC, and overseas will help me to be a careful steward of the resources which United States taxpayers have provided to help the people of Lesotho.

The United States has a wonderful story to tell concerning the significant levels of assistance being provided to Lesotho, a country that is cooperating with us on many regional and global issues. Lesotho, the current chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), has demonstrated growing regional leadership on issues such as trade and democratization. Lesotho supports anticorruption policies, counterterrorism, and women's equality. Our assistance will help to reverse the devastation of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, reduce poverty, and achieve sustainable economic growth. It would be an honor for me to be part of this American story.

Mr. Chairman, our relationship with Lesotho is strong. If confirmed as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho, I will have the privilege of serving in an African country that, though still poor and with many challenges, has chosen to pursue democratic government and economic development, to the benefit of all citizens. Lesotho has focused its efforts on developing its economy, improving the health and security of its citizens, and maintaining and strengthening its democracy. Lesotho is a clear, constructive voice in southern Africa, and is a progressive leader within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is a worthy partner, providing an important foundation for successful efforts to protect United States' national interests and security in this region of southern Africa.

Mr. Chairman, Lesotho held, in February, its second parliamentary election since a troubled election in 1998 led to a SADC intervention to restore order. International and national observers declared the February election peaceful and free. Parliament was seated and a new government chosen. Disputes remain over the allocation of legislative seats, but are being addressed within the country's legal system. The governing and opposition parties have accepted mediation efforts from SADC aimed at resolving disagreements concerning the method to ensure broad opposition representation in parliament. Despite the progress in institutionalizing democracy, Lesotho still needs and welcomes help in developing its political parties, civil society, and governmental institutions. If confirmed, I would seek additional opportunities to help in these areas. Lesotho also suffers from chronic drought, and I will endeavor to maintain our leading role in providing food assistance and undertaking efforts to improve food security.

Lesotho has attained much success from the advantages provided by the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Industries were attracted by sound investment policies, creating 40,000 jobs currently, and making Lesotho the largest African exporter of apparel to the United States. And as this workforce is predominantly female, the apparel manufacturing boom is empowering women. Many major United States companies source apparel in Lesotho, based on competitive wages and a sound and ethical labor environment.

Mr. Chairman, Lesotho's democratic Government and its record of good governance and sound fiscal and monetary policies helped it qualify for participation in the Millennium Challenge Account. After several years of hard work, the Government submitted its compact proposal for review. Now, Lesotho anticipates the completion of a compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation in the near future; currently the MCC Board is considering the compact for approval. The investment of more than \$300 million will spur the economic growth and poverty alleviation started in Lesotho by the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will have the responsibility of working with the Government of Lesotho and the Millennium Challenge Corporation to implement and carry out the compact.

Mr. Chairman, the news is not as good about public health. Lesotho faces an HIV/AIDS crisis, with an infection rate of approximately 23 percent of the adult popu-

lation—the world’s third highest prevalence rate. The Government of Lesotho’s response has quickened, as has our assistance. We are transitioning from a regional platform of assistance to a robust in-country presence to manage \$12.5 million in fiscal year 2007 approved for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief program in Lesotho. As the largest contributor worldwide to the Global Fund, we are also working with other donors to ensure efficient use of these multilateral funds to fight this disease in Lesotho. We remain committed to supporting the fight against the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and related challenges associated with widespread tuberculosis, and I would work to continue the excellent work of my predecessors.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed and privileged to serve as the United States Ambassador to Lesotho, I would look forward to working with you to further strengthen the bilateral relationship and advance the mutual interests of our governments and citizens.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Nolan.

And now we’ll turn to William John Garvelink to be Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

**STATEMENT OF WILLIAM JOHN GARVELINK, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE
CONGO**

Mr. GARVELINK. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today.

I would like to thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as the nominee for the Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo. I am honored by the prospects of this assignment, and the challenges and opportunities it presents.

I am not alone here today. My wife, Linda, is present. Without her love and support, I would not have been able to undertake the Foreign Service career I have pursued for the past 28 years.

Over my career in USAID, I served in Bolivia, and as the Mission Director in Eritrea. I served as the Deputy Director of USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and in the Africa section of the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration.

Currently, I am the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in USAID’s Bureau for Democracy Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. My work, mostly in Africa since the late 1980s, has focused on humanitarian response, and post-conflict assistance programs. I began in Southern Sudan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique in the late 1980s, I established the United States Humanitarian Assistance Program in Mogadishu in the early 1990s, and accompanied United States forces as they moved from Mogadishu into Southern Somalia. I led the first humanitarian assistance assessments in Angola, before there was a United States diplomatic presence in that country. I led disaster assistance response teams in the mid- and late-1990s into Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern Congo—then Zaire. I served in Eritrea during the conflict with Ethiopia.

Today I oversee extensive emergency and post-conflict programs in East and Central Africa, including the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Democratic Republic of Congo stands at a historic point today. Last year’s successful elections marked the culmination of efforts by various African nations, led by South Africa, and supported by the international community, to bring sustainable peace

for the Congo. The United States contributed to this effort through our active engagement in the peace process, our support for the United Nations mission to the Congo, our considerable humanitarian assistance, and our leadership in fostering regional dialog among former belligerents through the United States-facilitated Tripartite Plus Joint Commission.

This ravaged nation continues to suffer from violence, human rights abuses, hunger, disease, and endemic corruption, and the challenges remain staggering. Last year's elections did not miraculously unite all of the people of Congo, but they marked a crucial first step in a long process of recovery and development. For the Congolese and their international partners, the hard work begins now. We need to seize the great opportunity before us to restore the health of a nation that has suffered greatly—over 4 million deaths in the last decade.

With elections behind us, and a new government in place, the work has finally begun to rebuild. To avoid squandering Congo's rare opportunity for change, we must continue to press the government to protect the rights of its citizens to engage in open political debate, and to guarantee the free speech rights of those who speak out against their government.

We also wanted to bring an end to widespread impunity and corruption, by fostering the rule of law, and a more vigilant civil society.

I think that it takes a trusted friend to deliver, effectively, the frightened messages the Congolese occasionally need to hear. Ambassador Meece has been such a trusted friend, and I hope to earn the same kind of trust from the Congolese leadership and the Congolese people, as I work to protect United States' citizens and interests. Elections launched the nation toward political stability, though we are well aware that lasting stability will require the establishment of functional and democratic state institutions to serve the needs of the people and encourage economic growth.

If confirmed, my job will be to do everything I can to foster a culture of democracy, accountable government, human rights, and sustainable economic development. I plan to place primary emphasis on restoring the security and stability needed to rebuild the nation.

Working with our Congolese and international partners, we need to invest in establishing—in the establishment of professional military, police, and border security forces. Working with other partners, we need to replicate, in the security sector, the unprecedented donor cooperation that enabled last year's elections to take place. I will work to enable Congolese security forces to end threat of armed groups who continue to prey on local citizens, and exploit Congo's resources.

If confirmed as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo, I will continue United States efforts to support the new government at this time of great optimism and opportunity. The Congo's diplomatic, democratic development and its stability are essential for its citizens, and critical to the stability of much of Africa.

I look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and with the committee in this most important endeavor. Thank you, again, Chairman Feingold, and members of the committee for the

opportunity to appear here before you today, I would welcome any questions that you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Garvelink follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM JOHN GARVELINK, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sununu, and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today. I would like to thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as the nominee for Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo. I am honored by the prospect of this assignment and the challenges and opportunities it represents.

I am not alone here today. My wife, Linda, is present. Without her love and support, I would not have been able to undertake the Foreign Service career I have pursued for the last 28 years.

Over my career in USAID, I served in Bolivia and as the USAID Mission Director in Eritrea. Most of my career has focused on providing humanitarian assistance in conflict situations around the world. I served as the Deputy Director of USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and I served in the Africa section of the State Department's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration. Currently I am the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance.

My work, mostly in Africa since the late 1980s, has focused on humanitarian response and post-conflict assistance programs. I began in southern Sudan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique in the late 1980s. I established the United States humanitarian program in Mogadishu in the early 1990s and accompanied United States forces as they moved from Mogadishu into southern Somalia. I led the first humanitarian assistance assessments in Angola before there was a United States diplomatic presence in that country. I led Disaster Assistance Response Teams in the mid- and late-1990s into Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and eastern Congo, then Zaire. I served in Eritrea during the conflict with Ethiopia. Today I oversee extensive emergency and post-conflict programs in East and Central Africa, including the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Democratic Republic of Congo stands at an historic turning point. Last year's successful elections marked the culmination of the efforts of various African nations, led by South Africa, and supported by the international community, to bring sustainable peace to the Congo. The United States contributed to this success through our active engagement in the peace process, our support for the United Nations Organization Mission to the Congo (MONUC), our considerable humanitarian assistance, and our leadership in fostering regional dialog among former belligerents through the United States-facilitated Tripartite Plus Joint Commission. Under the leadership of Ambassador Roger Meece, U.S. Embassy Kinshasa has played a leading role in a truly international effort to promote peace in a troubled region and foster democracy and economic growth in a nation devastated by a decade of war following a generation of mismanagement and decline.

This ravaged nation continues to suffer from violence, human rights abuses, hunger, disease, and endemic corruption—and the challenges remain staggering. Last year's elections did not miraculously unite all of the people of Congo, but they marked a crucial first step in a long process of recovery and development. For the Congolese and their international partners, the hard work begins now. We need to seize the great opportunity before us to restore the health of a nation that has suffered tragically—over 4 million deaths in the last decade. With elections behind us and a new government in place, the work has finally begun to rebuild. To avoid squandering Congo's rare opportunity for change, we must continue to press the Government to protect the right of its citizens to engage in open political debate and to guarantee the free speech rights of those who speak out against their government. We also want to bring an end to widespread impunity and corruption by fostering the rule of law and a more vigilant civil society. I think that it takes a trusted friend to deliver effectively the frank messages the Congolese occasionally need to hear. Ambassador Meece has been such a trusted friend. I hope to earn the same kind of trust from the Congolese leadership and the Congolese people as I work to protect United States citizens and interests.

Elections launched the nation toward political stability, but we are well aware that lasting stability will require the establishment of functional and democratic state institutions to serve the needs of the people and encourage economic growth. If confirmed, my job will be to do everything I can to foster a culture of democracy, accountable governance, human rights, and sustainable economic development. I

plan to place primary emphasis on restoring the security and stability needed to rebuild a nation. Working with our Congolese and international partners, we need to invest in the establishment of professional military, police, and border security forces. We have made a start with the training we are providing to military brigade staff officers, and we know that the rebuilding of professional security forces will take time. Working with other partners, we need to replicate in the security sector the unprecedented donor cooperation that enabled last year's elections to take place. I will work to help enable Congolese security forces to end the threat of armed groups who continue to prey on local civilians and exploit Congo's resources. Consistent with my own professional background, I will continue to place emphasis on assisting refugees and internally displaced persons to reestablish homes and restore livelihoods.

If confirmed as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo, I will continue United States efforts to support the new government at this time of great optimism and opportunity. The Congo's democratic development and its stability are essential for its citizens and critical to the stability of much of Africa. I look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and with the committee in this most important endeavor.

Thank you again Chairman Feingold and the members of the committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would welcome any questions that you might have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Garvelink. This is a particularly important post in which I have a lot of interest, so I look forward to pursuing some of these issues with you.

I thank all of you.

I'll now begin a 10-minute round for this panel, starting with Congressman Green.

Congressman, how will you cooperate and coordinate your efforts with other United States agencies and officials operating in Tanzania?

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, my view is that one has to operate as a team. We have to recognize that, in so many parts of a country like Tanzania, the face of our nation, the face of American foreign policy may be, for example, the Peace Corps volunteer working in that village, working in that clinic, or writing up at the chalkboard. It is extraordinarily important that our efforts are coordinated and supported amongst each of the programs and agencies that are present in Tanzania.

So, I will work closely, by being in constant dialog with the leaders of each of these programs, and making sure that I am giving them the resources and the help that they need to be successful. Because if they don't succeed, then our overall mission doesn't succeed.

Senator FEINGOLD. Congressman, I visited Tanzania in the wake of the 2002 elections, and was concerned about the fraud and violence that had characterized the polls and by the subsequent opposition demonstrations, particularly in Zanzibar.

At his confirmation hearing, current Ambassador Michael Retzer assured me that he would make it a United States priority to improve and defend the enfranchisement of all Tanzanian people.

Unfortunately, the 2005 elections were, again, marred by widespread allegations of voting irregularities and intimidation of opposition groups. What steps will you take to raise respect for democratic principles and practices throughout Tanzania?

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it's a very important question.

The good news is that with the election of President Kikwete, we have seen the third successive, peaceful transfer in Tanzania, as a

whole. But, as you pointed out, with respect to the elections, particularly in Zanzibar, there were widespread irregularities reported by the National Democratic Institute. The opposition party has refused to recognize the election results, and has said that unless there is negotiated settlement of some kind, they will boycott the elections in 2010.

President Kikwete has said that reconciliation in Zanzibar is his highest domestic priority. I happen to agree that, in many ways, unless there is some reconciliation, unless we strengthen the democratic process in Zanzibar, it will hold back the potential of Tanzania.

On top of that, with respect to the nation as a whole, while there's certainly some very positive signs in democratic development, it's still true that the country is largely governed by one party. It's also true that an enormous amount of power is concentrated in the executive branch. And so I think for a democracy to be vibrant, we need to work with the administration to ensure that there are sufficient checks and balances.

I'm aware of the project of the National Democratic Institute is undertaking right now in Tanzania. I support that, I think the early results and early reports are very interesting, and I think we should work with them, and work with the administration in Tanzania to try to implement some of the reforms and suggestions, so that democracy truly is vibrant and widespread.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Congressman.

Mr. Parker, what programs and policies does the United States support in helping Swaziland address the AIDS pandemic? And are United States efforts complementary to Swaziland's national plan? And, if not, in what areas do they differ, and why?

Mr. PARKER. That is a very good question, Mr. Chairman.

The U.S. Government has been very appreciative of the funds that have been made available through the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief. This very important program has infused almost \$5 million—\$7 million into USAID's budget. And, it is combined with USAID, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of Labor. Together, they have been able to develop extremely effective prevention, awareness, and treatment programs, and also palliative care for people who are suffering from this disease. And they are also working hard, particularly with the Peace Corps, to develop programs to destigmatize the scourge of AIDS, because many people are afraid to come forward and receive testing for fear of being an outcast.

Fortunately, one of the great programs that we have—one of the great successes that the United States Government has experienced recently in Swaziland, has been the work that we have been able to do with the Swazi Government.

In 1999, the King who—as I mentioned before is an absolute ruler—declared a national health emergency in Swaziland, due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As late as January of this year, the King made a national appeal to the public on television, requesting and advising all Swazi people to be tested for the AIDS virus. This was a major step forward.

The Ministry of Health has been working very closely with our embassy, and we find that where—that this is probably the one area where the United States Government, and the Swazi Government, are working most closely together to ensure that we are able to fight this scourge of AIDS in Swaziland.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Parker.

Mr. Nolan, most of your career has been spent in administrative positions. How have you prepared for the managerial and public leadership role you'll be expected to fulfill as Ambassador to Lesotho?

Mr. NOLAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that very important question.

The United States has a wonderful story to tell in Lesotho. Currently, we are anticipating a Millennium Challenge Account compact, with approximately \$362 million, which will result in building 96 clinics, 18 HIV/AIDS emergency testing units in hospitals, in addition to which two hospitals will be built. Also, we have \$12.5 million through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, being spent in Lesotho in fiscal year 2007, and we have a wonderful Peace Corps volunteer program of approximately 100 volunteers.

From my managerial, as Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, I have an extensive experience background in management. I view an important part of my role—if I am confirmed in Lesotho—to be the management of considerable resources being devoted by the United States Government and our taxpayers. And my job there would be, in part, to ensure that the various agencies of the U.S. Government, we wisely and prudently spend the taxpayers money there.

I would view my management experiences to be very helpful, and I would plan on being—if confirmed—a very hands-on manager. And I would view it as a wonderful opportunity to help the people and the Government of Lesotho.

Senator FEINGOLD. As I understand it, the majority of your embassy staff will be locals. What experience do you have working closely with Africans?

Mr. NOLAN. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my introductory statement, my father was in the Foreign Service, and as a teenager I was fortunate enough to live in Kenya and Sierra Leone. And then my first two assignments in the Foreign Service were in Africa—in Conakry, Guinea and Antsiranana'i, Madagascar—both as the management officer. In both of those assignments, I supervised a considerable number of Foreign Service nationals in our embassies in both places. And, I take great—I believe our Foreign Service nationals are the backbone of our embassies. They serve us day in, day out, in many difficult parts of the world, and I would view the opportunity to supervise them in Lesotho—the approximately 60 Foreign Service nationals that we have there—to be a wonderful opportunity, because they are committed—as are the Americans, official Americans there—to furthering United States policy objectives.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Nolan.

Mr. Garvelink, for years Congo has been one of the most disastrous human rights crises in Africa, and perhaps, in the world. But

at last, as you have mentioned, the fighting appears to be winding down. How will you keep Congo near the top of the Humanitarian AIDS Assistance Priority List when it's no longer in the headlines?

Mr. GARVELINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think there are a number of ways to go about that. I guess, first, from my background, it will be a little easier coming from the humanitarian community, and having extensive contact throughout the U.S. humanitarian community, and the international one, to help use those contacts to maintain the focus on what's going on. Not just in the Eastern Congo, but in Congo, in general. The conditions throughout the country are quite dire in other places, as well as just the Eastern Congo.

But I will use my contacts, in confirmed, to maintain the high visibility of the situation that continues in the Eastern Congo. I think another way that we will be able to do that, and will, is to use our public diplomacy tools in the embassy to call attention to the situation, and offer solutions, and to identify opportunities for the international community to respond to the humanitarian crisis throughout the Eastern part of the Congo.

Senator FEINGOLD. Finally, given the central role that natural resources play in DROCs economy and development, the history of widespread corruption, and the risk that natural resources can pose to peace and security if they're not properly managed, how will you try to ensure that the new Congolese Government prioritizes the responsible and transparent management of natural resource reforms? For example, in ensuring the upcoming review of mining contracts—making sure that that review is meaningful?

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would continue the policies that Ambassador Meece has underway right now—he's working very closely with the new government as it goes through the review of the 60 major mining contracts. The Government of Congo is a member in good standing of the Kimberly Process. Through USAID, there's a project by the United States, NGO, PACT, that's working with the mining companies in Katanga to ensure that responsible mining occurs, and that the—some of the profits that emerged from those mines is used for the social, economic benefit of their population.

There are some other initiatives underway, transparency initiatives underway by the United States in cooperation with the British Government, and the Government of the Congo has endorsed, but not signed up yet, to these sorts of activities.

So, I think the embassy has underway a number of initiatives with the government to try to ensure responsible mining, and responsible use of the country's natural resources.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much.

And, Senator Cardin, thanks for your patience. Your round.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, let me thank all of our guests today for their service.

I would daresay that most of the people in the State of Maryland probably know very little about the four countries in which you all are seeking to become Ambassador to. And, I think that's probably true in the United States. As I said in my welcome, you're choosing to serve in a part of the world that, I think, is very important to the United States.

I saw that in Eastern Europe, and in Asia, the ties between ethnic communities and the United States and those parts of the world developed ties—economic ties, business ties—that help in the transformation of those countries and their economies. So, I guess my question to each of you is that, I think it's very important that we develop closer economic ties between the four countries that are represented by you and our communities. And that's going to take some leadership from the Ambassador, to get interest in the United States for—particularly smaller companies and communities to take an interest in the part of the world that you seek to represent the United States. And, I'm just wondering what strategies you have to develop more interest in the United States, in the countries that you seek to be the Ambassador?

Mr. Green, we can start with you.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Senator, thank you for the question.

First off, I agree with the premise of your question. Unfortunately, I think the level of awareness in many parts of the country of the countries represented here, clearly isn't as great as we would like it to be. I agree, it happens to be a very important part of the world for United States interests in a number of ways, and on a number of fronts.

With respect to economic ties, with respect to Tanzania, there are some positive developments. We have, in President Kikwete, a pro-Western President who has indicated publicly that he'd like to have even stronger, and warmer relations with the United States. He has publicly called for greater investment in Tanzania, and has made that pledge.

If I'm confirmed, what I will do is to continue to help that along by helping Tanzania address some of the barriers to increased American investment in that country.

For example, despite the fact that the country is committed to the rule of law, there are still problems with corruption in both the public sector and the private sector. On top of that, there certainly are some infrastructure challenges in Tanzania, particularly into the rural areas, that I think holds back American investment.

Right now, the Government of Tanzania has put forward plans for a Millennium Challenge Act Compact, which would be the largest compact, to date. Many of the projects—as far as I know—many of the projects that are in their plans would be the kinds of projects that I think would help encourage American investment in that nation, because it is aimed at roads, at energy, at infrastructure, and in water—some of the very challenges that Tanzania is now facing.

On top of that, while Tanzania has benefited from AGOA, from the African Goals and Opportunity Act, there is still capacity there for greater growth involvement. And so, if I'm fortunate enough to be confirmed, I look forward to working with leaders in Tanzania to help develop better use of that potential. So, those would be the steps that I would take.

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Parker, you're going to have a challenge, not only because of lack of knowledge in the United States, but the slowness of political reform, and concern about the safety of doing business. I welcome your thoughts on this.

Mr. PARKER. Thank you, Senator, and I welcome this question.

There is a great deal of concern on the part of many American investors going into Swaziland. However, we have one example of success, and that is with Coca-Cola, the primary American investor in Swaziland, where they have been able to set up a factory that produces the syrup that is used at the bottling plants within Southern Africa.

And we can build upon the success of this one industry to, hopefully, bring other investors into Swaziland. And if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, I will assure you that I will work to make investment in Swaziland one of my priorities, but for United States investors.

But, at the same—and you are also correct in stating that the Swazis are a very traditional and conservative people when it comes to business ventures. However, the Swazis have been very successful in taking advantage of the African Goals and Opportunity Act passed back in 2000.

In 2006, Swaziland, Swazi products—United States imported \$155 million in Swazi products into the United States, duty free, through the American Growth and Opportunity Act. According to the Department of Commerce, this is one of the real success stories of the Plan.

If I am confirmed as Ambassador, I will use all of the resources of our embassy to ensure that we are able to expand and diversify the economy of Swaziland, by having the Swazis draw on the resources provided by the USAID trade hub in Gabarone, Swaziland.

We also have another program that is AID-funded, known as the Swaziland Enterprise and Entrepreneurship Program. This is a 5-year, \$8 million program that will work on both the grassroots levels, to educate children about business, and using American business models. And also to provide assistance to small and medium entrepreneurs, to ensure that they are also able to have seed money, in some instances, and also to teach them how to expand their businesses.

If I am confirmed as Ambassador, I will use all of my resources to ensure—in this area—to ensure that we are able to find additional growth in the Swazi economy.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Parker.

Mr. Nolan, the challenge might be that Americans know South Africa, but the country that you're seeking to represent, the United States, is not as well known.

Mr. NOLAN. Senator, thank you for that very important question. The—and I agree with your premise totally. The United States, the people of the United States, know the Republic of South Africa much better than they know the Kingdom of Lesotho. And one of the things I would strive, if I am confirmed, would be explaining the story of the United States in Lesotho to a broader audience of the American people.

We have been described—the desk officer for Lesotho told me—that the people of Lesotho, the Government of Lesotho, describes the United States as their “best friend.” And, we have a wonderful story to tell there—Lesotho does not have strategic resources, they do not have oil, significant mineral resources, and very modest amount of diamonds so far have been discovered. And so, the face of the United States in Lesotho is our best face, it is the United

States and our people doing things for humanitarian reasons, and that is a wonderful story, and I would like to articulate that to the American people.

I think we have a wise investment of money through the African Growth and Opportunities Act. We have created 40,000 jobs through the export of textiles to the United States. Lesotho is the largest exporter within Africa under AGOA, and those jobs are principally for females, which is critically important in that region.

In addition to which, under the Millennium Challenge Compact, there will be approximately—as I mentioned previously, Senator—\$360 million. Part of that money—in addition to helping create health clinics and HIV, President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief facilities for the treatment of—part of that will go for creating water facilities, irrigation throughout the country to enable people to have clean water, which is obviously very important. In addition to which some—a smaller amount of the money will be spent on trying to assist the Government of Lesotho in developing the basic opportunities, such as check-clearing houses and an investment code, to help them come up to speed in terms of their private enterprise structure.

We have had a wonderful Peace Corps program there since the mid-1960s, the Peace Corps has done a wonderful opportunity, has done wonderful things there, and so, Senator, I would view it as, we have such a fabulous story to tell there, in terms of Lesotho, and what our great country is doing there, and I would welcome the opportunity, if confirmed, to explain that to the American people.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, and very briefly to Mr. Garvelink, let me tell you, I think the Congo not only represents a huge challenge, as the chairman has pointed out, because of the humanitarian crisis from disease and conflict, but the human rights violations—the failure of the government to deal with the human rights concerns. The failure of the judiciary, the use of the military—and I must tell you, I do look forward to strengthening the relationship between the Congo and the United States, but as you pointed out in your statement, human rights has got to be part of that.

Mr. GARVELINK. Thank you.

Putting human rights and the humanitarian situation, and all of that in the context of also an opportunity for an increase in U.S. business is something that's very interesting to me. And, I think there's a real opportunity here, given the elections that have just taken place in the Congo—if we can reinforce open democratic institutions, build a vibrant civil society—there will be bumps along the way, this is going to be a very tough process—but, I think by doing that, by being open about the human rights violations, and dealing with them, there may be a greater opportunity for United States investment, a greater interest beyond the extractive industries that are already in Katanga Province, if democracy is seen to be working. If opportunities are there, if the basic needs of the general population in health and education are being met, if salaries are being paid, and if the embassy—and, if confirmed, I would work very closely with the World Bank to secure additional funding for basic infrastructure, so that agriculture can get going at its basic level.

I think, if these things can be seen to be starting, than I think there begins to become a climate for more U.S. investment there.

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Cardin.

And, my congratulations to all of you, and I'm going to do what I can to expedite these nominations through the process. And I now dismiss the first panel, and ask the second panel to come forward.

Welcome, the second panel, and we will begin with June Carter Perry to be Ambassador to the Republic Sierra Leone.

Ms. Perry.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JUNE CARTER PERRY, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE**

Ms. PERRY. Thank you, Chairman Feingold, and members of the committee for the opportunity to appear before you today on "Juneteenth," which I think is a very important day in the history of American ethnic relations.

I am honored to be President Bush's nominee as Ambassador to the Republic of Sierra Leone. I would like to thank the President and Secretary of State, for once again placing their confidence in me to serve as an Ambassador of the United States.

I would also like to thank my distinguished husband, Mr. Frederick Perry, who is here with me today. He is a retired senior Foreign Service officer and without his unwavering support, I would not have the opportunity to be where I am at present.

If confirmed, I look forward to building on the work of my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Thomas N. Hull, III, to support Sierra Leone's heroic efforts to reconstruct society, to strengthen democracy, and to promote prosperity. Coming from the Mountain Kingdom of Lesotho, and if confirmed, going to the "Lion Mountain" of Sierra Leone, I believe I can bring proactive diplomacy to advance United States interests, as well as key development sectors, as Sierra Leone approaches an important transition period.

In my 24-year Foreign Service career, I have engaged the United Nations as Director of the Office in International Organization Affairs, the World Bank, universities such as Columbia, Boston, Harvard, and Howard, African Governments and civil society, to promote United States interests in Africa, including the advancement of human rights, working to ensure the effective use of United States HIV/AIDS assistance, quadrupling our assistance through PEPFAR in Lesotho, and fortunately through my 3 years of service, working extremely closely with our Millennium Challenge Corporation Team in Washington, as well as with the Government of Lesotho.

I also had the opportunity to participate, as indicated, in the further development of AGOA. Certainly, in Sierra Leone, we look forward to promoting AGOA even further as Sierra Leone is scheduled to chair a panel at the AGOA forum in July.

I have also had the opportunity, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, to promote advocacy for women and children, and to contribute to advancing civilian authority over foreign militaries, effective counternarcotic measures, results-based economic development policies, and humanitarian assistance in my previous roles,

not only as Ambassador, but as Deputy Chief of Mission in Madagascar, and in the Central African Republic.

These issues have remained key objectives during my service. However, my most important responsibility has been the safety and security of American citizens, including the development of counterterrorism measures. If confirmed, I would bring these experiences in dealing with African development issues to enhance the already excellent relationship the United States has with Sierra Leone. If confirmed, I would also further enhance, through public diplomacy, our relationship.

I noted that this week the reconstructed ship, the *Amistad*, will depart Connecticut on route to the port of Freetown. I would look forward, if confirmed, to using the arrival of that ship as a key public affairs opportunity, bringing, Mr. Chairman, perhaps yourself, if confirmed, as well as members of the committee.

Reaching back to my private sector experience with RKO radio broadcasting, looking forward to bringing in media sources, as well as key individuals, such as we did in Lesotho with Bill and Melinda Gates, with former Trade Representative, Ambassador Robert Zoellick, with the honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, and working closely with our allies in the international community, who have shown such interest in Africa, such as Prince Harry and the rock star Bono.

Five years after the end of a long and brutal civil war, Sierra Leone itself, stands at an important crossroads. With the departure of U.N. peacekeepers in 2005, the country has resumed control of its own security. Earlier this month, the Special Court for Sierra Leone began the trial of Charles Taylor for his involvement in the conflict. This week the court is expected to deliver a verdict in the trial of the former military hunter, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

If Sierra Leone succeeds in holding credible, free, and fair elections this August—a process we are actively supporting through the National Democratic Institute, as well as local nongovernmental organizations—the transfer of power from President Kabbah to another democratically-elected leader would mark an important post-conflict milestone, and pave the way for future success.

Despite the positive developments, Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain, that if not properly addressed, could again threaten the country's stability. Severe poverty and insufficient healthcare, especially for women and children, continue to push Sierra Leone to the bottom of the U.N. Human Development Index. Widespread youth unemployment, a root cause and catalyst for the civil war, continues to endanger peace. To address these serious issues, the Government of Sierra Leone must attack corruption.

If confirmed, I would increase the United States Mission's focus on improving governance and expand our engagement with Sierra Leone's own Anti-Corruption Commission. Our efforts to promote transparency in the diamond industry will also continue to be central to our engagement. In this regard, we would draw, as we have done in past positions, on U.S. Government expertise, for example, from the Treasury Department's very strong anti-money laundering and anticorruption divisions, as well as that of nongovernmental

organizations. I believe that promoting good governance and improving the government's capacity to provide basic, sustainable services would have a multiplier effect on our already existing health and agriculture assistance.

As a former ACTION Peace Corps official and as the spouse of a former Peace Corps Country Director in South America and Deputy Director in Southeast Asia, in Malaysia, I would strongly support the reintroduction of a Peace Corps program in Sierra Leone. Looking regionally, we should focus on improving Sierra Leone's peace-building efforts, within the larger context of the Mano River subregion. With Guinea's uncertain political transition and Liberia's fragile peace, Sierra Leone finds itself in a volatile neighborhood. Porous borders and weak governance have created fertile ground for a narcotics and small arms trafficking.

If confirmed, I would collaborate with our Ambassadors in Monrovia and Conakry and throughout the region, to encourage cooperation to improve the subregion's capacity to respond to instability, to programs through our various United States agencies that have a capacity to strengthen maritime controls, for example, and law enforcement border controls.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you and the committee today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Perry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JUNE CARTER PERRY, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

Thank you, Chairman Feingold and members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored to be President Bush's nominee as Ambassador to the Republic of Sierra Leone. I would like to thank the President and the Secretary of State for once again placing their confidence in me to serve as an Ambassador of the United States. If confirmed, I look forward to building on the work of my distinguished predecessor, Thomas N. Hull, III, to support Sierra Leone's heroic efforts to reconstruct society, to strengthen democracy, and to promote prosperity. Coming from the Mountain Kingdom of Lesotho and, if confirmed, going to the Lion Mountain of Sierra Leone, I believe I can bring proactive diplomacy to advance United States' interests as well as key development sectors, as Sierra Leone approaches an important transition period.

In my 24-year Foreign Service career, I have engaged the United Nations, the World Bank, universities (such as Columbia, Boston, and Howard), African Governments, and civil society to promote United States' interests in Africa, including the advancement of human rights, working to ensure the effective use of United States HIV/AIDS assistance, development of Lesotho's Millennium Challenge Account, and promoting equity for women and children. Promoting civilian authority over foreign militaries, effective counternarcotics measures, and results-based economic development policies and humanitarian assistance have been key objectives during my service. My most important responsibility has been the safety and security of American citizens. If confirmed, I would bring these experiences in dealing with African development issues to enhance the already excellent United States-Sierra Leone relations.

Five years after the end of a long and brutal civil war, Sierra Leone now stands at an important crossroads. With the departure of U.N. peacekeepers in 2005, the country has resumed control of its own security. Earlier this month, the Special Court for Sierra Leone began the trial of Charles Taylor for his involvement in the conflict. This week, the court is expected to deliver a verdict in the trial of the former military junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. If Sierra Leone succeeds in holding credible, free, and fair elections this August—a process we are actively supporting—the transfer of power from President Kabbah to another democratically elected leader would mark an important post-conflict milestone and pave the way for future success.

Despite the positive developments, Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain that, if not properly addressed, could again threaten the country's stability. Severe poverty and insufficient health care, especially for women and children, continue to push Sierra Leone to the bottom of the U.N.'s Human Development Index. Widespread youth unemployment, a root cause and catalyst for the civil war, continues to endanger peace. To address these serious issues, the Government of Sierra Leone must attack corruption. If confirmed, I would increase the United States Mission's focus on improving governance and expand our engagement with Sierra Leone's Anti-Corruption Commission. Our efforts to promote transparency in the diamonds industry will also continue to be central to our engagement. In this regard, we would draw on U.S. Government expertise from the Treasury Department, and that of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). I believe that promoting good governance and improving the government's capacity to provide basic, sustainable services would have a multiplier effect on our already existing health and agriculture assistance. As a former ACTION/Peace Corps official, I would strongly support the re-introduction of a Peace Corps program in Sierra Leone.

Looking regionally, we should focus on improving Sierra Leone's peace-building efforts within the larger context of the Mano River subregion. With Guinea's uncertain political transition, and Liberia's fragile peace, Sierra Leone finds itself in a volatile neighborhood. Porous borders and weak governance have created fertile ground for narcotics and small arms trafficking. If confirmed, I would collaborate with our ambassadors in Monrovia and Conakry to encourage regional cooperation and to improve the subregion's capacity to respond to instability.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to appear before you and the committee today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador. All three of these countries have been very complicated and often involved in tumultuous times in the entire 15 years that I have served on this subcommittee. So, I appreciate your willingness to take on these posts. I thank you for the connection you made between Juneteenth day today, an important occasion in the history of our country and the connection it has to what we're talking about today.

Now we go to Frederick B. Cook to be Ambassador to the Central African Republic.

**STATEMENT OF FREDERICK B. COOK, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

Mr. COOK. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the President's nominee to be the next Ambassador of the United States to the Central African Republic. I thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for entrusting me with this important responsibility. If confirmed, I will work with the committee and others in Congress to advance the interests of the United States in the Central African Republic.

In the interest of time, with your permission, I'd like to ask that my statement be entered for the record.

My wife, Denise, is with me here today, as she has been ever since we met many years ago in Cameroon where she was a volunteer with International Voluntary Service. My daughter, Heather, could not be here today. School may be out, but a school teacher's work does not end with the summer, and she is a school teacher in New York City. I'm pleased that my son, Trevor, is here from college in Florida, as is my nephew, Matthew Pollard of Penn, England. Matt is starting a summer as a Senatorial intern with the Budget Committee and has been selected as a participant in the Stennis Program.

At this point, I would comment on the geographic location of the Central African Republic, but I have the pleasure, Senator, that, Mr. Chairman, that we actually previously met in Dire Dawa, Ethi-

opia, when you traveled there to meet with a distinguished panel of Oromo a few months ago.

Senator FEINGOLD. Yes, sir.

Mr. COOK. A distinguished Somalian Oromo elders, so forgive a small geographic lesson. But bordered by Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, and both Congos, the aptly named Central African Republic is at the very center of the continent and faces almost every one of the challenges that can befall any African State—rebels, bandits, civil unrest, refugees flowing in and out, displaced persons, AIDS, other illness, illiteracy, and a plethora of issues involving women, children, and minorities. The Central African Republic has them all.

These issues arise from a variety of causes, ranging from internal political discord, which goes back long before independence, to significant spillover from conflict in neighboring states, including the tragic situation in Darfur.

There is, however, reason for guarded optimism. The President and Head of State were elected in elections that met minimal international standards. We thus have a small window of opportunity for the United States to engage more deeply in Central African Republic and work to the mutual interest of our two countries.

The engagement of the United States in the Central African Republic has been and must be multidimensional, ranging from humanitarian relief for the protection of refugees and displaced persons, to efforts to build and strengthen civil and governmental and nongovernmental institutions that promote and protect human rights and eventually lead to serious economic growth. Absent economic growth, there is no prospect for the situation in the Central African Republic to get better any time soon. There is a long way to go.

If confirmed, I will be the first United States Ambassador in Bangui since the end of the year 2002.

As a second generation Foreign Service officer, I've devoted my entire life to the service of my country. I fully understand the meaning of the word service, in Foreign Service. If confirmed, I will endeavor to rebuild our Mission in the Central African Republic, so that it can better protect the interest of our Nation, as well as the citizens that we have who are resident in that country. I have a long background in management and a certain expertise in the design and support of small posts. I can assure you that we will be proper husbands of the Government's resources and the taxpayer's money. We will produce a very effective, if very small, embassy.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and welcome any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cook follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK B. COOK, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the President's nominee to be the next Ambassador of the United States to the Central African Republic. I thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for entrusting me with this important responsibility. If confirmed, I will work with the committee and others in Congress to advance the interests of the United States in the Central African Republic.

Joining me here today are my wife, Denise, and my son, Trevor, a student at college in Florida. My daughter, a teacher in New York City, could not be with us

today. My wife and I met in Cameroon and my entire family has been an essential part of my Foreign Service career; without their love and support, I could not be here in front of you today.

One could say that I've spent my whole life preparing for this moment. I was born into a Foreign Service family and spent many of my formative years overseas. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1972, I have had the fortune of serving at several posts in Africa and in Latin America, including Botswana, Liberia, Bolivia, and Cuba. My first assignment was in Cameroon, where among other duties, I forwarded cargo to Bangui. My most recent assignments include tours as the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa in Djibouti, as Director of the Florida Regional Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Caracas, Venezuela. I fully understand the "service" aspect of the Foreign Service and welcome challenging assignments.

Mr. Chairman, the priorities of the United States in the Central African Republic (CAR) include rebuilding the U.S. Government presence, protecting civilians, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and humanitarian workers, and limiting the spread of the Darfur conflict. The essential focus of this process must be fostering security and stability and support for democracy and economic development.

To meet these goals, we are in the process of rebuilding our official presence in the Central African Republic. Operations were scaled back after the violent coup of 1996–1997 and security concerns led to the closure of the embassy in late 2002. The embassy reopened in early 2005 with one American officer and has continued to slowly reestablish staffing. If confirmed, I will become the embassy's fourth American officer.

The Central African Republic (CAR), like many of its neighbors, has a long history of instability and civil war due to a combination of domestic and regional factors. The country has been unable to establish a record of good governance, rule of law, or democracy, thus leaving it vulnerable to both internal instability and external interference. Positive gains were made, however, in 2005, when President Bozize won a presidential election that was determined to be free and fair by international observers.

Recent events in the CAR have highlighted the country's fragile state. Just one week ago, Elsa Serfass, a young Doctors Without Borders aid worker, was killed when her clearly-marked vehicle came under fire near the town of Ngaoundaye in the northwestern part of the country. Ms. Serfass was in the area to assess health conditions after receiving reports that a May 30 rebel attack and retaliatory government attacks had destroyed the health infrastructure. Doctors Without Borders, one of the few international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in CAR, was forced to suspend operations in the region following Ms. Serfass' killing. Other NGOs and the United Nations (U.N.) have followed suit.

The Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (ARPD), the group responsible for the attack on Ms. Serfass' vehicle, was one of the rebel groups that signed a peace agreement with the government earlier this year. While organized rebel attacks have declined, the ARPD and other rebels continue to operate throughout the northwestern part of the country. The government, in turn, continues to have difficulty controlling the actions of the military and presidential guard when they respond to rebel attacks, resulting in collective punishment and impunity. These conditions have led to increased fear and resentment among the general population, and temporarily derailed the national dialog scheduled for the coming year. The United States remains deeply concerned by these developments.

The U.S. response to the situation needs to be, and has been, multidimensional. In partnership with U.N. agencies and NGO's on the ground, we provide substantial humanitarian support to 212,000 IDPs, 50,000 CAR refugees in southern Chad, and 28,000 CAR refugees in Cameroon, and now the recently arrived 2,600 refugees from Darfur. Our interventions include emergency food assistance, water and sanitation projects, and seeds and tools to enable Central Africans to feed themselves.

In international fora, the United States has supported the mandates of the U.N. Peace-Building Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) and of the Multinational Force of the Central African Monetary and Economic Community (also known as FOMUC) in order to promote stability in CAR. Both BONUCA and FOMUC, while constrained by their small sizes and budgets, have contributed considerably to the pursuit of peace in CAR. We also support CAR's upcoming national dialog, in hopes that the CAR government, the political opposition, and the armed opposition will be better able to reach peace and move toward security in the countryside and in Bangui.

U.S. efforts to support democracy and human rights in the CAR have focused on strengthening the media and the parliament, both of which are largely inexperienced and remain susceptible to pressure from the executive branch. We have also

worked to provide voter education. If confirmed, I intend to continue our efforts to support democracy and human rights.

While rebel movements in the northeastern part of CAR have been limited since the signing of a peace agreement in April, the recent influx of refugees from Darfur highlights the risk that the crisis in Darfur holds for the region and the need for robust peacekeeping forces. The U.N. and several NGOs are working under difficult conditions to reach and feed these refugees before the rains cut off roads and transport links for the summer. If confirmed, I will work with others in the government and international community to support these refugees and others who have fled the systemic violence in Darfur. I have read with interest the transcript of the subcommittee's March 20 hearing on the regional aspects of the Darfur crisis, particularly focusing on Chad and CAR.

If confirmed, I will continue the work of the embassy and of my colleagues in Washington to support the deployment of an international peacekeeping operation in Chad and northeastern CAR that will focus on both protecting civilians and deterring cross-border attacks. The CAR government is supportive of such a force.

I fully understand, and accept, my responsibilities for the safety and security of our staff and of the American community in CAR. The American community has grown substantially as more United States-based aid and development organizations implant themselves in the countryside. These organizations provide welcome relief and development opportunities for the population, and I look forward to working with and supporting these organizations as they continue to improve the lives and health of Central Africans throughout the country.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I welcome any questions you may have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Cook, and that was just a superb meeting in Dire Dawa with the leaders there. I learned a great deal from it and look forward to working with you.

Now turn to Wanda Nesbitt, the Honorable Wanda Nesbitt to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WANDA L. NESBITT, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF COTE D'IVOIRE**

Ms. NESBITT. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.

Let me first express my gratitude to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as their nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire. I am honored to be nominated to serve in this important West African country at such a critical time.

Mr. Chairman, I believe my 26 years of diplomatic service qualifies me for this calling. I have served in a variety of postings abroad, including assignments in Madagascar, Rwanda, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, France, and Haiti. As the United States Ambassador to Madagascar, I devoted special attention to promoting democracy and good governance, to environmental preservation and protection, and to increased respect for market-driven growth.

I arrived in Madagascar just after a bitterly contested presidential election in which both candidates claimed victory. I worked with our partners in the international community, namely, the European Union, the World Bank, the IMF, and UNDP to help resolve the political crisis.

If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the United States promotes our interest in seeing a stable, peaceful, and democratic Cote d'Ivoire.

Conflict has plagued Cote d'Ivoire for years, but a peace agreement signed this past March gives reason for hope. It is a home-grown initiative, it was drafted and signed by the two key actors,

and thus far respectable progress has been made. The transitional government has been named, and the Zone of Confidence, which divides the country in two, is gradually being dismantled.

We recognize, however, that the agreement's success hinges on full implementation, and the political will of key Agorian actors to maintain their commitment to implement it.

Currently, United States Government assistance to Cote d'Ivoire is restricted by section 508 sanctions. Holding free and fair elections would not only bring Cote d'Ivoire back into the international realm of democracy, it would also remove the strict barrier to United States aid and cooperation.

Despite years of crisis, Cote d'Ivoire still has one of the largest economies in Africa. It has retained its free market economy, and financial and capital markets, and it continues to attract domestic, regional, and international capital, including American investments.

If confirmed, I would work to improve the investment climate for American companies, while promoting an economic program that helps to reduce poverty, and reduces the poverty that fuels instability in the region.

As a consular officer in the Foreign Service, I can never forget that the number one priority for our Missions overseas is to see to the protection of American citizens and their interests abroad. If confirmed, I would do everything I can to ensure the safety and well-being of every American citizen in Cote d'Ivoire, and would lead the efforts of our embassy to enhance homeland security and maintain the security of our borders.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for your abiding interest in America's relations with Africa, and thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak with you today. I'm happy to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Nesbitt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WANDA L. NESBITT, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF COTE D'IVOIRE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today. Let me first express my gratitude to President Bush and to Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as their nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire. I am pleased to be nominated to serve in this important West African country at such a critical time.

Mr. Chairman, I believe my 26 years of diplomatic service qualifies me for this calling. I am currently the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Consular Affairs. Earlier in my career, I completed assignments in Madagascar, Rwanda, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, France, and Haiti. As the United States Ambassador to Madagascar, I devoted special attention to promoting democracy and good governance, to environmental preservation and protection, to increased respect for market-driven growth for private sector involvement in the development of public policies to reduce poverty, and to girls' education. I arrived in Madagascar just after a bitterly contested presidential election in which both major candidates claimed victory. I worked with our partners in the international community, namely the European Union, the World Bank, the IMF, and UNDP to help resolve the political crisis. Thus, I have seen firsthand how critical credible, free, and fair elections are to the welfare of a nation. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the United States promoted our interest in seeing a stable, peaceful, and democratic Cote d'Ivoire.

Conflict has plagued Cote d'Ivoire for years, but a peace agreement signed in March gives reason for hope. I am cautiously optimistic that the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, although the 13th peace agreement since the crisis broke out in 2001, may be the best chance for lasting peace thus far. After all, it is a homegrown

initiative; it was drafted and signed by the two key actors, President Laurent Gbagbo, and New Forces leader, Guillaume Soro; and the international community did not force these actors to the negotiating table. Thus far, respectable progress has been made: A new transitional government has been named with Soro as the prime minister, and the Zone of Confidence, which divides the country in two, gradually is being dismantled. The agreement's success hinges on its full implementation and the political will of key Ivorian actors to maintain their commitments to implement it.

If a presidential election is to take place by next year, as Soro and the agreement's mediator, Burkina Faso's President Blaise Compaore, maintains that it will, then the Ivorians must move quickly to implement the disarmament and demobilization of militias; commence disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants; integrate the armed forces; and reestablish civilian administration throughout the country. These measures will allow the government to move forward on the registration of voters and the organization of free, fair, transparent, and inclusive elections with the assistance of the international community. Currently, United States Government assistance to Cote d'Ivoire is restricted by section 508 sanctions. Holding free and fair elections would not only bring Cote d'Ivoire back into the international realm of democracies, it would also remove a strict barrier to United States aid and cooperation.

Despite years of crisis, Cote d'Ivoire is still one of the largest economies in Africa. It has retained its free-market economy, and the financial and capital markets remain open and continue to attract domestic, regional, and international capital, including American investments. If confirmed, I would work to improve the investment climate for American companies, while promoting an economic program that helps reduce the poverty that fuels instability in the region. I would also call for greater transparency in the natural resource sector in Cote d'Ivoire.

If confirmed, I would also maintain the dedication of my predecessor, Ambassador Aubrey Hooks, in administering the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Cote d'Ivoire is one of 15 priority countries selected for intensive United States' support. This \$84 million program has produced significant results in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Cote d'Ivoire, such as providing antiretroviral treatment for more than 25,700 people, palliative care services to more than 44,000 people, and care and support for more than 24,000 orphans and other vulnerable children.

As a consular specialist in the Foreign Service, I will never forget that the number one priority for our missions overseas is to see to the protection of American citizens and their interests. If confirmed, I would do everything I can to ensure the safety and well-being of every American citizen in Cote d'Ivoire, and I would lead the efforts of our embassy to enhance homeland security and maintain the sanctity of our borders.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for your abiding interest in America's relations with Africa, and thank you for giving me the opportunity today to speak with you. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress to advance America's interests in Cote d'Ivoire.

I am happy to answer any questions you may have today. Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Nesbitt, very much.

And now we'll begin a series of questions, and we'll start with Ambassador Perry.

As you know, Sierra Leone's stability is intertwined with that of the neighboring Mano River Union countries, where armed cross-border factions continue to be a destabilizing factor in the sub-region. How will you facilitate regional communication and cooperation on security issues?

Ms. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this question, because it is indeed at the heart of the stability of the sub-region.

My colleagues and I—if I am confirmed, as they have already done—plan to communicate directly on a regular basis, concerning the border issues which I believe are extremely important. As we know, historically there has been a great deal of movement between those borders. Just recently, over 100,000 Liberians, for example, were repatriated from Sierra Leone. We believe that there are about 20,000 Liberians who remain in Sierra Leone, and with

the situation as indicated in Guinea, it is uncertain as to how the border situation will develop there.

Specifically, I will draw on our international law enforcement academy in Gabarone, in Botswana to seek training for individuals—not only from Sierra Leone—but to work closely with my colleagues to see how we might draw on that resource, that very rich resource, that the United States Government has established in Botswana to include the subregion, the Mano River subregion.

As I indicated, our communications would be, probably through video conferencing at some time, but we have also considered the idea, already, of having regular discussions amongst ourselves, as well as amongst the key players—including civil society—within those three countries.

Senator FEINGOLD. I think I had a chance to visit the facility in Gabarone that you just described, and was impressed with what was being attempted there, and I am impressed by your making the connection and the possibility of using that for help.

In your current post as Ambassador to Lesotho, Ms. Perry, you persuaded the monarchy of that kingdom to “invest in its people.” How will you seek to imbed this social consciousness in Sierra Leone?

Ms. PERRY. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman.

I have a deep belief that personal diplomacy and proactive diplomacy—as I indicated in my statement—is absolutely essential. Engaging not only the leadership, perhaps the last generation of the older leaders of Sierra Leone will be essential to developing a new mindset in that group, but looking forward to a younger generation, and I might indicate that the opposition parties, as well as the leading party, the SLPP, the Sierra Leone People’s Party—have all three indicated that they have a strong youth contingent within each of those parties. It is expected that during the general elections in August that a significant number of younger leaders will be elected to parliament, as well as a significant number of women. I think it will be absolutely crucial to the success of Sierra Leone, and I do believe the people of Sierra Leone desire peace and stability at this time, to engage those young leaders.

I would further seek to increase our public diplomacy and engagement to demonstrate that America cares in Sierra Leone, by increasing international visitors, by attracting Fulbright Scholars and by having exchange programs to take on this task, which will not be accomplished in a short period of time.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador.

Mr. Cook, as you know, the United States Embassy in Bangui has been closed twice in the past decade as a result of concerns over the pace of political and economic liberalization and human rights abuses in the Central African Republic.

As the first U.S. Ambassador to that country in 5 years, what do you hope to accomplish with your presence?

Mr. COOK. Mr. Chairman, that’s a very perceptive question.

I think the United States occupies a unique position in the world today. By sending an Ambassador to the Central African Republic, hopefully our intervention can act as a catalyst. The United States is already working through international partners, multinational organizations, NGOs, nongovernmental organizations and the rest,

to try to affect change in the Central Africa Republic, which has been described as the, sort of, “forgotten crisis.”

I would hope that my presence there, as an expression of the personal interest of the President and of the people of the United States, might serve to underscore and to encourage other nations to step up and become more committed in their engagement there. That engagement has suffered a reverse with the killing of a young volunteer from Medecins Sans Frontieres just last week, and the disturbing report of the execution of her murderer. It’s unlikely that any kind of full due process could have been followed.

When I was a child, and first went to the Department of State for 1,001 injections, I stood in front of the plaque in the lobby which listed our fallen colleagues. It was sobering, even at age 5. It’s more sobering now that we’ve filled up at least three more plaques. I have no desire to add my name to that plaque, but I am very much aware that very little history, or very little foreign policy takes place within the walls of the Chancery.

In Haiti, I traveled, literally, the length of the country to meet with opponents and supporters of President Aristide. I’m very proud that in the time that I was in Venezuela, I arranged a meeting between pro and anti-Chavez governors, rather mayors, and in fact, had to meet and have breakfast with some Congressional staffers. One of them said to me, a very strong Chavista, that this is the only place in Venezuela that I would ever meet with these people without a gun in my hand.

I am no stranger to personal diplomacy. I will try to reach out and engage with every element of society, where I can, to try to first understand, deeply, the problems of that country in a way that you can only understand on the ground, and then to mobilize the resources of our Government to affect change and protect our interests.

I acknowledge my family. I apologize I’ve been remiss. I should also acknowledge there are any number of colleagues, past, present, and future from the Department, from the Bureau of African Affairs and other parts, who are with me here today. I didn’t know they were coming. I’m gratified that they did. They can expect a call.

Senator FEINGOLD. What’s your analysis of the root causes driving the home-grown insurgency in the CAR.

Mr. COOK. The CAR first enters into history about the 7th century as a fertile harvesting ground for slaves. That’s not a part of any part of human history that we want to be proud of.

Before independence, during the Colonial Period, it was distinguished by the excesses of various commercial companies on the model of what was happening in the Belgian Congo.

Since independence, I doubt that there have been any 5 years in which the country has had a stable, democratic government. It’s a daunting challenge.

Internally, there is a real traditional of good governance, respect for human rights, as we would understand it.

In addition, neither matron or politics is very fond of vacuums. Sitting at the border of Chad, the Sudan and the Congos, the country faces pressure from neighbors who, may at times, prefer that the country be weak, and unstable, so that they can—it can either

serve as a refuge for their rebels or forces, or both. It would be very nice to build enough stability in the Central African Republic to help them, because it depends on the people themselves. It would be nice to help them build enough stability so that their armed forces might be a threat to rebels, and not just to their own citizens.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I wanted to ask you just a follow up—has the Bozize Government made any good faith efforts to address the grievances that led to this?

Mr. COOK. Mr. Chairman, I believe there is evidence that they have. Those efforts are small. It's very early to determine how good the faith is. In a country where the civil bureaucracy and the military have not been paid, or are months behind in their pay, it's very, very hard to hold them to the standard, to international standards. But that is exactly what we must do. We face the challenge of, on the one hand, denouncing violations of human rights and abuses, the impunity on both sides. And at the same time, trying to mobilize the resources, the programs that can actually lead the government to a state where they can meet those standards.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Cook.

Ms. Nesbitt, you saw the political reconciliation coalition building between perpetrators and victims in Rwanda's genocide in the late 1990s. What did you learn from that experience that will help you facilitate dialog and good faith commitments by both sides in the wake of a 5-year civil war.

Ms. NESBITT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that's a very important question.

One of the most important lessons, I think, that I learned through my time in Rwanda was the important role that the United States and other Western countries could play in terms of promoting the concepts of tolerance and recognition of the rights of minorities, as well as majorities. I am hopeful that, if confirmed, I would be able to carry some of those lessons with me to Cote d'Ivoire, where the lack of trust among the parties, and the lack of recognition of the rights of all involved, continues to be one of the major underlying sources of the conflict there.

Senator FEINGOLD. How likely is it that the current string of agreements between President Gbagbo, and the former rebel commander Guillaume Soro, will be affected?

Ms. NESBITT. That's a difficult question to answer. I am very cognizant of the fact that this is one in a long string of agreements that has taken place, been signed in Cote d'Ivoire in the last 5 years. But the fact that it is an initiative on the part of the President, and that it has been signed on to by the major protagonist, Mr. Soro, who is now the Prime Minister, gives us cautious optimism that they have a level of commitment that has not been there in the past. And so, we are hopeful and—as I mentioned a little earlier in my statement—there are some signs, already, that progress is being made, that they are beginning to integrate the commands of their—of the militia and the national forces, that there is movement to return civil servants to the Northern part of the country, so there are a number of steps in the right direction, and we hope that that will continue.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Nesbitt.

A recent report by the nongovernmental organization, Global Witness documents a pattern of mismanagement of revenues, opaque accounts, corruption, and political favoritism in the cocoa sector of Cote d'Ivoire. It presents detailed evidence showing the diversion of more than \$58 million from levies to the government's war effort, which raises serious security, economic, and governance concerns. How will you broach this pervasive problem with the Government of Cote d'Ivoire, and what specific benchmarks of progress will you be looking for?

Ms. NESBITT. Mr. Chairman, this is a very, very serious issue, and it is one that we are concerned about. As you mention, both sides in this conflict have used revenues from the cocoa industry to support their activities, and this is an issue of great concern to us.

If confirmed, what I would like to do is to work with our partners in the international community, to put pressure on Cote d'Ivoire to show greater transparency, in terms of letting outsiders see the uses that they put their revenue to. We've called for greater transparency in the natural resources sector, in cocoa, as well as other natural resources, and we would like very much to convince our partners in the international community to tie assistance from the World Bank and elsewhere to greater transparency in those sectors. And, I'm hopeful that I will be able to work on that, if confirmed.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Nesbitt.

I thank all of you and congratulate you. And, as I said to the first panel, I will do what I can to expedite your nominations, so you can get to these important posts. Thanks so much, and that concludes the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF MARK GREEN TO QUESTION SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Mr. Green, do you believe that you serve under the direction of the President and the Secretary?

Answer. Yes.

RESPONSES OF MARK GREEN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Tanzania held multiparty elections in 2005, but the country continues to experience political dominance by a single party. Additionally, tensions between the mainland and the Zanzibar archipelago remain. If confirmed, what steps can you take to strengthen civil society and promote political pluralism?

Answer. With the election of President Kikwete in 2005, Tanzania marked its third peaceful democratic transition since it opened the door to multiparty democracy in 1992. These elections gave President Kikwete a landslide victory with more than 80 percent of the vote and saw the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party make significant gains in Parliament.

While a number of opposition parties exist in Tanzania, the ruling party is dominant, and governing power is largely concentrated in the executive branch. Obviously, such political dominance increases the vulnerability of continued democratic reform. One of our key strategic priorities in Tanzania has been to work with all appropriate, willing entities—the legislature, judiciary, press, and civil society organizations—to strengthen democratic checks and balances. If confirmed, I will con-

tinue to build upon and expand my predecessor's advocacy for political plurality on both the mainland and on Zanzibar.

The steps I intend to take include the following: First, in my contacts with President Kikwete, I will tirelessly pursue the subject of developing democratic checks and balances, and urge him to show demonstrable progress on this front.

Furthermore, I will support the work of organizations such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI). NDI's current cooperative project with President Kikwete, in which NDI is drawing up recommendations for the modernization of the executive branch, shows great promise in helping to build a solid foundation for greater accountability in government administration.

On a related front, I will support the anticorruption programs launched under the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Threshold Program that foster greater transparency in public expenditures. It is important to make sure that the progress made in launching such initiatives as the Financial Intelligence Unit does not lose steam as new plans are developed under the MCC Compact Program.

In addition, I will continue the initiatives being undertaken by our Mission in Tanzania to train journalists in investigative reporting and to support NGOs that are pushing for greater freedom of the press.

Finally, I will strongly support the civic education programs and courses funded by USAID that enhance public awareness of democratic principles and rights. As Tanzania begins to look toward the 2010 elections, this greater awareness can help increase both political participation and the legitimacy of the election results.

The political situation in Zanzibar clearly warrants special attention. NDI's election mission reported serious irregularities in the 2005 election for Zanzibar's President and House of Representatives. A grave political impasse has emerged from these elections between the ruling party and the chief opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF). The CUF has refused to recognize the election of the Karume government, and is calling for a rerun of the elections and a government of national unity. The younger members of CUF, in particular, are frustrated by the lack of progress by the government in addressing what they feel are "three stolen elections." We need to be concerned about the potential for them to turn toward more radical solutions.

President Kikwete has proclaimed that political reconciliation in Zanzibar is his top domestic agenda item, but the progress has been uneven. Kikwete promised to address the "political tensions" in Zanzibar in his December 2005 inauguration speech, but it was not until January 2007 that reconciliation negotiations actually began. The President's popularity has been a double-edged sword for him. The Tanzanian people have high, if not unrealistic, expectations for what he and his administration will be able to accomplish. President Kikwete's first year in office was challenging, marked by a food shortage caused by drought and a power crisis which coincided with the rise of oil prices around the world, and it is not clear if he will be able to broker a solution in this case.

I believe that successful talks on Zanzibar are crucial in setting the foundation for free and fair elections in 2010 in Tanzania. The opposition party in Zanzibar lacks any trust in the ruling party and has pledged not to participate in the 2010 election unless an agreement is reached through the negotiations. This would obviously be a significant setback in the progress that the country as a whole has made on the democratic path.

I strongly support our Mission's plans to expand our public presence in Zanzibar, and believe that presence must include clear, unambiguous support for pluralism, fair elections, and peaceful political forums. Among other things, I support the Citizen Dialog Program, and would hope to expand it and programs like it, both on the mainland and in Zanzibar.

Question. Hundreds of thousands of refugees from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and elsewhere are presently living in Tanzania, many in camps. In recent months, the Tanzanian Government has expelled persons of Rwandan and Burundian origin and there were reports of physical abuse and theft by officials and militia members. If confirmed, what steps will you take to see that the Tanzanian Government abides by international laws prohibiting the ill-treatment and, pending the determination of their claims, the forced return of refugees?

Answer. Traditionally, Tanzania has hosted the largest refugee population in Africa. As of June 1 of this year, 273,678 refugees are being assisted in refugee camps in mainly the northwestern part of the country. Another 200,000–300,000 refugees are estimated to have settled spontaneously (without United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] assistance). The large majority of these refugees originate from Burundi and the DRC.

Even though the assisted refugee population remains large, for the first time in more than a decade, it has dropped below the 300,000 mark. This reduction is first and foremost a result of the implementation of repatriation operations to Burundi and the DRC in recent years. Local integration of refugees in Tanzania and resettlement to third countries are also durable solutions pursued in the Tanzania operation to solve the situation of the refugees still hosted in the country.

As Tanzania takes steps to reduce the number of refugees and to prevent the migration into the country of additional refugees, we need to work closely with the UNT-ICR to monitor the treatment and living conditions of the populations involved. While Tanzania certainly has the right to stop illegal migrants from coming into the country, we must push to see that such operations do not adversely affect legitimate political refugees.

The future of most of the refugees in northwestern Tanzania depends on the continued progress in the peace process in Burundi and the DRC, and the access to basic social services in the return areas. President Kikwete has been active in promoting an enduring, peaceful settlement for Burundi, and brokered an oral agreement on June 17, 2007, between the Burundi President and former rebel group leader who both agreed to resolve their differences. Kikwete's goal has been to facilitate peace in order to create the conditions necessary for the return of Burundian refugees. We are assisting these efforts both privately and publicly. In fiscal year 2006, the United States Government provided \$18.6 million to support Burundi refugee repatriation and \$16.3 million to support Congolese refugee repatriation. (Note: Our fiscal year 2006 assistance for refugees in Tanzania was nearly \$10 million.)

Our Mission in Tanzania has paid close attention to reports of abuse by authorities with regard to the refugees in western Tanzania and has followed up these reports by seeking clarification from the appropriate Tanzanian officials. If confirmed, I plan to pay very close attention to these reports and the overall refugee situation. I plan to visit the refugee camps myself—eyes on the ground are still the best way for us to not only determine the conditions that refugees are living in, but also to demonstrate the importance of the refugee issue to our government. Firsthand observations will also strengthen our credibility as I bring the subject up in our contacts with President Kikwete.

We should also promote the cause of refugee issues in the context of Tanzania's growing international stature. President Kikwete has shown an interest in being a stronger voice in regional matters and conflict resolution. How refugees are treated in Tanzania will certainly affect the government's credibility as a legitimate partner as well as its international standing.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Tanzania? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Tanzania? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Although the Government of Tanzania is clearly committed to the rule of law and the protection of human rights, there are continuing human rights problems in the country. Recent events probably make the status and condition of refugees the most pressing. My approach to addressing this subject is outlined above.

One of our most pervasive human rights concerns is the criminal justice system and rule of law. Police and prison guards sometimes use excessive force against inmates or suspects, at times resulting in death, and police impunity is a problem; prison conditions can be harsh and life threatening; police routinely conduct searches without warrants, and at times fail to bring detained individuals before a judge in the specified period of time; and the judiciary suffers from corruption, particularly in the lower courts. We need to work with civil society and NGOs that are engaged in civic education, and support efforts to, for example, train investigative journalists.

In a similar vein, fighting the inhuman trade of Trafficking in Persons (TIP) has been an important cause on the world stage, and must be an important part of our foreign policy. Tanzania is a "Tier 2" country, meaning it does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant efforts to do so. The government made progress over the preceding year in improving its law enforcement response to human trafficking, in particular through additional training of security personnel. To continue that progress, Tanzania should investigate and prosecute traffickers more vigorously, implement its plans to harmonize all elements of its legal code pertaining to trafficking in persons, and build on existing joint government-NGO efforts in education and awareness to result in a nationwide campaign.

Toward this aim, the Governments of Tanzania and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in May 2006 in order for the Department

of Justice to work in Tanzania for the next 2 years to assist the development of antitrafficking legislation, and to train police and prosecutors in antitrafficking procedures and techniques. If confirmed, I will work to see that this MOU is properly carried out, and that Tanzania moves firmly toward meeting international standards.

Last, but certainly not of lesser importance, is the longstanding, unequal status of women. Though Tanzanian law provides for equality for women, inheritance and marriage laws do not consistently provide full equality. Discrimination against women is most acute in rural areas where women's careers are limited to subsistence farming and raising children, and they have almost no opportunity for wage employment. Thus, in practice, women's rights often are not respected.

Civil society activists have reported widespread discrimination against women in property matters related to inheritance and divorce. This is especially the case in Zanzibar and parts of the mainland where judges bow to concessions demanded by customary and Islamic law. Women whose unions were not legalized under Hindu, Muslim, or Christian traditions, or under civil marriage laws were particularly vulnerable when they separated from their partners or their partners died.

Though the ratio of boys to girls in primary and secondary school is nearly equal in Tanzania, there continues to be a significant gender gap for girls completing their schooling, particularly at the secondary level. Girls are often left in the position of caring for siblings, being forced into marriage, or becoming pregnant, leading to a greater attrition by females from secondary school. Ensuring that girls are able to more fully pursue educational opportunities is both a public health matter (an educated mother is more likely to have a healthy family) and a matter of economic opportunity. President Kikwete and his wife, Salma, have both emphasized the importance of education, and Mrs. Kikwete has been a strong supporter of girls' education. Basic education for girls is a cause I have pursued as a Member of Congress and, if confirmed, would look to strongly advocate as ambassador.

It would be misleading and inaccurate to talk about human rights in Tanzania without noting that the Government of Tanzania (GOT) is making significant progress in a number of areas, including TIP and anticorruption. For example, the Tanzanian High Court recently outlawed the practice of "takrima," or the use of hospitality gifts and favors to constituents during election campaigns, and the GOT established the Financial Intelligence Unit using MCC Threshold Program funds. Both actions have been important steps toward fighting corruption.

Nonetheless, improving human rights conditions is an ongoing process, and if confirmed, I will continue to raise these human rights concerns with Tanzanian officials. In short, I will use all the tools I have available to me as Chief of Mission to press for continued reform and support solutions that make sense.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Tanzania in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. Probably the broadest challenge we face in this regard is the lack of capacity in Tanzania to implement many of the reforms, legislative initiatives, and other measures the government itself recognizes it needs to do to improve its overall human rights situation. But cultural practices too, are very hard to overcome, particularly with respect to women. Such attitudes change slowly, though Tanzania is notable for the number of talented women the country can showcase in significant positions of power—for example, the appointment of former Foreign Minister Dr. Asha Rose Mtengeti-Migiro as U.N. Deputy Secretary General.

These are challenges that are best addressed when our countries can work together as partners, with mutual respect. My background as a teacher in rural Kenya two decades ago certainly sensitized me to the need to be patient, listen, and to understand the underlying assumptions that were the motivating factors behind the villagers' actions. Likewise, finding solutions to difficult, sometimes entrenched, human rights issues requires not only adequate resources, but also excellent lines of communication between those who would be part of the solutions. If confirmed, I am looking forward to working with the Tanzanian Government and President Kikwete to find these solutions and implement them through the authority I will have as the United States Ambassador to Tanzania.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. The most important thing that an ambassador can do to ensure that the promotion of human rights is an integral part of the embassy's activities is to lead by example. In other words, if confirmed, I will use my office to carefully highlight human rights conditions and concerns. That would range from activities such as taking a firsthand look at refugee camps to publicly promoting the cause of women's education. I believe that an ambassador needs to be constantly on the move . . . highlighting issues and demonstrating through deeds American priorities and values.

Furthermore, as Chief of Mission, I would ensure that human rights issues are on the central agenda of my senior staff, and reach out to other officers for their ideas and observations. If confirmed, I plan to meet regularly with my staff and look for ways to foster their ingenuity and interests. Listening to their ideas, giving them the authority to pursue those that are in line with our Mission's strategic plan (which must include human rights priorities), and highlighting successful projects will make our embassy a stronger voice for human rights. While I know that Foreign Service officers do not undertake their work in order to receive individual recognition, I also know that such recognition can serve to reinforce their work in the eyes of others and perhaps help shape the careers of those involved.

I also hope to support the work of Peace Corps volunteers and NGOs out in the field. Again, highlighting the difference that Americans make in the living conditions of everyday Tanzanians is a way of encouraging others—Americans and non-Americans—to take up the cause of human rights.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. I have taken a number of steps in my career and throughout my life that have served to promote the cause of human rights and democracy, which is a passion that led me to public service in the first place.

As a law student at the University of Wisconsin, I wrote an award-winning commentary that examined the potential for South Africa's legal system to improve human rights in that country. ("What Role Can South African Judges Play in Mitigating Apartheid?" 1987 Wis.L.Rev. 327 (1987)).

As I have mentioned elsewhere, 20 years ago, my wife, Susan, and I served as high school teachers in Kenya through WorldTeach Project, a development organization based at the Phillips Brooks House of Harvard University. While we spent most of our time in Kenya, we also traveled in the rural areas of western Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda. We lived in a small village setting, and taught each day at a rural school struggling to provide rudimentary educational opportunities. As teachers, we faced critical material shortages, and watched our students' families struggle with malaria and malnutrition-enhanced diseases. We ourselves were afflicted with malaria and typhoid. In addition to our teaching, we established a library at the school with donations from Americans living in Kenya and from our own hometown.

I believe that our work not only brightened the educational prospects of our students, but also reinforced the value of education in our village. When we returned to Wisconsin, we delivered a number of speeches about education and poverty in East Africa based on our own personal experience and observations.

Our experiences in Kenya certainly shaped my political career. I had the privilege of serving on the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) in the 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses, and was a member of the subcommittees dealing with Africa and human rights in both the 108th and 109th Congresses.

I played a leading role in crafting the Millennium Challenge Act, America's historic commitment to invest in developing nations that are pursuing political and economic reforms. I played an important role in crafting the Global Access to HIV/AIDS Prevention, Awareness and Treatment Act of 2001, and the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act. I have worked on legislation covering critically important policy areas such as international terrorism and human trafficking, and was a member of the House Human Rights Caucus. I hope and believe that each of these initiatives will help lift the daily lives of millions and millions of people—particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.

Several years ago, I worked with the National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute and State Department as an election observer in Kenya. I watched voting and ballot counting procedures in the Kakamega District of that country, and helped the foregoing groups report on the progress of democratization in Kenya. In at least a small way, I believe our work reinforced the cause of democracy in East Africa.

Prior to my election monitoring efforts, I traveled to West Africa along with Congressman Earl Pomeroy with the Academy for Educational Development, Oxfam, and Save the Children to look at and work on programs related to women's health and education in Africa. Congressman Pomeroy and I then worked to dramatically increase funding levels in the Federal budget for U.S. support to such programs.

I also traveled to South Africa, Lesotho, and Namibia as a member of a HIRC codel that, in part, examined the HIV/AIDS challenges in that region. We met with public health officials, and pushed leaders to adopt more open and more aggressive policies toward the pandemic.

In summary, throughout my life and my career, I have worked to support the causes of education, democratization, and human rights in Africa. Whether the venue be that small village around Makhokho Secondary School in Kenya or on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, I have been committed to being a strong voice for improving the lives of everyday Africans. Whether it be in support of legislation fighting human trafficking, or pushing for our foreign policy to include strong support for gender equality in African education, I hope that my work has made at least a little bit of a difference.

I view the incredible honor of being nominated as United States Ambassador to Tanzania as a unique opportunity to serve our Government in an area of the world I care deeply about. It also represents yet another step in my lifelong commitment to Africa and a way to continue the work I love.

RESPONSES OF MARK GREEN AND ROBERT B. NOLAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps—State Department Relations?

Answer. State 258893 was sent to all diplomatic and consular posts on December 4, 2004. State 78240 was sent June 7, 2007 and carries substantially the same message. I have read both.

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this cable?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed as Chief of Mission in Tanzania, I understand these policy principles from Secretary Rice and fully intend to carry them out. The Peace Corps has a unique role and must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy.

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that “the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy” and that “the Peace Corps’ role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies”?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise your Chief of Mission “authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies”?

Answer. Yes. As I have indicated above, should I be confirmed, it is my intention to follow, fully and completely, Secretary Rice’s directions regarding the Peace Corps.

I respect and honor the mission and activities of the Peace Corps as it conducts its work in developing countries all over the world. There are few other U.S. programs—if any—that could duplicate the unique character of this organization as it seeks to improve the lives of those less fortunate than we. Peace Corps volunteers are the face of America in remote corners of the world, and they reflect the best attributes of the American spirit: Roll up your sleeves to tackle the daily challenges facing the world’s poor with optimism and hope. Should I be confirmed, that will be one of the core messages I will want my team in Dar es Salaam to reflect.

RESPONSES OF JUNE CARTER PERRY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Although the trial of Charles Taylor for his role in the armed conflict in Sierra Leone began on June 4, the process of truth and reconciliation in the country has largely stalled. What role do you see for the United States in ensuring that

the process of truth and reconciliation in Sierra Leone move forward? If confirmed, what will you do to promote the inclusion of justice in this process? What do you see as the long-term impact of the efforts of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in general and Taylor's trial in particular? United States support for the SCSL has been substantial. How do you see the courts as strengthening rule of law and democratization in Sierra Leone beyond the prosecutions of the individuals on trial?

Answer. The United States has an important role to play in supporting Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation process. However, as we support the consolidation of peace in Sierra Leone, we must ensure that the reconciliation process remains homegrown and that there is sufficient political will to implement the necessary reforms. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has identified corruption and the breakdown of the rule of law among the primary drivers of the civil conflict. The establishment of the Human Rights and Constitutional Reform Commissions create key opportunities for the U.S. Mission to support the TRC recommendations. If confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone, I would engage the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure that these commissions are empowered to complete their goals. In our direct engagement with these commissions, I would seek to identify areas in which greater attention is needed.

In addition to establishing these commissions, Sierra Leone has recently adopted key pieces of legislation such as the gender bills and the child rights bills, which set the framework to address some of the worst abuses that occurred during the civil conflict. If confirmed, I would direct the United States Embassy to continue to work with the relevant authorities in Sierra Leone to ensure the full implementation of these important pieces of legislation, and the law enforcement training needed to support their implementation.

The long-term impact of the Special Court for Sierra Leone reaches well beyond Sierra Leone, to the region and to the world as a whole. The Court is a clear expression that the international community will not tolerate the impunity of gross abuse of human rights, and that the reach of international humanitarian law extends as far as sitting heads of state, as evidenced by the court's precedent-setting 2003 indictment of then-President of Liberia, Charles Taylor. Additionally, the court's recent verdict in the case against the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council established new international humanitarian case law, such as the first-ever rulings on the crimes of recruitment of child soldiers into an armed conflict and forced marriage in an armed conflict. These important legal precedents will protect two of the most vulnerable classes of victims of the armed conflict that devastated Sierra Leone, thereby extending the court's legacy throughout the region and the world for future generations.

The court's excellent outreach efforts are a commendable example of its contribution to strengthening rule of law and democratization in Sierra Leone, having helped the people of the Mano River subregion take part in the justice process. Additionally, over 50 percent of Special Court personnel are Sierra Leonean, including police officers and prison guards, as well as lawyers, judges, court administrators, and courtroom personnel. The training these personnel have received while employed at the court, and the experience they have gained there, will have an enduring impact on judicial and law enforcement practices in Sierra Leone, as these dedicated professionals return to their jobs in the country's national courts and law enforcement agencies. Looking forward, both the Special Court and the Government of Sierra Leone should enhance their efforts to use the court's presence to enhance the rule of law and the administration of justice in Sierra Leone. If confirmed as ambassador, I would encourage the court to incorporate into its legacy a greater emphasis on improving the delivery of justice in Sierra Leone.

Question. Military rebellions and coups have historically been a source of instability in Sierra Leone and remain a potential threat to the elected government. If confirmed, what steps would you take to help strengthen civil society and the rule of law in the country?

Answer. Sierra Leone already has a strong and vibrant civil society with which the United States Mission enjoys a strong and healthy cooperation. If confirmed, I would continue the U.S. Mission's efforts to support and to work with civil society. The key challenge to stability in Sierra Leone is corruption. As ambassador I would ensure that all U.S. Government programs emphasize transparency, accountability and inclusiveness. I would continue the Mission's strategy to promote democracy and human rights awareness to increase citizens' expectations of transparent, responsive government, as well as to build the government's capacity to deliver services at all levels. I would continue to direct U.S. assistance to local and international NGOs to facilitate programs on improving human rights and democracy, promoting

reforms in the areas of decentralization, civic education, child labor, and combating human trafficking.

Question. Diamonds played a devastating role in fueling the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone. Although Sierra Leone is now a member of the Kimberley Process, controls on the artisanal diamond mining sector remain weak and smuggling of diamonds remains a serious problem due to lack of capacity and governance problems. If confirmed, what would you do to help promote better controls over the diamond sector to prevent diamonds from fueling conflict and to ensure that diamonds benefit the people of Sierra Leone? How would you support government and civil society in these efforts?

Answer. A recent Kimberley Process review visit concluded that Sierra Leone met the minimum requirements, though internal controls should be strengthened. If confirmed, I would target the Mission's development assistance to promote transparent management of the diamond industry, and transparent governance writ large. Diamond sector reform would remain the primary component of our natural resources and biodiversity program, aiming to create legitimate "fair trade" diamonds and the establishment of in-country cutting and polishing operations. Our collaboration with civil society through USAID and the Peace Diamond Alliance has charted new territory in Sierra Leone by bringing together civil society, the private sector, and local communities to monitor alluvial diamond mining, and to ensure that public revenues generated are used for public good.

Unfortunately, diamond smuggling remains a challenge in Sierra Leone. The 3 percent export tax, which some have contended may motivate smuggling to neighboring countries, is used to fund the Diamond Area Community Development Fund, which aims to enhance social and economic development in mining communities. To address the smuggling concerns, USAID and the UNDP are supporting regional efforts to harmonize export and fiscal taxes in the mining sector to eliminate the incentive for smuggling; I would continue to support these efforts, if confirmed.

Question. What would you do to promote transparent management of natural resources in Sierra Leone so that the revenues from these resources are used to promote economic development and alleviate poverty in Sierra Leone?

Answer. Sierra Leone is a resource rich country, which, due to poor governance, has not succeeded in transforming its natural wealth into prosperity for its people. Sierra Leone's weak economy is heavily dependent on agriculture and mining, and is moving steadily toward food security and diversification of rising mineral exports from diamonds to gold, rutile, and bauxite. Fishing is another key resource, but is heavily impacted by illegal poaching.

Despite expressing its intent to join the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), Sierra Leone has yet to complete the independent validation necessary to implement EITI's transparency rules fully. If confirmed, I would work with the Government of Sierra Leone, civil society, and our international donor partners to ensure that Sierra Leone's vast resources are harnessed for the good of the Sierra Leoneans in an open and transparent manner. Looking regionally, we would continue to work on tri-border forestry and wildlife management activities which emphasize good governance, transparency, and accountability.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Sierra Leone? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Sierra Leone? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Abuses by the security forces, domestic and gender-based violence, and child labor are the most pressing human rights issues in Sierra Leone. The recent passage of the child's rights and gender equity bills has created a framework to address some of these problems. If confirmed, I would work with the Government of Sierra Leone and the country's active civil society to ensure full and proper implementation of these important laws. For the last several years, my predecessor, Ambassador Hull, has effectively used the State Department's annual human rights report as a tool to engage Sierra Leone's Parliament on human rights issues. Following his most recent presentation of the report, the recently established Human Rights Commission publicly committed to publishing its own National Human Rights reports. Members of Parliament have asked that the Mission increase its engagement with Parliament on human rights beyond presenting the final report. If confirmed, I would build on my predecessor's work and establish an ongoing dialog with the new Sierra Leone Parliament to ensure that human rights are given the proper attention.

Abuse by Sierra Leone's security forces demonstrates the need for enhanced and continued engagement on human rights and the rule of law. As ambassador, I would

publicly call for serious, good faith investigations into abuses by security forces. Through our foreign assistance we should provide training that enhances police capacity to combat crime and promote the protection of human rights. In this regard, I would investigate training opportunities with the International Law Enforcement Academy.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Sierra Leone in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. Corruption is the primary obstacle to reform and the promotion of human rights in Sierra Leone. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission also identified corruption as one of the key drivers of Sierra Leone's decade-long civil conflict. Though the Government of Sierra Leone has established an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to address official malfeasance, more must be done. To date, the ACC has yet to convict officials for their involvement in incidents of high-level corruption. To complete the healing process and consolidate peace, Sierra Leone must address impunity. If confirmed, I would continue to incorporate a focus on good governance, transparency, and anticorruption into all the Mission's engagement and assistance to Sierra Leone.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. If confirmed, I would establish a working group on human rights within the embassy to address our human rights promotion activities. In addition, I would direct Democracy and Human Rights Funds to support local and international human rights-focused nongovernmental organizations in Sierra Leone. In public fora, I would speak on the importance of human rights and encourage any appropriate legislation through the Mission's engagement with the government leadership.

I would seek to recognize officers who actively promote human rights through Superior and Meritorious Honor Award nominations, and acknowledgement in the regular employee evaluations. Their work would be recognized not only within the Mission, but through larger events involving host government, civil society, and private entities.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. As Ambassador to Lesotho, I worked closely with the U.N. Development Program Representative, a female member of parliament, as well as the Ministers of Gender, Local Government, Foreign Affairs, and Culture to encourage the passage of a Women's Equity law. I also met with both the alliance of local NGOs and U.S. NGOs to advocate for the rights of all citizens, especially women and orphaned children. Through organizations such as "Save the Children Lesotho," we were able to provide Ambassador's Girl's Scholarship funds for tuition and mentors. I also spoke on human rights before diverse organizations such as the Homemaker's Association and the Lesotho College of Education. To develop officers, I had the Deputy Chief of Mission in 2006 address human rights before a religious organization and had the Public Affairs/Political Officer publish articles or letters in the major English-language daily emphasizing human rights. At the ambassador's residence, I hosted Martin Luther King Day programs featuring panels of the Minister of Justice, Besotho alumni of United States exchanges, and professors from the University of Lesotho. These programs resulted in opening frank dialog, which were especially important during the pre-electoral period, and encouraged organizations to take advantage of U.S.-sponsored grants. The Mission had not received Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Funds for some years. We were able to receive an initial \$10,000 and later \$30,000 to address human rights.

As Deputy Chief of Mission in Madagascar, I chaired the Human Rights working group and awarded grants to the Ministry of Justice to attain an integrated computer system that advised citizens of their rights. As a second tour officer in Zimbabwe, I supervised the Special Self-Help program, which assisted market women in establishing cooperatives to empower them financially. As a desk officer in the Department, I worked closely with USAID and NGOs such as Africare to establish bursaries for a total of \$20 million for nonwhite South African students during the apartheid era. I consider that effort to be a major achievement as it offered

an opportunity to young South Africans. As an office director in the International Organizations bureau, I was responsible for managing an office that included the Economic and Social Commission, the Commission on Human Rights, and the Commission on the Status of Women. In this position, I believe my team and I made a major contribution in preparing the United States position against Libya's bid to chair the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Our statement prepared for our ambassador was covered internationally and clearly laid out the fundamental beliefs that a country with major human rights violations and terrorist links should not chair the commission.

RESPONSES OF WANDA L. NESBITT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. LTNAIDS describes Cote d'Ivoire as suffering from "a relatively stable but serious epidemic," which shows some signs of decline in urban areas. Cote d'Ivoire is a PEPFAR focus country. If confirmed, how would you lead the United States country team in confronting the HIV/AIDS challenge in Cote d'Ivoire? As ambassador, what steps would you take to promote prevention efforts and to strengthen effectiveness of the Lesotho Government's response to the epidemic?

Answer. If confirmed, I would maintain the dedication of my predecessor, Ambassador Aubrey Hooks, in administering the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. The Cote d'Ivoire program—funded at \$84 million for fiscal year 2007, with a proposed budget of more than \$100 million in fiscal year 2008—has produced significant results in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Cote d'Ivoire, including providing palliative care services for more than 44,000 people, care and support for more than 24,000 orphans and other vulnerable children, and direct and indirect support for antiretroviral treatment for more than 36,300 people. I would continue the Ambassador's support for the PEPFAR interagency team by providing overall leadership and guidance at the policy level. To strengthen prevention efforts, I would build on the goodwill and solid relationships established by Ambassador Hooks to heighten the program's visibility and reach. I would pursue a systems-building approach and encourage the forging of new private- and public-sector relationships to build a sustainable response to the epidemic. In particular, I would focus on strengthening systems of accountability and partnership with decentralized local government and civil society. I am aware that I would be inheriting a dynamic and effective program that is achieving significant results under difficult circumstances, and I intend to be a supporter and advocate for the Cote d'Ivoire program.

Question. Cote d'Ivoire is the leading producer of cocoa; revenues from the cocoa trade have helped fuel armed conflict and corruption in the country. If confirmed, what steps would you take to promote greater transparency and accountability in the cocoa industry?

Answer. I strongly agree with proposals made by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which call on the Government of Cote d'Ivoire to enhance transparency in the mobilization and use of revenue from the oil, coffee, and cocoa sectors and to tie the agreement to do so with accessing World Bank funds for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. I would work diligently to ensure that such measures would be durable, effective, and open to scrutiny by both the international community and the Ivorian public. I would also maintain regular contact with private sector entities who have a keen interest in this issue, such as the Chocolate Manufacturers Associations, to ensure that we deliver a consistent message to the Ivorian Government.

Question. The U.N. and Kimberley Process reported last year that conflict diamonds from Cote d'Ivoire were being smuggled out and making their way into the legitimate diamond markets around the world. How will you work to help ensure that the Kimberley Process is effectively implemented in Cote d'Ivoire and that controls over diamond mining areas are enforced and revenues from diamond trade are managed in a transparent and accountable manner?

Answer. The U.S. Government strongly backs the Kimberley Process, and if confirmed, I would uphold its principles. It is important to note that with the recent peace accord between factions in Cote d'Ivoire, there are no areas of diamond production that meet the U.N. definition of conflict diamonds. Therefore, I believe the key to preventing the production of conflict diamonds is to offer the United States Government's full support to the implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement and to work with the Government of Cote d'Ivoire to ensure that free and fair elections, which would solidify that peace, take place in 2008. The Govern-

ment of Cote d'Ivoire is a member in good standing of the Kimberley Process and has cooperated fully with the U.N. and the Kimberley Process to eliminate the trade in conflict diamonds. Thus, I would encourage the government to continue to take constructive steps to mitigate disputes over control of diamonds and to prevent diamond revenues from being used for arms purchases.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Cote d'Ivoire? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Cote d'Ivoire? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. The 2007 United States Department of State's Human Rights Report gives the Government of Cote d'Ivoire poor marks for its human rights record. Among the most pressing concerns are: a delay in holding presidential elections, arbitrary and unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests and torture, exploitative child labor, and trafficking in persons. Human rights violations have typically been less documented in the north, but the New Forces militia group has been rightly criticized for killings and disappearances of civilians and ad hoc justice.

If confirmed, I would work with the government, the Ivorian Independent Electoral Commission, and our NGO partners to make sure that free, fair, and transparent elections take place in 2008. This would include advocating for a thorough identification and registration process, which would ensure voter lists are as comprehensive and accurate as possible. Obviously, the objective would be to have a government that has broad support and, therefore, greater incentive to respect democratic practices and human rights principles. In addition, I would also focus on the effort to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate former combatants so that this process was more than a symbolic gesture. The reunification of the country and the return of civil administration in the north should dramatically improve human rights throughout Cote d'Ivoire.

Regarding the worst forms of child labor in the cocoa sector, I would continue the United States Government's consultative dialog with NGOs, the United States cocoa industry, and the Government of Cote d'Ivoire. I would encourage the government to take steps to ensure children are given a genuine opportunity to attend school rather than work in potentially dangerous conditions on cocoa farms. Moreover, I would work with the government to meet the benchmarks laid out in the Harkin-Engel Protocol. The government has made significant efforts to combat trafficking in persons, but it falls short of meeting the minimal standards to eliminate the practice. I plan to work with our international and civil society partners to strengthen and train the Ivorian institutions charged with preventing trafficking in persons, protecting its victims, and prosecuting the perpetrators.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Cote d'Ivoire in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. Voter identification and registration as well as demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration are inherently controversial issues in Cote d'Ivoire. The former gets at the heart of the conflict: who is entitled to Ivorian citizenship, and who is not. I believe that one of the biggest obstacles will be overcoming the angst and fear that a number of different interest groups have about a potential change in the balance of power if 4 million currently undocumented people are eventually added to the voting rolls. The Government of Cote d'Ivoire needs to move on both of these issues quickly and decisively.

Five years of conflict have deteriorated infrastructure and institutions. A culture of impunity has cemented mistrust and will be difficult to reverse. Building rule of law, fostering reconciliation, and increasing transparency are long-term goals, which I plan to emphasize. Other challenges I believe I would face if confirmed include: holding the Ivorian Government to the commitments it has made; promoting greater political dialog with limited United States Government resources; mobilizing Ivorian resources to address trafficking and child labor; and seeking better coordination of donor contributions.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. First, if confirmed, I would be honest, open, and forthright with Ivorian leaders about my expectations related to human rights. I would make it clear that the removal of section 508 sanctions is dependent on Cote d'Ivoire conducting free,

fair, and transparent elections. Cote d'Ivoire cannot fully integrate into the international community of democracies without holding elections, and I would emphasize this point regularly. Furthermore, I would take advantage of all opportunities to intensively engage NGOs dedicated to promoting human rights, and I would use public outreach opportunities to engage Ivorian audiences on the subject.

Within the Mission, I would ensure that we have a good strategy for promoting human rights and that every member of the country team addresses this issue in their interaction with Ivorian officials. I would hold regular sessions to evaluate our progress and to make sure that we stay on track. The State Department has an excellent system for recognizing and rewarding its Foreign Service officers. I would reward an officer who made superior contributions in the field of human rights by recommending him/her for an embassy meritorious or superior honor award, and I would nominate an officer who made a truly exceptional contribution for one of the Secretary of State's Department-wide award competitions.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. As the United States Ambassador to Madagascar, I worked with our partners in the international community to resolve a 6-month dispute over the results of a Presidential election that resulted in the departure from office of the individual who had ruled Madagascar for 26 years. The leadership role we played in that crisis gave Madagascar its best opportunity in a generation to put in place a government that is more responsive to its people. Since the transition took place in 2002, the country has made good progress in terms of improving basic infrastructure, and increasing educational and economic opportunity. Much remains to be done but the trend is generally positive.

In Tanzania, our Mission was one of only a handful that held regular discussions with government officials in Zanzibar. Those discussions focused almost exclusively on the need for Zanzibari leaders to demonstrate greater respect for democracy and human rights. We had excellent relationships with the major opposition parties as well, and our open dealings with them sent a clear message to the general public that we were talking to—and listening to—both sides. Using our public diplomacy Visiting Speaker program, we were able to assist dialog among parties in Zanzibar. We invited a well-known Muslim-American academic to speak to a group of Zanzibaris that spanned the political spectrum. He talked about conflict resolution in an inspiring way. A number of attendees at the event told us it was the first time they had been in the same room and spoken to each other in several years. We succeeded in getting people to talk to each other even if they were not able to immediately resolve their differences.

In my assignments in Rwanda, Tanzania, and Madagascar I have been a strong supporter and proponent of women's rights and girls' education. In Madagascar, where a very large percentage of girls still do not go to school, we had a vigorous program—the Ambassador's Girls Scholarship Program—that gave hundreds of girls the chance to get all the way through high school. It was a program initiated by my predecessor and I was delighted to continue it. Thanks to our efforts, hundreds of girls, who would not otherwise have had the chance, can read and write because of this program; I am certain that they will retain a positive impression of the United States and make good contributions to their society for years to come.

RESPONSES OF MAURICE S. PARKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Tragically, the Kingdom of Swaziland has the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the world: An estimated one-third of its adult population is HIV positive. If confirmed how would you lead the U.S. country team in confronting this challenge? As ambassador, what steps would you take to promote prevention efforts and to strengthen the effectiveness of the Swazi Government's response to the epidemic?

Answer. If confirmed, I would make combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic my top foreign policy priority, after the protection of U.S. citizens and their interests. The horrible HIV/AIDS scourge devastates families, hampers economic growth, overwhelms health-care systems, and creates thousands of orphans. Stemming the tide of this disease in Swaziland will be a long-term effort.

I would lead the country team by working closely with the Mission's new office for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) that includes representatives of the Center for Disease Control (CDC), the U.S. Agency for Inter-

national Development (USAID), and the State Department's Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC). PEPFAR's increased funding for fiscal year 2008 will assist the country team in meeting its goals.

I would urge greater coordination of the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland's efforts against HIV/AIDS in my discussions with King Mswati III, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Health, and by working with officials at Swaziland's National Emergency Response Council on HIV/AIDS (NERCHA). I would stress the need for expanded prevention efforts, increased government capacity for addressing HIV/AIDS, including improved drug procurement and drug supply management, better palliative care, and greater access to treatment. I would emphasize the importance of a strong message from the King to help de-stigmatize those with HIV/AIDS, as well as leadership from the King and senior governmental officials in altering AIDS-vulnerable behavior.

Question. As high as Swaziland's national HIV prevalence rates are, they are even higher among young women. If confirmed as ambassador, what steps would you take to help the people of Swaziland address the vulnerabilities of women and girls to this epidemic and to increase the empowerment of women in this small, conservative kingdom?

Answer. If confirmed, I would address the special vulnerabilities of women and girls to HIV/AIDS in my public statements, discussions with governmental officials, and contact with the Mission's 20 implementing partners on HIV/AIDS programs. I would urge the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland to take rapid action in bringing to Parliament a draft bill currently under governmental review that addresses the issue of domestic violence and the protection of children. I would also underscore to government officials the importance of taking forceful steps to prevent trafficking in persons. In my leadership role for the Mission's PEPFAR Country Operational Plan, I would ensure that gender is an integral part of the Mission's PEPFAR programming.

In February 2006, a new constitution came into effect that provides new rights for women. I understand that the U.S. Agency for International Development is preparing to fund a program developed by a local civil society organization that will reach out to women throughout the country to explain to them their rights under the constitution. I would strongly support that effort as ambassador.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Swaziland? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Swaziland? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. I believe that governmental restrictions on democratic freedoms and serious abuses by security forces are the most pressing human rights issues in Swaziland. Although the new constitution provides for many democratic rights, the people are unable to change their government through democratic elections. Governmental practice places restrictions on freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association, among others. The police and security forces are known to act with impunity, use torture and excessive force, and to make arbitrary arrests. If confirmed, I would press the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland to amend existing legislation to bring it into conformity with the constitution and their international human rights obligations. For example, the new constitution provides women with fundamental rights and freedoms and these need to be codified in their legislation. I would publicly extol the benefits of a multiparty system and political openness. I would speak out against police abuses and press the government to bring the security forces under discipline. I would like to see the incidence rate of police abuse of detainees reduced.

While change comes slowly in a place like Swaziland, if confirmed, I would hope to effect change, ever mindful of my position.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Swaziland in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. The greatest potential obstacle to addressing human rights issues in Swaziland is the historically entrenched attitudes and practices. For example, the subordinate position long held by women makes it hard for them to assert their rights, even though the new constitution specifically provides greater rights for women.

I would like to see political parties recognized officially in Swaziland, yet there is a general sense among a large segment of the public that political parties are harmful to society. When the previous king banned political parties in 1973, he

claimed they were divisive and the cause of social discord. Given the tremendous respect accorded the previous king, this view of political parties continues to prevail in some quarters.

Civil society typically plays a crucial role in advancing human rights in a country. While there are numerous civil society organizations in Swaziland, they lack the cohesion necessary to facilitate their working toward a common end.

If confirmed, I would deal with these obstacles in a constructive manner in seeking to advance human rights in Swaziland.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. The United States plays a crucial role in advancing human rights throughout the world. If confirmed, the advancement of human rights in Swaziland would be one of the key objectives of my tenure. I would lead the Mission's work on human rights by speaking out and engaging the country's leadership and civil society community on the issues. I would encourage my staff to do the same by ensuring that addressing human rights is included in the work requirement statements of appropriate Foreign Service officers (FSO) and stressing the importance of that work in employee-supervisor counseling sessions. I would note the accomplishments in the field of human rights in annual FSO Personnel Evaluations and would look for opportunities to nominate human rights officers for Department of State and Mission awards.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. Promoting democratic principals and values and advocating for nations to institutionalize respect for human rights has been an important function throughout my career.

HUMAN RIGHTS

As Principal Officer/Consul General in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, I promoted Human Rights by:

- Advocating for the release from prison of an American citizen and her U.S. permanent resident husband, who were serving life sentences for confessing to having committed a murder as a result of their being subjected to torture. I personally met with the American prisoner; two consecutive governors and attorneys general of the state of Chihuahua, Mexico, to advocate on the prisoner's behalf; ensured that the Consular Officers on my staff were always available to assist the prisoner, her family members and attorneys, to conduct frequent visits (despite a 300-mile distance between Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua City, where the prisoner was imprisoned), and appear at all judicial hearings. I also worked with Mexican NGOs and the local media, and kept U.S. congressional officials informed of the status of this case. Through an effective combination of our Consulate General's active efforts against this blatant miscarriage of justice and a superb legal team, the couple was eventually released.
- As Principal Officer/Consul General in Ciudad Juarez, I strongly advocated for the investigation of the murders and disappearance, over a period of 10 years, of approximately 300 women in that border city. My efforts included meeting personally with two consecutive governors and state attorneys general to urge them to conduct intense police investigations (murder in Mexico is a state, rather than federal crime) into the murders. I also met with Mexican federal officials, the mayor of Ciudad Juarez, and municipal chiefs of police; hosted the fact-finding visits of two United States Congressional delegations (Representatives Hilda Solis twice and Janice Schakowsky) to Ciudad Juarez; and worked closely with Mexican and American NGOs to urge all Mexican authorities to investigate the murders. As a result of my efforts, I helped debunk many myths regarding the murders and provided the State Department, Congress, and the general public with a clearer idea of the problems facing the Mexican Government, including explanations of why the murders/disappearances were not solved. My ongoing discussions of the problem with the mayor of El Paso and the special agent in charge of the FBI for El Paso, Texas, led to a local agreement to have the El Paso homicide squad provide basic law-enforcement training to members of the Chihuahua state and Ciudad Juarez municipal police. The training included guidance on how to secure a crime scene, handle evi-

dence, and conduct a murder investigation. The agreement also established a 911 emergency telephone number in Ciudad Juarez for Mexican citizens to provide confidential information about possible crimes directly to Spanish-speaking members of the El Paso Police Department. This training has resulted in more effective investigative techniques for Mexican law enforcement. Unfortunately, due to the mishandling of most evidence associated with the murders of the women, the fact that the vast majority of cases under review were cold, and the general apathy demonstrated by the Chihuahua state officials responsible for the investigations, the crimes remain unsolved.

- In addition to my specific work on behalf of the disappeared and murdered women of Ciudad Juarez, I also worked closely with Ester Chavez Cano and her NGO, "Casa Amiga," a crisis center for battered women in Ciudad Juarez. Besides offering legal and practical assistance to abused women, this NGO has also advocated in a broader sense for human rights and full citizenship status, with accompanying protection and benefits under law, for women at all levels of Mexican society. To support Casa Amiga's invaluable efforts for the women of Ciudad Juarez, I obtained regular funding, a vehicle, and computer equipment from Embassy Mexico City's Narcotics Affairs Section, part of the Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) at the Department of State.
- During my assignments to Barcelona, Spain; Lagos, Nigeria; and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, I was a contributor to each embassy's annual Human Rights Reports. As United States Representative to the Principality of Andorra, I was responsible for drafting the Human Rights Reports for that newly-independent and democratic microstate.

DEMOCRACY

I have used the tool of public diplomacy to advance democratic principals during the visits of three United States Supreme Court Justices to my posts. In 1985, I assisted Chief Justice Warren Burger during his official visit to Edinburgh, Scotland, to meet with senior officials of the Scottish judiciary. In 1995 and 1996, I hosted separate visits of Associate Justices of the United States Supreme Court, Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsberg, to Barcelona. During each visit, I used their presence overseas to meet with local officials, members of the judiciary, key legal officials, the media, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and the public to discuss the U.S. Constitution, uniqueness of the American democratic system, and rule of law. Also, as Principal Officer in Barcelona, in cooperation with the post Public Affairs Officer, I helped to sponsor a highly publicized lecture by former U.S. Senator and Presidential Candidate, Gary Hart, on the U.S. Presidential electoral process. All of these events helped to educate some of America's closest allies about our unique democratic system and legal practices.

RESPONSES OF ROBERT B. NOLAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Lesotho has one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world—just under one quarter of the adult population is HIV positive. If confirmed, how would you lead the U.S. country team in confronting this challenge? As ambassador, what steps would you take to promote prevention efforts and to strengthen the effectiveness of the Lesotho Government's response to the epidemic?

Answer. With an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of over 22 percent, Lesotho has been in a head-on collision with the HIV virus for well over a decade. Fortunately, the Government of Lesotho recognizes this challenge to the nation's very existence, and has been in the forefront of the campaign to fight the war against HIV/AIDS, including the involvement of Their Majesties the King and Queen, the Prime Minister and First Lady, and other key leaders in the country's groundbreaking "Know Your Status" campaign. Now, in my view, this campaign is an important step for Lesotho as it highlights knowing your status to keep those who are negative negative, promotes protecting those who are HIV positive from infecting others, and offers a gateway to care and treatment for those in need. That being said, Lesotho needs to scale up its prevention campaign and move it to the next level—including the inclusion of prevention messages in all current donor HIV/AIDS programs in Lesotho. The battle to control HIV/AIDS in Lesotho cannot be won until the rate of new infections drops significantly. The key in this regard is ensuring that the general population has access to the entire package of HIV prevention interventions, including: quality counseling and testing; the prevention of mother to child transmission; ARV treatment as appropriately indicated and thus lowering the risk of HIV transmission among those who are HIV positive; addressing cultural factors that drive HIV trans-

mission such as multiple, concurrent sexual partners; regular access to condoms for targeted, at-risk populations; and recognition of and assistance with the need to formulate a national policy and implementation program on male circumcision. It is clear that there is no magic bullet for prevention, but I am confident that the PEPFAR program under my leadership in Lesotho can play a primary role in helping to assure that all of these strategies are part of the national response.

If confirmed, I will work energetically with His Majesty the King and other members of the Royal Family, Government of Lesotho officials, civil society leaders, and all stakeholders to encourage them to engage personally in reaching out to the people of Lesotho and in ensuring that the entire arsenal of prevention interventions is universally accessible to the people of Lesotho. I will specifically highlight the behavioral changes needed to prevent the spread of the virus as well as my belief that local ownership of behavioral change messages is essential if Lesotho is to win this battle.

Concerning the broader question of improving the effectiveness of Lesotho's response to the pandemic, I think there is a need for greater coordination both among the approximately one-dozen Government of Lesotho entities engaged in fighting HIV/AIDS and among the donors, NGOs, and civil society who are working to support the government's work. This coordination will become more necessary once implementation of the soon-to-be-signed MCA Compact begins. The Compact provides approximately \$122 million for the health sector to bolster human and physical infrastructure. If confirmed, I will work with the government and others to ensure that the considerable efforts to fight AIDS in Lesotho, including the work done under the MCA Compact and PEPFAR, are complementary and mutually supportive. The challenge to fight HIV/AIDS in Lesotho, particularly within the context of a vast shortage of qualified human resources, is so great that no efforts or resources can be wasted.

The United States Mission Country Team is the key to ensuring that United States Government resources are used to maximum advantage in helping the Basotho win the war against HIV/AIDS. In coming months the Country Team will expand greatly with the addition of resident representatives of CDC, USAID, and MCC. If confirmed, I personally will lead the Country Team in the battle against HIV/AIDS.

Question. The rights of women in Lesotho continue to be limited as well as violated. Despite the advocacy efforts of national NGOs, domestic violence and rape remain common, a fact which compounds the AIDS epidemic. If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these issues?

Answer. The Government of Lesotho has made important progress in safeguarding the rights of women. To advance its eligibility for an MCA Compact, Lesotho enacted ground-breaking legislation that accords Basotho women broad protection under the law, especially concerning their ability to conduct business, acquire loans, and possess land. If confirmed, I will direct my efforts to urge that this marriage equality law is fully implemented, as I know there will be considerable resistance from some quarters to according all women their full rights. I would also continue our impressive efforts to provide secondary education to girls from the most vulnerable sectors of society, especially orphans. I would continue Embassy Maseru's outreach on trafficking in persons issues so that Basotho women do not fall victim to this modern form of slavery. I would also make concerted efforts to support the work of some of Lesotho's leaders on women's rights, including the First Lady, the Speaker of the National Assembly, several women leaders in the government's cabinet, and many dynamic civil society leaders. Finally, I will encourage the PEPFAR and MCC staff to actively continue making linkages between lack of gender equity in basic social relations in Lesotho and the continuing spread of the HIV virus.

Question. Lesotho is considered to be one of the foremost beneficiaries of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), but its AGOA exports are made up almost exclusively of apparel. If confirmed, what steps would you take to promote greater economic diversity and enhance potential investment opportunities for United States businesses in Lesotho outside of the textile sector?

Answer. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been a success story for Lesotho, with 40,000 people employed in the textile industry. The Government of Lesotho is indeed cognizant of the vulnerability inherent in having its manufacturing sector wholly devoted to textile production.

To promote economic diversification in Lesotho, I will work with USAID's Trade Hub (located in Gaborone, Botswana) to maintain critical job-supporting exports in the apparel sector and to increase exportable products from Lesotho, such as ceram-

ics and processed food products. The Trade Hub plays a key role in making market linkages for exporters from Lesotho, both to regional markets and to the United States.

I will also work with the Trade Hub in conjunction with other donors, such as the British-funded “ComMark Trust” based in Maseru, on creating a business environment that is conducive to fostering additional investment to promote economic diversification in Lesotho and to create new jobs for the Basotho people.

The \$362.5 million Millennium Challenge Compact, soon to be signed with Lesotho, will help the country address a key constraint to increased industrial development. Specifically, the Compact will provide funding for a highland dam project intended to resolve water shortages in populated areas.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Lesotho? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Lesotho? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy and a vigorous, if young, democracy. As reported in the State Department’s 2006 Human Rights Report, human rights are generally respected by the government. One of the most serious human rights concerns in Lesotho is discrimination toward women, including the prevalence of violence. The Government of Lesotho has made important progress in safeguarding the rights of women. To advance its eligibility for an MCA Compact, Lesotho enacted ground-breaking legislation that accords Basotho women broad protection under the law, especially concerning their ability to conduct business, acquire loans, and possess land. If confirmed, I will urge that this marriage equality law be fully implemented, as I know there will be considerable resistance from some quarters against according all women their full rights. I would continue our impressive efforts to provide secondary education to girls from the most vulnerable sectors of society, especially orphans, as well as our funding of community self-help projects, many of which empower local women’s groups and organizations. I would also support the work of Lesotho’s leaders on women’s rights issues, including the First Lady, the Speaker of the National Assembly, cabinet members, and civil society leaders. Recent embassy activities publicizing the scourge of trafficking in persons and celebrating the history of the U.S. civil rights movement are examples we can build upon.

I will use my position to ensure that the nation’s military and police respect and support the Basotho people’s civil and human rights. In this regard, robust democratization efforts, such as the confidence and capacity-building activities which Embassy Maseru and the National Democratic Institute conducted during Lesotho’s February 2007 national assembly election, are key to the nation’s continued strong human rights record.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Lesotho in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. The greatest obstacle in overcoming lack of respect for women’s rights in Lesotho is the difficulty of changing traditional attitudes in Basotho society. Fortunately, those attitudes are changing under the leadership of His Majesty the King, the Speaker of the Assembly, the First Lady, and other government and civil society women leaders. If confirmed, I will work with Lesotho’s leaders and with civil society groups to help ensure women are informed of their rights and are able to take advantage of them. I would like to point out the tremendous positive impact that United States policies on women’s issues has had in the Mountain Kingdom, such as the advocacy by the United States Embassy and the Millennium Challenge Corporation of Lesotho’s “Legal Capacity of Married Persons” Act. Under my leadership, we will steadfastly continue to seek equality for Basotho women so that they can fully contribute to the nation’s development.

Additionally, under my leadership, the United States Embassy in Maseru will continue to aid the professionalization of Lesotho’s military and law enforcement entities so that they can serve as defenders of the Basotho people’s rights.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. If confirmed, it would be my intention to make the promotion of human rights and strengthening of democracy in Lesotho key elements in our mission strategic plan. Moreover, I will stress to all personnel and agencies under my authority

my belief that the institutionalization of basic human rights in Basotho society is a prerequisite for success in all other endeavors, including economic development and efforts to combat HIV/AIDS. I will ask all members of the Mission, regardless of their role, to contribute to advancing human rights in Lesotho. If confirmed as Ambassador to Lesotho, I intend to encourage and reward—through the Department's award system and individual performance evaluations—insightful, reporting on human rights and democracy, as well as on other issues. I will impress upon my team that we are in Lesotho to act as transformational players in fields such as human rights and democratization. I will also continue, adapt, and expand upon our recent cooperation with the National Democratic Institute to build local capacity and confidence among political stakeholders.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. From 2001 until 2006, I served as the Office Director in the Bureau of Human Resources for the Office of Performance Evaluation (HR/PE). In this position, I was responsible for the management of the Foreign Service's performance evaluation and promotion systems.

In HR/PE, I played a leadership role in the creation of the Career Development Program (CDP) for Foreign Service generalists. The CDP contains a road map of the assignments a generalist must take in order to be eligible for consideration for promotion into the Senior Foreign Service (SFS). In CDP, I helped to make the case that operational effectiveness needed to include a breadth of experience over several regions and functions. The CDP thus encourages Foreign Service officers to serve a tour of duty in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) as a mid-level officer in order to demonstrate their operational effectiveness. By creating this incentive for an assignment in DRL, we emphasized the importance of working to support human rights. In addition, we believe that CDP will result in more mid-level employees working on human rights issues to demonstrate their breadth of experience in order to become more competitive for promotion into the Senior Foreign Service.

While serving in HR/PE, I was also responsible for managing the Procedural Precepts process. The Procedural Precepts establish the scope, organization, and responsibilities of the Foreign Service Selection Boards and describe the criteria to be used by the boards in reaching their promotion determinations. In this HR/PE leadership role, I helped to emphasize the importance of human rights in the Procedural Precepts. For example, our 2006 Procedural Precepts specifically mentioned human rights as being of importance to U.S. interests as a global issue. The Procedural Precepts further added the comment that selection boards should acknowledge expertise and accomplishments of employees in areas such as human rights and give these employees full consideration for promotion. The Foreign Service promotion process thus helps to encourage employees to work on human rights issues.

Since 2006, I have served as the Office Director in the Bureau of Human Resources for the Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA). In this position, I am responsible for the management of the Foreign Service's assignments system. In HR/CDA, I have led management's efforts to reform the Foreign Service assignments process. Specifically, we have made changes to the bidding process to improve the staffing of our most difficult hardship posts overseas. These difficult hardship posts are very often dealing with critical human rights issues on a bilateral or multilateral basis. By helping to make certain that positions at these posts are filled rather than being left vacant, we are ensuring that U.S. Missions overseas have the necessary American staffing to focus on human rights issues.

RESPONSES OF FREDERICK B. COOK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. The International Criminal Court announced on May 22, 2007, that it would open an investigation into crimes committed in the Central African Republic by parties to the conflict in the region from 2002–2003. What is your opinion of this decision? If confirmed, how will you support the peace process in CAR?

Answer. In December 2004, the Central African Republic (CAR) asked the International Criminal Court to investigate crimes within the jurisdiction of the court committed anywhere in CAR territory since July 1, 2002, the date of entry into force of the Rome Statute, which established the court. The CAR Government referred this case to the court because the CAR justice system lacks the capacity to carry out the complex legal proceedings necessary to try this case adequately. The United

States is not a party to the Rome Statute, but we respect the rights of other states to become parties and to seek the involvement of the ICC in addressing serious crimes in their countries as the CAR has done in this instance. The United States shares a common interest in promoting justice and accountability for mass atrocities and we remain a leading world voice in furthering international criminal justice.

If confirmed, I will support the peace process in CAR by engaging with both the government and the opposition and emphasizing the need for a peaceful and democratic resolution to their differences. I would support the efforts of the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in CAR (BONUCA) to establish a comprehensive dialog and to mediate between political leaders to foster reconciliation. I would encourage the government and its mediators to develop peace agreements with the various armed rebel groups in a transparent and inclusive manner. Finally, I would urge the government to address some of the underlying issues contributing to the conflict, such as the lack of rule of law and uneven economic development.

Question. The United States Agency for International Development does not have a development assistance program in the Central African Republic. Under what conditions would you favor initiating an assistance program?

Answer. While the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) does not have a mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), there is a considerable amount of USAID engagement in the country. The majority of USAID support for CAR in fiscal year 2007, approximately \$16 million, consists of humanitarian assistance, including emergency food aid, emergency relief supplies, well rehabilitation, nutrition assessments, and seeds and tools distribution.

The remaining fiscal year 2007 USAID assistance, approximately \$1 million dollars, is targeted toward more traditional development programs. Projects include a program to develop property rights and increase transparency in alluvial diamond mining in CAR in accordance with the Kimberley Process as well as programs under the Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) to chart and record CAR's forest resources and to promote conservation. The property rights project is managed from USAID headquarters in Washington and CARPE is administered out of the USAID mission in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Presently, the United States Embassy in CAR is not staffed sufficiently to directly manage large-scale USAID development assistance, which is why the embassy has relied on regional missions and Washington to manage projects. If confirmed, I would welcome a mission should USAID headquarters determine that adequate operational funding was available to establish such a mission in CAR.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in the Central African Republic? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in CAR? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. With rebel groups and bandits operating throughout the country, and spill over from conflicts in neighboring states, the greatest challenge to the promotion of human rights in the Central African Republic (CAR) is the deteriorating security situation. Hundreds of thousands of people have been driven from their homes by both rebel attacks and counter attacks by government forces. The general condition of lawlessness and impunity, including extrajudicial killings by government agents and rebel groups, has also subjected civilians to increasing acts of banditry and violence. Homes and property have been destroyed or stolen by both sides and children have been kidnapped for ransom, resulting in displacement of almost 8 percent of the population. Displacement means greater exposure to disease and dangerously reduced agricultural production, which has led to a humanitarian crisis.

Not only does insecurity have humanitarian consequences, but it undermines long-term economic development as well. Bandit attacks on commercial routes in the west and northwestern parts of the country have stifled trade and business, hindering the ability of the Central African people to lift themselves out of a life of poverty.

Now that a democratically elected government heads CAR after years of conflict, we have a small window of opportunity to advance the cause of human rights in that country. If confirmed, I will attempt to engage all elements of society and encourage them to cooperate to bring peace and stability to the country.

To the government, I will deliver the message that the promotion of human rights is necessary, not merely to ensure assistance from the international community, but to lay the foundation of a strong and stable republic that enjoys the support of its own people. Government military forces must no longer act with impunity. To foster respect for human rights and civil-military relations, I will urge the government to

train its forces in these fields in addition to operational training that will make them more effective in securing CAR territory.

To the rebels, I will deliver the message that their grievances can only be resolved through peaceful political engagement. Attempts to gain power or leverage by force will be condemned by the international community.

To civil society, I will express U.S. support for their efforts to promote judicial and legislative independence and to advance transparency at all levels of government. These institutions must pass the laws and establish the procedures necessary to resolve internal conflict and end impunity.

If the CAR Government and society can make the necessary changes to enhance security, there will be a tangible increase in human rights and respect for democracy which will lead to a betterment of the lives of the Central African people.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in the Central African Republic in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. As the Central African Republic (CAR) has not had a history of democratically elected governments that respect human rights, the greatest challenge to promoting human rights in CAR is the lack of a shared vision of responsible democratic government amongst the various factions, be it government, rebel groups and bandits, or even perhaps civil society.

Thus, the first major challenge is to convince all of the factions that peaceful and democratic change is really possible. To do that, if confirmed, I will endeavor to meet with all elements of society throughout the country and will encourage my staff to do the same. We will, however, be constrained by our small size and the prevailing security conditions.

With a population of only about four million people, the problems of the Central African Republic are often overshadowed by those of neighboring countries such as Sudan or the Democratic Republic of Congo. It will be a major challenge to secure adequate resources to support the programs and projects we have identified. This will require intensive engagement and coordination with our international partners and the nongovernmental community to both encourage continued engagement as well as to prevent waste or duplication of effort.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. I see support for human rights as the cornerstone of our engagement in the Central African Republic. The United States Embassy in Bangui is extremely small, with a staff of only three United States citizen employees, (if confirmed, I will be its fourth) but, with energy and imagination, we can reach out to all elements of Central African society. If confirmed, I will make sure that the promotion of human rights remains a priority goal in the Mission Strategic Plan, the document in which we outline our major policy goals for each embassy. Similarly, as the rating or reviewing officer for every U.S. citizen employee at post, I will be able to assure that the promotion of human rights is highlighted in both the work requirements and the performance review of every member of the staff.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. One of the most powerful elements of diplomacy is personal engagement. I served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Venezuela during the period when President Chavez was removed from office and the aftermath. One of our major policy goals was to work for national reconciliation. I undertook a long-term campaign to encourage dialog between the various pro- and anti-Chavez mayors of the various districts of Caracas. This involved office calls, repeated invitations to my home, and late night visits to offices full of people with guns. As one mayor commented to a Congressional staff delegation over breakfast on my patio, "This is the only place in Venezuela where I would ever agree to be in the same room with these people." I wish I could tell you that my efforts achieved national reconciliation in Venezuela. I cannot. I do believe, however, that my personal intervention prevented violence on at least one occasion and I can assure you that both sides acknowledged, if only privately, the efforts of the United States to promote reconciliation.

While serving as interim Deputy Chief of Mission in Haiti, I undertook a similar effort to reach out to and meet with an important Aristide partisan who was in hid-

ing, thus attempting to model the kind of reconciliation that the Haitians themselves must eventually undertake. Haiti is another country where grinding poverty feeds political instability. When I learned that labor disputes threatened to close a factory on the other side of the island, near the Dominican border, I traveled overland to the plant and met with union members, the AFL-CIO representative, and the Dominican plant owner to reduce tensions and prevent the closure of the plant. This saved hundreds of Haitian jobs.

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM GARVELINK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. One of the many tragedies of the Democratic Republic of Congo's long civil war has been the widespread use of child soldiers. Reportedly, this practice continues, not only among rebel groups but also in the Congolese Army, including children who were serving as rebel combatants who have been integrated into the national army. The chief of staff of the armed forces has issued an order to his commanders to stop recruiting and using child soldiers, but the practice continues. What steps can you take to strengthen efforts to professionalize the military and eliminate this reliance on children and to assist in the rehabilitation and reintegration of former child combatants?

Answer. As you noted, the Congolese armed forces banned the recruitment of child soldiers in 2006. Approximately 29,000 out of a total of 33,000 child soldiers have been demobilized in the Congo, largely through programs funded through the World Bank-led Multi-Donor Regional Project (MDRP). That said, it is unacceptable that an estimated 4,000 children still serve as soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, largely in militia groups but also in Congolese armed forces units that have not yet been integrated. Our approach to this serious problem is to support the demobilization of all remaining child soldiers, as the first demobilization priority, as we work to assist in the formation of fully professional Congolese armed forces. We are planning programs to support the reintegration of former combatants, including demobilized child soldiers, both through the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and directly through USAID in areas not covered by the MDRP or UNDP Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs. We are working to raise the level of professionalism in the Congolese armed forces by training brigade staff officers. We are also planning to refurbish the Congolese military staff college and funding a Defense International Institute for Legal Studies assessment of the Congolese military justice system aimed at a designing a proposal for United States assistance in reforming the military justice sector.

Question. Gender-based violence has been another horrific legacy of conflict in the Congo, as well as the disintegration of many social norms. If confirmed, what steps can you take to help strengthen the rights and security of women and girls, to strengthen the rule of law, and to aid the Congolese in their efforts to assist survivors of gender-based violence?

Answer. Gender-based violence (GBV) is indeed a horrific problem in the DRC. The physical consequences of GBV are devastating, and the social and psychological consequences can be just as catastrophic. Fistula is also a serious problem for victims of sexual crimes in the DRC, and many lack access to appropriate treatment. In addition, an estimated 2 million Congolese are infected with HIV/AIDS, and there have been reports that as many as 60 percent of combatants are infected. In too many cases, victims of sexual violence will not even report the crime because of the social stigma associated with victims.

If confirmed, I will work to provide counseling and treatment for victims, and to remove the social stigma associated with GBV victims. Currently, with USAID funding, including Victims of Torture and Trafficking in Persons funds, international organizations work with local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), health structures, and community based organizations (CBOs) to increase their capacity to provide a package of support to survivors including medical, psychosocial, and socio-reintegration services, as well as to promote judicial support and referral when appropriate. Since 2002, USAID has assisted over 40,000 survivors of sexual violence in the eastern DRC.

The battle against GBV must also concentrate on preventative action. If confirmed, I will cultivate civil society partnerships that can augment our effectiveness in the struggle against GBV. I will also work closely with the Government of the DRC to strengthen the legal mechanisms for bringing the perpetrators of GBV to justice. The war-time perception that rape goes unpunished is prevalent, and the only way to change this perception is to reject impunity. Men must understand that

they can and will be punished for GBV, otherwise this crime will continue. If confirmed, I will also work to end impunity for the perpetrators of crimes of sexual violence.

Question. Given the central role that natural resources play in the DRC's economy and development; the history of widespread corruption; and the risk natural resources can pose to peace and security if not properly managed; if confirmed, how will you try to ensure the new Congolese Government prioritizes the responsible and transparent management of natural resource reforms?

Answer. The natural resources of the DRC, if managed properly, have the potential to play a crucial role in improvements of the DRC's economy and the livelihood of the Congolese people. Unfortunately, as your question indicates, the DRC's wealth of natural resources has historically brought much corruption and exploitation. The elections of last year established a foundation of legitimacy from which we have an opportunity to reverse this trend, and if confirmed I will push the government on this issue through every possible medium.

Recent actions in the DRC provide reason for optimism. Parliament recently undertook a review of 60 mining contracts in the DRC. It is my hope that this review reflects the will of the entire Government of the DRC (GDRC) to promote a legal and fair procedure for negotiating mining contracts. If confirmed, I will work with Parliament to develop a transparent and date-limited contract review process.

President Kabila's recent actions, such as his visit to South Africa to promote foreign investment in the DRC, show that he is attempting to rebuild the economy through capitalist means. It will be my job, if confirmed, to work with him to ensure that increased foreign investment in the mining sector benefits the Congolese people. I will also work with those companies in the private sector that invest in DRC extractive industries, such as the United States-based Freeport, to ensure fairness in contracts and emphasize oversight. If confirmed, I will also work with the GDRC to enhance border control in order to reduce illegal resource smuggling.

If confirmed, I hope to work with and increase cooperation among the GDRC, private companies, and the Congolese people. I will work to strengthen democratic institutions that facilitate communication and transparency. I would note that we are already working to foster this change through USAID's partnership through the NGO PACT and several major mining companies in the Extractive Industries Alliance. We also support DRC's membership in the Kimberley Process and encourage the completion of DRC's candidacy in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in the DRC? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in the DRC? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. The DRC's human rights record remains poor. Unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests and detention by security forces, disappearances, rape, and harassment of press and human rights defenders continue. At the core of many of these abuses is a corrupt and dysfunctional justice system. The Congo suffers from the gamut of human rights problems, exacerbated by widespread poverty, mismanagement of resources, and a lack of transparency. These issues are interrelated. Following last year's historic elections, the time has come to tackle the problem of impunity and to support the development of democratic institutions to nurture human rights to replace the predatory state institutions that have weakened the Congolese society. My role, if confirmed, will include working with government leaders and parliament to ensure that appropriate internal checks and balances are established and respected, enhancing communication among government agencies, supporting the development of a free and credible media sector, calling for proper resource management that allows profits to reach the Congolese people, and pushing for enhanced governmental transparency.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in the DRC in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. As I see it, there are three key obstacles to addressing these human rights issues: the culture of impunity, a lack of political will to effect change, and corruption. While impunity and the lack of political will are serious issues in their own right, I believe they are also linked to the underlying problem of corruption. Corruption in the DRC is a far-reaching problem, extending throughout both the government and the private sector. Should I be confirmed, corruption will pose a serious challenge to my efforts to work with the government of the DRC to develop

transparent and sustainable management strategies. If I am confirmed, I will make every effort to address these serious challenges. By establishing a functioning justice system and the fight against impunity, I believe the DRC can create a climate that fosters a genuine desire among the leadership to protect human rights.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. I plan to make the promotion of human rights a major aspect of my engagement with the Congolese host government, diplomatic colleagues, and staff at United States Embassy-Kinshasa. My goal would be to lead by example to show Foreign Service officers my commitment to the promotion of human rights, and to make it clear to them that I believe professional advancement depends in large measure on one's commitment to advance human rights internationally. I will recommend rewards for those officers who are outstanding performers in this area.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. Before joining USAID, I worked in the late 1970s as a human rights specialist for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Organizations chaired by Representative Donald M. Fraser. My interest in human rights, particularly as it relates to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, continues throughout my career. In 2003, I led the USAID effort to draft a USAID policy paper on assisting IDPs. The paper linked human rights and protection issues with approaches to assisting IDPs and is the current guidance for USAID missions around the world. The paper was approved by USAID and endorsed by the inter-agency. I presented the USAID strategy to the international community in Geneva in 2004. It was the first donor policy paper that linked assistance to IDPs with human rights and protection issues and was applauded for that. It is the example being used by several other nations in designing their own approach to IDPs, protection, and human rights.

Within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) where I serve as the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, I created in 2003 a Protection Unit which develops strategies to ensure that the rights of the IDPs and others assisted by USAID are properly protected. The Protection Unit implemented projects in Iraq on human rights and reprisal prevention. In 2004–2005, the unit oversaw the collection of evidence on human rights abuses in Chad and Darfur that supported a declaration of genocide. The unit currently oversees Violence Against Women projects in Darfur and Northern Uganda. Through the unit, I provided funding to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to hire 10 additional protection officers for rapid deployment on human rights issues around the world.

It is essential to integrate human rights and protection concerns with our humanitarian response and development activities if our assistance is to meet effectively the needs of the world's IDPs. The linkage had not been made in USAID programming decisions prior to the adoption of the IDP Policy Paper and the creation of the Protection Unit. With the policy paper, IDP assistance has become a USAID priority. The Protection Unit within DCHA implements activities and provides guidance to the rest of USAID on methodologies and techniques for integrating protection and human rights concerns into USAID's IDP and refugee programs. The Protection Unit is the institutional platform to ensure USAID's commitment to IDPs, human rights, and protection.

NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Brownfield, William R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia
Duddy, Patrick Dennis, to be Ambassador to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
McKinley, Peter Michael, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Peru

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb presiding.
Present: Senators Webb, Menendez, and Corker.
Also present: Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Senator WEBB. The committee will come to order.

This hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations will now come to order, with the precatory words that we are going to have some sort of a vote called during this hearing, in which case we will have to recess. But we're going to try to get all the opening statements into the record before that happens.

The committee is meeting to consider the nomination of three individuals for key leadership positions in the administration. The President has nominated William Brownfield to be Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia, Dr. Peter McKinley to be Ambassador to the Republic of Peru, and Patrick Duddy to be Ambassador to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

I want to congratulate all of you on your nominations. We look forward to hearing from each of you this morning. I also welcome my colleague, Senator Collins, who has joined us today to introduce Mr. Duddy.

It's a pleasure to chair my first Foreign Relations Committee hearing and to consider the nominations of three Foreign Service officers with extensive experience to serve in an often overlooked region of the world. Each nominee's dedication and skill will undoubtedly serve our Nation well in their respective posts.

With much of our Nation's attention and resources being taken up by the ongoing challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, little concern is paid to what's going on in what has been called America's back yard. The United States and Latin America share common in-

terests and cultures. We also share common problems, such as drug trafficking, transnational crime, and the threats of terrorism. Strengthening our relationships with countries in the Western Hemisphere will increase our level of cooperation to solve many of our shared challenges.

All three nominees possess incredible credentials, training, and proven expertise. I am confident that all of you have the skills and dedication to represent our Nation at this important yet challenging time.

I look forward to hearing about how each of you will approach your new assignments. I'd like to thank all of you for the years of service you've given our country and I commend you for your willingness to continue this commitment to serve in the future.

I'd like now to turn to the distinguished ranking member of the committee, Senator Corker, for his opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE**

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome all three of these distinguished gentlemen and the distinguished Senator from Maine, who I know is going to introduce one of them. I tell you that I chose to be on this subcommittee because of the importance I see the relationship with Latin America, South America, Central America to be. I think that the roles you are getting ready to perform, hopefully, are roles that are very, very important to our country. I want to thank you for your interest in that regard.

Dr. McKinley and I were together in Brussels about 3 weeks ago, meeting on issues relating to climate change, and I certainly was most impressed with him, and I look forward to getting to know the other two gentlemen during this hearing. But because of the time and the vote and the things that we have upcoming, I know that all of us want to hear from you and certainly the distinguished Senator from Maine.

So Mr. Chairman, thank you and I look forward to a very productive hearing.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Senator Corker.

I would now like to call on Senator Collins for her introduction of Mr. Duddy. Welcome to the committee.

**STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN M. COLLINS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE**

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker. I am indeed delighted to appear before you today to introduce one of my constituents, Patrick Duddy, to be the next Ambassador for our country to Venezuela.

The people of my State are proud of what this Mainer has accomplished during his long and distinguished career of service to our Nation. The United States and Venezuela have had a long history of friendship and cooperation, but lately that tradition is threatened as never before by the hostile and antidemocratic regime in Caracas. The deterioration of democratic institutions and civil liberties under President Chavez, the intimidation and imprisonment of political opponents, the corruption and the ties with such ter-

rorism-supporting states as Iran are all alarming developments. That is why it is critical that the President has nominated a diplomat with such extraordinary experience and skills as Patrick Duddy.

This is one of the most critical diplomatic positions in the Western Hemisphere and the President has indeed chosen wisely. Throughout his 25-year Foreign Service career, Mr. Duddy has demonstrated a deep commitment to our relations with Latin America and an expert understanding of the region. In his current position as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, he has played a lead role in recent international efforts to restore democracy and the rule of law in Haiti. As a career minister counselor, Mr. Duddy is one of the most experienced senior officers in the Western Hemisphere Bureau, with a portfolio that includes the Offices of Brazil and Southern Cone Affairs, Caribbean Affairs, and Economic Policy and Summit Coordination.

Immediately prior to his current assignment, Mr. Duddy served as Consul-General in Brazil, where he directed one of the largest consulates general in the world and the largest in the Western Hemisphere. Previously he served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Bolivia, where he was the chief operating officer of one of the largest embassies in the Americas.

Earlier in his career, Mr. Duddy served as counselor for public affairs in Panama. He has also served in Chile, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Paraguay. It's probably not a surprise to this committee that Mr. Duddy is fluent in Spanish and Portuguese, but it may surprise you to learn that he is also a published poet, but I think only in English.

Prior to this hearing, he was describing a speech that he had given to a group of legislators and he had talked to them for an hour in Portuguese.

To anyone wondering where such energy, dedication, and talent come from, the answer I am proud to say is Bangor, Maine. After graduating from John Bapst High School, he received his undergraduate degree from another outstanding Maine college, Colby College, and a master's degree from Northeastern University. He is also a graduate of the National War College, where he received a master's degree in national security strategy.

He is married and he and his wife have two children, Sarah and Robert. They are here today with him to give him support and I'm delighted that they could be with us since we all know it's not just the Ambassador, it's his family who serves, or her family, who serves as well.

Finally, I want to inform the committee that I'm very fortunate that Mr. Duddy's sister-in-law heads up my Portland office in Maine.

So this is a wonderful family that is very dedicated to public service. I strongly endorse Patrick Duddy's nomination to be the next United States Ambassador to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and I enthusiastically recommend him to this committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I truly cannot envision a better qualified person for this critical diplomatic post. Thank you.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.

Welcome again to all of the nominees. We've got some really incredible credentials in front of the committee this morning. We'll attempt to keep this bipartisan and not reflect on the fact that a family member of his works on your staff. [Laughter.]

In the interest of time, I think we should go ahead and move forward and see if we can get the testimony of the witnesses before us and into the record before this vote is called.

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I'd very much appreciate if you would excuse me at this point.

Senator WEBB. I appreciate very much having you with the committee this morning and thank you very much for being here.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Senator WEBB. I'd now like to turn to the nominees. I would ask that you deliver your statements in the order that you were introduced. If you're summarizing a statement, obviously the entire text of your statement would be included in the record. Also, as you testify, I'd be very pleased if you take the opportunity to introduce friends or family that you have with you today and we'd like to welcome them also.

So Mr. Brownfield, if you could begin.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, NOMINEE TO
BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA**

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WEBB. You may want to give Mr. Duddy a few words of advice in terms of the assignment that he is about to undertake.

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Oh, Mr. Duddy and I have already had many, many conversations. I'll not reveal all of the contents, other than to say the fact that he's still here before you today suggests that I haven't completely terrified him.

If I could take advantage of your offer, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention a couple of people who are sitting shyly back in the back of this hearing room. I believe I spotted as I came in my long-term next door neighbor, Mr. John Sullivan, whose garage has housed more Brownfield-Kenney household effects over the last 20 years than has my own garage. I think seated next to him is John Kenney, my brother-in-law, brother of my wife of the last 700 or 800 years.

She is not with us this morning, Mr. Chairman. She is actually the Ambassador to your Embassy in Manila. She told me this morning that she would love to come and talk to the members of this committee, but never ever at my side; that was an albatross she did not wish to have around her neck when talking to you.

Senator WEBB. We'll see if we can't continue to keep you in different hemispheres. [Laughter.]

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I think she would be grateful for that. I for one would not.

Mr. Chairman, may I offer you a very abbreviated version of my formal statement and ask that you enter my statement in the record in its entirety.

Senator WEBB. So ordered.

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I'm honored to appear before you today. I am, as you may have gathered, a Latin American hand.

I have served virtually my entire career in Latin America, most recently as our Ambassador to Venezuela and prior to that as our Ambassador to Chile.

Mr. Chairman, the United States and Colombia have been friends for nearly 200 years. We have been close and cooperative partners for more than 8 years in combatting the illicit drug trade, providing security to our region, building economic and commercial ties, supporting judicial reform, providing humanitarian relief, and ensuring respect for human, civil, and political rights.

We have produced real progress and real success. When we compare today with what we saw in 1999, I think all parts of the U.S. Government, legislative and executive branch alike, deserve recognition and congratulations for wise decisions skillfully implemented. The key in my judgment was our ability to reach agreement on issues of importance to the American people, assess correctly what value we could bring to address them, provide the necessary resources, and work with our Colombian counterparts to build solutions.

My task if confirmed by the Senate would be to build on successes of the past, adjust those programs and policies that require adjustment, and address those areas where we have concerns. Colombia is a sovereign state with a rich history. There are hundreds of bilateral issues linking our two states. We agree on the overwhelming majority of them. As with any two sovereign and independent countries, we will differ on some. When we do, I hope the Government of Colombia would find me to be an open and sympathetic friend, honestly expressing the views of the United States Government.

There are two areas, Mr. Chairman, that deserve special mention. The first is the security of employees, their families, and the entire American community in Colombia. Colombia remains a country with serious security threats. The American embassy and the larger American community in Colombia should know that in my embassy, security is second to no other issue. To the families of Keith Stansell, Marc Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes, the three American citizens now held hostage for more than 4 years in Colombia, I would like to say that I will not rest and our Government must not rest until they have returned safely home.

The other matter worth special mention is the U.S. business and NGO community. The United States-Colombia commercial and investment relationship is a 5-year success story. I hope to continue that story should the Senate choose to confirm, and if I am the next United States Ambassador to Colombia, the American business community should know that they will have a strong friend and advocate in Bogota.

The NGO community is also a major contributor to the enormous progress in Colombia of the past 8 years, and that in turn is a product of contact and communication. My door will be open.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, if confirmed I look forward to consulting and working closely with you to advance America's interests in Colombia and the wider region. Your advice and counsel are an essential part of our effort to advance programs and policies in Colombia. I realize that many members of this committee have visited Colombia to see for themselves the reality on the ground

and I hope that I can entice you, Mr. Chairman, and you, Senator Corker, to join them to visit and to judge for yourselves how our programs and strategy are taking effect.

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today and would be pleased to answer any questions you might have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brownfield follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the President's nominee to be the next American Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia. I want to thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. This is a position for which I hope you will find my professional experience has well prepared me. For most of my 28 years in the Foreign Service, I have served in Latin America. Most recently, I have had the honor to serve as our Ambassador to Venezuela, and before that, to Chile. Those two posts taught me something about articulating and defending U.S. interests in a challenging environment, as well as finding common ground between two nations with shared interests. In my last Washington assignments, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, and then in the same position for the Western Hemisphere, I worked closely with the Colombian Government in addressing bilateral and regional issues of great interest to our two peoples.

Mr. Chairman, the United States and Colombia have been friends for nearly 200 years. We have been close and cooperative partners for more than 8 years in combating the illicit drug trade, providing security to our region, building economic and commercial ties, supporting judicial reform, providing humanitarian relief, and ensuring respect for human, civil, and political rights. We have produced real progress and real success. When we compare today with what we saw in 1999, I think all parts of the U.S. Government—legislative and executive branch alike—deserve recognition and congratulations for wise decisions skillfully implemented. The key, in my judgment, was our ability to reach agreement on issues of importance to the American people, assess correctly what value we could bring to address them, provide the necessary resources, and work with Colombian counterparts to build solutions.

My task, Mr. Chairman, should the Senate choose to confirm me, would be to build on successes of the past, adjust those programs and policies that require adjustment, and address those areas where we have concern. Colombia is a sovereign state with a rich history. There are hundreds of bilateral issues linking our two states. We agree on the overwhelming majority of them. As with any two sovereign and independent countries, we will differ on some. When we do, I hope the Government of Colombia would find me to be an open and sympathetic friend, honestly expressing the views of the United States Government. Were I not to do so, I would be offering poor service to the Colombian Government, President Bush, the United States Senate, and this committee.

May I take a moment to share with the committee my general views on how to manage our largest diplomatic mission in the hemisphere? I believe that a good Chief of Mission provides clear guidance, strategy, and decisions to his senior team, and holds them to high standards, but then allows them leeway in doing their jobs. There are dozens of United States Government agencies represented in Embassy Bogota. They are staffed by superbly qualified, highly motivated people. My message to them would be that I will give them clear guidance, and I will hold them to high standards of accountability, but I will not tell them how to do their jobs.

There are two areas, Mr. Chairman, that deserve special mention. The first is the security of employees, their families, and the entire American community in Colombia. Colombia remains a country with serious security threats. The American Embassy and the larger American community in Colombia should know that in my embassy, security is second to no other issue. And to the families of Keith Stansell, Marc Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes, the three American citizens now held hostage for more than 4 years, I say that I will not rest, and our Government must not rest, until they have returned safely home.

The other matter worth special mention is the U.S. business and NGO communities. The United States-Colombia commercial and investment relationship is a 5-year success story. I would hope to continue that story, should the Senate choose to confirm. And if I am the next United States Ambassador to Colombia, the Amer-

ican business community should know that they will have a strong friend and advocate in Bogota. The NGO community is a major contributor to the enormous progress in Colombia of the past 8 years. That, in turn, is a product of contact and communication. My door will be open to both.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, should you choose to confirm, I look forward to consulting and working closely with you to advance America's interests in Colombia and the region. Your advice and counsel are an essential part of our effort to advance programs and policies in Colombia. I realize that many members of this committee have visited Colombia to see for themselves the reality on the ground. I hope to entice you, as well as your colleagues in the Senate and across the Capitol in the House, to continue to visit and judge for yourselves how our programs and strategy are taking effect.

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today, and would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Ambassador Brownfield.

I'd like to point out that we are about 8 minutes into our vote right now. So I do have some questions that I would like to ask. I know Senator Corker also would. And we're going to recess here, take the rest of the testimony, and then come back for questions. So we'll be back as soon as we finish our vote.

We stand in recess.

[Recess.]

Senator WEBB. The committee will come to order and we'd like to continue receiving the testimony of our witnesses. We will again thank Mr. Brownfield for having given his and move on to Dr. McKinley.

**STATEMENT OF DR. PETER MICHAEL MCKINLEY, NOMINEE TO
BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF PERU**

Dr. MCKINLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and thank you for the kind words of introduction. I am honored to appear before the committee today as the President's nominee to serve as the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Peru. I am grateful for the trust President Bush and Secretary Rice have placed in me.

As you consider my nomination, I would like to underscore my deep commitment to representing our Nation in Peru. I was born and raised in Latin America, studied the region in university, and started my Foreign Service career there. My work experience since has provided valuable perspectives on the importance of consolidating democracy around the globe, of vigorously confronting the transnational threats to our national security, and of strongly promoting economic development, investment, and free trade. These objectives are more important than ever in our relations with Peru and with Latin America today.

If I am confirmed, my highest priorities will include the security and protection of the 24,000 Americans resident in Peru, as well as the 300,000 American tourists who visit annually.

Bolstering Peru's democratic institutions—with two democratic transfers of power and high economic growth since 2001, Peru now has a critical opportunity to achieve a developmental breakthrough. Our programs to strengthen growth, civil society, and state institutions will help all Peruvians benefit from their democracy's success and help make Peru a model of development in the hemisphere.

Third, stemming the production and trafficking of illegal drugs in close collaboration with the government of President-elect Gar-

cia. Peru is the world's second largest cocaine producer and the ties between its narcotraffickers and those elsewhere in Latin America are growing. Profits from the narcotics trade feed transnational crime and terrorist groups that threaten the security of Peru and of this hemisphere. Peru's Government is willing to confront these threats head on and if I am confirmed I will support their efforts to expand interdiction, eradication, and alternative development.

Fourth, if confirmed, I will focus on implementing our bilateral trade and economic agenda, recognizing that millions of our citizens derive their livelihood from the export of U.S. products. I will work unstintingly to expand Peruvian markets for goods and services, which are already substantial. Deepening trade and economic relations with Peru will also support our democratic goals by advancing political and economic modernization. Peru's strong growth in recent years has been facilitated by integration into the world economy, but this growth is not reaching the poor in highland and rural areas as quickly as we and the Government of Peru wish.

In keeping with core American values of promoting opportunity for all and helping the least fortunate, we will make it a priority to work with the Government of Peru through USAID to extend the benefits of growth to Peru's poorest people.

If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with members of this committee and with your colleagues in Congress to achieve our objectives in Peru. Thank you again for giving me the honor of appearing before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. McKinley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PETER MICHAEL MCKINLEY, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF PERU

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before the committee today as the President's nominee to serve as the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Peru. I am grateful for the trust President Bush and Secretary Rice have placed in me.

As you consider my nomination, I would like to underscore my deep commitment to representing our Nation in Peru. I was born and raised in Latin America, studied the region in university, and started my Foreign Service career there. Since then, as Deputy Chief of Mission in postings in Africa and Europe, and as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department, my work experience has provided valuable perspectives on the importance of consolidating democracy around the globe, of vigorously confronting the transnational threats to our national security, and of strongly promoting economic development, investment, and free trade. These objectives are more important than ever in our relations with Peru and with Latin America today.

If I am confirmed, my highest priorities will include:

- The security and protection of the 24,000 Americans resident in Peru, as well as the 300,000 American tourists who visit annually.
- Bolstering Peru's democratic institutions. With two democratic transfers of power and high economic growth since 2001, Peru now has a critical opportunity to achieve a developmental breakthrough. Our programs to strengthen growth, civil society, and state institutions will help all Peruvians benefit from their democracy's success, and help make Peru a model of development for the hemisphere.
- Stemming the production and trafficking of illegal drugs in close collaboration with the government of President Alan Garcia. Peru is the world's second largest cocaine producer and the ties between its narcotraffickers and those elsewhere in Latin America are growing. While the majority of Peruvian cocaine still goes to Europe, the threat of diversion to the United States is growing. So is consumption inside Peru. Profits from the narcotics trade feed transnational criminal and terrorist groups that threaten the security of Peru and of this hemisphere. Peru's Government is willing to confront these threats head on

and, if confirmed, I will support their efforts to expand interdiction, eradication, and alternative development.

- Implementing our bilateral trade and economic agenda. Recognizing that millions of our citizens derive their livelihood from the export of United States products, if confirmed, I will work unstintingly to expand Peruvian markets for our goods and services which are already substantial. Deepening trade and economic relations with Peru will also support our democratic goals by advancing political and economic modernization. Peru's strong growth in recent years has been facilitated by integration into the world economy, but this growth is not reaching the poor in highland and rural areas as quickly as we and the Government of Peru wish. In keeping with core American values of promoting opportunity for all and helping the least fortunate, I will make it a priority to work with the Government of Peru through USAID to extend the benefits of growth to Peru's poorest people.

If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with members of this committee and with your colleagues in Congress to achieve our objectives in Peru. Thank you again for giving me the honor of appearing before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Dr. McKinley.
Now Mr. Duddy.

**STATEMENT OF PATRICK DENNIS DUDDY, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA**

Mr. DUDDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

Before I begin with my formal statement, I would like to take a moment to introduce my wife, Mary, my daughter, Sarah, and my son, Robert. My wife has accompanied me throughout my Foreign Service career. She's made many, many friends for the United States and I know I could not have done the work I've done over the years without her wise counsel and support. My children too have accompanied me through most of my career, though they will remain behind this time to finish their studies, and they have also been a source of great support and joy everywhere we've served.

Senator WEBB. We welcome your family. Nice to have you today.

Mr. DUDDY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am honored and humbled to be President Bush's nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. I'm deeply grateful to the President and to Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the members of this committee and the rest of the Congress to advance our interests in Venezuela and the wider region.

Mr. Chairman, I believe my Foreign Service career has prepared me for the important position of United States Ambassador to Venezuela. As Senator Collins very kindly mentioned, earlier I am presently serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere and I won't review for you again the particulars of my career, but I would note that if I am confirmed for this position it will be my eighth tour in the field in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, for most of our respective histories, the United States and Venezuela have enjoyed strong friendly relations based on shared democratic values, commercial, and cultural ties. Venezuela's strategic location, talented people, and abundant resources make it a natural friend and partner of the United States. Venezuela and the United States still have an important commercial

relationship. Bilateral trade totaled \$45 billion in 2006. Venezuela is one of the top five suppliers of United States foreign oil imports, with significant United States investments in the energy sector. It is also a major market for U.S. exports, which totaled an unprecedented \$9 billion in 2006.

Today, moreover, the United States is also home to over 600,000 Venezuelans. Their contributions and accomplishments extend to every facet of American life, from academia, journalism, and business, to sports, entertainment, and even fashion design.

It will not come as news to the members of this committee, however, that our bilateral relationship today is strained. This makes it all the more important for me, if confirmed as the next U.S. Ambassador, to redouble our efforts to build on the shared values that have always united our two nations—love of freedom and democracy, basic respect for human rights, and the rule of law. The Venezuelan people have time and again demonstrated their commitment to these values.

Mr. Chairman, there are fundamental differences of principle and governing philosophy between the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the United States. There are matters on which we will not agree and in some instances where we must agree to disagree. Still there are areas where it behooves our two governments to cooperate. Counternarcotics, counterterrorism, commerce, and energy are all issues that no one country can tackle independently in today's globalized and interdependent world. Drugs and terrorism endanger all of our citizens.

Addressing these problems effectively requires cooperation. If confirmed, I intend to work to promote both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in every arena where the wellbeing of our citizens will be advanced by working together.

As United States Ambassador, if confirmed, I know I will have no greater responsibility than ensuring the welfare and security of United States citizens in Venezuela. This naturally starts with U.S. embassy personnel and their families, who are essential for me to do the job for which I've been nominated. But this mandate also expressly includes private American citizens visiting, residing, or doing business in Venezuela. If confirmed, they will be able to count on my vigorous support.

Similarly, United States businesses and investors who face challenges working in Venezuela should know that my door will be always open.

Mr. Chairman, the United States views our relationship with Venezuela from a long-term perspective. We are mindful of the importance of strengthening people-to-people ties, promoting greater understanding of the United States. On the diplomatic front, the United States works with hemispheric and other partners, both bilaterally and multilaterally, through the Organization of American States and the inter-American system to advance our common goal of a democratic, peaceful, secure, and prosperous hemisphere. Indeed, our own agenda in Venezuela flows from the hemisphere's stated commitment to a better future for all of our citizens.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would be less than candid if I did not acknowledge that Venezuela currently is a uniquely challenging post. But I believe my professional and per-

sonal experience has prepared me for this very important assignment. If confirmed, I intend to bring all of my experience to bear as an advocate for the values to which all of the hemisphere's democracies subscribe and which are succinctly captured by the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

I look forward to working with you, all the members of this committee, now and in the future, and I thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Duddy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PATRICK DENNIS DUDDY, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am honored and humbled to be President Bush's nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. I am deeply grateful to the President and to Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and the rest of the Congress to advance our interests in Venezuela and the region.

Mr. Chairman, I believe my Foreign Service experience has prepared me for the important position of United States Ambassador to Venezuela. For the last 2 years I have served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere, responsible for the offices of Caribbean Affairs, Brazil, and Southern Cone Affairs, as well as the Office of Economic Policy and Summit Coordination. In that capacity, I have been particularly involved with our substantial efforts to restore democracy and the rule of law in Haiti. If confirmed, Venezuela will be my eighth tour in the Western Hemisphere. I have served as Consul General in Sao Paulo, Brazil, South America's largest city, as well as Deputy Chief of Mission in La Paz. Earlier in my career, I also served in Panama, Chile, Paraguay, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Chairman, for most of our respective histories, the United States and Venezuela have enjoyed strong, friendly relations based on shared democratic values, and commercial and cultural ties. Venezuela's strategic location, talented people, and abundant resources make it a natural friend and partner of the United States. There is much that brings us together. Venezuela and the United States have an important commercial relationship. Bilateral trade totaled \$45 billion in 2006. Venezuela is one of the top five suppliers of United States foreign oil imports, with significant United States investments in the energy sector. It is also a major market for U.S. exports, which totaled an unprecedented \$9 billion in 2006. Today, the United States is home to over 600,000 Venezuelans. Their contributions and accomplishments extend to every facet of American life—from academia, journalism, and business to sports, entertainment, and fashion design.

It will not come as news to the members of this committee that our bilateral relationship today is strained. This makes it all the more important for me, if confirmed as the next U.S. Ambassador, to redouble our efforts to build on the shared values that always have united our two nations: A love of freedom and democracy and basic respect for human rights and the rule of law. The Venezuelan people have time and again demonstrated their commitment to these values.

Mr. Chairman, there are fundamental differences of principle and governing philosophy between the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the United States. There are matters on which we will not agree, and, in some instances, where we must agree to disagree. Still, there are areas where it behooves our two governments to cooperate. Counternarcotics, counterterrorism, commerce, and energy are all issues that no one country can tackle independently in today's globalized, interdependent world. Drugs and terrorism endanger all our citizens. Addressing these problems effectively requires cooperation. If confirmed, I intend to work to promote both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in every arena where the well-being of our citizens will be advanced by working together.

As United States Ambassador, if confirmed, I know I will have no greater responsibility than ensuring the welfare and security of United States citizens in Venezuela. This naturally starts with U.S. Embassy personnel and their families who are essential for me to do the job for which I have been nominated. But this mandate also expressly includes private American citizens visiting, residing, or doing business in Venezuela. They can count on my vigorous support. Similarly, United States businesses and investors who face challenges working in Venezuela should know that my door always will be open.

Mr. Chairman, the United States views our relationship with Venezuela from a long-term perspective. We are mindful of the importance of strengthening people-to-people ties and promoting greater understanding of the United States through traditional exchanges as well as newer, more innovative strategies. On the diplomatic front, the United States works with hemispheric and other partners—both bilaterally and multilaterally, through the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American system—to advance our common goal of a democratic, peaceful, secure, and prosperous hemisphere. Indeed, our own agenda in Venezuela flows from the hemisphere's stated commitment to a better future for all citizens. There have been many successes in the region over the last 20 years, but there is still much to do.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would be less than candid if I did not acknowledge that Venezuela currently is a uniquely challenging post, but I believe my professional and personal experience has prepared me for this very important assignment. If confirmed, I intend to bring all of my experience to bear as an advocate for the values to which all of the hemisphere's democracies subscribe and which are succinctly captured by the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

I look forward to working with you during my confirmation process and in the future. Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Mr. Duddy, and thank all of you for your testimony.

I am going to pose one general question that I would ask all three of you to respond to. I know Senator Corker has some work to do on the floor, and I am going to go ahead and yield to him for whatever time he might take, and then we'll go to Senator Menendez. Then I'll come back and ask some more specific questions.

We've got a chance here with people who have extensive regional experience, even though you're looking to posts in specific countries. One of the strategic considerations of the United States overall has been the expansion of China, economically and otherwise, into this particular hemisphere. I would like to take this moment to benefit from some of the observations that all three of you would have in terms of your impressions of the extent of the Chinese interests in this region, the economic investments that have been going on, and other contacts, in terms of how it affects the economics of the region, the security of the United States, and the political relationships both inside that region and between the United States and the countries of that region.

Ambassador Brownfield, if you'd begin I'd appreciate that.

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure. Why don't I start, Mr. Chairman. I first bumped into Chinese diplomatic presence in Latin America when I was assigned to Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1986. The Chinese embassy in Argentina at that time was what I would call a second rate embassy in Latin America. They had very little ability to speak Spanish. They did not integrate or operate at all well with local society. And in fact they were not major players.

My counterpart today, Chinese counterpart, in Caracas is a first class ambassador. He is as good as any other diplomat in Venezuela today, your humble servant included in that group. He speaks the language superbly. He speaks well in public. He articulates well in the various sectors and communities of Venezuela. The Chinese have arrived in Latin America.

Now, some of this, Mr. Chairman, I submit is perfectly legitimate, reasonable, and something which we not only should not oppose, but should welcome to a certain extent. They have a right to engage in commercial activity in the region. They have a right to

express their own economic interests in the region, and we're going to have to accept that as their economy, their society, grows and expands, we are going to see more of them in the Western Hemisphere.

We also have a right, I might suggest, to note to them when their activities are beginning to cross a line between legitimate normal commercial economic business activity and activity that is designed to have a political component and to produce a political result. I submit that long after I and, for all I know, all of the Senators in this committee have retired, I suspect our children and our grandchildren will be addressing the China issue in Latin America for many decades to come.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

Dr. McKinley.

Dr. MCKINLEY. If I can comment from the perspective of being in Brussels for the last 3 years, China's emergence on the global market is affecting all regions of the world. Just over the last 5 to 6 years, China has—Europe, for example, has overtaken the United States as the principal trading partner for China.

In the context of Latin America, and specifically Peru, the relationship with China has been expanding quite dramatically in recent years. If I'm not mistaken, China has become Peru's second largest trading partner. Investments in the country are under way. China itself is becoming an important market for Peruvian products.

As we look at Peru as a member of APEC and the upcoming summit of APEC in 2008, what may play for all of us is the efforts that have been under way for quite a number of years under the aegis of APEC to construct transparent economic relations in the trans-Pacific economic arena. Peru is certainly interested in pursuing those objectives and I think it will be an important feature of the November 2008 APEC summit.

So in the context that you asked specifically of the extent of growing interest in the region, the trade and investment relations are growing. But as Ambassador Brownfield suggested, legitimate economic ties benefit all concerned. In terms of the impact on the United States, I think the APEC forum provides a good place to discuss the broader concerns we have.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

Mr. Duddy.

Mr. DUDDY. Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues suggest, the commercial presence of China in the Americas is substantially greater than it was. It is, I think, worth noting that China has become an important market for many Latin American economies, exporting largely commodities. Given the size of the Chinese internal market for consumption of commodities, this is not surprising and indeed has been very much welcomed by many in Latin America.

As is the case with Peru, China has become one of Brazil's, for instance, most important markets. They're also investing in the Americas, but their investments, compared to U.S. investment stock around the hemisphere is of course very, very much smaller.

That said, the Western Hemisphere Bureau has in fact engaged China, and Assistant Secretary Shannon traveled to China for consultations with his counterpart last year. We are following these

developments. We think they're natural developments, predictable developments, and certainly they have had an economic impact around the hemisphere.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much.

Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I think we have a vote at 11:15 and I'm going to try to get down to the floor and do something in advance. So what I'd like to do is again welcome you. You will have very different roles hopefully very soon in South America and we look forward to seeing you on site in your respective places, hopefully, in the very near future.

But I want to thank you for your service. I know that Senator Webb has some more questions along with Senator Menendez. They are very bipartisan and you'll be very well taken care of in their hands. But thank you for your service here to our country. Thank you for what you're getting ready to do in a very important region to our country, and I look forward to seeing you there.

Thank you very much.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Senator Corker.

Senator Menendez.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me welcome all of our nominees. I'm particularly happy to be at this hearing because the Western Hemisphere is something that I have spent my 15 years in Congress, first in the House and of course in the last year and a half in the Senate, focusing a lot of attention on. It doesn't always get a lot of attention, and I think that inures to the detriment of the United States.

So your service in this part of the world is incredibly important to our Nation. In my mind, one of my biggest challenges when I was in the House of Representatives was getting colleagues to focus on Latin America and the Caribbean, not just as a good neighbor, but in the national interest and national security of the United States. So many of the things that we're debating here in Congress today are intertwined with our relationships in this hemisphere, from undocumented immigration to the questions of building broader and more strong markets for American goods and services to the questions of making sure that terrorism doesn't take a foothold under the cover of chaos, to the questions of narcotic trafficking, to the questions of how do we deal with global warming and the Amazon rain forest, and the list goes on and on.

These are all questions in the national interest and security of the United States, not even about being a good neighbor. So your services in these countries are going to be incredibly important and we certainly salute you for your willingness to pursue them.

I have a couple of country-specific questions, so let me start with Venezuela. We have the benefit of having the present Ambassador to Venezuela and the soon to be one. So since one may have greater flexibilities than the other in the pursuit of the answers to the questions, let me start, Ambassador Brownfield. I know that this is where you're leaving, but maybe not what you want to be talking about.

But I am concerned, and of course while I ask the question of Ambassador Brownfield to start, Mr. Duddy, I hope you'll be listening. I am concerned about where Hugo Chavez is taking Venezuela. He, in my mind, continues to erode democratic institutions under the cover of constitutionality, but uses the majorities he has in the congress to change the constitution and therefore erode the very essence of democracy in Venezuela, and to have a cloak of legitimacy in the process of doing so.

That is a very dangerous proposition, not only for Venezuela but throughout the hemisphere that that's the way in which you ultimately achieve absolute power. Freedom House lists Venezuela as only partially free. It ranks it four in political rights out of seven. We have seen President Chavez have new laws enabling him to pass laws by decree; he plans to eliminate the autonomy of the central bank, changing the constitution allowing him to be reelected indefinitely, to nationalize the country's largest telecommunications companies and electricity companies, and to not renew the broadcasting license of Radio Caracas Television.

Then when you see that and you see the opposition that has generated to RCTV's, the pulling of that license, and you see the response by students, which is not the traditional opposition within Venezuela, and you see the polls that Gatos put out of 600 Venezuelans across social class that said 56 percent of them supported the students in this respect, and yet you see President Chavez say they are trying to create a soft revolution fired by the United States. I look at all of that, I look what Venezuela is using with its petrodollars in the hemisphere to try to influence the hemisphere's policy and largely to try to turn the hemisphere against the United States, and I say this is a very significant challenge to our national interests and our national security.

So, Ambassador Brownfield, as someone who is in the post and leaving, how do you respond to these concerns? How would you advise your successor, if you were to give him some free advice, to deal with these issues? What's the U.S. role in this conflict as Chavez continuously moves in a way that is undemocratic, but under the cloak of constitutionality?

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Thank you for this opportunity, Senator, this unexpected opportunity.

Senator MENENDEZ. We'll get to Colombia.

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. May I open by saying—and I want to be very clear on this—not only that I do not disagree with anything you have said, but rather that I agree with every single word you have just articulated. My position over the last 3 years both in public and in private has been to say that there are some fundamental deep-seated differences and disagreements between the United States of America and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela that go to the heart of concepts such as democracy, philosophy, model, vision for the 21st century.

We do not agree with many of these fundamental issues and we not only have a right, I would say we have an obligation to explain and articulate those differences clearly at every appropriate opportunity.

Then I pause and I say we both exist. The United States of America exists and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future.

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela exists. We have to deal with that reality.

My suggestion over the last 3 years, which has not fallen on particularly carefully listening ears down there, has been let us disagree in these important fundamental areas, but see if we can at least establish some sort of dialog, some sort of progress in areas that history and common sense suggest we ought to be able to cooperate on—drugs, terrorism, international crime, energy, bilateral commerce.

I will tell you honestly and somewhat humbly, Senator, that so far my success in that has been roughly equivalent to that of the Baltimore Orioles proceeding to win the World Series this year, which is very close to zero.

Senator MENENDEZ. So I take that President Chavez is not interested in finding areas of common ground where we might at least have common interests?

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Senator, obviously I cannot speak as to exactly what is in President Chavez's mind, although he shares his views with us quite frequently and quite publicly. I will say that I have obviously been unsuccessful in getting him to accept that some sort of pragmatic dialog should be possible even in an overall negative relationship.

My own personal view is that it is difficult for that gentleman to separate the criticism that he receives from us on fundamental issues—democracy, free press, freedom of religion, freedom of protest, freedom of expression—and our willingness to engage in pragmatic dialog in the other area; that at least so far it has not been possible to bridge, if you will, that difference between being negative on one side but still being able to have a positive relationship on the other.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I'll wait for the next round.

Senator WEBB. Would the Senator care to get the views of the prospective Ambassador on this before we proceed?

Senator MENENDEZ. I'd be happy to.

Senator WEBB. Okay, sure.

Senator MENENDEZ. You know, Mr. Duddy, I understand—

Senator WEBB. Let the record show that the outgoing Ambassador has a rather pessimistic outlook on United States-Venezuelan relationships.

Senator MENENDEZ. You're going to try to make the Baltimore Orioles win in your new term. My question is, as you approach this, having heard from our outgoing Ambassador, what do you see the United States Ambassador's role in Venezuela beyond the norm? I know what our roles are and when we send someone to represent our country abroad it's diplomatic, it's economic, it's political. It has all of these different elements.

But this is a very unique case, in which not only is our bilateral relationship at stake, but I would argue that increasingly the multilateral relationships within the hemisphere are being affected by Chavez. So how do you see dealing with this in your new role should you be confirmed by the committee?

Mr. DUDDY. Thank you, Senator, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think I would say in the first instance, returning to something I mentioned earlier, we do see this as a long-term relationship. The current situation is very difficult. Nevertheless, if confirmed I think I would have a particularly important role to play in publicly articulating our values and in looking to build, especially with the Venezuelan people, an appreciation for not only our historic ties, but the way those ties are reinforced and have developed on a basis of shared values.

The reality is in the hemisphere right now that, notwithstanding some difficulties, we have the Inter-American Democratic Charter which articulates in very specific ways the commitments of the hemisphere's democracies. And we've seen most recently, for instance, in Haiti, the hemisphere coming together in support of those values.

I think it falls to me or it will fall to me if I am confirmed to be a spokesman for those values, an advocate for democracy, an explicator of U.S. policy, which is frequently either distorted or misunderstood in some quarters. I think I can be a valid interlocutor on that front. And as in the case of my predecessor, I think it falls to us to try and induce cooperation in those areas where it is plainly in the interests of both Venezuela and the United States to cooperate, and to build from the shared perceptions of dangerous threats as well as opportunities. Things like counterterrorism and counternarcotics resonate with the peoples of both of our nations.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you think it's—Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence.

Do you think it is appropriate for the United States Ambassador to engage with those elements of civil society within Venezuela who are seeking to preserve and promote democracy within their country?

Mr. DUDDY. Senator, I think it's not only appropriate but essential that we engage them, as we would in any country in the world.

Senator MENENDEZ. So you wouldn't be reticent to do that?

Mr. DUDDY. No, sir.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'll wait for the next round.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

Ambassador Brownfield, we've spent \$5 billion over the past 6 years following the start of Plan Colombia, which promised to cut by half the production of coca, and the amount of coca under cultivation is essentially unchanged and we are told that the price on the street has actually dropped. Do you agree with others in the United States Embassy on Bogota who say that this program is going well, and specifically, do you believe that aerial spraying of herbicides, which is costing hundreds of millions of dollars a year, can substantially reduce the production of coca?

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the truth is I do believe our support for Plan Colombia, as it's universally referred to, has in fact been an overall success story, a success story for Colombia, a success story for the region, and a success story for the United States of America.

I would argue that back in 1999 and 2000 when we up here, both you in the legislative branch as well as those of us in the executive branch, examined the threats emanating from Colombia that would

affect the United States of America—drugs, security, and a collapsing economy that was producing pressure on hundreds of thousands of Colombians to come to the United States in an undocumented manner, I think we reached an agreement as to what was the best way for us as a government, as a Nation, as a people, to address these threats.

Seven, going on 8 years have now gone by. I was in Colombia on short visits in the 1990s and I can assure you that is a different country today than it was in 1999. Security on the streets is much better. The economy is booming. Unemployment is down. Jobs are being created. Security, even in the countryside, is far better now than it was then.

Drug production, is it about the same, down a little, up a little? I have seen studies that would support any of those three conclusions. But I have seen no study that suggested it's continuing to explode the way it was through the 1990s.

Do we need to, could we, should we, review our support for Plan Colombia, adjust it in some areas, fine-tune it in some ways, including the issue of eradication, spraying, or in essence how we are attacking the issue of drug cultivation itself? Of course it should. I think we should do that on a regular systematic basis. And perhaps, if this is your decision, naming a new ambassador is a good opportunity to do that in a careful, collective, ideally by consensus manner, I'm all in favor of it.

But before I would say let's eliminate this part of the program, I'd want to make sure we had that conversation, both up here in Washington and down there in Colombia, so that we would have a clear understanding of what the impact of that decision would be and what we would try to replace it with if we made that decision.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

Dr. McKinley, I'd like to ask you some questions about the U.S. free trade agreement which is going to be considered by Congress this year more than likely. What is your view of how the ratification of that agreement would affect the relations between the United States and Peru? Are you of the belief that the current labor provisions in the agreement are adequate?

If the United States Congress does not approve this agreement, do you have thoughts on what impact that would have on our relations?

Dr. MCKINLEY. Obviously, bringing the negotiation on the United States-Peru trade promotion agreement to a conclusion is an important priority for the administration. In terms of how the agreement as it stands would impact on relations, I would note first that economic ties between Peru and the United States have been growing at a very significant pace since 2001, with United States exports to Peru doubling in that time frame and 17 of our United States, in particular, seeing a doubling or a tripling or quadrupling of their trade and export ties with Peru.

So already there is an undercurrent of a strong and growing economic relationship with Peru. What the agreement would introduce is a reciprocal basis for trade relations between the United States and Peru. It would open Peruvian markets more generally to American products. Something like 80 percent of U.S. manufactured

goods, for example, would enter immediately without duty and something like two-thirds of U.S. agricultural products.

Under the current Andean trade preference agreement, Peruvian agricultural products already do have—sorry—exports already do have considerable access to the United States, but the advantage of the agreement under consideration now is its reciprocal nature. The ITC estimates are that the benefits for American business would be an increase of over a billion dollars by 2011 or 2012 in increased exports.

The trade and environmental provisions of the FTA have obviously been of considerable concern. These to my understanding have been worked on. USTR, I think, has been in negotiation and close discussion with Congressional committees and are trying to reach a point where adequate labor provisions are worked into the agreement. And in any case, as we look to if Congress were to approve the agreement to the implementation phase, there would be a strong emphasis on ensuring that implementation was completed before enforcement began.

So while I'm not conversant with the specifics at this stage of the labor provisions, there is the suggestion that we would have both through the negotiations that USTR is having with Congress, with the agreement of the Peruvian Congress, and an implementation phase to address the labor concerns that are there.

In the event of the agreement being approved, I would rather not speculate at this stage. I would note that we do have a strong relationship, that free trade agreements, strengthening of trans-Pacific market is important. Supporting Peru's evolution toward free markets and as a model for the Andean region on how free market and trade can lead to growth which trickles or provides support for broader swaths of the population all underscore the importance of focusing on the mechanisms for producing sustained economic growth as we look at our goals, not just in Peru but in the region and Latin America in general.

Senator WEBB. I thank you for that very comprehensive response.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have one more Venezuelan question. I am concerned about Venezuela's engagement with Iran. It has signed an agreement for \$200 million to finance joint investments in projects in building a series of oil explorations in the Orinoco River belt. They also have announced recently when President Ahmadinejad came in mid-January that they would use a \$2 billion investment fund to fund projects in both countries and other countries as well.

Should the United States be concerned with Venezuela's growing relationship with Iran?

Mr. DUDDY. Thank you, Senator. Certainly we are following developments with Iran very closely and it is a source of concern to us. For the last 2 years, the administration has characterized Venezuela as not cooperating fully in the war on terror. The expanding ties with Iran certainly are a matter that we follow very closely and is a source of concern for the administration.

Senator MENENDEZ. We have two countries in the world that have a great deal of oil supplies, both at this point in time who

have adverse interests to the United States. It seems to me that within the context of the hemisphere itself to have such a relationship, not that we can necessarily stop it, but ultimately is of concern to us and something that I hope we pay a lot of attention to.

Ambassador Brownfield, I want to follow up on the chairman's comments about Colombia. I have supported Plan Colombia. I voted for it when in the House of Representatives. I've been a big supporter. But I am growing skeptical as I don't see the results adding up.

If we looked at the Office of National Drug Control Policy 2006 survey of cultivation in Colombia, it indicates that statistically there's no change in the amount of coca being grown between 2005 and 2006. Even if there is no decrease, I fail to see the status quo as success, especially when considering how much U.S. money is being spent. And I'm not interested in caveats to numbers such as, quote, "confidence intervals." The numbers in the end need to point to progress and not to what works best, and personally I'm not seeing progress.

I can hear myself echoing these remarks and comments when I sat in the House on Plan Colombia in 2005. I look at that and I look at a briefing before the Senate where we were told that 70 percent of fields had been reconstituted within 6 months of spraying, to the most recent State Department verification mission. I think that's a serious problem.

So my question is how we avoid sitting here 2 years from now after you've been down there asking the same questions when faced with the same facts. How do you feel that our current counterdrug programs in Colombia are succeeding? Do you have a sense of why this number on reconstituting is so high, and how can we say that aerial eradication is successful when 70 percent gets reconstituted?

Last, to keep it all in a package here, you know, one of the problems is if you want poor coca farmers to turn away from coca you need to give them sustainable development alternatives so that they can sustain their families. I have a problem when in fact not only have we not seen an increase in alternative development to complement our drug eradication and interdiction program, but the alternative development institution-building program in the ACI account has gone from \$130 million to zero—to zero.

Now, I know some will say, well, we put it in ESF, but ESF doesn't guarantee that it's going to go for that purpose.

So with that as a package, with the realities that we're not moving numbers ahead, that the fields are getting reconstituted to the tune of 70 percent, and that we're going in the opposite direction in terms of alternative development programs, how are we going to claim that Plan Colombia is a continuing success? How are you going to get people like me to continue to be supportive as I have in the past?

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Well, let me try right here, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I'm glad you're smiling, to start off with. That was a smile of positive thinking, that's for sure.

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. That was a smile of departure. Now I'm giving you the smile of arrival.

Let me try to—

Senator WEBB. He's smiling because he's happy to leave the other place. [Laughter.]

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Let the record reflect that it was not the nominee himself who uttered those words.

Senator, let me offer you first 15 seconds of the macro and then address specifically the issue that you raise. I said during my statement, I said in response to the chairman's first question to me, and I repeat now, that as we take a look at the entire package that Plan Colombia was designed by us, by you in the Senate and at that time in the House and by us in the executive branch. What it was designed to address, I state again, it has been to date successful. It has delivered a better Colombia on all of these fronts—security, narcotics, economic, social justice, human rights, administration of justice. Go down the line, the difference between Colombia in 1999 and Colombia in 2007 is notable and visible in all of those areas, thanks largely or at least in large part to our support by the United States Congress, by this Senate and that House for this program.

Now, you have correctly pointed out that one area, specifically drug production, does not show the numbers that people like me were saying to you back in 2000, 2001, we should be seeing now, 6 or 7 years later. What has happened? First, there's no such thing as a perfect plan. A plan has to be changed, adjusted, revised on a regular basis, and that clearly would fall within the responsibility of whoever you should decide to confirm as the next Ambassador to Colombia.

Second, those people who engage in narcotics trafficking are neither stupid nor stationary. They also are changing, adjusting. As they see what is being thrown at them, they are trying to accommodate to keep their business going.

Third, people move. In areas that we were focused on in 2000, 2001, 2002, we now find perhaps are fairly secure, fairly calm, but move 200 or 300 miles to the east or to the north, to the west, depending upon what your starting point is, and you find you've got a brand new area.

The solution in my opinion is let's work on the plan. I have absolutely no problem, no objection whatsoever, to the United States Congress telling us, you had better rework this plan, you had better start reflecting the new realities and delivering some results and some outcomes. I cannot do that overnight. I cannot do that for you by breakfast tomorrow. But I think I should be—in fact, I think you should require me to tell you on a fairly regular, systematic basis what are we doing to change this current plan so that we are going to address what you have described.

I believe if we do it that way we'll actually accomplish what we all want to accomplish, reduce the production of cocaine in Colombia and reduce the amount of cocaine that is coming into the United States of America.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, Mr. Chairman, I'll make a final remark. The chairman's been very generous with his time.

Let me just say two things. One is reconstitution has nothing to do about moving to different areas. Reconstitution is about reconstituting the same area that has been eradicated. And that's a problem.

I appreciate your response insofar as both making you responsible should you be our ambassador, and I think you will be. Second, having some reporting to the Congress, because those of us who have been supportive—and I agree with you, Plan Colombia is more than about eradication. But when you look at the whole element of eradication and interdiction and when you look at the sustainable development alternatives which we are not pursuing and when you look at the latest set of circumstances as we talk about a trade agreement with Colombia, with some of the things that have been happening in that respect, where some of the administration's closest allies in the region have government ties with right-wing paramilitaries that have violated human rights, it's not the perfect picture that some in the administration would like to promote.

I think those are serious questions and I hope that, as someone who has supported President Uribe, I hope he understands that there is still some response necessary here for continuing large investments of the United States and a trade agreement.

Then finally, Dr. McKinley, I didn't want you to feel slighted that I didn't have any questions for you, but I will say this. I think Peru's an incredibly important part of our relationship in this hemisphere. I know they are planning the free trade agreement and the chairman asked about it. I want to tell you this: The Peruvians have to understand that arbitrary and capriciousness in their tax laws in SUNAT and others is not going to serve them well in the promotion of a free trade agreement.

I have New Jersey companies that made investments legitimately in Peru, that did it under their rule of law, that followed their tax policies, and then the Peruvians arbitrarily and capriciously had in essence a confiscation. Well, that's not the type of country I want to be dealing free trade agreements with, and I hope the Peruvians, and I hope you'll be part of that if you ultimately, and I believe you will, become our ambassador, make a very clear statement to the Peruvians that it's in their own interests—forgetting us, protecting United States companies and interests, which we should—it's in their own interest at the end of the day to have transparency to make sure that the rule of law is observed, because otherwise nobody's going to go and invest in Peru if their investments are going to be taken.

So I hope we'll have another opportunity at another time to talk about that.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

I'd like to note for the record that another vote has been called on the floor. We have about 11 minutes on the vote. I have one other question and then, Senator Menendez, if you have any others, and then we can wrap this up.

For the record, again, Ambassador Brownfield, you're aware that 4 years ago three Americans were taken hostage in Colombia by forces that are by definition hostile to the interests of the United States. Proof of life has been established. Can you provide us an update on where that situation is?

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure, Mr. Chairman. As you know—and let me restate it here for the record—recent proof of life was

offered within the past 2 months. It was offered by a Colombia national police officer who had also been seized by the FARC and held for many years, escaped a little over a month ago, finally found his way home, and in debriefings both with the Government of Colombia and with the United States Government personnel did provide sufficient detail and evidence to convince both us and the Colombia counterparts that he had in fact seen Mr. Stansell, Mr. Howes, and Mr. Gonsalves alive within the last 2 months.

That's good news because the previous last proof of life we had received was nearly 4 years old.

Let me just make the same simple statement that I made in my opening statement. Mr. Chairman, we all have a solemn obligation, you, me, and quite frankly everyone in this room, and that obligation is to do whatever we can to get these three United States citizens seized, held against their will, in captivity for 4 years and I believe now 4 months, to get them home safely to their families.

That I take as my responsibility. I am open to considering any option, any possibility to accomplish that mission. My door will be open to the families, to friends, to anyone who can offer information that would help us accomplish that objective. In my opinion it is an absolute outrage that an organization would hold three innocent men as hostages for more than 4 years without offering them the opportunity of returning to their families.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, and I'd like to thank all of the nominees for your testimony today, for your willingness to serve our country in these important positions. I expect from the testimony and from all the preparation that you will all soon be proceeding to your new positions and I look forward to working with all of you to work toward solving some of these problems and addressing others that over a time period probably can't be solved, but can at least be mitigated.

The record will remain open for 2 days so that committee members can submit additional questions for the record, and I ask that the nominees respond expeditiously in the event that there are such questions.

If no one else has any additional comments, I thank you for your time. I thank you for your full careers, all three of you in this area. I think it's tremendous that our Government can produce people with these sorts of backgrounds to address the issues that we have, and I look forward to working with you in the future.

We are now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF PATRICK DENNIS DUDDY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. President Chavez has called the students demonstrating against the denial of a license to Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), without any due process even through the Government of Venezuela's own communications authorities, "pawns" of the United States. Did the United States play any role in those demonstrations? Has the United States had any contact with the student protestors?

Answer. The United States has played no role in the student demonstrations that arose in reaction to the closure of Radio Caracas Television (RCTV). In the normal course of diplomatic activities the United States Embassy in Caracas has routine

interaction with many parts of civil society, including students. The United States did not, however, have contact with the student organizers in connection with the demonstrations.

Question. President Chavez says he is a champion of the people. To the best of your knowledge, what do current polls reveal about Chavez's popularity in Venezuela since the closure of RCTV?

Answer. A June poll by the Venezuelan survey research firm Hinterlaces showed 41 percent of those surveyed had a favorable rating of President Chavez's administration or "gestion." In November 2006, the same pollster found 49 percent of Venezuelans surveyed had a favorable opinion.

Another poll taken in June by the firm Datos found that over 66 percent of those surveyed disapprove of the closure of RCTV. Over 55 percent disapprove of the government's handling of the issue and matters dealing with freedom of expression, and its reaction to the student protests.

Question. Doesn't article 23 of the Venezuelan Constitution suggest that the Government of Venezuela is bound by treaties it has signed, and that issues of freedom of expression that relate to human rights are under Venezuela's Bolivarian Constitution, properly the subject of scrutiny by bodies such as the OAS, the United Nations, or other bodies whose enabling legislation in the form of treaties has been signed and agreed to by the Government of Venezuela, thereby giving those bodies proper jurisdiction in this area?

Answer. Venezuela and all the democracies of the hemisphere are signatories to international instruments that set forth principles and obligations regarding human rights and democratic governance.

In addition, article 23 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela states that "Treaties, pacts and conventions relating to human rights that have been signed and ratified by Venezuela have constitutional rank and priority in the domestic sphere in so far as they contain norms on the enjoyment and exercise of [human rights] which are more favorable than those established in the Constitution and the laws of the Republic, and [such norms] are immediately and directly applicable by the tribunals and other organs of the Republic."

In her remarks before the OAS General Assembly in Panama on June 4, Secretary Rice raised the closure of RCTV and the growing threats to freedom of expression in Venezuela. She echoed the United States Senate's call in Senate Resolution 211 for OAS leadership and action. ". . . [T]he members of the OAS must defend freedom where it is under siege in our hemisphere and we must support freedom wherever and whenever it is denied."

On June 19, we sent OAS Secretary General Insulza a diplomatic note formally reiterating the Secretary's request that the Secretary General make "every effort to visit Venezuela to consult in good faith with all interested parties in the case of Radio Caracas TV (RCTV), or consider other actions to address the situation, and to make a full report to the foreign ministers through the Permanent Council at the earliest opportunity."

The administration and, if confirmed, I will make every effort to encourage sustained OAS attention to this matter. The OAS can and should play a key role in actively promoting the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Democratic Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The United States and all member states should support and, when necessary, instigate its proper involvement.

Question. Given Venezuela's importance as an energy supplier to the United States, can you provide the latest data on the number of barrels of oil shipped to the United States from Venezuela over the last 5 years? Can you please explain whether the Government of Venezuela has increased or decreased its shipments? If production has decreased, what are the reasons for this decrease? Do you regard Venezuela as a reliable energy supplier to the United States?

Answer. According to the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA), Venezuela's total gross exports to the United States since 2001 were:

VENEZUELA OIL EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES

(Thousand barrels per day)

Year	Crude oil	Refined products	Total
2001	1,291	262	1,553
2002	1,201	198	1,399
2003	1,183	193	1,376
2004	1,297	258	1,555
2005	1,241	288	1,529
2006	1,138	270	1,408

Exports to the United States peaked in 2004 and have declined since, although the United States continues to receive over 60 percent of Venezuela's production in direct shipments. In addition, Venezuela ships roughly 300,000 barrels per day to a refinery in St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands.

The Energy Information Administration assesses Venezuelan production at approximately 2.4 million barrels of crude oil per day, or more than 500,000 barrels per day less than production before the December 2002–February 2003 oil workers strike. Private sector sources estimate oil production to be between 2.1–2.3 million barrels per day. This decrease has been caused by a number of factors including the strike that effectively stopped all production by the state oil company, PDVSA; production cuts ordered by PDVSA to comply with OPEC quota reductions in late 2006; and difficulties in transitioning the 32 fields operated by international oil companies under “operating service agreements” to new joint venture companies in 2006.

Another factor is what we believe is a long-term structural decline in production from Venezuela's mature oil fields.

Venezuela has been a long-term and reliable supplier of oil to the United States. PDVSA's current 5-year plan indicates that the company plans to maintain its exports to the United States at current levels in 2012.

Question. Venezuela has shipped oil at discounted prices to various parts of the world, including the United States. Can you tell us what Venezuela's posture has been in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) relative to energy prices, and what role Venezuela has played regarding oil prices in the market? Could you provide information regarding where Venezuela is providing discounted oil? Please provide information regarding where Venezuelan Government-owned refineries are around the world. And please provide an estimate of how much money has been lost as a result. Please provide updated information regarding reports that the Government of Venezuela is interested in selling CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anonima (PDVSA). If reports are true, who are the interested buyers?

Answer. Under the Chavez administration, Venezuela has been a price hawk in OPEC, seeking to maintain high oil prices. The December 2002–February 2003 oil strike resulted in the loss of both production and spare capacity.

The decline in Venezuela's production capacity prompted the government to intensify its calls for a higher OPEC target price band in order to offset the fall in revenue resulting from lower export volumes.

Venezuela is currently providing subsidized oil shipments to Cuba as well as to members of the PetroCaribe oil alliance. The PetroCaribe signatory nations include Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname. In fact, however, only Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica have received fairly steady shipments from Venezuela, while other countries have received sporadic or no shipments. Private sector sources have indicated that Venezuela may also be providing subsidized oil shipments to China.

Strictly speaking, Venezuela does not lose money on its financed shipments of oil and refined products. Since OPEC rules do not allow members to sell at a discount, Venezuela instead offers generous financing terms. These nations pay a certain percentage up front and the remainder can be paid through a 25-year financing agreement at 1 percent interest. Venezuela carries significant currency risk in these payment terms and may lose money on interest-rate differentials. In addition, it carries risk related to recipient countries' ability and willingness to pay these debts.

Besides the refineries it operates domestically, Venezuela's state oil company, PDVSA, currently has the following refinery investments internationally:

- CITGO, PDVSA's wholly owned U.S. subsidiary, operates three product refineries in Lake Charles, Louisiana; Corpus Christi, Texas; and Lemont, Illinois.
- CITGO also has two asphalt refineries in the United States in Paulsboro, New Jersey; and Savannah, Georgia.
- PDVSA also has a 50 percent stake in ExxonMobil's Chalmette, Louisiana refinery, as well as certain units at ConocoPhillips' Sweeny, Texas refinery.
- PDVSA has a 50 percent stake in the Hovensa refinery in St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands and leases the Emmastad refinery in Curacao.
- PDVSA participates in two joint refining ventures in Europe: A 50 percent stake in AB Nynas, a Swedish company that operates five refineries; as well as a 50 percent stake in Ruhr Oel, which has ownership stakes in five German refineries.

Over the past few years, Venezuelan Government officials have made contradictory statements about their intent to sell the CITGO refineries in the United States. Last year, former CITGO CEO, Felix Rodriguez, said that the Government of Venezuela did not plan to sell off the company's assets. Despite this, the company does seem to be seeking a buyer for its two asphalt refineries. Rumors of the potential sale of other CITGO assets continue to circulate, but we have not seen any concrete information about such plans nor who the potential buyers would be.

Question. Please indicate the frequency and character of engagement between the United States Government and the Government of Venezuela on energy issues. Who is representing the United States Government to the Government of Venezuela on energy issues? What are the U.S. Government priorities in the bilateral energy relationship?

Answer. While there has been a reduction in contacts between the Government of Venezuela and the United States Government on energy issues, we continue to look for opportunities to discuss a range of issues.

The United States Ambassador to Venezuela serves as the principal link to the Venezuelan Government, although the current ambassador has not been able to meet with the Energy Minister despite our requests. In the past, lower-level United States Government officials in Washington and Caracas have maintained contacts with Venezuelan Government officials on energy issues. However, Venezuelan Government officials have not responded to repeated requests for appointments by lower-level embassy officials in recent months.

Venezuela, traditionally, has been a reliable supplier and the United States a dependable consumer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure this relationship continues to benefit both our nations.

Question. How much of the Government of Venezuela's spending is financed through oil and natural gas exports? How has that level changed over the past 8 years? What amount of future income from oil and natural gas exports is necessary to meet projected Government of Venezuela domestic expenditure and foreign loans and grants?

Answer.

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA BUDGETS
(1999–2006)

Year	GDP	Budget (% GDP)	Budget (billions)	Oil income (% GDP)	Oil income (billions)	Oil income (% of budget)
1999	\$103.3	19.8	\$20.5	7.3	\$7.5	36.9
2000	\$121.3	21.8	\$26.4	10.6	\$12.9	48.6
2001	\$126.2	25.1	\$31.7	9.9	\$12.5	39.4
2002	\$95.4	26.1	\$24.9	10.9	\$10.4	41.8
2003	\$82.8	27.8	\$23.0	11.8	\$9.8	42.4
2004	\$109.2	26.5	\$28.9	11.5	\$12.6	43.4
2005	\$127.0	26.9	\$34.2	14.1	\$17.9	52.4
2006	\$174.7	33.8	\$59.0	16.9	\$29.5	50.0

As indicated by the table above, approximately 50 percent of the Government of Venezuela budget is derived from oil sales (Venezuela does not export natural gas).

The table demonstrates clearly that this level has increased in the past 8 years. In 2005, the Government of Venezuela created a parallel, or off-budget National Development Fund (FONDEN), which to date has received over \$27 billion from

Central Bank reserves and in direct transfers from PDVSA. Information about the FONDEN accounts is very limited. Thus, the budgetary numbers above do not necessarily paint a complete picture of 2005 and 2006.

It is difficult to set a number for future income which the Government of Venezuela needs to sustain its domestic fiscal policy much less its foreign loans and grants. While the Government of Venezuela has promised over \$100 billion toward projects outside Venezuela since the beginning of 2005, it is very difficult to say what portion will actually be spent.

Venezuelan oil production is not expected to rise in the near-term and most analysts predict that the price of the Venezuelan oil basket will range between \$50–\$60 per barrel in 2007. This may leave the government with the problem of stagnating revenues and increasing costs.

Most analysts believe that the Government of Venezuela has approximately \$30 billion in off-budget funds and another \$25 billion in foreign exchange reserves although the lack of transparency of government accounts makes these only assumptions. These funds could serve to cushion Venezuelan Government expenditures for some time to come.

A devaluation, while painful to ordinary Venezuelans, would also allow the Venezuelan Government to generate more bolivars for every dollar of oil revenue with which to meet domestic commitments.

Question. Secretary Rice has spoken often of “Transformational Diplomacy”; can you tell us what your vision is for the implementation of Transformational Diplomacy in Venezuela, and what specific steps you think you can take, while respecting the sovereign rights of the Government of Venezuela, and taking cognizance of the delicate situation which we find ourselves in regarding our relations with Venezuela?

Answer. Our efforts in Venezuela have been anchored by an advocacy of the President’s positive agenda for the hemisphere (consolidating democracy, promoting prosperity, investing in people, and promoting the democratic state). With many Venezuelan governmental institutions reluctant or unwilling to work directly with the United States Government, our approach has been to take our message directly to the Venezuelan people via the media, NGO’s, the private sector, and educational institutions. We have used new mechanisms, including baseball diplomacy and, recently, a major cultural stage show featuring popular American dance in order to consistently remind the Venezuelan people that we remain a committed and reliable friend of the Venezuelan people and are seeking to maintain United States-Venezuelan ties, despite government hostility to the United States.

We have also opened four American Corners in Venezuelan public institutions in provincial capitals and have launched a microscholarship program for young people to learn English.

If confirmed, I will continue to seek new means to advance our public diplomacy goals including the opening of additional American Corners and the expansion of the scholarship program.

Question. Please explain the Government of Venezuela’s interest in closer relations with Hamas? Should this be cause for alarm? If so, why?

Answer. In general, we have been disappointed in Venezuela’s lack of cooperation in global antiterrorism efforts. Publicly, senior Government of Venezuela officials have expressed sympathy and moral support for Hamas, which is a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under United States law. The reasons for Venezuela’s sympathies for Hamas are not fully clear, though Venezuela’s “anti-imperialist” foreign policy may provide some basis.

Certainly, this is cause for serious concern. Venezuela’s increasing ties with Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism, was an important factor that led President Bush to determine in 2006 that Venezuela was not fully cooperative in United States antiterrorism efforts. Absent willingness by Venezuela to cooperate in deterring this common global threat, the United States Government will continue to scrutinize closely Venezuela relationships with FTOs such as Hamas.

Question. Please explain the Government of Venezuela’s interest in purchasing Russian submarines? What is the military justification for such a purchase? Please provide an assessment of neighboring countries’ capabilities in this regard, and whether Government of Venezuela’s acquisition of this capability would pose a threat that could lead to a regional arms race. How should the United States address this situation in terms of its arms sales policies to the region?

Answer. President Chavez has stated repeatedly and as recently as June 21, his intention to purchase Russian submarines. The acquisition of advanced submarines could give Venezuela a military advantage in force projection over that of its neigh-

bors, though this would depend to a great degree on the Venezuelans' ability to maintain and deploy such a complicated system and the nature of the specific subsystems and weapons with which the submarines Venezuela acquires are equipped. We have urged the Government of Venezuela to practice full transparency with its neighbors in its arms acquisitions.

The United States Government has already responded to Venezuela's ambitious arms build-up by imposing a ban on all United States arms sales and services to Venezuela. Under this policy, we are also required to deny licenses to third countries that wish to export arms sales and services to Venezuela that involve United States munitions list equipment. We repeatedly have urged all major arms suppliers to practice restraint in their military sales or transfers to Venezuela given, in part, the deterioration of democratic conditions in Venezuela and the effect these acquisitions will have on regional stability.

Question. There is much concern in the United States Senate for what occurs within Venezuela's borders, as domestic factors play an important role in defining Venezuela's intentions in the region and the world.

The United States Senate stands firm, as was demonstrated by the overwhelming bipartisan support for a recent resolution passed by unanimous consent on May 24, 2007, and cited by Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, at the recent Organization of American States (OAS) Assembly on Panama earlier this month, rejecting the closure of RCTV (S. Res. 211).

I introduced this resolution with Senator Dodd and one of its intentions was to highlight to the citizens of the United States the unfortunate deterioration of democracy in Venezuela. The resolution is proof that when it comes to United States policy toward Venezuela, there is one United States policy, from both aisles of the United States Congress and from both branches of our Government.

Nevertheless, many transnational issues remain that present challenges to our interests and those of other countries in the region, from energy to narcotics and to security, especially. In these areas, threats have been made by the Government of Venezuela that raise questions regarding our overall policy approach to Venezuela.

In this regard is there a "red line" in our relationship with Venezuela that if crossed would lead to serious consequences for the Government of Venezuela? Should there be one?

Answer. Both President Bush and Secretary Rice have expressed concern over the erosion of democratic institutions in Venezuela. We have been firm in reminding Venezuela of its obligations to its citizens as a signatory to the Inter-American Democratic Charter and other international instruments. It was for this reason the Secretary called on OAS Secretary General Insulza to visit Venezuela to investigate the vulnerabilities to freedom of speech made evident by the Government of Venezuela's decision not to renew the RCTV license. The Secretary's decision also reflected increased concern from other hemispheric partners in the OAS.

We will continue to take actions to protect our homeland from the scourge of drugs and terrorism and will continue to engage and consult closely with key allies in the region and beyond to determine appropriate steps required to protect democracy and security interests. Many countries, for instance, are affected by the drug flow through Venezuela—we are working with them to press Venezuela to take steps to disrupt trafficking organizations.

RESPONSES OF PATRICK DENNIS DUDDY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Venezuela? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Venezuela? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right and essential to democracy. Over the past few weeks, freedom of expression in Venezuela—press freedom in particular—has experienced a worrisome setback. The United States Senate, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, other governments, and countless international human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have expressed their concern over the May 27 closure of RCTV.

This adds to our growing concerns about the concentration of power in Venezuela, the deterioration of checks and balances, and the erosion of respect for human rights and the rule of law.

If confirmed, I will continue to seek to work with our hemispheric and European partners and through multilateral and international organizations to support the right of all Venezuelans to express their views freely.

In addition, I will continue the work we are doing in Venezuela, as elsewhere, to strengthen civil society, political parties, labor unions, and the independent media that play an important role in the democratic process in any country. Our programs offer support to NGOs open to Venezuelans of every political persuasion.

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Venezuela in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. In Venezuela, as elsewhere, much of the embassy's work on human rights and democracy is accomplished through its programs with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Our programs work with NGOs that welcome participation from Venezuelans of all political persuasions. The 2006 Country Report on Human Rights conditions in Venezuela reported that, although a wide variety of independent domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, several domestic human rights NGOs received threats and intimidation by government representatives and supporters. More generally, NGOs are increasingly viewed with suspicion by some elements of the Government of Venezuela.

Moreover, an "international cooperation" law under consideration by the National Assembly would restrict NGOs' ability to receive foreign funding and to operate independently. The nationalization of several private sector companies earlier this year eliminated another important source of funding, particularly for human rights NGOs.

Beyond the threat that they may lose their funding, some NGOs increasingly worry that being associated with the United States would compromise them with the Government of Venezuela. We will continue to work with those who wish to work with us, but will be respectful of the decision that some may make not to do so.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. The promotion of human rights is already an important embassy priority and is one that I will maintain if I am confirmed.

If confirmed, I would stipulate that engagement on human rights issues would be a requirement in the annual work goals of the relevant embassy political and public diplomacy officers. I would ensure that the relevant embassy personnel have access to the appropriate training and professional development opportunities, whether through courses at the Foreign Service Institute or in venues such as the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor's annual Human Rights officer conference.

I would make it clear to all embassy personnel that advocacy for human rights and accurate and timely reporting on such issues is an important embassy reporting requirement. I would ensure that such issues would be addressed in the annual performance review of the relevant embassy officers. I would also work to ensure that truly exceptional performance receives the attention it merits, for example by nominating outstanding officers for Departmental awards that recognize their efforts.

I would plan to meet regularly with the appropriate local interlocutors and the embassy personnel working on these issues to underline to them that this issue is important to me as chief of mission.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. The promotion of human rights and democracy has played an important role in my career. Most recently I worked on restoring democracy and the rule of law, and diminishing the level of violence in Haiti. I played a personal role in advocating for human rights issues during the period of the interim government and I believe my intervention aided materially in the release of one high profile detainee for medical treatment.

When assigned as the Consul General in Sao Paulo, I worked closely in support of the establishment of the Sao Paulo state Office on Trafficking in Persons, one of the first such offices ever supported at the subnational level. This office helped to establish combating human trafficking as an issue in which local and regional government has a legitimate role and responsibility.

Earlier in my career, I was active in raising levels of concern about human rights issues in Paraguay as that country was working to complete its transition to democracy. I believe that United States attention to human rights there helped to establish progress in that arena as an important indicator of the country's over all progress in leaving behind the legacy of Paraguay's authoritarian past.

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Colombia? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Colombia? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. The persistence of a complex and violent armed conflict is the greatest obstacle to the advancement of human rights in Colombia, resulting in numerous homicides, kidnappings, and massive internal displacement of Colombian citizens. The majority of human rights abuses are carried out by illegal armed groups, principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and paramilitary organizations. Key to ending these abuses is weakening the control of illegal armed groups so that the state may bring the security and stability necessary to protect human rights and consolidate democracy.

Four decades of violence has hindered the Colombian Government's ability to consolidate democracy and establish state presence throughout the country and has strained the government's resources. The government has made great strides in taking back swaths of territory from illegal armed groups, has successfully demobilized over 30,000 paramilitary members, and continues vigorous operations against the FARC, ELN, emerging criminal groups, and the narco-trafficking industry that is their primary source of funding. However, major challenges remain in defeating Colombia's illegal armed groups.

Throughout this conflict, there have also been allegations of human rights abuses by members of the armed forces. The United States has repeatedly raised its concerns over these reports, and the Colombian Government has responded positively, instituting changes to try to prevent these alleged abuses. It has also made changes in its judicial procedures to ensure civilian control over cases involving the military and a change in its criminal code and justice system that allows for cases to move much more quickly from arrest to verdict than under the old system. The Colombian Government also runs—with United States support—two protection programs that together total \$34 million (2006 budget) and provide protection to approximately 10,000 individuals. It has established a special labor sub-unit within the Prosecutor General's Office to prioritize the resolution of cases of violence against trade unionists. However, more remains to be done.

Central to continued progress on human rights is maintaining a close and constructive relationship with the Government of Colombia. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Colombian Government to improve respect for human rights within the military and to improve its capacity to stamp out the illegal armed groups that operate within its borders. United States programs will continue to focus on the promotion and protection of human rights; the prevention of human rights abuses; and increasing the capacity of the Colombian Government to provide the social services necessary to assist the internally displaced.

Likewise, maintaining a strong, supportive relationship between the United States Embassy and human rights NGOs in Colombia is critical to ensuring continued progress on pressing human rights concerns. The work of these organizations is a vital part of Colombian democracy and, if confirmed, I will continue to work with the Colombian Government to ensure their safety.

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Colombia in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. The primary challenges to advancing human rights and consolidating democracy in Colombia continues to be the four-decade-old armed conflict with illegal armed groups financed by narcotics revenues, combined with a slow judicial system that has facilitated a culture of impunity.

The majority of human rights abuses are carried out by illegal armed groups, principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and paramilitary organizations. These groups continue to hinder the consolidation of democracy in Colombia by preventing the state from establishing presence throughout its territory and bringing the services that accompany a democracy to its people. Until the influence of the illegal armed groups oper-

ating within Colombia's borders is diminished, advancing human rights and consolidating democracy will continue to be an arduous task.

The Colombian Government, with United States support, continues to weaken the control of these organizations, but the task is not over. The FARC is weakened but not yet defeated. Additional support may be needed to ensure the Colombian Government maintains its momentum in defeating this organization. The Colombian Government is talking to the ELN about a possible demobilization, but the outcome remains to be seen. If an agreement is reached, the government will undoubtedly require international assistance to see it through.

Over 30,000 paramilitary members have demobilized from over 35 paramilitary groups, including the largest of these, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). However, the government faces the triple-headed challenge of (1) vigorously implementing the Justice and Peace Law, and thereby taking testimony from approximately 3,000 demobilized paramilitaries eligible for benefits under the law and over 60,000 victims; (2) reintegrating the demobilized into society and ensuring they do not return to a life of crime; and (3) combating the newly emerging criminal groups that are rushing to fill the vacuum left by the demobilization of these groups.

In addition, Colombia's judicial system has been slow to adjudicate allegations of human rights abuses by Colombian military personnel. Decades of delayed response to allegations of such abuses and an almost zero percent conviction rate have fed a culture of impunity in Colombia. Recognizing this dilemma, Colombia began—and is in the middle of—a historic transition from an outmoded inquisitorial judicial system to a new oral accusatory criminal justice system, with the Prosecutor General's Office leading the charge. The changes are being introduced through a gradual four-phase regional process, which will be completed in 2008.

The system enables cases to progress much faster from arrest to verdict than under the old inquisitorial system, with cases averaging 6 to 18 months to resolve. Compared to an average of 3 to 5 years for resolution of cases under the old system, this is an average reduction of over 80 percent in the time that it takes to resolve criminal cases. The new system has also shown a 60 to 80 percent conviction rate, a vast improvement over the 0 to 3 percent conviction rate under the old system.

The transparency of the new system brings with it an increased need for protection of witnesses, courtrooms, and judicial officers. Colombia's overburdened Prosecutor General's Office will need a great deal of international support to ensure it successfully completes this transition and to prevent old habits from carrying over into new practices.

The office also faces the challenge of strengthening its Human Rights and Justice and Peace Units, and providing additional support to overburdened judges so that outstanding cases can be resolved. The 351-person Human Rights Unit has within it a sub-unit to prioritize 204 cases of violence against trade unionists. Created in October 2006, this sub-unit is an important step toward ending impunity in these cases. Similar prioritization needs to be given to resolve outstanding human rights cases. The 186-person Justice and Peace Unit faces the enormous task of implementing the justice side of the Justice and Peace Law. This entails taking voluntary confessions from 2,812 demobilized paramilitary members, receiving reports from and interviewing victims, and exhuming and identifying victims at massacre sites. In just over one year, with limited resources, through the 40 *versiones libres* (confessions from demobilized paramilitary leaders) it has taken to date, the unit has attained confessions for 200 murder cases and confirmed the locations of over 90 mass grave locations, which have resulted in locating over 704 victims (of which, 42 have been identified and 188 others have been preliminarily identified). After receiving information from over 60,000 victims, the unit estimates an additional 3,200 bodies have yet to be exhumed. Though the Colombian Congress approved an additional \$600,000 in assistance for the unit on May 16, additional resources and personnel are greatly needed.

As the Colombian Government tackles impunity in human rights cases and implements the Justice and Peace Law, it will also need to increase protection for victims, witnesses, and vulnerable groups to ensure that human rights are protected and justice is served. The Colombian Government runs—with United States support—two protection programs that together total \$34 million (2006 budget) and provide protection to approximately 10,000 individuals. These programs are vital to preventing human rights abuses and more needs to be done to coordinate the two in order to ensure that vulnerable persons receive the protection they need.

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Colombian Government and international partners—including NGOs and international organizations—to ensure these challenges are met and that respect for human rights and democracy are advanced throughout the process.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service.

Answer. The promotion of human rights was at the center of United States Embassy activities in Bogota under Ambassador Patterson and Ambassador Wood. If confirmed, I will do all I can to ensure that the widely recognized improvements that occurred during their tenures will continue. We seek an end to the cycle of violence, respect for the human rights of all Colombians, especially vulnerable groups; expansion of protection programs; and an end to impunity.

Human rights issues will be at the forefront of my agenda in meetings with Colombian Government officials at every level. In addition, I will continue the periodic meetings and consultations with Colombian and international human rights organizations as well as representatives of international organizations such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bogota and the International Committee of the Red Cross. My door will be open, as will be the door of all key staff.

In addition, I will certainly continue my practice of meeting often with embassy officers who work on human rights issues and to give them my full support. This includes making sure that all elements of the embassy understand the importance of our human rights concerns and are accurately reflecting them in our activities.

I will also pay close attention to ensure that the formulation of our proposals for U.S. Government programs includes protection of human rights, justice sector reforms, humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons, and attention to the situation of indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.

If confirmed, I will continue to mandate that the embassy adhere to Secretary Rice's 10 guiding NGO principles regarding the treatment by governments of nongovernmental organizations. In concordance with the Guiding Principles on Non-Governmental Organizations, we will continue to recognize that nongovernmental organizations are essential to the development and success of free societies and they play a vital role in ensuring accountable, democratic governments.

Supporting human rights is a top strategic priority of the political section, USAID, NAS and the mission as a whole. If confirmed, ensuring that these mission elements have what they need to do their job—support Colombia's efforts to improve its human rights situation, advocate on behalf of our key human rights interests, and call attention to lapses and abuses—will be a top priority of mine. The embassy's designated "Human rights officers" generally work in the political section—coordinating closely with other offices and agencies—on portfolios that are among the mission's most substantive, interesting, and exciting. In that sense, the position generates the kinds of challenging professional opportunities that translate into recognition and advancement. I plan to make sure that that is and remains the case in Embassy Bogota. To that end, I would encourage the relevant embassy personnel to take advantage of opportunities for professional development and networking, such as the annual Human Rights Officer's Conference run by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.

In previous posts, I have always tried to recognize Foreign Service officers for superior service, either through their performance reviews or special awards, and intend to continue to do so. One way to recognize outstanding work by our human rights officers is to nominate them for the Annual Assistant Secretary's Award from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for exceptional achievement in the field of democracy and human rights.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. During my career, and especially as I moved into more senior positions, I have sought to ensure that the promotion of human rights objectives are an integral part of U.S. Embassy activities. In my many years of public service, I have always placed great emphasis on human rights. The following is a review of some of the actions I have taken in this area:

- El Salvador (1981–1983): I worked to bring to justice the murderers of four United States churchwomen, two AFL–CIO advisers, and the head of the campesino (peasant farmer) union, and several other labor leaders. I also initiated outreach and programs with Nahuat indigenous communities in western El Salvador.
- Argentina (1986–1989): As human rights officer, I worked with the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, Nobel Prize-Winner Perez Ezquivel, and other NGO's to bring

to account those who had abused human rights during previous years of military rule.

- Geneva (1995–1998): As Counselor for Humanitarian Affairs, I worked with the U.N. and other international organizations to bring initial international relief, support, and observation to Bosnia (Srebrenijna and Sarajevo), the Great Lakes region of central Africa (Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire), and the Kurdish provinces of northern Iraq, and West Africa.
- Colombia (as Deputy Assistant Secretary, 1999–2001): Established and initially led the quarterly United States Government consultations with United States, Colombian, and international NGO's on human rights, integrated human rights programs into United States support for Plan Colombia, and provided input for United States policy and operations. This work earlier included consulting with NGOs and Congressional staffers on establishment of a certification process that would measure Colombia's human rights progress. While not perfect, this process has contributed to the significant improvements we have seen in Colombia since 2000.
- Chile (2002–2004): As the United States Ambassador to Chile, I established public affairs programs in support of Mapuche indigenous communities in southern Chile.
- Venezuela (2004–2007): Most recently, as the United States Ambassador to Venezuela, I provided regular, systematic, and public support for all human rights, civil society, free speech, and democracy NGO's in Venezuela, including direct and indirect funding for more than 20 such organizations. I defended publicly all these NGO's, which brought a threat of expulsion from the Venezuelan authorities. I visited most of these NGO's in their offices, in the face of violent Chavista mob attacks and protests. I also established support programs for Venezuelan poor indigenous and Afro-Venezuelan communities for education and health care.

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. How would the Government of Colombia react if the United States Congress failed to ratify a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between our two countries? What implications would the failure to ratify this agreement have for Colombia and for our greater interests in Latin America?

Answer. Failure to approve this agreement would strain relations with the Colombian people, and would have ramifications for United States foreign policy interests throughout the region. The carefully negotiated agreement that we signed with Colombia is widely seen as a mutually beneficial trade pact that will expand economic and social opportunity, thereby helping to lock-in Colombia's hard won gains. If we fail to approve the agreement, it will cause others throughout the region to question our reliability and the sincerity of our commitment to the human and developmental goals that are the cornerstone of our policy in the region. As a result, we would suffer a tremendous setback in securing a prosperous and free hemisphere.

The Colombian people have worked hard—and paid an enormous human price—to achieve a stable, democratic, transparent political system. They have vested their hopes in, and given their votes to, a President who is extending his government's authority throughout the country and seeking to deliver security, health care, economic opportunity, and education to all Colombians. Colombia embraces democratic governance and open markets as the path to economic opportunity and freedom for its people. It shares our belief that the trade agreement will contribute to the overall development and growth of its nation and to bring expanded opportunity to all sectors of society.

The United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) will solidify the social and economic reforms that have provided sustained growth over the past 5 years. It will develop a permanent base on which to boost trade, attract investment, create jobs, and further cut poverty. Trade-led growth creates higher-paying jobs, and workers in trading industries enjoy improved conditions and benefits. Prestigious Colombian academics and economists predict a minimum 3 percent GDP benefit from CTPA passage.

Question. What are Colombia's largest export and import markets currently? What products? Would an FTA between the United States and Colombia change commercial flows for Colombia? How so?

Answer. Colombia's largest export markets are the United States, Venezuela, Ecuador, Spain, and Peru. Major exports to the United States include: petroleum and petroleum products, coal, coffee, flowers, gold, bananas, and apparel.

Colombia receives most of its imports from the United States, Mexico, China, Brazil, and Venezuela. Major imports from the United States are: corn, chemicals, aircraft and aircraft parts, wheat, machinery, and oils.

According to the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) "may have a small, positive effect on the United States economy." United States exports to Colombia will experience an estimated 13.7 percent increase valued at \$1.1 billion with full implementation of the TPA, and United States GDP is expected to increase by \$2.5 billion (just under .05 percent). The ITC projects "the TPA will provide annual benefits to U.S. consumers worth \$419 million in the economy of 2007." Because of tariff asymmetry (especially the tariff preferences currently provided to Colombian exports to the United States under the Andean Trade Preference Act), the commission report notes that "the TPA is likely to result in a much greater increase in United States exports to Colombia" than vice versa.

Question. What United States products/markets stand to benefit from increased trade and lower tariffs with Colombia? What U.S. States produce these products?

Answer. Under the CTPA, over 80 percent of United States exports of consumer and industrial products to Colombia will become duty-free immediately, with remaining tariffs phased out over 10 years. The phase-out of tariffs and quotas is predicted to create the largest increase by value in United States exports to Colombia in the areas of (1) chemical, rubber, and plastic products, and (2) machinery and equipment. The TPA will also lead to substantial increases in U.S. exports of motor vehicles and parts, electronic equipment, paper products, metal products, ferrous metals, and wheat.

In addition, over half the value of current United States agricultural exports to Colombia will enter duty-free upon entry into force of the CTPA, including high quality beef, a variety of poultry products, soybean meal, cotton, wheat, whey, and most horticultural and processed food products. Furthermore, U.S. agricultural exporters will achieve new duty-free access through tariff-rate quotas, including on corn, rice, dairy products, and pet food.

Colombia's top 10 trading partners among the 50 States—Texas, Florida, Louisiana, Illinois, Alabama, California, North Carolina, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Georgia—all exported \$126 million or more in 2006 to Colombia. All 10 States have at least one of the previously listed industries in their top five exports.

RESPONSES OF PETER MICHAEL MCKINLEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps—State Department Relations?

Answer. Yes, I have read cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps—State Department Relations.

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this cable?

Answer. Yes, I understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this cable.

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that "the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy" and that "the Peace Corps's role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies"?

Answer. Yes, I understand and accept that "the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy" and that "the Peace Corps's role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies."

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise your Chief of Mission "authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies"?

Answer. Yes, I pledge to exercise my Chief of Mission “authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies.”

RESPONSES OF PETER MICHAEL MCKINLEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. What are the major problems that Peru is facing?

Answer. Peru faces a set of interrelated challenges. First and foremost is persistent poverty. Close to half of Peruvians, mostly in the southern highlands and the Amazonian lowlands, continue to live below the poverty line. The government’s primary challenge is to expand the benefits of economic growth, both in the form of jobs and improved social services, to the regions where poverty is most heavily concentrated and to the country’s poorest classes, who believe that the country’s economic growth has failed to benefit them.

This sense of alienation has fueled support for radical presidential candidates, buttressed the strength of political leaders who favor coca production, and provided the basis for an increasingly fragmented political landscape. The challenge is to consolidate Peru’s democracy, increase social inclusion, and “lock in” and expand recent policy gains.

Another major challenge facing Peru is security, particularly the scourge of narco-trafficking, which is complicated by the increasing internationalization of the drug trade and evidence of growing linkages between narco-traffickers and the terrorist remnants of Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) providing them protection and undoubtedly benefiting from drug trafficking revenues.

Question. If confirmed, how will you establish goals for assistance in Peru?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to use existing mechanisms, principally the Mission Strategic Plan (MSP), for defining and planning our foreign assistance goals. I have reviewed the goals in the most recent MSP for fiscal year 2009 and it is clear that they address the major challenges facing Peru. These goals are (1) improved governance and inclusion of marginalized citizens to strengthen support for democracy; (2) ensuring prosperity for all through trade and investment-led economic growth; (3) achieving peace and security; (4) investing the gains from economic growth in human development; (5) effective counterterrorism; and (6) fortifying the foundation of trust in United States leadership and support for Peru among the Peruvian public.

If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with all members of the Country Team, drawing on the strengths and expertise of each agency at post, and will consult regularly with Congress and all interested agencies in Washington to define whether and how these goals should be revised as the situation in Peru progresses. Also, if confirmed, I will meet regularly with all elements of Peruvian society, including public officials, the private sector, civil society, and individual citizens around the country to determine how we can best work with Peruvians collaboratively to meet the country’s ongoing challenges and design an appropriate foreign assistance response.

Question. If confirmed, how will you coordinate United States bilateral assistance? How will you coordinate with multilateral organizations?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to rely on the comprehensive system of interagency thematic group meetings among Embassy Lima staff on a weekly or bi-weekly basis to ensure that United States foreign policy objectives and assistance activities coincide. Under the leadership of the COM, the United States Mission in Peru uses interagency groups on counternarcotics, democracy, economic and commercial matters, political-military issues, and health and education to coordinate efforts of the various agencies at post.

Regarding coordination with other donors, the Government of Peru, through an agency within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leads coordination efforts for both bilateral and multilateral assistance. The government’s leadership in coordinating donors is the most effective way to promote the sustainability and efficiency of assistance efforts by ensuring that donor efforts fit within host country strategies and are not duplicative. In addition, members of the country team meet regularly with both bilateral and multilateral donors. If confirmed, I will ensure that these close coordination efforts continue.

Question. If confirmed, how will you conduct oversight of foreign assistance?

Answer. The best means of conducting oversight is to promote close collaboration among all United States Government agencies at post so that the broad variety of

development programs implemented by our Embassy in Peru are integrated and have the greatest impact. Specifically, if confirmed, I will continue to use the structure of the five interagency thematic working groups in the areas of counter-narcotics, democracy, economic and commercial matters, political-military, and health and education. Another important aspect of oversight that I will continue is frequent personal visits to the field by me and embassy officers to observe firsthand our understanding of political, social, and economic realities and conduct oversight of programs to see that they are administered within the parameters of pertinent law and regulation, and that they are achieving their stated goals.

Question. If confirmed, how will you evaluate whether or not goals are being met? What will your monitoring mechanisms be?

Answer. If confirmed, I would rely on a variety of existing mechanisms to measure progress toward goals and monitor implementation. Currently, weekly or biweekly interagency thematic meetings are used to ensure that U.S. foreign policy objectives and program activities coincide. This is an effective coordination and monitoring mechanism that I would continue, if confirmed.

Second, our planning mechanisms establish precise, quantitative results we plan to achieve with assistance. Specifically, in the Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) we lay out up to two performance indicators per goal and establish targets for three fiscal years, currently 2007, 2008, and 2009. Actual results are reported on in subsequent MSPs and allow us to judge progress toward the goal and make mid-course corrections as needed.

Finally, an extensive set of standard indicators in the Foreign Assistance Framework permits more precise target-setting and results measure measurement, specifically at the level of each activity in our foreign assistance portfolio.

RESPONSES OF PETER MICHAEL MCKINLEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Peru? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Peru? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. In general, Peru has a strong record on democracy and human rights. The Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed in Lima, Peru, on September 11, 2001. On the fifth anniversary of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, Peru submitted a voluntary report on its own implementation of the Charter. Freedom House ranks Peru 2 out of 7 on political rights and 3 out of 7 on civil liberties, with an overall status of “free.” Last year, Alan Garcia of the Popular Revolutionary Party Alliance (APRA) won the presidency in elections that were generally free, fair, and transparent. The government generally respected the human rights of its citizens, and continued efforts begun during the Toledo administration to expand and consolidate labor law and to prosecute those responsible for gross human rights violations. As the annual human rights report makes clear, however, there are a number of areas where the implementation and application of national laws requires stronger follow-up.

Also, Peru still faces several challenges. The terrorist organization, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), continues to be responsible for killings, kidnappings, and other human rights abuses. In addition, prison and detention center conditions are poor, and in the past the media has faced attacks by local authorities and organized crime.

If confirmed, I will ensure that the embassy continues its two-pronged approach of promoting greater citizen participation in government decision making and improving service delivery. I will support USAID’s work to strengthen the national legal framework for decentralization and train regional presidents, mayors, and their staff on the use of transparent financial and management systems to facilitate active citizen participation and greater accountability. If confirmed, I will work with USAID in order to provide technical assistance to political parties to increase their representativeness. USAID will also administer MCC funds aimed at complementing Government of Peru efforts to control corruption and strengthen systems to improve predictability in the administration of justice.

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Peru in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. If confirmed, the primary challenges to consolidating democracy in Peru will be building wider relationships with segments of the population who have yet to benefit from the country’s strong economic growth and do not feel fully enfran-

chised, and reducing a level of poverty which has fueled support for radical political alternatives in an increasingly fragmented political landscape. In addition, Peru is dealing with a legacy of human rights abuses that are still working their way through the court systems. While exceptional rates of economic growth are providing the Government of Peru with a budget surplus, these funds must be used for systemic change to demonstrate that democracy can deliver to all citizens.

I believe that civil society plays a vital role in strengthening respect for human rights. Last year, the Government of Peru enacted a law regulating NGOs that is vaguely written. NGOs are concerned that it could be applied selectively for political purposes. If confirmed, I will build on the strong lead of Ambassador Struble and our USAID Mission to urge the Government of Peru to ensure that NGOs enjoy the appropriate legal and regulatory freedom to carry out their important work.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. Supporting human rights is a top strategic priority of the political section, USAID, NAS, and the mission as a whole. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to ensure that these mission elements have the support and recognition they need to do their job—support Peru's efforts to improve its human rights situation, advocate on behalf of our key human rights interests, and call attention to lapses and abuses. The designated embassy "human rights officer" generally works in the political section—coordinating closely with other offices and agencies—on a portfolio that is among the mission's most substantive, interesting, and exciting. In that sense, the position generates the kinds of challenging professional opportunities that translate into recognition and advancement. I plan to make sure that that is and remains the case in Embassy Lima.

If confirmed, I will ensure that the embassy adheres to Secretary Rice's 10 guiding NGO principles regarding the treatment by governments of nongovernmental organizations. In concordance with the Guiding Principles on Non-Governmental Organizations, we will continue to recognize that nongovernmental organizations are essential to the development and success of free societies and they play a vital role in ensuring accountable, democratic governments.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. I have spent most of my career working on regions and countries in conflict or in post-conflict transition. The promotion of human rights and a democratic outcome have been central objectives of the United States in the work I did during the negotiations leading to Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola in the late 1980s, during the U.N.-supervised peace process and elections in Mozambique in the mid-1990s; and in Uganda in the late 1990s where opening the political space for the opposition and consolidating democratic gains under President Museveni were important United States goals. In the earlier part of this decade, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to work with refugee programs in many parts of the world, to support programming for abused women and children in conflict situations, and to be part of the response to the crisis in Darfur and the first negotiations of a ceasefire.

I have rarely evaluated my specific contributions outside the context of the many other people I have worked with, both inside and outside the State Department. Perhaps the most significant actions I took were as a member of small U.S. Government negotiating teams successfully responding to crises or conflicts causing widespread loss of life, devastation, and atrocities. As Angola/Namibia desk officer between 1987–1989, and as the sole Spanish and Portuguese speaker on Assistant Secretary Crocker's negotiating team, I supported talks which led to Namibia's independence, its emergence as a democracy, and the end of apartheid in that country. Namibia's independence also ended the long-running conflict which had caused the loss of thousands of lives. In Mozambique, I worked closely with my ambassador and the U.N. team to ensure that the country's first-ever democratic elections in 1994 were a success, to include personally helping convince the former insurgency movement not to pull out of the process during an election-eve crisis. The result has been more than a dozen years of peace, the return of more than 2 million refugees to their homes, and an emerging democracy.

In Uganda, I personally and successfully lobbied to have additional funding provided to a hospital in northern Uganda that was servicing a displaced population

of tens of thousands in the wake of the brutal Lord's Resistance Army insurgency. In both Mozambique and Uganda, as Deputy Chief of Mission, I worked with and supported nongovernmental organizations on capacity-building for emerging parliaments. In Washington, as the PRM Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for African and European programs, I sought to increase funding for UNT-ICR and NGO programs specifically aimed at vulnerable populations of women and children, to include at camps in Kenya, Guinea, and Chechnya. Working with the Africa Bureau and USAID, I was a member of the team responding to the crisis in Darfur starting in late 2003, with trips to the border region with Chad, and produced personal recommendations for much greater resource commitment on the ground at a time when consensus on Darfur's tragedy was still forming. I also took over the United States negotiating team to the international talks in Ndjamená which produced the first ceasefire in Darfur in April 2004, but unfortunately the latter did not produce the desired results.

Almost by definition, conflict resolution and post-conflict transitions cannot succeed without human rights and democracy as the core objectives and desired outcomes of our diplomatic efforts. It is also important to work with other interested governments, donors, international organizations, and NGOs and civil society. In my current position, I have been privileged to be part of the growing dialog with the European Union on how to promote democracy and human rights more widely in our joint efforts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sudan, and the Middle East.

NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Ereli, Joseph Adam, to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain
Norland, Richard Boyce, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Uzbekistan
Patterson, Anne Woods, to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Powell, Nancy J., to be Ambassador to Nepal
Seche, Stephen A., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Kerry presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry and Feingold.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KERRY. Thank you. This hearing will come to order. I apologize to everybody for being a little late. We're in the middle of negotiations on the energy bill, that subject of CAFE standards, which we've been fighting about for as long as I've been here. So we're trying to see if we can get something done on that, and I apologize again for being late.

Thank you all very much for being here. This hearing is to examine the nominations for ambassador of a number of career Foreign Service officers: the Honorable Anne Woods Patterson to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; the Honorable Nancy Powell, to be Ambassador to Nepal; Mr. Joseph Adam Ereli, to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain; Mr. Richard Boyce Norland, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Uzbekistan; and Mr. Stephen A. Seche, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen.

I might add, having sat on these hearings for a long time now, it is really both refreshing and enormously reassuring to see so much experience at one time and so many people whose long careers have really, I think, prepared them all so effectively for these challenging missions. There isn't one mission here that isn't challenging in one way or the other.

We thank your families also. I certainly personally understand the commitment and sacrifices involved in your service and we're

very grateful to all of you for that, particularly those of you going places where it takes a real toll in a lot of different ways.

So we welcome all of you here and we welcome any family members who have come to share this hearing with you.

Let me just speak individually if I can for a moment. Ms. Patterson, thank you. I'm very glad we had a chance earlier to talk personally. I met with the foreign minister just the day before yesterday and we had a good meeting and discussed some of the subjects that you and I talked about.

The position you've been nominated for, Ambassador to Pakistan, is a central one in terms of our current efforts in struggling with terrorism. Pakistan, needless to say, has been a key ally in the region and in the fight against terrorism. It's one of the most significant and complex relationships we have anywhere in the world. Recent developments there are obviously of great concern to many of us on the committee.

Pakistan clearly has many contributions to make in the fight against terrorism and they have also made sacrifices in this effort. But we're also concerned about the current situation in the border region with Afghanistan, and particularly in North Waziristan, where the deal President Musharraf made with local tribal leaders has not worked out, as many predicted.

Al-Qaeda has reportedly established a base of operations there and we know the direct threat that those bases can pose to us and to our allies. Most judgments are that Osama bin Laden and top al-Qaeda leaders are still likely hiding out somewhere in that region. And the Taliban has been using that area as a base from which to launch attacks against coalition forces and the Government of Afghanistan.

So we need to continue discussing how Pakistan can address this problem and show greater accountability for the dollars that we're putting in there.

Recent political developments are also troublesome. President Musharraf's refusal so far, though I trust that this will be resolved, but the question of his living up to his promise to relinquish his role as the chief of the military, his unwillingness yet, though I think this may also resolve itself, to allow former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to return to the country for the upcoming elections, and the arrest of hundreds of political activists from opposition parties, have raised fundamental questions about the future of democracy.

The President's dismissal of the chief justice of the Supreme Court resulted in widespread protests and has raised concerns about the rule of law. The temporary crackdown on the media could have a chilling effect on free press in the future. So we need to reinforce our commitment for both democracy, human rights, respect for the rule of law, and find a way—and this is your task—to balance all of that with the complicated mutuality that is needed in other endeavors.

I know that Deputy Secretary Negroponte and the Assistant Secretary have been in Pakistan recently raising these concerns and I would be interested in hearing your views on them today.

Bahrain has long been an ally of the United States. We have had a U.S. naval command there for nearly 60 years. The country now

faces many of the challenges that we see unfolding across the region. It has a majority Shia population with Sunni leadership and we know that Iran has attempted to influence, to extend the influence that it's always had there. In fact, if you go back historically to its independence, that independence came about partly as a result of their efforts to separate themselves from Iran.

They have made some significant progress in implementing democratic reforms and respecting freedom of religion, but more remains to be done. Given that their oil reserves might be exhausted in the next 15 years, they, needless to say, want to diversify their economy, and there are many, many reforms and quite a remarkable level of developments taking place there, as we all know. But it's a key as we try to bring stability to a chaotic region.

Yemen also presents, similarly, significant challenges for American foreign policy. While it's the only republic in the region, it's also one of the poorest countries in the area, lacking its own oil resources particularly and other resources. And it has a very high population growth. In fact, some have suggested that Yemen is at real risk of becoming a failed state in the next decades.

Even now, significant portions of Yemen are outside the control of government and potentially provide a haven for terrorists. We all remember that the USS *Cole* was attacked in the port of Aden.

It is in the interest of both the United States and Yemen that we work together to find sustainable solutions to the challenges that we face.

After nearly a decade of civil war and many years of autocratic rule, a place that most people have always thought of as rather peaceful, Nepal, finds itself at a critical point in its history. The United States and the international community need to help Nepal to restore and solidify their democracy. Key to this is moving forward with the process of integrating the Maoist opposition into the political process.

Nepal faces a tough road ahead and we obviously need to give them the support they need to succeed. Our ambassador's relationship and leverage in that process will be critical.

In Uzbekistan, one of the more powerful of the Central Asian former Soviet republics, we are faced with deteriorating relations with an increasingly brutal and repressive dictator in Islam Karimov. For a brief period after 9/11, we had a more cooperative relationship with Mr. Karimov, but subsequent human rights violations have led us to sever our military ties.

We need to emphasize the need for genuine significant improvement in Uzbekistan's record on human rights, religious rights, press freedoms, NGO rights, and democratic reforms.

So it's clear that each of you as ambassadors would be going to face some very immediate, complicated, and important challenges. And I know the members of this committee will be interested in how you're going to approach them, but also in the progress as we go along over the next year and a half or more.

So we're slightly under the gun here, but I don't think this is going to be a prolonged hearing, the reason being that we have a meeting on Iraq at about 4:00, a little bit after 4:00. So I suspect that it will not push us up against the wall, but I just wanted to sound that note of alarm.

So this is the picture. It's an interesting group of places. This is actually enormously challenging when you put it all together, and it's not separate, either. It's all interconnected, which makes it all the more fascinating in terms of our larger interests and goals.

So thank you again for being here. Why don't we get into your testimony. If I could ask you each summarize your testimony, and each of your testimonies will also be placed in the record in full and then we can have a dialog, which I think would be helpful.

So Ambassador Patterson, if you'd lead off and we'll just run down the line. Thank you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE WOODS PATTERSON, NOMINEE TO
BE AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN**

Ms. PATTERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to be here today as President Bush's nominee for Ambassador to Pakistan. I would like to thank the President and Secretary Rice for the confidence they have shown by nominating me to serve in this position. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and Congress in furthering our goals in Pakistan. Allow me to summarize my written statement.

U.S. relations with Pakistan were transformed after the September 11 attacks, when Pakistan made a commitment to stand with us against terrorism and extremism. I endorse the 9/11 Commission's recommendation to comprehensively support the Pakistan Government in its struggle against extremists and am ready to assist Pakistan in its plan to enhance internal security, propel democratic reform, and improve relations with its neighbors.

The United States must maintain and enhance Pakistan's cooperation in the war on terror and, if confirmed, it will be my most urgent task.

Additionally, I am fully committed to encouraging a democratic transition by supporting free and fair elections. The Pakistani people deserve the same right we in the United States enjoy, the right to choose their leaders democratically. But we also know that democracy means more than just holding elections. It means building respect for the rule of law and reinforcing institutions such as a free press that are essential for democracy to flourish. Social and economic development programs play an instrumental part in nurturing democracy and we should step up our efforts to assist the Government of Pakistan in bettering the lives of its citizens, particularly in ungoverned parts of the country, so that terrorism and radicalism will not find fertile ground.

These goals are not contradictory, but mutually reinforcing. We therefore have to move forward together with the Pakistanis on all fronts simultaneously.

Pakistan's contribution to the war on terror has been significant. Since 2001 the Pakistani Government has arrested hundreds of terrorist suspects, turning over to the United States such senior al-Qaeda figures as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Zubaida. Eighty-five thousand Pakistani forces are stationed on the Afghan border and more than 450 members of Pakistan's security forces have sacrificed their lives in support of antiterror efforts.

We are committed to supporting Pakistan's new strategy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas with development assistance, appropriate aid to the military and police, and new measures to promote investment.

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department of Defense, the United States Congress, and our Pakistani and nongovernmental partners on these and other key issues, such as furthering legal protection for women and ethnic and religious minorities, and combating child labor and human trafficking. Similarly, I intend to actively pursue our public diplomacy efforts inside Pakistan to ensure that we reach out to Pakistani citizens.

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan's good relations with neighboring states are also crucial to its progress toward a stable, peaceful, and prosperous democracy. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Pakistani Government and my colleagues in Embassy Kabul to support efforts to build a stable Afghanistan. The joint statement issued by President Musharraf and President Karzai in Ankara this spring demonstrates growing cooperation between the two countries, but very serious tensions remain.

With United States assistance, Pakistan is working to secure its border with Afghanistan to prevent the smuggling of arms, terrorists, and illegal drugs which are fueling the Taliban insurgency. The United States and NATO must continue to foster expanded Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral dialog.

On the eastern border, we remain ready to support and assist Pakistan and India's renewed commitment to the Indo-Pakistani reconciliation. We recognize the progress made by the Pakistan Government in disabling the A.Q. Khan proliferation network and the steps taken to ensure that such a network cannot be reconstituted. However, we must continue to be vigilant and, if confirmed, I will remain engaged with Pakistan on this vital issue.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed I look forward to working with the Congress as we face the challenge of building a strong strategic partnership with Pakistan that reflects and protects these interests.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Patterson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE WOODS PATTERSON, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before the committee. I am honored that the President and Secretary have expressed their confidence in me through this nomination.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will do my best to advance the multiple and related United States goals in Pakistan. The United States must maintain and enhance Pakistan's invaluable cooperation in the war on terror and, if confirmed, it will be my most urgent task. It is my belief that these efforts will help prevent attacks on our homeland and on American and allied troops in Afghanistan, and reduce violence against civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States must also encourage a democratic transition by supporting free and fair elections, respect for the rule of law and the systems that underpin it, and institutions such as a free press that are essential for democracy to survive and flourish. We should step up our efforts to assist the Government of Pakistan in bettering the lives of its citizens, particularly in ungoverned parts of the country, so that terrorism and radicalism will not find fertile ground.

These goals are not contradictory but mutually reinforcing. In my previous assignments, I learned that criminals and insurgents cannot prosper if the government has a presence in the villages, provides the population with decent public services,

and allows them a voice in their own future. We therefore have to move forward together with the Pakistanis on all fronts simultaneously.

United States relations with Pakistan were dramatically transformed after the September 11 attacks, when Pakistan made a clear commitment to stand with us against terrorism and extremism. The 9/11 Commission recommended the United States Government “support Pakistan’s Government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education . . .” As the commission recognized, we have a strong interest in the success of Pakistan’s ambitious program to enhance internal security and propel democratic reform. We also have a strong interest in a Pakistan that is secure in its borders and at peace with its neighbors. I believe we have the right plan in place to work with Pakistan on all of these fronts. The challenge is to maintain the right balance and implement the plan quickly and effectively.

There has been a lot of discussion about whether Pakistan can and should “do more” in the war on terror.

Pakistan’s contribution has been significant. Since 2001, the Pakistani Government has arrested hundreds of terrorist suspects, turning over to the United States such senior al-Qaeda figures as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and Abu Zubaida. Eighty-five thousand Pakistani forces are currently stationed on the rough terrain of the Afghanistan border, and more than 450 members of Pakistan’s security forces have sacrificed their lives in support of antiterror efforts. Pakistani security operations in the tribal areas are disrupting terrorist activities in an area where terrorists previously felt secure. One unfortunate indicator of the insurgents’ desperation to maintain their hold is the intimidation of the local population through targeting tribal leaders.

In many of these offensives against militants, Pakistani troops are using equipment and training provided by the United States. This assistance has been crucial to bolstering Pakistan’s antiterrorism capabilities, and by extension, our own. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department of Defense (DOD), with our Pakistani counterparts, and with Congress to ensure that the Pakistani forces have the necessary training and equipment to conduct these operations appropriately and effectively.

Also, much less frequently mentioned is Pakistani cooperation in facilitating the logistical support of United States and NATO forces deployed in neighboring Afghanistan. Most of our support for coalition forces in Afghanistan pass through Pakistan. Without Pakistani support and cooperation, we would face severe difficulties in supplying, reinforcing, and protecting our and allied troops defending the democratically elected Afghan Government.

The Government of Pakistan is committed to improving living conditions and expanding governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and this past February, the State Department briefed you on the United States Government’s multiyear plan to assist Pakistan in this effort. FATA has the worst social indicators in all of Pakistan, such as only a 3 percent female literacy rate. We believe this Pakistani strategy, supported by us and other international donors, will make these areas less hospitable to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups, while improving the quality of life for the citizens in FATA.

At the same time, I am under no illusions concerning the difficulties faced by the Pakistan Government in extending its writ into these territories or about al-Qaeda and Taliban activities in this area, and the level of commitment required to prevent them from finding safe-haven there. I give you my personal commitment that this will always be a top priority.

Mr. Chairman, I also want to underscore to you and to the Pakistani people my firm commitment to fostering a fully functioning, sustainable democracy.

Our partnership with the Pakistanis gives us an opportunity to support Pakistan’s own efforts to become a modern, prosperous, democratic state, and a moderate voice in the Islamic world. This is the vision for Pakistan that President Musharraf has articulated. It is strongly in the United States’ national interest that Pakistan succeeds in realizing this vision.

President Musharraf has stated that he is committed to holding a free and fair election in the coming months. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that we are in position to assist Pakistan in this process and to help the Pakistani people strengthen their democratic institutions by participating in an open and honest electoral process. The Pakistani people deserve the same right we in the United States enjoy—the right to choose their leaders democratically.

But we in the United States also know that democracy means more than just holding elections, although elections are certainly a necessary component. Democracy means a free and vibrant press, the right to free assembly, a fair and impartial criminal justice system, active civil society organizations, and broadly participative

and responsive political parties. Throughout the world, it is U.S. Government policy to back democratic institutions with training, assistance, and moral support, and I will look to intensify these efforts in Pakistan.

Social and economic development programs also play an instrumental role in nurturing democracy. United States development assistance in Pakistan is tailored to help build sustainable growth and improve living standards that promote the conditions for good governance, responsible citizenship, and foreign investment. In this context, our education programs are particularly important. The United States is supporting the Pakistani Government's efforts to upgrade public education, placing emphasis on improving the quality and affordability of Pakistan's public schools. This will allow parents of limited means to pursue educational opportunities for their children beyond religiously oriented madrassahs.

I will also work closely with our Pakistani and nongovernmental partners on key issues such as furthering women's rights and legal protection for ethnic and religious minorities, and combating forced child labor and human trafficking. Women's health appears to be a particular challenge in Pakistan, and my previous posts have shown me that the rate of maternal mortality can be lowered significantly with properly trained rural health providers.

Similarly, I intend to actively pursue our public diplomacy efforts inside Pakistan to ensure that we reach out to Pakistani citizens to share our own message, and help others understand American policies, views, and values. The Pakistanis have not always had such a clouded picture of the United States as today; rather very early reaction toward American assistance in the 1950s was very encouraging. Americans continue to be generous in their willingness to help and reach out to Pakistanis. I was impressed and moved by the Pakistani reaction to United States earthquake relief, where the immediate and overwhelming support of the U.S. military and the donations of private Americans saved many lives. Nothing could have been more effective in demonstrating American values and disseminating a message of friendship between our peoples.

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan's good relations with neighboring states are also crucial to its progress toward a stable, peaceful, and prosperous democracy.

I will continue to work with the Pakistani Government and my colleagues in Embassy Kabul to support efforts to build a stable Afghanistan. The joint statement issued by President Musharraf and President Karzai in Ankara this spring demonstrates growing cooperation between the two countries. But it is obvious that tensions remain. United States and NATO policies must continue to foster expanded Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral dialog, stronger economic and trade ties, and deeper cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan border security forces. With United States assistance, Pakistan is working to secure its border with Afghanistan to prevent the smuggling of arms, terrorists, and illegal drugs which are fueling the Taliban insurgency.

On the eastern border, we have been pleased to see renewed commitment to Indo-Pakistani reconciliation. Pakistan and India opened the fourth round of the Composite Dialog this past March, a process originally launched in 2004. We continue to be ready to support and assist this important endeavor.

We also recognize the progress made by the Pakistan Government in disabling the A.Q. Khan proliferation network and steps taken to ensure that such a network cannot be reconstituted. During President Bush's visit to Pakistan in 2006, President Musharraf committed that Pakistan would take a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related technology and expertise. We currently have a bilateral program through the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program (EXBS) to help Pakistan bring its export controls in line with accepted international standards. In April, Pakistan established a Strategic Export Control Division within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and earlier this month, Pakistan joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

We are gratified by these steps, however, we must continue to be vigilant and if confirmed, I will remain engaged with Pakistan on this issue of vital United States interest.

Finally, I am determined and will work to ensure that the substantial resources the American people provide to Pakistan are utilized efficiently and effectively. I will also work hard to ensure that the dedicated American employees in Pakistan have good security and working conditions that foster high morale.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress as we face the challenge of continuing to build a strong, enduring strategic partnership with Pakistan that reflects and protects these interests.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Ambassador.

Ambassador Powell, a little *deja vu* for you in all that?

**STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY J. POWELL,
NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO NEPAL**

Ms. POWELL. A little bit, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I'm deeply honored to be——

Senator KERRY. Tell me which country you're here for? [Laughter.]

Ms. POWELL [continuing]. As the President's nominee to serve as United States Ambassador to Nepal. I thank both President Bush and Secretary Rice for their confidence. If confirmed, I will have the privilege of returning to a region that has been the focus of much of my career and to an embassy where I spent my second tour in the Foreign Service. However, much has changed since then.

Nepal is at a critical juncture in its history. Its Government and people are simultaneously working to end a devastating decade-long Maoist insurgency and to established sustained, multiparty democracy. They are also struggling to emerge from poverty and to address the issues of discrimination and inequality that have long plagued Nepal. Peace and democracy in Nepal would directly serve United States interests in stability and democracy in South Asia.

The seven-party alliance and the Maoists, who together comprise the interim government, have agreed to a political road map that, if fully implemented, has the potential to deliver peace and democracy to Nepal. There has been much progress to date, but success is far from assured. Although the Maoists joined the government on April 1, they continue to violate commitments they have made in the course of the peace process. Unrest in the lowlands along the Indian border has further complicated efforts to restore law and order and the authority of the government throughout the country.

The security vacuum and the political stalemate precluded free and fair constituent assembly elections from being held this month as originally planned. They are now expected in November or early December. In order to assure these polls are free and fair when they do take place, the government must urgently restore law and order throughout the country, complete the legislative and logistical groundwork for a well administered election, and reach out to disaffected groups to ensure their adequate representation and peaceful participation in the political process.

If confirmed, I will continue our active support of Nepali efforts to these ends.

Although democracy and stability are among our strongest interests in Nepal, they are far from the only ones. Nepal's magnificent art and architecture, as well as its scenery, continue to make it a favorite destination of American travelers and the provision of services to American citizens is a responsibility that comes ahead of all others. Also, achieving durable solutions for the 108,000 Bhutanese refugees in Nepal continues to be a United States priority. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Government of Nepal to implement current plans for a voluntary resettlement program that would accommodate at least 60,000 of these refugees.

I will also encourage the Government of Nepal to ensure that the rights of all Tibetan refugees resident in or transiting Nepal are respected.

There remains room for improvement in Nepal's efforts to prevent and prosecute human trafficking and to ensure its security forces uphold the highest human rights standards. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the government on these issues as well.

Foreign assistance is and will continue to be the most useful tool at our disposal to influence developments in Nepal along the full spectrum of our national interests there, from technical support intended to strengthen Nepal's nascent democratic institutions to health programs that improve the daily lives of many Nepalese, as well as humanitarian assistance for refugees and conflict victims and training for Nepal's military that is focused on improving its human rights record and working under civilian authority. Our aid provides a critical programmatic complement to our diplomacy. I take seriously the responsibility to ensure that American taxpayers receive high returns on their investment in Nepal.

If confirmed, I look forward to consulting closely with you, Mr. Chairman, all members of the committee and your staffs throughout my tenure in Nepal. I appreciate the opportunity to speak before the committee today.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Powell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT FOR HON. NANCY J. POWELL,
NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO NEPAL

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am deeply honored to appear before you today as the President's nominee to serve as United States Ambassador to Nepal. I thank both President Bush and Secretary Rice for their confidence.

If confirmed, I will have the privilege of returning to a region that has been the focus of much of my career, and to an embassy where I spent my second tour in the Foreign Service. In the 25 years since I left Nepal, I have had the good fortune to serve in a wide variety of diplomatic assignments, including as United States Ambassador to Uganda, Ghana, and Pakistan. If confirmed, I will rely on the experience I acquired in those postings, as well as in my most recent assignment as National Intelligence Officer for South Asia at the National Intelligence Council, to advance United States' interests in Nepal.

Nepal is at a critical juncture in its history. Its government and people are simultaneously working to end a devastating, decade-long Maoist insurgency and establish sustained, multiparty democracy. They are also struggling to emerge from poverty and to address the issues of discrimination and inequality that have long plagued Nepal. All of these efforts are eminently worthy of United States support, since peace and democracy in Nepal would directly serve United States' interests in stability and democracy in South Asia. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to support the efforts of the Nepalese to bring peace, democracy, and development to their country.

The Seven-Party Alliance and the Maoists, who together comprise the interim government, have agreed to a political roadmap that, if fully implemented, has the potential to deliver peace and democracy to Nepal. There has been much progress to date, but success is far from assured. Although the Maoists joined the government on April 1, they continue to engage in criminal behavior and otherwise violate commitments they have made in the course of the peace process. In addition, unrest in the Terai (the lowlands along the Indian border) has further complicated efforts to restore law and order, and the authority of the government, throughout the country. The security vacuum and the political stalemate in Kathmandu precluded free and fair constituent assembly elections from being held this month as originally planned; they are now expected in November or early December.

In order to ensure the polls are free and fair when they do take place, the government must urgently restore law and order throughout the country, complete the leg-

islative and logistical groundwork for well-administered election, and reach out to disaffected ethnic groups to ensure their adequate representation and peaceful participation in the political process. If confirmed, I will continue our active support of Nepali efforts to these ends.

Although democracy and stability are among our strongest interests in Nepal, they are far from the only ones. Nepal's magnificent architecture and art, as well as its scenery, continue to make it a favorite destination of American travelers, and the provision of services to Americans is a priority that comes ahead of all others. The protection of Americans abroad is not just a responsibility, but a privilege.

Also, achieving durable solutions for the 108,000 Bhutanese refugees in Nepal continues to be a United States priority. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Government of Nepal to implement current plans for a voluntary resettlement program that would accommodate at least 60,000 of these refugees. I will also encourage the Government of Nepal to ensure the rights of all Tibetan refugees resident in or transiting Nepal are respected. There remains room for improvement in Nepal's efforts to prevent and prosecute human trafficking and to ensure its security forces uphold the highest human rights standards. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the government on these issues as well. Foreign assistance is and will continue to be the most useful tool at our disposal to influence developments in Nepal along the full spectrum of our national interests there. From technical support intended to strengthen Nepal's nascent democratic institutions, to health programs that improve the daily lives of many Nepalese, to humanitarian assistance for refugees and conflict victims, to training for Nepal's military that is focused on improving its human rights record and working under civilian authority, our aid provides a critical programmatic complement to our diplomacy. If confirmed, I will ensure that American taxpayers continue to receive high returns on their investment in Nepal.

If confirmed, I look forward to consulting closely with you, Mr. Chairman, all the members of the committee, and your staffs throughout my tenure in Nepal. I appreciate the opportunity to speak before the committee today, and would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much. We appreciate it.
Mr. Joseph Adam Erel.

**STATEMENT OF JOSEPH ADAM ERELI, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN**

Mr. ERELI. Thank you, sir. It's an honor to be here, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the members of the committee for this opportunity and, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you.

Mr. Chairman, for over 50 years, as you said in your statement, the Kingdom of Bahrain and its leaders have been strong allies and close friends of the United States in a very dangerous neighborhood. They have stood with us in times of war and in times of peace. Their vision for the future of Bahrain and the region is one that we largely share—representative democracy, free trade, and security cooperation. My priorities, if confirmed as ambassador, would be to move our bilateral relationship forward in all three areas.

Bahrain is a major non-NATO ally. It hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command headquarters. It sent air, ground, and naval assets to Kuwait in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Its naval vessels are serving beside ours in ongoing maritime operations in the Arabian Gulf.

As an ally with a shared security vision for the region, we have an interest in helping Bahrain develop its defense capabilities and ensuring interoperability with our forces. An increasingly aggressive, assertive Iran makes this cooperation all the more important. If confirmed, sir, I will work closely with my Department of Defense colleagues to enhance Bahraini defense capabilities and their cooperation with our forces in confronting regional threats. If con-

firmed, I will also devote considerable attention to counterterrorism cooperation.

The United States and Bahrain have a free trade agreement which entered into force a year ago. It has stimulated economic growth and is a positive model for other countries in the region. If confirmed, I will focus much of my effort on fully exploring the free trade agreement's potential for United States investment in Bahrain and two-way trade that benefits both our countries.

Another important goal, sir, for the embassy and the United States in the coming years will be to strengthen support for democracy and democratic institutions in Bahrain. Bahrain has had two successful parliamentary elections since 2002. Political tendencies of all stripes have a voice in the affairs of their country. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen political pluralism, civil society, and the rule of law.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, should I be confirmed I will have no higher priority than the safety and security of the dedicated men and women under my charge, both American and foreign national. They are bravely serving our country in difficult circumstances and I will do everything in my power to see that they have the resources and protection required to accomplish their mission on behalf of the American people.

Thank you again, sir, for this opportunity and I'd be pleased to answer any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ereli follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH ADAM ERELI, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, it is an honor to be here today, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the members of the committee for this opportunity. I am deeply humbled by the confidence that President Bush and Secretary Rice have shown in nominating me to be the next United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain.

As a Foreign Service officer, there is no higher calling than to serve your country as the President's representative and Chief of Mission. If confirmed, I will honor that trust by doing everything in my power to advance American interests and represent faithfully the values of our great Nation in this strategically vital region.

Mr. Chairman, for over 50 years the Kingdom of Bahrain, its leaders and its people, have been strong allies and close friends in a very dangerous neighborhood. They have stood with us in times of war and peace. Their vision for the future of Bahrain and the region is one that we share: representative democracy, free trade, and security cooperation. My priorities, if confirmed as ambassador, will be to move our bilateral relationship forward in all three areas.

In 2001, President Bush designated Bahrain a major non-NATO ally. This was in recognition of almost 50 years of close security cooperation and partnership, marked by its hosting the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. Bahrain hosted the United States-led Multinational Interdiction Force that enforced the U.N. embargo on Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Bahrain deployed naval assets in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. It sent air, ground, and naval assets to Kuwait in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Its naval vessels are serving beside ours in ongoing maritime operations in the gulf.

As an ally and partner with a shared security vision for the region, we have an interest in helping Bahrain develop its defense capabilities and ensuring interoperability with our forces. Access to Bahraini facilities, land, and airspace is critical to United States Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. An increasingly aggressive, assertive Iran makes this cooperation with Bahrain and the rest of the gulf all the more important. If confirmed, I will work closely with my Department of Defense colleagues to enhance Bahraini defense capabilities and their cooperation with our forces in confronting regional threats.

If confirmed, I will also devote considerable attention to counterterrorism cooperation. Bahrain has implemented new laws addressing terrorism and terror financing.

Our priorities will be to strengthen Bahrain's ability to pursue and prosecute terror suspects and to enhance further Bahrain's capability to block sources of funding for terrorism and proliferation.

Economically, Bahrain is among the most progressive countries in the region. The United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which entered into force in August 2006, has stimulated economic growth and is a positive model for other countries in the region. If confirmed, I will focus much of my effort on fully exploiting the FTA's potential for United States investment in Bahrain and two-way trade that benefits both our countries, particularly through active engagement with the private sector.

Mr. Chairman, political reform and respect for human rights are critical to Bahrain's future stability and United States interests. Bahrain's leadership recognizes this and has been among the region's most progressive in introducing democratic reforms and strengthening the rule of law. In November and December 2006, Bahrain held parliamentary and municipal elections. Opposition groups that had boycotted Bahrain's 2002 elections fully participated. Two hundred and seven candidates competed for 40 seats. Seventy-two percent of eligible voters participated. Among those winning election was Bahrain's first elected female Member of Parliament.

An important goal for the embassy in the coming years, will be to strengthen support for democracy and democratic institutions. In May 2006, the government closed the office of the National Democratic Institute. If confirmed, I will work to support NDI and the multitude of other NGO's working in Bahrain to strengthen parliamentary institutions, civil society, and the rule of law.

Finally, Mr Chairman, should I be confirmed as ambassador, I will have no higher priority than the safety and security of all American citizens in Bahrain, including the dedicated men and women, American and foreign nationals, under my charge. They are bravely serving in difficult circumstances, and I will do everything in my power to see that they have the resources and protection they need to do their work on behalf of the American people.

Thank you again for this opportunity and I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much. We appreciate it.
Mr. Norland.

**STATEMENT OF RICHARD BOYCE NORLAND, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN**

Mr. NORLAND. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you here today. I am honored that the President has nominated me and I'm thankful to Secretary Rice for recommending me for the position of Ambassador to Uzbekistan. Thank you also for the opportunity to introduce my wife, Mary Hartnett, who has made it possible for me to serve for 2 years on an unaccompanied tour in Afghanistan and supported me throughout that, my son Daniel, who has just graduated from Boston University Law School. Our daughter Kate is overseas and can't be here.

Senator, thank you also for coming to Kabul, where you will be remembered not only for taking risks and working hard, but also for being the only U.S. Senator to have a snowball fight with the embassy staff.

Sir, at the heart of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is a country that presents great—

Senator KERRY. Remember who won? [Laughter.]

Mr. NORLAND. You were outnumbered.

At the heart of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is a country that presents great challenges and great opportunities for the United States. The historical center of the famed Silk Road trade, the seat of the Emperor Tamerlane's empire, a traditional center of Islamic thought, and the core of former Soviet Central Asia, Uzbekistan

has developed a very strong identity, which is reflected in its relationships with neighbors and with the United States.

Mr. Chairman, as I'm sure the committee is aware, the close bilateral relationship we once enjoyed with Uzbekistan on security issues, particularly on Afghanistan, has been reduced significantly during the past few years. Concurrently, our concern about the state of democratic development and human rights in Uzbekistan, already great, has steadily increased with every report of actions taken against civil society, including press outlets, human rights activists, and nongovernmental organizations.

I strongly believe that, despite the challenges of recent years, the United States can and should seek cooperation with Uzbekistan in areas integral to our common national security interests, particularly the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the narcotics trade.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, the policy which has consistently guided our engagement in Uzbekistan and which will bring true security to both Uzbekistan and the United States is multifaceted and balanced. Along with pursuing security cooperation, we will seek to promote greater respect for human rights and rule of law, real political reform, and the expansion of economic opportunity for Uzbek citizens.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed I look forward to drawing upon my experiences in the former Soviet Union and most recently as deputy chief of mission in neighboring Afghanistan to seek the reinvigoration of meaningful cooperation with the Government and the people of Uzbekistan, as was envisaged when we signed the 2002 declaration on the strategic partnership and cooperation framework.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will focus on reversing the deteriorating human rights situation in Uzbekistan, including the decline in religious and press freedom. The acknowledged use of torture by the security services, for example, is not only a grave violation of human rights, but also undermines the government and the country's security. We must work with Uzbek authorities to put an end to this awful practice.

Although not yet announced, Uzbekistan is likely to hold presidential elections before the end of the year that will determine the next phase of the country's history. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Government of Uzbekistan and international bodies such as the OSCE to underscore the Uzbek people's right to a free and fair election.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it is crucial that we continue efforts already underway to strengthen economic ties between Uzbekistan, its immediate neighbors, South Asia, and the United States. Uzbekistan can only be as strong and prosperous as the economic opportunities it provides its people and increasing these will only be achieved if the government adopts the difficult changes necessary to attract foreign investment, lower its trade barriers, and participate fully in the world economic community.

Mr. Chairman, Uzbekistan and the United States do not enjoy the close partnership we once had, but Uzbekistan's strategic location, importance and potential require that we remain engaged and do our best to return the relationship to where it should be. Work-

ing with you and members of this body, along with our dedicated team of American and Uzbekistan professionals on the ground at Embassy Tashkent, I believe we can make progress in securing our interests and encouraging Uzbekistan to realize its full potential.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity and I would be pleased to respond to any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Norland follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD BOYCE NORLAND, NOMINEE
TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you here today. I am honored that the President has nominated me and am thankful to Secretary Rice for recommending me for the position of Ambassador to Uzbekistan.

At the heart of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is a country that presents great challenges and great opportunities for the United States. The historical center of the famed Silk Road trade, the seat of the Emperor Tamerlane's empire, traditional center of Islamic thought, and the core of former Soviet Central Asia, Uzbekistan has developed a very strong identity, which is reflected in its relationships with neighbors and with the United States.

Mr. Chairman, as I am sure the committee is aware, the close bilateral cooperation we once enjoyed with Uzbekistan on security issues, particularly on Afghanistan, has been reduced significantly during the past few years. Concurrently, our concern about the state of democratic development and human rights in Uzbekistan, already great, has steadily increased with every report of actions taken against civil society, including press outlets, human rights activists and nongovernmental organizations.

I strongly believe that despite the challenges of recent years, the United States can and should seek cooperation with Uzbekistan in areas integral to our common national security interests—particularly the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the narcotics trade.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, the policy which has consistently guided our engagement in Uzbekistan, and which will bring true security to both Uzbekistan and the United States, is multifaceted and balanced—along with pursuing security cooperation, we will seek to promote greater respect for human rights and rule of law, real political reform, and the expansion of economic opportunity for Uzbek citizens.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to drawing upon my experiences in the former Soviet Union, and most recently, as Deputy Chief of Mission in neighboring Afghanistan, to seek the reinvigoration of meaningful cooperation with the Government and people of Uzbekistan as was envisioned when we signed the 2002 Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework. That declaration recognized the indivisibility of global and regional security as well as the importance of consistent implementation of democratic and market reforms “as a necessary condition for ensuring political, social and economic stability, sustainable development, prosperity, and national security.”

I believe those words are even more relevant today than when written. In the space of a few years' time, we have witnessed a tightening of the political climate of Uzbekistan.

Today, our efforts to promote long-term stability and security for partners in the region are being challenged by those who view with suspicion our message of prosperity and stability through reform.

It is therefore, Mr. Chairman, my belief that bolstering Uzbekistan's independence and stability through genuine democratic reforms, increased trade links with neighbors in the region, and security cooperation, is more urgent now than at any time since the country's independence.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will focus on reversing the deteriorating human rights situation in Uzbekistan, including the decline in religious and press freedom. The acknowledged use of torture by the security services, for example, is not only a grave violation of human rights, but also undermines the government and the country's security. We must work with Uzbek authorities to put an end to this awful practice.

Although not yet announced, Uzbekistan is likely to hold Presidential elections before the end of the year that will determine the next phase of the country's history. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Government of Uzbekistan and inter-

national bodies such as the OSCE to underscore the Uzbek peoples' right to a free and fair election.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it is crucial that we continue efforts already underway to strengthen economic ties between Uzbekistan, its immediate neighbors, South Asia, and the United States. Uzbekistan can only be as strong and prosperous as the economic opportunities it provides its people; and increasing these will only be achieved if the government adopts the difficult changes necessary to attract foreign investment, lower its trade barriers, and participate fully in the world economic community.

Mr. Chairman, Uzbekistan and the United States do not enjoy the close partnership we once had, but Uzbekistan's strategic location, importance, and potential require that we remain engaged and do our best to return the relationship to where it should be. Working with you and members of this body, along with our dedicated team of American and Uzbek professionals on the ground at Embassy Tashkent, I believe we can make progress in securing our interests and encouraging Uzbekistan to realize its full potential.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity, and I would be pleased to respond to any questions.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Seche, I'm proud to welcome you via the University of Massachusetts and the Berkshire Eagle.

**STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. SECHE, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**

Mr. SECHE. Thank you, sir.

Senator KERRY. Good to have you here.

Mr. SECHE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to appear this afternoon. As each of my colleagues have noted, Mr. Chairman, I too am honored to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen, and I am grateful for the trust and confidence President Bush and Secretary Rice have placed in me.

If confirmed by the Senate, I can assure you that protecting embassy staff and the lives of all Americans in Yemen, as well as American facilities and other interests, will be my top priority.

On May 2, following their meeting at the White House, President Bush and Yemeni President Saleh each spoke to the strength of the bilateral relationship. At the heart of that relationship is a shared desire to strengthen democracy, counter extremism, and provide economic opportunity and a stable future for the Yemeni people.

Yemen and the United States have achieved important successes together in our common effort to eradicate terrorism. Successes to date include joint action against al-Qaeda cells and successful prosecution of the perpetrators of the October 2000 terrorism attack on the USS *Cole*. This cooperation continues today and strengthening this partnership will be one of my principal priorities if I am confirmed by the Senate.

We must be mindful at the same time, as you noted yourself, Senator, that Yemen is one of the world's poorest countries, suffering from high levels of population growth, unemployment, infant mortality, and chronic illiteracy. Over 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and nearly 50 percent is under the age of 15. Oil production, which currently comprises two-thirds of government revenue, is expected to decline dramatically during the next 10 years.

Our partnership therefore also must include assistance to help Yemen improve the lives of its citizens through comprehensive education, health care, agricultural development, and good governance. Our support for Yemen as it addresses these critical needs will in turn contribute to the advancement of U.S. interests in the country and more broadly in the region.

Over the past 18 months, the Government of Yemen has undertaken significant democratic reforms. With major support from the United States, Yemen in September 2006 conducted presidential and local council elections that were judged to be open and genuinely competitive by international observers. Other significant reforms include passage of a much-needed anti-corruption law, judicial and civil service reforms, and the drafting of a new government procurement law.

International donors, led by the Gulf States, responded to these reforms by pledging \$4.7 billion towards Yemen's development in November of 2006. In February of this year, these achievements led to Yemen's reinstatement in the Millennium Challenge Corporation's threshold program.

United States efforts in support of economic development will focus on combating the corruption endemic to nearly every level of Government in Yemen, through technical assistance to both government and NGOs that will encourage transparency and increase the confidence of international investors and donors.

Mr. Chairman, over the course of a Foreign Service career that is now approaching three decades and has included assignments in eight different countries, I have tried to forge relationships that advance American interests by encouraging political stability, economic prosperity, and confidence that the United States can be relied up on as a partner and a friend. Nowhere is this issue of confidence more important today than in the Middle East. I believe that in Yemen, thanks to the persistence and professionalism of colleagues here in Washington and at our Embassy in Sana'a, we have made significant strides in recent years toward a relationship that has the potential to serve as a model for the region and the world.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I'd be remiss if I failed to publicly thank my wife Susan, my daughters Kate, Lucy, and Ariel for their love and forbearance in the face of the constant disruptions that they have endured in their own lives as I have pursued my career, and I'm pleased that, with the exception of Ariel, the women in my life are all here with me this afternoon.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to encourage members of Congress and your staff to visit Yemen for a firsthand look at the partnership we are building and to ensure that our efforts on the ground reflect the will of this body and the American people.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Seche follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. SECHE, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen, and I am grateful for the trust and confidence President Bush

and Secretary Rice have placed in me. If confirmed by the Senate, I can assure you that protecting embassy staff and the lives of all Americans in Yemen, as well as our facilities and other interests, will be my top priority.

On May 2, following their meeting at the White House, President Bush and Yemeni President Saleh each spoke to the strength of the bilateral relationship. At the heart of that relationship is a shared desire to strengthen democracy, counter extremism, and provide economic opportunity and a stable future for the Yemeni people.

Yemen and the United States have achieved important successes together in our common effort to eradicate terrorism. In the aftermath of the October 2000 attack on the USS *Cole*, and with renewed resolve after September 11, 2001, the United States undertook important steps in cooperation with President Saleh's government to help Yemen develop its counterterrorism capabilities. Successes to date include joint action against al-Qaeda cells and successful prosecution of the perpetrators of the October 2000 terrorist attack on the USS *Cole*. American assistance has helped build the capacity of the Yemeni security forces to apprehend, detain and try terrorists, as well as to defend its borders and territorial waters. We have also assisted in the professional development of the armed forces, including the Coast Guard, and have helped combat the flow of illicit arms through Yemeni territory. That cooperation continues today. Strengthening this valuable partnership will be one of my principal priorities, if I am confirmed by the Senate.

We must be mindful at the same time that Yemen is one of the world's poorest countries, suffering from high levels of population growth, unemployment, infant mortality, and chronic illiteracy. Over 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, and nearly 50 percent is under the age of 15. Oil production, which currently comprises two-thirds of government revenue, is expected to decline dramatically during the next 10 years.

Our partnership, therefore, also must include assistance to help Yemen improve the lives of its citizens through comprehensive education, health care, agricultural development, and good governance. Our support for Yemen as it addresses these critical needs will, in turn, contribute to the advancement of United States' interests in the country and, more broadly, in the region. If confirmed, I will ensure that United States assistance in these areas is used effectively, and will also work closely with other donors to ensure that foreign-assistance pledges translate into sustained progress and a higher standard of living for the Yemeni people.

Over the past 18 months, the Government of Yemen has undertaken significant democratic reforms. With major support from the United States, Yemen in September 2006 conducted Presidential and local council elections that were judged to be open and genuinely competitive by international observers. Other significant reforms include passage of a much-needed anticorruption law, judicial and civil service reforms, and the drafting of a new government procurement law. International donors, led by the gulf states, responded to these reforms by pledging \$4.7 billion toward Yemen's development in November 2006. In February of this year, these achievements led to Yemen's reinstatement in the Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold Program.

United States efforts in support of economic development will focus on combating the corruption endemic to nearly every level of government in Yemen, through technical assistance to both the government and NGOs that will encourage transparency and increase the confidence of international investors and donors. If I am confirmed, I will also continue our efforts to help the Yemeni Government undertake the measures required for World Trade Organization accession.

I will, if confirmed, continue efforts to strengthen Yemen's internal security and counterterrorism capabilities. This includes assisting the Government of Yemen to take greater action against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, increasing information-sharing on terrorist activities, passing a comprehensive counterterrorism law, and continuing to cooperate with the Government of Yemen on matters relating to the return of Yemeni nationals currently detained at Guantanamo Bay.

Mr. Chairman, over the course of a foreign-service career that is now approaching three decades and has included assignments in eight different countries, I have tried to forge relationships, both official—between governments—and informal—among people—that advance American interests by encouraging political stability, economic prosperity, and a level of confidence that the United States can be trusted as a reliable partner and friend. Nowhere is this issue of confidence more important today than in the Middle East. I believe that in Yemen—thanks to the persistence and professionalism of colleagues here in Washington and at our Embassy in Sana'a—we have made significant strides in recent years toward a relationship that has the potential to serve as a model for the region and the world. If confirmed,

it would be my privilege to lead the U.S. Embassy as we build on these successes in the coming years.

Finally, I would be remiss if I failed to publicly thank my wife, Susan, and my daughters for their love and forbearance in the face of the constant disruptions they have endured in their own lives for the sake of my career.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to encourage Members of Congress and their staff to visit Yemen for a firsthand look at the partnership we are building, and to ensure that our efforts on the ground reflect the will of this body and the American people.

Thank you very much.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Seche, and thank you for your last comments.

I neglected to say, does any other ambassador-designate have family here you want to introduce?

Yes, Ambassador Patterson.

Ms. PATTERSON. My husband David.

Senator KERRY. What's that?

Ms. PATTERSON. My husband David.

Senator KERRY. Welcome. Glad to have you here.

Ms. PATTERSON. He's a fellow Foreign Service officer.

Senator KERRY. Terrific.

Mr. ERELI. Sir, my wife Marina and stepdaughter Masha, who are former residents of Brookline, Massachusetts.

Senator KERRY. Terrific judgment. [Laughter.]

Mr. ERELI. And an employee of Newton Free Library.

Senator KERRY. Beg your pardon?

Mr. ERELI. An employee of Newton Free Library.

Senator KERRY. Terrific. We share an alma mater.

Ms. POWELL. Mr. Chairman, I don't have my immediate family with me today, but I do have members of my Foreign Service family, and I appreciate their support today.

Senator KERRY. Well, that's wonderful. Will they raise their hands? Where are they all? Thank you, all of you. Thank you all for your service.

I couldn't help as I was looking through all of your curricula, to notice the astonishing the span of experience that's sitting here, the numbers of places you all have served in, from the Caribbean to Latin America to Canada, Saudi Arabia, Africa. It's really quite staggering. It's a great deal of experience and I hope it's going to be really well put to use.

I know that some people in the Foreign Service can sometimes get a little bit frustrated at the bureaucracy and sometimes the unwillingness of Washington to listen. I believe these hearings ought to be more than pro forma sessions. We're going to ask some of the questions we need to about your countries, but I want to draw on that experience if I can and ask you to just be candid. And if you say anything too out there, we'll make sure the Secretary doesn't hear about it and we'll still follow through and get this done.

In fact, sometimes I think that the experience that's on the ground in some of these countries just gets wasted. When I go out and visit, as some of my colleagues on the committee do, and we sit in the embassies and listen, it's a great education and you learn so much more than here. I think a lot of that experience sometimes doesn't make it all the way to where it ought to and get listened to enough.

So, having said that, let me proceed to ask a few specific questions. Then I want to turn to my colleague, and then I'll come back and perhaps ask some of these others.

But just to let you reflect on it a little bit, I want to get you beyond your countries. I want you to share with the committee for the record—you know, we're really tangled up in Iraq and we're tangled upon the Middle East, and Hamas is stronger and Hezbollah is stronger, and Iran is flexing its muscles. You know, we're sort of on the short end more than we've been or want to be and our leverage and credibility are at risk and at stake.

I meet a lot of students nowadays who are traveling abroad and they tell me they tell people they're Canadian, not American. I see some heads nodding out there. I mean, it burns you up and it hurts, but it's a reality that people face. People tell me they flash their American passport, but they put it back in their pocket as fast as they can because they don't want to be identified, and so forth. And for business people it's got to cost nowadays.

I want you to share with this committee, because you've spent a lot of time as junior officers, you've got friends in these countries, you hear what people are thinking and saying, I want you to share with the committee ultimately, and we'll come back to it, some of the things you think we ought to be doing to restore that confidence and to rebuild our credibility and to address some of these burning issues that are feeding insurgencies and feeding terrorism and allowing extreme radical religious zealots to try to somehow isolate us in a world where we should be isolating them.

I think it's a very significant question for all of us to think about. And if we don't draw on your experience, shame on us; we're missing something important here.

So that said, let me just turn to a few of these countries and listen to your views. Why don't I start with you, Mr. Seche, since we just ended with you. First of all, obviously people are concerned about al-Qaeda's operational structure in Yemen. The State Department's annual report suggests that it's been weakened and dispersed. But real concerns remain about the organization's attempts to reconstitute operational cells there, as the State Department says.

Can you share with us what the portfolio is that you've been given or as you understand it and what you think you can do to enhance our situation on the ground there?

Mr. SECHE. I'd be happy to try. Thank you very much, Senator. I think that the counterterrorism portfolio, as you rightly point out, is among the most important I will have before me if confirmed by the Senate and if I get to serve as Ambassador to Yemen. There is no greater issue and no greater opportunity for cooperation between our two governments than this presents itself. Certainly, thus far we have seen President Saleh commit himself I think quite resolutely to efforts to eradicate terrorism through the arrest of al-Qaeda suspects, through stemming the flow of fighters to Iraq from Yemen, and by arresting the perpetrators of the Cole bombing.

So there is some success being done there. There is also at the same time, again as you pointed out and as I tried to address in my statement, some very worrisome political, economic, and social

indicators in the country that continue to create conditions that one might easily argue encourage young men to turn to extremism as a way to better their lives and gain goals they may feel otherwise are unattainable.

Senator KERRY. You say you could easily argue it. Is it your judgment that it is or isn't a factor?

Mr. SECHE. In my judgment it is a factor. I certainly think in my experience I have seen these kind of—

Senator KERRY. A significant factor?

Mr. SECHE. Sorry?

Senator KERRY. A significant one?

Mr. SECHE. It depends to some extent on the individual, I think. But I don't think there's any way to argue against the fact—

Senator KERRY. What do you think the other factors are?

Mr. SECHE. I think possibly there may be an argument to be made that there is a cultural element in certain people's lives, there's religious elements in certain people's lives. There are certainly economic aspects of extremism that I think we need to address as well. So I think it's a package, and I think that all of these elements together may create a certain kind of a corrosive mix, and we find this very much in some of the poorer countries in the region, and that is the most worrisome aspect in Yemen, as I say, and one reason why we need to address the internal conditions and make sure that Yemenis can find a road to prosperity and democracy that will give them the confidence that their needs will be met by their government.

Senator KERRY. Can you share anything with the committee, do you have any view at this point from a distance, or have you been informed, about the rumors that President Saleh is grooming his son Ahmad for a succession?

Mr. SECHE. I've certainly heard the rumors, and I think that it's important for us as a government and certainly if I am confirmed and go to Yemen that will be one of my first tasks, to try to continue the efforts being made on the ground to ensure that a succession process is in place that will be democratic, that will be transparent, that'll be constitutionally viable, and that will leave the Yemeni people with full confidence that their will has been expressed at the polls.

Senator KERRY. What do you think has been the impact of the increased American aid since the attacks of September 11?

Mr. SECHE. I think it's had a very positive impact. I think we have focused very smartly on the five governorates where the conditions are least propitious economically and politically and perhaps most volatile, and where the conditions are such that we might see the kind of extremism take root that we're trying to avoid. I think for that reason alone this sharp focus, the effort we've made in health care, education, economic reforms, transparency, anti-corruption, all of these are Yemeni society that need to be addressed, and I think identifying ourselves with these remedial steps is a very positive element in the relationship.

Senator KERRY. What do you think is the top priority in terms of building the relationship and diminishing the impact of radical gains?

Mr. SECHE. I think we need to be seen as being absolutely true to our values. I think this is rule of law, all the constitutional guarantees we take for granted. We need to make sure that around the world people see us and say, yes, America can be trusted, can be relied upon to bring these values to bear in our own societies.

Senator KERRY. And what do you think is the biggest crow that sticks in their throat with respect to that, and what perception is working against us in your judgment in Yemen?

Mr. SECHE. Well, I suspect that probably, conversely, the fact that there is an erosion of this confidence, there is a sense that we have not really proven to be true to our values in some sense. They look around and they see—

Senator KERRY. Tell me in your judgment, what do you hear? What is the biggest evidence of that? Is it Guantanamo? Is it Abu Ghraib? Is it Iraq itself? Is it some particular thing, or a conglomerate of them?

Mr. SECHE. I think it's a basketful of issues. I think Guantanamo is one that strikes very closely and very personally to many Yemenis, and I think this is something that we need to resolve with as much dispatch as we can. I also think that Iraq, of course, has a very negative influence on people's opinions and perceptions of us, and I think the continued protracted inability to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue is another issue that has to be addressed.

Senator KERRY. Share with us just very quickly, and then I'll ask you others, the prospects for improving Yemen's economic situation and this level of poverty?

Mr. SECHE. I think fundamentally what we need to do is address the issue of corruption. I think it's endemic in the government at all levels. I think it's a real impediment to investor and donor confidence. I think that people are using their own ability to get at wealth for their own personal gain. It tends to be a dispiriting element in a society and we need to address that as well.

I think we've done very well with the aid we've been able to put in the country in very critical areas to ensure that we try to lift the boat up a little bit so that everybody can come home and float a little bit more safely to harbor.

Senator KERRY. Thank you.

Mr. Norland, did you enjoy Norway?

Mr. NORLAND. I had the great fortune, sir, to be in Tromso, Norway, before anybody ever used the term "American presence post," and it was a one-person post 250 miles north of the Arctic Circle, and it was a marvelous experience.

Senator KERRY. It must have been. I hope somebody was there with you.

Mr. NORLAND. My wife and kids.

Senator KERRY. Terrific.

Mr. NORLAND. Yes.

Senator KERRY. Uzbekistan presents one of those tricky balances, as do a couple of the other places you all are going to represent, between advocating for human rights and democracy and the balance of getting day to day cooperation from people to fight terrorism. Give us your assessment of where that balance is and to what degree you judge Uzbekistan is in fact cooperating with our antiproliferation and antiterrorism efforts?

Mr. NORLAND. Yes, Senator. I think, sadly, the balance has tilted toward a situation where, given a panoply of interests—security, economic, cooperation, counternarcotics, human rights—the human rights part of that equation needs the most attention. We're in a situation where it cannot be business as usual. But I think that one of the ways to approach this is to go back to the idea that we share common interests, to try to persuade the Uzbek Government that in fact our interests in stability in the region, in peaceful succession, in resolving security and other issues, these are interests we share in common and it is very much in the Uzbek Government's interests to restore its proper standing in the international community with respect to human rights and rule of law.

Senator KERRY. What do you think is the impact of Congress's prohibition on some assistance to Uzbekistan?

Mr. NORLAND. I think that the role that Congress has played in that respect, the role that some of the—I won't say suspension—well, suspension or not doing business as usual in terms of some of the executive branch activities with Uzbekistan, have gotten their attention. Again, it's regrettable—

Senator KERRY. When you say get their attention, there's still a pretty widespread understanding of torture and abuse and things like that. How do you leverage this sort of level of cooperation we need? If you start to get pushy on one, you could lose the other, can't you?

Mr. NORLAND. You can, but I think there have been a couple of examples recently where the government has taken actions that show that perhaps our approach and condemnation by the international community has an impact. There were a couple of journalists who were first arrested, sentenced to long jail terms. There was an outcry by us, by the European Union, and those terms have been suspended and the journalists have been released.

Now, granted this was after kind of a show trial type of confession on their part. It's not a solution to the problem. But I think what it sends—the signal it sends is that they can't be completely oblivious to what we think.

Senator KERRY. Well, I have some more questions I want to get into. But I'll let my colleague have an opportunity here, and I thank him for coming here.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN**

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you for holding this hearing.

I just have a couple of quick questions, but I congratulate all of you and you're all going to interesting posts. Mr. Chairman, I enjoyed listening to your questioning, particularly with regard to Yemen. It was an interesting conversation.

Ms. Patterson, with regard to Pakistan, we had a chance to meet and I just want to follow up a little bit. Given your extensive history working on drug-related issues, I'm interested to hear your thoughts on how to best combat the major drug trafficking problems in Pakistan and along the border countries, especially since opium trafficking may be a major source of revenue, as we know,

for many terrorist and insurgent groups operating out of Pakistan or along its borders.

Ms. PATTERSON. Thank you, Senator Feingold. Actually it's a growing problem, and the spillover effect from Afghanistan is not only funding the Taliban, and our intelligence and information on that gets better by the day, but it's also increasing addiction very dramatically in Pakistan. I visited a treatment center run by a very impressive woman up in Peshawar. They had huge numbers of addicts that are not only native Pakistani citizens, but that come out of the refugee camps. There are still two million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

This is a problem that's going to have to have enormous cross-border cooperation. It's going to have to have enormous political will on both sides of the border. The Pakistani army has 85,000 troops on the border. We have—the bureau I work with now has funded border stations all along the border. That said, it's had little impact on the flow through Pakistan and into Iran, which also has an enormous addiction problem right now.

We hope that with this new strategy in the FATA, the one the Pakistani Government has put forward and that we will support, that too will have an effect on drug trafficking. But I am certainly not optimistic in the short run, Senator.

Senator FEINGOLD. Can you tell me about the nature of the opium issue in Pakistan as opposed to Afghanistan?

Ms. PATTERSON. Yes, sir. Pakistan actually has quite a good record against narcotics in terms of treatment and eradication and law enforcement. What's happening now is they're simply being overwhelmed with the flow from Afghanistan and they're not able to interdict it.

Senator FEINGOLD. This is opium—

Ms. PATTERSON. Opium.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. That's produced in Afghanistan?

Ms. PATTERSON. In Afghanistan.

Senator FEINGOLD. And it flows to Pakistan?

Ms. PATTERSON. It flows into Pakistan and a lot of it flows into Iran in the old Turkish Connection route. But Pakistan has done a pretty good job in recent years in controlling its own poppy problem. It just can't now control the flow in from Afghanistan.

But the really scary thing from our standpoint is the funding of the Taliban.

Senator FEINGOLD. So the poppy production in Afghanistan is much greater than in Pakistan.

Ms. PATTERSON. Vastly greater. I think Pakistan has a thousand hectares of poppy production, which is considered negligible by U.N. standards.

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you believe the drug eradication efforts in Colombia have been effective, and do you intend to implement similar practices in Pakistan?

Ms. PATTERSON. Yes, sir, I do believe they've been effective. And I entirely realize that many in this Congress have a different view. But I firmly believe that if we had not taken this amount of coca in this case, cocaine products, off the market, we would have had a much more difficult problem in this country.

When Plan Colombia began, we had so much narcotics coming in that it threatened to swamp our treatment programs with cheap dope. So I believe that the eradication has had an impact. I believe interdiction in Colombia had an impact in its not reaching the streets of the United States.

And no, we have no intention to put in place such a program in Pakistan, nor would it be necessary. They have a very modest program.

Senator FEINGOLD. Okay. Do you think Pakistan is on the verge of a state of emergency being declared? And if Musharraf declares a state of emergency, how would we respond? What message is the administration sending with its unwavering support of President Musharraf?

Ms. PATTERSON. Let me address the state of emergency first, Senator. After we spoke I went back and found more detail about this and both the Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and President Musharraf have said that no state of emergency is intended or planned.

I also found the most astonishing statement by Shaukit, that this would be the first time in the history of Pakistan that parliament would ever complete a full term. The administration, rest assured, is sending the right message on this. I would be fairly confident to predict that no state of emergency is going to be imposed. Our policy is to push for free and fair and transparent elections before February of 2008, and if I'm confirmed I will pursue that vigorously.

Senator FEINGOLD. What about the unwavering support of Musharraf? What kind of message is that sending?

Ms. PATTERSON. President Musharraf has been our friend. He is our friend. He has been in many respects a modernizer in Pakistan, certainly on issues like the economy and on issues like women's rights—actually a rather remarkable modernizer. I would not say we have unwavering support for Musharraf. I think we have pushed for elections. We pushed for institutional development in Pakistan. It's up to the electorate to decide the next steps. That's our policy and that's the policy I will pursue if I'm confirmed.

Senator FEINGOLD. What about his giving up his leadership of the army?

Ms. PATTERSON. That's up to the people of Pakistan, Senator. And they have—if elections are free and fair and transparent, they will have several opportunities to address this. Certainly the electors can take this into account when they vote on him, and if they don't like the decision, his decision, they can vote for parties that have a different view.

Senator FEINGOLD. But we don't weigh in on the inappropriateness of him being both president and head of the army?

Ms. PATTERSON. Let me state our policy very clearly, Senator. Our policy is to push for a civilian-elected government in Pakistan. But the timing of that is up to the Pakistanis.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold, for an important round of questioning, and we appreciate your participation enormously.

I'm going to come back to you in a moment, Ambassador Patterson. Let me just ask Ambassador Powell, if I can. In your judgment, does the interim government have enough legitimacy and lift to be able to pull off the assembly elections?

Ms. POWELL. They appear to be working very hard at making the necessary steps. They've taken a very important one this week in getting new legislation in that determined the kind of elections. They will have a mix of both "first past the post" and proportionate. They have one more piece of legislation they need to pass. They are certainly going to have to do much more on the law and order front in order to ensure that people aren't intimidated, that the campaigns can go forward in a reasonable manner.

Senator KERRY. Assuming they did the law and order front, is it your judgment that the outcome—and there's I assume to be some kind of international observation for the legitimacy. Let's say it's signed off on. Do you think that internally within the country there will be an acceptance of an outcome?

Ms. POWELL. I think that's one of the major questions, particularly with the Nawas Party. They have committed themselves to the parliamentary system—

Senator KERRY. How committed do you judge they really are?

Ms. POWELL. I think we will have a chance to see that. They have not shown 100 percent commitment, particularly with the founding of the Young Communist League. Intimidation, extortion, some of the kidnapping has been continuing. This has been recognized both by the U.S. Government representatives, by my predecessor, and also by the prime minister, by other political leaders.

Senator KERRY. So it's your judgment or the State Department's conclusion that the likelihood is they may engage in coercive activities during the election?

Ms. POWELL. That certainly is one of the things that their pattern has shown so far. I believe that the international community, certainly the Nepali Government, is going to have to watch this and take steps to stop it.

Senator KERRY. What impact do you believe street demonstrations would have on the election process?

Ms. POWELL. It's had a number of impacts already, certainly a very devastating impact on the economy. They've lost a number of work days. They do intimidate those who are opposed to the Maoist philosophy and this has served to form the debate in certain ways that have not been truly democratic.

Senator KERRY. Can you comment on what the status of their weapons are at this point?

Ms. POWELL. They turned in approximately 3,000 weapons to the U.N. They are under lock and key in the camps. They are monitored by the U.N. It is not clear that that is the entire cache, but that has been—

Senator KERRY. Is there any judgment at all about the relative quantity?

Ms. POWELL. I don't believe so. It was also matched by a similar quantity from the army being restored. My experience in South Asia is that even if they had locked up all those in their possession, it isn't that difficult to get new ones in the region.

Senator KERRY. Therefore, what judgment, if any, is made about what they might resort to in the event they don't like the outcome of the election?

Ms. POWELL. I think there are two things that we'll need to watch for. One of them is making sure that the elections are as free and fair as they can be, so that there is no reason for groups, whether it's the Maoists or others, to reject the results. The international community is trying to work in a coordinated manner with the Government of Nepal to provide expertise, to provide assistance in the logistics and in the legal framework for those elections. There are a number of international bodies, including American ones, that are already committed to providing international observers, training Nepali observers to be in the more remote parts of the country, so that it can be documented on the conduct of the election, on the conduct of the various parties. I think all of those will go a long way. Strengthening the security forces so that they can deal with occasions of violence on election day, ensure that there is not an outbreak of violence after the elections.

Senator KERRY. What's the anticipated date on the constituent assembly election?

Ms. POWELL. They are talking about a Nepali month in the fall between mid-November and mid-December.

Senator KERRY. Is there a role that the United States and the international community can play that we aren't playing? Is there anything we should be doing in your judgment?

Ms. POWELL. I think we need to continue to work with the United Nations to make sure that the cantonments in which the Maoist fighters have been put are adequately staffed and taken care of. We need to look at what we can do to make sure that the people who are in those camps receive some kind of training that will allow them to rejoin society after having been part of a group that has not encouraged support for democratic ideals.

I think those are key areas. Also the very, very important and practical aspects of the elections. They are going to need money. They are going to need logistics. Nepal is not an easy country to move around in, and to get the ballots out, to get the security forces out to the various regions will take a lot of funding and a lot of work on the logistics.

Senator KERRY. Is there a current plan for that?

Ms. POWELL. I believe the U.N. is working hard on it. We certainly have advisers working with the election commission from IFES and others that the USAID has contracted to support the Nepali efforts.

If confirmed, one of my first topics will be to look at our own plans and to see, both for the elections and then what happens the day after the elections. Are we prepared to be able to support the constituent assembly that is elected and how can we best do that?

Senator KERRY. Is there a compromise of some kind that you believe could be attained at the ballot box that would sufficiently vest the Maoists so they don't resort to an armed struggle? That is, is there some frame of that that you have that you would articulate? Or do you think this has to be simply worked through and see what the outcome is?

Ms. POWELL. I think this one is going to take, first of all, a free and fair election where people have confidence that they have voted for those that they want. There is a certain amount of support for the Maoists and that also needs to be respected in an election.

They have committed to this, although there are divisions, we believe, within the Maoists. We need to encourage those that are committed to the democratic process and to make sure that all forms, including the court system, that there are ways to encourage the ethnic groups and the others who feel disadvantaged that they have a role. Right now most of the violence is from those groups rather than from the Maoist groups.

Senator KERRY. What role do you believe India has in this?

Ms. POWELL. They have a very important role to play. There are a large number of Nepali citizens who live and work in India. The border is relatively open. This has provided a free flow of ideas and goods. It's also permitted smuggling and other illegal activities to take place. They have enormous amounts of influence with the various political groups, including the Maoists, over the years. So they will continue to play a very important role.

Senator KERRY. Do you believe that China has any ability to help?

Ms. POWELL. I do. They have, again, a long border with Nepal. They have rejected the idea that these are people that are somehow tied to their former leader and have spoken out in favor of the current peace process. I would hope that they would be engaged in promoting that.

Senator KERRY. I assume this will be task number one for you the minute you set foot there, that you're going to focus on what we can do to be supportive without being viewed as interfering or managing it.

Ms. POWELL. It is. At the same time, I think our assistance and our support has been focused on both the short term, with a very, very heavy focus on the peace process and the elections, but also on our assistance to ensuring that the government can deliver services. We have concentrated over the years particularly on education and health, with the current focus on health, and that very much needs to continue. The average Nepali is struck by poverty, with a lack of opportunity for education. We need to continue to assist the government to address those needs.

Senator KERRY. Is there any other challenge that the Committee ought to be thinking about to be helpful to you?

Ms. POWELL. I think the Nepalis, in particular, need to continue to look at trafficking. We have had a very, very positive response, I believe, on the offer to resettle some of the Bhutanese refugees, who have been in camps for 17 years, as a humanitarian gesture. We're going to continue to have to look at how to do that. It is not easy to implement. But we will continue to work on those issues as well.

Senator KERRY. We wish you well in that. What about the strife in Terai?

Ms. POWELL. I think the security forces have not been deployed in a manner to assist the government in ensuring that there is law and order. There are a number of groups who have taken the position that the way to get the government's attention is to take to

the street, to commit violent acts. This needs to be addressed in a way that they can have their grievances heard. There is a roundtable planned with the new minister for reconstruction and they will be—I think this is something that we need to encourage, that they address these needs, these grievances, more energetically and more quickly, so that they don't feel the need to go to the streets.

Senator KERRY. I may come back and follow up on a couple of those issues. But let me first ask Joseph Adam Erelí a couple of things if I can.

How would you describe the relationship right now between Bahrain, the Shiite community in Bahrain, and Iran?

Mr. ERELÍ. I think there are similarities and differences. Obviously, the similarities of the coreligionists. But there are Shia who look to Qum for guidance in Iran, there are Shia—in Bahrain there are Shia who look to Qum for guidance. There are Shia who look to Najaf for guidance. So it would be a mistake to assume just because they're Shia they share a sympathy and allegiance to Iran.

I think you need to look, one needs to look beyond the surface religious affiliation and dig a little deeper to see where—how people think and where their allegiances lie. But I think, going beyond that, obviously Bahrain finds itself on the same religious fault line that Iraq does. It goes north to southeast to west, and Bahrain is squarely at the epicenter of it.

Having said that, Bahrain has a long history of peaceful coexistence between religious communities.

Senator KERRY. Are there any signs now of sectarian divisions growing?

Mr. ERELÍ. Excuse me, sir?

Senator KERRY. Are there any signs now of the spillover of the Iraqi divide, that sectarian violence spilling into Bahrain?

Mr. ERELÍ. Not really.

Senator KERRY. Or any Sunni-Shia—

Mr. ERELÍ. Obviously, people are thinking about it and people are watching for it. But I have not in my consultations and my discussions heard anybody suggest that the kind of sectarian strife we're seeing in Iraq is spilling over into Bahrain.

Senator KERRY. What level of middle class "refugeeism" is taking place in Bahrain out of Iraq?

Mr. ERELÍ. Not the way, for instance, in Jordan. I would make an important—I would make one point, sir, is that the Bahraini leadership has been pretty farsighted in this in the sense that they have proactively incorporated or included prominent Shia into the cabinet. There are five Shia cabinet ministers in Bahrain, thereby giving that community, as I said in my opening statement, a voice in the affairs of their country. That's an important step and I think one that recognizes and puts its finger ahead of time on the issue that you raise in your question.

Senator KERRY. What do you see as your biggest challenge?

Mr. ERELÍ. There are several, sir. No. 1, I think when you talked about what can we do to restore confidence in a region and a world that is looking to America for I think consistency and leadership is—and this is very true in the Gulf and especially true in Bahrain—we have to stand by our friends. It's not—in these dangerous neighborhoods, being friends with the United States entails risks.

And Bahrain has been one of the most steadfast and forward-leaning friends of the United States. It's not without risk, both domestically as well as with very big and brutal neighbors.

So we need to stand by, we need to stand by our friends. We need to, as I said before, promote interoperability, promote cooperation with Bahrain in our regional efforts, both confronting Iran as well as promoting regional security cooperation with the other members of the GCC. That will serve as a strong signal to other states that there's a payoff to being a friend of the United States, that it's in their interest and it's in our mutual interest. I think that serves American national interests over the long run.

Democratic development, human rights, sir, is a ball you can never take your eye off of. I think what we see in Bahrain as well as other countries in the region is that democratic development is not constant, it is not linear. There are setbacks. Even though a country can be committed to reform and political pluralism and respect for the rights of its citizens, there are always challenges to that commitment. There's always backsliding. As ambassador if confirmed, I would keep my eye on that ball. I would be engaged with the government constantly to help them move forward in the way that they have outlined. And I think, sir, the case of NDI is a good example of that.

Senator KERRY. Just a few more questions if we can. Ambassador Patterson, what do you make of the dustup with the chief justice in Pakistan?

Ms. PATTERSON. That is before the—the Supreme Court of Pakistan is reviewing that case right now. I think everyone would say that the acting Chief Justice is an honorable individual known for his integrity. The Supreme Court itself is well respected. They're going to review his reinstatement on a variety of substantive and procedural grounds, and the government has said that they will stand by that decision.

On the issue itself, obviously it was most unfortunate. Certainly the violence that was associated with it is to be deplored. But it is before the courts of Pakistan now and they have a long and distinguished history.

Senator KERRY. You're saying you have confidence that they'll resolve this appropriately?

Ms. PATTERSON. Yes, we're confident, and we're confident that the government will stand behind the decision. Like courts everywhere else, it's hard to predict when they might make a decision.

Senator KERRY. Do you base that at all on any reporting from Under Deputy Secretary Negroponte in his visit?

Ms. PATTERSON. Certainly from his—I think the government's made public statements to that effect, and we've had quite a string of high-level visitors there, and the embassy's reporting.

Senator KERRY. And that comes from that?

Ms. PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator KERRY. Now, what is your assessment of the al-Qaeda presence in the tribal areas?

Ms. PATTERSON. My assessment, sir, is that it's very alarming. When you've asked my colleagues here about their highest priority that has to be my highest priority, to do everything we possibly can

to prevent an attack on either the United States or allied countries from that. But it is alarming.

I think reconstitution or resurgence might be too strong a word, but they certainly are operating from Pakistan. And they operate across—fairly freely in a cross-border way, too.

Senator KERRY. When I was in Kabul, I heard a lot from President Karzai about his view of what's happening there. Then obviously when I met with Musharraf also heard a lot. I gather the meeting between the two of them was not a good meeting on any interpretive level. So we have a difficulty in this relationship. It's hard to get control of that border under those circumstances, isn't it?

Ms. PATTERSON. It's extremely difficult, sir.

Senator KERRY. It sounds to me like a Taliban-al-Qaeda dream.

Ms. PATTERSON. It's extremely difficult, not only because of the terrain, which is terrible, but also, and terribly difficult to control, but also, yes, because of the relationships. But we're working on that. And we're working on enhanced cross-border cooperation. Our embassies cooperate.

I think the Pakistanis and the Afghans work better on the operational level than you might suspect. As we developed this new strategy, it will do things like put in place intelligence centers that can fuse the information that becomes available on the border. So we have some plans that I think are fairly convincing and impressive.

Senator KERRY. I was going to ask you what steps you thought we could take in order to try to improve the situation. I trust those plans are in the making now?

Ms. PATTERSON. Yes, sir, they're actually quite well developed, and they build on—

Senator KERRY. Are they public in any way?

Ms. PATTERSON. No. Certainly we can provide a briefing for you and your staff. I wouldn't call them public, but they're certainly available.

Senator KERRY. Well, it's something we obviously want to try to follow up on. I don't think we need to explore it in a public session right now.

I'll ask two questions, quickly. Kashmir, India—how do you interpret the current state of that dialog? There's been a lot of talk and a lot of discussion about how things are great and they're good, but on the other hand nothing's been resolved fundamentally. And there seems to be just a continued idea of having talks. Now, talk's better than what we had, I'm not dismissing it, but do you see any notion, any sense that they really could get a resolution on Kashmir?

Ms. PATTERSON. I think, Senator, Mr. Chairman, I think relations are better than they have been in years. This dialog has continued. As you pointed out, at least it's not a hot situation right now. When I was talking to members of the committee staff in preparation for this hearing, they suggested, and I would tend to agree, that we, the United States Government, have been distracted—not distracted—have been very active elsewhere in the region, and that we might offer to play a more active role in that. I certainly took that on board.

Senator KERRY. Finally, how do you interpret the radical Islamic movement in Pakistan and the balance between the scope that President Musharraf has to deal with that and the street, maintain the independence and sovereignty of his administration and the country, and still be our close ally in the war on terror?

Ms. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, that sort of radical extremist or even the very conservative religious parties—and the two are of course not necessarily the same—they've not had a historically important role in Pakistan. They've never had more than 10 or 11 percent of the vote. I think what is alarming is the increase in Islamic extremism in the Northwest Frontier Province and in the FATA. There seems to be some impression that these people live very collegially with the tribes up there. That's not the case either. These tribal leaders have been killed by the hundreds. People have been intimidated and threatened. And as you know, there have been multiple assassination attempts against government—not only the president, but a wide range of ministers, including the minister of interior.

So yes, it's a serious problem, but not one that I think cannot be controlled. In other words, Pakistan—and President Musharraf talks very eloquently about this in his book—Pakistan largely speaking is a moderate and tolerant Islamic country.

Senator KERRY. Well, Islam honestly speaking is a moderate and tolerant religion. But some people have hijacked it around a number of different distortions. We've got about 5 minutes to explore what I left out in the beginning. I'd just like each of you to share with me your experience. You're about to be Ambassador of the United States in a relatively troubled arena. You're going to have unprecedented levels of security. Your embassy personnel are working in barricaded fortresses and will have huge levels of security.

What's your readout on what we need to do as a country to improve your ability to live, to represent us in a different status, to be in a different place in these relationships? Anybody want to take that first? I'm going to ask each of you. But share your experience. What do we need to do? What do you think would make the most difference? Is it simply solving Iraq? Is it bigger than Iraq? Is it something we're not doing well in terms of multilateralism, diplomacy overall? Is there a multiple message?

What's your gut tell you when you go home at night some day after getting a cable from the State Department and you pound the wall and say, they don't understand? What do you think we ought to do? Mr. Norland?

Mr. NORLAND. Well, maybe I'll speak as somebody whose father was in the Foreign Service and who grew up living partly overseas. I would say that there's both a policy function, but also kind of an ironic function of modern life that's at play here. We're under the illusion that in the age of the Internet and of jet travel that we understand the world better than we actually do. There really is no substitute, as you're suggesting in your question, for actually being on the ground and living with people in a foreign country, getting to know them, establishing family relationships that last maybe longer than just that tour.

I think one of the challenges we have, as you suggested, is to overcome the security and other barriers that exist and really penetrate these societies and establish long-term relationships, both as diplomats, also through graduate student exchange programs and other kinds of exchange programs.

From a policy perspective, as a policy function, I think as was said earlier, addressing the Israeli-Palestinian issue and applying perhaps a little more focus to multilateral diplomacy would probably also help restore our standing in the world.

Mr. SECHE. If I might follow up, and if Dick hadn't said it so well I would say exactly what he has just said. I think there's something important here. There will always be policies that create neuralgia between us and other peoples around the world. We will never avoid those kinds of controversies and disappointments. It may be Iraq, it may be something else tomorrow. We have to understand that and at that level where human interaction becomes the key to convincing people they can come back to a level of trust and confidence in us, that's where I think we need to do this. That is public diplomacy. That is relationships among people that will let us relate to them as individuals and convey to them what our values and our principles are. I think there are a lot of common bonds that can be forged in that manner.

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Powell.

Ms. POWELL. I would add to that that it needs to work both ways. We need to be welcoming also of our foreign friends and find ways to process their visits to the United States. Particularly, I hope for education. I think the universities and the schools in America have been a tremendous area for improving understanding of America, for having people understand that, and I would hope that we can continue to do that, while at the same time we protect our borders and make them secure.

I'm facing a situation in which the Peace Corps has had to terminate its program in Nepal. I truly believe the Peace Corps has had a tremendous influence around the world and would encourage additional programs like that where possible.

Mr. ERELI. Sir, I come from a background in public affairs and public diplomacy and have spent a lot of time talking to people in the region for a number of years. One of the constant refrains you hear is: You know, it's not that we don't like America; it's we don't like its policies. Frankly, I've been hearing that refrain for 20 years.

I think what's incumbent upon us as representatives of the United States is to represent and advocate and promote the values that have made this country the greatest country in the world. It is those values, sir, that the people of the region in every region I've been in largely share with us and largely seek to emulate. It's when they see us as somehow betraying those values or falling short of those values that we come in for the greatest criticism.

So the task before us is to try to establish the mutual understanding and the relationships and the policy convergences that are based on values of freedom, of equality, of opportunity, and of the rule of law, and at the same time square them with what's going on in the world. That's not always an easy thing to do, but that's why we get paid the big bucks.

The other point I would make is I would echo something that my current boss, Under Secretary Hughes, talks about quite often, which is the diplomacy of deeds. That is that the United States does an awful lot of good for the world that goes unrecognized. Our support, the President's support for AIDS funding; the actions we're taking on malaria; what we devote to educational exchanges and educational opportunities. These are acts that improve people's lives in a material way.

Nothing helped us more, sir, than when we flew aid to the people of Pakistan after that earthquake. You saw a notable jump in attitudes towards the United States. I would just underscore the importance of the diplomacy of deeds and the importance of doing concrete things to improve people's lives that again provide material support and material expression to our values as a Nation.

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Patterson, you get a by because I've just been given a message I've got an emergency meeting here on CAFE that I've got to get to right away.

But I need to ask each and every one of you, is there any reason, is there anything that would act as a potential conflict of interest in the performance of your responsibilities as an ambassador that we should be aware of? Ambassador Patterson.

Ms. PATTERSON. No, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Powell.

Ms. POWELL. No, sir.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Ereli.

Mr. ERELI. No, sir.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Norland.

Mr. NORLAND. No, sir.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Seche.

Mr. SECHE. No, sir.

Senator KERRY. And is there any holding, asset or interest that any of you have that would potentially pose a conflict of interest in the performance of your responsibilities?

Ambassador Patterson.

Ms. PATTERSON. No, sir.

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Powell.

Ms. POWELL. No, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Ereli.

Mr. ERELI. No, sir.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Norland.

Mr. NORLAND. No, sir.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Seche.

Mr. SECHE. None whatsoever.

Senator KERRY. Great.

Well, again let me repeat what I said at the outset: a tremendous amount of experience. You are all of you superbly qualified to go out there and undertake these responsibilities. We're going to try—I'm going to leave the record open until Monday only because I want to move, if we can, Wednesday or Thursday to a business meeting, which should allow us to have a vote on the floor of the Senate either Thursday night or Friday to get you all out there, which we need to do, particularly before we break for the Fourth of July recess, so you can all take the "if I am confirmed" out of your repertoire and get ready to be confirmed and go to work.

We appreciate it again and look forward to seeing some of you, anyway. I'm not sure I'll get everywhere that you are, but I look forward to getting out there some time. Good luck. God bless. Thank you.

We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF RICHARD B. NORLAND TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Before Islam Karimov severed military ties with the United States, the State Department was often at odds with the Department of Defense over the degree to which human rights, political liberties, and other core American values should be sublimated to the short-term goals of gaining occasional support for ongoing military operations. If confirmed, will you commit to make human rights, political liberties, and other core American values the centerpiece, rather than merely one factor in the equation, when determining United States policy toward Uzbekistan?

Answer. Human rights and democracy have long been key underpinnings of United States policy toward Uzbekistan. During the period of close military ties with Uzbekistan, which began soon after the 9/11 attacks, we pursued a strategic partnership with Uzbekistan—as agreed to in our 2002 bilateral Declaration on the Strategic Framework—which explicitly conditioned our relationship on improvements in Uzbekistan's human rights and democratic practices, among other areas.

In 2004, when the Secretary of State could no longer certify that Uzbekistan was fulfilling these commitments, we severely restricted assistance, notably including both International Military Educational Training and Foreign Military Financing. While there is no question that the promise of Uzbekistan's support in the war on terror was of great importance to us, we have not and will not seek to secure this at the expense of human rights and basic freedoms.

In fact, our conscious decision to repeatedly and persistently call for an international investigation into the violent events at Andijon in 2005, together with criticism and condemnation of Uzbekistan's human rights practices more generally, was a factor leading to the expulsion of United States military forces from Karshi-Khanabad air base and the overall chill in bilateral relations.

Our critical task now is to rebuild and reshape the bilateral relationship, emphasizing to the Uzbeks that improving their human rights record is fundamental to progress in all spheres. Security, for example, will suffer if moderate Muslims cannot practice their faith and are pushed toward extremism by restrictive government practices. Likewise, the positive foreign investment climate needed to boost the Uzbek economy is undermined by Uzbekistan's poor human rights record. At the same time, we must make clear that security and economic cooperation, if conducted properly, can also play an important part in improving the overall human rights picture for the people of Uzbekistan. If confirmed, I will keep our Mission fully committed to the goal of ensuring that Uzbekistan observes international human rights standards.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Uzbekistan? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Uzbekistan? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Democracy is severely undermined in Uzbekistan by a government that stifles debate and punishes those who challenge the status quo. Its human rights practices are rooted in its Soviet past, and include the use of torture to extract confessions, unjust imprisonments, life-threatening prison conditions, harassment and prosecution of journalists, human rights activists, religious groups, and other members of civil society.

The United States must continue to emphasize to the Government of Uzbekistan that we value human rights and that we, along with other members of the international community, will continue to monitor the country's treatment of its citizens. If confirmed, I will engage in systematic diplomatic efforts to persuade Uzbekistan's current and emerging leaders that democracy and rule of law are essential to Uzbekistan's stability, economic prosperity, and the overall well-being of the Uzbek

people. I intend to maintain our Mission's support for human rights defenders with training and material support to organizations and individuals. Our Mission will support domestic and international efforts to promote a free press and ensure that elections are free and fair. Where appropriate, I will also seek out opportunities to assist the Uzbek Government in improving its own practices in these areas through training, exchange programs, and persistent diplomacy. I would hope that these activities would facilitate improvements in human rights practices and promote stability and prosperity.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges will you face in Uzbekistan in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. The chief obstacles and challenges to advancing human rights stem from the Uzbek Government's decision to severely restrict relations with the United States, in part as a consequence of United States and international criticism in the aftermath of Andijon. Uzbekistan's Government continues to harass human rights activists and journalists and obstruct civil society organizations that cooperate with us. If confirmed, my principal challenge will be to establish effective working relationships between our Mission and all levels of government and society, and to use these relationships to persuade Uzbekistan that improved human rights is in the fundamental interest of both our countries.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. Our current team at Embassy Tashkent realizes that promoting human rights and democracy extends far beyond the portfolio of a single diplomat, or section of the embassy. Human rights issues are in one way or another the focus of all sections and agencies at the Mission. If confirmed, I would institutionalize briefings on the human rights situation in Uzbekistan for all members of the Mission team, and see to it that human rights issues and concerns were consistently included in all areas of our policy, including the design and content of any assistance program undertaken with the Uzbek Government.

All Foreign Service officers are trained from the beginning of their careers on the importance of human rights diplomacy and programs. In addition, the State Department recognizes outstanding human rights officers with an annual Department-wide award. Human rights officers at Embassy Tashkent are regularly nominated for this award, and have won it three times in the last several years. If confirmed, I would ensure that officers at Embassy Tashkent continue to be recognized for outstanding work.

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Uzbekistan who are working to promote human rights?

Answer. Regrettably, because of actions taken by the Uzbek Government, the human rights community in Uzbekistan has dwindled to only a few international nongovernmental organizations and many individuals across the country working bravely to protect individual rights. Previous Ambassadors to Uzbekistan have made a regular practice of meeting with human rights activists and nongovernmental organizations working in this field. If confirmed, I would continue to make these meetings, which are a critical source of moral support to this community, a high priority. At the same time, we must bear in mind that interactions with the embassy have resulted in harm to several activists in the past. I would take care to work quietly with those who wish to do so. I would also make it a priority, before departing for Post, to meet with United States NGO's that are following the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, and to stay in touch with them throughout my tour.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. In seeking to advance human rights in Uzbekistan, I will draw on strong support for human rights manifested throughout my career. In addition to the work I have carried out over the past 2 years as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kabul, Afghanistan, where United States efforts alongside those of the international community are helping to prevent a resurgence of the brutal Taliban regime, I would cite the following three examples over the course of my career:

- South Africa: As a desk officer on the South Africa Desk in 1983–1985, I looked for ways to ensure that United States policy stood up to apartheid. I crafted remarks for Secretary Shultz that drew the ire of the South African foreign minister because of their outspoken criticism of apartheid. I personally engaged with the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in an effort to ameliorate the policy of “constructive engagement,” seen by many as appeasement of apartheid and soon overtaken by the Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act. I used my influence to help a deserving black South African get a visa to the United States even when other factors worked against this.
- Soviet Union: As a political officer in Moscow in 1988–1990, during the waning days of the Soviet Union, I focused my engagement and reporting on advancing United States-Soviet cooperation in support of the Middle East peace process as well as conflict resolution efforts underway in eastern and southern Africa. I worked to expedite the departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Progress was made in all these areas, tangibly improving human rights for millions of people, and I feel I played a part in these efforts. In addition, as Soviet authority crumbled, I was successful in persuading Russian contacts that they had nothing to fear from the United States, and bolstered them in their growing awareness that the demise of Soviet Communism would spell a massive advance in human rights on a global scale—which it did. I am proud to have played a small part in this, very early and large-scale example of Transformational Diplomacy.
- Northern Ireland: I worked for 5 years on the Northern Ireland peace process, three as political counselor in Dublin (1995–1998) and two as a director for European affairs on the National Security Council staff (1999–2001). I feel this was an example of a successful peace process—one where the investment of U.S. political capital (by both the executive and legislative branches) paid off in terms of bringing the parties to the negotiating table and keeping them focused on reaching a solution. The success of United States, British, and Irish diplomacy in this effort has paid off in terms of lives saved and misery averted for hundreds of thousands of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. I am proud to have been part of the many-layered team that over the years helped shepherd this process to a successful conclusion. The trust I established with key players in the Irish and British Governments and among the political parties involved, including Sinn Fein and the loyalists, helped keep them engaged and committed to the peace process during the United States Presidential transition in 2001. The human rights gains have been significant. Senior officials on all sides would, I believe, concur in the assessment that I played a helpful role in advancing this process.

RESPONSES OF ANNE WOODS PATTERSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Do you agree with the opinion expressed by Gen. James Jones at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on September 21, 2006, that in the view of many United States military officers the Taliban central headquarters is located in or near the Pakistani city of Quetta?

Answer. The border areas of Pakistan, including Baluchistan, are of great concern to the United States and the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan is stepping up security operations that are yielding results, including the death or capture of senior Taliban leaders like Mullah Dadullah Lang. Pakistan is also making efforts to extend the writ and benefits of government into areas along the border to eliminate territory from which the Taliban and other extremists may draw support. NATO military leaders tell us that these efforts are helping disrupt Taliban command and control. I believe that we have made good strides, but more needs to be done.

We will continue to support Pakistan in their efforts: in governance, economics, development, education, security, and other areas. The Department can provide a classified briefing to you or your staff to further discuss the situation if needed.

Question. Is it your understanding that the total amount of noncovert aid provided to the Government of Pakistan by the Government of the United States since 9/11 is approximately \$10 billion?

Answer. Yes, the U.S. Government has provided, in round numbers, about \$10 billion in foreign assistance and coalition support funds.

The amount provided to Pakistan by the Government of the United States since 2001 is approximately \$5.6 billion. Of that, \$5.1 billion has been directed toward socio-economic development, law enforcement, and foreign military financing. The

Department of Defense has also provided Pakistan with \$500 million in counterterrorism and counternarcotics training.

In addition to the aid described above, the United States has provided Pakistan with approximately \$4.9 billion since 2001 in the form of reimbursement for expenses incurred by the Government of Pakistan in its support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

As I was preparing for the hearing, I realized that determining the precise amount provided to Pakistan was not easy. Some have implied that the United States Government has promoted this lack of clarity to obfuscate our assistance to Pakistan. This is simply false. The funding for Pakistan comes from different appropriations, is designated to different accounts with discrete legal authorities, is provided to different United States Government agencies, and is further complicated by continuing resolutions, wartime supplementals, and reprogramming. If confirmed, I will try to clear up this issue by describing our assistance programs on the embassy Web site as clearly and completely as possible.

Question. Do you believe that the Government of Pakistan has made satisfactory efforts to dismantle the terrorist groups Lashkar-e Taiba and Jaish-e Muhammad? Are you satisfied with the lack of meaningful punishment given to the leaders of these groups: Hafez Saed and Maulana Azhar?

Answer. The government of Pakistan has seen some successes in confronting these groups, having captured several senior terrorist leaders—particularly those from sectarian terrorist organizations that target victims based on their religion—and adopting policies that have dramatically reduced the cross-border movements of Kashmir related groups in the last year alone. But we must all do more, including Pakistan, if we are to successfully dismantle all terrorist groups in Pakistan and elsewhere.

President Musharraf banned Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-e Muhammad, and other domestic terror groups in 2002, recognizing them as a threat not only to Pakistan's development but its domestic and regional security. Since then the Government of Pakistan has made considerable efforts to dismantle internal terrorist networks and to curb movements of these groups across its borders.

If confirmed, I will continue to work with Pakistan not only to deepen our cooperation in combating al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but also to ensure that ultimately all terror groups, including groups attempting to resurface under new names, are subject to the same scrutiny, and to enhance their efforts to prosecute the leaders and key members of all terrorist organizations operating on Pakistani soil to the fullest extent of the law.

Question. Do you believe there can be genuinely free and fair elections in Pakistan so long as the leaders of the two largest political parties remain barred from returning to the country?

Answer. I believe that the absence or presence of individual politicians from Pakistan on its upcoming election day will not determine whether Pakistan has held a free and fair election.

The credibility of Pakistan's upcoming parliamentary election will rest on the ability of Pakistani political parties to campaign and seek votes openly, the ability of Pakistani voters to vote for the political parties and candidates of their choice, and the ability of those political parties who emerge with a majority of the votes to form a democratic government reflecting the will of Pakistan's electorate.

If confirmed, I will do everything possible to ensure that the U.S. Government supports free, fair, and transparent elections with the widest possible participation of political parties.

Question. What specific metrics would you use to evaluate whether Pakistan's scheduled parliamentary elections can be judged free and fair?

Answer. Elections will be free and fair if the parties can campaign and seek votes openly, if voters can vote for the party of his/her choice, if media is free to cover the electoral campaign and outcome, if voters can be sure that his/her vote will be properly counted, and if the political parties who win can form a democratic government.

If confirmed, I will seek guidance from established international experts, such as the National Democratic Institute and the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor bureau, to evaluate the electoral process and to suggest where U.S. Government assistance might most usefully be directed. I would also expect to be in regular contact with the Elections Commission and opposition parties to seek their views. USAID is already working with the International Foundation for Election Systems, UNDP, and the Asia Foundation to improve elections procedures; State's Department of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor is pro-

viding assistance to local NGOs who will help political parties develop a code on conduct and will conduct basic voter education campaigns, particularly targeted at women.

In my view, it is important that both international and domestic observers be available throughout the electoral process. For instance, there are real concerns about the registration process, which may have excluded millions of eligible voters. I have also learned in my previous assignments that there are lots of ways to steal elections, some very sophisticated and some fairly crude. International experts and domestic monitors on site throughout the process will reduce the chances of a fraudulent election.

The U.S. Government has made clear that we expect to see a parliamentary election in 2007–2008 that meets broad international standards for transparency. I would expect to keep this committee and others in Congress closely informed about this process.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Pakistan? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Pakistan? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Pakistan, a developing country with a population of over 160 million, faces significant challenges in ensuring that the human rights of all of its citizens are not only legally protected, but practically enforced.

As noted in the 2006 State Department Country Report on Human Rights and International Religious Freedom Report, current human rights concerns include treatment of Pakistani citizens by security forces, respect for the rights of women and religious minorities, child labor, trafficking in persons, arbitrary detentions, and hindrances on freedom of the press.

The treatment of women in Pakistan, particularly in rural areas, does not accord with international human rights standards. Protection of the rights and safety of women and children is essential to Pakistan's social and economic development, and if confirmed, I plan to work with the Government of Pakistan closely to identify ways that the United States can help Pakistan improve in this area. The passage this year by Pakistan's National Assembly of the first significant women's rights legislation in decades is an indication that all of Pakistan's mainstream political parties recognize the importance of moving forward in this key area. Still, much remains to be done.

It is also imperative for Pakistan's internal stability and its emergence as a full democracy that the rights of Pakistan's religious minorities be protected, and that religious minorities not be subject to discrimination. The Government of Pakistan has recently reached out to multifaith leaders at the national and local level in a series of interfaith dialogs; this is an initiative that we should encourage as a first step toward increasing the understanding and respect amongst Pakistan's faith communities that underpins freedom of religion.

Arbitrary arrests, including of opposition political figures, are an issue in Pakistan. We have made it clear to the government that freedom of assembly is not only a basic democratic right, but also an essential component of free and fair elections. We have also made it clear that we expect candidates and campaigners from all parties, including the opposition, to have freedom and security of movement in this electoral season. We need to send a strong message on this issue, and will.

We also track closely reports of disappearances, or detentions, in which families are unable to determine the welfare and whereabouts of their imprisoned relative. Transparency is a critical element of justice. The Government of Pakistan has legitimate and serious internal security concerns. But in addressing those concerns, Pakistan needs to balance the imperatives of security with respect for personal freedoms and the rule of law.

Finally, it is important that the United States encourage fuller observance of political rights and encourage Pakistan's movement toward a civilian-led democracy. It is important that the considerable progress made by the Government of Pakistan in recent years toward ensuring freedom of the press and of assembly not be halted or eroded. I was relieved to see that, following objections from the local media community, the Government of Pakistan recently reversed an initiative to introduce legislation that could have negatively impacted press freedom in Pakistan.

If confirmed, I will encourage long-term programs, such as female literacy, that will gradually improve human rights. The United States Government needs to concentrate on building up Pakistani civilian institutions apart from the military, including the media, political parties, the police, the civilian ministries, and civil society organizations.

Pakistan has produced several globally-recognized leaders in the human rights field, leaders who have gained international prominence through work accomplished despite the hurdles described above, through the strength of their own convictions. I will work to ensure that we continue to identify and support such individuals, whose own work greatly increases Pakistan's capacity to ask and answer those questions of its own society.

I believe we already have in place a number of projects to accomplish these objectives, through our assistance to build institutional capacity for government accountability and responsiveness to the needs and interests of Pakistani citizens. If confirmed, I will also carry the message to Islamabad that I believe Pakistan's record on issues such as freedom of the press and freedom of assembly to be key to the government's domestic as well as its international credibility.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges will you face in Pakistan in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. As I prepared for this confirmation hearing, almost every expert on Pakistan told me that literacy levels were an impediment to democracy and respect for human rights. Illiterate people are easily misled. Individual Pakistanis' access to information about their own government, their country, and the world beyond their borders is key not only to development, but also to the emergence of citizens who are well-informed about their rights and able to hold their government accountable.

For that and other reasons, education remains a key target area of our development assistance to Pakistan. In 2007 we will directly contribute \$60.7 million to Pakistan's education sector: \$28.7 million in basic education and \$32.0 million for higher education. Pakistan has acknowledged the need for increased commitment of its own resources to education and from 2001 to 2006 has significantly increased its spending in the education sector.

Rigid, politicized interpretations of religious and cultural traditions are also challenges to implementation of international human rights standards. These traditions particularly influence the treatment of women and minorities in Pakistan. As in our Rule of Law programs in Afghanistan, we will support efforts to modernize these tribal and religious interpretations.

As in many other countries in the world, striking the right balance between our security interests and rights of the individual in Pakistan will continue to be a challenge. If confirmed, I will do my best to maintain the proper balance in our relations with Pakistan.

The long history of military rule and the relative importance of the military in Pakistani society will present a challenge in moving Pakistan toward a civilian-led democracy. Pakistan has a long history of an educated political elite and political parties but little experience with democratic transitions. Key to lessening the military role will be the strengthening of civilian institutions such as an independent judiciary, robust media, and domestic political parties, while persuading the military that politics is incompatible with a truly professional military.

The United States Government also faces a challenge of communication on our ongoing dialog with Pakistan about the importance of ensuring respect for basic human rights. In many developing countries, legislation and initiatives designed to protect human rights are portrayed at the local level by self-interested actors as "foreign" imports masking hidden agendas. If confirmed, I plan to continue our ongoing work with Pakistani human rights NGOs, civil society members, multifaith religious leaders, and local and national politicians who are able to advocate the important role respect for human rights—and for the institutions of democracy—plays in Pakistan's emergence as a stable and prosperous democracy.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. Responsibility for promoting respect for human rights is not restricted to any one section or function of a U.S. diplomatic mission. Just as protection of our basic rights and freedoms is inherent in the United States' system of government, promotion of these basic rights and freedoms internationally is inherent in every aspect of our diplomatic mission.

Our strong material, technical, and advisory support for Pakistan's 2007–2008 national election targets one key human right—the right of individuals to select a democratic and representative government freely and with confidence. This dedication of resources and attention does not, however, come at the expense of our con-

tinual and extensive engagement with Pakistani Governmental and nongovernmental actors on other key issues such as the legal protection and enforcement of women's rights, eradication of child labor, and respect for the rights of religious minorities.

My experience in previous posts has made clear to me that the most important human rights messengers are often not the USAID human rights officer, important though he/she may be, but our intelligence, law enforcement, and military officials. Our military officers convey to their counterparts that a professional military does not participate in politics, while our intelligence and military officials reiterate to their counterparts that violations of human rights are not only wrong but counterproductive to their objectives. Our law enforcement officials teach professional techniques like forensic evidence collection to secure convictions, thus eliminating the perceived need to beat suspects to obtain confessions. Fortunately, the dedicated Americans serving in our embassies overseas seldom need prompting to convey these messages to their local counterparts.

Our Embassy in Islamabad and our Consulates in Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar are key diplomatic posts in our efforts to promote human rights, and the Department of State greatly respects the service of the officers who staff these critical Missions. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that officers engaged in the critical task of promoting respect for human rights and freedoms in Pakistan receive full credit and professional reward for their vital work.

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Pakistan who are working to promote human rights?

Answer. Absolutely.

Our Office of Pakistan and Bangladesh Affairs in Washington, our Embassy in Islamabad, and our Consulates in Lahore, Peshawar, and Karachi have close and ongoing ties with domestic and international nongovernmental organizations working to promote human rights in Pakistan.

If confirmed, I commit to strengthening those ties by participating personally in this ongoing dialog about how we—the international community, Pakistan's Government, and Pakistan's citizens—can better resource and increase our effectiveness in promoting the development of a fully-realized human rights regime that protects all Pakistani citizens.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. During my tenure as Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, virtually our entire effort was designed (and largely successful) in professionalizing police, prosecutors, and judges. This is basic to promoting human rights and the rule of law. Without professional police, societies revert to vigilante or paramilitary justice, which is almost impossible to roll back.

I am particularly proud of the progress in the rule of law program in Afghanistan, including our significant support to the Afghan attorney general, an honest and dedicated official who is determined to root out corruption.

I believe my leadership of our Embassy in Bogota and the interagency implementation of Plan Colombia programs played a role in sharp reduction of violence in that country. This was essential for broader improvements in human rights—although Colombia is still struggling to come to terms with its past—as government presence was restored throughout the countryside, military ties to paramilitaries were reduced, and the insurgents weakened throughout the country.

Although Colombia still faces enormous human rights challenges, I believe the political and human rights of Colombians have greatly improved because of United States assistance.

In my assignments in El Salvador and at USUN, I believe that human rights were an integral part of United States Government policy.

If confirmed, promotion of human rights will be a key element of our policy and of my personal agenda. More than in any of my other posts, identifying the American Government with human rights will be particularly important in Pakistan where (unlike in Latin America) the population is more hostile to the United States and deeply skeptical of our motivations.

RESPONSES OF NANCY J. POWELL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. In recent years, the United States has been regarded in Nepal (rightly or wrongly) as a force that is closely allied with the monarchy, implacably opposed to any role for the Maoists in the political process, and only supportive of democratic development to the extent that elections produce outcomes agreeable to American interests. What concrete steps would you take to reverse this widespread perception?

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead a country team review of our current activities to ensure that our private and public diplomacy messages are unambiguous in our support and respect for the peace process and for free and fair constituent assembly elections. My initial schedule will provide numerous opportunities to reiterate this stance consistently and clearly and to highlight the extent of United States assistance to Nepal's emerging democratic institutions as well as our efforts to reach out to nongovernmental organizations and work with nonviolent civil society groups.

Question. As the Maoists have steadily moved from the battlefield to the political arena, the United States has been considerably slower than the Nepali populace and outside regional actors, to welcome and support this transition. If confirmed, would you commit to a full-scale top-to-bottom review of U.S. policy toward the Maoists?

Answer. As noted above, if confirmed, I will lead a nearly entirely new country team in a review of our democracy programs in Nepal with special focus on our ongoing support for the peace process and the upcoming constituent assembly elections. As part of that review, I plan to assess whether the current policy, which restricts contact with the Maoists to official business with those who are officials of the interim government, is serving U.S. interests effectively. I will share the results of that review with Washington policymakers along with reporting on Maoist compliance (or lack thereof) with basic democratic principles, especially respect for human rights and rule of law.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Nepal? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Nepal? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Nepal faces many simultaneous human rights challenges. The most urgent are increasing respect for the rule of law throughout the country and ensuring that the government addresses the expectations and needs of traditionally marginalized groups. Continued intimidation through extortion, kidnapping, and violence threatens to roll back the democratic progress that has been made and to prevent free and fair constituent assembly elections, leading to more violence.

If confirmed, my immediate focus will be on support for free and fair elections in November, drawing on U.S. resources as well as cooperating with other members of the international community. We also need to pre-position assistance for the post-election period to be ready to help the new government establish quickly its governing authority and a transparent constitution-drafting process.

If confirmed, I will also encourage the Government of Nepal to strengthen the National Human Rights Commission and to establish a truth and reconciliation mechanism that would allow conflict victims to air their grievances and seek redress from abusers in an organized, peaceful manner.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges will you face in Nepal in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. The biggest obstacles are the continuing Maoist lack of respect for basic democratic norms and the unmet expectations of marginalized groups who have resorted to violence as a means to emphasize their demands.

Nepalis' lack of education, poverty, and limited experience with democratic governance will complicate efforts to improve the human rights situations. The limited capacity and resources of the security forces will challenge efforts to restore rule of law.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. Support for the establishment of sustained democracy is the No. 1 United States interest and priority in Nepal. Respect for human rights is at the very top

of the agenda. Progress in these areas is vital to a successful democratic transition and regional stability. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the promotion of human rights continues to be integrated into the activities of all personnel in the Mission, from our diplomacy with senior government and party officials, to the planning and administration of police and development assistance programs by State and USAID personnel, to the military training programs managed by the Office of Defense Cooperation.

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Nepal who are working to promote human rights?

Answer. If confirmed, I will meet regularly with nongovernmental organizations—both international and domestic—working to promote human rights in Nepal.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. Beginning in 1980 in Kathmandu when I was named the Mission's human rights officer, I have been an active supporter of our human rights goals in all of the posts at which I have been privileged to serve. The means of expressing that support has changed with my responsibilities, but my interest and dedication have been unwavering.

I am most proud of an effort undertaken under my supervision by junior officers in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 1997, to address the trafficking of women and children in South Asia. The officers developed an interagency approach that included a USAID grant to develop programs to inform women of their rights, a public diplomacy campaign that distributed articles on prevention to law enforcement and other government officials, and an outreach effort to other diplomatic missions in Dhaka and United States missions in South Asia to encourage coordinated activities to halt the trafficking. The program served as a model for later programs throughout the region and led to the arrests of traffickers along the border with India. The program also provided me with a model for use at posts where I have been ambassador to encourage all members of the Mission to be involved in promoting human rights.

RESPONSES OF STEPHEN A. SECHE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What are the most important actions you have taken in your career to date to promote human rights and democracy? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. From 2002–2004, while serving as Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'Affaires of the United States Embassy in Damascus, I directed a robust mission-wide effort to publicly associate the United States Government with Syrian NGOs and individuals who were—and continue to be—working at considerable personal risk to affect important political reforms in that country.

We met with them whenever possible, invited them to events at our homes, and made direct and forceful interventions with Syrian Government officials to encourage the development of an atmosphere in Syria in which their citizens could freely exercise their fundamental human rights of expression and association.

We also worked closely with European and other allies with a presence in Damascus in order to ensure the message that political, economic, and social reforms must be undertaken was delivered clearly and repeatedly.

Question. What are the most pressing human rights issues in Yemen? What are the most important steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Yemen? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. In recent years, the Government of Yemen has made a concerted effort to address human rights abuses, but significant human rights issues persist in some areas. These include limited press freedom and harassment of journalists, allegations of torture and poor prison conditions, prolonged pre-trial detention, pervasive corruption within the government and judiciary, and discrimination against women. In addition, Yemen's small Jewish community has recently been targeted and threatened by supporters of the al-Houthi group, and requires the continued protection and support of the Yemeni Government—for which the Government is to be commended.

If confirmed, I plan to engage the host government and civil society actors to promote the strengthening of Yemen's human rights record and democratic and judicial reforms. I will also endeavor to use the annual reports on human rights, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons to encourage/press for progress in these areas.

I hope these efforts will enable me to support women's human rights initiatives, advocate for freedom of the press, promote judicial reform, demonstrate U.S. support for civil society activists; and investigate reported cases of torture, prolonged pre-trial detention, and child trafficking.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges will you face in Yemen in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. Although the Government of Yemen has undertaken significant democratic reforms over the past 18 months, many of these reforms have not yet been fully implemented and reports of abuse continue, especially in the areas of women's rights, freedom of the press, torture, and police brutality. If confirmed, one of my key priorities will be to ensure that the Government of Yemen follows through on its democratic reforms and makes continued progress.

Change comes slowly to Yemen and other traditional countries of the Middle East. If confirmed, I will also engage the government, other political actors, and civil society groups in order to promote respect for democracy, fight corruption, and work to promote the role of women in government.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. If confirmed, I will expect all members of my staff working directly with the various facets of Yemeni society to make the promotion of human rights a professional priority of their own. I would like to see language to that effect included in the annual work requirements of all embassy staff engaged on these issues. This formal identification of human rights and democratic development as a priority of the United States Mission to Yemen will enable me, my Deputy Chief of Mission, and appropriate section chiefs to recognize the accomplishments of individual officers and support their promotion based, at least in part, on their performance in this regard.

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Yemen who are working to promote human rights?

Answer. The United States Embassy in Sanaa has a robust program of supporting and promoting civil society in Yemen in general, and human rights NGOs in particular. If confirmed, I will continue this trend.

Embassy officers frequently meet with the NGOs that we fund, as well as many others, in order to keep abreast of allegations of human rights abuses, and to update our annual human rights report. We raise human rights abuse allegations with the Minister of Human Rights and her staff, as well as with the Minister of Interior and the President when necessary. Embassy officers also correspond and meet with U.S.-based human rights NGOs, including the Committee to Protect Journalists.

Over the past year, we have expended more than \$250,000 in Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) funding to NGOs promoting human rights. The bulk of this money will go to NGOs that focus on increasing women's participation in electoral life. We are also funding one of Yemen's premier human rights NGOs—the HOOD organization to write a draft of the Judicial Authority Law.

In addition to our small grants funding, the embassy has directed larger grants to NGOs focused on human rights, including through the Office of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Through MEPI, the United States has built a partnership between Italian, Turkish, and Yemeni human rights NGOs as part of the Democracy Assistance Dialog. The embassy has also actively supported the Department of Labor in its funding of organizations that fight child labor and trafficking in Yemen.

Question. In November 2005, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) suspended Yemen from its participation in a Threshold Account on concerns about corruption. In February 2007, the MCC reinstated Yemen's eligibility to participate in the program. Please explain the anticorruption efforts of Yemen leading up to the MCC's February 2007 decision on Yemen. How do you see your role in facilitating Yemen's anticorruption efforts?

Answer. President Saleh focused his successful reelection campaign on reform issues, particularly government corruption. The result was an election judged to be open and competitive by international observers, with largely unfettered media coverage of opposition candidates.

Since the election, Saleh has continued to invest his personal prestige in important reforms. For example, when the government's draft procurement law—written with assistance from U.S. Government-funded consultants and World Bank experts—was gutted by reform opponents, Saleh ordered the draft be returned to its original version and placed a front-page declaration in the government's newspapers ordering the law to be passed expeditiously.

Since its suspension from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program in November 2005, the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) has undertaken the following specific efforts to combat corruption:

- Reshuffled the cabinet (twice);
- Empowered technocrats to shepherd major legislative and regulatory changes through the Yemeni system;
- Elected a National Supreme Anticorruption Authority (NSAA);
- Passed anticorruption and the financial disclosure laws;
- Drafted a procurement law;
- Drafted a decentralization amendment law; and
- Crafted a National Decentralization Strategy (to be presented to cabinet in July 2007).

If confirmed, I will work to with donors and the ROYG to implement anticorruption activities. Support from USAID has played, and will continue to play, a key role in providing guidance and technical assistance to the ROYG on its efforts to receive MCC assistance and combat corruption.

Question. As one of the poorest countries in the world, what are the most pressing socioeconomic issues facing Yemen? What role can the United States play in addressing them?

Answer. Yemen will face significant social and economic challenges over the next 10 years. Oil revenue and water resources are declining. Yemen's population of 20 million, nearly half of which is under the age of 15, is exploding. Unemployment, illiteracy, and infant mortality rates are all high.

Ongoing United States assistance to Yemen helps to address these issues in several ways. By providing bilateral development assistance that builds schools, equips health clinics, and teaches women to read, we are helping Yemenis prepare to face these challenges. By coordinating with other international donors to ensure that foreign assistance pledges are targeted to meet the areas of greatest need, we are ensuring that each dollar of foreign aid is stretched as far as it can go. Finally, by encouraging the Government of Yemen to undertake significant political and economic reforms, we are encouraging economic growth and assisting the government to become more transparent, more efficient, and better able to respond to the needs of its population.

RESPONSES OF JOSEPH ADAM ERELI TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What are the most important actions you have taken in your career to date to promote human rights and democracy? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. As Public Affairs Officer in Yemen from 1996–1998, I was particularly active in promoting democracy and human rights. I provided specialists to assist the Supreme Elections Commission prepare for Yemen's first multiparty parliamentary election. I helped bring the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to Yemen. I worked with the Government of Yemen to facilitate the opening of an NDI office there and developed programs to strengthen the institutional capabilities of the newly-elected Yemeni Parliament. In a precedent-setting initiative, I brought Yemeni intelligence and security officers to the embassy's English Language Institute and provided them with language training that had a heavy human rights and rule of law emphasis. The Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the time, Martin Indyk, recognized these efforts by awarding me a State Department Superior Honor Award.

As State Department Deputy Spokesman, I aggressively used the podium to put America's rhetorical and diplomatic muscle behind democratic causes. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this was in November 2005, during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The regime was threatening to annul the results of a democratic election won by the opposition. In no small part due to very vocal and public warnings from Secretary Powell and the State Department, many of which I authored or conveyed, the Government of Ukraine backed off and there was a peaceful transfer of power.

Question. What are the most pressing human rights issues in Bahrain? What are the most important steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Bahrain? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. The most pressing human rights issues in Bahrain are strengthening democracy, the rule of law, protections against trafficking in persons, and support for civil society. Through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the United States Embassy in Bahrain is funding programs in these fields, which if confirmed, I will continue to support and seek to expand.

In May 2006, the Government of Bahrain expelled the National Democratic Institute (NDI) Director in advance of the November parliamentary and municipal elections. The resumption of NDI activities is among my most immediate priorities, both for the important work that the institute has conducted in the country and the symbolic importance of NDI's return in terms of demonstrating the United States commitment to advancing democracy and human rights in Bahrain.

Bahrain should take action to protect victims of trafficking in persons. It will be my immediate priority, if confirmed, to help the government enact—and implement—meaningful legislation that criminalizes this practice and provides for effective prosecution of those responsible for it. I will focus on this and other actions to help Bahrain move forward positively on the question of trafficking in persons.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges will you face in Bahrain in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. An issue of great sensitivity for Bahrain—and the United States—is internal stability and the prospect of sectarian conflict. The challenge before all of us is how to promote an inclusive, transparent, and participatory democracy in which both citizens and government play by the same rules: adherence to the principles of freedom of speech and peaceful dissent; tolerance of differences; and equality of all before the law. Helping Bahrain's leaders and people help to manage these different pressures will, I believe, be our greatest challenge.

The most important thing that America can do to bring about positive changes in the human rights practices of other nations is for us to live our values and represent those to other countries. Winning the hearts and minds of the Bahrainis must include “diplomacy of deeds.” As the United States takes positive action around the world it is important that other countries, like Bahrain, are aware of those actions. Likewise, it is important for the United States to take concrete steps to improve people's lives. It is important to remember that Bahrain is a friend and ally to the United States and that human rights and democratic development are neither constant nor linear—there are setbacks, backsliding, and challenges. Bahrain has continually risen to the challenges of human rights promotion and if confirmed, I will do my part to support them.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. I will also engage the Bahrainis in a dialog about human rights and what true respect for human rights entails. Highlighting the importance of NGO groups will also be a valuable asset in promoting respect for human rights in the country. Also, I would encourage participation in Human Rights Day (December 10) by hosting activities and programs at the embassy.

I believe that human rights should not be relegated to its own section of activities—there should not be a human rights box. Rather, I believe that human rights are an integral part of everything else and as such they will be incorporated into my discussions on other topics and will remain a focal point of my activities. Bahrain is a key post for United States efforts in transformational diplomacy and if confirmed, I will work to lay the diplomatic foundations necessary to foster respect for human rights, equality, and respect for the rule of law.

I will urge the continued support for invaluable human rights and democratic reform-related programming, much of which is funded through MEPI assistance. Embassy Manama currently supports the following programs:

- The American Bar Association (ABA) is providing technical assistance to the Bahraini Ministry of Justice, including in the areas of judicial education and training, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), court management and administration, and development of a Bahraini Bar. The ABA also supports programs

aimed at reforming Bahraini family law and strengthening networking opportunities for female legal professionals.

- The Bahrain Transparency Society (BTS) has undertaken a series of activities focused on assessing and monitoring Bahrain's electoral processes; raising public awareness of electoral transparency; and training election monitors, efforts which will help to encourage both human rights and democratic reform in Bahrain.

These programs are only a small sample of the extensive and broad ranging reform efforts supported by Embassy Manama. If confirmed, I will continue to work with these institutions, the Government of Bahrain, as well as international and domestic NGO's to support reform efforts in Bahrain.

I have discussed with both the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and Democracy Human Rights and Labor the possibility of additional funding and staff to expand the level of engagement and programming with Bahraini institutions and NGOs in the areas of human rights, representative government, and civic education. If confirmed, I will establish a Democratization Working Group in which officers from all sections of the embassy will have responsibilities for ensuring that this work is coordinated and effective. I will work with Department of State principals in Washington to ensure that officers engaged in the critical task of promoting respect for human rights and freedoms in Bahrain receive full credit and professional reward for their important work.

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Bahrain who are working to promote human rights?

Answer. Under my leadership, if confirmed, United States Embassy Manama will endeavor to strengthen support for democracy and democratic institutions within the Kingdom of Bahrain. I will work to support the efforts of United States-based NGOs, including the National Democratic Institute and American Bar Association, as well as the efforts of indigenous civil society organizations dedicated to the advancement of human rights and democracy in Bahrain. To support the latter, I will direct embassy political and public affairs officers to continue to engage with local NGOs. I will also direct them to continue to fully access all the means and resources at the embassy's disposal to support the efforts of local democracy promoters.

If confirmed, I plan to begin opening the door to NGO dialog by participating in an Ambassador's NGO roundtable set up by the Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor. The roundtable will bring together several NGO groups to participate in a dialog with me.

NOMINATIONS

THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

English, Charles L., to be Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kennedy, J. Christian, to be Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues
Moore, Roderick W., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Montenegro
Munter, Cameron, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Serbia
Withers, John L., III, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Albania

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barack Obama presiding.

Present: Senators Obama, Nelson, and DeMint.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Senator OBAMA. The hearing will come to order. The Foreign Relations Committee is convening this confirmation hearing. We have Dr. John L. Withers II, to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Albania; Mr. Charles Lewis English, to serve as Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina; Dr. Cameron Munter, to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Serbia; Mr. Roderick W. Moore, to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Montenegro; and Mr. J. Christian Kennedy, for the rank of Ambassador during his tenure as Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues.

Four of these posts are in Southeast Europe, a region that faces a dual challenge. As people of this region reconcile themselves with a troubled past, they must now chart a shared course toward a better future. If confirmed, these individuals will be called upon to build on the best traditions of American diplomacy to facilitate these countries' integration into the Euroatlantic community.

With respect to Mr. Kennedy, the crimes he will try to rectify are not as recent as the genocide in Srebrenica, but the shadows they cast across Europe are every bit as dark. Finding justice for victims of the Holocaust remains a moral imperative, and I hope Mr. Kennedy will do everything in his power to right the wrongs stemming from that unconscionable era.

I'm pleased that the administration has put forward five capable career Foreign Service officers to fill these positions. I welcome you all, and your families who are also with us here today.

In the interest of time, I'll place my full statement in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Obama follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARACK OBAMA,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

The hearing will come to order.

The Foreign Relations Committee is convening this confirmation hearing on the following nominees:

- Dr. John L. Withers II to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Albania;
- Mr. Charles Lewis English to serve as Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Dr. Cameron Munter to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Serbia;
- Mr. Roderick W. Moore to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Montenegro;
- and
- Mr. J. Christian Kennedy to serve as Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues;

Four of these posts are in Southeast Europe, a region that faces a dual challenge—as the people of this region reconcile themselves with a troubled past, they must now chart a shared course toward a better future. If confirmed, these individuals will be called upon build on the best traditions of American diplomacy to facilitate these countries' integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

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I am pleased that the administration has put forward five capable, career Foreign Service officers to fill these positions. I welcome them and their families who are also with us here today.

Let me now address some of the issues that some of the nominees will face, if confirmed.

SPECIAL ENVOY FOR HOLOCAUST ISSUES

Mr. Kennedy, you have been serving as the Department's Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues for some 11 months now, so I know you have already been deeply engaged with the issues your office addresses. But I am pleased to have you come before the committee for confirmation, and I look forward to your testimony.

As the Holocaust recedes in history, and the generation that survived it begins to pass on, it is incumbent on all of us to keep the torch of memory lit. But while those brave survivors are still with us, we have an obligation to help achieve a small measure of justice for them, where details of crimes against them and their families can be documented.

I know you and your predecessors have been actively engaged in efforts to seek restitution for unpaid Holocaust-era insurance claims, to restore stolen works of art to their rightful owners, and to negotiate the settlements of other outstanding claims. I will be interested in hearing about these efforts, and also about where we stand on gaining access for survivors and researchers to the Bad Arolsen archive of Nazi records.

ALBANIA

Dr. Withers, as you know, Albania has been an American ally since the fall of communism. Albania began working toward NATO membership in 1993, it supported United States operations in Kosovo in 1999, and it has sent troops to both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The transition from communism to democracy has not been easy for Albania. The country went through a terrible economic crisis in 1997, followed by a political crisis in 1998. Despite these problems, Albanians have managed to put themselves on the right track over the last decade. They have reformed their constitution and stabilized their economy. Growth is high, inflation is low, and unemployment is beginning to edge downward.

Albania's progress deserves recognition, but more needs to be done. Albania is seeking membership in NATO and hopes, along with Croatia and Macedonia, to get a clear signal of support for its candidacy at the NATO summit in April 2008. Before that happens, however, it must consolidate the gains of recent years and stamp out the scourge of public and private corruption.

Dr. Withers, if confirmed, you will be positioned to help shape these events, and with them Albania's future for decades to come. I will be interested in hearing your views on the United States-Albania relationship.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Mr. English, it has been almost 12 years since the signing of the Dayton Accords and key issues remain unresolved in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Differences between the "Bosniak and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and the Serbian "Republika Srpska" continue to diminish the effectiveness of the central government and thwart the ambitions of the country as a whole. Failure to engage in constitutional reform—and particularly reform of the police services—has put the process of accession to the European Union on hold. Resolving these key issues will be essential if Bosnia is to gain membership in NATO and the European Union.

Despite the proliferation of new challenges around the globe, we cannot lose focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European Union is planning to close down the office of its High Representative and to end the country's status as an international protectorate. If that process is managed well, Bosnia could emerge as a powerful example to the world—a largely Muslim, multiethnic country that went from civil war to European democracy in a single generation. If it fails, Bosnia could remain a hostage to the ethnic tensions that hijacked the region in the 1990s.

Mr. English, if confirmed, you will face the formidable challenge of ensuring robust United States and international engagement in the country while helping Bosnians of all ethnicities address the problems facing their country. I will be interested in hearing how you will face this challenge.

MONTENEGRO

Mr. Moore, Montenegro is the latest addition to the family of European democracies. Since declaring sovereignty on June 3, 2006, Montenegro has worked energetically to make a place for itself in major international organizations. It joined the IMF and the World Bank in January of this year, and it has set its sights on membership in the European Union and NATO as well.

Despite the country's early achievements, it still faces many of the hurdles familiar in new democracies. Montenegro successfully held legislative elections last November and yet it still has not agreed on a new constitution to replace the one that was drafted in 1992.

In addition, Montenegro must find a new way to live together with Serbia as the two countries finish the process of moving apart. And it must also learn to adapt to a final status for Kosovo.

Mr. Moore, if confirmed, you will participate in the consolidation of this new democracy in the Balkans. I will be interested in hearing your views on how we can help Montenegro complete this process.

SERBIA

Dr. Munter, Serbia has made significant progress since the end of Slobodan Milosevic's reign of terror. However, the country is still struggling to overcome its troubled past—both as it relates to Kosovo and its failure to deliver fugitives to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. United Nations envoy Maarti Ahtisaari has offered a path forward on Kosovo. Prompt implementation of his recommendations is the best way for Serbia and Kosovo to ultimately realize the European future that their people deserve. However, Kosovo's independence will be traumatic for Serbia and pose a severe challenge for United States relations with the country.

The United States' Ambassador to Serbia will have to nurture Serbia's democracy and our countries' bilateral relationship during the uncertain times ahead. I look forward to working with you on this undertaking and will be interested to hear from you about how you would address the challenges facing Serbia.

With that, I now call on the distinguished ranking member of the European Affairs Subcommittee, Senator DeMint, for his opening statement.

Senator OBAMA. Senator DeMint is not yet here, and so, what I'd like to do is to ask all the nominees to begin with their opening statement. When Senator DeMint arrives, we may interrupt your opening statements to allow him to make his statement.

And if you would like to introduce your families, feel free to do so, because we know that they are signing on, as well, and should be congratulated and commended for their public service.

My wife did not ask me to write that. [Laughter.]

That was something I thought of all on my own. [Laughter.]

Senator OBAMA. So, what I'd like to do is—let's start with Mr. Withers.

**STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN L. WITHERS II, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA**

Dr. WITHERS. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by introducing my mother and my father, Dr. John Withers, Sr., who is soon to turn a youthful 91 years old, and my mother, Daisy Withers. My wife, who is a Foreign Service officer, is in Slovenia, where her duties as deputy chief of mission have kept her.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I'm privileged to be here today. I appreciate President Bush's and Secretary Rice's confidence in supporting me as their nominee as the next Ambassador to Albania. Should you confirm my nomination, I will do my utmost to advance our Nation's goals and to represent our country well. I also promise to work closely with this committee, its staff, and your congressional colleagues in pursuing our common objectives.

Albania, Mr. Chairman, is a country determined to better itself. As President Bush, the first President of the United States to visit Albania while in office, said in Tirana 10 days ago, "The Albanians are working hard to establish the institutions necessary for a democracy to survive."

Today, the United States and Albania are partners on the major issues of our time. Today, Albanian soldiers stand side by side with Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the European Union stabilization force in Bosnia. Albania plays a positive leadership role on Kosovo and fully supports the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo.

Albania's cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism is second to none. It is the only country to date that has accepted Guantanamo detainees from third-world countries. Albania has also made steady progress in combating crime, trafficking, and corruption, although there is more work to be done in these areas. I am pleased to say that the United States sponsors programs aimed at assisting Albania in these areas.

Albania now needs to extend these successes to its domestic political program. Although this young democracy has made important strides, its leaders and political parties must demonstrate maturity in the interest of their society, as a whole. This summer's presidential election by the parliament will provide Albania with an early opportunity to show that electoral reform is alive and well.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my first and foremost priority as Ambassador will be promoting United States interests in Albania while maintaining a solid partnership with the host country. I will support and work with the Albanian Government as it pursues its goals of NATO membership and a Balkans free and at peace.

I will encourage our thriving development programs which seek to assist Albania toward a vibrant market economy. I will focus on increasing trade between the United States and Albania, and on

assisting American companies interested in investing in, and bringing international commerce to this long isolated Balkan country.

I promise to manage our Embassy responsibly, and, if confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working closely with you, the members of the committee, and your congressional colleagues to make a difference in this vital region of the world.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Withers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN L. WITHERS II, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am privileged to appear before you today. President Bush has honored me as his nominee to be our country's next Ambassador to the Republic of Albania. I appreciate his and Secretary Rice's confidence in supporting me for this assignment, and hope to gain yours as you consider me for this important position. Should you see fit to confirm my nomination, I promise to validate your trust by doing my utmost to advance our Nation's goals in Albania and in the Balkans, and to represent our country well. I also promise to work closely with this committee, its staff, and your Congressional colleagues in pursuing our common objectives.

Mr. Chairman, I am accompanied today by my parents, John and Daisy Withers, and by my dear friends and mentors, Ambassador Johnny and Angie Young. I am literally a child of the Foreign Service. My father, who will soon turn a youthful 91 years of age, made his career in the Foreign Service. My wife, Maryruth Coleman, whose duties as Deputy Chief of Mission at our Embassy in Slovenia keep her from being here today, and I have been diplomats for some 20 years. Mine was an upbringing in places as diverse as Laos, Ethiopia, Korea, and India, and a professional career in the Netherlands, Nigeria, Latvia, and Russia. No one knows better than I the vital work that our Nation does abroad nor has witnessed more closely the contributions that America makes to the world.

Albania, Mr. Chairman, is a country determined to better itself. Despite decades of repression under the most tyrannical of dictatorships and the years of instability that ensued, the Albanian people strive to bring a bright future from a dark past. They, better than most of us, understand the value of the democracy, economic prosperity, and rule of law so long denied them. They, more than most, know the need for peace in a region so often beset by conflict. They, after so many years of enforced isolation, uniquely appreciate the importance of integrating their country and their region into the broader European and transatlantic communities. And they are, as President Bush, the first American President of the United States to visit Albania while in office, said in Tirana 10 days ago, "working hard to establish the institutions necessary for a democracy to survive."

Today, the United States and Albania are partners on the major issues of our times. Today, Albanian soldiers stand side-by-side with Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the international European Union Force's (EUFOR) stabilization force in Bosnia. As Kosovo's long-awaited final status determination approaches, Albania continues to play a positive leadership role by urging calm and restraint among the parties involved. The Government of Albania expressed immediate and full support for U.N. Commissioner Martti Ahtisaari's peace plan for Kosovo.

Albania's cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism is second to none. The government has moved quickly to freeze terrorist assets and has been vigilant in monitoring foreign attempts to radicalize its domestic Muslim population. Albania must also be commended for granting political asylum in May 2006 to five ethnic Uighurs previously held at Guantanamo Bay and for admitting three additional detainees last fall. Albania is the only country, to date, that has accepted Guantanamo detainees from third countries.

Albania has also made steady progress in combating organized crime, trafficking, and corruption. There is more to be done and these issues remain the country's most serious obstacles to economic and democratic development, but it is satisfying to note the recent progress. Albania has reduced cross-border crime through joint border monitoring programs with neighboring states, passed key legislation on witness protection and criminal asset seizure, mandated asset disclosure by government officials, and implemented the use of special investigative techniques in pursuing organized crime and corruption. I am pleased to say that the United States sponsors multiple programs aimed at assisting Albania in the struggle against crime and cor-

ruption that have helped bring Albania closer to fulfilling its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

Albania now needs to extend its successes in these areas—successes built on patient negotiation and open dialog—to its domestic political system. Although this young democracy has made important strides in establishing representative government, the lack of clear, consensus-based rules and procedures for voting means its democratic institutions are not as robust as they should be. Albania's leaders and its political parties must all work together on this issue and demonstrate the maturity needed for the interest of their society as a whole. This summer's Presidential election by the Parliament will provide Albania with an early opportunity to show that electoral reform is alive and well.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is committed to helping Albanians achieve the democracy, free market economy, and rule of law they so desire. Although Albania enjoys economic stability characterized by healthy growth, low inflation, and a budget deficit well within targets set by government and international institutions. It is still one of the poorest countries in Europe. Endemic corruption, a weak infrastructure, high business registration costs, and an unstable legal environment are serious deterrents to foreign and domestic investment. It is an encouraging sign that United States investment has recently increased in response to Albania's efforts to improve its business climate. Bechtel's \$550 million highway project and Lockheed Martin's multimillion dollar coastal surveillance system are both positive examples of increased U.S. business engagement—a trend I hope to foster, if confirmed to this position.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my first and foremost priority as ambassador will be promoting United States interests in Albania while maintaining a solid partnership with the host country. I will strongly encourage the Albanian Government to continue its support of international efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia, and persist in its good work in combating terrorism abroad and in countering extremism within its borders. I will continue our efforts to promote democracy and the rule of law in Albania, and work closely with the Albanian Government to sustain progress in the democratic institution building, electoral and judicial reforms, and anticorruption and antitrafficking programs that are so critical to the country's future. There would be no better way to demonstrate commitment to these changes than through several high profile apolitical arrests for crime and corruption. I will also encourage Albanian leaders to uphold freedom of speech for both an independent media and individual citizens, and to welcome the open exchange of ideas as a crucial component of democratic discourse. And I will maintain open lines of communication with all key political actors to encourage dialog and consensus in the name of doing what is right for the people of Albania as the hallmark of a mature democracy.

If confirmed, I will support and work with the Albanian Government as it pursues its goal of NATO membership. Together, we will do all we can to help Albania be the best candidate it can be. Together, we must also work toward our shared goal of a Balkans free and at peace. I will encourage our thriving development programs which seek to assist Albania as it moves further away from the burdens of poverty and closer toward a vibrant market economy through the creation of sustainable economic growth. I will focus on increasing trade between the United States and Albania and on assisting American companies interested in investing in, and bringing international commerce to, this long-isolated Balkan country.

As Albania develops politically and economically, our embassy must also develop to meet changing circumstances. I promise to manage our Mission responsibly, focusing on the innovation, security, and enhanced quality of life necessary to attract a talented workforce and meet the needs of families who choose to serve in this rapidly transforming nation.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, should my nomination be confirmed, I will do my utmost to maintain the distinguished record of service of the men and women who have held this position before me, especially my predecessor, Ambassador Marcie Ries, who contributed so outstandingly to bettering American-Albanian relations. I look forward to working closely with you, the members of the committee, and your Congressional colleagues to make a difference in this vital region of the world.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Mr. English.

**STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. ENGLISH, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

May I also begin by introducing my wife, Patti Espey-English, and my daughter, Catie. My son, Matt, unfortunately, was unable to be with us today. And I just want to thank them for all the help and support they've provided throughout my career.

Mr. Chairman, I am very honored to be before you today as President Bush's nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am deeply grateful for the trust and confidence that the President and Secretary Rice have placed in me. And, if confirmed, I will look forward to a close working relationship with this committee and with all of your colleagues in Congress to advance United States interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

If you will allow, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my statement and submit a full written version for the record.

Just to note, Bosnia and Herzegovina has now been at peace for over a decade. Twelve years ago, some 60,000 NATO troops, including 20,000 Americans, deployed to secure the peace, and now fewer than 5,000 European Union troops remain. The Dayton Peace Accords are now nearly completely implemented, and enormous progress has been made. However, much more must be done before Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoys lasting stability.

Broad reforms, including constitutional reform, will be needed for the country to advance toward Euroatlantic integration. Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, the architects of the genocide at Srebrenica, remain at large. They and the two other remaining fugitives from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia must face justice.

Unfortunately, and despite the urgent need for progress, Bosnian politics remains somewhat backward-looking, blocking consensus on critical issues, such as police reform, and preventing the conclusion of an—European Union Stabilization and Association Agreement. Our critical challenge lies in convincing Bosnia and Herzegovina's leaders to show leadership through compromise.

Mr. Chairman, to conclude, if I am confirmed by the Senate, my highest priority will be furthering the values, goals, and security of the United States and its citizens. If confirmed, I will work in partnership with the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to counter extremism and terrorism.

If confirmed, I will promote the reforms Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to become a full member of the Euroatlantic family.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm grateful for the opportunity to appear here today, and I await your questions, later.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. English follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. ENGLISH, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to be before you today as President Bush's nominee to be United States Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am deeply grateful for the trust and confidence that the President and Secretary Rice have placed in me, and if confirmed by the Senate, I will endeavor to serve my country with honor and dignity. If confirmed, I will look forward to a close working relationship with this committee and with all of your colleagues in Congress to advance United States' interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and throughout Southeastern Europe.

Mr. Chairman, my wife, Patti Espey-English, is here with me today. She has been a great source of support and strength for me throughout my career, and I would

like to take the opportunity to acknowledge that fact here and to thank her for it. My children—Catie, who is here, and Matt, who could not be—have handled Foreign Service life with grace and humor and I would like to thank them also.

Mr. Chairman, throughout the course of my career at the State Department, I have had numerous opportunities to further the values of the United States. Much of my work for the past 15 years has been focused on the Balkans and neighboring countries. I believe my experiences are relevant to the responsibilities I seek to assume in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if confirmed by the Senate. I served as Director of the State Department's Balkans office—the Office of South Central European Affairs—and as Deputy Chief of Mission in our Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia. In my various roles I have helped broker dialog between Serbian and Albanian leaders in Kosovo, in an effort to find compromise and avoid conflict there; pressed Balkan leaders to surrender indicted war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and worked with officials in the region to help refugees displaced by its wars return to their homes. As Counselor for Economic Affairs at our Embassy in Budapest in the early 1990s, I aided successive post-Communist governments in Hungary in their efforts to privatize state-owned assets and advance reforms toward a market economy. I believe these efforts have prepared me to address, if confirmed, serious challenges still to be met in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has now been at peace for over a decade. The Dayton Peace Accords that ended the brutal 1992–1995 war are nearly completely implemented. The international community, under strong leadership from the United States, has helped the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina rebuild their institutions, infrastructure, economy, and society. Enormous progress has been made. Today Bosnia and Herzegovina protects its borders, fights terrorism, and combats domestic and transnational crime. Soldiers who fought each other 12 years ago now wear the same uniform, serve under the same flag, and report to a single Minister of Defense. This country that was once a threat to international stability is now a contributor to global security, with a multiethnic Explosive Ordinance Disposal unit serving with distinction alongside United States forces in Iraq. While just over a decade earlier NATO intervened to halt a brutal conflict, last November, NATO offered Bosnia and Herzegovina membership in Partnership for Peace, a first step toward Bosnia and Herzegovina's goal of achieving full membership in the Alliance.

These reforms are the result of dedicated Bosnians of all ethnicities working to change their society with the support of the international community. In the dozen years since Dayton, much has been accomplished that, at the time, would have seemed impossible. However, much more must be done before Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoys lasting stability. Broad reforms, including constitutional reform, will be needed for the country to advance further towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Bosnia and Herzegovina need to make new efforts to combat high levels of joblessness, to reduce corruption, and to ensure that state institutions are fully staffed and functioning in a depoliticized and professional manner.

Unfortunately, the legacies of war that remain embedded in the Bosnia and Herzegovina psychological landscape still must be addressed. Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, the two architects of the genocide at Srebrenica, remain at large. They and the two other remaining fugitives from the ICTY must face justice so that the people of Southeast Europe can truly put the past behind them.

Despite the urgent need for reform and progress, Bosnian politics remains mired in the past. Zero-sum ethnic nationalism is the norm. Inflammatory rhetoric characterized the October 2006 Parliamentary election campaign and has yet to dissipate even now, some 9 months later, blocking consensus on urgent issues such as police reform and preventing the conclusion of an European Union Stabilization and Association Agreement. Our critical challenge lies in convincing Bosnia and Herzegovina's leaders to show leadership through compromise and coalition-building, rather than pursuing ethnic advantage through polemics and prejudice.

The United States has invested great amounts of human, financial, and institutional resources to help rebuild and transform Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have seen dividends from those efforts. Twelve years after 60,000 NATO troops—including 20,000 Americans—deployed to secure the peace, fewer than 5,000 European Union troops remain. The international civilian presence also continues to evolve. The Office of the High Representative has downsized and is focused on concluding its core tasks of implementing Dayton. We hope to be in a position to return full sovereignty to the Bosnians by the summer of 2008 and replace the Office of the High Representative with a customary European Union mission to guide Bosnia and Herzegovina through the European Union integration process.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my highest priority will be furthering the values, goals, and security of the United States and its citizens, including all American per-

sonnel assigned in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as private American citizens living, traveling, and doing business there. If confirmed, I will work in partnership with the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to counter extremism and terrorism. If confirmed, I will guide the transformation of the international presence, while promoting the reforms Bosnia and Herzegovina need to fully transition to a stable, productive member of the Euro-Atlantic family of nations.

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this committee today. I look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. English.

Mr. Kennedy.

STATEMENT OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY, NOMINEE FOR THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR DURING HIS TENURE AS SPECIAL ENVOY FOR HOLOCAUST ISSUES

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me begin by introducing my wife, Luz Marina, who accompanies me today. Our three children could not be with us. Two of them are overseas, and one of them is not in town.

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before you on behalf of my nomination for the rank of ambassador. I am very grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for nominating me for this title while I am serving as Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues.

If the Senate confirms me for this rank, I will be better armed to pursue the objectives that our two branches of government and the American people care so deeply about: To help right past wrongs, to bring a measure of dignified justice to Holocaust survivors, and making sure that the world remembers the lessons of the Holocaust.

My own professional contact with Holocaust issues began while I was consul general in the city of Poznan, Poland, shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since starting in August of this year, I have been, several times, to Poland again, as well as France, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, and Romania, all with the objective of pursuing property compensation or property restitution for Holocaust victims and their heirs.

Financial restitution has also been a very important component of our work. We are in the process right now of transitioning the German Slave and Forced Labor Foundation, which has paid out nearly 5 billion euros to 1,600,000 victims, to a foundation that will focus on Holocaust remembrance and on tolerance education.

Education is another major focus of our office. I am the delegate to the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, a 24-nation international organization that supports NGOs, universities, teachers, and academics.

Remembrance is also one of the reasons why we have worked so hard on gaining greater access to archives for Holocaust survivors, and, to that end, we are in the process now of helping bring an electronic copy of the Holocaust archives at Bad Arolsen, Germany, to the Holocaust Museum. That is about 50 million pages of documentation.

In pursuing these goals of compensation, restitution, education, and remembrance as Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, the rank of Ambassador will be especially valuable, if I am confirmed.

In closing, I want to thank the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for considering me for this unique position and high honor. If confirmed, I will continue to work diligently on helping Holocaust survivors and their families obtain the support and assistance they deserve.

Thank you for this opportunity to describe my background and review, briefly, the work that I have been doing and the challenges that lie ahead. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY, NOMINEE FOR THE RANK OF
AMBASSADOR DURING HIS TENURE AS SPECIAL ENVOY FOR HOLOCAUST ISSUES

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen. It is an honor to appear before you on behalf of my nomination for the rank of Ambassador. I am very grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for nominating me for this title while serving as Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues. If the Senate confirms me for this rank, I will be better armed to continue to pursue the objectives that our two branches of Government and the American people share: To help right past wrongs, to bring a measure of dignified justice to Holocaust survivors and their families, and to making sure that we and the international community remember the lessons of the Holocaust.

My own professional contact with Holocaust issues began while I was consul general in the city of Poznan, Poland, from 1990 to 1994, a tour that everyone in my family still looks back on with nostalgic fondness.

My wife, Luz Marina, had learned Polish with me, and using this new language and her own great people skills, she helped establish two NGOs in Poznan. She's always created a positive legacy for the United States in each country where we have served during a 27-year career in the United States Foreign Service. Be that assignment in Poland or Mexico or Panama. Our three children, Mary Kathryn, Veronica, and Jack all attended different schools in Poznan. I thank all my family, and especially Luz Marina, for the support and love they've given me throughout these years.

My father, Jack, was the Chairman of the Political Science Department at the University of Notre Dame for several years and taught there most of his professional life. From him I learned early on that a fascinating and complex world lay not just within the United States but also beyond our borders. My mother, Carol, taught me fairness is vital in human relations, and I learned from her enormous practicality about the need to get things done.

Let me touch again on Poland where my prior experience has served me well in this assignment. Since starting in August 2006 as the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, I have traveled to Poland several times to meet with members of the parliament and government officials to urge that they take action on a draft private property compensation bill.

Generally, a key focus of my office is encouraging foreign governments to return in kind or pay compensation for private property taken by the Nazis and their collaborators. In this regard, I have also worked with officials in France, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, and Romania to push for concrete solutions for survivors and heirs. Besides real estate holdings, art looted during World War II has become a more frequent topic in Holocaust-era restitution. On this theme, I recently addressed an international gathering of experts and government officials in Potsdam, Germany.

Financial property restitution has been another important focus for my colleagues and me. The German Foundation for Forced and Slave Labor has paid out nearly 5 billion euros to about 1.6 million victims of these heinous practices. As a member of this foundation's board of trustees, I look forward to working with my foreign counterparts and American NGOs on developing the structure of its successor organization. The new foundation, the Future Fund, will work in the areas of Holocaust remembrance and tolerance education.

Education is another major focus of my office. I am the U.S. delegate to the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research. This international organization of 24 countries provides a far-reaching platform for academics, researchers, teachers, and NGOs that work in making sure that the Holocaust is remembered and that it is taught in schools and universities throughout the world. Founded in 1998 by the United States, the U.K., and Sweden,

it continues growing. Six new countries are in various stages of membership. Like my work on the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Council, the Task Force provides a clear example of our country's commitment to honoring victims and survivors of this terrifyingly grim chapter in human history and to ensuring that its lessons are never forgotten.

Remembrance has also driven the United States' leadership in making the archives of the International Tracing Service (ITS) more accessible to Holocaust survivors and heirs of victims. At the ITS International Council meeting in May, the 11 member states agreed to make an advance electronic copy available of the collection for countries that need to harmonize their national repository's computer system with the ITS data—in our case the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. This will be the first time that ITS's archival data will be available outside of Germany, and we will continue to encourage the two countries that must still approve the provisions for greater accessibility to data for survivors.

In pursuing these goals of compensation, restitution, education, and remembrance as Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, the rank of Ambassador will be especially valuable, if I am confirmed. The rank would underscore clearly the importance that the U.S. Government and the American people place on acknowledging the horrors of the Holocaust and the respect and dignity owed to its survivors.

In closing I want to thank the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for considering me for this unique position and high honor. If confirmed, I will work diligently on helping Holocaust survivors and their families obtain the support and assistance they deserve. I will also strive to promote the study and understanding of the tragedy of the Holocaust and its bitter lessons.

Thank you for the opportunity to explain my background and review briefly the work that I have been doing and the challenges that lie ahead. I look forward to your questions.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you.

Dr. Munter.

**STATEMENT OF DR. CAMERON MUNTER, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA**

Dr. MUNTER. Thank you.

Please allow me to introduce my wife, Marilyn Wyatt, who's here behind me, my son, Daniel, my daughter, Anna. Anna and Marilyn will, if I am confirmed, accompany me to Belgrade.

Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the honor—the opportunity to appear before you as the President's nominee to be America's next Ambassador to Serbia. I'm honored that President Bush and Secretary Rice have expressed their confidence in me. And, if confirmed, I pledge to consult closely with this committee, with other Members of Congress, on the President's foreign policy agenda or Serbia and for the entire Balkans region.

I, too, will summarize my statement for the record.

My top priority, if confirmed, will be to protect the security and interests of the United States and its citizens, including all Americans in Serbia. I also look forward to working with the democratic government of the people—and the people of Serbia as they seek to overcome the difficulties of their recent history and complete their integration into a Europe, whole and free.

Serbia has continued its progress away from the disasters of the Milosevic era. It is now led by a democratic coalition. Small ethnic populations have been accorded full representative status in parliament. Serbia's military services continue their positive reforms. Serbia's economy continues to grow at a healthy rate, and reforms underpin our efforts to bring stability and prosperity to the region.

Successive governments in Belgrade have apprehended and transferred many war crimes indictees to The Hague, including facilitating, in recent weeks, two major arrests. Four ICTY indictees

remain at large, including Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, so Serbia's work is not done on this key issue.

Indeed, our own role in supporting and promoting a democratic transition in Serbia is far from complete. More needs to be done eliminating corruption, ensuring that privatization continues apace with transparent rules and no undue political interference. Our assistance efforts focus on these and other crucial tasks.

Of course, the imminent resolution of Kosovo's status remains a great challenge, but we and our friends will face it. Kosovo's independence will bring stability to Serbia and to the region.

American interests in Serbia are clear. We want a strong Serbia as our friend, working with us on a common agenda, integrated into the institutions of the West. The challenges for U.S. policy are equally apparent. We want to offer our friends in Serbia hope for a better future while expressing our expectations very clearly and very firmly. I look forward to these challenges and to serving American interests and American values if you confirm me.

Thank you, again, for allowing me to appear in front of this committee, and I, also, look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Munter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. CAMERON MUNTER, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of my nomination by the President to be our country's next Ambassador to Serbia. I am honored by President Bush's and Secretary Rice's expression of confidence. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting closely with this committee and other Members of Congress on the President's foreign policy agenda for Serbia and the entire Balkans region.

Mr. Chairman and members, I believe that two decades in our country's diplomatic service have prepared me and my wife, Marilyn, for this challenge. Marilyn, our daughter Anna, and our son Daniel are here today to continue in what has been a family affair in the Foreign Service. My top priority, if confirmed, will be to protect the security and interests of the United States and our citizens, including all Americans in Serbia. I also look forward to working with the democratic government and the people of Serbia as they seek to overcome the difficulties of their recent history and complete their integration into a Europe whole and free.

Since this committee presided over the nomination of my predecessor over 3 years ago, Serbia has continued its progress away from the disasters of the Milosevic era and toward integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Having conducted free and fair Presidential elections in 2004 and Parliamentary elections in 2007, Serbia is now led by a new democratic coalition. Small, ethnic populations have been accorded full representative status in parliament and share in the balance of power Serbia has normalized diplomatic relations with its neighbors, exchanging high-level visits and pursuing regional trade liberalization. When faced with the separation of Montenegro from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro last year, Serbia avoided the mistakes of the past and, along with the rest of the international community, welcomed Montenegro's return to independence. Serbia's military services continue apace with positive reforms, making notable progress in modernization, transparency, and civilian control that will help it move forward in NATO's Partnership for Peace.

Serbia's economy continues to grow at a healthy rate. Continued economic reform is a top priority of the new government. Fostering a business environment that creates jobs and encourages the growth of small and medium enterprises is key to addressing public dissatisfaction with the economy. Privatizations and institutional reforms have led to increases in foreign investment, bringing more jobs to Serbia, underpinning our efforts to bring stability and prosperity to the region. In the private sector, the United States is currently the second largest foreign investor in Serbia.

Cooperation on war crimes continued over the last 3 years, albeit in short bursts. Successive governments in Belgrade have apprehended and transferred 17 war crimes indictees to The Hague. This includes facilitating the arrest 3 weeks ago of

Zdravko Tolimir, a close associate of Ratko Mladic, and Sunday's arrest, in Montenegro, of Vlastimir Djordjevic, wanted not only by the Hague Tribunal but by Serbian courts on charges stemming from the execution of three Albanian-Americans in 1999. Due in part to a recent positive trend in ICTY cooperation, the European Union last week restarted negotiations with Serbia over its Stabilization and Association Agreement—a necessary step before beginning talks to join the European Union. Four ICTY indictees remain at large, including Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, so Serbia's work is not done on this issue.

The United States plays a crucial role in Serbia in supporting and promoting a democratic transition, which is far from complete. Unreformed nationalist parties continue to wield considerable influence in the Parliament and regularly block needed reforms. The new constitution brings with it an ambitious legislative agenda that will be key in defining democratic standards and the rights of Serbia's citizens. More needs to be done in eliminating corruption and ensuring that privatization continues apace with transparent rules with and no undue political interference. The media, while generally free and independent, are overly sensationalist and often at the service of anti-reform interests who confuse and distort public debate. In short, serious challenges remain—the imminent resolution of Kosovo's status foremost among them, and finding durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons not the least of them. Many Serbs feel that, having overthrown Milosevic in 2000, they should not now be penalized for the mistakes of his rule. Independence for Kosovo, with its deep historical, cultural, and religious significance to Serbia—and as a reminder of the bloody, painful disintegration of Yugoslavia—will lead some Serbs to challenge all other aspects of our bilateral relationship as well as Serbia's relations with its neighbors and the rest of Europe.

While understandable, such emotional responses serve no one, least of all the people of Serbia. In the end, the country will only be ready for integration into the community of democracies when it comes to terms with the unfortunate legacies of its past. When it comes to war criminals and even Kosovo, much of the population is more forward-looking than public statements from Belgrade would indicate. I am optimistic that the decency and drive of the Serbian people, which have characterized our relations as friends and allies for 125 years, will prevail in the end; and that Serbia will indeed turn the corner and again look toward Europe.

By fully and forthrightly dealing with the past, not only by ensuring justice to the victims of misguided nationalism, but also by providing recognition to all those in Serbia who struggled to bring freedom, democracy, and humanity to their country, Serbia can realize its historic role as a regional leader and constructive member of the Euro-Atlantic community.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, American interests in Serbia are clear: We want a strong Serbia as our friend, working with us on a common agenda, integrated into the institutions of the West. The challenges for United States policy are equally apparent: Offering our friends in Serbia hope for a better future while expressing our expectations clearly and firmly. I look forward to these challenges, and to serving American interests and American values, if you confirm me.

Thank you again for allowing me to appear before this committee today. I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Moore.

**STATEMENT OF RODERICK W. MOORE, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO**

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, Senator, I, also, will provide a brief oral summary of the written statement which I've submitted for the record.

I, also, am very honored to appear today before you as the President's nominee to be the first American Ambassador to the Republic of Montenegro, the world's newest independent state.

Mr. Chairman, Senator, since its declaration of independence last year, Montenegro has already quickly established itself as a solid friend and partner of the United States. If I am confirmed, it would be a great honor to work with the talented team at our new Embassy in Podgorica to strengthen this partnership further.

Mr. Chairman, it is in our national interest to maintain a vigorous partnership with Montenegro. Having navigated its way

peacefully to independence, Montenegro has emerged onto the world stage as a dynamic democracy committed to the values we share with our Euroatlantic allies.

Moreover, although it is small in size, Montenegro can play an outsized role in partnership with us on the global arena, including in the war on terror and as a potential member of NATO and the European Union.

A prosperous and democratic Montenegro will also be a key ally in strengthening stability in historically unsettled Balkans, our top priority in this region. In this direction, Montenegro has committed itself to political and economic reform. It is zealously pursuing Euroatlantic integration and is building increasingly strong relationships with its neighbors. Montenegro is witnessing strong economic growth and a boom in tourism and real estate along its beautiful Adriatic Coast.

Nevertheless, many challenges do lie ahead for Montenegro. Like other transition countries, its youthful democratic institutions are still fragile. Montenegro can do more to cement the rule of law and to fight corruption and organized crime. Montenegro could do more to accelerate broad based economic development and attract more American and other foreign investors.

Although its ethnic groups peacefully coexist, Montenegro could do even more to become a model for multicultural harmony in a region too frequently divided along ethnic fault lines.

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that Montenegro's rich history, demonstrated friendship toward the United States, commitment to reform, and keen determination to integrate fully into the Euroatlantic community offer fertile ground for cultivating a strong bilateral relationship through successful transformational diplomacy. We have a tremendous opportunity at this early stage to root into this ground a strong friendship between the peoples of our two countries, a friendship that will bear fruit for many decades to come.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moore follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RODERICK W. MOORE, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on the occasion of my nomination by the President to be our country's first Ambassador to the Republic of Montenegro, the world's newest independent country.

Mr. Chairman, since its declaration of independence last year, Montenegro has already quickly established itself as a solid friend and partner of the United States. If I am confirmed, it would be a great honor for me to work with the talented team at our Embassy in Podgorica to strengthen this partnership further. Having worked for over 15 years of my 20-year diplomatic career on issues related to Southeast Europe, I believe I could bring a wealth of relevant experience and energy to this task. In recent years, I have also had the opportunity to work extensively on issues directly involving Montenegro. Following my arrival in January 2004 as Deputy Chief of Mission in Belgrade, then the capital of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, I directly supervised the former United States Consulate in Podgorica, overseeing United States policy and management issues in Montenegro until Montenegro gained its independence last year.

I am proud that the United States was among the first countries to recognize independent Montenegro and welcome it into the family of democratic nations. After all, the rich and complex history of our relationship with this remarkable country boasts deep roots. The Kingdom of Montenegro was well established as a nation-

state by the late 1800s and the United States first established diplomatic relations with it just over 100 years ago. Although that official relationship ceased after the First World War, Americans and Montenegrins enjoyed strong ties until Montenegro again emerged as an independent state in 2006. By way of example, in 1919, the United States posthumously awarded Montenegrin-born Sergeant James Mestrovich with the Medal of Honor for his heroic service to the United States armed forces in World War I. Sixty years later, in 1979, the United States Air Force airlifted 139 tons of supplies to Montenegro, stricken by a devastating earthquake.

Mr. Chairman, we all know too well that the 1990s brought great tragedy to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, a tragedy from which the countries that emerged from Yugoslavia are still healing. Although Montenegro is the republic of the former Yugoslavia that had the least conflict on its territory, its role as both protagonist and victim in the Yugoslav tragedy will no doubt be examined by historians for ages to come. There can be no doubt, however, that Montenegro played a key role in the latter stages of the Yugoslav crisis in helping the United States and its allies bring an end to that conflict and to the destructive policies of Slobodan Milosevic.

Mr. Chairman, our relationship with Montenegro entered a historic new phase on August 15, 2006, with the restoration of bilateral diplomatic relations between our two countries for the first time since 1918.

Mr. Chairman, it is in our national interest to forge an even stronger partnership with newly-independent Montenegro and to help it become an important source of stability in the Balkans. Having navigated its way peacefully to independence—in a referendum judged free and fair by the international community—Montenegro has emerged onto the world stage as a dynamic democracy committed to the values we share with our Euro-Atlantic allies. Already a member of the United Nations and OSCE, Montenegro will almost certainly have the opportunity, if it so decides, to seek membership in NATO, the European Union, and other international organizations in the years to come. Although it is small in size, I am convinced that Montenegro can play an outsized role in partnership with us in the global arena.

While Montenegro is on the right path, this young state is nevertheless still a society in transition. Many of its youthful, and still fragile, democratic institutions continue to be buffeted by challenges that grew out of the tumult of recent years. Like other transition countries in the region, Montenegro needs to do more to cement the rule of law. It needs to do more to fight corruption and organized crime. It needs to do more to reform and strengthen the judicial sector, steps that will build confidence in Montenegro's judicial processes and make the country even more attractive to United States and other foreign investors from a broader range of countries. It can do even more to strengthen interethnic bonds and to make itself a true model of multicultural harmony in a region that has too frequently been divided along ethnic fault lines. It can do more to accelerate broad-based economic development to ensure that all of its citizens have an equal stake in the success of independent Montenegro.

Mr. Chairman, Montenegro faces challenges on the foreign policy front as well, particularly in its immediate neighborhood. The wars of the former Yugoslavia scarred and destabilized the region, leaving legacies that the new countries that emerged are still struggling to overcome. Montenegro is no exception, facing challenges in building new relationships with its neighbors—Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania. Montenegro, host to over 16,000 refugees from Kosovo, must also keep a watchful eye on developments in neighboring Kosovo, with which it shares a 40-mile-long border. More broadly, the wars, propaganda, and isolation of the 1990s have bequeathed public skepticism about the aims of NATO and the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that Montenegro has made great progress in meeting these challenges. A new government, elected in free and fair elections last year, has committed itself to reform and Euro-Atlantic integration. Montenegro is rapidly transforming its economy and is witnessing strong GDP growth, a booming tourism sector along its beautiful Adriatic coast, and substantial foreign investment. In a region that has been racked by interethnic conflict, Montenegro's rich mix of ethnic groups peacefully coexists.

Montenegro has already made great strides in building political, economic, and security links with its neighbors, including in areas such as antitrafficking and anti-smuggling. At the highest levels, its leaders regularly work with their counterparts in nearby states to resolve disputes peacefully and to seek new forms of cooperation. Montenegro has eagerly supported regional initiatives, even recently becoming the first country to ratify the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), a free trade agreement that will open markets in the region to a degree unprecedented in history. Montenegro has established good cooperation with the ICTY and has agreed

to work with other countries in the region in investigating and prosecuting war crimes and organized crime.

The democratic leadership of independent Montenegro has also embarked on a zealous pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration. Invited to join NATO's Partnership for Peace last November, Montenegro is moving swiftly ahead to strengthen its links with the Alliance. Likewise, it is moving full steam ahead toward closer association with the European Union, rapidly concluding talks on a Stability and Association Agreement earlier this year.

Our nascent bilateral relationship with Montenegro also shows great potential. Already, our two countries have exchanged a series of high-level visits, including separate visits to Montenegro last year by a senior delegation of U.S. Senators and by the U.S. Secretary of Defense. More recently, in early May, President Vujanovic conducted the highest-level visit to the United States by a Montenegrin official since the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. This visit significantly advanced, *inter alia*, our rapidly developing security relationship. In Washington, President Vujanovic signed with Secretary Rice a Status of Forces Agreement and committed to send military observers to Iraq or Afghanistan. Just before his visit, on April 19, Montenegro also became the 104th country to enter into an Article 98 agreement with the United States.

Mr. Chairman, we have a clear interest in ensuring that this new partner successfully carries out its political and economic reforms. The good news is that the United States has much to offer in helping this new country succeed. We have 17 years of experience in helping the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe successfully implement political, economic, and military reforms. We have tremendous experience in helping these countries prepare themselves for membership in NATO, the European Union, and other institutions. Thanks to the Congress' continuing support for funding under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) and other programs, we still have at our disposal substantial resources to help reformers in Montenegro overcome the challenges they face in building their post-communist society. If I am confirmed, I would be eager to bring fully to bear the experiences and resources of the United States to accelerate Montenegro's process of reform.

Mr. Chairman, my experience in working on issues relating to Montenegro and other countries in the Balkans has left me convinced that Montenegro's rich history, demonstrated friendship toward the United States, and keen determination to integrate fully into the Euro-Atlantic community combine to make it fertile ground for a success story in what Secretary Rice calls transformational diplomacy. With the appropriate resources, I believe that we have an outstanding window of opportunity at this early stage of our young relationship with Montenegro to deeply root into this fertile ground a friendship between the peoples of our two countries that will bear fruit for decades to come.

If I am confirmed, I would work hard with my team at the embassy to use the tools provided by the Congress and the administration to help Montenegro develop into a prosperous and democratic source of stability in South Central Europe. I would work hard to stimulate the economic and judicial reforms that will consolidate democracy and open the doors for much greater U.S. trade and investment. I would work hard to help Montenegro combat the corruption and organized crime that sap its progress and undermine public confidence in its institutions.

If confirmed, I would also invest great effort to build a partnership in which the United States and Montenegro work hand-in-hand in regional, European, and global fora to address challenges to international peace and security. I would work to strengthen our bilateral and multilateral security relationship and seek ways to support Montenegro's declared interest in participating more actively in the global war on terror. I would work hard to support the efforts of the Montenegrins themselves to strengthen their democratic institutions and pave the way for more rapid membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Mr. Chairman, in short, we now have a rare opportunity to implement this vision, building our new relationship from the ground floor up. The goals I have laid out may sound lofty, but I believe that—with the appropriate amount of energy and attention—they are achievable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

What I'd like to do before we start a round of questions is to allow Senator DeMint to offer greetings and an opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA**

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for missing some of your opening statements. I appreciate your willingness to serve at, really, a challenging time for the United States. Our image abroad is certainly tarnished, in some ways, and, despite our willingness to help so many countries, sometimes that help is very misunderstood. So, your potential positions are very important to us.

I think, as we talk about spreading democracy and freedom abroad, I—as all of you know, that freedom involves much more than just the right to vote. And you have already referenced the importance of institutions and just the importance of rule of law and property and free enterprise and freedom of the press and freedom of religion, a lot of things that, in your positions, you'll need to encourage and help to guide. I think the big challenge we have as a world is trying to determine the difference between socialistic principles, which ultimately lead to big government and the dependency on government—things which often start out with good intentions, to help people, ultimately sap freedom, as we even find in our own country—and—but to be able to direct a government in how to help its people and to help the poor and to provide healthcare in a way that ultimately promotes freedom is a challenge to us, and hopefully you can help these countries learn from our successes, as well as, perhaps, some of our failures.

So, I'm very interested in supporting your nominations and hearing any additional ideas as we go through just a few questions, but I very much appreciate your willingness to serve our country, as well as the countries that you're looking at serving in.

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you.

I would—what we'll do is, I think I'll try to restrict myself to one question each—for each of you, and then Senator DeMint can ask his questions; and if any others join us, then we'll go with them.

Let's start with you, Dr. Withers. You know, international observers have criticized Albania for failing to live up to democratic standards, which, as you know, is a prerequisite for NATO membership. What do you think the United States can and should do to help sustain Albanian democracy? And, you know, how ready do you think they are to join NATO, at this point?

Dr. WITHERS. Well, thank you very much for that question, Senator.

I believe that you must say, looking at Albania's difficult recent history and its long experience with the tyrannical regime of Enver Hoxha, that it has made important strides. There is a constitution. There is a parliamentary democracy. And the government is decided by elections, which, however, as you have said, have been flawed.

But I believe that the progress is such that we have moved away from many of the more dysfunctional parts of their electoral system. What we need them now to do really falls into two things. The February 7 local elections did not meet international standards. The OSCE and other groups have set forth a series of reform recommendations, and we strongly urge the Albanians to take these

recommendations to heart, to implement them, and to improve on the problems which they had recently.

Another element of their political difficulty is bickering between the parties, between the government and the opposition, which has prevented the type of rapid forward movement that I think we all hope for. And I think that the Albanians should—need to understand that they must begin to work in concordance for the larger interests of the society, as a whole. The presidential election, which will begin in just a few days, will give us a measure as to how seriously they have taken the advice of their friends to heart, and we hope that they can reach a consensus on the next president, and move forward in a smooth, fair, and internationally recognized manner.

In terms of NATO, the Albanians, again, have made considerable progress. They have modernized the military. They have undertaken many measures in the rule-of-law area. They have taken such measures as a joint investigative unit, which brings their prosecutors and their police together to investigate crimes. They have adopted laws on witness protections, special investigations, and many, many other things that are aimed at rooting out the corruption, which is one of the poisons that could affect their NATO membership.

We have made clear to the Albanian Government, as their friends and as their supporters, how important NATO is to us and how its standards are legitimately tough; and they must meet those standards, with our support, and with our help. If they undertake the measures that are required, they will be as strong a candidate as they can be, and we encourage them to take those steps.

Senator OBAMA. Okay.

Mr. English, you know, we've made tremendous progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the past decade, but obviously, the parties are still far from fully reconciled. There's still no integrated national police force, there are still issues with respect to the Republic of Srpska and Kosovo, and how we differentiate between those two situations. How do you see your role in a positive resolution in the antagonism between these two parts of the country?

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the question.

I—the United States—first of all, Bosnia and Herzegovina has no better friend in the world than the United States, and our position there is a critically important one. And, if confirmed, I pledge to continue the vigorous leadership efforts that my predecessors have brought to the office of Ambassador in Sarajevo.

We do work with other partners in the international community very closely. As a matter of fact, our Deputy Assistant Secretary just came back from a meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Sarajevo where many of these very critical issues were discussed, and where we worked with our European partners, in particular, to send a very strong message to the Bosnians, that they must put differences behind them and move forward. Bosnian politics, we've seen in the period since Dayton, are usually two steps forward and one-and-a-half steps back. And right now, unfortu-

nately, they seem to be a bit on the back foot. Nationalist rhetoric is very strong. There is no sense of consensus for the way forward.

If confirmed, I see my job, in terms of relating to the Bosnians, as going to them and helping to push them forward, helping them to understand that police reform is the path to Brussels. Brussels is the path to stability and prosperity for all citizens in Bosnia.

And one thing that we've told them, in particular, to get to your comment on Republic of Srpska and Kosovo and Srebrenica, is that the—all the questions that relate to Bosnia's integrity were resolved at Dayton, and we will not permit a reopening of Dayton. Dayton established—Dayton was the answer to the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dayton is the answer that we're going to stay with.

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will take a very firm and energetic approach to United States leadership in Sarajevo.

Thank you.

Senator OBAMA. Good.

I'll take one more question, then I'll turn it over to Senator DeMint.

But, before we do that, Senator Nelson, do you care to make an opening statement? Okay.

For you, Mr. Kennedy, within the last few months, the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims concluded its work to help survivors receive some compensation from insurance companies who had long refused to pay on policies held by those who perished during the Holocaust. How do you rate the success of ICHEIC's efforts? How many survivors received compensation, and in what amounts? I know that some have criticized ICHEIC for cutting off the process before all the claims had a chance to be adjudicated. Do you share that criticism? And are there steps that you think our Government can take to improve the process?

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much for that question, Mr. Chairman. It goes right to the heart of a lot of things that we're trying to do in the Office of Holocaust Issues.

If I could just put a little historical context on this. When ICHEIC was established, in 1997, and became largely a body controlled by State insurance commissioners, Holocaust survivors, NGOs, and the state of Israel, they began looking for a way to handle what was probably a large number of potential claims. Working with Yad Vashem, they came up with a list of about 500,000 possible policyholders who might have perished in the Holocaust. The process was then to publicize that list, notify people that there was a possibility of making a claim.

The total number of claims that were processed—and these are, I'd emphasize, claims without documentation, or with very, very little documentation, so people were asking for something they couldn't prove but they suspected was there—the total number processed was about 92,000 claims out of that potential list of 500,000. Roughly 8,000 people received payments, ranging from \$5,000 to \$20,000. Most of these policies were initially rather small. They were written as burial policies or dowry policies; some cases, education policies for daughters. So, they—the initial amounts were not great, but the ICHEIC process, which was an in-

dividual claims process, located a lot of policies, was able to make specific payments on them.

Another 40,000 people or so had a story that was credible, that had facts in it that matched up with a likely policy. And those people were paid about \$1,000 each.

The total payments were a little over \$300 million. When they had processed all the policies that they felt were credible, Chairman Eagleburger, last March, announced that ICHEIC would be closing its doors.

I hope that covers the issues you needed, Senator.

Thank you.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you.

Senator DeMint, do you want to take a stab at a couple of questions?

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'll start on the other side, since you worked on—starting on the right.

I'd really just—maybe Mr. Moore and Dr. Munter, just a perspective of your role as Ambassadors, to Montenegro and Serbia. I've often heard, as I've talked to people I've worked with around the world in various countries, that sometimes our State Department, regardless of the administration, can do more harm than good in, maybe, trying to direct the affairs of other nations. I would guess that you would see your role as not only doing the bidding of whatever administration is in power, but understanding and listening and trying to direct the policy of the United States in a way that would best serve the country that you are in, as well as our own country here, back home.

I would just be interested in your perspective of your role in how you would direct us and an administration to really understand other countries in a way that would help them—or help us work with them, rather than perhaps alienate them, which is apparently what we occasionally do. So, Mr. Moore—if that question makes any sense.

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Senator. I fully understand the question. I appreciate it.

I think the good news with Montenegro is that we actually have a win-win situation. I say that, because I think that success on the part of the Montenegrin people, and the Montenegrin institutions themselves, to reform and transition their society, equals foreign policy success for the United States. I think we're pushing in the same direction. And let me define that a little bit more clearly.

It's my view that the United States can play an important role. We have 17 years of experience working with countries in Eastern Europe, former socialist countries, and we've gained a lot of experience and know-how, and we've applied, thanks to the generosity of the taxpayers and the Congress, a substantial amount of resources during these 17 years.

But I think that we have more work to do, in terms of supporting the success of political and economic reforms. And what I mean by that is strengthening the economy of Montenegro, creating jobs in Montenegro, strengthening democratic institutions, strengthening rule of law, fighting corruption, and so forth. These are all issues which I think will help strengthen Montenegro and are in the in-

terest of the United States, for two reasons, primarily—a successful Montenegro—a Montenegro which makes it through this transition and becomes a democratic and prosperous state in a region which has been traditionally unstable, unfortunately, over the last two decades or so—will be an important ally of ours in helping to export stability to other areas of this region.

Second of all, a successful Montenegro, which does make it through this transition, also has the potential to be an important partner of the United States as we try to advance our agenda, both within the region of South Central Europe, in the Euroatlantic area, and globally, as well. Montenegro is—if it so decides, is a prospective member of the European Union and NATO. It's already a member of the United Nations and the OSCE.

So, I think—again, to sum up, I think it's a win-win situation. I think we're all moving in the same direction.

Senator DEMINT. I thank you very much.

Dr. Munter, really the same question.

Dr. MUNTER. Thank you very much for the question, Senator, and I really appreciate it.

I think that the points Rod made are universal, in the sense that we have spent a number of the years, for the last 17 years in the transition countries in which many of us have served, gaining the experience we believe not only of giving our system—putting it forth as a model, but learning from these countries in transition what has worked and what has not. And I think this kind of partnership that is not only going out to speak, but also to listen, is a key part of our job. And I certainly pledge that, if confirmed, listening, as well as speaking, will be a central part of what I do.

Specifically, I think we have to create a partnership that bases the focus of our relationship with Serbia, which is a much more troubled relationship at this point, on our common goals and our long-term goals, defining them in a way that we can understand that, no matter how the process works getting us there, that we agree integration into the West—integration into Western institutions, creating more effective markets, creating the institutions that allow for the rule of law—are something that we're all going to be working for, not so much because the Serbs are being told by the Americans how to do this, but that it's a partnership for us, as well, that they are also working with us to help us define how those partnerships work.

In a broader sense, partnerships will be not only America, but this is a job for our European friends, as well. We'll work very closely with our European allies to make sure that this process of building the transition and setting of the long-term goals is a common one, not just something the Americans come up with, but that our European allies bear, in fact, a very large part of this burden, for this is, actual—after all, their backyard, and we want to work with them very closely.

Ultimately, this will come down, in a specific sense, to our ability to practice what we preach in public diplomacy, to make sure that the way in which we get our message across, and the way in which we understand our colleagues there, is effective, that the entire Embassy is mobilized to get the message across to listen to what others are saying, so that we are effective in trying to put together

a long-term plan that isn't swayed by what are clearly going to be some very difficult times that we will go through in the short term.

Thank you.

Senator DEMINT. So, you're comfortable, as far as just the organization and philosophy of the State Department, that you can be a true ambassador in the sense—on behalf of the United States, as well as on behalf of Serbia to us, and that there really is a two-way system within our structure that you can help direct what we do. I mean, do people listen, back home?

Dr. MUNTER. I would characterize it, Senator, as much more than—I'm working for America.

Senator DEMINT. Yeah.

Dr. MUNTER. And there's no doubt about that. What is nice about working for America, in my opinion, is that we represent more than interests, we represent values that are universal. And—as best we can espouse those values with the help of the colleagues we're working with—I think that's where we get traction, rather than simply coming and saying that we represent something, in a vacuum.

Senator DEMINT. Great answer. Great answer.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you.

Senator OBAMA. Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kennedy, I want to follow up. In light of what you just testified about ICHEIC and Secretary Eagleburger, the issue has arisen, because of legislation filed over on the House side, that would go beyond the International Commission for Holocaust Era Insurance Claims Commission. And, since they have closed up shop, this legislation would require disclosure of Holocaust-era policies by insurers, beyond the 500,000 that you mentioned. And it would also allow insurers to be sued in Federal court.

The findings of that legislation, which I think is to be heard in a committee shortly in the House of Representatives, criticize ICHEIC for inadequate research and for limiting itself only to certain forms of insurance.

What do you think about that?

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much for that question, Senator Nelson.

We have—the Department has been asked to comment on the draft legislation that you mentioned, and we are in the process of developing a coordinated position within the administration, and will certainly get back—I'll make sure that you're informed as soon as we have that coordinated position.

Senator NELSON. Well, do you have an opinion, now that ICHEIC has closed up business, do you have an opinion about the finding in the bill that ICHEIC only paid out less than 5 percent of the policies sold to Jews prior to World War II?

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, the kinds of policies that ICHEIC looked at, I think—I'm not an insurance expert—would be called, probably, "whole life policies," in a broad category, but they were very specialized kinds of policies. They were largely for burial, to ensure that the insuree was—would receive a proper burial, or to provide a dowry for a daughter. There are other kinds of insurance that ICHEIC did not deal with—casualty policies, for example. So, I

really believe that the goal that ICHEIC set itself, it did a good job, it researched thoroughly, and it was an individualized claims process.

Thank you, sir.

Senator NELSON. So, you think, with what ICHEIC did and what it handled, that it did a reasonably good job.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, Senator, I think it basically did. It was—it's obviously sort of "a glass half full, a glass half empty" situation, about half the people whose claims could be processed received some kind of compensation. And these were difficult claims to process, in—to my understanding, because they—none of them had documents—almost none of them had documentation. This wasn't about processing claims where people had adequate documentation to make their claims.

Senator NELSON. Well, the question now is, as a matter of Federal policy, should survivors be able to go into Federal court? What is your opinion on that?

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, sir, on that one, I'm going to have to defer to the process that we're engaged in now, within the administration, examining the proposed bill that's coming up in the House committee.

Senator NELSON. So, basically, the administration is not ready to make a statement about whether or not this process ought to stop, or whether it ought to go forward and be facilitated in the Federal courts.

Mr. KENNEDY. I believe I received a copy of the bill yesterday afternoon, sir, or that was the first time I became aware of it, and we've tasked it out.

Senator NELSON. Well, somebody is pretty slow, then, because that bill's been filed for a couple of months.

Let me ask you—is this true? Now, this is a matter of what you've been dealing with, because you've been active as the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues for—how long?

Mr. KENNEDY. Ten months, Senator.

Senator NELSON. Okay. It's my understanding that the German Insurance Association has agreed that it would continue to accept claims, provided that they're filed directly with German companies. Is that true?

Mr. KENNEDY. My understanding is that the German companies are willing to process claims for which some documentation could be provided, that the work that ICHEIC did with undocumentable claims was a different story. But I certainly hope that people who have some documentation will follow up on this, because I think we ought to hold the companies to their statements that they are willing to process claims. But I believe—my understanding is that those claims would have to be processed with some kind of documentation.

Senator NELSON. Does that hold for the Italian company, Generali, as well?

Mr. KENNEDY. Generali has told us the same, that they would process documentable claims. And, again, I certainly hope people who are not happy with the outcome of the class-action suit that's underway right now, if they feel they've got a claim that wasn't handled properly, that they would try to pursue a remedy.

Senator NELSON. How about the Austrian companies?

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, again, you've got a willing—an indicated willingness to handle claims that can be, as my—as I understand it, can be documented, that the undocumentable claims period is over, because ICHEIC has finished that—

Senator NELSON. So, all of them—German, Italian, and Austrian.

Mr. KENNEDY. That's my understanding, sir. But, of course, we're kind of moving into a new period of time here. ICHEIC finished its work about—well, a little over 2 months ago, on March 31 of this year.

Senator NELSON. Well, you're the point man for Holocaust issues, so I would think that we would need to know what the policy of these companies is after ICHEIC has shut its doors. And, since it has shut its doors, what do you think ought to be done to assist survivors to be able to proceed with their claims that they feel that are unfulfilled?

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, my office would certainly be willing to work with survivor groups to help them get the information they need from the insurance companies to proceed. As I say, this is—we have a stated willingness from the insurance companies to proceed with documentable claims, and we're certainly willing to help in that regard. We're not going to drop the issue.

Senator NELSON. When might I expect a reply from you as to the administration's position on this legislation?

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, I would hope, shortly, sir. I don't have an exact timeframe, but we would certainly try to do it in the next few days.

Senator NELSON. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, sir.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator OBAMA. I want to appreciate Senator Nelson for—or compliment Senator Nelson for raising some important issues. I think it's—these are issues that all of us share. Obviously, given the unprecedented nature of the Holocaust and the fact that survivors are aging, the sooner that we can get some resolution to some of these issues, the better. And I think all of us are going to share a deep interest in this. So, thank you, Senator Nelson, for raising it.

Senator DeMint, do you have any further questions?

Senator DEMINT. No, Mr. Chairman.

Senator OBAMA. If not, I'd like to thank all the nominees for testifying today and for their willingness to serve our countries in these important positions. I want to thank you for your past service, because, as career Foreign Service officers, you all have exemplary records and have done outstanding work. And, you know, we know that you're going to be working in some difficult areas, but we also are confident that you will be up to the task.

So, we're going to keep the record open. We're going to—it will remain open through Friday, so that committee members can submit additional questions for the record. And I'd ask that the nominees respond expeditiously to those questions, should they arise.

Senator OBAMA. With that, if no one has any additional comments, then this hearing is adjourned.

Good luck.

[Whereupon, at 2:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

CORRECTION TO WRITTEN STATEMENT AND RESPONSE OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

In my written statement for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I noted that two members of the International Commission of the International Tracing Service (ITS) still had not approved the procedures for greater access to the archives. Following my June 21 confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Biden submitted a "Question for the Record" regarding the ITS. Based on the same information in my possession at the time, I mistakenly informed the Senator that 9 of the 11 signatories to the ITS agreement had already ratified the amended ITS protocols, leaving just France and Italy to do so.

Since then I have received information from the Greek Embassy that Athens has not yet completed its ratification procedure. It expects to do so in coming weeks.

I sincerely apologize to Senator Biden and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee for providing this incorrect information. I also would like to reassure the Senators that the Department remains steadfast in its efforts to press for expeditious ratification by the remaining three members of the International Commission of the ITS so that the amended protocols can enter into force as soon as possible.

RESPONSES OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR NORM COLEMAN

Question. Could you describe the role of the State Department and in particular your office with respect to ICHEIC?

Answer. As Special Envoy, I and my predecessors participated as observers on the board, not only as an advocate of the survivors but also with the responsibility to take appropriate steps to contribute to the success of ICHEIC. From the beginning, we have supported ICHEIC as an example of a forum for cooperative resolution of Holocaust-era claims. Within ICHEIC, we viewed our role as one that would facilitate resolution of issues and provide assistance. In this regard, we conducted demarches in European capitals advocating the opening of archives relating to insurance claims, and we sought to mediate any differences among ICHEIC participants, especially when they related to ICHEIC's interactions with entities created in Germany and Austria as a result of United States bilateral agreements.

Question. What U.S. bilateral and or international agreements govern the restitution of Holocaust-era insurance policies? How do these agreements relate to ICHEIC?

Answer. In July 2000 and January 2001, the United States entered into bilateral agreements with Germany and Austria, respectively, that include provisions relating to Holocaust-era insurance policies. The agreement with Germany led to the creation of the German Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future," which provided about half of ICHEIC's operating capital (about \$275 million) out of funds dedicated for insurance claims and for humanitarian purposes to those with unpayable insurance policies. Similarly, the Austrian General Settlement Fund (GSF), established pursuant to our January 2001 agreement with Austria, has earmarked \$25 million for insurance claims. ICHEIC and the GSF concluded an agreement in December 2003 relating to payment procedures.

ICHEIC concluded memoranda of understanding with American state insurance regulators, leading Jewish and survivor organizations, and European insurance companies, as well as with the German Insurance Association, although these are not binding international agreements.

Question. How would you characterize the work of ICHEIC? How would you characterize the cooperation of the insurance companies? Have the insurance companies participating in ICHEIC disclosed all of their Holocaust-era policies? If not why not? What about non-ICHEIC participating insurance companies?

Answer. ICHEIC's mandate was to identify and pay life insurance policies issued to Holocaust victims that were never paid to the beneficiaries. With ICHEIC's board consisting of representatives with disparate interests, finding a consensus on some issues took years rather than months. These issues included researching and identifying policyholders and establishing appropriate evidentiary and valuation stand-

ards. Nevertheless, what eventually emerged was a conviction among all parties in the process that the process worked as intended and provided meaningful compensation for unpaid life insurance policies from the Nazi period. And it only worked because at key moments all representatives, including insurance company representatives, were prepared to make pragmatic compromises on difficult issues.

Regarding the disclosure of all Holocaust-era policies, ICHEIC published 500,000 names of likely insurance policyholders who were also Holocaust victims. The list of 500,000 names was produced with the cooperation of European insurance companies and foreign government archives, as well as the German Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future" and Yad Vashem, which was established by the Israeli Knesset to document the Holocaust. Yad Vashem has over 3 million names of victims stored in its electronic database as well as an extensive collection of documents. We and ICHEIC's commissioners believed that this list was a cost-effective approach to identifying all of the relevant life insurance policyholders who were Nazi victims. At ICHEIC's concluding meeting in March 2007, the leaders of American and Israeli survivor and claims organizations represented on ICHEIC's board expressed great satisfaction with the results of ICHEIC's work.

The Austrian General Settlement Fund employed its own researchers, and also used the ICHEIC list, to identify policyholders. Other funds in Europe had their own system for identifying policyholders and were able to take advantage of ICHEIC's research. The identification of names by insurance companies in cooperating nonmember companies in Belgium or the Netherlands was not an issue. The ICHEIC companies, and other companies in the countries cited above, issued the bulk of the life insurance policies in Europe.

Question. How many survivors presently reside in the United States and overseas? How many of the current survivors and or heirs (both United States and foreign) have had their claims paid through ICHEIC? How many have not? What are the principle reasons why restitution has not been made to some survivors and their heirs?

Answer. We are aware of one survey that estimated the total number of survivors worldwide to be just under 700,000 in the year 2003. If one assumes that 10 percent of survivors die every year, than the current number of survivors could be about 450,000 today. Using the same percentages for the country of residence of survivors as in the 2003 study, one would estimate that there are 170,000 in Israel, 70,000 in the United States, and about 210,000 in the rest of the world. This study, prepared by Ukeles Associates for ICHEIC, is available on the Claims Conference Web site (claimscon.org).

We know that about 90,000 survivors or heirs filed claims and that 48,000 of these were eligible for payments that totaled \$300 million. Most of those applying for and receiving payments could provide no documentation beyond anecdotal information, yet ICHEIC was able to research their claims and submit them to insurers at no cost to the claimant. Even those with only credible stories and no documentation were eligible for a small payment. ICHEIC also made available an additional \$169 million for social welfare and related projects.

We estimate that \$500 million have reached Holocaust survivors and heirs as payments for claims via ICHEIC and via related agreements. No compensation program involving 70- or 80-year-old claims could ever be perfect, but ICHEIC's efforts to honor unpaid life insurance policies was thorough and comprehensive.

(A large category of ineligible claims applications came from countries in the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, because no private sector insurance companies existed in that area, and therefore no insurance policies could be issued there during that time, a large number of claims applications from countries in the former Soviet Union were ineligible for payment.)

Question. What is the status of ICHEIC's compliance with section 704(a) of the fiscal year 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (Public Law 107-228)?

Answer. Section 704(a) is a reporting requirement directed at the United States Government not ICHEIC. The Department of State has provided all the information called for by the section that is available to it in its biannual reports to the Congress, but not all the information was available at the time of the most recent report, as has been the case in years past. Some information about ICHEIC, including statistics on claims and appeals, however, is publicly available on ICHEIC's Web site (www.icheic.org). Moreover, additional information can be found in ICHEIC's Final Report, which is available at the ICHEIC Web site and at www.naic.org.

[NOTE: Section 704(a) requires, inter alia, a number of detailed questions. For example, whether the participating ICHEIC insurers provided claimants with a status report on their claim within 90 days and whether the appeals body of ICHEIC had

the resources to fully investigate each claim. This section also requested information on the adequacy of independent audits and administrative expenses and whether the companies complied with ICHEIC evidentiary and valuation standards and provided policyholder lists. Most of these questions were addressed at the end of the ICHEIC process in its Final Report.]

Question. What legal basis exists, if at all, for the preclusion of restitution-based lawsuits against insurance companies?

Answer. Lawsuits face numerous legal hurdles. Some lawsuits against insurance companies concerning Holocaust-era claims were resolved through a negotiated settlement of class actions. Those settlements precluded future claims. Other lawsuits may be precluded by well-established legal doctrines, such as statutes of limitations.

United States executive agreements with Germany and Austria concerning Holocaust compensation did not preclude lawsuits against insurance companies or other companies. Rather, in consideration of the significant payments those countries agreed to make, the United States agreed to file statements of interest in suits against German and Austrian companies arising out of the Holocaust urging courts to dismiss on any available legal ground, noting continuing litigation would be contrary to United States foreign policy interests and that those companies should instead have “legal peace.” The United States has made these interests clear in numerous courts, all of which have dismissed litigation that would have undermined these important policy goals.

We believe litigation would be acrimonious, expensive, and ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, it would cause significant problems for the foreign relations of the United States, especially with respect to countries with which we have bilateral agreements. We facilitated and supported ICHEIC and agreements with Germany and Austria on Holocaust-related claims because they provided for \$500 million for insurance claims on the basis of relaxed standards of proof, and without any legal costs to the claimants and without any of the litigation risks. They also provided \$5.5 billion in payments for other losses or damages to Holocaust victims.

Question. While ICHEIC has provided more than \$306 million on Holocaust-era insurance policies to 48,000 survivors and their heirs, there are estimates that the value of unpaid policies is at least \$17 billion? How would you explain this difference?

Answer. The \$17 billion figure is well above the estimates we have seen in other studies and raises question about methodology and sources. We informally consulted with a historian at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum about these estimates, and he was unaware of any data-based and document-based study that produced estimates of comparable size for the insurance assets of the entire Jewish population of Europe.

ICHEIC’s Final Report (available at naic.org and at icheic.org) provides a realistic picture of the European insurance industry between World War I and World War II, as well as of compensation programs available to Holocaust survivors and heirs following the Second World War (pages 6 to 15 and pages 33 to 37 of the Final Report). In addition, there are other experts who have written on the overall wealth of the Jewish population of Europe, broken down by country of residence and category of wealth, and the estimates of these experts are substantially lower than those cited in the question. One useful study was prepared by Helen B. Junz, who wrote at the request of the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons chaired by former Federal Reserve Board Governor Paul Volcker. (See appendix S on page A-127.) We can provide a citation: <http://www.crt-ii.org/ICEP/ICEP—Report—Appendices—A-W.pdf>.

Additional sources of information are the “Research Reports” that can be found at the “Document Center” on ICHEIC’s Web site. One of these reports identified 78,000 life insurance policies belonging to 55,000 Jewish policyholders in Europe during the Nazi era. The policyholder lists came from noncompany files such as public archives and repositories, such as the Nazi regime’s tax records and its Jewish property declarations.

In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that ICHEIC’s mandate was to pay unpaid life insurance policies on the basis of claims filed by survivors or heirs. It is conceivable that the estimates relating to the \$17 billion in unpaid insurance policies include nonlife policies and policies where there are no survivors or heirs. For example, it could be based on the inclusion of property insurance (and possibly marine insurance) losses that have not been paid, but seeking to cover such losses would be problematic given the widespread destruction caused by military operations that took place during the Second World War and the typical exclusion of war-related damages in such policies.

Question. With the ICHEIC process now completed, what recourse do survivors and their families have in the event they should come into possession of information relating to Holocaust-era insurance policies?

Answer. If one has a claim involving an insurer that participated in ICHEIC, and that person could not file a claim before ICHEIC's closing dates of December 2003 and March 2004, then one can still file the claim directly with the insurance company that issued the policy. The German insurance association representative on ICHEIC's board stated that the association's members will continue to consider any Holocaust-era claim filed directly with a company.

Statement of German Insurance Association: "I believe that the process to work for a better future needs to continue, even as we hope that we have by now addressed all unresolved insurance policies from the Holocaust era. . . . Therefore let me assure you that our member companies intend to continue to address inquiries that are sent to a specific company and will honor legitimate claims."

There is also a way in which one can file a claim with the Italian insurer Generali under certain circumstance. More information is available at the claims settlement Web site: <http://www.nazierainsurancesettlement.com/?lang=en>.

[NOTE: The deadline for filing claims with Generali was also extended by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The claims Web site states the following: "Claims based on documents obtained from the [Bad Arolsen] archive must be submitted no later than six (6) months after the opening of the archive, but in no event later than June 30, 2008. If the archive is not opened by May 1, 2008, the deadline for claims based on archival documents is 60 days after the opening, but no later than August 31, 2008."]

Question. Generally speaking, what sort of information is contained at the Arolsen Nazi archives? What can be reasonably expected about documents relating to insurance policies?

Answer. The archive consists primarily of three major sections: 1) camps, transports, ghettos, and arrest records; 2) forced and slave labor records; 3) displaced person camp records.

Approximately one quarter of the records deal with Holocaust victims. The remaining material covers non-Jewish forced laborers, political opponents, and other persons arrested, detained, or persecuted by Nazi authorities, and displaced persons. In addition, the ITS staff created a Central Name Index which consists of some 17.5 million names on approximately 40 million index cards. Some entries are redundant. For example, the same name appears on multiple documents and on multiple cards.

The files do not contain information on every survivor or every person who was victimized or killed. They only contain information on individuals whose names appeared on lists related to certain—not all—ghettos and concentration camps, forced or slave labor camps, or displaced persons camps. The name of someone who fled the Nazis or was hidden is unlikely to appear in these records unless the individual was registered at a displaced persons camp following the war. Similarly, the name of someone killed on arrival at a camp and not registered would be unlikely to appear in camp records.

There do not appear to be any collections at Arolsen that consist specifically of information about life insurance policies, although there may be some information within the archives. So far, the ITS staff has not encountered a significant number of such references, but the staff has not systematically looked for insurance information.

A survivor or heir who wishes to pursue this matter should file a request for a search of ITS records with the Holocaust and War Victims Tracing Service, American Red Cross, 4700 Mount Hope Drive, Baltimore, Maryland 21215-3231.

RESPONSE OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY TO QUESTION SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Why do you believe the process of opening the ITS archives at Bad Arolsen has taken so long? Has the United States done enough to allow Holocaust survivors, their descendants, and academic researchers access to these documents? What lessons should we take away from the process?

Answer. The International Tracing Service (ITS) is governed by an International Commission (IC) of 11 nations: the United States, Israel, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy, and Greece. The International Committee of the Red Cross manages the facility at Bad Arolsen.

Beginning in 1943, the core function of the ITS was to aid in family reunification; it has more recently assisted with slave labor settlements. But as a backlog in answering requests for information increased, momentum among survivors and scholars started to grow to open up the archives to the public. The U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum led the diplomatic charge in pushing for greater openness.

For several years, however, a number of the other members on the International Commission and the ITS Director expressed concern that changes in procedures for accessing information would be inconsistent with European privacy practice and laws. Their opposition to changing the rules prevented action by the ITS to open the archives, despite intense pressure to do so.

In April 2006, German Justice Minister Zypries declared her country's readiness to accept new access procedures while she was visiting the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. She also called on the other member states of the ITS International Commission to do the same, thereby finally opening up the door for real negotiations.

At its May 2006 meeting, the International Commission proposed draft protocols amending the 1955 Bonn Accords that have governed the ITS. By November 2006, all countries had signed the protocols and indicated their intention to move rapidly to ratify them. Early this year, the United States asked for an extraordinary meeting to assess and accelerate progress, which took place in The Hague in March 2007. The meeting emphasized the importance of rapid approval of the amendments by all IC member states and agreed to put on the agenda for the May 2007 annual meeting the authorization to the ITS administration to distribute an advance electronic copy of the Bad Arolsen data. The advance copy meant that repository institutions could harmonize ITS data with their computer systems while the full approval process took place.

In addition to a series of demarches in Washington by the Office of Holocaust Issues at the State Department, Germany and the United States made joint demarches in the capitals of the ITS countries urging prompt approval of the amendments.

By the time of the May annual meeting of the ITS International Commission, seven countries had finished their internal approval procedures. Also at this meeting the commission approved distribution of an advance copy and rules for access to the documents at Bad Arolsen. Since May, two more countries have approved their own internal procedures; only France and Italy still need to finalize the approval process. The State Department continues to press these countries to expedite their ratifications.

United States leadership on this issue has been vital to advancing greater access to the Bad Arolsen data. American-German cooperation helped overcome significant hurdles to progress as well. It is also important to note that during these long negotiations, the American Red Cross' Holocaust and War Victims Tracing Center aided survivors and next of kin in accessing information. This center continues to operate today. American citizen survivors and heirs can gain access to ITS materials by writing to the Holocaust and War Victims Tracing Center, American Red Cross, 4700 Mount Hope Drive, Baltimore, Maryland 21215-3231.

RESPONSES OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Question. What is your position on H.R. 1746, the legislation introduced in the House by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, to require disclosure of Holocaust-era policies by insurers and allow insurers to be sued in Federal court?

Answer. We oppose H.R. 1746. The information requirements set forth in H.R. 1746 have largely been met by the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC). This was achieved through publication of 500,000 names of likely insurance policyholders who were also Holocaust victims. The participants in the ICHEIC process, including survivor organizations, did not believe that a list of names similar to that required by H.R. 1746 would add further benefit to Holocaust survivors or their heirs.

ICHEIC has already achieved many of the objectives of the draft legislation. ICHEIC has paid \$300 million to 48,000 claimants and made available \$169 million in funds for social welfare projects. We estimate that \$500 million has reached Holocaust survivors and heirs as payments for claims via ICHEIC and via related agreements involving other countries, such as the one with Austria, as well as through social projects. None of this would have been possible if the foreign governments and companies providing these payments believed they would be subject to continuing

litigation in United States courts over Holocaust-era claims. In return for \$6 billion in payments to Holocaust victims, including to holders of Holocaust-era insurance policies, the United States agreed, with respect to German and Austrian companies, that continuing litigation would be contrary to its foreign policy interests and that those companies should instead have "legal peace." The United States has made these interests clear in numerous courts, all of which have dismissed litigation that would have undermined these important policy goals.

The proposed legislation would take the opposite course. Its primary effect would be to enable and facilitate renewed litigation, even where the claims at issue had already been explicitly settled in U.S. courts. We believe such litigation would be acrimonious, expensive, and ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, it would cause significant problems for the foreign relations of the United States, especially with respect to countries with which we have bilateral agreements and which will see enactment of this legislation as a repudiation of such agreements. If such legislation is enacted, we expect it will be extremely difficult to achieve cooperation from other countries in their taking additional domestic steps on Holocaust restitution matters.

Question. Do you think that it is a good idea, now that ICHEIC has concluded its work, for survivors and their families to sue for compensation on World War II era policies in Federal court?

Answer. No. ICHEIC has already achieved many of the objectives of the draft legislation. ICHEIC has paid \$300 million to 48,000 claimants and made available \$169 million in funds for social welfare projects. We estimate that \$500 million has reached Holocaust survivors and heirs as payments for claims via ICHEIC and via related agreements involving other countries, such as the one with Austria, as well as through social projects. None of this would have been possible if the foreign governments and companies providing these payments believed they would be subject to continuing litigation in United States courts over Holocaust-era claims. In return for \$6 billion in payments to Holocaust victims, including to holders of Holocaust-era insurance policies, the United States agreed, with respect to German and Austrian companies, that continuing litigation would be contrary to its foreign policy interests and that those companies should instead have "legal peace." The United States has made these interests clear in numerous courts, all of which have dismissed litigation that would have undermined these important policy goals.

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Question. Can you give me your assessment of the bill's disclosure and judicial review provisions in light of ICHEIC and the other efforts to address Holocaust insurance claims?

Answer. See answers to previous questions.

Question. How likely is it in your opinion that litigation that would be authorized under this bill would result in the actual payment of insurance benefits on Holocaust-era policies in a timely manner?

Answer. We believe such litigation would be highly unlikely to be successful. Particularly in the case of insurance companies that issued policies in Europe to European citizens some 70 or 80 years ago, the legal hurdles for plaintiffs would be numerous and significant. There would also be objections from foreign governments, which would argue that bilateral agreements with the United States require the United States to oppose such lawsuits. In addition, lawsuits may take years in lower courts and on appeal, and can involve huge costs.

Question. Findings in the bill state that the judicial review provisions of the bill would not be limited by any existing international agreements, court decisions, or settlement agreements (such as the Generali settlement). Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Answer. We believe that the provisions of the bill that facilitate lawsuits are in direct conflict with existing international agreements, court decisions, and settlement agreements. For example, agreements between the United States and Germany and the United States and Austria commit the United States to oppose litigation against companies from those countries over Holocaust-era claims. Many U.S.

courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized and given weight to U.S. policy interests in this regard. And there have been settlements of lawsuits involving Swiss companies and Generali (Italian) in our courts, and those settlements contemplate an end to litigation.

Question. If the bill doesn't override the agreements, what kinds of claims would be left to pursue and are Federal lawsuits the way to pursue them?

Answer. We support dialog, negotiation, and cooperation, not lawsuits, as the means to resolve matters relating to any Holocaust-era claims. If one has a claim involving an insurer that participated in ICHEIC, and that person could not file a claim before ICHEIC's closing dates of December 2003 and March 2004, then one can still file the claim directly with the insurance company that issued the policy. The German insurance association stated that its members will continue to consider any Holocaust-era claim filed directly with a company. In the case of Generali, one should go to the claims Web site for information on filing claims based on new archival research: <http://www.nazierainsuranceclaim.com/?lang=en>.

Question. Findings in H.R. 1746 criticize ICHEIC for inadequate research and for limiting itself to only certain forms of insurance. Do you agree with these findings? If not, why not?

Answer. We disagree with those findings. ICHEIC's mission was determined by its commissioners, who were American state insurance regulators, leading Jewish survivor organizations and representatives from the state of Israel, as well as major European insurance companies. The commissioners decided to focus on identifying and paying claims on life insurance policies. It is understandable that other kinds of policies were not part of ICHEIC's mission. For example, the inclusion of property insurance (and possibly marine insurance) would have been problematic given the widespread destruction caused by military operations that took place during the World War II and the typical exclusion of war-related damages in such policies.

ICHEIC established an extensive research apparatus for identifying claims so that a claimant could file a claim that was based on limited information, such as only the first and last name of the policyholder, and if possible also the dates of birth and residence of the policyholder. The list of 500,000 names was produced with the assistance of the German Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future" and Yad Vashem, which was established by the Israeli Knesset to document the Holocaust. Yad Vashem has over 3 million names of victims stored in its electronic database as well as an extensive collection of documents. The ICHEIC names list and other archival information was compiled using high technology, such as the Soundex system that uses phonetics to incorporate various spellings of names and places.

In addition, ICHEIC sent out researchers to archives in 15 countries throughout Europe, Israel, and the United States to compile evidence of insurance policies. These archives were located in insurance companies and in government records centers, and the researchers gathered evidence of nearly 80,000 life insurance policies. ICHEIC researchers also were able to develop a company-country matrix to track the transfer of policy liabilities from one company to the next, as one insurer went bankrupt or was sold and responsibility for paying the policy was taken over by another company.

Question. One finding states that ICHEIC only paid out on less than 5 percent of the policies sold to Jews at the beginning of World War II, and that the unpaid insurance theft actually is somewhere between \$17 billion and \$200 billion. Do you agree with that estimate? If not, why not?

Answer. We have not seen the methodology of the authors of these studies used to arrive at such figures. The wide range reflected by these figures raises questions about methodology and sources for this data. We informally consulted with a historian at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum about these estimates, and he was unaware of any serious study that produced comparable estimates for the insurance assets of the entire Jewish population of Europe.

ICHEIC's Final Report (available at naic.org and at icheic.org) provides a realistic picture of the European insurance industry between World War I and World War II, as well as compensation programs available to Holocaust survivors and heirs following the World War II (pages 6 to 15 and pages 33 to 37 of the Final Report). The ICHEIC report does not support the large estimates of insurance losses cited in the question, and certainly not for losses in life insurance. In addition, there are other experts who have written on the overall wealth of the Jewish population of Europe, broken down by country of residence and category of wealth, and the estimates of these experts are lower than those cited in the question. One useful study was prepared by Helen B. Junz, who wrote at the request of the Independent Com-

mittee of Eminent Persons chaired by former Federal Reserve Board Governor Paul Volcker. (See Appendix S on page A-127.) We can provide a citation:<http://www.crt-ii.org/ICEP/ICEP—Report—Appendices/A-W.pdf>.

ICHEIC's mandate was to process the claims of survivors and heirs for unpaid life insurance policies. European insurance companies cooperating with ICHEIC contributed the funds to pay claims that could be traced to a particular company and to establish humanitarian projects. The funds for the humanitarian and related projects were intended to honor the millions that perished in the Holocaust and to provide for needy survivors, including those who were ineligible to file a claim. In addition to paying \$300 million for all claims, ICHEIC allocated an additional \$169 million for humanitarian projects. At the outset, it was clear that this amount was never intended to cover the value of all insurance assets of those murdered in the Holocaust. Obtaining funds from European insurance companies to cover the insurance assets of all who perished in the Holocaust would not have been an achievable goal, and such a negotiation would have probably delayed further the possibility of elderly survivors receiving a measure of justice in their lifetimes.

Question. My understanding is that the German Insurance Association agreed, at the conclusion of ICHEIC, to continue to accept insurance claims now and forever provided that they are filed directly with the German companies. Is your understanding that the German insurance companies will continue to accept insurance claims and if so, will they do so under ICHEIC's evidentiary standards?

Answer. German insurance companies through their association are committed to continuing to consider claims that are sent directly to the issuing company. However, the research apparatus of ICHEIC and the German Insurance Association will no longer be able to assist claimants in verifying a claim. At the concluding meeting of ICHEIC in late March, the Association representative did not address the issue of ICHEIC evidentiary standards (see his statement below). We intend to contact the association in the next few days and ask for a clarification of evidentiary standards.

Statement of German Insurance Association: "I believe that the process to work for a better future needs to continue, even as we hope that we have by now addressed all unresolved insurance policies from the Holocaust era. . . . Therefore let me assure you that our member companies intend to continue to address inquiries that are sent to a specific company and will honor legitimate claims."

Question. Generali also has extended the period during which it will accept claims. Do you know if they are doing so under the ICHEIC standards?

Answer. Yes. We understand that, as part of a court settlement, Generali agreed to follow ICHEIC valuation and eligibility standards. One can obtain more information by going to Generali claims settlement Web site: <http://www.nazierainsurance-settlement.com/?lang=en>.

[NOTE: The deadline for filing claims with Generali was also extended by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The claims Web site states the following: "Claims based on documents obtained from the [Bad Arolsen] archive must be submitted no later than six (6) months after the opening of the archive, but in no event later than June 30, 2008. If the archive is not opened by May 1, 2008, the deadline for claims based on archival documents is 60 days after the opening, but no later than August 31, 2008."]

Question. What is the State Department doing to use its diplomatic leverage to get insurance companies, such as the German Insurance Association, Generali, and the Austrian insurance companies, to make good on their willingness to accept claims and to do so under the ICHEIC standards?

Answer. As an ICHEIC member company, Generali followed ICHEIC standards and paid all eligible claims. There was a separate issue involving the processing of claims by an Israeli subsidiary, the Generali Trust Fund (GTF), which failed to maintain ICHEIC processing standards. ICHEIC resolved the matter on its own by terminating its contract with the GTF and transferring the claims processing to Generali's in-house claims processing operation. In other words, this was a temporary problem that has been completely resolved. One can read a fuller description of the matter in ICHEIC's Final Report available at naic.org (pages 29-30 and 54-55).

We understand that, as part of a court settlement, Generali agreed to follow ICHEIC valuation and eligibility standards. One can obtain more information by going to Generali claims settlement Web site:<http://www.nazierainsurancesettlement.com/?lang=en>.

Regarding the Austrian General Settlement Fund (GSF), an issue that has recently arisen is whether the GSF would cover claims on policies issued by Austrian subsidiaries outside the Austrian Republic's present-day territorial limits. ICHEIC believed that such claims were covered under its operating agreement with the GSF. Austrian officials cited the precise wording of the July 2001 agreement with the United States, indicating that the latter agreement explicitly excluded GSF payment of claims on policies issued by Austrian subsidiaries in such countries as the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Its reasoning was that the nonpayment of policies by such subsidiaries or affiliates was due to the actions of the post-war communist governments, which also confiscated the assets of the subsidiaries, and not the Nazi regime in Austria. At the request of ICHEIC Chairman Lawrence Eagleburger, the Department of State raised the matter with Austrian officials. As a result, we received a commitment that the GSF would take care to review each specific claim on a policy issued outside the present-day territory of Austria with the objective of determining whether nonpayment resulted from actions that occurred in Austria or outside of that country, and the GSF would pay the claim if actions within Austria led to nonpayment.

As this proposal was not full satisfactory to Chairman Eagleburger, he raised the possibility of Austria reimbursing ICHEIC for the \$4.5 million in payments made on the claims from outside Austria. The ICHEIC Final Report (pages 48 and 49) notes that no such reimbursement was forthcoming and ICHEIC continues to hope that the \$4.5 million will be made available to the Claims Conference, the entity responsible for disbursing ICHEIC's remaining humanitarian funds. In this regard, please refer also to the answer to the last question and response in this section.

Even following the close down of ICHEIC, the Department of State's Office of Holocaust Issues remains in regular contact with governments and the insurance companies and will continue to encourage them to meet their commitments regarding the further review of individual claims.

Question. What is your assessment of the humanitarian aid portion of ICHEIC?

Answer. ICHEIC struck a reasonable balance in dividing the use of its funds from insurance companies between evidence-based claims, humanitarian claims, and humanitarian projects. Some claims did not meet evidentiary standards, despite ICHEIC's extensive research and its relaxed standards of proof of a policy's existence. Nevertheless, these claims could be paid from one of ICHEIC's two humanitarian claims programs: one to cover claimants who could provide only credible anecdotal evidence; the other to pay evidence-based claims against East European insurance companies with no present-day successors. (Both humanitarian claims programs are covered on pages 46 to 48 of ICHEIC Final Report.) We regard both programs as successful.

The ICHEIC report also refers to \$169 million of its funds being allocated to humanitarian projects with the bulk of the funds administered by the Claims Conference. The issue among survivor organizations was which groups and countries to focus spending of the humanitarian funds. The consensus among survivor organizations and insurance regulators was to devote the bulk of payments to countries which lacked an adequate social safety net and also had a large population of destitute Holocaust survivors. Thus, a large portion went to the needy Jewish population in the former Soviet Union. However, there were also funds allocated to needy survivors in the United States.

Question. A recent op-ed in the New York Times described the fact that there are Holocaust survivors who are financially destitute and even homeless. What is being done to assist them? Is humanitarian aid that was given out through ICHEIC being directed to help these survivors? What is your office doing to help direct aid to these survivors?

Answer. ICHEIC discussed this issue at great length and concluded that most of the funds available for humanitarian purposes should be reserved for the benefit of needy Holocaust victims worldwide. ICHEIC's commissioners also believed strongly that it also was important to allocate a portion of the funds ". . . to support the strengthening of Jewish culture and heritage in recognition that the Nazis attempted to eradicate Jewish culture as well as the Jewish people. . . ." ICHEIC contracted with the Jewish Claims Conference to distribute \$132 million in social welfare benefits, including health care and home-care services, for needy Jewish victims of Nazi persecution. Given the weakness or absence of a social safety net in many countries of the former Soviet Union and given that Eastern Europe was where the Nazis sought to eradicate Jewish culture, ICHEIC's humanitarian programs have focused on this area. However, a significant portion of funds for home

care and for destitute survivors have also been spent in the United States. We recommend contacting the Claims Conference for details in this regard.

As observers on ICHEIC's board, we spoke out in favor of ensuring that a portion of the humanitarian funds be allocated for needy survivors in the United States.

Question. ICHEIC recently released its final report and that report contains a section on lessons learned. It is important to look at how ICHEIC worked so that future claims commissions can learn from the ICHEIC experience. What in your view are the most important lessons learned from the ICHEIC process and how can they be followed in the future?

Answer. The most important lesson in such matters is to determine whether one should have an individualized claims process or a mass claims process, as this decision will determine the cost and the time involved to process claims.

The ICHEIC process, similar to that for the Swiss bank claims settlement, researched each claim and created a vast research apparatus, including audits, to find policies which failed to name an insurance company. This step in turn led to the publication of a names list that was thoroughly vetted and a second research step to determine from company archives and state archives in Europe whether the claim had been paid in the past. The individualized process also created the need to establish a mechanism for valuing claims issued in different currencies, and addressing policy losses created by inflation and currency depreciation. There were also translation costs to deal with documents in over 20 languages. Given these requirements, it is understandable that the ICHEIC process faced some delays and was relatively costly. Administrative costs amounted to \$95.5 million, compared to the \$300 million paid in claims and \$169 million in humanitarian projects.

By contrast, some other Holocaust settlements involved lump-sum payments and required only a minimum of research or documentation to establish eligibility. The simpler, lump-sum payments processes often had the same level of payment for different levels of loss or suffering, but they also had lower administrative costs and made payments somewhat faster.

The ICHEIC participants determined fairly early in the process that the processing of claims must be handled on an individual basis. This meant that the process depended also on finding a consensus among various board members with different interests: the European insurance companies that contributed the funds in exchange for legal protection from further claims; the American state insurance commissioners who were strong advocates for the victims and heirs; and, of course, the representatives of the survivors and the state of Israel. The United States participated as an observer on the board, not only as an advocate of the survivors but also had to view the decision of ICHEIC in the context of other agreements settling Holocaust claims.

Thus, with ICHEIC's board consisting of representatives with disparate interests, finding a consensus on some issues took years rather than months. Nevertheless, what eventually emerged was a conviction among all parties in the process that the process worked as intended and provided meaningful compensation for unpaid life insurance policies from the Nazi period. And it only worked because at key moments all representatives were prepared to make pragmatic compromises on difficult issues.

Question. In order to learn from the ICHEIC process, it is essential that members of the public have the information they need to assess ICHEIC. Are you doing everything you can to ensure that the records from ICHEIC are preserved and made available?

Answer. ICHEIC has made an excellent decision to send to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum its records for safekeeping relating to the 92,000 claims filed and decisions regarding payment offers and payments. Following a reasonable period and in order to protect privacy, the documents will be open to historical research and the public. ICHEIC's decision documents will eventually also be stored at the Museum.

The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum has also agreed to maintain indefinitely the ICHEIC Web site, which contains a valuable record of its key decisions as well as a wealth of information relating to the claims process. ICHEIC's complete 66-page Final Report appears on the ICHEIC Web site and on the NAIC Web site. Thus, we will direct any interested party to these Web sites as part of our continuing efforts to educate the public about the ICHEIC process.

The Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues and his staff are prepared to brief the staff of Senate and House members, and we will be available nation-wide for speaking tours and interviews with local media wherever there are Jewish communities

seeking information about ICHEIC. It is important that the success of ICHEIC is well-known.

Question. Now that ICHEIC has shut its doors, what more can and should be done to assist survivors who have yet to get a measure of justice. What is the State Department doing? What can we do here in Congress?

Answer. Survivor organizations are in an extremely important position to recommend what the greatest continuing needs are for survivors. From what we are hearing, it appears that the greatest need remains health care, home care, and long-term care.

In recent years, the Department of State has facilitated agreements with companies and governments that made available \$8 billion in payments related to labor claims, personal injury, and property losses, including insurance. All of these agreements have been implemented or their implementation is nearing completion. These agreements involved Swiss banks, Germany, Austria, France, and European insurance companies.

The one area which continues to require the high-level attention of the Department of State is compensation for property claims in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, which had Europe's largest Jewish community. Poland, and many other countries in this area as well, have not yet implemented an effective compensation law to cover the confiscation of property during the Nazi occupation. The Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues has given this matter the highest priority.

In contacts with counterparts, all branches of the government may want to consider how to emphasize the importance Americans place on this issue of fundamental fairness.

Question. What is the status of the Austrian claims process?

Answer. After a 4-year delay due to problems in obtaining a dismissal of certain lawsuits in United States courts, the \$210 million Austrian General Settlement Fund (GSF) began making payments to claimants in January 2006. This fund was created pursuant to a January 2001 agreement with Austria and covers compensation for property losses, as well as the physical return of some properties that were once confiscated from Holocaust victims and recently, through historical research, were found to be still in the Austrian Government's possession. The Austrian Fund anticipates making payments on about 20,000 claims and has processed about half of the claims to date. The GSF is expected to complete all payments by 2008.

We should note that the Austrian labor fund of \$330 million has completed its payments, as has the \$150 million special fund for paying compensation to Jewish victims for household property, long-term apartment leases, and business leases and property. Moreover, the Austrian pension system has been paying nursing home benefits to Holocaust victims and Austrian Jewish emigres in the United States (benefits over 10 years from 2001 to 2010 are estimated to be some \$112 million).

Question. Do you know if the Austrian claims process has paid 100 cents on the dollar for the insurance claims that they have recognized? If not, how much have they been paying on the dollar for claims? Is that an adequate level of compensation in your opinion?

Answer. The Austrian payments under the \$210 million General Settlement Fund (GSF) are regrettably in the range of 10 to 15 percent on the dollar. This is due to several factors, including primarily the unexpected high value of claims.

We have always taken the view that no level of payment can ever be adequate to compensate survivors for their suffering and losses during the Holocaust. The amount allocated to the GSF in 2001 was negotiated among survivor groups, attorneys, companies, and governments to ensure that the elderly victims of the Holocaust received a measure of justice in their lifetimes. Had this been the only Austrian Government compensation program, the payment amounts would cause much greater concern. But one must place the shortcomings of the GSF in the broader context of other recent Austrian programs listed below:

- Austrian National Fund: \$150 million to 30,000 victims;
- Slave and Forced Labor Fund: \$330 million;
- Household and Business Tenancy Rights: \$150 million to 23,000 victims; and
- Nursing Home Care to former Austrian citizens residing abroad: \$112 million.

We should also note that the GSF also provides for the physical return (in rem) of several valuable properties confiscated during the Nazi period and held by the government or public entities until historical research revealed their rightful owners. We will be able to provide more details on the value of these properties at a later date.

RESPONSES OF CHARLES ENGLISH TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Please describe in detail what steps you plan to take, if confirmed, to support the work of the State Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina? How will you work to facilitate construction of a state prison?

Answer. Ensuring that the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a fully functional, depoliticized institution capable of efficiently rendering just and fair verdicts is a key policy priority for the administration. If confirmed, I will fully support all of the efforts already underway to build this institution's capacity, such as financial contributions, technical assistance, and the seconding of talented American judges and prosecutors to the court. I will also, if confirmed, seek to improve the court's performance and cement it as the institution capable of delivering domestic justice to perpetrators of war crimes, organized crime, terrorism, and other grave offenses. For example, the administration is working to enhance the state court's capacity by supporting the development of a prosecutorial strategy that emphasizes better case management and makes the process of case prioritization and selection more systematic and transparent. If confirmed, I will seek similar ways to advance the objectives we share with Bosnia and Herzegovina in this area.

The recent escape of Radovan Stankovic, the first war crimes case transferred from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and tried to completion in the Balkans, highlights Bosnia and Herzegovina's need for a state prison. The current proposal for a prison is quite expensive and no donors have stepped forward to pledge sufficient funds. If confirmed, I will encourage the Bosnians to find a way to lower the current 14.4 million Euro price tag without sacrificing security or safety. Additionally, if confirmed, I will work with Bosnian Government officials and members of the international community to develop a realistic and sustainable funding strategy.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Despite considerable progress over the last 12 years, there are still significant human rights issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords, which mandates the safe and secure return of all displaced persons to their pre-war homes, has yet to be fully implemented. Bosnians who have returned to communities where they are not the ethnic or religious majority deserve acute attention. If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure that minority returnees are a fully integrated and thriving part of Bosnia and Herzegovina's multiethnic communities.

Respect for religious freedom is another urgent issue. Unfortunately, incidents of crimes targeting minorities' religious symbols increased in the run-up to the October 2006 national elections. To address this, I will, if confirmed, work with the leaders of the four main religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote reconciliation, mutual respect, and dialog. I will make clear that disrespecting religious property or symbols will not be tolerated by this administration or the international community. I will also support the full implementation of the State Law on Religious Freedom.

Building the capacity of institutions in the law enforcement and judicial sectors, and specialty offices such as the Office of the State Antitrafficking Coordinator, will serve to further promote human rights and democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These institutions serve as important deterrents to possible human rights violations and help to investigate, protect and bring justice to victims when violations do occur. If confirmed, I will oversee the development of these institutions, working closely with Bosnian leaders and international community partners to point out instances of human rights violations, hold the perpetrators accountable, and build institutional mechanisms to safeguard against future violations.

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Bosnia-Herzegovina in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. Following the February 26, 2007 decision of the International Court of Justice in *Bosnia v Serbia*, political rhetoric in Bosnia and Herzegovina has seriously deteriorated. The court's finding that genocide occurred in Srebrenica, while at the same time finding that Serbia was not accountable for perpetrating genocide, has prompted a focus on the roles played by institutions within Bosnia's Republika Srpska entity, and has led to calls for drastic constitutional change that challenges the fundamental principles of Dayton. Reversing this climate of heightened nationalism and refocusing the public conversation on ways to improve the lives of victims

and all Bosnian citizens will be my first significant challenge, if I am confirmed. The victims of the Srebrenica genocide should live safe, secure lives free from any fear that they might suffer such tragedy again. They should also be afforded economic opportunities to improve their lives. If confirmed, I will focus much effort on ensuring that the conversation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a constructive dialog that addresses the horrors of the past while focusing on improving people's lives in the immediate future.

Establishing accountability for past actions helps establish fundamental acceptance of the rule of law that reinforces all other reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Toward that end, another significant challenge I will face, if confirmed, will be ensuring that the remaining fugitives from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia are captured and extradited to The Hague. Namely, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, the architects of the Srebrenica genocide, must face international justice. The principles of individual accountability and no impunity for war crimes or serious violations of humanitarian law must be a core part of a just, democratic, and stable Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. The promotion of human rights objectives under the Dayton Accords has been central to this administration's agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If confirmed, I will ensure that the focus on human rights remains a key element of Embassy Sarajevo's work. Promoting American values and interests go hand-in-hand with promoting respect for human rights and a democratic society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Much of the administration's reform agenda is aimed at creating a stable and just society that will permanently move Bosnia and Herzegovina away from the tragic past and toward the community of nations that embraces the United States' key democratic principles such as freedom of speech and the press, rule-of-law and respect for minority communities. If confirmed, I will use the many tools at my disposal to communicate to the leaders and public of Bosnia and Herzegovina the benefits of fully embracing democratic principles.

Public diplomacy opportunities, such as U.S.-funded exchange programs, press and media outreach, American celebrity speakers, and civil society events will all provide opportunities to engage the local community in conversations about human rights, and to press for action on specific issues. If confirmed, I will lead the embassy community by example by constantly returning to human rights principles as guideposts for good policy and by being a vocal critic of any abuses.

If confirmed, I will assure that officers who show commitment to using their diplomatic voice to encourage tolerance, accountability, transparency, and justice throughout the institutions and social fabric of Bosnia and Herzegovina receive recognition for their work. If confirmed, I will encourage officers to think creatively about how the administration can support local organizations and/or projects aimed at providing opportunities and voice to minority communities. If confirmed, I will work closely with my officers to identify a handful of immediate changes that, if enacted, would tangibly benefit Bosnian communities and would immediately demonstrate the administration's commitment to human rights.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. My work over the past 15 years has largely been focused on countries in transition, and in particular on the Balkans. Promotion of human rights and democracy has been at the top of our policy agenda, and I have been active in promoting that agenda.

While I was in Croatia from 1998 to 2001 as Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) and as Charge d'Affaires, we sought to help Croatian society heal the wounds from Yugoslavia's bloody wars of secession and return the country to normalcy. Two items topped our agenda—promoting return of those displaced by the war, and holding accountable those charged with war crimes. I coordinated embassy assistance programs that helped refugees reclaim property and return to their homes. I pressed a sometimes reluctant Croatian Government to provide the same reconstruction assistance to the ethnic-Serb minority as they did for ethnic-Croat returnees. As Charge, I led the diplomatic community's concerted effort to push for equal justice for minorities seeking redress in Croatian courts. My public message to the Croatian people emphasized the need for reconciliation and respect for the rights of all citi-

zens. I believe my contributions helped push the “returns agenda” toward completion, and thereby advanced Croatia’s efforts to take its rightful place in Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Full normalcy cannot be restored to the nations of the former Yugoslavia until those responsible for the terrible crimes committed in nearly a decade of war there are brought to justice. As Director of the State Department’s Office of South Central European (i.e., Balkan) Affairs from 2003 to 2006, I met frequently with leaders in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Pristina, and pressed them to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). As DCM and Charge in Croatia, I helped to promote a positive climate between the ICTY Prosecutor and the Croatian leadership.

Restoring rule of law to these societies is a paramount concern. As Policy Director for the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs from 1995 to 1998, I directed comprehensive programs aimed at building democratic police structures in countries emerging from war or other trauma. Our efforts supported the beginnings of such reform in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

These are just a few examples of actions I have taken to promote human rights and democracy. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue a vigorous reform agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

RESPONSES OF RODERICK W. MOORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Regarding United States assistance to Montenegro, the President’s 2008 Congressional Budget Justification states that “U.S. funding for democratic reform will decline relative to security and law enforcement assistance to help Europe’s newest nation build capacity to secure its people and its borders.” Can you comment on the priorities of the administration toward Montenegro? If confirmed as the first United States Ambassador to Europe’s newest nation, what will be your top priority?

Answer. Our top priority in Southeastern Europe is to achieve enduring stability in a region that has been racked too often by conflict. In achieving this, we can help integrate the countries of the Balkans into the President’s vision of a Europe “whole, free, and at peace.”

If confirmed, my top priority will be to ensure that Montenegro succeeds with its political and economic transition and continues on the path toward full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. A democratic and prosperous Montenegro that fully respects the rights of all its citizens and that meets the requirements for membership in NATO and the European Union will be a stable Montenegro that can also act as a reliable partner of the United States on regional and global issues.

To achieve this success in Montenegro, the administration’s top priorities are the promotion of equitable economic growth, strengthening the rule of law—including the promotion of human rights and democratic reform, and enhancing regional stability. Progress in all of these areas, including the strengthening of democratic institutions, is critical to success.

Job creation and balanced economic development will build support for Montenegro’s democracy and free market reforms. This is particularly true in the impoverished north, where opposition to Montenegrin independence was largely centered. Ensuring the north a greater economic stake in an independent Montenegro will be critical to long-term stability.

Second, we must work with the Montenegrins to strengthen the rule of law and to fight corruption and organized crime. We have already spent millions of dollars in recent years to strengthen democratic institutions, and we intend to remain engaged in this sector. Although much has been accomplished in terms of democratic development, the judicial sector in particular remains weak and will continue to be a primary focus for our attention.

Finally, it is in our interest to help Montenegro, as a potential future NATO ally, to reform its military and secure its borders. The Montenegrins have expressed their willingness to contribute forces to the war on terror, but require our help in building and transforming their military into a capable force. We are also working with the Montenegrin police to create a more professional and capable force, in order to combat corruption and organized crime and trafficking.

Question. Rampant corruption remains a significant obstacle to the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in Montenegro. How do you think this issue is best addressed?

Answer. The United States has many tools at its disposal—and a great deal of experience in the region—in helping the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to combat corruption. If confirmed, my top priority in supporting Montenegrin efforts to fight corruption would be to apply those practices that have been successful elsewhere in ensuring that perpetrators of corrupt practices are investigated, prosecuted, and punished. I am convinced that firm enforcement of the law is the best deterrent against corrupt practices.

Another key strategy in combating corruption in Montenegro is to increase transparency, particularly in how Montenegro's Government, at all levels, takes and implements decisions. We will also encourage efforts to strengthen real checks and balances and to develop further the oversight role of the parliament. By helping develop strong civil society organizations, we can also ensure that they serve as an important check on government and play a key watchdog role. Judicial reform will also be important in the fight against corruption.

Montenegro will have to improve its record of fighting corruption if it is to achieve its goal of membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and the European Union. These, and other organizations, will require concrete progress in this area.

Question. Local authorities in Montenegro have been accused of torturing several United States citizens that are currently in custody of the Montenegrin Government. What steps has the embassy taken to investigate these allegations? If confirmed, what steps will you take as ambassador to assure these individuals receive a fair trial?

Answer. I take these allegations very seriously, and, if I am confirmed, protecting the rights of American citizens in this, or any other case, will be a top priority of mine.

In the case in question, the embassy formally requested “a full and impartial investigation” of alleged police abuses by Montenegrin authorities immediately after being authorized to do so by the prisoners. The results of the initial internal police investigation were inconclusive, but a subsequent investigation by the prosecutor's office continues. From the first days of the American citizens' detention, embassy staff have regularly visited the men in jail, and have assisted the detainees and their families who have sought to visit them in every permissible way. During the ongoing trial of the three American citizens, embassy observers have been present in the courtroom whenever the American citizens were being questioned by the presiding judge.

If confirmed, the embassy and I will continue to stay in close contact with representatives of the accused American citizens in order to monitor the trial proceedings. I will also continue to send the message—something our Embassy in Podgorica has consistently done—that we expect our citizens to receive a fair trial.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Montenegro? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Montenegro? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. As the State Department has documented in the annual Human Rights Report, the most pressing human rights issues in Montenegro involve the justice system, including occasional abuse of suspects while in police custody, lengthy pre-trial detention and delayed trials, and corruption within the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary.

To address these problems I would, if confirmed, support efforts to make Montenegro's law enforcement institutions more professional and competent; support the work of the independent human rights Ombudsman in Montenegro, and continue to support and strengthen civil society, which serves as an important watchdog over the police and justice system. If confirmed, I will work closely with the OSCE mission in Montenegro, which has programs in these areas that complement our efforts. If confirmed, I will also ensure that the embassy continues advocacy on this issue in public and in private, which has proved effective in drawing attention to deficiencies and encouraging better compliance with international norms.

Although we cannot expect progress in all of these areas overnight, I firmly believe that Montenegro can—with continued United States and European Union assistance—achieve real progress in all of these areas and further the protection of human rights in Montenegro. My hope, if confirmed as ambassador, is to see steady progress in making the police and judiciary more professional and accountable, and much closer to western standards.

If confirmed, I would also focus extensive energy on strengthening relations among Montenegro's rich mix of ethnic and national groups. As a diverse society, Montenegro has the potential to be a positive model for other ethnically-mixed countries in the region.

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Montenegro in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to face many of the same challenges I faced in some of my previous tours, such as in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sofia. Promoting human rights and democracy can be a difficult, but enormously rewarding job, and it is one I have relished throughout my Foreign Service career.

If confirmed, my main challenge in promoting human rights and democracy in Montenegro will likely be the fact that truly protecting human rights and promoting democratic development usually requires deep-seated changes in societal attitudes and mindsets. Simply passing legislation—although important—is not enough. Members of the government, parliament, and ordinary citizens must understand and embrace the need to advance and protect human rights and democratic norms.

This is already happening in Montenegro, although more needs to be done. I am heartened that recent polling showed that the most respected public figure in Montenegro is a young woman who is the head of an NGO working to fight corruption. Montenegro has also had a series of elections and votes, including the May 2006 independence referendum, deemed to be free and fair by international and United States Government observers. The Montenegrin people's support for a Euro-Atlantic future for Montenegro is also having a deep impact on Montenegrin society as Montenegrins increasingly embrace our commitment to human rights and democracy.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. Promotion of human rights objectives is already an integral part of Embassy Podgorica's activities. More importantly, it is a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy and a central pillar of the values our country represents.

If confirmed, I would certainly continue and strengthen this emphasis. After all, we cannot achieve the goal of supporting Montenegrin efforts to create a truly democratic and stable Montenegro without a genuine commitment on their part to human and civil rights. To make sure of this, I will make certain that the promotion of human rights has a central place in our yearly strategic planning process, when the embassy, through its Mission Strategic Plan, lays out its priorities for the coming years. Promotion of human rights and democracy is also the central focus of the embassy's Democracy Commission and is a central focus of our assistance to Montenegro.

In terms of recognizing those Foreign Service officers who engage in the promotion of human rights, I feel strongly that for any Foreign Service officer to be successful, he or she must demonstrate a strong commitment to promoting human rights. This is something I have consistently strived for throughout my career, and if confirmed it is something I pledge to continue to push for as ambassador.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. During the course of my career, I have had the opportunity to work extensively on human rights issues in a variety of countries facing significant human rights challenges.

In my most recent post, Belgrade, I led a major effort to ensure that the perpetrators of the 1999 killings of three young American citizens—the Bytyqi brothers—be brought to justice. When I arrived at post in 2004, the Serbian-led investigation had stalled, and no arrests had been made. During the course of the next 3 years, I made dozens of public and private interventions to appeal for justice in the case, raising it to a high-level bilateral issue between our countries. I also worked extensively with the FBI, the Justice Department, and Serbian law enforcement officials to push for an aggressive investigation. Largely as a result of this pressure, six separate Serbian security officials have since been arrested, and one trial is ongoing.

Also in Serbia, I launched a major effort to increase awareness among the Serbian population regarding war crimes committed by Serb forces during the wars of the 1990s. Widespread denial about Serb crimes distorts public attitudes toward important policy issues (e.g., cooperation with the Hague Tribunal; Kosovo; relations with

neighboring states), undercutting our efforts to encourage a more constructive Serbian approach on key matters impeding its fuller integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. I made numerous nationally-covered speeches, some in conjunction with the 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, that contributed significantly to national debate on this topic. I also coordinated a United States Government effort to produce a nine-part, nationally-televised retrospective on Serb war crimes that attracted millions of viewers.

As chief of the political section in Zagreb, Croatia, I devoted a substantial portion of my time promoting the return of refugees (primarily Serbs) forced from their homes as a result of actions taken by the Tudjman regime. I made dozens of visits to areas formerly occupied by Serbs (e.g., Krajina, Western, and Eastern Slavonia) to push local and national government officials to facilitate the return of refugees. In the embassy, I also played a central role in implementing the Refugee Return Assistance Program, a United States Government-funded project that provided incentives to selected municipalities that proved open to the return of displaced persons. On several occasions, I served as the embassy's chief negotiator in concluding formal agreements with the Croatian Government relating to the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Moreover, as a junior political officer in Bulgaria in 1990, I extensively monitored efforts by communist authorities to establish unfair advantages over the nascent democratic opposition in the run-up to that country's first democratic elections. I also reported on and advocated for the rights of ethnic minorities (Pomaks, Turks, and Roma) to be fully enfranchised and worked extensively with representatives of those minorities on issues related to human rights in Bulgaria's new democracy.

RESPONSES OF CAMERON MUNTER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. The President's 2008 Congressional Budget Justification states that "Serbia's stability and reform are fundamental to the success of United States foreign policy in the region." Yet 2008 requested funding for the country has been reduced across the board, and significantly in areas critical to ensuring Serbia's stability and reform (for example "governing justly and democratically" and "civil society"). Can you comment on this? If confirmed, how will you promote democratic reform in the country and what steps will you take to support Serbia's beleaguered civil society?

Answer. For strategic and fiscal reasons, overall assistance to Southeastern Europe in 2008 will decline. However, funding for projects in Serbia is still at relatively high levels. Like many other of the "new" democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, as Serbia moves closer to European integration and receives more European Union funding, United States assistance levels will decrease and eventually phase out. Nevertheless, there remain at present many opportunities for U.S. Government programs to promote the rule of law, fight corruption, strengthen institutions, and encourage economic growth, thus keeping Serbia on the path toward Euro-Atlantic integration. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the United States Congress to ensure that our policy objectives are met and that our assistance is used appropriately to support United States interests in Serbia.

If confirmed, I will reach out to United States-based civil society organizations before I depart for Belgrade, including the National Endowment for Democracy and other groups who have done so much to promote democracy in Serbia. Soon after my arrival in Serbia, I will endeavor to establish quickly a solid and productive working relationship with in-country civil society organizations and to maintain that relationship throughout the duration of my assignment. These NGOs will be key partners of the embassy in a common effort to deepen democratic values not only for those in Serbia, but for all persons throughout the Balkans.

Question. The European Union recently reopened SAA talks with Serbia despite the fact that the two most wanted war criminals from the wars of the 1990s, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, remain at large. What is your opinion of this decision? Does full cooperation with the ICTY remain a priority of the administration? If confirmed, how will you encourage the serving of justice for those responsible for war crimes while discouraging the further isolation of the country?

Answer. Serbia's full compliance with its ICTY obligations remains a key goal of this administration. Until May of this year, the level of cooperation out of Belgrade since early 2005 was unsatisfactory. Since the formation of a new government in mid-May, cooperation appears to be improving. The administration's expectations are that compliance will improve and that the remaining indictees will be arrested

and transferred to The Hague. That means the Serbian Government must do everything practicable to locate, arrest, and transfer fugitive indictees, as well as making witnesses and documentary evidence available to the Tribunal.

While the European Union has restarted SAA talks with Serbia, European Union officials have made it clear that a conclusion of those talks and eventual European Union membership are contingent upon full cooperation with ICTY. The European Union has said that it will not sign the SAA until accused war criminal Ratko Mladic has been arrested and transferred to The Hague. Ultimately, however, this is a decision for the European Union.

The administration also has refined our own approach on how to encourage Serbia to meet its obligations; if confirmed, I will do my part to further this goal.

For example, the administration is currently working toward the establishment of mechanisms through which each of the four remaining ICTY fugitives will face justice regardless of ICTY's impending closure in 2010. This will send a clear signal that fugitives cannot out-wait justice.

The administration is not waiting for the remaining fugitives to turn themselves in. Rather, it is actively encouraging their apprehension. The State Department has recently designated a regional liaison officer to assist with war crimes investigations and prosecutions. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that my embassy leads in this effort. I will stress, both in private and publicly, the importance to our shared future of ensuring that the indicted fugitives face justice.

Cooperation with the Tribunal is the key to Serbia's future integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. The administration wants Serbia to become part of a united Europe, whole, free, and at peace. If confirmed, I will help design our assistance initiatives and outreach with the ultimate goal of Serbia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. While many reforms have been successfully implemented, Serbia simply cannot complete the process of integration without fully and openly facing up to its war crimes legacy. In the end, the desire of so many Serbs for Serbia to have a place in Europe, and even NATO, may be the biggest motivator of all.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Serbia? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Serbia? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. The Serbian Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; however, there are problems, including widespread corruption, failure to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, and attacks on religious and ethnic minorities, journalists, and human rights defenders.

The administration is working to ensure that Serbia continues its efforts to commit to international human rights standards, including a fair and efficient judicial process, respect for ethnic and religious minorities, a free, independent, and professional media, and the elimination of trafficking in persons. To this end, if confirmed, I will continue to assist the government in reforming the judiciary and law enforcement through training and technical assistance to help build an institution capable of ensuring a functioning rule of law. The administration will maintain efforts to ensure that all persons displaced as a result of the conflicts in the region—of which Serbia hosts the largest percentage—have a real choice about their future. Since all minorities should be able to live in peace, if confirmed, I will continue efforts toward ethnic reconciliation to help the region move beyond the problems of the past, including working to improve cooperation with ICTY and the capacity for domestic war crimes adjudication. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage the government to address problematic aspects of a law on religion that discriminates against “non-traditional” religious groups, and to pass a law on associations that will comply with international standards regarding regulation of nongovernmental organizations. If confirmed, I will also continue to work with authorities in Serbia to help them more effectively combat trafficking in persons through protection, prevention, and prosecution.

Ultimately, if confirmed, I will work to bring Serbia closer to integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions through United States assistance and continued active engagement on these important human rights concerns.

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Serbia in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. The Balkan region suffered significantly as a result of the events of the 1990s. Ethnic cleansing, armed conflict, the forced displacement of approximately 4 million people, and an internationally isolated criminal regime, left a legacy of loosely controlled borders, corruption, and weak rule of law structures. Today, serious in-

stitutional challenges remain, complicating Serbia's ability to reform the economy, meet the basic needs of its citizens, and combat organized criminal groups.

Reversing the effects of this difficult legacy by helping to establish functioning democratic institutions capable of moving Serbia closer to Europe is the focus of the administration's efforts in Belgrade and throughout the region. While rooting out corruption, fighting crime, and moving beyond the ethnic hatreds of the past are hard work, they are necessary elements of ensuring a stable, democratic, and peaceful Balkan region.

Political will in Serbia is key to advancing human rights and democracy in this country. While there has unquestionably been progress since the fall of Milosevic, there are still noticeable gaps in the government's commitment to protect and advance the rights of all its citizens—not just those of ethnic or religious minorities, but also the rights of those who oppose the government's approach to the question of Kosovo status. The new coalition government formed after January 2007 elections is a democratic one, but as the brief inclusion of radical elements into national-level government by the Prime Minister's party highlighted, the coalition may still be susceptible to pressure from nationalist parties and Milosevic-era rhetoric. The administration will need to push Serbia's leaders and continue to work with democratic parties to stand up against the nationalist agenda and to advance human rights.

This is too important to do alone. If confirmed, I pledge to engage our European partners to join with us to advance our common human rights agenda.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. The promotion of human rights and democracy is a core objective for our engagement in the Balkans. Like other embassies in the region, the United States diplomatic mission to Serbia has a Foreign Service officer whose portfolio is dedicated to monitoring and reporting on human rights, which includes our Country Report on Human Rights, International Religious Freedom Report, and Trafficking in Persons Report. This officer maintains close contact with human rights organizations in Serbia. If confirmed, I will assure that these duties are highlighted in this individual's performance requirements and ratings.

In addition, if confirmed, I will make clear to my staff that human rights issues are the responsibility of every staff member, regardless of his/her formal work assignment. If confirmed, I will make certain that strong human rights performance is given emphasis in rating performance and in the awarding of special commendations.

If confirmed, I pledge to you that the public stance of the embassy, including my own speeches and those of my colleagues, will highlight human rights issues consistently and clearly.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. I have addressed human rights issues—and, I believe, made a difference—through the two decades of my Foreign Service career. Let me provide three examples:

- In 1986–1988 in Warsaw, I served as the embassy's contact for the still-illegal trade union Rural Solidarity. I assisted in its efforts to promote democratic ideals and economic freedom by helping activists with publicity and dissemination of informational materials. By paying close attention to the individuals and to the issues raised by Rural Solidarity, and encouraging the Western press to do the same, I helped protect Rural Solidarity activists from government retribution.
- In 1997–1998, as chief of staff in the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office, I worked closely with many Americans (including the Senate NATO Observer Group) to ensure that aspirants for NATO membership enshrine key elements of human rights practices in legislation as a prerequisite for consideration for accession to the Alliance. Thanks to this effort, Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians have a high standard of law governing anti-Semitism, discrimination against Roma, the heritage of Nazi and Communist dictatorships, and relations with neighbors.
- In 2006, I volunteered to lead the first Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq, in Mosul. At that time, Abu Ghraib was shutting down, and Mosul's Baddush

prison became the largest in Iraq. Under my PRT's Rule of Law section, I created a human rights subgroup that had as one of its tasks regular civil-military visits to Baddush, often three to four times per week, to ensure that the abuses associated with Abu Ghraib would not be repeated at Baddush. In this, we were successful.

I am proud of these and other actions I've taken in advancing human rights and democracy, and pledge to continue in a similar direction if confirmed to serve as Ambassador to Serbia.

RESPONSES OF DR. JOHN L. WITHERS II TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. Albania has proved itself a loyal ally of the United States. However, its governments have not always lived up to international standards of democracy. In recent years local watchdog groups have expressed concerns about government encroachment on civil liberties in the fight against corruption. If confirmed, what steps will you take to promote such rights as freedom of speech and freedom of association? How would you react if you believe the Albanian Government is exerting inappropriate pressure on human rights groups and other civic associations?

Answer. The United States Embassy maintains a constant and active engagement with human rights groups and civil society organizations in Albania dedicated to promoting freedom of speech and freedom of association. For example, the United States has supported the Citizen's Advocacy Office (CAO), which serves as a corruption watchdog and investigative unit, as well as the Albanian Coalition Against Corruption (ACAC), a civil society umbrella network including more than 160 non-governmental organizations dedicated to democratic freedoms.

The Government of Albania knows that corruption threatens to derail achievement of its foreign policy ambitions, and it is addressing the problem. Albania has made several advances on its democratic agenda this year; however, the country's democratic institutions remain fragile. Media, the judiciary, and civil society are independent of government control, but do not provide effective checks and balances. A pervasive culture of corruption corrodes independent institutions, as well as political entities. Public awareness of the problem is growing, and Albanian citizens are becoming empowered to speak out against corruption. Of course, more progress needs to be made.

Strengthening Albanian citizens' rights to the fundamental freedoms of expression and association is one of the administration's highest bilateral priorities, and figures prominently in our ongoing dialog with top Albanian politicians. If confirmed, I will continue the high-level dialog we are engaged in with the Albanian Government in support of these freedoms. If there is evidence that the Albanian Government is exerting inappropriate pressure on human rights groups and other civic associations I will move quickly to call this to the Albanian Government's attention. If confirmed, I will likewise continue the Mission's support of human rights groups and civil society organizations dedicated to promoting freedom of speech and freedom of association.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Albania? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Albania? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Although the Albanian Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens and is dedicated to the promotion of democracy, there remain significant problems in several areas. Albanian arrest and pre-trial detention conditions continue to be concerns, as well as police corruption and impunity. Societal violence and discrimination against women and children are a problem, as is trafficking in persons and discrimination against minority groups. Corruption and a weak rule of law have blocked the prosecution of those who have committed human rights offenses. The United States continues to stress to the Albanian Government that respect for human rights is an integral part of NATO and European Union accession standards, and that Albania must continue to improve its adherence to international human rights, democracy standards, and the rule of law, including the obligation to bring human rights abusers to justice.

If confirmed, I would work to enhance the effectiveness of the criminal justice system to ensure that human rights abuses are not left unpunished. I would use Mission resources to mentor and train prosecutors, facilitate police reform by promoting legislative and policy changes, and boost civil participation by helping Albanian organizations gain more influence in policymaking and implementation. Furthermore, I would work to enhance the professionalism of the media in order to focus public

scrutiny on government practices in the human rights area, fostering transparency and respect for law. Through these actions I would hope to focus both government and public attention on the issue of human rights violations, thereby facilitating change.

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Albania in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. If confirmed, the greatest challenges I would face in advancing human rights and democracy would be corruption, inconsistent prosecution, and a weak rule of law. Corruption among those involved in policing human rights abuses continues to present itself as a major obstacle in the battle against human trafficking, arbitrary arrests, and unlawful prison abuse. Similarly, a weak rule of law presents challenges in combating organized crime, a major driver of trafficking and other unlawful activities that violate human rights. If confirmed, I will continue the practice of my predecessors of raising concerns with senior government officials for the purpose of advancing human rights and democracy in Albania.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. Promoting human rights is central to our overarching objective in Albania, which is to assist Albania in its mission to become a modern, democratic nation fully accepted by and integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities by making it clear that the human rights, including women's rights, religious rights and minority rights have a major place in the Mission's agenda. If confirmed, I will encourage officers to focus on these issues in both their official and unofficial interactions with Albanians and ensure that these topics are a key element of discussion and reporting. I will also encourage officers to travel throughout Albania to collect information on human rights abuses, as well as monitor progress in this area. If confirmed, I will acknowledge, advance, and give full consideration to Foreign Service officers who show energy and creativity in promoting U.S. human rights objectives.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. As a political officer in Nigeria (1988–1990), I was deeply engaged in the processes that led that country to democracy after a decade of military rule, including serving as the embassy's point person in working with human rights organizations and fledgling political parties, and in reporting on Nigeria's Constituent Assembly as it drafted the new constitution. My assignment to Moscow in August 1991 coincided with an historic moment: the collapse of the communist system, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the emergence of democratic Russia. I worked closely with Russia's emerging political parties and pro-democracy support groups such as NDI and IRI, and monitored reform efforts in city governments throughout Russia and in the Congress of People's Deputies. My focus as the Director of the State Department's Office of North Central European Affairs (which was responsible for the new democracies of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia) was on the issues of political pluralism, economic restructuring, social integration, and commitment to individual liberties crucial to any nation intent on shedding its authoritarian past.

Perhaps my most important achievements occurred in Latvia, where I served as Deputy Chief of Mission from 1997 to 2000. It was a country striving both to rejoin the international community through membership in such institutions as NATO and the European Union, and to cope with two crippling historical legacies: a massive, stateless Russian-speaking minority and the Holocaust. I played a central role in the embassy's efforts to encourage Latvian social integration, including urging the Latvians to meet international standards on citizenship, education, and language protections for minorities. In addition, I took the lead on embassy initiatives on anti-Semitism, Jewish property restitution, and the formation of an international Historical Commission to examine Latvia's role in the Holocaust. My work in coordinating a joint effort by the Department of Justice's Office of Special Investigation, the Latvian Prosecutor General, foreign diplomatic missions, and international legal experts to extradite an accused Latvian war criminal from Australia earned me a commendation from the United States Attorney General.

RESPONSES OF DR. JOHN L. WITHERS II TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps—State Department Relations?

Answer. Yes, I have read the cable.

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this cable?

Answer. I do understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in the cable.

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that “the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy” and that “the Peace Corps’s role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies”?

Answer. I understand and accept these important principles, which govern the relationship between U.S. missions and the Peace Corps.

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise your Chief of Mission “authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies”?

Answer. I pledge to exercise my authorities as Chief of Mission according to this guideline laid out by Secretary Rice as Departmental policy.

NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, JULY 24, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

John, Eric G., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand
Michalak, Michael W., to be Ambassador to the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer presiding.

Present: Senators Boxer and Webb.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

Senator BOXER. Good morning. The committee will come to order. Today the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets to consider two distinguished nominees for ambassadorial posts in Vietnam and Thailand. So we're actually sitting as the full committee.

The reason we're starting so exactly on time is because we have votes scheduled shortly and it is my intention to complete this hearing. In my view these are two excellent nominees and there's no need for extended questioning. However, if for example Senator Webb wanted to come back and pursue a line of questioning, I would give him the gavel to do that.

So, as chair of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I'm very pleased to welcome our nominees, Michael Michalak and Eric John. Ambassador Michalak, the President's nominee to be ambassador to Vietnam, has served his country as a member of the Foreign Service for more than 30 years, most recently as the senior Foreign Official for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. Ambassador Michalak has extensive experience in Asia, having served in both Japan and China, and in a variety of posts in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Eric John, the President's nominee to be ambassador to Thailand, has also served his country for more than two decades, most recently as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Prior to that, Mr. John served as political minister counselor at the United States Embassy in Seoul, Korea. Earlier in his career, Mr. John served at the United States Embassy in Thailand as part of the Orderly Departure Program.

I've enjoyed working with Mr. John on matters relating to East Asia, including extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, a matter on which Mr. John testified before my subcommittee earlier this year.

Thank you both for your service to your country. It goes without saying that Vietnam and Thailand are important nations in the Southeast Asian region. The United States relationship with Thailand is one of the oldest in Asia, dating back to the 19th century. The United States relationship with Vietnam, essentially frozen after the Vietnam War, has improved significantly this past decade. In fact, the President of Vietnam recently concluded a high level visit to the United States, the first such visit since the end of the war.

Our economic relationship with both countries has increased over time, and is poised to grow in the coming decades. Vietnam and Thailand share our commitment to continued development and security in the Asia Pacific region and beyond. In fact, Thailand has even contributed to United States efforts in Afghanistan.

As you know, there are many here in Congress who want to see these relationships strengthened and our ties deepened. My own State of California is home to vibrant Vietnamese and Thai communities who want to see these relationships grow in a progressive and constructive fashion. But let's be clear. Both countries have their share of difficulties. Thailand was recently rocked by a bloodless coup that derailed its democratic system. While Thailand appears to be on track to restore the democratic process and hold elections, its future is far from certain.

Thai officials may publicly assert that they are moving to restore democracy, but there is evidence that the current Thai Government is silencing political opponents, taking over media outlets, and censoring Internet sites, particularly for those with opposing viewpoints. These are serious concerns that can't go unchecked. Thailand also needs to address corruption, which was a serious problem under the previous administration.

Vietnam remains under the control of an authoritarian communist party that wants recognition as a powerful and prestigious member of the international community, but still refuses to afford its citizens the basic rights and freedoms that are associated with such stature. Individuals perceived as a threat to the communist party continue to be harassed and imprisoned. In fact, a wave of arrests occurred in the months preceding Vietnamese President Triet's recent trip to the United States, a crackdown that was so severe it jeopardized the entire visit.

The Vietnamese Government ultimately released a number of important prisoners in advance of the visit, but not before serious questions were raised about Vietnam's commitment to improving its human rights record once and for all.

So with that said, it looks like you both have your work cut out for you. I know that you are up to the test. And I look forward to hearing from both of you.

At this time I would ask Senator Webb to make an opening statement and see if he can keep it to 5 minutes, and when Senator Murkowski comes in I will do the same. Go ahead, Senator Webb.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES WEBB,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA**

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will keep my remarks very brief. I have had extensive opportunities over the past several decades to spend time in both of these countries. I have a great affection for the people of both of the countries. I've been able to sit down and have conversations with both of the nominees. I would have some questions at the appropriate time, but I would prefer to go ahead and move forward in the interest of time and proceed with their statements.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator.
So why don't we start with Mr. John.

**STATEMENT OF ERIC G. JOHN, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND**

Mr. JOHN. Thank you very much, Madam Senator. May I also introduce, take the opportunity to introduce my wife, Sofia, and my son, Adam, who was actually born in Bangkok when we were stationed there, and Nicole, our daughter.

Senator BOXER. Why don't you stand up. We welcome you all. Thank you so much for coming.

Now, if you can we'll go back to a 5-minute clock.

Mr. JOHN. Madam Chairman and Senator Webb, I am honored to appear today as the President's nominee to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand. I am deeply grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I will have the good fortune to represent the United States in a country that has long been one of our closest allies and partners. In nearly 175 years of diplomatic relations, the United States and Thailand have stood together in both good times and bad, to the benefit of both nations.

The partnership between the United States and Thailand has brought important benefits to both sides. Thailand remains a close United States partner in promoting peace and security in Asia and in other parts of the world. The foundation of our alliance with Thailand does remain strong, but the coup that took place in September of last year represented a rare setback for the relationship. There is never a sufficient reason for a military overthrow of a duly elected government, and we immediately made that clear to the interim authorities. We scaled back senior level engagements and continuously emphasized our expectation that the new government would make speedy restoration of democracy its top priority. We also suspended a number of assistance programs pursuant to section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.

At the same time, we decided that our interests in the restoration of democracy and in preserving our long-term bilateral relationship would be best served by continued engagement with the interim government. We also have faith that the Thai people will not abide anything less than a speedy return to democracy and when that return comes it will be to the credit of the Thai people.

We are confident we have correctly calibrated our response to the coup and believe Thailand has made steady progress to date toward restoring democracy. The government has essentially kept to its timetable for the political process, with the national referendum

on the draft constitution scheduled for August 19 and national elections expected by the end of the year.

If confirmed, I will continue to look for ways that we can address still existing weaknesses in Thailand's democratic structures, such as strengthening the judicial system, attacking corruption, and increasing voter participation.

Ensuring a healthy economic relationship with Thailand is an imperative for the United States. Although our free trade agreement negotiations were suspended after the coup and trade promotion authority has lapsed, we need to find ways to reinvigorate this vital bilateral economic relationship. If confirmed, one of my immediate tasks will be to work with Thailand to address concerns about the deficiencies in its intellectual property rights protection regime that compelled us to add Thailand to our priority watch list this year. If confirmed, I will ensure that we engage the Thai Government constructively but firmly on the full spectrum of intellectual property issues.

If confirmed, I also intend to continue the work I have undertaken in my capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary to strengthen our ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Ensuring appropriate protection and assistance for refugees and asylum seekers in Thailand is a high priority for the United States Government. Thailand hosts more than 150,000 Burmese refugees and several thousand asylum seekers from other countries, including Hmong Lao. The burden of assisting these vulnerable populations places a strain on the Thais' resources and their relationships with some of their neighbors. Significant humanitarian assistance provided by the United States and other countries helps to ease the strain, as does third country refugee resettlement, primarily to the United States.

If confirmed, I also will have the privilege of leading one of our largest embassies in the world, including ensuring that both American citizens and foreign visa applicants receive the gold standard of treatment in consular services. I very much look forward to these opportunities.

Madam Chairman, Senator Webb, I know you're on a tight schedule today, so I'll keep my opening remarks short, and I thank you for the opportunity to testify and will be happy to respond to questions at the appropriate time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. John follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC G. JOHN, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND

Madam Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the President's nominee to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand. I am deeply grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for their confidence in me.

I am a career Foreign Service officer and have served 22 years of my career in the East Asia and Pacific Bureau (EAP). I have lived in Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam for a combined total of 14 years and speak Korean and Vietnamese. For the past 2 years, I have had the honor to serve our Nation as Deputy Assistant Secretary in EAP, overseeing our relations in Southeast Asia. East Asia is vital to our Nation's interest, and I hope to continue to help build our bonds with the region.

If confirmed, I will have the good fortune to represent the United States in a country that has long been one of our closest allies and partners. In nearly 175 years of diplomatic relations, the United States and Thailand have stood together in both good times and bad, to the benefit of both nations.

Ties between Thailand and the United States are multifaceted and run deep. From scientific collaboration to joint disaster relief operations, peacekeeping, and travel and tourism, United States-Thai interests are intertwined and enduring. Thailand was one of the first to offer aid to the United States after Hurricane Katrina and lent its air base in Utapao for United States troops to launch humanitarian aid to the thousands displaced after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

The partnership between the United States and Thailand has brought other important benefits to the United States. As a major non-NATO treaty ally of long standing, Thailand remains an important United States partner in promoting peace and security in Asia and in other parts of the world. Access granted by the Thai Government to facilities in Thailand is critical to executing our highest priority military operations, and the Thai have further supported those missions with their own personnel. Thailand also hosts major bilateral and multinational military exercises that are essential to maintaining our forces' readiness and interoperability with allies, and its troops have participated in international peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and soon in Darfur.

The foundation of our alliance with Thailand remains strong, but the coup that took place in September 2006 represented a rare setback for the relationship. Our deeply held view is that there is never a sufficient reason or circumstance that justifies a military overthrow of a duly elected government, and we immediately made that clear to the interim authorities. We underscored our disappointment by scaling back senior-level engagement and continuously emphasized our expectation that the new government would make speedy restoration of democracy its top priority. We also suspended a number of assistance programs pursuant to section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.

At the same time, we decided that our interests in restoration of democracy and in preserving a long-term bilateral relationship critical to achieving United States' goals in Asia and beyond would be best served by continued engagement with the interim government. We also have faith that the Thai people will not abide anything less than a speedy return to democracy, and when that return comes, it will be to the credit of the Thai people.

We are confident we have correctly calibrated our response to the coup, and believe Thailand has made steady progress to date toward restoring democracy. The government has essentially kept to its timetable for the political process, with a national referendum on the draft constitution scheduled for August 19 and national elections expected by the end of the year. If confirmed, I will continue to look for ways we can address still-existing weaknesses in Thailand's democratic structures, such as strengthening the judicial system, attacking corruption, and increasing voter participation.

A continuing U.S. policy goal is to remove barriers to increased bilateral trade and investment. Although our free trade agreement negotiations were suspended after the coup, and Trade Promotion Authority has lapsed, we need to find ways to reinvigorate this vital bilateral economic relationship. With two-way trade of over \$30 billion in 2006 and United States companies' total investments in Thailand estimated at approximately \$21 billion, ensuring a healthy economic relationship with Thailand is an imperative for the United States.

We will need to address difficult issues directly with our ally and work to resolve them expeditiously. If confirmed, one of my immediate tasks will be to work with Thailand to address concerns about the deficiencies in its intellectual property rights protection regime that compelled us to add Thailand to our Priority Watch List this year. Piracy of music, movies, and software products has not been meaningfully addressed, and losses to our creative industries continue to climb. Thailand now has the second highest rate of movie piracy in the world after China. We also remain concerned about the lack of transparency in the Thai Government's decision earlier this year to issue compulsory licenses for three medications. If confirmed, I will ensure that we engage the Thai Government constructively but firmly on the full spectrum of intellectual property issues.

Another of my priorities, if confirmed, will be to continue to coordinate closely United States and Thai efforts to facilitate a return to democracy in Burma. Although we share that goal, Thailand's approach to Burma differs from ours. The Thai Government shares a nearly 1,200 mile border with Burma and needs to engage with the junta to manage critical public health and border security issues. Bangkok does not support economic sanctions, but it has used its engagement to advocate for democratization. It can do more, though, and if confirmed, I will work with Thai officials to coordinate our endeavors to help speed a return to democracy in Burma.

If confirmed, I also intend to continue the work I have undertaken in my capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary to strengthen our ties with the Association of South-

east Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN is an important regional organization in which Thailand and its neighbors work toward common goals. It is a significant vehicle for promoting and strengthening key shared values of democracy, free trade, and cultural exchange. I believe that a stronger ASEAN would build an even more successful Southeast Asia. If confirmed, I will work with the Thai on developing joint initiatives and other policies our two nations can implement to help ASEAN realize its potential.

We also remain concerned about the Malay Muslim separatist insurgency in southern Thailand that has cost so many lives and endangers amity between the Buddhist and Muslim communities. The Thai Government has maintained a vigilant security posture in the region, but, at the same time, has adopted a conciliatory approach to begin addressing issues that have long fueled resentment against central Thai authority.

Ensuring appropriate protection and assistance for refugees and asylum seekers in Thailand is a high priority for the United States Government. Though not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, for several decades Thailand has hosted asylum seekers fleeing repression and persecution from countries in the region and elsewhere. Thailand hosts more than 150,000 Burmese refugees and several thousand asylum seekers from other countries, including Hmong Lao. The burden of assisting these vulnerable populations places a strain on the Thais' resources and their relationships with some of their neighbors. Significant humanitarian assistance provided by the United States and other countries helps to ease the strain, as does third-country refugee resettlement, primarily to the United States.

If confirmed, the continued care and protection of refugees and asylum seekers will be one of my priorities. In particular, I will encourage the Thai Government to accede to the Refugee Convention and to work closely and cooperatively with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to ensure that refugees and asylum seekers in Thailand are protected and afforded the rights granted to them under international law.

If confirmed, I also will have the privilege of leading one of our largest embassies in the world, including ensuring that both American citizens and foreign visa applicants receive the gold standard of treatment in consular services. I very much look forward to these opportunities.

Madam Chairman, members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for considering my nomination. I would be happy to respond to your questions.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. John, and we will put the rest of your statement into the record if you have further comment.

Mr. Michalak, welcome. If you can, speak to us for about 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL W. MICHALAK, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Mr. MICHALAK. Thank you very much. Madam Chairman, Senator Webb, I too welcome the chance to sit before you as the President's nominee for Ambassador to Vietnam. I'm just coming from an assignment where I worked on the APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. I think the 2 years that I spent there, the 2 years that we spent refocusing the agenda, providing more resources for that organization and strengthening the institution have prepared me somewhat for dealing with Vietnam. I say this because 2006 was the year of APEC in Vietnam and during that year I saw this country and its officers go from a rather tentative bureaucratic stance toward international relations to the end of that year, when they turned into some very self-confident and forthright spokespersons for their government.

At this hearing I have already submitted my written remarks for the record and I think, Madam Chairman, that your remarks pretty much summarized exactly what I was saying in my own testi-

mony. So what I'd like to do is maybe just touch on the three areas that I intend to focus on if confirmed and if I do go to Vietnam.

One of the first areas that we need to work very carefully on is going to be actually the physical plant, the United States Embassy. It's somewhat of a disgrace. It's an old plant and we need to continue, finish up 6 years of negotiations with the Government of Vietnam to get a new embassy.

Turning to more substantive issues, as you mentioned, Madam Chairman, human rights and the current performance of the Government of Vietnam certainly have cause for concern. I think, on the other hand, there is a good story to tell, particularly in the area of religious freedom, where treatment of various religious groups over the past 2, 3 years has changed considerably, including using diplomatic means to actually get Vietnam removed from the countries of particular concern list in that particular area.

Economic development, as you correctly mentioned, is one of the spotlights, one of the highlights of our relationship with Vietnam, as one of the fastest growing economies within ASEAN and indeed second only to China in the entire Asian Pacific region. We think that there are tremendous opportunities there to improve not only the United States-Vietnam economic relationship, but to spill over into other areas of human endeavor, including social areas and even in human rights.

Finally, Madam Chairman, what I'd like to do if confirmed is to work on education. I believe that the Government of Vietnam and the Government of the United States both share the value of improving the educational infrastructure within Vietnam. I think the Virginia—"the Virginia"; I'm thinking of Senator Webb there. The Vietnam Education Foundation and other organizations are working to send well over 100 graduate students per year, concentrated mostly in science and technology, to the United States for further study. If confirmed, when I get to Hanoi I'm going to try to double the number of students that we send from Vietnam to the United States.

In conclusion, Madam Chairman, I think that our expanding ties with Vietnam in many areas are generating excitement and strengthening our engagement with this increasingly dynamic player in Southeast Asia would be one of my highest priorities. I hope to be the type of ambassador of which are country and the United States Senate can be proud, and I look forward at this time to answering all of your questions.

Oh, I might mention one other thing. You did mention the fact that in your own, your own constituency, there are large Vietnamese-American communities. Earlier on, in discussion with both your staff and Senator Webb's staff I made it clear that I would be more than willing to try and sit down and talk with some of these folks and to hear their views on our relationship.

So thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Michalak follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL W. MICHALAK TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Thank you, Madam Chairman Boxer and members of the committee. It is a great honor for me to appear before this committee as the President's nominee to be the fourth Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam since normalization of rela-

tions in 1995. I am grateful for the confidence and trust that President Bush and Secretary Rice have placed in me.

As a member of the Foreign Service, I have extensive experience in Asia, including a significant amount of recent work in Vietnam. Most of my career in the State Department has been spent working on Japan and China with my last overseas assignment having been Deputy Chief of Mission in Japan, our most important bilateral partner in Asia. I believe my work in Asia and in the State Department has prepared me well for this assignment. If I am confirmed, I look forward to representing and vigorously advancing the interests of the United States in Vietnam.

My first direct engagement with Vietnam occurred in 2006 when, as United States Ambassador for APEC, I led our delegation through Vietnam's year-long chairmanship of APEC. I visited the country at least five times during that year and worked closely with senior officials of the Government of Vietnam. Vietnam's performance was nothing short of spectacular. Over the course of 2006, we were able to forge an excellent relationship of trust and honesty. In fact, Vietnam hosted one of the most productive leaders' meetings ever.

President Bush's November 2006 visit to Vietnam was a success both bilaterally and multilaterally and was reciprocated through President Triet's visit to Washington and several other United States cities last month. While these high-level exchanges served to advance ties and mutual understanding and overcome our legacy of mistrust, they also highlighted the complexities in our relationship and the challenges and opportunities we face to take relations to the next level. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure full normalization of relations and the creation of a true partnership between the people of our two great countries.

Vietnam is clearly a country on the move, leading with its rapidly growing economy and burgeoning export sector; a new Asian Tiger if you will. Starting with the Doi Moi program in 1986, Vietnam has built tremendous momentum toward economic reform and opening to the world, culminating in its recent accession to the WTO and realizing Permanent Normal Trade Relations status with the United States. If confirmed, I can assure you that one of my highest priorities will be to work to ensure that Vietnam fulfills its WTO commitments and in the process provides increased market opportunities for United States goods and services.

Vietnam is also emerging as a regional player. Vietnam has been identified by the Asian Grouping as its candidate for a nonpermanent seat on the U.N. Security Council in 2008, and its voice is being increasingly heard in ASEAN councils and beyond.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The economic story in Vietnam deserves praise and encouragement, but it should not obscure our very real concerns over human rights and religious freedom there. Vietnam's record of respect for human rights and religious freedoms is decidedly mixed. While there have been improvements in religious freedoms over the past year, we have seen backsliding on human rights issues since last November.

Promotion of human rights has been and will remain one of our highest priorities in Vietnam, as reaffirmed by President Bush to President Triet during their June 2007 meeting at the White House. Prior to President Triet's visit, the Government of Vietnam released three persons of concern to the United States: Phan Van Ban; former National Endowment for Democracy Fellow Le Quoc Quan; and Nguyen Vu Binh. Following the visit, labor activist Bui Kim Thanh was also released. While we welcome the release of these individuals, we continue to press for systemic human rights improvements in Vietnam. We need to build bridges between the Government of Vietnam and the full range of groups in the United States—veterans, Vietnamese-Americans, and human rights and business groups—to convince the Vietnamese that free speech and expression of views strengthens, not weakens, societies and economies. If confirmed, I will make advancing human rights one of my highest priorities.

Vietnam made significant progress during the past year on advancing religious freedom, leading Secretary Rice to remove Vietnam as a "Country of Particular Concern" last November. Vietnam instituted a new law on religion, including a ban on forced renunciations, registered hundreds of places of worship, allowed the majority of closed places of worship to reopen, began educating central, provincial, and local officials on how to implement the new law, and in some cases disciplined officials responsible for violations of religious freedom. Although Vietnam was taken off the "CPC" list, we still have work ahead of us to ensure full religious freedom for all Vietnamese. The Department of State, along with other government and NGO stakeholders, will continue to monitor and evaluate the situation and press for continued progress in this area.

I am strongly committed to the idea that societies are enriched when people are allowed to worship freely and express themselves as they wish. Building on the excellent work of my predecessor, Ambassador Michael Marine, I will, if confirmed, vigorously push for continued expansion of the civil rights of Vietnamese citizens, as well as the release of all those in prison for peacefully expressing their political views. These include Father Nguyen Van Ly, lawyers Nguyen Van Dai and Le Thi Cong Nhan, and the leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Vietnam and the United Farmers Workers Organization.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

One of the best ways to encourage expansion of civil rights and liberties is to ensure strong economic growth. The Vietnamese economy is undergoing a rapid and fundamental transformation due, in part, to the rapid growth of foreign investment and economic reforms undertaken to meet the requirements of WTO and our 2001 Bilateral Trade Agreement.

The wholesale economic restructuring taking place in Vietnam, including new legislation on intellectual property rights, elimination of state supports, and reductions in tariff rates, has made its markets more attractive to United States companies. U.S. companies have responded vigorously, with two-way trade in goods as rocketing up from \$1.5 billion in 2001 to \$9.6 billion in 2006 and U.S. foreign direct investment increasing \$639 million in 2006 alone. United States service providers and technology companies in particular are looking to Vietnam—providing capital, technology and management know how, as well as supporting Vietnam's efforts on education, environment, and combating trafficking in persons. I believe in leading by example, and our companies are excellent examples of how freedom and democracy can bring real gains to people across the entire economic and social spectrum.

Nevertheless more work is still needed to liberalize Vietnam's financial sector and reduce the state's role in the economy. If confirmed, I will work to engage the Vietnamese on still-sensitive topics such as privatization, energy, intellectual property rights, environment, and labor. To continue the momentum of economic reform, we also need to help Vietnam redouble its efforts to promote transparency, legal reform, and good governance.

EDUCATION

Along with traditional economic development and improvement in human rights and religious freedoms, educational reform and development is a priority area that we believe could most benefit an emerging nation like Vietnam. We have extremely effective Fulbright and Humphrey exchange programs, and through the highly successful Fulbright Economic Teaching Program in Ho Chi Minh City, we train local government officials and business professionals annually on economics and public policy.

The Government of Vietnam has explicitly stated that it looks to the United States, and our great colleges and universities, to train the next generation of Vietnamese leaders, scientists, educators, and engineers. One of my goals as ambassador, if confirmed, will be to double the number of university students from Vietnam in our colleges and universities over the next 3 years to help train Vietnam's leaders of the future.

I will also work closely with the Vietnamese Government to establish a Peace Corps program in Vietnam, which I know is of special interest to many Members of the Senate, a number of whom have written to the Government of Vietnam in support of this proposal.

CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

Resolving the fates of the Americans lost during the Vietnam War remains an issue of continuing and profound importance. Our reengagement with Vietnam was founded on this effort and I am firmly committed to this mission, which embodies principles that remain critical to our men and women serving today. If confirmed, I will endeavor to work with the Vietnamese to move our already positive cooperation to a new level through both joint measures and enhanced unilateral efforts on their part.

At the same time, the United States continues to approach other issues that relate to the consequences of war in a constructive manner. We have invested over \$45 million since 1993 to help Vietnam clean up unexploded ordnance and landmines left from conflicts dating back to World War II. We continue to provide considerable humanitarian assistance, totaling over \$43 million since 1989, to Vietnamese with disabilities regardless of cause. This year, the United States contributed \$400,000 to assist the Government of Vietnam to develop a plan for environ-

mental remediation at the Danang Airport, part of approximately \$2 million the United States has provided since 2002 to increase Vietnam's capacity to deal with the environmental challenges posed by dioxin. The Congress also passed, and President Bush signed in May, supplemental legislation providing \$3 million in assistance for remediation and health-related programs. The administration, in consultation with Congress, is now making final decisions on how and where best to spend these funds.

EXPANDING OUR RELATIONSHIP

We are also cooperating with Vietnam on global issues of high importance, particularly on global health issues such as HIV/AIDS and avian flu. I am convinced that health cooperation could be a model for United States-Vietnamese cooperation on other areas. If confirmed, I'll also look for ways to apply that model to encourage more robust engagement on law enforcement and military-to-military issues. Although United States-Vietnamese bilateral relations have expanded in numerous areas, bilateral military cooperation has developed at a slower pace and has gradually expanded to include search and rescue (SAR), medical programs, professional seminars, a nascent security assistance program, training, and even some environmental security issues. Law enforcement cooperation is also strengthening, and the United States encourages the Government of Vietnam to take the necessary implementation steps to provide meaningful assistance in drug trafficking/money laundering investigations. If Vietnam is elected to the Asia-Pacific Group's nonpermanent 2008-2009 seat on the United Nations Security Council, I will encourage Vietnam to contribute to regional stability, humanitarian initiatives, and possibly peacekeeping missions.

Finally, if confirmed, the welfare and safety of American citizens traveling or working in Vietnam will always be my top priority. The United States mission in Vietnam will provide accurate and timely information on the risks that Americans will face in Vietnam. I hope to reenergize negotiations for a new Embassy that meets current security standards and provides a safe working environment for the United States mission.

CONCLUSION

In sum, Madam Chairman, our country's many ties to Vietnam and the excitement generated by its emergence as a young and dynamic player in Southeast Asia sparks enthusiasm for engagement. Just 12 years ago, we normalized relations, concentrating our cooperative efforts on dealing with the lasting effects of the Vietnam War, especially the fullest possible accounting for Americans still missing. Since then, our economic ties have deepened and we have engaged in important discussions on human rights and a host of other issues. At virtually all levels of government and society, the United States and Vietnam are seeing increased dialog and cooperation. I hope to be the type of Ambassador of which our country and especially the United States Senate can be proud.

Thank you. I would welcome your comments and questions.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Michalak, do you have any family with you today by chance? Would you like to introduce them?

Mr. MICHALAK. Yes, let me introduce my wife, Yoshiko, and my daughter, Kay.

Senator BOXER. Hi. Welcome, both of you. We're very happy you're here. I know the families are very proud of their dad and husband, and we're proud of them too.

I'm going to ask Senator Webb to lead it off, knowing his deep interest in this area. Please go ahead, Senator.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I may, if we're going 5 minutes, I may have a second round just to clarify.

Senator BOXER. I think I'd like to give you 10 minutes so you can take your time, okay. 10 minutes.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much.

I do have long experience in the region in many different capacities and just returned, as both of you know, from a pretty brief trip, but a very interesting trip, where we were in both countries. And I've had the opportunity to sit down with each of the nominees

and discuss issues. I'm obviously very inclined to support both of them and think they bring great experience to the table.

A lot of people think that this is your entire career boiled down to 5-minute statements, but obviously there's an awful lot of work that goes into this before you sit here.

Mr. JOHN, you were mentioning about the recent turmoil in Thailand. I had the opportunity to discuss this with government people in Thailand from our government, and theirs, and also with a number of people that I've known for many, many years—some of them are Americans who resided in Thailand for years, some of them are Thai—to try to get a true picture of the dynamic of that event and how we're going to move our way through it.

As a starting point, I would like your thoughts, because you have extensive time in Thailand. How would you rank Thailand among other Southeast Asian nations in terms of the overall maturity of their political structures?

Mr. JOHN. It's unique in the sense that it's very much a constitutional monarchy and the king does play a very significant role in that structure. So in that sense it is different because the Thai people do look to the king for overall guidance. I mean, he sets the tone of the country.

But when I referred in my statement to the U.S. Government placing a lot of confidence in this process in the Thai people, I very much meant that, in that international pressure was appropriate, but for the Thais to work their way through the coup and get back to a democratically elected government it really is up to the Thai people. And I think we've seen that the Thai people want very much to get back as quickly as possible to a democracy.

I think the adherence to the timetable is more a tribute to the pressures and the demands that the Thais have put on the interim government to get back, to get a constitution, to get a democratically elected government in place, than anyone else. And in that sense, comparing it to other nations in Southeast Asia, I'd say Thailand is at the top with other democracies in terms of deep roots for commitment to democratization and maintaining a democracy.

Senator WEBB. I'm not trying to put words in anybody's mouth, but do you think it's fair to say that the Thai movement toward democracy was only partially interrupted by this coup? Is it fair to say that local elections still have remained as a function even after the coup?

Mr. JOHN. Yes, I'd say that—yes, the coup was a significant interruption, but I would define it as that, an interruption. And I think that people remain optimistic in Thailand and outside of Thailand that there is an end to this coup and that at the end of this coup there will be a government back in place that truly was elected and put in place by the Thai people.

Senator WEBB. My understanding of this coup is it did not interrupt local government. This was a coup of national offices.

Mr. JOHN. Right.

Senator WEBB. Not a total coup. To the extent that it existed beforehand, freedom of press, freedom of religion, freedom to speak out remained in place, which you don't always see in other countries in Southeast Asia. Is that fair to say?

Mr. JOHN. Yes, I think freedom of the press, freedom of expression has largely remained in place. I think Senator Boxer was correct that there have been disturbing interruptions, and nobody likes to see that. But the foundation of freedom of expression has remained throughout the coup and you'll see there are demonstrations against the coup, there are demonstrations for the coup. There's a very free debate in print, on television, and to a large degree I think it's been a very healthy debate that's gone on in Thailand. And in the end I hope it would strengthen democracy.

Senator WEBB. Well, it was certainly my impression that the repair of this unfortunate incident was well on its way in Thailand.

Would you have any thoughts on the emerging relationship between Thailand and China?

Mr. JOHN. It's largely a—it is growing stronger and I think that it's largely healthy. I think we, all of us, feel comfortable if—if you look at a very stark difference, whether it's good or bad for China to have healthy relations with its neighbors, I think all of us would agree that it's good.

The Thai economy in large degree benefits from a rising Chinese economy. So trade relations are strong. I think there are concerns about certain sectors or industries that might be threatened by Chinese economic growth. There are areas where I think that we need to be wary. Obviously, Chinese values and what they place an emphasis on in their relationships with other countries oftentimes is starkly different than what the United States places an emphasis on in our bilateral relations.

Senator WEBB. Ambassador Michalak, we had a pretty extensive discussion about the Vietnamese community in the United States and how it is unique in many ways among expatriate communities and immigrant communities because of the way that the Vietnam war ended. When the communists took over in China most of the Chinese who had opposed the communist takeover remained in Asia, particularly Taiwan, northern Thailand, et cetera, while a very, very large percentage of the Vietnamese who had stood with us—I think that's an important distinction that we lose when we talk about the history of the Vietnamese before 1975—ended up here in the United States, and that creates a great challenge, probably the greatest challenge in terms of community diplomacy, in building a bridge and repairing that damage as we all move to the future.

I was very gratified to hear you indicate that you wanted to have discussions with the Vietnamese community here in the United States. I think it's too often not discussed as one of the key barriers for a full, totally full cultural normalization with Vietnam.

I would ask you a question about a couple of incidents that happened outside the ambassador's residence earlier. The chairman, chairwoman, mentioned this in her opening statement. But I would sort of like your thoughts on this. This is a little bit of a disturbing situation. I've been contacted by a number of overseas Vietnamese, Vietnamese Americans, about the incident, because it was an action apparently of the Vietnamese Government itself intercepting individuals who had been invited to the ambassador's home.

It's kind of a unique situation and I'm wondering about your thoughts on that and how you would be dealing with similar situations if they occur on your watch.

Mr. MICHALAK. Well, Senator, yes, these kinds of incidents are absolutely unacceptable. I certainly would immediately call the highest level of the Vietnamese Government that I could get and protest in as strong a way as possible to try and change the situation. We have since been in touch with all of the women involved and we have managed to contact I believe three out of the five of them, and the other two were just unavailable at the time.

I think since then the ambassador, sitting ambassador, has been able to meet with most of them and I think he is still seeking to meet with some of the other ones. But this kind of situation in general, I think, shows definitely an overreaction on the part of the Government of Vietnam. If confirmed, I think one of the things that I will try to do is to try again to encourage the government to look at how freedom of speech, freedom of expression, particularly political expression, are not disruptive and can in fact be constructive and be a positive force for societal growth within Vietnam.

Senator WEBB. Thank you for saying that. Just a final closing statement. My time is running out here. As I mentioned to you, I started going back to Vietnam in 1991 and spent a great deal of time from that period forward. It's been quite a journey for both of our countries, but also I think in terms of the Vietnam Government itself, moving from a government that was completely dominated by people who economically and politically had been trained in Eastern Europe and who step by step had been learning how to deal with other environments, other political environments.

I am very optimistic when I see a number of the people who have moved through the system since those days. I think it's been a struggle, but I think we've laid the groundwork for a very strong and very important relationship, and I wish you well.

Mr. MICHALAK. Thank you, Senator. The only other additional comment I might add to that is that I think you're absolutely right; if you look at some of the makeup of the new government, you're beginning to see people who have been educated overseas and the Vietnamese are looking to the United States to be the educators of an awful lot of the next generation of businessmen and government leaders.

Senator WEBB. There are also a lot of Vietnamese who have not had the opportunity to be educated—or who have not been educated overseas; they may not have wanted the opportunity to, but who have learned through the interactions that took place during normalization with western countries and seeing different points of view and just becoming more sophisticated in terms of a lot of nuance that wasn't there before.

I will give you one example. Mr. Foke, who I had mentioned to you during our meeting, who I have known for 14 years now, since he was an economics minister down in Danang, who really is among this group of people who are looking for solutions based on mutual respect rather than the bitterness of history and those sorts of things. So I'm very optimistic that we can continue to make this relationship grow.

Thank you very much.

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator.

I want to just welcome the Ambassador of Thailand serving in the United States, His Excellency Mr. Crit Garjana Gunjorn, and I invite him to stand up. We thank you, sir, for being here. We welcome you.

I'd ask unanimous consent to place into the record an introduction of Eric John by Senator Lugar. It's very glowing—I'm sure you'll be glad to know that—and I ask that it be placed into the record at this time. I'll give that to you to make sure that happens.

[The statement from Senator Lugar appears at the end of this hearing, in the "Additional Material Submitted for the Record" section.]

Senator BOXER. I want to ask a question about Thailand. Thailand's been a magnet for hundreds of thousands of refugees from throughout Southeast Asia, many of them Hmong. You may know we have a very large Hmong community in California. While Thailand has generally been cooperative in helping refugees, there have been a number of high profile incidents of forced deportations that have raised international concern.

Last month the State Department expressed regret over the Thai Government's deportation to Laos of about 160 ethnic Hmong who had sought diplomatic asylum in Thailand. Specifically, State Department spokesman Sean McCormick said in a statement, and I quote: "We urge the Thai Government to live up to its traditions and international standards and to ensure that those with a genuine claim to refugee status are not returned to an uncertain fate."

Just yesterday, the Bagh—the Bangkok Post—I almost said "Baghdad" because I have Iraq on my brain 24-7. Yesterday the Bangkok Post reported that nearly 7,700 Hmong currently living in a makeshift camp in Thailand's Shabung Province will be deported to Laos, 7,700 Hmong. Mr. John, have you seen this report in the Bangkok Post? And if it's accurate, what is the United States planning to do to prevent it?

Mr. JOHN. I haven't seen that specific report, but we're aware of this refugee community of about 8,000. I have not—I am not aware of reports that they are going to be deported any time soon. But it's a serious issue that we have been following for quite a while.

There are sort of three components, I think, to the refugee situation that we have to work on, and Thailand is one of those critical components. The first component I think we would all agree is that Laos needs to integrate, treat its ethnic Hmong better, give them equal rights, integrate them into the society, and that's something that our embassy is working on there, that we worked on here as well. And that's I think the foundation for the problem.

The second, as you mentioned, is that we are working with the Thais so that they do not deport back to Laos refugees who have not been screened yet by a competent international organization such as UNHCR. And of course, the 7,700 or 8,000 group that's in Shabung Province should not be returned if they are deemed refugees and have been screened as refugees, and at that point we would need to work with the Thai Government for third country resettlement.

The third leg, I think, of this stool in working on the Hmong issue is to again work on the pull factor, and Thailand is very concerned that there's no end to this, and we need to be cognizant of those concerns, that, working with the Lao Government to make sure they're settled there back into Laos or that legitimate refugees can move on to third countries is something that's important.

So, if I were confirmed, it's something I would work very closely with the Thai Government.

Senator BOXER. Well, let me say, I want to show you the article because I think you need to take this to the folks there and whether this is true. We don't have a lot of time if this report is true—maybe you can talk to the ambassador about it on your way out the door. But I hope that you'll provide me with periodic updates on this and other issues related to human rights abuses against the Hmong, because these are good, decent people. Would you do that if confirmed? Would you give me regular updates?

Mr. JOHN. Absolutely. We owe a great debt as a Nation to the Hmong.

Senator BOXER. We do, yes.

Mr. JOHN. And it's something that we take very seriously.

Senator BOXER. Okay.

Mr. Michalak, as you well know, the Vietnamese Government instituted a wave of crackdowns against democracy and human rights activists that began in 2006 and peaked in the spring of this year. A number of prominent activists were imprisoned, including Father Nguyen Van Ly and Le Quoc Quan, a lawyer who recently completed a fellowship with the National Endowment for Democracy here in Washington, DC.

These arrests caused significant international outcry, particularly since they occurred in the run-up to the first visit to the United States by a Vietnamese head of state since the end of the Vietnam War. Many question why the crackdown occurred when it did and whether or not Vietnam is truly committed to ending its record of human rights abuses and fully integrating into the international community.

First and foremost, can you explain why the crackdown occurred when it did? Was the Vietnamese Government trying to send some type of message? As ambassador how will you engage with the Government of Vietnam to improve its human rights record? And I would also ask—and this is the same question I asked of Mr. John—would you please make available to us on a regular basis how we are working to advance the cause of human rights in Vietnam?

Mr. MICHALAK. Thank you very much, Madam Senator. Yes, I already wrote that down, periodic reports. Yes, be happy to do that.

The number of people that you mentioned that were under detention, mainly Father Nguyen Van Ly—I think Le Quoc Quan has been released, the National Endowment fellow has been released, and I believe is now with, has been reunited with his family.

But in general, as to why the crackdown occurred, there are several theories. Unfortunately, the inner workings of the Government of Vietnam are not as transparent as we would like, and if confirmed that's one of the things I would work on, is transparency and anticorruption there. But many have said that this is part of

a general crackdown on dissidents prior to the May 20 elections to make sure that the elections went smoothly and in a stable fashion. Some people believe that it is after the—I guess “outburst” may be too strong a word, but the continued improved human rights situation that took place during 2006, there is some thought that certain hardliners within the government thought that the pendulum had swung too far toward freedom and liberalization, so they wanted to sort of again send a message that, yes, the central party still is in charge.

I think that we have a multipronged way in which we want to deal with human rights in Vietnam and I certainly, if confirmed, will support that. We have a human rights dialog which is chaired by Assistant Secretary Lowencron and which last year set out a good work plan for the coming year. We have several programs which we use under our public diplomacy rubric where we actually teach journalists how to do investigative journalism and take steps to try and improve journalistic freedom. We also have under our improvement, development, economic development program programs to improve transparency, to improve anticorruption and good governance programs. We believe that these work not only within the economic sphere, but there is a significant spillover and demonstration effect that takes place in the human rights sphere as well.

So I think in all of these programmatic fashions we can work to try to improve the situation there. On a personal level, I think that I personally would certainly take every opportunity that I can to work especially hard, particularly for the release of detainees like Father Ly, lawyers Nguyen Van Di and Li Thi Qong Yan, who also have been detained recently. I think President Bush, in his meeting with President Triet, also raised the issue and laid down a marker that we’re going to continue to work for improvement in this situation over there, and if confirmed I’ll certainly continue that effort.

Thank you.

Senator BOXER. Thank you, sir. I think obviously our hope, all of us, is that these detentions don’t happen in the first place. I think a lot of nations around the world make a mistake, specifically the developing nations, when they think it shows strength to put your opponents in jail. It’s the opposite. It’s the opposite. I think we’re never stronger as a country as the times that we’re having vigorous debate, yes, in the Senate. A lot of people decry: It’s mean. It’s not mean. It’s the way it has to be in a free society. If you feel strongly, it’s an obligation.

Now, obviously these things could be taken too far, but it’s the right tone. And I think the message that you can give these countries is that if they want to be viewed as strong, then they should allow dissent through speech that doesn’t hurt anybody else. Anything other than that makes them look weak, impotent, and not worthy of emulation. I do feel it’s kind of a nuanced message, but I know both of you will be very fine at getting that message across.

I don’t have any other comments, but I know that Senator Webb wanted to make some closing comments, so I will call on him, and then we’ll adjourn. We both feel that you should have a good confirmation process from here on out.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Ambassador Michalak, I just wanted to add on something to what you said about the issue of human rights in Vietnam, because it's an issue that very rarely makes it to the national discourse and yet it's a key element of fully repairing our relations. That is the issue of the people who were with us during the war who remain inside Vietnam and their families. There has been a great deal of progress on this issue inside Vietnam, but we need to remember that a lot of the anger in the Vietnamese community here came about not simply because of the war, but because of what happened after 1975, where a million mostly South Vietnamese were put in reeducation camps—240,000 of them stayed longer than 4 years, 56,000 of them died in the reeducation camps.

When they came back—some of them stayed as long as 18 years. They did it by rank, generally. I see Mr. John nodding. He was a big part of the processing of people out when they started processing a lot of them back here in the United States. But a lot of them remained.

When I first was returning to Vietnam for visits, I can get around pretty well in Vietnamese and talk to people without having to have a government interpreter with me, and there basically was a situation where the people who had been with the South Vietnamese military and government, and in some cases intellectuals who had basically supported the cause of democracy, were precluded from working. Their families were kept—their children were kept out of advancement in schools. There were truly roadblocks.

One of the things that I was working on for many years starting back in the early 1990s with this normalization process was trying to get a formula in place so that all Vietnamese could move forward together regardless of their past affiliations. This is not a negative shot at today. It's just trying to affirmatively deal as best we can with the consequences of history.

As I said, my feelings from having returned to Vietnam many times is that the government has begun to do that. They've been listening to that call, but that it still really is a challenge to make sure that all the Vietnamese, the children of the people who were with the Vietnam Con Hua, are allowed the same access to these benefits that we are going to be bringing to Vietnam with our emphasis on trade and cultural exchanges and these sorts of things.

So I would just express my hope that you'll keep your eye on that. And again, I wish both of you the best of luck in your new positions.

Senator BOXER. Gentlemen, I made a mistake. There was one more point I wanted to raise with you, Mr. Michalak, because an issue that's been very important to me—and we actually set up a POW memorial in California, and it's a beautiful site in the San Bernadino area. So my constituents have great concerns about the POW-MIA recovery efforts in Vietnam.

According to the CRS, there were 1381 Americans unaccounted for in Vietnam as of August 2005. While I understand Vietnamese cooperation on POW-MIA recovery efforts has improved since the normalization of relations, much work remains to be done. Families are still waiting for their loved ones to be brought home, and I un-

derstand that many families would like more searches along the coastline of Vietnam.

If you're confirmed, can I get your commitment that you will work to ensure that POW-MIA recovery efforts are conducted in a robust fashion? Would you let me know if you need additional assistance to help you with this effort, because I can assure you on this committee you would have broad support?

Mr. MICHALAK. Madam Chairman, absolutely. You have my assurance and you certainly have my commitment on trying to get the fullest accounting for all missing American service members as a result of the Vietnam War. That is one of the pillars upon which our reengagement with Vietnam began. If confirmed, I would certainly support that and certainly do everything that I can to try to get access to archives that we have not been able to do and to try to get permission to do some of these searches along the coast, which I know that we have been attempting, with some progress. But you're absolutely right; there is much more that can be done. And yes, I'll definitely do that.

Senator BOXER. My hope is that you will be honest and let us know if you need any help in that regard, because we will get that help for you.

Mr. MICHALAK. Yes, ma'am.

Senator BOXER. If there's no other business to come before the committee, we stand adjourned, and we wish you well.

[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Chairman Boxer, today I am pleased to endorse the nomination of Mr. Eric G. John to serve as United States Ambassador to Thailand. A native of New Castle, IN, Mr. John has served with distinction since 2005 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Previous postings include the United States Embassy in Seoul as Political Minister and Counselor, the Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City, as Deputy Principal Officer, and the United States Embassy in Thailand, where Mr. John served as Vice Consul and Second Secretary of the Orderly Departure Program. Mr. John has received numerous awards for outstanding service in the Department of State.

Senator Boxer, as you are aware, the Thailand-United States relationship is held in high regard by United States officials and the American people. However, in recent years, the situation has grown complex. Under the regime of former Prime Minister Thaksin, traditional democratic institutions, freedom of the press, and rule of law came under stress. On September 19, 2006, a military coup was orchestrated by the country's military leaders, who have continually promised since then to return the country to democratic rule.

This is all to say that the next American Ambassador to Thailand will face a situation of special complexity. DAS John is particularly well-qualified to serve at this crucial time as the President's representative to the people of Thailand, who have long shown their commitment to democracy, and to promote sustained relations between our two countries.

**NOMINATION OF HON. HENRIETTA HOLSMAN
FORE TO BE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTER-
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

TUESDAY, JULY 24, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Fore, Henrietta Holsman, to be Administrator of the U.S. Agency
for International Development

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez presiding.

Present: Senators Menendez, Nelson, Casey, Lugar, Hagel, and Corker.

Also Present: Senator Hutchison.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

Senator MENENDEZ. This hearing will come to order.

Secretary Fore, let me welcome you to the committee, as well as on behalf of Senator Lugar, who I'm sure will be with us shortly, and our—the ranking member of the full committee, and Senator Hagel, the ranking member of the subcommittee.

I know, Madam Secretary, that you know—that you have stated, in both past hearings and in writing to me, that you have made improving and expanding communications in consultation with Members of Congress one of your key goals. And I think you're to be commended for trying to forge a new alliance with Congress, and I want to thank you for and your staff for your responsiveness throughout this process.

I'd also note that today's nomination hearing, of course, is only the first step in what may be a long journey. This hearing today provides members of the Foreign Relations Committee the opportunity to ask you key questions about USAID and the "F" process, as well as questions relating to your position as Under Secretary of Management.

Obviously, how the nominee responds to the questions posed to her today, and questions submitted for the record, will help determine when and if the full committee schedules a vote on her nomination. Assuming that vote is scheduled and the nominee is voted

out of committee, her nomination would then go before the entire Senate. So, I say, again, today's nomination is only the first step in that journey, but an important one.

We've already had an entire hearing on the foreign assistance reform, or "F" process, so I'm not going to restate everything that we've already discussed in that hearing, but I want to reiterate that the administration's foreign assistance reform, in my view, is in need of serious reform, itself. Mr. Tobias created a top-down secretive process that continued the decimation of USAID, did not actually put all of U.S. foreign assistance under one umbrella, and tried to shift funding away from the long-term development goals like poverty alleviation.

So, Madam Secretary, as I told you at our last hearing, I believe you had a window of opportunity to make some serious changes to the "F" process. In both your hearing and in the subsequent letter, I asked for commitments from you in many areas, including repairing morale at USAID, focusing on poverty alleviation, providing for real consultation on the ground, rethinking the shift of funds from development assistance to more flexible accounts. I'm not going into detail about your responses to my letter on each of these issues at this time, although I and my staff will be closely following how you handle each of them.

I also know that you're aware that one of the most contentious issues we discussed was the possible closing of a number of USAID missions. Frankly, when it comes to the issues of closing USAID missions, I'm faced with a very strange situation. On the one hand, I have numerous experts and insiders coming to me, telling that there is a list of possible USAID missions to be closed. In fact, some of the USAID staff believe they were not going to certain USAID missions, because they were going to be closed, and outside organizations had been told that their projects were ending. On the other hand, USAID staff, in meetings with the Senate staff, have clearly stated that there was no list of USAID missions to be closed, and they have explained that there is only a, quote, "exercise" carried out to take a look at the issue, and never a determination that any missions should be closed.

I know, however, that this exercise did produce a list, which included Panama, Guyana, Namibia, Mongolia, Brazil, and Cyprus. USAID staff have promised us that there are no current plans to close these USAID missions during fiscal year 2008, and that the list I just read is not a list of missions to be closed. If you are confirmed, however, you may be faced with a decision about whether to close such missions, and let me be absolutely clear—at least for myself—I do not expect USAID to close any missions without intense consultations with Congress. An intense consultation with Congress does not mean that you come up here and tell us about the decision after you have made it.

Now, for many years I have been talking about the importance of increasing minority representation at the State Department, especially in the Foreign Service. I believe we need to make the face of America to the world look like America at home, and I'd like to take a moment to commend my colleague, Senator Obama, for being a leader on this issue. I know he wanted to be here, and he

will be submitting some statement and questions for the record in that regard.

Finally, Madam Secretary, as I said in the beginning of my statement, this hearing is the beginning of a long process. Right now, although I appreciate your efforts to be responsive to the committee, I don't know whether or not I'll support your nomination. In making my determination, I plan to look closely at your responses to my questions and those of other members of this committee. I also would like to see a true commitment to fix the failing foreign assistance reform process.

And, with those introductory words, let me turn to Senator Lugar, the ranking member of the full committee, for any remarks he may have.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I join you in welcoming Henrietta Fore for her confirmation hearing before the committee today. I appreciate the presence of the distinguished Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, by her side.

I appreciate, also, the cooperation shown to the committee throughout her tenure at the State Department by our nominee today. Ms. Fore is before the committee to be considered for confirmation as the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. She's already serving as the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance at the State Department, a position created by Secretary Rice.

If confirmed for this dual-hatted role, Ms. Fore will be tasked with overseeing and coordinating our Government's multifaceted outreach to countries where poverty and suffering create both a humanitarian imperative and a new security risk. Obviously, Secretary Rice has the highest regard for the nominee's abilities.

She has also received a sterling endorsement from the Foreign Affairs Council, an umbrella group of 11 organizations that focus on foreign policy management. I ask that the letter written by the Council's president, Tom Boyatt, be inserted in the record.

Senator MENENDEZ. Without objection.

Senator LUGAR. I thank the Chair.

[The information previously referred to appears at the end of this hearing in the Additional Material Submitted for the Record section.]

Senator LUGAR. Americans have long supported their Government's work to save lives and alleviate human misery. Since 9/11 and the harboring of terrorists in Afghanistan, we have acquired new insights into how failing states can provide fertile ground for nurturing global terrorism. This administration has taken on the challenge by making new commitments to international economic development. It has increased foreign aid spending and created new funding mechanisms. It has boosted America's focus on crises, such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, that can set developing societies back decades. It is preparing a response capability to rush civilians and reconstruction expertise to countries devastated by conflict. And it has sought to promote good government, sound economic

policies, and strong social programs focused on human development in all poor countries around the world.

Secretary Rice's instinct to seek greater coordination and clarity in the new firmament of foreign assistance is on the mark. We need to meld new activities in a constructive way with our traditional approaches. We need to prioritize our goals and design our strategies in a way that is transparent to policymakers, legislators, and recipients, alike. We need to be able to measure, analyze, and assess outcomes so we can tell if we're making a difference.

Every dollar of foreign assistance needs to count toward our hopes for a more peaceful and prosperous world.

In the two key areas of USAID Administrator and director of the process of foreign aid coordination that Secretary Rice initiated a little more than a year ago, the Congress is looking for leadership that strikes the appropriate balance between the need for strategic direction from headquarters and the flexibility in the field to address the unique challenges posed by each recipient country.

To inform our own views, I directed the Republican staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to undertake a field-based study of our foreign assistance efforts. Now ongoing, we are looking at assistance funded by the State Department, USAID, the Defense Department, and other agencies, in more than 20 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, and we're paying particular attention to the new coordination process to see how it is mirrored in the field. We're looking at USAID programs, section 1206 security assistance, Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, known as PEPFAR, as well as how programs run by such U.S. Government departments as Agriculture, Treasury, and Homeland Security are coordinated at the embassy level.

In a previous staff report, "Embassies as Command Posts in the Campaign Against Terror," it was recommended that the Secretary of State should insist that all security assistance, including section 1206 funding, be included under her authority in the new foreign assistance coordination process. Ms. Fore, the committee today will be interested in how you view your own role in making certain that our response to violent extremism is calibrated, supported by an appropriate mix of civilian and military foreign aid.

I plan to share the findings of our current study with you as it's completed. I welcome you to the committee, and I look forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator HAGEL, would you care to make some remarks?

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA**

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I do have a statement, which I will ask to be submitted—

Senator MENENDEZ. Without objection, all of the members' statements will be submitted to the record.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. For the record. Thank you.

Senator HAGEL. I add my welcome to Secretary Fore and to our distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from Texas. And I

await Secretary Fore's testimony, and then I would be very pleased to pursue questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary Fore back to the committee as the President's nominee to be USAID Administrator. [As the Chairman has noted,] if confirmed, Secretary Fore would also serve as the State Department's Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance—a position created by Secretary Rice to oversee long-needed and unfinished reform of U.S. foreign assistance programs.

Since August 2005, Secretary Fore has served as the Under Secretary of State for Management, a position critical to the State Department's operations. In the last few years, the State Department has faced new, more difficult, and in many ways, unprecedented personnel and staffing challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the growing number of unaccompanied posts around the world.

Focused attention to the stewardship of the State Department and its Foreign and Civil Service employees must remain a top priority for Secretary Rice and her team. As USAID Director, Secretary Fore will need to devote considerable attention to the management of USAID's personnel.

Before serving at the State Department, Secretary Fore held significant positions in government and the private sector, including Director of the U.S. Mint, and chairman and president of Stockton Products. She also served 4 years at USAID from 1989 to 1993, including as the Assistant Administrator for Private Enterprise and the Assistant Administrator for Asia.

The dual-hatted position of USAID Administrator and Director of Foreign Assistance is one of the most vital foreign policy positions in the U.S. Government—and one of the most challenging. The responsibilities include the billions of dollars of U.S. taxpayers money that go to the core of our efforts to address many of the fundamental challenges of the 21st century—easing crushing poverty, creating economic opportunities, tackling corruption, rebuilding war-torn societies, and fighting pandemic disease. Basic development and growth in economic opportunities for the billions who have not enjoyed the prosperity of the 20th century must remain a central tenet guiding our foreign assistance.

This position is also charged with reforming America's foreign assistance system. I welcomed the Secretary's decision last year to conduct a fundamental overhaul of U.S. foreign assistance—a significant undertaking. While there have been changes, the results are mixed and the process has not enjoyed a satisfactory level of transparency. In a recent study by the Hudson Institute, it noted that the private sector devoted over \$33 billion in assistance to developing countries in 2005, compared to about \$28 billion in U.S. Government foreign assistance. Public-private partnership on assistance to developing countries enhances, rather than undermines, the effectiveness of the U.S. Government's foreign assistance programs. There should be more effective consultation between the public and private sectors and more effective harnessing of resources where possible.

The war in Iraq has incurred an overwhelming cost to America's attention, leadership, and resources, which I believe has undermined our attention, resources, and efforts in Afghanistan. Secretary Fore, I will seek your commitment that United States assistance for Afghanistan will be among your top priorities. We cannot allow Afghanistan to slide backward. This area represents the real, central front in our war against al-Qaeda and terrorists.

Finally, Madam Secretary, you cannot accomplish your responsibilities by relying on Washington-based advisors. Our field-based diplomats, development specialists, and experts on the ground must play a central role in guiding our foreign assistance. You must be committed to seeking and welcoming their advice and recommendations.

I would like to acknowledge your family—husband, Richard, and children, Jonathan, Jessica, Rebecca, and Richard—for their support and contributions.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important nomination hearing. I look forward to questioning Secretary Fore, and to the committee's upcoming consideration of her nomination.

Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator.

Well, with that, I see that the senior Senator from Texas is here with you, Secretary Fore, so I would welcome the Senator's re-

marks on behalf of the nominee, and then we will turn to you, Madam Secretary. We'll ask to keep your opening statement to about 7 minutes. Your entire statement will be included in the record.

And, with that, Senator Hutchison.

**STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS**

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and the distinguished ranking member of the full committee, and Senator Hagel.

I am very pleased to introduce to you Henrietta Holsman Fore for the position—the permanent position of Administrator of the USAID.

She is highly qualified for this post, and I know all of you know her outstanding record in government service, and she is the Acting Administrator, right now.

In 2005, she became the Under Secretary of State for Management, and, in that role, has been responsible for the people, resources, facilities, technology, and security at the Department of State. Prior to her service at the Department of State, she served as the 37th Director of the U.S. Mint in the Department of Treasury. She served as a presidential appointee at USAID back in 1989 to 1993, as Assistant Administrator for Private Enterprise and then as Assistant Administrator for Asia. During that period, she founded, and served as the first chairman of, the United States Asia Environmental Partnership, a coalition of business, government, and community organizations in the United States and 31 Asian nations. She also was a founder of the Financial Services Volunteer Corps.

She has been recognized for achievements with the Department of Treasury's highest honor, the Alexander Hamilton Award. She also received her bachelor of arts degree in history from Wellesley and a master of science degree in public administration from the University of Northern Colorado. She studied international politics at Oxford and at Stanford University Graduate School of Business.

She is married and lives in Washington, DC, and Nevada.

Mr. Chairman, just on a personal note, I want to say that I have known Henrietta Holsman Fore since before she was in this administration. We are both members of an organization of women entrepreneurs called Committee of 200. She has been an outstanding entrepreneur. And I think you can see from her record that she has also tried to give back in public service. I recommend her highly. I've known her for a long time. And I know that she has the capability to manage, and she also has the heart to do the right thing for our country in USAID.

I have traveled extensively in foreign countries where USAID can make a huge difference in the image of America and in the actual help that is given. And sometimes I find USAID is the best thing that we have going. And I know that she believes that, as well. And I want to make sure that we do keep it strong, that we keep it doing the right things and helping developing nations learn—the people of these nations learn how to become self-sufficient in their own right. And I hope that, while you have all of your

questions, that are certainly legitimate, I hope that, in the end, you will see that she is a qualified nominee for this very important job for our country.

Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.

With that, Secretary Fore, the floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF HON. HENRIETTA HOLSMAN FORE, NOMINEE
TO BE THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Ms. FORE. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez. Senator Lugar, Senator Hagel, it's good to see both of you.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today as the President's nominee to lead the United States Agency for International Development, USAID.

As you are aware, I have served this administration proudly since 2001—as Senator Hutchison mentioned, first as the 37th Director of the United States Mint in the Department of Treasury, and, since August 2005, as Under Secretary of State for Management. Since May 7, 2007, I've served as Acting Administrator of USAID and Acting Director of United States Foreign Assistance in the Department of State.

If I have the honor of being confirmed, I will be returning to an agency of remarkable and extraordinarily capable people, where I first served from 1989 to 1993. This committee has made it clear that we can, and must, use foreign assistance more effectively. You have also indicated that reform must be a substantially consultative process. I take this mandate seriously. In fact, the process began the day after I was nominated.

I have spent much of the last 2½ months listening. The message that I have heard from Congressional Members, from your staffs, from our stakeholders in the humanitarian and development community, from educators and businesspeople, from our host countries and recipients of our assistance in the field, other U.S. foreign assistance implementors, from the Secretary of State, and, of course, from USAID itself, is a remarkably consistent one. They share with me a perception of foreign assistance importance in America—to America and the developing world, and they see USAID as central to the success of this Nation's development mission.

In short, USAID's unique, long-term development focus is an invaluable instrument for U.S. foreign policy, for U.S. economic policy, and our Nation's humanitarian outreach. I am encouraged by this consensus, but I want to make clear that listening is not an end in itself. If confirmed, I intend to build on this consensus and use it as a basis for scaling up the Agency for International Development. For this, I will need your counsel, your guidance, and your support.

I firmly believe that our people are our most important asset. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary's transformational diplomacy goal by ensuring that we have the people who can work on the complex tasks that the 21st century foreign assistance requires. With the active support and backing of Congress, we can stem the tide of declining numbers of USAID employees in our Foreign Serv-

ice and in our civil service ranks. I will also upgrade skills and training for USAID's employees already in place, and will put in place a new capacity to work for America. We will increase our training and career development opportunities.

The economic, political, social, and technological developments of recent years have brought with them a need for new nontraditional approaches that embrace transnational concerns involving a range of nontraditional and nongovernmental foreign assistance providers. To ensure that we are not working at cross-purposes, but for shared purposes, we will need to engage these new partners and stakeholders and prepare them for the challenges ahead. USAID needs employees with diverse backgrounds and broad substantive expertise. My goal is to hire, not just recruit, diverse employees. And, if confirmed, I will work hard to ensure a professional environment at USAID, where every employee feels valued.

The United States leads as the largest donor country and with the largest private donor community in the world. USAID should be leading, both intellectually and programmatically. So, first and foremost, we must replenish our core workforce and our core skills.

In recent years, Congress has appropriated less for our operating expenses than the agency has requested. And, as you know, OE is what makes our footprint in Washington and the field possible. If confirmed in the coming months, I will explore with you what options we might have to address our 2008 OE stringency.

I've asked USAID leadership to engage with me in analyzing how we might position USAID for the future by addressing the composition of our workforce and determining how the workforce might be more effectively repositioned, trained, and deployed. The Secretary and I believe that U.S. interests would be well-served by a strong, well-trained, and well-deployed USAID. If confirmed, I intend to work very hard to find ways to achieve this result. I will engage the Congress in this issue as my first order of business.

As we align and harmonize our administrative services at USAID and the Department of State, I will be asking Congress to consider new investments in information technology for USAID. The greater transparency and openness that I pledge requires modern information and communications systems at USAID and at the Department of State. Substantial investments will be required to bring USAID up to a level that will sustain our 21st-century vision. The payoffs will be substantial. They will benefit the United States over the long run by increasing effectiveness and efficiency of our programs, enabling us to report to you with much greater detail and timeliness, and to integrate more closely with the programs of other United States Government agencies.

Additionally, such investments will enable subsequent administrators to be more responsible stewards of the United States taxpayers' dollars. These people and these tools will help, each in their own way, to reach our aim, which is to significantly improve the human condition. Our foreign assistance programs save lives and lift individuals from poverty. We want to lift nations and their citizens to permanent prosperity. We want to create more donor nations. We want countries to build their own schools and train their own teachers. We want healthy young children, with bright futures

ahead. We want to partner with public and private organizations and individuals throughout the world.

In conclusion, if I have the honor of being confirmed by the Senate as Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, it will be a pleasure to work with you once again in the service of our great country.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fore follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HENRIETTA HOLSMAN FORE, NOMINEE TO BE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Hagel and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

I am honored to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to lead the United States Agency for International Development as its Administrator. I am proud to have served in two other positions in this administration. From 2001 to 2005, I served as the 37th Director of the United States Mint in the Department of the Treasury. Since August 2005, I have held the position of Under Secretary of State for Management.

I have been Acting Administrator of USAID since May 7, and have been very active since then in preparing myself to lead the agency. If the Senate approves my nomination, it will mark a return to the agency for me, where I served from 1989—1993, as Assistant Administrator for Private Enterprise and as Assistant Administrator for Asia.

Several weeks ago, I appeared before this committee and pledged to you a new openness in the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and at USAID. If I am confirmed as Administrator, I said that I would endeavor to improve communications, enhance collaboration, and bring greater simplification and transparency to decision making in foreign assistance and for the agency. I see USAID as the intellectual and operational leader of Foreign Assistance for the United States Government and with your assistance, will assemble the resources necessary for that leadership.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have spent the last several weeks working to make good on this pledge. I began within the agency itself, the day after my nomination. On average, I spend about half of my day at USAID. Much of this time has been spent listening to the leadership and staff at USAID as well as doing “walk throughs” to speak with all my colleagues in the agency.

I have also consulted extensively with the humanitarian and development assistance community here in Washington seeking their counsel on how USAID can better focus its resources to have the greatest impact on the challenge of poverty and instability around the world and to more effectively pursue opportunities for long-term development, spreading democracy, fostering economic growth, and investing in people through education and health.

I also intend to be fully engaged in the United States and abroad in public diplomacy outreach efforts to build greater understanding of U.S. foreign assistance and the role it has played in building a more peaceful, prosperous world. In this regard, I was privileged to travel to Africa last week as part of the United States delegation to the African Growth and Opportunity Forum and to visit several USAID programs with our field staff.

Outreach is important to helping build understanding of U.S. foreign policy here in this country and the role of USAID's development efforts around the world. There is no better public diplomacy for the United States than a diplomacy of deeds, providing effective foreign assistance through effective communications about these efforts to host country audiences.

Finally—and most important—I pledge to improve communication with Congress. I will come to you earlier and more often, seeking your views on what we propose to do. I want to make sure that we answer your calls and provide full and timely answers to your questions. I will, if confirmed, consult fully with the Congress on the major issues facing the agency.

The fiscal year 2008 budget is now in your hands and early next year we will be coming to you to present the President's request for fiscal year 2009. Should I be confirmed, I pledge to work with you to make our consultation closer and more effective.

The Secretary's goal of transformational diplomacy is in the forefront as I consider the issues facing me, if I am confirmed. We are helping people to better their lives,

to build their own nations, and to transform their futures. The administration's foreign assistance reform is critical to that goal in that it moves us toward a single, more coherent, and better integrated foreign assistance budget, making the best use of the resources that you appropriate for foreign assistance. It allows program and resource allocation decisions to be based on a comprehensive view of all accounts and resources flows.

This committee has made it clear that we can, and must, use foreign assistance more effectively. You have also indicated that reform must be a substantially more consultative process. I agree and take this mandate seriously.

During my tenure as Acting Administrator these past 2½ months, I have sounded out a number of ambassadors and mission directors for their views on how to strengthen U.S. foreign assistance and to make it more effective and visible in the countries they represent. I am soliciting similar suggestions from the field to make the voices of those who actually implement our programs more prominent in their formulation. I have charged the agency's Chief Operating Officer to convene a conference of mission directors in Washington, now tentatively scheduled for October. We are reviewing the after action report on the reform process to date and will be considering the suggestions of internal working groups in the agency that have been charged with adapting agency practices to better meet the Secretary of State's transformational diplomacy goals. I would like to underscore the fact that we are in the early stages of the reform process. I will work closely with you to strengthen and improve the process as we move forward.

Much has changed since my last tour at USAID. The demise of the Soviet Union, the integration of global communications and markets, the growing menace of global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and transnational crime, the surge of HIV/AIDS, and the threat of other infectious diseases—all these are hallmarks of a significantly altered 21st century landscape for development.

As the National Security Strategy underscores, the locus of our concerns has shifted from great power rivalries to failed and failing states. Americans now understand that security in their homeland depends, as never before, on bringing security, freedom, and opportunity to the underdeveloped regions of the world and to countries far beyond our borders.

In short, the challenges that America now faces have significantly increased the importance of development to security and well-being. This in turn has prompted a rethinking and redesigning of foreign assistance mechanisms as well as unprecedented commitment of resources to foreign assistance, which has nearly tripled over the last 7 years. Development is now recognized as comparable in importance to diplomacy and defense as key to U.S. national security. In fact, foreign assistance is one of our most powerful assets. In addition to reducing poverty, foreign assistance shapes "hearts and minds" abroad and it shapes our quality of life and prosperity, here at home.

Let me turn to our people. Our people and our partners around the world are now operating in more areas of conflict and unstable post-conflict environments. This is far more demanding and difficult work, and more often we are working side-by-side with the military.

USAID is staffed by remarkable and extraordinarily capable people, both here in Washington and in over 80 missions around the world. As Americans, we are well-served by the hard work and dedication of all these fine individuals who stand ready to respond to humanitarian emergencies anywhere they arise, and willingly accept personal hardship and separation from family in some of the most remote and deprived areas of the world.

USAID boasts an impressive track record of success that has rightfully earned it a reputation as the world's premier development agency. In over 60 years of development and humanitarian work, it has been instrumental in dramatically reducing infant and child mortality, raising agricultural production through scientific innovation, spurring economic growth and helping build democracies. In those years we have created a great number of friends—from students to Government Ministers who have come to study and travel in the United States—and we have created a reserve of goodwill.

If confirmed as Administrator, I intend to build on these successes. My goal is to reinvigorate USAID and to help build a platform for my successors which will position them to better meet the unprecedented challenges and opportunities of today's world.

I am greatly encouraged by what I have heard in my "listening tour." The message I have heard—from you in Congress as well as from your staffs, from our stakeholders in the humanitarian and development community in Washington, from educators and business people, from our host countries and the recipients of our assistance in the field, other government agencies within this administration, from the

Secretary of State, and, of course, from within USAID itself—is a remarkably consistent one. Everyone I have consulted shares with me a perception of foreign assistance as more important than ever to the welfare of the world and to this Nation's security. And they see USAID as central to the success of this Nation's development mission. In short, USAID is unique both in its reach and the flexibility of its programming. And it is a valuable instrument of U.S. foreign policy, U.S. economic policy, and our Nation's humanitarian outreach.

I want to make clear that the "listening mode" I have adopted these last several weeks will continue. In this regard, I am encouraged by the consensus I have found. I also want to make clear that "listening" is not an end in itself. It is my intention to build on the consensus I have found as the basis for an action plan for the agency. And for this I will need the counsel, guidance, and support of the Congress during the time I am Administrator, should I be confirmed, as well as the support of USAID's other key stakeholders.

If a revitalized USAID is to make its contribution to the success of our foreign assistance mission and to this Nation's security, first and foremost, we will need to replenish a core workforce that has been dramatically reduced over the course of several decades.

The trend lines in this regard are as disturbing and have reached a critically low level. In 1980, there were approximately 4,000 direct hires in the USAID workforce; today there are 2,000, managing comparable amounts of programming dollars.

The reservoir of experienced personnel that existed a generation ago no longer exists. We have lost a cadre of development experts, versed in the myriad facets of foreign assistance, who are long-term, institutionally bound to the agency and closely identified with it. While today it is both common and appropriate for the agency to contract for much of the expertise to carry out its mission, current staffing levels are not adequate to lead and manage the programs and projects effectively. Moreover, that the agency faces the retirement bow wave common to much of the rest of the Federal Government, and that can only exacerbate these problems.

In recent years, Congress has appropriated less for our operating expenses (OE) than the agency has requested. OE is what makes possible our "footprint"—our people and where we deploy them. In the coming months, should I be confirmed, I will be exploring with you the implications of this OE situation. I can assure you that the agency is analyzing in detail how we might position USAID for the future by addressing the composition of our workforce and determining how it might be more effectively repositioned, trained, and deployed. I believe that U.S. interests would be well served by a strong, well-trained, well-deployed USAID. I intend to work very hard to find ways to achieve that result, and, should I be confirmed, I would plan to engage the Congress as a first order of business on these and related matters.

As we improve administrative services at USAID and the Department of State, I will also be asking Congress to consider significant new investments in the Information Technology at the agency's disposal. The greater transparency and openness that I am committed to requires a modern information systems architecture at USAID and the Department of State. That will take substantial investments and time, but will pay off dramatically over the long run by helping us manage our programs and activities much more efficiently and effectively.

Last, you have asked me about morale at USAID and how I will address what is perceived to be a lingering problem there. I want you to know that I am a hands-on manager and will establish a very visible and accessible presence at the agency, should I be confirmed. I have already done so as an Acting Administrator. I believe in our USAID people and our programs. Our people are enormously dedicated and rightfully proud of the work they accomplish every day in small and large areas of the world. USAID needs employees with diverse backgrounds and broad substantive expertise. My goal is to hire, not just to recruit, diverse employees. If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure a professional environment at USAID where every employee feels valued.

In conclusion, if I am confirmed by the Senate as Administrator of USAID, it will be an honor to work together with you once again in the service of our great country.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your statement.

We'll start off with 7-minute rounds, and then I'm sure there'll be other opportunities for further follow-up beyond that. And the Chair will recognize himself to start that conversation.

Madam Secretary, the committee has learned that, on two occasions in the past 12 months, some 20 to 30 employees of AID re-

ceived briefings by the Office of Political Affairs at the White House. One of those briefings was held at AID headquarters. One of these was at the old executive office building. And I understand that Senator Biden, the chairman of the full committee, wrote you a letter last week seeking additional information about these briefings.

I'd like you to tell the committee what you know about these briefings.

Ms. FORE. I know what I have read in the newspaper, and I have read the letter from Senator Biden.

Senator MENENDEZ. You know nothing independently of the newspaper or Senator Biden's letter?

Ms. FORE. I was not present at either event, and, as you know, I have been only involved with USAID for approximately 2½ months.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, you had no previous knowledge about this, either in your acting capacity or in your previous capacity in the role that you've had at the State Department, until now?

Ms. FORE. I have been aware that a number of informational briefings have been taking place over the years, but I have not been aware of these two particular instances, and I was not present at either one.

Senator MENENDEZ. When you say "informational briefings," these have been described by public accounts, as well as a copy that has been received by the committee of what the informational briefing was, and I think that the informational briefing could be described as nothing else as a political briefing. Is that what you're referring to as "informational briefings"?

Ms. FORE. I have not—I was not present at these briefings. I believe that they are informational briefings, and—

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, let's look at the information. But you did say you weren't at these two briefings, but you did say you were aware of what you describe as "informational briefings." Have you ever been at any one of these informational briefings, outside of these two briefings?

Ms. FORE. When I was at the Department of Treasury, there were informational briefings for senior individuals in the Department of Treasury, and I was one of those individuals.

Senator MENENDEZ. And what was the centerpiece of that informational briefing the essence of politics, the political landscape in the country?

Ms. FORE. Yes, it was the political landscape, to try to make sure that we were aware of issues that were relevant to legislation or activities that were going on that might better inform us, as individuals.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, the memo that we have, that was used at these meetings, that—the two that you were not at—talks about not legislation, but talks about "race is extremely close," talks about "split districts represented by Democrats," talks about "Democrats having a precarious hold on power," talks about "targeting House races in the year 2008," talks about "battle for the Senate," and talks about where there is a "GOP defense" and where there is a "GOP offense," including my home State of New Jersey.

Do you think it is appropriate, as you are up for the nomination of this Department, that AID employees be spending their time being briefed on the electoral landscape?

Ms. FORE. I think it is important that we follow all regulations and appropriate legal procedures. And I would be very pleased, Senator, to relook at what our guidelines are in the U.S. Agency for International Development, because there are very strong guidelines about not being involved with political candidates and other activities, to make sure that our people are well briefed and really understand what the guidelines are.

Senator MENENDEZ. To the extent that you went to some of these briefings, how did the invitation get extended to you?

Ms. FORE. I believe that the invitation would have come through our White House liaison. As you know, most departments have a White House liaison, and that would generally be how such invitations would come to us.

Well, from my own view, I don't think that it is appropriate. I think it is a corruption of the process to have employees—and, I'm not sure, do you know whether the 20 to 30 employees of AID that received briefings, were they all political appointees or were some of them civil servants? Have you looked at that yet, since Senator Biden sent you the letter?

Ms. FORE. I have not yet looked at that, but we will look at that and respond.

[NOTE. The information requested above appears at the end of this hearing in the "Additional Material Submitted for the Record" section.]

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I hope that's a high priority for you, because it certainly, in my mind, is the inappropriate use of the time of the men and women of AID, to be being informed about where the battleground States are and which are targeted House races and which are targeted Senate races. I'm not quite sure how that promotes the development agenda abroad, the foreign policy agenda of the United States, to be using the time of USAID employees for the purposes of what is, in essence, a political strategy program. And, to me, that seem—clearly seems a corruption of a process that we should and I would hope that, if you were to receive the approval of this committee, that you would have a strong opposition to. I heard you say you're going to look at the regulations. I would want the Assistant Secretary to be telling me, "I will not be having my employees at USAID spending their time on the domestic politics and political landscape of the country. I'm going to have them developing the best programs to put America's best foot abroad, in a development context."

Ms. FORE. Well, Senator, I, too, would like to see our people spending their time on creating the best programs overseas for development and for foreign assistance, because that is their main mission, and that is what they are to spend their time on.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, we look forward to your response to Senator Biden's letter.

With that, let me recognize the distinguished ranking member, Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

For the 28 years I've served on the committee we've had Republicans and Democrats leadership, different administrations, and the age-old battle goes on as to how many of our ambassadors should be so-called political people, as opposed to Foreign Service. Ditto for under secretaries and others down the line. Roughly, in all administrations, a quarter to a third have been so-called political people. By that, it means many of them were vigorously involved in the election of whoever was elected President of the United States. Vigorously. Now, it's inconceivable these people never had a thought about partisan politics. They thought about it all the time, trying to elect whoever was going to be President—probably didn't forget about it after they went out to their posts.

Now, without trivializing the matter, I suspect it is not appropriate to have charts of candidates coming and going in an official function attributed to Karl Rove or anybody else. I would hope that the administration would cease and desist from that, but, likewise, the subsequent administrations would cease and desist from activities of that variety. Within this committee we've had members on both sides of the aisle who rant and rave about political appointees, who berate these poor souls who come before our committee, under that guise. Most of them, somehow or other, are confirmed, and many are distinguished in their service.

But I hope—and I take the point of the Chairman today—that you will not have any briefings, if you are confirmed, that have lists of candidates, either prospective or past, or political reminiscence on the job. There is a time and a place for that, and not inside the Department.

Now, having said all that, let me ask you, What are your plans for the so-called "F" process? And I want to define "F process," the reform effort that Mr. Tobias headed at the State Department to try to bring into the fore the foreign policy programs examined at the country level by those who were administering, those experiencing them. Can you give us some comment about that process and how you would forward it?

Ms. FORE. Yes, thank you very much, Senator.

I think it's been a very interesting time. This is a bold goal, to try to gather together all of the foreign assistance that we, as the United States Government, invest on behalf of the American people. And it is very complex. It is not easy. But we have begun. And I have spoken to Senator Menendez before about the fact that we're really at the beginning; we're not at the middle, and we're not at the end of this process.

So, the first area that I began to look at was, How much was our involvement with the field? Because the field, in the end, is where all of our programs are carried out, it's where our implementing partners are doing their good work and reaching out and helping others to help themselves. And I do not think that we have involved the field enough. And in our after-action report, one of the key findings was that we needed to involve the field more.

So, we've started involving the field more. We are now involving the field before the Secretary makes her decisions on country-level programs. We are now making sure that the field can make some choices, in terms of implementors of the programs in the field. And I've had very instructive discussions with our ambassadors and

mission directors in the field on the things that they see that we should be working on, and how we could improve the process. I am hearing that our process, this year, for fiscal year 2009, is much improved. I would anticipate, for next year, that the process will be even more improved. But, starting with the field, that is where we began.

Second, I very much want to streamline and simplify the process, and I would also like to get greater transparency into the system, for USAID, for State Department, and for implementing partners; everyone needs to be able to see into the system, so they know ways that they can improve it and how they can see themselves as a part of a larger whole in a country-development program.

So, I think we have a good start, but there's much to do. This will be a continuing process. And, with your help and your counsel, I think we can leave this in even better shape in 18 months' time.

Senator LUGAR. In this administration, there's been debate, among friends and critics, as to which has been paramount, counterterrorism efforts in the field or alleviation of extreme poverty. The two are not necessary exclusive, but some would charge that one has taken precedence over the other.

What is your observation, at least initially, of what has been occurring in the field as people from the field come forward and give the testimony that you're encouraging?

Ms. FORE. Yes, it's a very interesting question. It's one that has wide ramifications for how the United States policies are seen abroad, as well as how we invest our resources. There are many instances where counterterrorism, or the peace and security portfolio, is the most important area to attend to first, because, without some basis of security, it's very hard for people to begin lives that are at all normal. Their quality of life is very poor. And yet, one can never forget the humanitarian and development side. So, we are trying to find a balance. It is something that the new foreign assistance framework—the Secretary and I have been very committed to, to find a balance between these areas, but also to find a balance between short-term and long-term development needs, because they are all important.

What we are hearing from the field is that some ambassadors and mission directors and implementors, nonprofit organizations in the field, feel very strongly that we should be doing more of this, or more of that. But, in the end, almost everyone, as we begin to talk at roundtables, begins to see that there has to be a very strong balance. But it is a difficult world. It is a less secure world. It is a world with many more countries in conflict and in post-conflict. And thus, it is the world that we have.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much for your answers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And we're going to alternate both sides, so I'd recognize Senator Nelson now.

Senator NELSON. Good afternoon, Ms. Fore.

We have talked privately about the passport fiasco that occurred under your watch. And I want to ask you a few questions about that with regard to how it will relate to your management capabilities with regard to this new position that you are nominated for.

As you have heard me describe, Ms. Hardy was here, about a month ago, and there were a lot of frustrated Senators. And they expressed the frustration of thousands of the folks back home. There have been angry phone calls. It's forced the State Department to immediately try to react. And the State Department has had to divert resources. Do you consider this a management failure?

Ms. FORE. Well, I consider it a challenge, and one that we must overcome, because we have American citizens, who are our customers, that need to have passports. And so, our job, our sole focus, is how to make sure that every American who comes forward and who applies for a passport gets it in a timely manner.

Senator NELSON. Indeed, it's a challenge, but I'm trying to focus on the management. Now, Mrs. Hardy, who was here a month ago, she took the entire blame for this, and, as recently as, I think, yesterday, she, as Assistant Secretary, accepted—and I use her words—“complete responsibility,” end of quote, for the passport fiasco. And what I would like to understand from you, since you were her boss, as Under Secretary for Management in the State Department, do you bear some of this responsibility?

Ms. FORE. Yes. I think we all bear the responsibility whenever we are not able to meet the expectations of the American people. The good news, Senator, is that passports are much desired by the American public, and that we will be better off, as a Nation, with more Americans carrying passports.

Senator NELSON. Well, share with the committee—what was your role in preparing for the excess demand for the passports under the new Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative?

Ms. FORE. In looking forward to what sorts of demands that we thought that we would have, a group of advisors were gathered, in Consular Affairs, which included outside private consultants and individuals from private industry, from travel and tourism, and individuals who have been working in Consular Affairs, with decades of experience. And they gathered to think through and look forward, for the next 1 year, 5 years, what sorts of demand we could anticipate as a department. And their sense was that it was perhaps a 33 percent increase in demand. And then, all of us begin to work to try to gather the resources. These are both the contractors, the funds, the people, the training, and the raw materials, like passport books. We try to gather them, to be able to fulfill that estimate.

The estimate was low. And what happened this spring, in January, February, March, and April, was that the requests, the applications, came in at double the rate that had been anticipated. It's unprecedented in history, and it just was not seen.

So—

Senator NELSON. The estimates, originally, for excess demand, were last fall. Why, for example, would you—as a manager overseeing Mrs. Hardy, why would you allow the outside contractor to go all the way until the month of May of this year in order to hire additional personnel to handle the backlog, when, in fact, it was known last fall?

Ms. FORE. Senator Nelson, we have a number of contractors who are helping. We have contractors who work the call centers. We

have contractors who are working the lockbox. We have a number of types of contractors who are by our side in manning the windows and doing much of the work for creating passports. And we tried to work with every one of these contractors to get the service and to make sure that they understood the increasing demands that we were seeing in this entire supply chain.

So, I and others were on the phone talking to contractors, making sure that we were getting all of the authorities we needed to bring back retirees, to get volunteers, to put everyone to work, to get enough training programs going, because we have to do this thoughtfully; it is not something that we can do lightly. We bear a responsibility to do this properly and well—

Senator NELSON. In this case—

Ms. FORE [continuing]. But to gather these resources.

Senator NELSON. In this case, there was only one contractor. It was Citibank that was the lockbox, and the ones that—it was way on up until May that they did not start hiring additional personnel, and they just got more and more behind the eight ball.

Well, let me ask you—I have two remaining questions, and not much time left—how many Foreign Service officers have been brought home from their current post, or taken out of the Foreign Service Institute, to help process passports?

Ms. FORE. Well, at this moment, we have 273 Foreign Service officers, who are volunteers, who are working around the country. We have another 350 Department employees, who are volunteering to work on the telephone task force. So, these could be customer service. We now have the ability to use our IT systems and remotely adjudicate renewals of passports, so they are staying in place, and they are in London and New Delhi and Chennai. So, we also have people who are offshore, our Foreign Service officers, U.S. citizens, who are remotely adjudicating passports.

Senator NELSON. Well, taking them out of their existing jobs and having them meet this, has this had an effect upon our foreign diplomacy?

Ms. FORE. Well, we are all working very hard. And, for most of us, we are working very long hours. You know we're working 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, at our passport centers. So, for many of our people, they're working a full day, plus then they work another 4 hours on passports. So, everyone's trying to pitch in. I cannot tell you how hard everyone is working. They are just trying to make sure that there is not one American citizen that is without a passport and that—whose travel plans need to be delayed.

Senator NELSON. And for the \$60 expedited fee, are you going to make sure that those who did not get it expedited are going to have a refund of their money?

Ms. FORE. Yes. We have several options for you on that, Senator, which maybe we can speak about with you later.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Well, I'd be just as happy to hear it now. I don't want to take the time—

Ms. FORE. All right.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Of the committee members. Let's go on with you all, but, in the course of this hearing.

Senator MENENDEZ. All right. Thank you.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And welcome, again, Secretary Fore.

Speaking of passports, as you no doubt saw in Sunday's Washington Post—rather significant story about a report that our Ambassador to Iraq, Ambassador Crocker, if I have this correct, sent you a cable, and, according to the paper, the cable urged the United States to offer United States immigrant visas to all Iraqi employees who worked for the United States Government in Iraq. You may know that this is part of a Kennedy-Hagel bill that is larger and more substantial than just the visas, but deals with Iraqi resettlement here in the United States, those who have assisted the United States Government over the last 5 years.

I think this committee would be interested in your response to that story. What is the current status of Ambassador Crocker's cable, and anything else you can tell us about that issue?

Ms. FORE. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

We think this is a very important issue. There is a special responsibility that we bear for those brave Iraqi nationals who have been working by our side, and we feel it most acutely in USAID and Department of State and Department of Defense, because they are often by our sides. As you know, there is some legislation which allows us to have special immigrant visas for translators. And we certainly welcome legislation which would allow this to be broader, so that it could cover more of the Iraqi nationals who would like to be covered under the special immigrant visas.

There is a second route that Assistant Secretary Ellen Sauerbrey has spoken about quite frequently and well, which is that of the refugee status. Our Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration has processed, and looked at, a number of opportunities and ways for Iraqi nationals to come to the United States.

And there is a third area that we have worked on, which is for internally displaced persons, and ways that we, whether it's United States Agency for International Development, can help with Iraqi nationals who have moved to either the borders along Jordan or other countries, and ways that we can help in education or with humanitarian assistance for those individuals.

But we do feel that there is a responsibility, and we certainly like to encourage legislation that would help these individuals.

Senator HAGEL. Well, if I read that story correctly—I've not seen the cables, incidentally—Ambassador Crocker is putting some rather significant urgency on this issue. And if I interpret at least the story correctly, without having read the cables—and, by the way, this is an issue he brought before this committee last week, and it's an issue he has discussed with me privately—I definitely got the sense that he felt that the State Department should be making this as a high a priority as there is, and doing something about it. So, what are we doing about it?

Ms. FORE. Well, we, in the State Department, can't do everything alone; we just don't have enough authorities. So, all of the chief-of-mission authorities that he can exercise, he has, because we agree with him that he should have those authorities. So, he has those. We are looking to see if there are any additional authorities

which he might be able to have, and we do not have a full answer on that, as yet.

Senator HAGEL. When will we have an answer?

Ms. FORE. I would think, shortly.

Senator HAGEL. Well, I would like for you to get back to the committee on that. My vote may well hinge on that.

Senator HAGEL. I would like to know, also, how many Iraqis have we resettled in the United States?

Ms. FORE. I don't know the answer to that question, sir.

Senator HAGEL. Well, the answer is about 60 or 70. Now, if this administration is putting this kind of urgency on this issue, and we are saying all the things, from the President on down, that we owe—just as you have said, Madam Secretary—we owe this to these good, faithful Iraqis who have supported us, at great risk. To your point, it seems we're not matching our words with our actions. And I would like a better answer to this question. And I would expect that. And certainly, my vote would very much depend on that, because there's a disconnect, in my mind, somewhere. If our Ambassador is saying one thing, in rather urgent tone—at least that's the way the story in the paper reflected it; and if I saw the cables, I might have a different interpretation—but is that your interpretation, that Ambassador Crocker was rather urgent and serious about this?

Ms. FORE. Absolutely. And we feel that same urgency in the Department, which is why every chief-of-mission authority that we can give him, we have given him. What we are looking into whether there are additional authorities? Beyond that, we will need help from Congress.

Senator HAGEL. Well, why would he send it to you? The cable.

Ms. FORE. Because I am Under Secretary of State for Management.

Senator HAGEL. For management. So, that tells me that we've got some bottleneck somewhere; to some extent, focused on what Senator Nelson was talking about. So, I will leave that issue where it is, and you know my sense of that.

Let me move to the issue of Afghanistan. What's your assessment of our assistance programs in Afghanistan?

Ms. FORE. I have not, as yet, visited to see the USAID programs within Afghanistan. I have visited Kabul to visit the embassy, and also have been out to a PRT in Panjshir. And my sense is that there is a strong sense of partnership, and that there is real progress.

As I read my briefing papers on how we are faring in Afghanistan, there are some real successes in school, and attendance by girls in school in Afghanistan. There is also real success in building of roads, of irrigation; thus, of other livelihoods. There are successes in the north, in eradication of poppies. There are successes that can be found throughout the country. There are also some areas that are real challenges, and, I think, will need increasing attention by all of us, but I will look forward to taking a look on the ground and talking to the people and seeing how they feel about our foreign assistance programs with USAID, but also with our other foreign assistance entities.

Senator HAGEL. All right, just before—my time, I know, is up—but I would just make this last comment. On eradication of poppy, Madam Secretary, the poppy crop in Afghanistan is at a historical high. It was the largest poppy crop in the history of Afghanistan. So, I'm not sure you'd want to list that as a success story.

Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Madam Under Secretary, I want to thank you for being here.

I wanted to speak to a couple of things that pertain to recent reports in the press, as well as your jurisdiction, should you be confirmed, and some of the statements you made in your prepared remarks.

I want to refer, just as a predicate, to a couple of things. First of all, a story I'm sure you've seen this Sunday in the Washington Post, that talks about—the headline is, "Hill Aid Groups, One Opaque System Replaces—Replaced Another." It talks about Secretary Rice asking, in 2005, quote, "How much does the United States spend each year on promoting democracy overseas?" Nine months later, I guess, she gets the answer of 1.2 billion. It goes on to talk about 23 overlapping programs. The assertion in the article, that there's still—that one opaque system, as opposed to transparent, replaced another. At the beginning of about the fifth paragraph, "Rice's foreign aid approach, sadly, bears the hallmarks of our failed early assistance efforts in Iraq," unquote, and it goes on from there.

And I say that as a predicate. And I also say, as a predicate, I've got a chart here that was presented in this room—I believe it was this room, in another hearing not too long ago by Dr. Lael Brainard of the Brookings Institute. And what she has here, that it's hard to see, even when you're close, but she had a better copy of this—the headline on this—the title, I should say, is, "U.S. Foreign Assistance Legislation Objectives and Organizations." And it's a mind-numbing chart which is almost difficult to trace. It would take you hours, probably, to trace every line. So, it's a picture of what—unfortunately, what too many people who watch a hearing like this—too many people will follow the work of government, especially the Federal Government, are concerned about. And they have a right to be concerned, and a right—and a right to be disturbed by overlapping jurisdictions, wastes of money, bureaucracy that is not only confusing, but, in the end, is a barrier or an obstacle to getting, in this case, aid to countries and people that should get it, not to mention what it does in the context of our overall budget.

And I'll quote a President, also—and I'll be done with my predicate in a second—quote, "No objective supporter of foreign aid can be satisfied with the existing programs. Bureaucratically fragmented, awkward, and slow, its administration is diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure," unquote. Well, unfortunately, that wasn't made recently. The President was President Kennedy. It was in 1961. So, we haven't made much progress.

But I ask you, in light of that—the predicate to my question, and in light of your testimony—I know you spoke, in your prepared remarks, about simplification and transparency, neither of which, I would argue, are possible, or in any way possible, if we don't do something about the maze that is these series of programs, initiatives, and objectives. And I'd ask you to outline for us—and supplement and amplify it for the record, if you need to—but tell us, as best you can, in the few short minutes, about what you're going to do, and what—the plans you have that are already developed to deal with this mess that is the overlapping set of lines that I just showed you in that chart.

Ms. FORE. Senator Casey, it is, indeed, a very complex field. And your chart, with your set of lines, does show that it is fragmented and that it can often lead to one entity not understanding what another entity is doing. And that is within the United States Government, but it's also in the donor community at large with other countries. It's also with the private sector.

So, what I would hope to do with the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance portfolio is that we can gather, that we can focus, and that we can really place all of our assets of the United States Government in a country in areas that will have the greatest impact. It is something that is a challenge, something that Senator Lugar has spoken about in years prior. It remains a challenge. But I am committed to begin that process. It is a process that has now begun, on the budget side, where we gather all of the departments around a table and talk about countries and regions, so that you will see Department of Defense and Department of Treasury and Department of Commerce and USAID and HIV/AIDS, the PEPFAR program, and others around a table and talking about what the development programs should be. We also now have some beginnings of definitions for what is democracy, for example.

And all of these are good starts, but we're just at the beginning of this process. And what I would hope to be able to do in coming months is to try to simplify this, but also to try to better coordinate that which currently exists so that we can really have a strong impact, and the best impact possible, for the American people, as well as for the people around the world that we are serving.

Senator CASEY. Thank you for your answer. I'd—I would ask you to—and I appreciate the answer, and I appreciate the commitment that you've made today, but I'd ask you also to submit for the record a game plan for this, and a rather detailed game plan, about how you're going to go about this. I realize it's difficult. Those of us who have been in government—I was in State Government—it's hard to break through, and it's important to identify where efficiencies are and where overlapping jurisdictions prevent us from reaching our goal. So, I'd ask you to supplement in—for the written—a written version of what you've said, and amplify it for the record.

[The requested information appears at the end of this hearing in the "Additional Material Submitted for the Record" section.]

Senator CASEY. I'd also ask, Mr. Chairman, that the chart I just showed you—we'll submit a larger and more understandable and color version of that chart—I'd ask that that be submitted as part of the record.

Senator MENENDEZ. Without objection.

Senator CASEY. And, finally—I wanted to make one last point—the paragraph I talked—that I referred to, in the Washington Post story of this Sunday, talks about the failed early assistance efforts in Iraq, but here’s something else that I think is very important with regard to transparency. And this is a challenge for you, not just in the context of going forward, but, of course, even in the context of your confirmation. It says that—and I’m picking up in the middle of a line—“. . . one opaque system has replaced another.” And then it follows with these words, which I should have read before, quote, “. . . with a small group of people deciding how (a) dollars are divvied up, what countries they reach, and who controls them,” unquote. That’s a recipe for, not just disaster in the erosion of confidence that the American people feel and that Congress would feel in the work that you’re doing and will continue to do if you’re confirmed, but I think that would be the wrong path to take, to have a small group of people who may be driven by ideology—or even if they’re not—if they’re driven by narrow interests, to make these decisions. So, I would urge you to be a leader in the transparency which I think people have a right to expect, and I think that’s going to be a key indicator of your stewardship, if you were to be confirmed.

Thank you.

Ms. FORE. Thank you, Senator Casey.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Casey.

Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here today, and for your service.

Along with some of the things that have been mentioned coming up to your nomination, there have been other things, maybe some policy conflicts between your personal thoughts and those of the State Department. My assumption is that you would stay within the guidelines that are laid out in the State Department, and that’s not an issue. Is that correct?

Ms. FORE. Correct.

Senator CORKER. One of the things that—I know you’ve been having a 2-month listening tour, if you will, to kind of understand what’s going on in the Department as you, hopefully, prepare to move ahead—Iraq, I’m sure, is a place you’ve spent a focused amount of time, because of its importance—and one of the things that I think has been most noticeable, and that is that our military has been absolutely outstanding in what they have done, and yet, we really have lacked so much progress on the civilian side in, really, coordinating with them properly, whether it’s—and not, by the way, because people aren’t committed and dedicated that are there, but certainly we’ve had trouble staffing the PRTs. There’s a lot of categories there that we have not complemented properly. And I’d like for you to speak to that, because it seems to me that, from the standpoint of the things that are urgent for you to deal with, if confirmed, that has to be one of those, and I’d just love to hear you expand on that.

Ms. FORE. Yes. Thank you, Senator Corker. It is, indeed. I am on a weekly call with our Iraq mission, because I do think it is so very important.

Let me talk to you a little bit about PRT staffing. I think it is important that—as the military has done such an excellent job that we are sure that we are there with the civilian resources coming in behind them. We have been working on the civilian surge and we have done very well. I've just received a report this morning. Phase 1 ended March 31 and we have all of our individuals fully deployed, but phase 2 was to be completed August 31, putting 12 more technical experts that would go out to the field. And that has been readied 2 months early. So, that's good. That means that, for USAID, we are meeting the staffing goals for the PRTs. Phase 3 is coming along. With phase 2 already complete, we should be able to move quite quickly into phase 3.

It's going to be very important that we have the right technical expertise in the PRTs; that they are cohesive units; that USAID and Department of State, as well as other agencies and DOD, work together in the field.

Senator CORKER. You know, I—just, sort of, building off Senator Casey's comments—I think all of us—and this certainly has nothing to do with you—but the sense that there's just this abyss, if you will, to deal with, as it relates to foreign aid, as it relates to so many things that we try to deal with in our foreign relations. Could you talk a little bit about just how those relationships seem internal to the organization, and what you might—whether it's with State or Defense—and how you see, if there's deficiencies there in the ability for you all to communicate and work together and actually get something done, what your thoughts are about improving that.

Ms. FORE. Yes. It's a very interesting area, and it's a very important area for the United States. Our national security strategy lists diplomacy, development, and defense as the three legs of the stool. And it is very important that they be integrated and coordinated. We now have an Office of Military Affairs within the U.S. Agency for International Development, so that there is good liaison with the military—within the Department of State, the same—so that we have links in with combatant commanders, we have links in with the field, that we begin to cross-train our people—it's one of the most important things—so that our people in USAID and State have a chance to train with the military, that we have a chance to train with each other, so that we understand how we can have more synergy as a trio.

But it is a constant challenge. We have enormous goodwill. People are really trying to work hard on it. One of my areas of focus, as the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, is to think through how we can coordinate even better.

The Reconstruction and Stabilization Teams that we have begun discussing, I think, are one of the ways that we can look at that, because it means that there are more civilians who can be mobilized on short notice, and that they are able to move out to the places they are needed. And that will be a very important new tool for all of us.

Senator CORKER. Moving back to Iraq, when you—looking at some of the difficulties that have been sustained, if you will, in trying to have appropriate personnel in place in civilian positions—has been more of the different types of responsibilities that are

being taking on—taken on in Iraq, or has it been more the security, if you will, of the people—or the perceived security—in going to serve in that way?

Ms. FORE. Well, more of our resources go toward security than, I think, any of us had originally planned. Security has become such an overwhelming need for us to plan for so that people can do their work. But we identify individuals based on their technical expertise. So, whether it is agriculture, or whether it is municipal election systems, or whether it is some other part of civil society, it is those technical skills that are the ones that we look for—engineering capacity, for instance. And that’s how we then fill these positions in the PRTs.

Once they are there, it is then our responsibility and our mission to be sure that they are able to do their jobs and that they have the tools that they need to do their jobs. But it is a constant challenge, in many of these posts, to have a secure enough environment so that they get their work done to the maximum extent possible.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired.

Thank you for your testimony.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Senator Corker.

We’re going to start a second 7-minute round of questions.

Let me—and I’ll recognize myself—let me go back to where I left off with you, Madam Secretary. I appreciate Senator Lugar’s comments about ambassadors who are political appointees. I didn’t even reference those, although I don’t believe, once you are an ambassador, that you should be using your time for the purposes of the political landscape. What I was referencing was the 20 to 30 employees of AID, who are not ambassadors, who clearly should not be spending their time at political briefings.

In that respect, let me ask you two final questions. How many of these political briefings have you attended in your time in the administration?

Ms. FORE. Let’s see, when I was at the Department of Treasury, one, perhaps two.

Senator MENENDEZ. Is that the totality, in that and the present position?

Ms. FORE. I believe so. I have not attended any in the Department of State.

Senator MENENDEZ. And who conducted those briefings?

Ms. FORE. Individuals from the White House, whose names, at this moment, escape me.

Senator MENENDEZ. You don’t remember any of the people who conducted them, they must not have been very impressive. [Laughter.]

It wasn’t Mr. Rove—I think you would have remembered him. [Laughter.]

Ms. FORE. But, Senator, I could come back to you on that.

Senator MENENDEZ. I would love to see it, for the record.

Ms. FORE. All right.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much.

Second, let me change to a different issue. As I discuss in my statement, I’m deeply concerned about the possibilities of closing USAID missions. We have been assured that there are no plans to

close the list of USAID missions that I mentioned in my opening statement in fiscal year 2008. Is that correct?

Ms. FORE. That is also what I have been told.

Senator MENENDEZ. Can you tell us if there are any plans to close these or other missions in fiscal year 2009?

Ms. FORE. I do not have any plans and I have been told that there are no other plans, to close missions in 2009.

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay.

Ms. FORE. There are missions that open and close on a regular basis and I believe you know about the three that Congress had intended to close in Europe.

Senator MENENDEZ. Yeah, I am. Can you tell us, then, as we move forward, exactly what criteria you would use, if you were permanently given this position, in the context of closing missions?

Ms. FORE. I've been thinking about this, but I do not yet have a complete answer, because I feel that it's very important for us to talk to our mission directors. We will have the mission directors coming in for a mission directors conference in the fall. And I would like to hear their thoughts on what criteria we should use as an agency.

I also think that we should consider the notion of a good strategy for USAID. And I would like to do that with our leadership in USAID, as well as with the mission directors.

One of the areas that is a constant challenge for us is our operational expense level. I know that people have struggled with it and they have come up with a number of possible ways to deal with it. One of them is to close missions, or to reduce missions, or to reposition our people. In the Department of State, I've been seeing the benefits from repositioning people and I think that that is an area that I would like to encourage at USAID. The world changes and we need to change with it. But that does not necessarily mean that you close a mission. It means that you may change your profile, because our programs change from country to country, from year to year, and from decade to decade. So, I would like to consider, as part of those criteria, in those situations when we are drawing down the capacity of a mission, if we are bringing it up in other areas, as well as a better use of regional missions, because the regional capacity allows you to have technical skills and surge capacity so that you do not have to have every skill at every mission in every country.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, but can you make a commitment to the committee, that, if confirmed, you would consult closely with Congress before closing any USAID mission?

Ms. FORE. I would.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Let me turn to poverty alleviation. As you know, many of us believe this should be at the core of development assistance. And I asked you, in a letter, if you would commit to ensuring that the fiscal year 2009 budget process substantively implements the top-line goal of poverty alleviation. I appreciate your response to my question and your statement that poverty reduction is a part of the Secretary's transformation diplomacy and development initiatives. You also went on to say, quote, ". . . that an appropriate balance must be struck among development objectives in order to bring about

lasting change in a case-by-case basis, and I look forward to consulting with you and other members regarding that balance as we move forward.”

Now, while I appreciate that comment, and that we have to strike a balance—that’s obvious, I think—I’m also concerned that poverty alleviation will get lost in your calculations, particularly since it was only added to the transformational development goal after considerable urging from Congress and outside groups.

So, my questions are these. Exactly what are you doing differently in the fiscal year 2009 budget process than in the 2008 process to make sure that poverty alleviation is included, No. 1? And, No. 2, what—do you have specific metrics that are being used? Are you tracking what percentage of the funds for a specific region or a country are targeting poverty alleviation? And, No. 3, since the Secretary of State and your predecessor included poverty alleviation in the top-line goal for the “five by six” strategic framework, it still remains unclear how this additional goal has since been integrated into the “F” reform process and structure. Could you, with some explicit reference, clarify how poverty alleviation has, or is being, integrated into the “F” reform process, including the objective in country categories?

Ms. FORE. Yes. Thank you, Senator.

Having been at USAID before, I have a long-standing strong sense that poverty alleviation and poverty reduction are among the main purposes of the Agency for International Development. It’s what people count on us for. That old saying that often proves so true, that, “If you give a man a fish, you feed him for a day; if you teach him how to fish, you’ll feed him for a lifetime,” is part of that balance between short-term and long-term poverty reduction and alleviation. And this 2008 and 2009 process made sure that people are now gathered around the table who support all of these interests. And I think that will be the most important asset that we bring to the budgeting process.

The second part is that I’ve begun outreach to nonprofit organizations, and I’ve begun to hear the areas that they feel that they have not seen enough in the way of either funds or attention or policies, so that we are beginning to see the landscape of the things that we want to be sure we are including in these budgets. This is ongoing for the 2009 process and we will try to weave as much of that in as possible in 2008. As you know, there is limited movement for 2008, but we will do our best to include these.

In terms of how one can move forward in these areas, I would anticipate that we will find ways to make outreach ongoing. I don’t feel that we have had as much involvement by our outside advisory groups, many of whom represent the best among the implementers of our poverty alleviation and poverty reduction portfolio. This ongoing dialog will lead to changing people’s hearts and minds as well as changes in budgets and programs.

So, I anticipate having more continuous, more regular meetings with all of our outside entities. And I think that that will help everyone. Some of this is just a training process, making sure that everyone sees all parts of development. It is not something that you can learn in a week, or that you can learn in a year. The best of our people have been serving for decades in the world of develop-

ment, and we need to pass this information along. This is why I made my initial plea that we be able to begin to staff up and train people. We need the next generation to come along and carry this banner for poverty alleviation and reduction.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate your answer. I want to follow up with you, but let me turn to Senator Lugar for—

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, what comment could you make about section 1206 funding—The train-and-equip security assistance that comes through the Pentagon? This arises, as you know, from the general desire of our country to become more involved in nation-building, but particularly on the security side. Some of the countries that we're trying to rebuild had extraordinary problems, and sometimes it was expedient for the Department of Defense, that had a much larger budget for this, simply to take things in its own hands and to move ahead, sometimes even without the knowledge of the ambassador of the country. Now, that became worrisome, at least in our oversight capacity. Our staff members went to embassies, and that report has been made public. And it was not to embarrass the Pentagon or the security people. Many did a very good job—but the need for at least the ambassador in the country to have cognizance of what was going on in the country, so that, as protests arose, or various other difficulties, is apparent.

Now, we've had these fledgling efforts of our staff in oversight, but what I wanted to inquire of you was, as a part of your "F" process, of heading out to the embassies, interviewing the personnel involved, and so forth, will this section 1206 set of issues also be a part of your purview?

Ms. FORE. Yes. And the very good part of section 1206, that the Secretary concurs in the use and the placement of these funds, they are very useful. They were used in Lebanon after the hostilities in reconstruction. And this has been a very powerful tool for integration and linkage between the Department of Defense and Department of State.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I appreciate that assurance, and we look forward to that result, as well as the composite of all of the results that you will have from those examinations.

One of the issues that lies before, certainly, the committee and the administration is the continuation of the MCC program. The problem with the MCC program is that it has not expended very much money, in the judgment of many members—and the directors would point out, "Just as well"—because, in the case of Millennium Challenge, the countries themselves try to determine what their priorities will be. There's a nation-building, policy-building process, and that takes time for some countries that have not had experience in doing that, and it takes time for our administrators to make certain that the expenditures have some checks and balances, and are valid uses of American taxpayer money. Now, probably it's a good idea to have criteria such as we have for the MCC program, of democracy-building and human rights, the rights of women, and a number of things—

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Lugar, if—

Senator LUGAR. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. If I may just briefly interrupt you. On the floor right now there is a moment of silence being observed—

Senator LUGAR. Oh, yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. For the officers, Chestnut and Gibson, who were killed in the line of duty defending the Capitol. If I may interrupt you for just one moment—

Senator LUGAR. Of course.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. And I would ask the committee to observe a moment of silence, as well.

[A moment of silence was observed.]

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for reminding us of that very important time on the floor that we have observed now in the committee.

In any event, the problem with the MCC, is that things have moved along slowly and the Congress has become impatient on occasion. Within this committee we've had debates. In what ways will you evaluate and help the Congress interpret the value of the program, which I think is considerable? But, if it is not, what kind of procedure can you have for giving us good counsel on MCC?

Ms. FORE. Yes. This is an area I'm very interested in, because it is a very interesting new model for delivering foreign assistance.

AID is a model, and the new GDA is a model, and the new Millennium Challenge Corporation is a model. And there are other models in other donor countries around the world. I would very much like to look at these models, see which are the most effective, which might hold great promise for the United States, and ways that we can improve this system.

This is all exactly what we want to try to do with a Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, because, if we can gather and focus our resources, as the United States, it will have greater impact. But we also should use the most effective and efficient models.

So, I would love to get back to you on that, Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Madam Secretary, let me just pick off—where I left off with you. And I appreciate what I think is part of the answer to my three-part question. Let me reiterate two parts.

You talked about putting people around the table. Maybe you could tell me—when I asked you, “What’s different in the 2009 budget process than in the 2008 budget process, to make sure that poverty elimination”—or alleviation, I should say—hopefully, ultimately, alleviation—elimination—but “alleviation is achieved and included?” You said, “Putting people around the table.” What exactly does that mean? What people? What level of individuals? And I appreciate the conversations you’re having with NJOs—NGOs. I think those are perfect, and to be applauded. But what people are you putting around the table that are going to make a difference in the 2009 budget process?

Ms. FORE. There are interagency roundtables in the budget process itself for 2009. These include individuals at the senior level, but most often it is at a mid-level—who are talking by country, about

the programs that their agency is carrying out; and thus, what sorts of synergies are possible between their programs. Let us say, for example, the Department of Education and a USAID program on education. We have enormous challenges in Africa, for instance. One would wish this to be well integrated. If these individuals, in their agencies, begin to talk and see what their programs are, there will be less duplication, less overlap, but there will also be more of a commitment to the issue that they are discussing. And these issues can deal with humanitarian assistance, maternal and child healthcare, the environment, agriculture. It can be on any number of issues, but they are all around a table and they are talking around a country program. So, how we integrate and mesh these country programs is what is being discussed.

I think it is a very good model for sharing interagency knowledge and training and being able to build on each other's efforts, as well as for building on each other's budgets, because many of these programs are being funded separately out of separate committees in Congress.

Senator MENENDEZ. And as you do this interagency process, the question is, Are they actually required to look at poverty reduction? You know, you could have an interagency process that can look at a lot of different issues within the development assistance question. The question is, Are they actually being asked to look at poverty reduction, and are there any specific goals that they are trying to achieve?

Ms. FORE. Yes. Every roundtable looks at poverty reduction. And they will look at it through a number of lenses. Take, for example, micro enterprise. They will all be discussing poverty—poverty reduction—because, as you know, the reduction of widespread poverty is one of the goals that is overarching for the entire foreign assistance process.

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, I asked you about metrics, and I didn't hear you respond to that. Do you have any metrics in mind, at this point, as to—in addition to—so, you have an interagency process which is supposedly going to actually look at poverty reduction, look at goals for poverty reduction, you have the outreach to the NGOs—that's good, okay—so, what are the metrics that we're going to be able to look at and judge by?

Ms. FORE. The metrics that are currently used cover a range, so that, for example, in the use of the number of people in poverty—an economic measure will be used. One of the things that we have begun talking about with our nonprofit organization community, the community at large, is: Are we measuring the right things? Are we measuring results in the right way? Are we putting them into our programs in the best possible way? We have a number of studies and reports coming out of our advisory committees that I think will help inform this discussion, so that the metrics for getting the results that we wish in reducing and alleviating poverty will be there in years to come.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you—going to Senator Hagel's conversation with you about Ambassador Crocker's request, and it's also an interest that Senator Kennedy has expressed to me—can you provide us with a copy of Ambassador Crocker's cable to you?

Ms. FORE. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Cable Text:
UTES758
ACTION M-00

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-00	EEB-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AEX-00	A-00
	CA-00	INL-00	DS-00	DHSE-00	EUR-00	E-00	UTED-00
	VCI-00	FOE-00	H-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-00
	MOFM-00	MOF-00	VCIE-00	NEA-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIG-00
	OMB-00	CAEX-00	PA-00	PER-00	PM-00	P-00	SCT-00
	D-00	DOHS-00	SP-00	IRM-00	NCTC-00	FMP-00	R-00
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07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2115

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 002271

FOR U/S FORE FROM AMBASSADOR CROCKER

E.O. 12958: NA
TAGS: AFSN, AMGT, CMGT, IZ
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA FOR ALL IRAQI EMPLOYEES
UNDER CHIEF OF MISSION AUTHORITY

1. I am writing to ask your assistance in getting relief for our brave, hard-working Locally Engaged Staff (LES). As you know, our LES work under extremely difficult conditions, and are targets for violence including murder and kidnapping. Since Coalition Provisional Authority days, we have had at least nine LES killed because of their employment with the Mission, or due to random violence. Just last week we recovered and identified the bodies of two LES (husband and wife) who were kidnapped in May.

2. Many of our staff are taking advantage of the asylum process and are leaving our employment, seeking safety and a better life in other countries. We refer an average of 2 LES per week to the US Refugee Asylum Program (USRAP). We would like to have other options for our LES, in particular, I would like to have a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) available for all Iraqi employees under Chief Of Mission

(COM) authority. By housing our LES on the compound we can give them a safer environment, but this comes at the cost of separation from their families. Space constraints in the international zone make it impossible for us to offer housing for the families of our LES. Unless they know that there is some hope of an SIV in the future, many will continue to seek asylum, leaving our Mission lacking in one of our most valuable assets - our Locally Engaged Staff. We cannot continue to lose our experienced, knowledgeable LES to the asylum process except in the cases where we simply cannot protect them and their families.

3. The recently-passed Kennedy/Lugar bill expands the number of SIVs for translators/interpreters and extends the availability to COM personnel. Post asked I to review the language to determine whether it is possible to broadly define translator/interpreter to ensure the greatest number of COM LES participants. The interpretation from I is that, if a major or predominant portion of the actual job responsibilities of the LES is working as a translator or interpreter, they would be eligible, even if their job title is not "translator" or "interpreter." While this interpretation covers LES who work in POL, Office of Language Services and PAS, those employees who only need to know simple English phrases, such as the GSO staff, or who possess fluent English but have jobs that are more technically focused cannot be considered to be functioning primarily as interpreters or translators and would, therefore, not qualify for the SIV. Yet their presence is just as vital to the successful operation of the mission and their employment with the mission brings no less danger than that experienced by LES who would qualify for the interpreter SIV.

4. The security environment is difficult for all Iraqi employees associated with western missions. Our Danish colleagues are undertaking a similar effort to provide migration assistance to employees who find themselves in a difficult security situation as a result of their association with Denmark, regardless of their position in the Danish mission.

5. The Administration's proposal for a COM-wide three year SIV (some versions propose a one year SIV), has been pending for some months; unfortunately, there does not appear to be much support on the Hill at this time. I hope the Department can make a renewed push for an expedited SIV process for all of our LES, not just the interpreters/translators. We believe they should all be treated equally; and we should reward our LES for their sacrifice, loyalty and dedication to the USG.

CROCKER

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End Cable Text

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. And, in response to that, what were your instructions to the Consular Affairs Office on the cable? What was your instructions to them, in terms of—in pursuit of what was trying to be achieved in the cable?

Ms. FORE. We consider this a top priority for the Department. So, it's not just the Bureau for Consular Affairs, it's also the Human Resources Department, as well as our legal office, that looks at what our capacities are and what we are able to give to a chief of mission. It is very important that we be sure that our ambassadors are armed with all of the authorities that they can have. But we

cannot give away authorities we do not yet have, so this link with Congress is a very important part of this, if we are to make sure that we have the right authorities to delegate to our chiefs of mission.

We've asked Consular Affairs to look at the special immigrant visa. As I mentioned, there is also the refugee question, so the Population, Refugee, and Migration Bureau is also looking at it.

But, as a whole, we, as a Department, are looking at ways that we can help facilitate things for these Iraqi nationals who are working with us, for us, beside us, in ways that would be helpful for them and for their families.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, we'll look forward to seeing the cable, as well.

Senator Nelson asked me—he had to go to an Intelligence meeting, but he would like for the committee to hear your response to his expedited-fee issue. What is your plan to reimburse that to those individuals who paid, but got no expediting, at the end of the day?

Ms. FORE. For individuals who have requested expedited service, and who have indicated when they are traveling, and for whom we did not return their passport within the timeframe that we had promised, if they apply to us, we would return their expedited fee. There are several options that we can discuss with Senator Nelson which might also help. He—

Senator MENENDEZ. But right now, your—

Ms. FORE [continuing]. And his staff—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Your—

Ms. FORE [continuing]. And his constituents.

Senator MENENDEZ. Right now, your plan is simply that, "If you apply, you get the reimbursement; if not, you don't"?

Ms. FORE. Yes, with the proviso that it has to be people that were using the expedited-fee process, and that they also have indicated that they were traveling. Many people who have used the expedited process did not have travel plans, so, if people did not indicate when they were traveling, then that was—

Senator MENENDEZ. But if you apply—but if you applied and paid an expedited fee, the whole purpose of paying an expedited fee is to have your application expedited, whether that was, in fact, because you were going to travel, or whether it was for whatever reason you chose to pay the expedited fee. If, in fact, you didn't get an expedited process, does the Department take the position that it should keep the money, even though it didn't provide the process—the expedited process that was paid for?

Ms. FORE. Well, there are a number of options here, Senator Menendez. And so, what we—

Senator MENENDEZ. Are you pursuing those options, or are you—

Ms. FORE. We're—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Are you just—

Ms. FORE [continuing]. Considering them.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Thinking? You're considering them.

Ms. FORE. Right.

Senator MENENDEZ. And can you tell us what those options are?

Ms. FORE. Perhaps I could take that question and come back to you with those options?

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay, if you would—if you would submit the options in writing for the committee.

Ms. FORE. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you two last questions, because I appreciate your forbearance of the committee. We're doing a little work here for others, as well, so—but these last two questions are questions I am particularly interested in.

You know, when the administration proposed the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, they promised that this initiative would be in addition to our current development programs. However, there is an emerging trend of cuts in aid to countries that have signed MCC compacts, as we have seen. And, in fact, all the MCC compact countries have had cuts in other USAID funding between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2008's budget request, except for one. So, in light of the administration's pledge, which so many of us who supported MCC pointedly asked to make sure this was not supplantive, but in addition to, not to cut foreign aid at the expense of MCC, how do we explain these numbers? And I would urge you, before you answer, if our argument that we're going to hear is that we have increased the total foreign assistance budget, as well as MCC—but that doesn't answer the question on the impact of specific countries that have seen their development assistance cut while they have signed an MCC agreement.

So, give me a sense of what is happening in this respect.

Ms. FORE. In this past 2½ months, I've heard about this. And one of the issues, I believe, is the bridge between a USAID program and the MCC program. So, as an MCC program coming online or scaling up into full usage, the USAID programs are scheduled to link into this, or to dovetail into it. Sometimes, as the USAID programs are coming down, or their linkage is coming down, too soon, before the Millennium Challenge Corporation money and programs begin to come online. So, there can be a gap between the two. It's one that Ambassador Danilovich and I have begun to talk about. We are seeking ways that can bridge that gap so that there is a seamless process when USAID programs and other foreign assistance programs work in cooperation with MCC programs and they begin to add additional resources in the country.

There is cooperation in trade capacity-building and other areas, but we need to be sure that this is integrated, and that's part of the challenge that we have. But it's one that we have identified and will look at.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, we would love to see—if you would look at the realities of how this is taking place—I'd love to hear "integration"—what's happening is that we've had "disintegration" of those programs that were funded by USAID, and we see them—it's not that they were already on their natural downward curve because they were moving toward the fulfillment of their goals, it seems to me, from what I've been able to review; but, as the MCC monies were assigned into—and the monies began to flow, then we see a reduction of the USAID. That ends up not being additive, it being—it ends up being supplantive of those funds. That is not—

that is not what I think Congress supported when it supported the MCC. So, you know, we'd like to see a response to that.

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally, I appreciate, in today's statement and in past conversations, that you have said that you are committed to sustaining and strengthening the State Department's minority recruiting efforts. And, in your written statement, you specifically discussed the need for hiring USAID employees with diverse backgrounds. I appreciate that.

I know that there are those who have concerns about statements made in the past, and it relates to—this regard, but what I'm concerned is—in the actions, and here's where I want to go to. I'm not particularly impressed with the State Department's representation of minorities, in general. And I'm not impressed with it under your watch. And I have a particular concern, when I see that—when we finally make some improvement, particularly in the Senior Executive Service, that then we lose it.

Minority employment in the senior executive service increased by 2.7 percent over the course of 6 years, from 2000 to 2006, but, under your tenure, minority employment in the Senior Executive Service actually decreased by 2 percent in 2005 and 2006, so we've virtually wiped out the increase that it took us 6 years to achieve. Many of us in Congress who have been—in my days in the other body, and continuing since last year here—have been saying—and you and I met and talked about this in your previous role—and so, what took 6 years to have a marginal gain in the Senior Executive Service has been erased. How do we claim that that is a management success?

Ms. FORE. Well, I share your frustration, but also share your desire about this—that we be able to move forward positively and strongly in this area.

Senator MENENDEZ. But, Madam Secretary, if—

Ms. FORE. It's—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. I appreciate that—words, but the proof is in the pudding. If it took us 6 years to make a 2.7-percent increase, and we eliminate 2 percent of it in the scope of 1 year, boy, that's not powerful and positive and moving forward.

Ms. FORE. Well, as you know, we are moving forward throughout the Federal Government. Approximately one-third of our workforce is eligible for retirement, so, when you are in the Senior Executive Service, or in the Senior Foreign Service, we lose people to retirement. And you know our systems within the Senior Foreign Service—

Senator MENENDEZ. Are you suggesting—

Ms. FORE [continuing]. And the Senior—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. All of that loss—

Ms. FORE [continuing]. Executive Service—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Is because of retirement?

Ms. FORE. Well, from the Senior Executive Service and the Senior Foreign Service, it's either for retirement or taking a position in another agency. But what we have put in place, sir, in this last year and a half, is a very strong program in recruiting, training, mentoring a diverse workforce. We are really reaching out everywhere to try to encourage both the recruitment, as well as the retention, of a diverse workforce. And sometimes these things take

time. I know that they never occur fast enough. But it is important that we have an environment of inclusion. I think that, with our new Diversity Council, with our new Diversity Officer position, we really have a changed sense of commitment. And it starts at the top. It starts with Secretary Rice. It is certainly a commitment that I have, very strongly; the Director General, very strongly. I mean, we have—

Senator MENENDEZ. All right, but—

Ms. FORE [continuing]. This as a—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. If you have a—

Ms. FORE [continuing]. Strong commitment—

Senator MENENDEZ. If you have a strong commitment, then let me ask you why it was that there was no minority promotion at all among the Senior Executive Service while you were there.

Ms. FORE. I believe you are looking at the 2006 numbers, and the 2007 numbers, which is this fiscal year. We will actually have the data for you September 30.

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. I look forward to those numbers, as does Senator Obama. I mean, we—you know, it is important, in a world which is ever more diverse, that the power of what comes through men and women who represent the fullness of America is represented in the Foreign Service and in the Senior Executive Service. And, in my view, this is the worst department of all of the departments of the Federal Government, in the reflection of those minorities in the service of any one of our Federal departments. It's got to change. It's got to change.

And so, you know, I appreciate all the high-sounding words. The problem is, I don't see the concurrent actions to make it happen. And there are many of us who are disturbed that we continue to see this reality. And so, I hope that you're going to make, if you are given the opportunity, a action plan that is very aggressive, that is transparent to all of us, so that we can judge whether or not this is going to produce results, because, so far, it just simply has not. And that is simply not acceptable.

Ms. FORE. I would look forward to having such an action plan and talking with you about it, Senator Menendez. This is an area that we share a strong commitment to.

Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I appreciate the time that you have shared with the committee.

There will be other questions. We will leave the record open for 2 days for all members to ask questions, so they may submit additional questions to the nominee. Of course, we ask you to respond to those as expeditiously as possible.

Senator MENENDEZ. And, seeing no other member before the committee, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARACK OBAMA,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the nomination of Henrietta Holsman Fore to be Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Develop-

ment. I appreciate Ms. Fore's willingness to discuss her credentials for this important position and her goals for the agency if she is confirmed.

In 2005, this committee considered Ms. Fore's nomination for the position of Under Secretary of State for Management. At the time, I expressed my serious concerns about disparaging remarks she made about minorities while she was a trustee at Wellesley College. I appreciated Ms. Fore's willingness to meet with me during that period to respond to my concerns.

As a result of our conversations, I voted to approve her nomination in 2005, after receiving her assurances that she was committed to expanding diversity at the State Department. Now that she has been nominated to be Administrator of USAID, it is important to look carefully at her record over the last 2 years to see if she has followed through on these assurances.

In June, Senator Menendez and I sent a letter to Ms. Fore asking for detailed information on recruitment, promotion, and retention of minority employees from 2005 to the present. We also asked Ms. Fore to demonstrate that she had taken tangible steps to recruit and promote minorities and that she has met with the Congressional Black Caucus and Congressional Hispanic Caucus to address their concerns.

I am pleased that, according to her response, she has implemented a minority outreach strategy and has met several times with members of the Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus on minority recruitment and retention issues. I am also pleased to hear that she has created a position of Chief Diversity Officer at the State Department, with a mission to integrate diversity principles into the practices of all of the Department's operations.

I have concerns, however, about the data on recruitment, promotion, and retention of minority employees provided by Ms. Fore. The data seems to show some progress in some areas, but in other areas, there has been no progress. Minorities have been hired during Ms. Fore's tenure, but the fraction of minority employees at State has decreased slightly instead of increasing. The overall promotion rate for African Americans and Hispanics decreased from 2005 to 2006. Between 2005 and 2006, the number of African American employees in the SES decreased, and the number of Hispanic employees in the SES remained unchanged.

I am interested in hearing more from Ms. Fore about her plan to promote diversity in her new position.

I am also concerned about evidence that White House aides conducted political briefings for U.S. diplomats that included, among other things, analyses of congressional and gubernatorial races in this country. In one instance, according to press reporting, State Department officials attended a meeting at the White House at which political officials discussed key House races for 2002 and media segments that were deemed important for President Bush's reelection in 2004.

For the life of me, I cannot understand why the administration decided to invest taxpayer-funded resources and time in this clearly political effort.

These types of briefings are an inappropriate politicization of the State Department, which should be carrying out its diplomatic mission without involvement in domestic political activities. I would like to know what Ms. Fore thinks about the appropriateness of these briefings and how she will ensure such briefings do not occur again at USAID if she is confirmed as the next administrator.

In addition to promoting diversity in the workforce and ensuring proper conduct relative to political activities, the next Administrator of USAID will face a host of challenges in improving the agency's ability to carry out its critical mission. We need the world to know that we are fully committed to supporting economic growth, global health, and democracy. We need to ensure that people around the world can live with dignity and have an opportunity to make a better life. And because weak states and countries mired in poverty provide a breeding ground for disease, terrorism, and conflict, providing foreign assistance has a direct benefit from a national security standpoint.

At a time when the global challenges facing the agency are daunting, there are reports that the capabilities of USAID are lagging, that the agency's technical expertise has eroded, and that the morale of its employees is low. It is essential that the new administrator provide the leadership necessary to rebuild the capabilities of the agency, hire and retain an exceptional and diverse workforce, and make a significant improvement in our ability to provide foreign assistance to those in need.

I will be looking very carefully at Ms. Fore's qualifications for this critical position and her potential to make real improvements in the operations of the agency.

Thank you.

ENDORSEMENT LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL,
Washington, DC, June 23, 2007.

Senator Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR: I am writing to inform you of the reasons why my colleagues and I on the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) believe that Under Secretary Henrietta Fore has a mix of qualities and experience which uniquely qualify her to serve as Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator.

The Council (FAC) is a non-partisan umbrella group of the CEO's of 11 organizations concerned about the processes of diplomacy and the management of the people involved therein. We do not address foreign policy issues. We are dedicated to the most effective possible management of the Nation's foreign policy business of which foreign aid is an important part.

The FAC has just issued its third biennial assessment of the Secretary of State's stewardship of the State Department from the management perspective. Given our interests and objectives, we have worked very closely since 2005 with Under Secretary of State for Management, Henrietta Fore, and have observed firsthand her management successes as outlined in our report. Ms. Fore's attributes include:

- Years of experience in the Government and the private sector enabling her to bring the best practices from both sectors to bear on the problems;
- Previous service in AID as an Assistant Administrator which means she will "land running";
- Intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the Department of State and Foreign Service at the highest levels which is critical to the implementation of development which—at the end of the day—happens overseas;
- The strong strategic sense necessary to put all of the development pieces (AID, Millennium challenge Account, HIV—AIDS, Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization, etc.) into a coherent whole; and
- Leadership qualities which have brought to the State Department two (of only four) Presidential Awards for Management Excellence, a second place ranking in the 2007 list of best (Federal) places to work, and an additional Presidential Award for retiree services.

In addition to the above, Henrietta Fore has consistently demonstrated a genuine concern for all employees—protecting their interests and maximizing their potential. One of the FAC's member organizations, The Association of Black American Ambassadors, has strongly endorsed Secretary Fore in this regard.

Senator Lugar, the next 2 years will be critical for U.S. development assistance. Subcommittee Chairman Menendez's recent hearings on foreign assistance, which you attended, have gotten the discussion off to a terrific start. The FAC will put the evolution of assistance at the center of our 2008 report and we hope to work with you in that effort. Given the need for strategy, structure, and implementation in U.S. development efforts, we believe Henrietta Fore has all of the necessary qualities and abilities to manage development with the same excellence she demonstrated as Under Secretary of State for Management.

Thank you for your consideration in these matters.

Warmest Personal Regards,

THOMAS D. BOYATT,
President.

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

Question. Do you agree with the longstanding policy that CRSPs are long-term research programs that are designed for 10 years, with initial funding provided for 5 years and then a second 5 years if the 5-year review, based on performance with respect to the cooperative agreement, is satisfactory?

Answer. USAID's procurement policy is to award cooperative agreements for an initial 5 year period. In the case of agricultural research, USAID recognizes and appreciates the long-term nature of these programs. Therefore, when USAID awards a new CRSP to a university, the initial agency commitment is for 5 years. A 5-year extension is provided based on three criteria: (1) a record of good performance during the first 5-year period; (2) continued relevance of the CRSP subject area to the overall agency development priorities; and (3) the availability of agency funding.

Question. Are you aware that it has been proposed within USAID that renewal of the Integrated Pest Management and Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management CRSPs would be based not on the performance goals specified in their cooperative agreements, but rather on the following:

For IPM: How well the other CRSPs are addressing IPM.

For SANREM: How well SANREM is addressing the goals of a proposed Soil, Water, and Ecosystem Services CRSP that did not exist when the SANREM CRSP research program was designed and implemented.

Can you provide an explanation of what the renewal process for these CRSPs will actually entail, if not performance based on their current agreements?

Answer. A 5-year renewal of all CRSPs will be based on three criteria: (1) a record of good performance during the first 5-year period; (2) continued relevance of the CRSP subject area to the overall agency development priorities; and (3) the availability of agency funding. External reviews of the CRSPs will be conducted to evaluate performance. The Integrated Pest Management (IPM) and Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resources Management (SANREM) CRSPs' external reviews are scheduled for early 2008.

In the case of the IPM CRSP, in addition to evaluating performance, the review will determine whether the new commodity-oriented CRSPs (peanut, sorghum, and pulses) have taken on substantial IPM issues related to their targeted commodities. The review will also inform USAID on the need for a stand alone IPM CRSP that broadly deals with IPM issues apart from the IPM activities of the commodity-oriented CRSPs.

In the case of the SANREM CRSP, the review will only consider the performance of the CRSP. The review will not look at how well SANREM is addressing the goals of a proposed Soil, Water, and Ecosystem Services CRSP.

Question. The USAID Web site pages listed below, describing the Revised CRSP Portfolio, currently indicate that the IPM and SANREM CRSPs are to be eliminated. Does the Web site reflect current USAID intentions concerning IPM and SANREM? If not, why has it not been changed?

<http://www.usaid.gov/our—work/agriculture/crsp/index.html#over>

<http://www.usaid.gov/our—work/agriculture/crsp/major—changes.htm>

Answer. The information on the Web site was meant to document an evolving process of review and consideration of a CRSP portfolio, in consultation with the Board for International Food and Agricultural Development (BIFAD) that aligns with development needs. The current information needs to be updated to reflect more recent discussions and decisions, such as the evaluation process for IPM and SANREM discussed above, and it is a good reminder to update our Web site. To avoid further confusion the CRSP portfolio information on the Web site will be removed until it has been updated.

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.

Question. Under Secretary Fore, on July 16 I, along with a number of other Senators, wrote to Secretary Rice in reference to the United States-Ukraine Foundation. We expressed our concerns over USAID funding for the Foundation and its programs. The Foundation, the longest serving American presence in Ukraine, is highly respected by all political factions in that country and has done fabulous work throughout the country. As a result, every year since 2000 Congress has expressed its support for the funding of the Foundation. Foreign Operations Appropriations Conference Reports and/or the reports of the respective Appropriations Committees have "urged" increased funding, "directed" increased funding or in some other unequivocal way made it clear that Congress knows and has followed the Foundation's activities in Ukraine and had determined the funding for those programs needed to be continued, indeed, increased. Last year, the Senate report language for this fiscal year called for USAID to bring its level of funding for the Foundation to \$10 million.

And, yet, despite this clear expression of Congressional purpose and policy, USAID has cut the Foundation's budget each and every one of those years. In fact, I understand that USAID has told the Foundation that it will receive no further funds unless Congress either enacts a specific line item as part of its future Foreign Operations Appropriations Bills or a decision to fund the Foundation is made at the very top of this administration. Such actions exhibit an unsettling disregard for congressional intent.

Under your stewardship of USAID, if confirmed, how do you intend to handle clear expressions of Congressional intent on funding and policy priorities relating to the United States-Ukraine Foundation?

Answer. I am told that USAID has funded the United States-Ukraine Foundation (USUF) since July 1997, when USUF was awarded a 3-year, \$7 million noncompetitive grant. The original grant was extended several times and the total amount awarded to USUF by the time the grant ended on July 14, 2007 was \$23,145,918. During the 10-year period of the grant, USAID's funding level in Ukraine dropped fourfold, from \$163 million in 1997 to \$41 million in 2006. Nevertheless, USUF's average funding level has remained fairly consistent at about \$2.3 million per year and has thus in recent years accounted for an increasingly larger percentage of the total USAID technical assistance budget.

I am also told there is a good opportunity for USUF in our partnership programs. USAID recognizes the importance and value of Ukrainian Diaspora groups and we hope to continue benefiting from their participation in the USAID assistance program. We have encouraged USUF in writing to partner with USAID in the future through a new mechanism that specifically encourages Ukrainian-American organizations to apply for funding. This mechanism is the Annual Program Statement for Global Development Alliance (GDA) partnerships, issued on March 16, 2007. An explicit statement in that solicitation notes that USAID welcomes proposals from Diaspora groups. Since there are currently many active and experienced Ukrainian Diaspora groups, we expect to select a future program implementer via a competitive process. To date USUF has not submitted a proposal in response to the APS. The solicitation remains open until November 15, 2007, and USAID would welcome USUF's participation in this competition.

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

Question. Do you believe that the executive branch can successfully develop a comprehensive, effective, transparent, and efficient country-focused foreign assistance framework without changing the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act? If so, please describe how a "reformed" U.S. foreign assistance process would operate. If not, what legislative changes will you seek?

Answer. The reforms that have been proposed so far—including the creation of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance—are an attempt to ensure that we make every effort within current statutory authorities to fulfill our responsibilities to maximize U.S. foreign assistance activities. With the reform process still in the early stages, we are taking time to review carefully, with input from a wide range of participants and stakeholders, what has been accomplished to date and how we might strengthen or adjust our processes. If as part of these ongoing assessments, we determine that successful reforms will require legislative changes, we will consult with you and other members of our authorizing committees to work together toward necessary change.

Question. What will be the staffing structure and size of the Director of Foreign Assistance office? Will you bring in new staff into the "F" bureau? Who will be your key advisors on foreign assistance reform?

Answer. To coordinate the entire gamut of activities associated with managing the approximate \$25 billion foreign policy programs of the United States, I will have about 80 direct hires. I plan to have a very lean administrative support mechanism and will rely as much as possible on existing State Department support mechanisms to manage my office.

I am pleased to inform you that Richard Greene will act as my Deputy in the Director's office. He is experienced and committed, and I believe you will find him to be very responsive. At USAID, Jim Kunder will be acting as my Deputy, and I am confident that you are familiar with his excellent work. In addition, my key advisors will be USAID Assistant Administrators, State Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries, and I will actively seek suggestions from colleagues at the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the National Security Council (NSC), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and, of course, Congress and the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community.

Question. In response to my question, you stated that 80 percent of U.S. foreign assistance is under the direct control of the Director of Foreign Assistance. However, Dr. Radelet testified on the second panel that only 55 percent of U.S. foreign assist-

ance is controlled by State or USAID. Please provide a breakdown of the amounts and percentages of U.S. foreign assistance that are under the direct control of State and/or USAID, under “policy guidance” of State and/or USAID, and not under any type of control of State and/or USAID. How much U.S. foreign assistance is controlled by the Defense Department?

Answer. Attached please find a summary chart of the fiscal year 2008 International Affairs Request, which appears in the Congressional Budget Justification on pages 12 and 13. Section 1 of the chart, “Department of State and USAID Bilateral Economic Assistance,” lists the accounts and programs under the approval authority of the Secretary of State, which amount to approximately 80 percent of the entire Foreign Operations request. The Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator has direct approval authority over roughly 60 percent of all foreign assistance in the Foreign Operations request, and has robust coordinating authority over assistance provided under the Global HIV/AIDS (GHAI) and Millennium Challenge Corporation accounts (at which Corporation the Administrator serves on the Board).

The Department of Defense is an important implementing partner of the Department of State, implementing both Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training programs. The Department of Defense also implements programs with foreign partners that are authorized under Defense Authorization Acts using funds appropriated in the Defense Appropriations Acts. Some of those programs provide training and equipment for foreign forces, similar to that provided under the Department of State’s foreign assistance authorities. Thus, for example, the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund are used to provide training and equipping to a range of security forces in those countries. Both of these authorities must be exercised with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. In addition, pursuant to section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act, the President is authorized to direct the Departments of Defense and State to jointly develop programs to build the capacity of foreign military forces to be funded from Department of Defense appropriations in an amount up to \$300 million in this fiscal year. Likewise, pursuant to section 1207 of the same act, the Departments of State and Defense may concur on the provision of reconstruction and stabilization assistance to be funded through DoD appropriations up to \$100 million per fiscal year. These authorities have proved effective in addressing rapidly evolving security situations. DoD has certain other authorities that they rely upon in specific circumstances to provide assistance to foreign countries in support of their mission, e.g., the Commanders Emergency Response Fund and authorities to respond to humanitarian emergencies.

Question. Also in your testimony, you highlight “detailed country-level operations plans that describe how resources are being used” and that such plans have been developed for 67 countries already. Will you make these plans available to this committee? Will these plans be available to the public?

Answer. I am committed to providing as much information on our foreign assistance activities as possible to our oversight committees and Congressional partners. We are currently looking at ways to make the information obtained from the fiscal year 2007 Operational Plans as user friendly and available as we can. We are likewise exploring formats for future years’ Operational Plans with an eye toward the same goal. In the meantime, if there is particular fiscal year 2007 country or other information that you would like to discuss, we would be happy to meet with you.

FY 2008 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REQUEST			
(\$ in thousands)	FY 2006 Actual	FY 2007 Estimate	FY 2008 Request
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, USAID and FOREIGN OPERATIONS (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS)	31,389,613	29,916,040	36,186,518
I. Department of State and USAID Bilateral Economic Assistance	18,074,969	17,713,444	20,266,913
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI)	727,155	569,350	442,812
Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (AEEB)	357,390	269,200	289,322
Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSA)	508,860	435,480	351,585
Child Survival & Health Programs Fund (CSH)	1,591,425	1,518,359	1,564,279
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, & Malaria	[247,500]	[247,500]	[0]
Development Assistance (DA)	1,508,760	1,508,000	1,041,248
Development Credit Authority - Subsidy (DCA)	[21,000]	[0]	[21,000]
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	2,616,075	2,603,540	3,319,567
U.S. Emergency Refugee & Migration Assistance (ERMA)	29,700	30,000	55,000
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	4,464,900	4,454,900	4,536,000
Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI)	1,975,050	1,852,525	4,150,000
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria	[198,000]	[198,000]	[0]
International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA)	361,350	348,800	297,300
International Military Education & Training (IMET)	85,877	85,237	89,500
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	472,428	703,600	634,600
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	783,090	750,206	773,500
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining (NADR)	405,999	392,821	464,000
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)	173,250	170,000	221,200
P.L. 480 Title II	1,138,500	1,223,100	1,219,400
Transition Initiatives (TI)	39,600	40,000	37,200
USAID Operating Expenses (OE)	623,700	641,000	609,000
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund [Mandatory]	[42,000]	[38,700]	[36,400]
USAID Capital Investment Fund (CIF)	69,300	75,942	126,000
USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses	35,640	37,915	38,000
Development Credit Authority - Administrative Expenses	7,920	3,469	7,400
Democracy Fund	94,050	-	-
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)	4,950	-	-
II. Independent Department and Agencies Bilateral Assistance	3,012,408	2,354,024	4,373,509
African Development Foundation (ADF)	22,770	22,225	30,000
Broadcasting Board of Governors			
International Broadcasting Operations	633,257	636,060	618,777
Broadcasting to Cuba	-	-	38,700
Broadcasting Capital Improvements	10,754	7,624	10,748
Subtotal, Broadcasting Board of Governors	644,011	643,684	668,225
Department of Agriculture			
McGovern-Dole International Food for Education	99,000	98,260	100,000
Department of the Treasury			
Treasury Technical Assistance	19,800	23,700	24,800
Debt Restructuring	64,350	20,000	207,300

(\$ in thousands)	FY 2006 Actual	FY 2007 Estimate	FY 2008 Request
Subtotal, Department of the Treasury	84,150	43,700	232,100
Export-Import Bank			
Loan Subsidy	74,000	26,382	68,000
Administrative Expenses	72,468	69,234	78,000
Inspector General	990	-	1,000
Direct Loans, Negative Subsidy	-50,000	-45,000	-
Offsetting Collections	-	-	-146,000
Subtotal, Export-Import Bank	97,458	50,616	1,000
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission	1,303	1,417	1,684
Inter-American Foundation (IAF)	19,305	19,268	19,000
International Trade Commission (ITC)	61,951	62,575	67,100
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)	1,752,300	1,135,000	3,000,000
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)			
Administrative Expenses	41,851	41,856	47,500
Net Offsetting Collections	-223,000	-175,279	-236,000
Credit Subsidy	20,073	9,423	29,000
Net Negative Budget Authority, OPIC	-161,076	-124,000	-159,500
Peace Corps	318,780	324,000	333,500
Trade and Development Agency (TDA)	50,391	50,300	50,400
United States Institute of Peace	22,065	26,979	30,000
III. Multilateral Economic Assistance	1,581,124	1,392,361	1,788,350
International Financial Institutions	1,277,236	1,066,198	1,498,950
Global Environment Facility	79,200	56,250	106,763
International Development Association	940,500	752,400	1,060,000
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1,287	1,288	1,082
Asian Development Fund	99,000	99,000	133,906
African Development Fund	134,343	134,343	140,584
African Development Bank	3,602	3,613	2,037
European Bank for Reconstruction & Development	1,006	1,006	10
Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund	1,724	1,724	29,232
Inter-American Investment Corporation	1,724	1,724	7,264
International Fund for Agricultural Development	14,850	14,850	18,072
Arrears	[5,453]	[4,018]	[175,000]
International Organizations & Programs (IO&P)	303,888	326,163	289,400
IV. Department of State Operations and Related Programs	8,721,112	8,456,211	9,757,746
State Administration of Foreign Affairs	6,434,123	6,238,058	7,194,596
State Programs	4,421,359	4,561,170	5,013,443
Diplomatic and Consular Programs	4,294,734	4,460,084	4,942,700
Ongoing Operations	3,614,018	3,664,914	3,977,940
Worldwide Security Upgrades	680,716	795,170	964,760
Capital Investment Fund	58,143	34,319	70,743
Centralized IT Modernization Program	68,482	66,767	-

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Madam Secretary, during your nomination hearing on July 24, 2007, you testified that, during your career with the current administration, you have attended one, or perhaps two, political briefings which took place during your tenure at the Department of Treasury.

- What are the names and positions of the individual(s) who conducted this briefing?
- When were those briefings?
- Exactly what was discussed at those briefings?

Answer. There were two Treasury Senior Staff Retreats that I attended. The agenda for the Senior Staff Retreat on January 12, 2004, listed a 1-hour presentation entitled Political Overview and listed Barry Jackson, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Senior Advisor, and Matt Schlapp, Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Political Affairs as presenters. The agenda for the Senior Staff Retreat on January 4, 2005, listed a 45-minute presentation entitled

Political Overview and listed Barry Jackson, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Senior Advisor, and Matt Schlapp, Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Political Affairs as presenters. My recollection is that the briefings were about the political landscape at the time.

Question. During our question and answer period I asked you if you thought it was appropriate that USAID employees be spending their time being briefed on the electoral landscape. You responded that you would re-look at what your guidelines are in USAID, because, “there are very strong guidelines about not being involved with political candidates and other activities.”

- Did these briefings on the U.S. electoral landscape comply with USAID and guidelines and Federal law?
- Were the 20 to 30 employees of AID that received these briefings all political appointees? Can you tell us what positions they held?

Can you commit to not holding such briefings if you are confirmed?

Answer. As you know, the briefings for USAID staff were conducted prior to my appointment as Acting Administrator. I believe that those invited to the briefings were Presidential appointees confirmed by the Senate, administratively determined employees (the USAID equivalent of Schedule C), or Non-Career Senior Executive Service. The White House has expressed the view that it is appropriate for White House officials to provide informational briefings about the political landscape and its potential impact on our legislative relations to Federal agency appointees whose job it is to implement the President’s policies.

I certainly commit to reviewing and, if need be, revising, existing guidelines and policies at USAID, and to ensuring that any similar activities proposed to me are acceptable under all appropriate laws, regulations, and policies before I would approve them. I will also ensure that political appointees at USAID are thoroughly briefed by our Agency Ethics Officer on the Hatch Act and its requirements.

Question. Madam Secretary, in your testimony, you discussed some of the barriers preventing Iraqis from gaining United States immigrant visas. You also said that you would be supportive of legislation that would expand the scope of current law to allow more Iraqi nationals to be allowed to enter the United States under special immigrant visas.

- What legislative measures would you recommend to address this issue?
- Do you support the current legislative proposal introduced by Senator Kennedy, S. 1651, the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act?
- In the meantime, what are you doing to respond to the concerns expressed by Ambassador Crocker in his cable to you?

Answer. In February of this year, we identified the issue of assisting Iraqis who work for the embassy as a top priority for the Department and as a matter of urgency. We took immediate steps to address the needs of those at risk in Iraq because of their association with the United States Government. We asked Congress to assist us in providing relief to these brave Iraqis by expanding the coverage of Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) to include more of the Iraqi nationals who are serving the American people.

Secretary Rice set up the interagency task force on Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons led by Under Secretary Dobriansky, which continues to meet regularly. The interagency task force has a specific focus to address the humanitarian situation, including the needs of those at risk in Iraq because of their association with the United States Government. I have attended two such meetings and can assure you that those involved are dedicated to securing the best solution.

The interagency task force drafted and cleared the administration’s legislative proposal to provide a mechanism to lower, in “extraordinary circumstances,” the years of service required for SIV eligibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Embassy Baghdad was consulted often during the drafting process and its recommendations, which included years of service, were integrated into the administration’s SIV proposal.

In April, we sent to Capitol Hill the legislative proposal as an administration position which allows SIVs for LE Staff who have served in “extraordinary conditions” as determined by the Secretary and have fewer than the minimum years of service otherwise required. Through meetings and briefings, we are working actively to get support in both the Senate and House to secure introduction, consideration, and passage of the proposal. We are working simultaneously to find a germane legislative vehicle for the legislative proposal or a sponsor to introduce it as a free standing bill. We are set to send another letter to all members regarding the urgency for the legislative proposal.

While the United States Government agencies involved in the management of United States refugee and immigration programs overseas appreciate the support for the many Iraqis who have worked in support of American efforts in Iraq that is contained in the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act introduced by Senators Kennedy and Smith, we believe the administration's SIV proposal is a more comprehensive and practical vehicle for addressing the dangers that local employees of the United States Government confront in a manner that will ensure continued effective operation of our diplomatic operations in Iraq and of our worldwide administration of the SIV program.

The Department and Embassy Baghdad have communicated to LE staff the processes by which locally employed interpreters and translators under Chief of Mission authority can take immediate advantage of the Special Immigrant Visa opportunities offered by Public Law 110–36. Embassy Baghdad has also acted to accelerate the access of LE staff to the United States Refugee Admissions Program.

The Department and the administration recognize that a solution must be secured to assist those LE staff in extraordinary conditions who are serving the American people. We very much appreciate your support and interest in this matter as we seek to partner with the Hill to implement the legislative changes that are required.

Question. USAID funding to countries that have signed an MCC compact has decreased in every country except one. This is not what Congress supported when during the birth of the MCC we were promised it was to be additive and not replace USAID funds. You responded in the testimony to this discrepancy by saying that linkage issue where USAID programs were changing to close the gap between MCC and USAID. I fail to see how this is not replacing funds to USAID.

In light of the administration's pledge to us to not cut foreign aid at the expense of MCC, how do you explain these numbers?

Answer. As the attached table and chart indicate, the President's request for the three largest "traditional assistance accounts—Child Survival and Health, Development Assistance and Economic Support Fund—has risen from approximately \$4.6 billion in fiscal year 2002 to some \$5.9 billion in fiscal year 2008, an increase of nearly 30 percent. At the same time, the President's request for the Millennium Challenge Account has grown from zero in fiscal year 2003 to \$3 billion in fiscal year 2006 and since. The total for these two categories has grown from the \$4.6 billion of fiscal year 2002 to nearly \$9 billion for fiscal year 2007 and 2008, a near doubling. This is an indicator of the administration's intentions.

The Congress has modified these requests in a variety of ways, but in most of those fiscal years, appropriated less to overall foreign operations accounts than has been requested. We have had to adjust individual country programs in response to these and other Congressional changes, in an environment of limited resources.


It is not appropriate, however, to conclude that in no individual country will "traditional" assistance programs remain unchanged when that country signs an MCC Compact. Countries develop at different rates and in unique patterns. Some may require emphasis on economic growth programs, some on investing in people, some on infrastructure, still others on good governance, and still others on security or rule of law. These complex requirements change over time in each country, and the goal of our assistance efforts needs to be the most effective possible mix of programs given each country's unique circumstances. I would emphasize, however, that it is not the policy of the administration to automatically reduce "traditional" assistance flows when countries begin MCC Compacts.

Development funding	Requests						
	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008
Child Support and Health Programs (CSH)	1,011,000	1,374,000	1,495,000	1,420,000	1,251,500	1,433,000	1,564,279
Development Programs (DA)	1,325,000	1,365,500	1,345,000	1,329,000	1,103,233	1,282,000	1,041,248
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	2,269,400	2,290,000	2,535,000	2,511,500	3,036,375	3,214,470	3,319,567
Subtotal ..	4,605,400	5,029,500	5,375,000	5,260,500	5,391,108	5,929,470	5,925,094

Development funding	Requests						
	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008
Millenium Chal- lenge Account (MCC)	0	0	1,300,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,333
Total	4,605,400	5,029,500	6,675,000	7,760,500	8,391,108	8,929,108	8,925,094

GRAPH INFORMATION

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Subtotal*	4,605,400	5,029,500	5,375,000	5,260,500	5,391,108	5,929,470	5,925,094
Total** ...	4,605,400	5,029,500	6,675,000	7,760,500	8,391,108	8,929,470	8,925,094



*The Sub Total includes a summation of CSH, DA and ESF requests in the given FY
 **Total includes the Sub Total plus MCC requests in the same FY

◆ Sub Total* ■ Total**

Question. As soon as they're available, please provide the numbers for the minority recruitment data for the Senior Executive Service and the Foreign Service for fiscal year 2007.

Answer. Through July 31, 2007, the Department has hired one minority at the Senior Executive Service (SES) level. In addition, one minority employee was promoted into the SES after participating as the Department's only nominee in OPM's 2006 SES Candidate Program. There have been a total of seven promotions into the SES in fiscal year 2007.

To date in fiscal year 2007, minorities have comprised 14.1 percent of Foreign Service Generalist new hires and 19.6 percent of Foreign Service Specialist new hires. These percentages may underestimate actual minority hiring in fiscal year 2007, as we have seen an increase in the number of new hires who choose not to self-identify their racial or ethnic status. In addition, the percentage of minority registrants for the Foreign Service Written Exam (FSWE) increased from 34.2 percent in 2005 to 36.3 percent in April 2006, the second highest percentage of minorities registering for the exam since 1980. Registration for the September 2007 Foreign Service Officer Test, the only offering in fiscal year 2007, is currently underway at this time and we will not have statistics on minority registrants until registration is closed in September.

Question. As I said in my statement, I do not support the idea of development attaches or development counselors if they are used as a way to demote USAID Mission Directors. In your letter to me, you said that the concept was going to be used for countries that could manage and finance their own development process but "may not yet have the capacity or experience to put together partnerships that bring

together host country government, private sector, and other public or private donor interests to address development issues.”

Which current USAID missions are on the list to lose their Mission Director and receive a mission attache or development counselor?

Answer. The concept of using a development counselor builds on the recognized value of USAID to not only provide a formal voice on country development issues and manage appropriated funds, but also to facilitate partnerships between host country governments, the private sector, NGOs, and other public and private donors. USAID’s thinking has been that the placement of development counselor might be appropriate in situations where USAID’s experience and capabilities in facilitating partnerships will enhance the United States Government’s engagement within a country. Generally, this would be in countries that do not receive bilateral USAID funding or in which USAID manages limited development programming with support provided from another location (e.g., a regional center or platform). We have not reached any decisions to replace Mission Directors with development counselors. Our consideration of how the “development counselor” concept would affect current USAID roles or staffing, if at all, will continue and we look forward to consulting with you on this once our concept has been further refined.

Question. How much control over the money would these development counselors have compared to mission directors?

Answer. The amount of control over funds will be addressed and determined as we continue to refine and discuss the concept. Factors to consider would include size and orientation of the program, development goals and objectives, and availability of regional support.

Question. How is a “development counselor” not simply a demotion for the USAID Mission Director?

Answer. We do not envision the concept involving a “demotion” of a mission director to a development counselor, but rather the placement of a development counselor in countries in which we have programs but do not currently have a resident USAID direct hire, or in countries where we no longer have an active development program. For example, as we close out USAID programs in Eastern Europe, a development counselor could be placed on the United States Embassy country team for the purpose of advising the United States Ambassador on ongoing country development issues, coordinating with other donors, and facilitating public private partnerships. There are no plans to replace Mission Directors with Development Counselors in any country where we have a Mission.

Question. Freedom House recently released an analysis of the administration’s fiscal year 2008 budget request for Democracy and Human Rights. I am deeply concerned over the administration’s proposed decreases of 9 percent in funding for human rights and 7 percent for civil society in the fiscal year 2008 budget request.

Can you explain why these funds were cut? What was the rationale?

Answer. The administration is committed to enhancing democracy and the rule of law as part of our foreign assistance efforts. The fiscal year 2008 budget request reflects an overall increase in democracy and governance programs of \$215 million or 17 percent over fiscal year 2006 levels. From fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2008, this increase was focused in an additional 33 percent for Rule of Law and Human Rights and an additional 46 percent for Good Governance.

The fiscal year 2008 request is based on an assessment of needs and opportunities to advance and consolidate democratic progress in specific priority countries. An interagency team determined funding levels through a country-driven process which prioritized areas most critical to promoting and sustaining long-term country progress—a process which naturally required making tough trade-offs in a resource-constrained environment. The Department’s fiscal year 2008 request thus reflects significant increases for countries with the potential to serve as democratic lynchpins for regional stability. The largest increases were targeted at strengthening government capacity and rule of law in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While funding for Civil Society and Political Competition did decrease overall, the fiscal year 2008 request includes a significant increase in these areas for key restrictive countries, including large increases for Cuba (\$32 million) and Iran (\$75 million). Other countries with increases for Civil Society include Bolivia, Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen, Nigeria, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Countries with increases for Political Competition and Consensus Building included Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kosovo, Liberia, and Sudan.

Funding for Human Rights as an element under the broader area of Rule of Law and Human Rights decreased 9 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2008.

However, human rights funding increased in the restrictive and rebuilding country category, and held steady overall for the developing country category.

Question. After receiving reports that USAID was supporting programs in occupied Cyprus without consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the Senate Appropriations Committee included in its fiscal year 2006 report the following: "The committee is concerned that funds made available for bicomunal projects on Cyprus have been obligated without appropriate notification and participation of the Government of Cyprus. The committee believes that if such funds are to improve the prospect for peaceful reunification of the island, they must be allocated transparently and in full consultation with the Government of Cyprus and other interested parties."

In this year's fiscal year 2008 report, the Appropriations Committee again expressed concern with the lack of transparency and consultation: "The committee is aware of concerns that some projects on Cyprus have been funded without advance consultation with the Government of Cyprus. The committee recommends that such consultation occur whenever practicable in the interest of transparency in the allocation of funds."

How will you engage and consult with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus as Congress directed? What will you do to address the concerns expressed by Congress?

Answer. The United States Government is committed to consultation and transparency with the Government of Cyprus on the United States Government foreign assistance program for Cyprus, in accord with the fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2008 Senate Appropriations Committee reports. Since 2005, Embassy Nicosia has made it a priority to increase the frequency and breadth of consultations. The Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Public Affairs Officer, and USAID Representative have had numerous meetings with Government of Cyprus officials to discuss United States Government foreign assistance in Cyprus. Concerns expressed by Government of Cyprus officials at these meetings have been taken into account in our programs. For example, United States Government foreign assistance programs are highly sensitive to recognition, property issues, and contractor office locations, all of which have been raised as concerns by Government of Cyprus officials in our consultations. These are examples of productive results of our consultations with the Government of Cyprus.

Unfortunately, Government of Cyprus officials do not always accept consultation meetings sought by embassy officials and have indicated that they are not satisfied with the detailed information provided by USAID and its partners on the island. In fact, the Government of Cyprus has increasingly sought to exercise control over our projects directed at the Turkish Cypriot community. Acceding to such Government of Cyprus demands would effectively undo the basic premise of over 30 years of bicomunal programming in Cyprus and clearly would discourage Turkish Cypriots from participating in our programs, which would defeat the intent of the United States Government. To summarize, we seek and welcome consultations with the Government of Cyprus and other interested parties. However, the U.S. Government cannot allow any foreign government to control U.S. assistance programs, in accord with the instructions in the fiscal year 2008 Senate Appropriations Committee Report, which stated: "The committee understands that United States assistance does not go to the Government of Cyprus, but rather to private and nongovernmental organizations, and therefore the committee intends that with respect to the provision of such assistance, the organizations implementing such assistance and the specific nature of that assistance shall not be subject to the prior approval of any foreign government."

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. In your testimony you note: In 1980, there were approximately 4,000 direct hires in the USAID workforce; today there are 2,000, managing comparable amounts of programming dollars.

Please provide for the record the number of direct hires at each USAID bilateral mission as of July 24. Please note the number of personal service contracts working at these same missions. Finally, please provide the dollar value currently managed by each mission based on fiscal year 2007 dollars figures.

Answer. The attached table contains the information on the staffing levels for each country by the categories requested with the information verified for the end of September 2006. USAID is in the process of converting to a new comprehensive

personnel tracking system for each country by each employee type. The country disaggregated data will be available shortly. The dollars managed are for the fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget Justification levels broken out by country, and include not only funds appropriated to USAID, but funds managed by USAID on behalf of MCC, PEPFAR, the State and Agriculture Departments, and other agencies of the U.S. Government.

MISSIONS, FUNDING, FSOS AND PSCS AS OF 9/30/2006

[PSCs include all nondirect hire U.S. citizens]

Region/Organization unit	Total FY 08 CBI program funding	FSO	PSCs/other
Total	\$10,613,910	755.0	530.0
AFR Angola	25,786	4	0
AFR Benin	10,360	4	2
AFR Botswana (RCSA)	79,000	13	10
AFR Burkina Faso	4,675	0	0
AFR Burundi	27,977	0	0
AFR Cameroon	1,000	0	0
AFR Cape Verde	—	0	0
AFR Chad	5,200	0	0
AFR Comoros	—	0	0
AFR Cote d'Ivoire	96,000	0	0
AFR Democratic Republic of the Congo	71,088	7	7
AFR Djibouti	3,240	0	0
AFR Equatorial Guinea	—	0	0
AFR Ethiopia	443,346	16	8
AFR Gabon	—	0	0
AFR Gambia	—	0	0
AFR Ghana	38,994	15	9
AFR Guinea	13,969	5	7
AFR Guinea Bissau	600	0	0
AFR Kenya	489,124	9	12
AFR Kenya (REDSO-ESA)	24,320	17	19
AFR Lesotho	7,500	0	0
AFR Liberia	90,838	5	1
AFR Madagascar	32,213	5	5
AFR Malawi	59,277	10	6
AFR Mali	28,399	11	4
AFR Mauritania	6,520	0	0
AFR Mauritius	190	0	0
AFR Mozambique	271,180	13	7
AFR Namibia	92,775	5	4
AFR Niger	18,405	0	0
AFR Nigeria	509,770	16	8
AFR Rwanda	120,530	7	7
AFR Sao Tome	—	0	0
AFR Senegal	33,303	12	5
AFR Seychelles	—	0	0
AFR Sierra Leone	15,983	0	0
AFR Somalia	10,000	0	0
AFR South Africa	533,809	22	9
AFR Sudan	600,913	12	3
AFR Swaziland	7,500	0	0
AFR Tanzania	256,604	14	4
AFR Togo	120	0	0
AFR Uganda	312,138	13	16
AFR West African Regional Program (WARP)	40,100	5	15
AFR Zambia	315,409	10	5
AFR Zimbabwe	21,010	7	4
ANE Afghanistan	1,016,513	26	51
ANE Bangladesh	106,218	15	8
ANE Burma	4,630	0	0
ANE Cambodia	37,421	8	7
ANE China	9,290	0	0

MISSIONS, FUNDING, FSOS AND PSCS AS OF 9/30/2006—Continued

[PSCs include all nondirect hire U.S. citizens]

Region/Organization unit	Total FY 08 CBI program funding	FSO	PSCs/other
ANE East Timor	8,640	2	2
ANE Egypt	415,000	29	17
ANE India	71,005	17	8
ANE Indonesia	152,083	27	7
ANE Iraq	1,070,000	19	20
ANE Israel	—	0	—
ANE Jordan	284,751	16	6
ANE Laos	1,521	0	0
ANE Lebanon	40,688	1	0
ANE Mongolia	6,200	2	1
ANE Morocco	21,500	3	4
ANE Nepal	20,636	7	10
ANE Pakistan	440,418	11	2
ANE Philippines	66,106	16	6
ANE Regional Development Mission—Asia	20,400	15	16
ANE Sri Lanka	1,703	4	8
ANE Thailand	1,040	0	0
ANE Vietnam	93,400	0	0
ANE West Bank and Gaza	73,500	18	10
ANE Yemen	12,833	2	0
E&E Albania	15,865	4	8
E&E Armenia	34,965	6	8
E&E Azerbaijan	17,698	0	0
E&E Belarus	9,999	0	0
E&E Bosnia and Herzegovina	22,900	5	5
E&E Bulgaria	—	3	3
E&E Croatia	—	2	3
E&E Cyprus	11,000	1	0
E&E Georgia	50,381	13	10
E&E Hungary (RSC)	21,204	7	12
E&E Ireland	1,000	0	0
E&E Kazakhstan	14,397	21	14
E&E Kosovo	151,246	4	4
E&E Kyrgyzstan	23,790	0	0
E&E Macedonia	18,665	5	6
E&E Moldova	11,814	0	0
E&E Montenegro	7,572	0	0
E&E Poland	—	0	0
E&E Romania	—	5	3
E&E Russia	49,872	19	4
E&E Serbia	51,300	6	11
E&E Slovakia	—	0	0
E&E Tajikistan	26,880	0	0
E&E Turkey	850	0	0
E&E Turkmenistan	5,466	0	0
E&E Ukraine	70,430	20	4
E&E Uzbekistan	8,460	0	0
LAC Argentina	—	0	0
LAC Belize	200	0	0
LAC Bolivia	106,745	10	3
LAC Brazil	2,947	2	2
LAC Caribbean Regional Program	9,062	0	0
LAC Central America Regional Program	10,700	0	0
LAC Chile	—	0	0
LAC Colombia	506,468	10	9
LAC Costa Rica	—	0	0
LAC Cuba	45,700	0	0
LAC Dominican Republic	28,542	13	4
LAC Ecuador	19,988	4	5
LAC El Salvador	17,449	15	5
LAC Guatemala	43,826	11	4

MISSIONS, FUNDING, FSOS AND PSCS AS OF 9/30/2006—Continued

[PSCs include all nondirect hire U.S. citizens]

Region/Organization unit	Total FY 08 CBI program funding	FSO	PSCs/other
LAC Guyana	23,393	1	3
LAC Haiti	203,196	15	7
LAC Honduras	35,149	10	6
LAC Jamaica	8,536	9	8
LAC Mexico	14,768	4	10
LAC Nicaragua	25,579	9	3
LAC Panama	976	2	0
LAC Paraguay	5,985	3	0
LAC Peru	89,786	21	6
LAC South America Regional	1,500	0	0
LAC Uruguay	—	0	0
LAC Venezuela	3,000	0	0
AFR Summary	4,719,164	257	177
ANE Summary	4,065,496	238	183
E&E Summary	625,755	121	95
LAC Summary	1,203,495	139	75

Question. As a follow-up to the question regarding the number of officers who are being pulled away from their current assignments to adjudicate passports, please provide the committee with a list of those currently serving in this temporary capacity and any that have been identified by: Foreign Service/Civil Service or Presidential Management Fellow, Grade of the Individual, Current Location (Main State/FSI/Overseas Post), Current/Onward Assignment, Date of Assignment to Passport Office, Which Office, Duration of their temporary assignment.

Answer. We have provided the information requested in the attached a spreadsheet listing the status, assignment, and grade of the officers assisting with passport adjudication along with the length of their respective passport assignments. Some of the WAE (When Actually Employed re-employed annuitants) personnel have open-ended assignments or are working intermittently in Washington. We have noted precise assignments when available. Those listed as “ELOs” are entry level officers who are doing passport adjudication full-time. The ELOs’ onward post of assignment is listed, and in many, but not every case, their arrival at the post of assignment will be delayed by the length of their passport assignment. In Washington, 363 Department volunteers have self-scheduled for intermittent 4-hour adjudication shifts.

Furthermore, 271 other employees (including Civil Service, Foreign Service Specialists, WAEs, CA contractors, and Eligible Family Members currently employed by the Department) have been assigned full-time to customer service details in various agencies. These details range from 3 to 8 weeks. Additionally, 337 have voluntarily scheduled themselves for customer service work and another 324 for shifts on the Passport Phone Task Force. (Note that volunteers for the Customer Service and Passport Phone Task Force may overlap). These are primarily after duty hours and weekend hours.

Status	Office	Grade	Agency	Start	Weeks
Advanced Consular	FO-03	Washington	10-Jul	3
Advanced Consular	FS-01	New Orleans	9-Jul	4
Advanced Consular	FS-01	New Orleans	9-Jul	3
Advanced Consular	FS-03	New Orleans	10-Jul	3
Advanced Consular	FS-03	New Orleans	10-Jul	2
Advanced Consular	FS-03	New Orleans	10-Jul	3
Advanced Consular	FS-03	New Orleans	16-Jul	2
Advanced Consular	FS-03	New Orleans	10-Jul	4
Advanced Consular	FS-03	New Orleans	11-Jul	3
Advanced Consular	FS-03	New Orleans	10-Jul	3
Advanced Consular	FS-03	Washington	10-Jul	3
Advanced Consular	FS-03	Washington	10-Jul	3

Status	Office	Grade	Agency	Start	Weeks
Advanced Consular		FS-04	New Orleans	9-Jul	3
Advanced Consular		FS-04	New Orleans	10-Jul	3
Advanced Consular		FS-04	Portsmouth	11-Jul	3
Advanced Consular		GS-11	New Orleans	9-Jul	3
Advanced Consular		GS-11	New Orleans	9-Jul	3
Civil Service	AF/S	GS-08	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Civil Service	CA/FPP	GS-13	Philadelphia	27-Aug	2
Civil Service	CA/FPP	GS-14	Portsmouth	19-Aug	2
Civil Service	CA/PPT	GS-13	New Orleans	15-Jul	2
Civil Service	CA/VO/LA	GS-13	Seattle	4-Aug	2
Civil Service	EB/ESC	GS-08	New Orleans	4-Aug	4
Civil Service	EB/IFD	FS-03	Los Angeles	6-Aug	4
Civil Service	EUR/AGS	FS-03	Portsmouth	26-Aug	1
Civil Service	IIP	FS-03	Los Angeles	4-Aug	4
Civil Service	IIP/AF	FP-04	Los Angeles	4-Aug	4
Civil Service	INR/GGI	GS-12	Chicago	3-Sep	4
Civil Service	NEA/SCA/EX	GS-09	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Civil Service	Nogales	GS-11	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Civil Service	PRM/MCE	GS-11	Portsmouth	4-Aug	4
Civil Service	RM/GFS	GS-09	Charleston	23-Jul	1
Civil Service	S	GS-11	Houston	5-Aug	6
Civil Service	S-EX-IRM	GS-13	New Orleans	16-Jul	2
Civil Service	Tijuana	GS-11	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Domestic	HR/REE	FE-MC	Washington	15-Aug	4
Domestic	HR/REE	FE-OC	Washington	23-Jul	4
Domestic Foreign Service	AF	FS-02	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Domestic Foreign Service	CA/CST	FS-01	New Orleans	4-Aug	4
Domestic Foreign Service	CA/FPP	FP-04	Washington	11-Jul	4
Domestic Foreign Service	EAP/MTS	FS-03	Washington	9-Jul	1
Domestic Foreign Service	EUR/SE	FP-04	Honolulu	27-Aug	1
Domestic Foreign Service	HR/REE	FE-MC	Washington	14-Jul; 21-Jul	1
Domestic Foreign Service	M	FO-02	New Orleans	14-Jul	2
Domestic Foreign Service	OBO	FS-02	Philadelphia	4-Aug	4
Domestic Foreign Service	OBO	FS-02	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Domestic Foreign Service	OES	FS-02	Portsmouth	4-Aug	4
Domestic Foreign Service	OES	FS-03	San Francisco	4-Aug	4
Domestic Foreign Service	OES/ENV	FO-02	New Orleans	4-Aug	4
Domestic Foreign Service	PD	FP-04	Boston	25-Jul	3
Domestic Foreign Service	PM/WRA	FS-02	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Domestic Foreign Service	PPT deployment	FP-05	Colorado	8-Jul	8
Domestic Foreign Service	S/ES	FE-MC	Washington	13-Aug	8
Domestic Foreign Service	S/ES-S	FS-03	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Domestic Foreign Service	S/ES-X	FS-02	Washington	6-Aug	4
Domestic Foreign Service	Training	FS-02	Chicago	12-Aug	2
Domestic Foreign Service	Training	FS-02	Houston	22-Jul	1
Domestic Foreign Service	Training	FS-03	New Orleans	4-Aug	4
Domestic Foreign Service	Training	FS-04	New York	29-Aug	1
Domestic Foreign Service	Training	FS-02	Seattle	16-Jul	1
ELO	Abu Dhabi	FP-04	New York	5-Aug	6
ELO	Abuja	FP-05	Washington	22-Aug	6
ELO	Accra	FP-04	New Orleans	9-Sep	8
ELO	Accra	FP-04	Washington	30-Jul	8
ELO	Addis Ababa	FP-05	New Orleans	3-Sep	8
ELO	Amsterdam	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	8
ELO	Ankara	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	8
ELO	Athens	FP-04	Portsmouth	29-Jul	4
ELO	Athens	FP-04	Washington	25-Jul	4
ELO	Bangkok	FP-04	New Orleans	30-Sep	7
ELO	Beijing	FP-05	Washington	13-Aug	7
ELO	Beirut	FP-05	Washington	6-Aug	7
ELO	Beirut	FS-03	Washington	15-Oct	8
ELO	Berlin	FP-04	Washington	20-Aug	4
ELO	Berlin	FP-05	Washington	13-Aug	7
ELO	Bogota	FP-04	Miami	30-Sep	7

Status	Office	Grade	Agency	Start	Weeks
ELO	Bogota	FP-04	Portsmouth	14-Oct	5
ELO	Bogota	FP-05	Washington	16-Jul	5
ELO	Bogota	FP-05	Washington	23-Jul	6
ELO	Bridgetown	FP-04	Washington	23-Jul	7
ELO	Bridgetown	FP-05	Houston	4-Sep	8
ELO	Bucharest	FP-04	Portsmouth	10-Sep	7
ELO	Bucharest	FP-04	Washington	20-Aug	7
ELO	Canberra	FP-04	Los Angeles	16-Sep	8
ELO	Canberra	FP-04	Seattle	14-Oct	8
ELO	Caracas	FP-04	Washington	23-Jul	5
ELO	Caracas	FP-05	Washington	2-Aug	5
ELO	Caracas	FS-03	Washington	20-Aug	8
ELO	Chengdu	FP-04	Washington	2-Aug	8
ELO	Chennai	FP-04	Washington	2-Aug	8
ELO	Ciudad Juarez	FP-04	Washington	16-Jul	8
ELO	Ciudad Juarez	FP-04	Washington	22-Aug	7
ELO	Ciudad Juarez	FP-04	Washington	20-Aug	7
ELO	Ciudad Juarez	FP-04	Washington	23-Jul	8
ELO	Ciudad Juarez	FP-04	Washington	10-Jul	7
ELO	Ciudad Juarez	FP-04	Houston	8-Oct	7
ELO	Ciudad Juarez	FP-05	Washington	20-Aug	7
ELO	Copenhagen	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	6
ELO	Dakar	FP-04	Washington	10-Jul	7
ELO	Dakar	FP-04	Washington	30-Jul	8
ELO	Dar es Salaam	FP-04	Houston	3-Sep	8
ELO	Dhaka	FP-04	Washington	2-Aug	8
ELO	Dhaka	FP-04	Washington	4-Sep	4
ELO	Djibouti	FP-05	Washington	4-Sep	7
ELO	Djibouti	FP-06	Washington	6-Aug	7
ELO	Doha	FP-04	Los Angeles	5-Aug	4
ELO	EUR/RPM	FP-04	Washington	6-Aug	4
ELO	Geneva	FP-04	Washington	30-Jul	4
ELO	Georgetown	FP-05	Washington	22-Aug	7
ELO	Guangzhou	FP-05	Washington	16-Jul	7
ELO	Guatemala	FP-04	New Orleans	29-Jul	8
ELO	Guayaquil	FP-05	Washington	30-Jul	8
ELO	HCMC	FP-04	Washington	20-Aug	7
ELO	Hong Kong	FP-05	Washington	20-Aug	2
ELO	INR	FP-04	Washington	24-Sep	2
ELO	Iraq Desk	FP-05	New Orleans	22-Jul	6
ELO	Islamabad	FP-04	Washington	10-Jul	6
ELO	Islamabad	FP-04	Washington	30-Jul	6
ELO	Islamabad	FP-05	Washington	27-Aug	4
ELO	Islamabad	FP-05	Washington	13-Aug	8
ELO	Jakarta	FP-04	Washington	9-Aug	7
ELO	Jakarta	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	1
ELO	Jakarta	FP-04	Washington	30-Jul	7
ELO	Jakarta	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	0
ELO	Jerusalem	FP-04	Washington	2-Aug	7
ELO	Jerusalem	FP-04	Washington	2-Aug	7
ELO	Jerusalem	FP-05	Washington	17-Sep	8
ELO	Johannesburg	FP-04	Washington	26-Sep	8
ELO	Johannesburg	FP-05	Washington	13-Aug	7
ELO	Kampala	FP-04	Washington	4-Sep	7
ELO	Kampala	FP-04	Washington	4-Sep	5
ELO	Kampala	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	5
ELO	Kampala	FP-05	Washington	22-Aug	2
ELO	Kathmandu	FP-05	Washington	16-Jul	8
ELO	Kathmandu	FP-05	Washington	24-Jul	7
ELO	Khartoum	FP-05	Washington	13-Aug	6
ELO	Kinshasa	FP-04	Washington	20-Aug	7
ELO	Kuala Lumpur	FP-04	Seattle	13-Aug	7
ELO	Kuwait	FP-04	Washington	24-Jul	7
ELO	Kyiv	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	4

Status	Office	Grade	Agency	Start	Weeks
ELO	Kyiv	FP-04	Washington	4-Sep	4
ELO	Kyiv	FP-04	Washington	30-Jul	7
ELO	Kyiv	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	3
ELO	La Paz	FP-06	New Orleans	12-Aug	8
ELO	Lagos	FP-04	New York	22-Jul	9
ELO	Lagos	FP-04	Washington	4-Sep	9
ELO	Lagos	FP-05	Washington	16-Jul	8
ELO	Lagos	FP-06	New Orleans	5-Aug	8
ELO	Lima	FP-04	Washington	4-Sep	8
ELO	Lima	FP-04	Washington	18-Jul	7
ELO	Lima	FP-05	New Orleans	28-Jul	6
ELO	Lima	FP-05	Washington	11-Jul	6
ELO	London	FP-04	Washington	24-Sep	8
ELO	Madrid	FP-06	Washington	20-Aug	4
ELO	Managua	FP-04	Los Angeles	9-Sep	7
ELO	Managua	FP-04	Washington	3-Sep	7
ELO	Manama	FP-05	Washington	27-Aug	4
ELO	Maputo	FP-04	Washington	9-Oct	7
ELO	Mexico City	FP-04	New Orleans	16-Sep	8
ELO	Mexico City	FP-04	Washington	11-Jul	8
ELO	Mexico City	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	7
ELO	Mexico City	FP-05	Washington	6-Aug	8
ELO	Mexico City	FP-06	Washington	20-Aug	8
ELO	Minsk	FP-06	Washington	30-Jul	7
ELO	Monrovia	FP-05	Washington	23-Jul	4
ELO	Monterrey	FP-05	Washington	2-Aug	7
ELO	Moscow	FP-05	Washington	11-Jul	8
ELO	Mumbai	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	7
ELO	Mumbai	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	7
ELO	Mumbai	FP-04	Washington	26-Jul	8
ELO	Mumbai	FP-05	San Francisco	16-Sep	5
ELO	Mumbai	FP-06	New Orleans	3-Sep	8
ELO	Nairobi	FP-04	Washington	17-Sep	8
ELO	Nairobi	FP-04	Washington	27-Aug	6
ELO	Nairobi	FP-05	Washington	6-Aug	8
ELO	NEA/I	FP-05	Washington	16-Jul	4
ELO	NEA/I	FP-06	Washington	4-Sep	1
ELO	New Delhi	FP-04	Washington	6-Aug	8
ELO	New Delhi	FP-04	Washington	20-Aug	8
ELO	New Delhi	FP-04	Washington	23-Jul	2
ELO	Nogales	FP-06	New Orleans	14-Oct	5
ELO	Nuevo Laredo	FP-04	Washington	21-Sep	5
ELO	Nuevo Laredo	FP-05	New Orleans	23-Jul	7
ELO	Onward Pending	FP-04	Washington	11-Jul	7
ELO	Ottawa	FP-04	Washington	6-Aug	9
ELO	Ottawa	FP-05	Washington	23-Jul	6
ELO	Panama	FP-04	Portsmouth	19-Aug	8
ELO	Panama	FP-05	Washington	16-Jul	8
ELO	Paris	FP-04	Washington	4-Sep	6
ELO	Port of Spain	FP-04	Washington	6-Aug	7
ELO	Port of Spain	FP-04	Washington	2-Oct	8
ELO	Quito	FP-05	Los Angeles	3-Sep	8
ELO	Riga	FP-04	Washington	2-Aug	8
ELO	Rio de Janiero	FP-04	Washington	16-Jul	4
ELO	Rio de Janiero	FP-05	Washington	16-Jul	6
ELO	Riyadh	FP-04	Washington	11-Jul	6
ELO	Riyadh	FP-04	Washington	1-Sep	6
ELO	Riyadh	FP-05	Washington	2-Aug	4
ELO	Riyadh	FP-05	Washington	30-Jul	4
ELO	Riyadh	FP-05	Washington	30-Jul	3
ELO	S/CRS	FP-04	Washington	10-Sep	4
ELO	San Jose	FP-04	San Francisco	4-Sep	8
ELO	San Jose	FP-04	Washington	4-Sep	8
ELO	San Salvador	FP-04	Los Angeles	26-Aug	8

Status	Office	Grade	Agency	Start	Weeks
ELO	San Salvador	FP-05	Washington	2-Aug	8
ELO	Sanaa	FP-04	New Orleans	22-Sep	5
ELO	Santo Domingo	FP-04	Miami	16-Sep	3
ELO	Santo Domingo	FP-04	Portsmouth	19-Aug	8
ELO	Santo Domingo	FP-05	Washington	16-Jul	8
ELO	Santo Domingo	FP-05	Washington	16-Jul	6
ELO	Sao Paulo	FP-04	Los Angeles	16-Jul	7
ELO	Sao Paulo	FP-04	Washington	16-Jul	7
ELO	Sao Paulo	FP-04	Washington	16-Jul	6
ELO	Sao Paulo	FP-04	Washington	16-Jul	6
ELO	Sarajevo	FP-04	Portsmouth	29-Jul	7
ELO	Seoul	FP-05	San Francisco	2-Sep	8
ELO	Seoul	FP-05	Washington	2-Aug	8
ELO	Singapore	FP-05	San Francisco	19-Aug	8
ELO	Sofia	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	8
ELO	Surabaya	FP-04	Washington	23-Jul	3
ELO	Sydney	FP-04	Washington	23-Oct	4
ELO	Sydney	FP-04	Washington	24-Sep	3
ELO	Taipei	FP-04	Los Angeles	13-Aug	8
ELO	Tallinn	FP-04	Washington	30-Jul	8
ELO	Tegucigalpa	FP-04	Washington	16-Jul	3
ELO	Tegucigalpa	FP-04	Washington	16-Jul	7
ELO	Tel Aviv	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	6
ELO	Tijuana	FP-04	San Francisco	22-Aug	7
ELO	Training	FP-06	San Francisco	16-Sep	5
ELO	Training	FP-06	Washington	13-Aug	5
ELO	Vancouver	FP-04	Washington	17-Sep	2
ELO	Vatican	FP-04	Washington	27-Aug	7
ELO	Vatican	FP-04	Washington	13-Aug	7
ELO	Vienna	FP-05	Washington	20-Aug	3
ELO	Sao Paulo	FP-04	San Francisco	12-Aug	8
Overseas Foreign Service	(End of tour) Kabul	FS-02	Houston	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	(End of tour) Kabul	FS-04	Los Angeles	4-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Abidjan	FP-5	New Orleans	10-Aug	3
Overseas Foreign Service	Abidjan	FS-03	Washington	19-Jul	—
Overseas Foreign Service	Accra	FP-03	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Amsterdam	FS-01	Portsmouth	4-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Amsterdam	FS-04	Portsmouth	22-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Antananarivo	FS-04	Washington	8-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	APP Toulouse	FS-03	Portsmouth	13-Aug	3
Overseas Foreign Service	Athens	FP-04	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Azerbaijan	FP-04	Portsmouth	16-Sep	3
Overseas Foreign Service	Beijing	FP-04	Los Angeles	16-Aug	3
Overseas Foreign Service	Berlin	FE-MC	New Orleans	4-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Buenos Aires	FS-04	San Francisco	23-Sep	6
Overseas Foreign Service	Cairo	FP-05	Washington	24-Aug	6
Overseas Foreign Service	Ciudad Juarez	FP-04	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Ciudad Juarez	FP-04	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Dar es Salaam	FS-02	Boston	17-Jul	1
Overseas Foreign Service	Frankfurt	FE-OC	New Orleans	12-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Frankfurt	FS-03	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Geneva	FP-05	Seattle	4-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Guadalajara	FP-04	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Guadalajara	FP-05	Portsmouth	9-Jul	3
Overseas Foreign Service	Guangzhou	FP-04	Chicago	6-Jul	1
Overseas Foreign Service	Guatemala	FP-05	Portsmouth	5-Aug	3
Overseas Foreign Service	Guatemala	FP-05	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Guayaquil	FP-04	Portsmouth	4-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Hanoi	FA-MC	Portsmouth	13-Aug	6
Overseas Foreign Service	Harare	FS-04	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Hermosillo	FP-04	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Hermosillo	FP-04	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Ho Chi Minh City	FP-03	Washington	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Ho Chi Minh City	FS-02	Chicago	17-Sep	3

Status	Office	Grade	Agency	Start	Weeks
Overseas Foreign Service	Ho Chi Minh City	FS-03	Washington	23-Jul; 6A	3
Overseas Foreign Service	Home Leave	FP-03	Washington	12-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Home Leave	FP-04	Los Angeles	2-Jul	2
Overseas Foreign Service	Hong Kong	FP-04	Philadelphia	4-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Jakarta	FP-04	Washington	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Jakarta (R&R)	FS-02	Seattle	4-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Johannesburg	FP-04	Washington	13-Jul	3
Overseas Foreign Service	Kinshasa	FO-03	New Orleans	26-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Kinshasa	FS-03	Washington	19-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Kuwait	FP-01	Washington	30-Jul	2
Overseas Foreign Service	Kyiv	FS-04	Chicago	16-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	La Paz	FS-03	Washington	26-Jul	2
Overseas Foreign Service	London	FP-05	Washington	26-Jul	2
Overseas Foreign Service	Manila	FP-04	Portsmouth	4-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Melbourne	FS-02	Washington	16-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Melbourne	FS-02	Washington	2-Jul	1
Overseas Foreign Service	Mexico City	FP-04	Portsmouth	16-Jul	3
Overseas Foreign Service	Mexico City	FP-05	Portsmouth	4-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Monterrey	FP-02	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Monterrey	FP-04	Portsmouth	31-Jul	2
Overseas Foreign Service	Moscow	FP-04	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Munich	FP-04	Houston	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Nairobi	FP-04	Washington	28-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Nassau	FS-02	Washington	5-Aug	1
Overseas Foreign Service	New Delhi	FS-01	Philadelphia	4-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Nogales	FP-04	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Panama	FP-04	Washington	21-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Paris	FE-MC	Colorado	6-Aug	8
Overseas Foreign Service	RCO Frankfurt	FS-01	Portsmouth	2-Jul	3
Overseas Foreign Service	RCO Frankfurt	FS-02	Portsmouth	13-Aug	3
Overseas Foreign Service	RCO Johannesburg	FS-03	Chicago	11-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Seoul (R&R)	FP-04	Seattle	20-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Singapore	FS-02	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Singapore	FS-04	San Francisco	6-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Skopje	FS-04	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Surabaya	FP-03	Washington	9-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Taipei (R&R)	FP-02	Miami	23-Jul	1
Overseas Foreign Service	Tegucigalpa	FP-07	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Tel Aviv	FP-04	Washington	30-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Tijuana	FS-02	Seattle	30-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Tokyo	FP-04	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Tokyo	FP-04	Washington	3-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Tunis	FP-09	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Vienna	FS-02	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Warsaw	FP-04	Washington	26-Aug	1
Overseas Foreign Service	Warsaw	FP-07	Portsmouth	4-Aug	3
Overseas Foreign Service	Warsaw	FS-04	Portsmouth	4-Aug	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Yaounde	FS-04	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
Overseas Foreign Service	Yerevan	FS-02	Washington	10-Aug	4
PMF/CEP	A	GS-09	Portsmouth	12-Aug	5
PMF/CEP	A/EX/HRD	GS-09	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	A/EX/HRD	GS-09	Washington	23-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	EX/PTS	GS-09	Washington	16-Jul	2
PMF/CEP	A/ISS/IPS	GS-12	Portsmouth	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	AC	GS-11	Portsmouth	13-Aug	7
PMF/CEP	AF	GS-11	Washington	23-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	AF/E	GS-09	Washington	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	AF/E	GS-12	Washington	16-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	AF/SPG	GS-09	New Orleans	16-Sep	8
PMF/CEP	AF/SPG	GS-11	Washington	23-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	AF/W	GS-12	Washington	23-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	CA/OCS	GS-12	Los Angeles	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	CA/VO/L/A	GS-12	Portsmouth	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	Colombo	GS-09	Seattle	6-Aug	7

Status	Office	Grade	Agency	Start	Weeks
PMF/CEP	DRL	GS-07	Washington	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	DRL	GS-12	Portsmouth	27-Aug	2
PMF/CEP	DRL	GS-12	Washington	16-Sep	2
PMF/CEP	DRL/AE	GS-12	Portsmouth	30-Jul	3
PMF/CEP	DRL/AW	GS-12	Portsmouth	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	DR/INF	GS-12	New Orleans	16-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	DRL/MLGA	?	Washington	30-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	DRL/MLGA	GS-11	Portsmouth	15-Jul	5
PMF/CEP	DRL/MLGA	GS-11	Portsmouth	7-Aug	7
PMF/CEP	DRL/NESCA	GS-07	San Francisco	19-Aug	7
PMF/CEP	DRL/NESCA	GS-09	Chicago	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	DRL/NESCA	GS-09	New Orleans	29-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	DRL/P	GS-11	Portsmouth	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	DRL/P	GS-11	Portsmouth	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	DRL/SCA	GS-09	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	DS/IP/OPO	GS-11	Portsmouth	16-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	DS/MGT/HRM	GS-09	Los Angeles	15-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	DS/MGT/HRM	GS-09	Washington	24-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	DS/MGT/HRM	GS-09	Washington	23-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	DS/T/TPS	GS-11	Washington	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	EAP	GS-11	Portsmouth	30-Sep	5
PMF/CEP	EAP	GS-11	Washington	4-Sep	5
PMF/CEP	EAP	GS-11	Washington	10-Sep	3
PMF/CEP	EAP/CM	GS-11	Boston	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	EAP/CM	GS-11	San Francisco	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	EAP/EP	GS-09	Portsmouth	9-Sep	8
PMF/CEP	EAP/EX	GS-07	New Orleans	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	EAP/FO	GS-09	Portsmouth	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	EAP/K	GS-09	Washington	23-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	EAP/K	GS-11	Washington	30-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	EAP/K	GS-12	Washington	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	EAP/P. EAP/AWP	GS-09	New Orleans	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	EAP/RSP	GS-09	Washington	12-Aug	7
PMF/CEP	EB	GS-11	Portsmouth	14-Aug	4
PMF/CEP	ECA	GS-11	Washington	21-Aug	4
PMF/CEP	ECA/A/E	GS-11	New Orleans	22-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	ECA/PCE	GS-09	Washington	23-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	ECA-IIP/EX/BF	GS-11	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	ECA-IIP/EX/BF	GS-11	Washington	16-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	EEB	GS-09	New Orleans	15-Jul	2
PMF/CEP	EEB	GS-09	Washington	22-Sep	2
PMF/CEP	EEB	GS-11	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	EEB/IFE	GS-11	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	EEB/TPP	GS-09	New Orleans	15-Aug	6
PMF/CEP	EEB/TPP/MTA	GS-09	New Orleans	2-Aug	7
PMF/CEP	EUR/ACE	GS-12	New Orleans	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	EUR/NB	GS-09	Portsmouth	16-Jul	3
PMF/CEP	EUR/NB	GS-09	Washington	13-Aug	3
PMF/CEP	EUR/PPD	GS-12	Los Angeles	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	EUR/PRA	GS-09	Portsmouth	14-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	EUR/RPM	GS-12	Washington	23-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	EUR/RUS	GS-11	New Orleans	9-Aug	7
PMF/CEP	EUR/SCE	GS-12	Portsmouth	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	F	GS-11	Portsmouth	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	F	GS-11	Washington	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	G/TIP	GS-11	Houston	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	G/TIP	GS-11	New Orleans	22-Jul	5
PMF/CEP	G/TIP	GS-11	Washington	23-Jul	5
PMF/CEP	H	GS-07	San Francisco	23-Jul	9
PMF/CEP	H/EX	GS-12	Portsmouth	17-Sep	7
PMF/CEP	HR/CSP	GS-09	Portsmouth	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	HR/ER	GS-07	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	HR/ER	GS-09	Portsmouth	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	HR/ER	GS-09	Washington	23-Jul	8

Status	Office	Grade	Agency	Start	Weeks
PMF/CEP	HR/REE	FP-04	Washington	27-Aug	7
PMF/CEP	HR/REE	GS-07	Portsmouth	20-Aug	5
PMF/CEP	HR/REE	GS-12	San Francisco	22-Jul	5
PMF/CEP	HR/REE/REC	GS-07	Washington	23-Jul	3
PMF/CEP	HR/RMA	GS-12	New Orleans	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	IIP/NEA-SCA	GS-09	Washington	13-Aug	7
PMF/CEP	IIP/P	GS-09	Washington	16-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	INL	GS-11	New Orleans	9-Sep	2
PMF/CEP	INL	GS-11	Washington	9-Sep	2
PMF/CEP	INL	GS-12	Portsmouth	14-Aug	5
PMF/CEP	INL/AAE	GS-12	Washington	23-Jul	5
PMF/CEP	IN/LAP	GS-09	Portsmouth	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	IN/LAP	GS-09	Washington	13-Aug	8
PMF/CEP	IN/LAP	GS-11	New Orleans	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	INL/CIV	GS-09	Portsmouth	6-Aug	8
PMF/CEP	IN/I	GS-09	Washington	29-Oct	8
PMF/CEP	INL/LP	GS-11	Washington	30-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	INL/LP	GS-11	Washington	6-Aug	9
PMF/CEP	INL/LP	GS-12	Portsmouth	23-Jul	2
PMF/CEP	INR	GS-12	Washington	26-Jul	2
PMF/CEP	INR/INC	GS-12	Portsmouth	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	INR/IRE	GS-12	San Francisco	29-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	INR/NESA	GS-11	Washington	16-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	INR/R/EUR	GS-11	Portsmouth	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	INR/R/EUR	GS-12	Washington	23-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	INR/TNC	GS-09	Washington	23-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	IO/MPR	GS-12	San Francisco	4-Aug	7
PMF/CEP	IO/OIC	GS-11	New Orleans	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	IO/PSC	GS-09	New Orleans	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	IO/RHS	GS-12	New Orleans	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	IO/UNP	GS-11	Portsmouth	16-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	IRM/OPS/MSO	GS-05	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	ISN	GS-11	Washington	11-Sep	8
PMF/CEP	ISN	GS-12	Portsmouth	18-Sep	2
PMF/CEP	ISN/CATR	GS-11	Washington	16-Jul	2
PMF/CEP	ISN/CPI	GS-12	Portsmouth	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	ISN/CTR	GS-12	Portsmouth	23-Jul	6
PMF/CEP	ISN/RA	GS-09	Portsmouth	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	ISN/RA	GS-09	Portsmouth	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	ISN/RA	GS-11	Portsmouth	23-Jul	5
PMF/CEP	ISN/RA	GS-12	Washington	23-Jul	5
PMF/CEP	ISN/WMDT	GS-09	Portsmouth	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	ISN/WMDT	GS-11	Washington	6-Aug	8
PMF/CEP	ISN/WMDT	GS-12	New York	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	L	GS-07	Washington	4-Sep	7
PMF/CEP	L	GS-11	New Orleans	29-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	L/AN, L/T	GS-07	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	L/CA, L/EMP	GS-11	Portsmouth	6-Aug	8
PMF/CEP	L/CA, L/WHA	GS-07	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	L/DL	GS-09	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	L/HRR	GS-07	New Orleans	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	L/HRR, L/LEI	GS-07	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	L/LFA, L/PM	GS-07	Washington	23-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	L/NPV	GS-07	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	L/WHA	GS-07	New Orleans	30-Jul	4
PMF/CEP	M/P	GS-09	New Orleans	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	NEA	GS-09	Portsmouth	4-Sep	4
PMF/CEP	NEA/ELA	GS-09	Washington	16-Jul	4
PMF/CEP	NEA/I	GS-11	Portsmouth	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	NEA/I	GS-12	Washington	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	NEA/IPA	GS-09	Portsmouth	22-Jul	2
PMF/CEP	NEA/PI	GS-12	Washington	8-Oct	2
PMF/CEP	NEA/PI	GS-12	Washington	21-Jul	6
PMF/CEP	NEA/RA	GS-09	New York	22-Jul	8

Status	Office	Grade	Agency	Start	Weeks
PMF/CEP	OBO/HR	GS-05	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	OBO/PE/MEB	GS-11	New York	26-Aug	8
PMF/CEP	OES	GS-07	Portsmouth	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	OES	GS-07	Portsmouth	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	OES	GS-07	Washington	16-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	OES	GS-11	Portsmouth	23-Sep	4
PMF/CEP	OES/EGC	GS-09	New Orleans	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	OES/EGC	GS-09	New Orleans	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	OES/ENV	GS-09	New Orleans	6-Aug	8
PMF/CEP	OES/ETC	GS-11	Washington	30-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	OES/HB	GS-09	New Orleans	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	OES/STC	GS-07	Washington	16-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	OES/STC	GS-11	Washington	16-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	PA	GS-11	Washington	20-Aug	7
PMF/CEP	PA/FO	GS-09	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	PA/RMO	GS-11	Portsmouth	16-Jul	5
PMF/CEP	PA/RMO	GS-12	Portsmouth	25-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	PIU/RSAT	GS-11	Washington	16-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	PM/DTC	GS-09	New Orleans	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	PM/PPA	GS-12	Portsmouth	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	PM/RSAT	GS-09	Portsmouth	7-Aug	7
PMF/CEP	PM/RSAT	GS-11	Washington	23-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	PM/WRA	GS-09	New Orleans	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	PRF/AFR	GS-11	Washington	30-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	PRM	GS-09	New Orleans	29-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	PRM/ANE	GS-11	Portsmouth	20-Aug	8
PMF/CEP	PRM/MCE	GS-12	Portsmouth	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	PRM/PRP	GS-11	New Orleans	22-Jul	6
PMF/CEP	PRM/PRP	GS-11	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	PRM/PRP	GS-12	New Orleans	20-Aug	8
PMF/CEP	RM/BP	GS-09	New Orleans	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	RM/BP	GS-09	Portsmouth	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	RM/BP	GS-09	Washington	10-Sep	8
PMF/CEP	S	GS-12	Portsmouth	10-Sep	3
PMF/CEP	S	GS-12	Washington	13-Aug	3
PMF/CEP	S/CRS	GS-11	Portsmouth	13-Aug	4
PMF/CEP	S/CRS	GS-11	Washington	10-Sep	4
PMF/CEP	S/CRS	GS-11	Washington	30-Jul	2
PMF/CEP	S/CT	GS-12	Washington	30-Jul	2
PMF/CEP	S/ES-S	GS-07	San Francisco	23-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	S/GAC	GS-12	Portsmouth	23-Jul	4
PMF/CEP	S/GAC	GS-12	Washington	23-Jul	4
PMF/CEP	S/I	GS-12	Portsmouth	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	S/OCR	GS-09	Portsmouth	6-Aug	6
PMF/CEP	S/OCR	GS-09	Washington	30-Jul	6
PMF/CEP	S/WCI	GS-09	New Orleans	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	S/WCI	GS-09	New Orleans	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	SCA	GS-09	Chicago	23-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	SCA	GS-11	New Orleans	21-Aug	6
PMF/CEP	SCA/A	GS-12	Washington	7-Sep	6
PMF/CEP	SCA/A	GS-12	Washington	16-Jul	4
PMF/CEP	SCA/CEM	GS-09	Washington	23-Jul	4
PMF/CEP	SCA/INS	GS-09	Portsmouth	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	SCA/PPD	GS-09	New Orleans	16-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	SCA/RAO	GS-11	New Orleans	22-Jul	2
PMF/CEP	USAID/GC	GS-09	New York	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	VCI/CCA	GS-07	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	VCI/FO	GS-09	Portsmouth	30-Jul	7
PMF/CEP	WHA/AND	GS-09	New York	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	WHA/CAR	GS-11	Washington	6-Aug	8
PMF/CEP	WHA/CCA	GS-09	New Orleans	15-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	WHA/CEN	GS-11	New Orleans	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	WHA/CEN	GS-12	New Orleans	6-Aug	8
PMF/CEP	WHA/EX	GS-07	Portsmouth	16-Jul	7

Status	Office	Grade	Agency	Start	Weeks
PMF/CEP	WHA/PDA	GS-09	New Orleans	22-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	WHA/USOA	GS-12	Washington	23-Jul	8
PMF/CEP	WHA/USOAS	GS-11	Portsmouth	23-Jul	2
R&R		FS-03	Washington	20-Aug	2
WAE	CA	GS-13	Houston	5-Aug	6
WAE	CA	GS-13	Houston	15-Aug	4
WAE	CA	GS-13	Houston	5-Aug	6
WAE	CA	GS-13	Houston	5-Aug	4
WAE	CA	GS-13	Houston	5-Aug	6
WAE	CA	GS-13	Houston	19-Aug	6
WAE	CA	GS-13	Portsmouth	8-Jul; 8-Aug	6
WAE	CA	GS-13	Portsmouth	8-Jul	8
WAE	CA	GS-13	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
WAE	CA	GS-13	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
WAE	CA	GS-13	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
WAE	CA	GS-13	Portsmouth	7/16/2007	2
WAE	CA	GS-13	Portsmouth	8-Jul	4
WAE	CA	GS-13	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
WAE	CA	GS-13	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
WAE	CA	GS-13	Portsmouth	5-Aug	4
WAE	CA	GS-13	Seattle	18-Sep	4
WAE	CA	GS-13	Seattle	22-Jul	*
WAE	CA/FO	GS-14	Portsmouth	28-Jul	2
WAE	DS	GS-13	Portsmouth	15-Jul	7
WAE	DS	GS-13	Washington	7/25/2007	*
WAE	INL	GS-13	Washington	26-Jul	*
WAE	NEA	GS-13	San Francisco	7/23/2007	*
WAE	NEA	GS-13	San Francisco	26-Aug	9
WAE	NEA	GS-13	Washington	23-Jul	9
WAE	NEA	GS-13	Washington	17-Jul	4
WAE	OIG	GS-14	San Francisco	12-Jul	2
WAE	WHA	GS-13	Washington	30-Jul	3
WAE	WHA	GS-13	Washington	23-Jul	2

* Indefinite.

Question. The so-called “F process” through which the Secretary intends to provide strategic direction and priorities for our multiple foreign aid programs has been met by considerable resistance. The loudest complaints have centered on the lack of transparency of the process but the unspoken complaint is that a number of actors—certain bureaucrats, congressional earmarkers, NGOs, and others—have lost some of their say over how individual pots of money will be spent. What can or should be done to overcome such resistance?

Answer. The past year’s budget process focused on looking at the full picture of funding and programs going into a particular country or region. This brought additional understanding to a wider group of actors about what the U.S. Government is trying to accomplish in a particular country or region and the interests and resources each were contributing. However, this also brought a new set of challenges. Many programs have supporters—some with vested interests—whether they be in the field, within the Department of State or USAID, in Congress, or in the NGO community. Within a constrained budget environment there is never sufficient funding for all programs that everyone would like to do in a country or might be nice to do in a country, nor is there enough funding to continue all projects in the same levels in all countries. Real, strategic choices have to be made.

One of the goals of establishing the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and the reform process is to make it clear what we seek to accomplish in a country using foreign assistance, not just to identify worthwhile programs to fund. By establishing these strategic goals, we can then identify which programs, out of a myriad of worthwhile programs, are most likely to accomplish our foreign assistance goals. I would therefore argue that it is better for the U.S. Government and other stakeholders and partners to understand the full picture of what the U.S. Government is achieving in a country rather than only focusing on their own programs; often not realizing how they are impacting other sectors and the overall objectives. It is beneficial to make the tough decisions to ensure that our foreign assistance funding is coordinated, coherent, and used to the maximum impact. I believe that with the

intensive consultations that I have embarked on, and will continue to do, we will be able to move forward taking all of this into consideration.

Question. As you may know, there are many of us who believe that decisions on foreign assistance fall within the realm of foreign policy and should be made by the Secretary of State. Do you intend to include section 1206 funding, train-and-equip security assistance from DoD, in the “F process” deliberations?

Answer. Pursuant to section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act, the President is authorized to direct the Departments of Defense and State to jointly develop programs to build the capacity of foreign military forces to be funded from Department of Defense appropriations in an amount up to \$300 million in this fiscal year. This authority has proved effective in addressing rapidly evolving security situations.

Senator, this is a new authority and we are still working with the Department of Defense (DoD) on the best way to coordinate and plan. Our understanding of Congressional intent of the section 1206 authority is that it is to provide supplementary urgent funds (outside of the normal budget cycle) and not replace normal programming. Therefore, it is a challenge to incorporate the section 1206 authority in the planning stages of the budget preparation, but we must be including it in our thinking the 1206 authority as a possibility in emerging situations. The authority requires that all funding proposals be jointly developed by DoD and the State Department. Staff in the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance are involved in this joint development process along with the other key stakeholder bureaus in the Department. This joint development process ensures that the Secretary’s foreign policy views are incorporated into the decision process.

Question. We should expect to see some shifting of funding as countries develop and can begin to take responsibility for pockets of extreme poverty that may still exist despite economic progress. U.S. foreign assistance cannot be seen by recipient countries or those working in them as an entitlement and it would be good to see more not fewer graduates. How do you judge when a country is ready to “graduate” from U.S. assistance? As funding has increased to the Middle East and northern Africa, for example, some funding to countries in Latin America (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru) and Europe and Eurasia has decreased. Is this a function of a finite budget or has a conclusion been reached that the countries with aid cuts in these regions are graduating from U.S. foreign assistance?

Answer. We closely monitor the composition and type of U.S. assistance provided to ensure it is carefully matched to a country’s needs and our shared interests. “Graduation” should be viewed in the context of becoming, to use the terminology in the Foreign Assistance Framework, a Sustaining Partner country. For example, Slovenia is a “Sustaining Partner” country where U.S. assistance is provided to support NATO interoperability and to help position Slovenia to participate in international peacekeeping missions. But, since Slovenia performs well against the economic and democratic measures we monitor, it does not need and does not receive substantial foreign assistance. South Africa is another example. Despite 28 successive quarters of economic growth and well-developed financial, legal and transport systems, South Africa has been unable to realize fully its capacity, due largely to a range of social issues (most prominently, high rates of HIV/AIDS). Our assistance to this sustaining partner is therefore targeted to that specific obstacle to success, with the largest proportion of U.S. funds directed to combat HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.

In Europe and Eurasia, development assistance is provided under the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act and FREEDOM Support Act (FSA), which address the transition goals of helping post-Communist states become stable, market-oriented democracies. While some of the decline in development assistance funding for Europe and Eurasia can be attributed to critical needs in other regions of the world, more notably, we are also able to lower SEED and FSA assistance to the region due to the success of sustained efforts since 1989. Eleven SEED countries have graduated from dependence on development assistance, and now only receive security assistance (Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education Training). Of these, 10 have joined the European Union (E.U.) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the only exception, Croatia, is on track to join both organizations. The remaining six SEED recipients appear headed toward eventual NATO and E.U. accession, although it may take a decade or more in some cases. SEED programs are directed toward joining these Euro-Atlantic institutions, which will go hand in hand with graduation from U.S. assistance. In Eurasia, FSA assistance has played a substantial role in supporting reform, dramatically illustrated by the democratic breakthroughs in 2003–2005. For Russia, Kazakhstan, and

Azerbaijan, U.S. funding has been reduced in acknowledgement of the increasing energy wealth these countries can bring to bear in addressing their development challenges. Nevertheless, progress across Eurasia has been uneven and a number of difficult challenges remain to completing FSA's transition goals, most notably in democratic reform, that will necessitate the continuation of development assistance to the region for the foreseeable future.

Similarly, in the Western Hemisphere region, of 26 bilateral country programs in Latin America, over half (14) are either in the Transforming or Sustaining Partnership categories. Using a strategic country based approach, we gave priority to key anchor states in the region—notably Colombia and Haiti—where strategic and development interests are most salient. Colombia, Haiti, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador account for more than 71 percent of the United States assistance resources request for the Western Hemisphere in fiscal year 2008.

In short, a range of factors affects graduation, well as the degree and timing of graduation, and the concomitant shifting of U.S. foreign assistance recourses.

There is no doubt that we are working in a constrained budget environment. Tough choices have to be made and fair and appropriate rationales were developed for making those choices.

Question. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention serves as a partnering technical agency in collaboration with USAID in many areas of global health programs. Please describe how this works. How would you describe the relationship between USAID and CDC? How can we ensure that these collaborations, including work on PEPFAR, the Presidential Malaria Initiative, and the focus on TB, are best taking advantage of each agency's strengths?

Answer. I am told that USAID has a strong relationship with CDC that capitalizes on the independent strengths of each agency.

In PEPFAR, both agencies serve as Deputy Principals of the PEPFAR implementation committee. As a disease control and prevention agency, CDC focuses primarily on clinical and laboratory delivery. As a development agency, USAID focuses primarily on service delivery outside of the clinic, including community outreach, prevention, orphans, and sustainability.

In the President's Malaria Initiative, USAID and CDC interact at both the country level and at headquarters, under the direction of a White House appointed coordinator based at USAID and a deputy coordinator detailed to USAID from HHS. Both USAID and CDC have put considerable effort into making this partnership productive, to the benefit of the recipient countries. Each recipient country is staffed by a team that includes one CDC and one USAID technical advisor, supported by short-term technical assistance from both Atlanta and Washington. Annual country plans are jointly developed by these interagency teams.

In TB, USAID and CDC have been working closely together over many years and have an extraordinarily good working relationship, which ensures that U.S. Government resources for TB and TB/HIV are used in the most effective and efficient manner possible. The agencies have worked together to outline the roles and responsibilities for each agency, with USAID taking the lead on international TB, and CDC leading on domestic TB.

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. I have been a long-time supporter of the Cooperative Association of States for Scholarships (CASS) program, which has a pending application for a new cooperative agreement. While I understand that a decision on the application may not be forthcoming soon, could you please advise as to when a decision will be made on the agreement? Are there budgetary barriers that are preventing a decision from being made?

Answer. USAID has received an unsolicited proposal for the amount of \$50 million to extend funding for CASS another 5 years beyond fiscal year 2007. The CASS program has been in effect for over 20 years; generally it is USAID policy that assistance awards to U.S. organizations should not be extended beyond 10 years from the original award without full and open competition. Therefore, should resources be made available, USAID policy would favor an award based on open competition.

Question. I applaud the administration for recognizing the critically important role basic education plays in reducing widespread poverty as well as in the achievement of all transformational diplomacy goals. However, of the 52 countries with existing basic education programs, 22 countries are seeing cuts to basic education in the administration's fiscal year 2008 request; and an additional seven countries'

basic education budgets are being zeroed out (East Timor, Guinea, India, Madagascar, Mexico, Nepal, and South Africa). Please explain the justification for zeroing out basic education in these seven countries. Why does the administration's fiscal year 2008 request eliminate basic education funds to India, which is home to over 1/3 of the world's illiterate people, and a country where 4.6 million children do not have access to school?

Answer. Funding for basic education has increased more than fivefold since fiscal year 2000, from less than \$100 million to more than \$500 million. As a founding member of the Education for All—Fast Track Initiative and as a signatory to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Agreement on Aid Effectiveness, the United States is committed to aligning its assistance with that of other donors in support of country-driven education strategies. The decision making process used to determine the fiscal year 2008 funding request for basic education involved country teams in Washington and the field. These teams are knowledgeable about each country's mix of donors and what U.S. Government assistance is required to stimulate and sustain transformational development, including whether U.S. Government resources would best be used to support basic education or for other high priority programs in the country.

Our evaluation, based upon suggestions from experts in Washington and in the field is that basic education funds have been spread too thin in some cases. Better and more strategic results may be achieved by supporting more robust programming but in doing so we will need to focus on fewer countries. Under this approach, we will focus our technical attention on fewer countries but will have greater resources to leverage host country commitment to change. For instance, basic education programs were prioritized in Indonesia to provide a positive alternative in basic education in the world's most populous Muslim nation (increased \$19 million from fiscal year 2006).

Overall, USAID feels that our requested fiscal year 2008 budget will not be detrimental to lasting transformational change in these seven countries, and in each case there was a sound rationale for the decision, often based on the local will and capacity to help their own education system. We certainly want to maximize our investments to-date, and we will actively work toward this in each of these countries.

In the case of India, this is precisely the type of difficult question that we have focused on in designing our foreign assistance reforms and in trying to make the most strategic use of limited resources. We recognize that India does have significant education needs. Because of the large population size, limited foreign assistance resources, and extreme and growing needs in health, we determined that focusing the majority of United States foreign assistance in the health sector will have a greater impact reducing poverty and transforming India than spreading limited resources across many sectors. According to the Millennium Challenge Corporation indicators, India has improved in education this year, while health indicators have declined. Therefore, over 90 percent of the fiscal year 2008 request for India will be used to integrate health services and nutrition to improve survival of children and their mothers, stem global disease threats, and help India manage the growth of its rapidly increasing population.

In line with the administration's commitment to basic education, the President announced a new initiative on basic education which will provide \$525 million over 5 years to educate an additional 4 million children. The initiative would provide approximately \$425 million for additional basic education activities to help partner countries meet concrete needs identified through the Fast Track Initiative process and \$100 million for a new Communities of Opportunity program that will provide after school language and skills training for at-risk youth in the 8–14 age group.

Question. The U.S. Government currently funds basic education programs in 25 African countries. Why does the administration's fiscal year 2008 request cut or eliminate funds for basic education programs for 13 of these 25 African countries?

Answer. The administration's total basic education request for Africa for fiscal year 2008 of \$155.6 million represents a \$26.5 million (21 percent) increase over the fiscal year 2007 request. This request demonstrates our commitment to basic education as a critical component of the U.S. Government's transformational diplomacy goal of building strong democratic states equipped to meet the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and engage responsibly in the international community.

The fiscal year 2008 budget was built on an assessment of where assistance could be most effective given the overall strengths and challenges associated with a country rather than a more fragmented sector approach. Resources were prioritized to the interventions that would serve as critical levers for development. In some countries, therefore, country portfolios were realigned to provide additional funding in

support of other objectives, including, in some countries in Africa, activities relating to strengthening democracy and governance.

Notably, the fiscal year 2008 request contains \$100 million for President Bush's Africa Education Initiative (AEI), a \$600 million multi-year initiative that focuses on increasing access to quality basic education in Africa through scholarships, textbooks, and teacher training programs. This \$100 million request represents a \$45 million (82 percent) increase over AEI funds provided in fiscal year 2006.

Question. Both the President and Congress have indicated through budget and appropriation commitments their interest in supporting education for African and other developing countries. At the same time, however, the commitment to funding a strong education officer staff in USAID missions and at central and regional headquarters education offices seems to be decreasing. How will you address the need for more staff in both the field and headquarters in education?

Answer. USAID recognizes the education staffing shortage and will announce very soon the recruitment of 10 Foreign Service officers in the education sector who will be placed in regional offices and missions over the next 2 years. Additional education officers for high priority education countries and at USAID headquarters are part of a proposal that would complement the increased budget and appropriation commitments from the President and Congress.

Question. President Bush recently spoke about the importance of basic education in the developing world, identifying education as one of the top 3 priorities for U.S. foreign assistance and acknowledging its vital role in achieving sustainable development and global stability. How will you ensure that basic education remains a priority throughout the structural reorganization of U.S. foreign assistance?

Answer. Education is an important driver for poverty reduction, social empowerment, and gender equality, and the administration has made significant strides in expanding the amount of foreign assistance resources devoted to basic education programs in particular, and targeting these resources effectively. In fiscal year 2008, the President's budget requested \$535 million for basic education programs, up from \$126 million in fiscal year 2001. In fiscal year 2006, the United States provided \$521 million.

Currently, most of USAID's basic education programs support teacher training, scholarships, textbook distribution, and policy reforms. These metric-focused efforts have helped to address financial obstacles to schooling and availability of quality instruction. Empirical evidence illustrates that school enrollment, performance, and the development of employable skills are tied to a range of factors. This demands a more comprehensive approach. On May 31, 2007, the President announced an Expanded Education Program for the world's poorest targeting up to 4 million more children. This initiative will build upon existing efforts with a bold and innovative plan to: (1) provide an additional 4 million children with accountable and quality basic education; (2) deliver technical training for 100,000 at-risk youth; and (3) coordinate with child health programs that impact educational attainment.

The President's initiative would provide approximately \$525 million over 5 years—roughly \$425 million for additional basic education activities to help partner countries meet concrete needs identified through the Fast Track Initiative process and \$100 million for a new Communities of Opportunity program that will provide after school language and skills training for at-risk youth in the 8–14 age group. Additionally, the administration will establish a new high-level position—located at the U.S. Agency for International Development—for international basic education programs to carry out this initiative and improve program coordination and support greater policy coherence at the global level across U.S. Government agencies.

As a founding member of the Education for All—Fast Track Initiative and as a signatory to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Agreement on Aid Effectiveness, the United States is committed to aligning its assistance with that of other donors in support of country-driven education strategies. The decision making process used to determine the fiscal year 2008 funding request for basic education involved country teams in Washington and the field. The goal of this country-focused process was to determine the appropriate U.S. Government assistance in each sector, including education, required to stimulate and sustain transformational development in that country.

The Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance provides coordination and guidance to all foreign assistance delivered through all agencies and entities of the U.S. Government through the Operational Plan process. Operational Plans provide a comprehensive, interagency picture of all foreign assistance resources planned for implementation in-country and the utilization of those resources in support of trans-

formational diplomacy. Developed by the Country Team under the leadership of the Ambassador, the Operational Plans ensure that all U.S. foreign assistance resources in that country are coordinated, appropriately linked to foreign policy objectives, and supportive of an integrated country strategy. They strengthen the link between funding, activities, and results and collect standardized data about foreign assistance programs.

Question. In that speech the President also announced a new initiative on basic education which will provide \$525 million dollars over 5 years to educate an additional 4 million children. What countries will receive funds through this new initiative? How are they selected?

Answer. No countries have been selected yet as we are still finalizing the criteria for country eligibility. While the criteria have not been finalized, some proposed criteria include: (a) demonstrated country need; (b) the availability of any Fast Track Initiative endorsed plan; (c) Millennium Challenge Account program eligibility to help guard against corruption; and (d) country commitment to improving education quality. We anticipate making a significant budget request to Congress for this new program fiscal year 2009. In addition, we anticipate reprogramming \$14 million in fiscal year 2008 funds for this program.

Question. What types of basic education programs will be funded under this initiative?

Answer. The types of basic education programs to be funded under this initiative will be tailored to each country's specific needs based on an assessment. The overall focus will be on supporting a comprehensive, systematic approach to improving education. Activities could include teacher training, education finance and governance, effective measurement of student achievement, education management information systems and public-private partnerships.

Question. It is now early August and USAID still does not have an approved budget for fiscal year 2007. Country level programs have been unable to make decisions and have delayed program activities. What has been the impact of the delay in finalizing the budget on program activities?

Answer. As you know, once we receive our appropriation from Congress, we provide a notification to Congress as to how the funding will be allocated by country and account. Prior to submitting such a notification, the Department engages in intensive consultations with Congress. Due to the delayed passage of the Continuing Resolution, these consultations began later than expected.

After productive and intensive consultations, we reached agreement with the appropriations committees on final fiscal year 2007 budget levels for countries and specific programs during the week of July 23. Operating year budgets are considered final once this agreement is reached. I am transmitting the 653(a) Report summarizing the allocations to Congress and money is moving rapidly to the field.

Over the course of this fiscal year, we made partial funding available to the field, after appropriate notification to Congress. I recognize, however, that not releasing the full appropriation has been a challenge for our field missions especially with regard to negotiating implementing mechanisms. I am fully engaged in this matter and believe we are now in a position to ensure that programs are moving forward in the most expeditious manner possible. We shall aim to have funds to the field much earlier next year. If you or your staff would like us to provide a briefing on the 653(a) final levels, we would be more than happy to do so.

Question. Why was USAID management contemplating cutting back operating expenses and shutting down some USAID offices in Africa despite the President's stated commitment to Africa? Would new offices be opened or would the funding be absorbed by existing programs? What is the status of this possible cutback?

Answer. The fiscal year 2008 USAID budget request is our bare minimum requirement for operating in an overall scarce budget environment. The USAID budget is a reflection of the many competing demands on taxpayer resources.

USAID operates in some of the most difficult circumstances in the world and adequate resources are critical to implementing successful programs. USAID has been reviewing its budget and structure to ensure that operations are appropriately funded to continue its mission and support our national security interests abroad.

USAID currently anticipates no additional mission closings beyond what has been planned for several years. These include several Eastern European missions that are phasing out (Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania) and the Botswana regional mission, which is relocating into the Pretoria regional mission.

Question. How do you intend to proceed with the “F” process when most Hill committees are working on appropriations using the old standard methods?

Answer. Since its establishment in June 2006, the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance has developed new, integrated strategic planning, budget planning, program planning, and results monitoring tools. These tools are designed to provide senior leadership with the necessary information to assess progress and trade-offs, and improve decision making that supports policy goals, including our goal of achieving transformational diplomacy.

We think it is valuable to look at all the resources going to a country rather than considering each account in isolation. At the same time, we utilize the account structure established by our appropriations act. Thus, in the fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget Justification we requested funds both by account and in the context of the Foreign Assistance Framework. Our objective is to ensure that the process we establish can accomplish both the goal of creating a strategic view of foreign assistance in a country while working within the account structure of our appropriations acts.

We are at the beginning of this important reform process, not in the middle and not at the end. There are many aspects of the foreign assistance apparatus that have to be carefully examined; for example, whether the current authorities and account structures are equipped to meet the evolving needs of a post 9–11 world. I am committed to fully engaging with our committees in a collaborative manner regarding further steps and improvements to the foreign assistance process and our reform efforts.

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE
TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY VARIOUS SENATORS

Question from Senator Hagel. What are you doing to answer the concerns raised by Ambassador Crocker in his cable about United States Government Iraqi employees?

Answer. In February of this year, we identified the issue of assisting Iraqis who work for the embassy as a top priority for the Department and as matter of urgency. We took immediate steps to address the needs of those at risk in Iraq because of their association with the U.S. Government. We asked Congress to assist us in providing relief to these brave Iraqis by expanding the coverage of special immigrant visas (SIVs) which would enable us to include more of the Iraqi nationals who are serving the American people.

Secretary Rice set up the interagency task force on Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons led by Under Secretary Dobriansky, which continues to meet regularly. The interagency task force has a specific focus to address the humanitarian situation, including the needs of those at risk in Iraq because of their association with the U.S. Government. I have attended two such meetings and can assure you that those involved are dedicated to securing the best solution.

The interagency task force drafted and cleared the administration’s legislative proposal to provide a mechanism to lower, in extraordinary conditions, the years of service required for Special Immigrant Visa eligibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Embassy Baghdad was consulted often during the drafting process and its recommendations, which included years of service, were integrated into the administration’s SIV proposal.

In April, we sent to Capitol Hill the legislative proposal as an administration position which allows SIVs for LE Staff who have served in extraordinary conditions as determined by the Secretary and have fewer than the minimum years of service otherwise required. Through meetings and briefings, we are working actively to get support in both the House of Representatives and the Senate and to secure introduction and consideration of the proposal. We are working simultaneously to find a germane legislative vehicle for the legislative proposal or a sponsor to introduce it as a free standing bill. We are set to send another letter to all members regarding the urgency for the legislative proposal.

The Department and Embassy Baghdad have communicated to LE Staff the processes by which locally employed interpreters and translators under Chief of Mission authority can take immediate advantage of the Special Immigrant Visa opportunities offered by Public Law 110–36. Embassy Baghdad has also acted to accelerate the access of LE Staff to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program.

The Department and the administration recognize that a solution must be secured to assist those LE Staff in extraordinary conditions who are serving the American people.

Question from Senator Casey. Submit a detailed game plan on simplifying and making more transparent the foreign assistance process and dealing with the mess of overlapping jurisdictions?

Answer. Senator, clearly there is a great deal of work to be done to ensure that our foreign assistance dollars are used efficiently and to the maximum impact. To work toward accomplishing these goals, Secretary Rice has established umbrella leadership for foreign assistance resources under a new position of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, which is at the rank of Deputy Secretary of State. And to more fully align the foreign assistance activities carried out by the Department of State and USAID and demonstrate that we are responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars, she has appointed the Administrator of USAID to serve concurrently in this position. The USAID Administrator and the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance has direct approval authority over roughly 60 percent of all foreign assistance in the Foreign Operations request, and has robust coordinating authority over assistance provided under the Global HIV/AIDS (GHA) and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) accounts which includes 80 percent of all foreign assistance. Additionally, the USAID Administrator serves on the Board of the MCC.

Since its establishment in June 2006, the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance has developed new, integrated strategic planning, budget planning, program planning, and results monitoring tools. These tools are designed to provide senior leadership with the necessary information to assess progress and trade-offs, and improve decision making that supports policy goals, including our goal of achieving transformational diplomacy.

While all these steps have led to improvements, clearly much remains to be done. If I am confirmed, I will engage in transparent and simplified detailed strategic planning which will outline improvements and next steps needed in the reform process. I have listed some of the key issues I plan to address and a corresponding tentative timeline.

- I will work to consult closely and on a regular basis with key stakeholders such as Congress, NGOs, and the foreign aid and development community. I have already started this as I indicated in my testimony and I plan to continue this during my time as administrator, if confirmed. I strongly believe that robust communication, transparency, and buy-in to the Secretary's foreign assistance reforms are essential to its success.
- I will streamline the budget process over the next 6 months. We are working to ensure that the budget process includes regional and functional viewpoints as well as participation from other U.S. Government agencies such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Department of Defense. Additionally, we are formalizing field suggestions throughout the process and reducing the number of decision points in the budget process to relieve staff requirements. I am also working to establish clear guidelines on communication with the field and USAID and state bureaus to ensure transparency. To help me in doing this, I will be holding a series of conferences with USAID Mission Directors starting in October.
- Over the next 8 months, I will work to improve the Operational Plan process so that it is less labor intensive while still capturing the key data. Operational Plans are integrated interagency implementation plans for foreign assistance funding. Operational Plans are intended to strengthen the link between funding, activities, and results, and collect standardized data about foreign assistance programs. This data provides a basis for comparing and evaluating country, program, and partner progress in helping to achieve the transformational diplomacy goal.
- Over the next year, I will improve the core foreign assistance data systems. Through upgrading and enhancing the key budget and planning data systems we will be able to ensure that the systems are user-friendly, accessible, reliable, and flexible.
- Within the next 6 to 12 months, I will launch a strategic review to look at how we can ensure full coordination with agencies other than the Department of State and all of the foreign assistance programs and dollars they manage.
- Finally, over the next 3 to 6 months I will develop options for ensuring increased field involvement in the reform process to enable our foreign assistance to remain field driven and needs based. This will involve developing additional input points throughout the budget process and starting all budget discussions with field input.

I appreciate your and the committee's interest in helping us to ensure that we have the appropriate tools in place which will improve our foreign assistance decision making and effectiveness. The reforms proposed so far, including the creation

of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance position, are vital steps to ensure that we make every effort within statutory authorities to provide assistance strategically and effectively. Together with the Secretary, we will continue to evaluate the process and look to make improvements to the process and our reform efforts, as I mentioned in my testimony. I look forward to engaging with all stakeholders as we identify additional changes and improvements that will maximize the use of the foreign assistance dollars appropriated by Congress. Again, I very much welcome the opportunity to work with Congress on this and other matters relating to the foreign assistance reform going forward, and, if confirmed I would plan to come back to the committee periodically with more detailed discussion of our plans and progress.

Question from Senator Menendez. Who conducted the one or two political briefings you attended at Treasury?

Answer. There were two Treasury Senior Staff Retreats that I attended. The agenda for the Senior Staff Retreat on January 12, 2004, listed a 1-hour presentation entitled Political Overview and listed Barry Jackson, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Senior Advisor, and Matt Schlapp, Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Political Affairs as presenters. The agenda for the Senior Staff Retreat on January 4, 2005, listed a 45-minute presentation entitled Political Overview and listed Barry Jackson, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Senior Advisor, and Matt Schlapp, Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Political Affairs as presenters.

Question from Senator Lugar. What will you weigh in on as you take a look . . . giving us good counsel on MCC?

Answer. Among the more important innovations that Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has brought to the table is a greater capacity to concentrate resources toward the specific areas that have the greatest leverage in a country's growth agenda. In my view, the focus on country progress and country ownership is an essential element of the MCC model; the focus on country progress is also a corner stone of the foreign assistance reform. However, MCC is in a unique role to focus significant resources on the highest priority requirements for each country's growth and development. This is an essential tool in the U.S. Government's foreign assistance portfolio. I would like to take a thoughtful look at the advantages and disadvantages of the existing foreign assistance models.

Second, MCC's emphasis on measuring outcomes is important in the delivery of foreign assistance, and something on which we need to focus to improve the quality and quantity of our results both at MCC and in the rest of our foreign assistance portfolio.

Third, I would note that I am particularly interested in the fundamental linkage of MCC—USAID collaboration. The MCC is starting to build its capacity in the field in order to oversee implementation, and measure and evaluate results. In many cases, the MCC leans on USAID, whose capacities are stretched thin, while the MCC is still in the process of building. I want to explore opportunities for synergy and not duplication in our closer collaboration. There are others, and as I learn more about the issues and opportunities we face, I will look forward to consulting closely with you and others in the Congress on the best way forward.

Question from Senator Menendez. Submit the options (about refunding expedite fees) in writing for the committee.

Answer. After we examined several options to determine when and if to provide refunds for certain expedited applications, I determined that the most effective policy would be to continue to have applicants apply for refunds when they have reason to believe that they did not receive expedited service. The State Department will then address each refund request carefully on a case-by-case basis.

As of July 18, 2007, a total of 3,829,913 expedited passport requests have been received and acted upon in calendar year 2007; our passport agencies and passport centers have issued 2,716,448 expedited passports, 71 percent within 3 business days of receiving the applications. A total of 3,286,751 passports (86 percent) were likely to have been in customers' hands within 3 weeks of them having applied, the period outlined on the State Department Passport Web site.

A total of 543,162 expedited passports out of 3,829,913, approximately 14 percent, were not processed within 3 weeks. Even then, these individuals still received expedited treatment and most had their passports in hand by the date they specifically requested on their application. In the face of unprecedented demand (more than 40 percent increase over last year), those who requested expedited service did receive priority over the millions of other Americans who applied for passports at the same time. The expedited applications were automatically given a higher priority in the queue; these individuals received much faster service than the applicant who did

not pay for expedited service and whose wait climbed at one point to twelve weeks. To further ensure expedited service, the Department has been paying for expedited passports to be mailed via FEDEX and has not, unlike past practice, asked customers to cover this additional cost.

In reaching the conclusion to refund on a case-by-case basis, there were several options.

The first would be to issue no refunds at all given the unprecedented demand. This option did not merit consideration.

The second would have been to refund the fee paid by every applicant who requested expedited passport service, regardless of how fast the requester received the passport. We do not believe that providing a blanket refund automatically to all applicants would be either appropriate or equitable.

A third option is to provide refunds to applicants who did not receive their passports by the date they requested on their application. The Passport staff was constantly re-sorting and queuing applicants in order to provide those with the greatest/earliest need the fastest service. Thus, while some applications were not processed within 3 days, the passport was still received prior to the date the applicant requested.

A fourth option could be to have those who paid the fee and believe they did not receive expedited service request a refund. Our Web site already contains instructions on how to apply for a refund via e-mail. We will review each request thoroughly and provide timely refunds to those who meet the requirements.

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. I understand that during your first few weeks as Acting Administrator and Acting Director of Foreign Assistance you reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the "F" reform process to date.

- (a) What are some of the lessons learned about this process to date?
- (b) How will the change in leadership at the F Bureau affect the plans that Ambassador Tobias put in motion?
- (c) Do you plan to follow the timelines he laid out? If not, how will they differ?

Answer. During my tenure as Acting Administrator these past 2½ months, I have sounded out a number of ambassadors and mission directors for their views on how to strengthen U.S. foreign assistance to make it more effective and visible in the countries they represent. I am soliciting suggestions from the field to make the voices of those who actually implement our programs more prominent in their formulation. We are reviewing the After Action Report on the fiscal year 2008 budget formulation process and will be considering the suggestions of internal working groups in the agency that have been charged with adapting agency practices to better meet the Secretary of State's transformational diplomacy goal. I would like to underscore the fact that we are in the early stages of the reform process. I will work closely with you to strengthen and improve the process as we move forward.

Through my listening tour, I have taken away several key lessons and corresponding improvements that I think need to be made. First and foremost is that we must increase and regularize consultations with key stakeholders and increase collaboration and buy-in to the Secretary's reform. Second, we must streamline the budget process, while also increasing field involvement and transparency. Third, we must improve the Operational Plan process to be more effective and to make it less labor intensive while still collecting the necessary data. Fourth, our budgetary and financial systems must be strengthened to allow them to be user-friendly and flexible. And finally, communication and transparency must be enhanced. I take this as a serious mandate, and if confirmed, I assure you that my active listening tour will not end.

What I hope to do is capitalize on and reinforce what appears to be working and make changes to those elements which are not proving useful. I am particularly interested in simplifying the processes, making them more effective for all stakeholders, and considering attendant timelines in that regard.

Question. I understand there are plans to reformulate the process and the Strategic Framework. Please discuss what changes are being contemplated and what we can expect to unfold.

Answer. The Secretary and I believe that as we increase the quantity of our foreign assistance, which is critically important, we must also work to improve its quality. This is a driving factor behind her foreign assistance reform initiative. In my role as Acting Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, I am charged with helping

the Secretary to identify and realize new means to constantly improve our foreign assistance programs and activities. Having assumed this role but a short while ago, one of the first things I am doing is to listen to people's concerns and to consult with stakeholders about what we might improve. I will take all the ideas and suggestions I have received under advisement and continue to gather more as I think about the best ways to move forward. I want to reiterate that we are only at the beginning of the reform process, and I do intend to make changes taking into account what I have heard from all our stakeholders. I am especially interested in any thoughts and suggestions you might have about the reforms, including the processes and tools, and I would seek an opportunity to consult with you before making any significant changes.

Question. The State Department conducted an after-action review following the development of the fiscal year 2008 budget that solicited input from personnel at USAID, the State Department, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other Federal departments and agencies. Please outline the findings of this review, and your plans for responding to the identified weaknesses.

Answer. With a view toward improving the fiscal year 2009 process, an After Action Review (AAR) was conducted of the new budget formulation process. AAR sessions were attended by a mix of people from State and USAID regional and functional bureaus, including both working and senior-level individuals. It was especially important that the field's views were heard, therefore, mini-AAR sessions were held with at least one USAID mission and one embassy representative from every region of the world. Feedback was also solicited from key stakeholders such as the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and Congressional staff and members of the NGO community. This feedback was incorporated into a number of recommended changes to the fiscal year 2009 budget process to make the use of foreign assistance resources more transparent, efficient and effective.

Refined Roles: In an effort to formalize the field's input, as well as to empower them at the beginning of the budget process, the fiscal year 2009 process began with the Mission Strategic Plans (MSP), a joint State-USAID field submission of budget and allocation levels down to the program element. Washington direction will remain at the strategic, or program area level, with the field making necessary adjustments to program elements throughout the budget request process. This is an essential change in my view, as it gives the field a very prominent and defined role in formulating their budget request.

Strategy Development: In recognition that country strategies should guide strategic budgeting and consensus building, each MSP includes brief country strategies. Additionally, early in the process, regional assistance strategy sessions and functional roundtables were held to ensure that everyone agrees on the strategic direction for that region/functional area.

Initial Budget Levels: In an effort to minimize the last minute changes that often need to be made, the fiscal year 2009 budget process will incorporate into initial budget guidance levels consideration of likely Congressional and Presidential priorities identified through regional assistance strategy sessions and functional roundtables.

Efficiency: While we don't want to compromise participation and transparency, there was concern over the staff time requirements involved in setting the fiscal year 2008 budget. Therefore, in fiscal year 2009 we will reduce the number of decision points in the budget process and improve overall coordination in F. I am currently looking at ways the F organizational structure can be improved so as to maximize coordination with all relevant parties.

Communication: I am working to establish clear guidelines on communication with the field and the bureaus here in Washington through weekly updates, and the distribution of the fiscal year 2009 timeline including responsibilities and tasks. Additionally, to further increase transparency, I am working on ways to communicate to the bureaus as changes are made throughout the allocation process and in the budget negotiations with the Office of Management and Budget.

Question. An ongoing criticism has been that USAID missions were not adequately involved during the budget writing process, and that it was a Washington-driven exercise. Before Ambassador Tobias' departure, he had stated that field staff would be involved to a greater extent in the future. To what extent will you implement this commitment?

Answer. This is a commitment I fully intend to carry out. During my tenure as acting administrator these past 2½ months, I have consulted a number of ambassadors and mission directors for their views on how to strengthen U.S. foreign as-

sistance to make it more effective and visible in the countries they represent. I am soliciting suggestions from the field to make the voices of those who actually implement USAID programs more prominent in their formulation. I have charged the agency's Chief Operating Officer to convene a conference of mission directors in Washington, now tentatively scheduled for October.

With a view toward improving the fiscal year 2009 process, an After Action Review (AAR) was conducted of the new budget formulation process. AAR sessions were attended by a mix of people from State and USAID regional and functional bureaus, including both working and senior-level individuals. It was especially important that the field's views were heard, therefore, mini-AAR sessions were held with at least one USAID mission and one embassy representative from every region of the world.

In an effort to formalize the field's input, as well as to empower them at the beginning of the budget process, the fiscal year 2009 process will begin with the Mission Strategic Plans (MSP), a joint State-USAID field submission of budget and allocation levels down to the program element. Washington direction will remain at the strategic, or program area level, with the field making necessary adjustments to programs elements throughout the budget request process. This is an essential change in my view, as it gives the field a very prominent and defined role in formulating their budget request.

Question. I understand that AID mission staff have observed that the F process reduces their flexibility to transfer funds from one activity to another without the USAID Administrator's approval. Previously, such decisions could be made by the USAID Mission Director. Why is this level of oversight needed?

Answer. In my time as Acting Administrator, I have worked to ensure that we are respecting long standing criteria regarding levels and amounts for programs and activities that can be transferred by the field without further approval from the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance. I have done this to make certain that the appropriate balance between the field and Washington is maintained.

The important balance I refer to is the one between ensuring fiscal integrity and accountability of taxpayer funds and overall coherence of foreign assistance programming while permitting the field to respond rapidly to programming needs especially near the end of the fiscal year. Many USAID programs are subject to cross-cutting earmarks and the independent decisions of mission directors moving funds can result in our inability to fund programs at earmarked levels. That said, we are working to provide mission directors with sufficient flexibility to reprogram funds to address the realities in the field while ensuring our ability to meet Congressional and administration priorities.

Question. How do you plan to coordinate foreign aid programs outside the DFA's jurisdiction, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Coordinator for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)? To what degree will State and USAID programs complement MCC and PEPFAR programs?

Answer. The Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance provides coordination and guidance to all foreign assistance delivered through all agencies and entities of the U.S. Government through the operational plan process. Operational plans provide a comprehensive, interagency picture of all foreign assistance resources planned for implementation in-country and the utilization of those resources in support of transformational diplomacy. Developed by the country team under the leadership of the ambassador, the operational plans ensure that all U.S. foreign assistance resources in that country are coordinated, appropriately linked to foreign policy objectives, and supportive of an integrated country strategy. They strengthen the link between funding, activities, and results, and collect standardized data about foreign assistance programs. In fiscal year 2008, all recipient countries will complete operational plans. In fiscal year 2007, our pilot year, a total of 67 countries submitted integrated operational plans.

As you know, the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (Public Law 108-25), enacted in 2003, provides the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator with primary responsibility for the oversight and coordination of all resources and activities of the U.S. Government to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance was subsequently established by the Secretary to make every effort within existing statutory authority to ensure that U.S. assistance writ large was programmed in support of our foreign policy goals. The Director's responsibilities accordingly include providing overall coordination and guidance to U.S. foreign assistance delivered through other agencies and entities of the U.S. Government, including the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator.

The Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (Sec. 604) as an independent entity with its own board of directors. The Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID sit on that board. In addition to the Secretary's authorities as a member of the MCC board, the Foreign Assistance Act directs that the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance to ensure that such programs are integrated and the foreign policy of the United States is best served. In building the fiscal year 2009 budget, therefore, we are receiving input from MCC about projected expenditures in countries in which we are working. In MCC threshold and compact countries, teams considered proposed U.S. Government resources in light of the specific gaps and obstacles impeding country progress, as well as how best to coordinate these resources in such a way as to both facilitate the success of MCC programs and to amplify results. For example, in the fiscal year 2008 request for Ghana, we shifted funds to enhance the capacity of local government as the responsible party for implementing the MCC compact program. In El Salvador, State/USAID funds increased for programs to strengthen specific obstacles impeding country progress—the rule of law and justice sector, and other programs to address gang-related violence. In Honduras, economic growth funds actually increased overall, particularly in trade and investment and private sector competitiveness to complement MCC program.

Question. What do you think is an appropriate division of labor between the U.S. military and civilian agencies, particularly USAID, in development activities? Under what circumstances, if any, do you think that the U.S. military should take the lead in economic and political development activities? What sorts of mechanisms are there to coordinate activities where the U.S. military and USAID are involved? What further mechanisms might be useful? Do you believe DoD will, or should, maintain a role in foreign assistance after the completion of military action?

Answer. Wherever possible, U.S. development assistance should be carried out by civilian agencies. But exceptions to this rule can and do arise, as we are witnessing in Afghanistan and Iraq. Where there is active combat, or in extremely insecure environments, the security situation may not permit the exclusive deployment of civilian personnel. In these highly threatening environments, the presence of civilians depends on adequate force protection (provided by the military or by private security contractors) to enable their work on the ground. The support systems required to effectively staff missions, and meet the personal security requirements of our officers in hostile environments, is a significant strain on USAID resources.

The unique division of labor between civilian-led and military-assisted missions (or vice versa) is often environmentally dependent. The greater the threat of violent conflict or armed hostilities, the higher the likelihood that the military will have a role to play in ensuring economic and political stability. As we move along the continuum of conflict, from hostile to permissive environments, the military may play a less significant role. With relatively limited human resources, in proportion to the scope of the stabilizing mission we are pursuing in many of these insecure countries, whenever practicable civilian agencies have opted to yield operational control to the military in areas beyond our reach, while either continuing to maintain or enhancing intellectual control of the development space.

In those circumstances where the civilian agencies are significantly stretched by the human and financial requirements of operating in high-threat environments, the military may take on additional responsibilities to facilitate economic and political development.

In hostile environments, USAID staff often serve alongside military personnel on integrated civil-military platforms such as the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) construct in Afghanistan and Iraq. In concept, these constructs allow for synchronization of civilian and military activities. Synchronizing various quick impact resource streams, such as DoD's Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds and USAID's quick impact funds to further security, economic, and political goals is one example of successful civil-military coordination. At a minimum, USAID officers seek to ensure that military-led and resourced activities are conceived and implemented in a way that furthers the country's economic and social development, and that the activities are aligned with and complement national development strategies. The transferability or sustainability of CERP-like funds as control begins to shift from military to civilian leadership and control is an ongoing challenge.

There is an emerging institutionalization of collaboration frameworks in the U.S. Government. USAID has begun working with the various regional Combatant Commands to develop a system for synchronizing their respective theater security cooperation plans with USAID's operational plans.

What we could practically use now is a new framework that dictates civilian-military coordination of all foreign assistance engagements from the national to the tactical level. Theater security cooperation guidance and foreign assistance guidance should be published and promulgated simultaneously. Country plans and theater security cooperation plans should be produced and executed in concert. In the field, activity coordination is orchestrated by the country team, chaired by the ambassador. The EUCOM initiated Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership is one recent example of such cooperation and collaboration which will eventually lead to a better understanding of each others' planning systems and procedures.

As you know, we now have an office within USAID, staffed with Foreign Service officers and military liaison officers, with a mission to institutionalize the USAID-DoD relationship through formalized training and education programs and collaborative policy development that will ultimately lead to a process that mitigates the current challenges to unified planning and implementation.

USAID has developed memoranda of understanding governing the placement of USAID Senior Development Advisors in the U.S. Central Command, Special Operations Command, and European Command, and memoranda with other Combatant Commands are currently being negotiated. Four Combatant Commands have placed Military Liaison Officers with USAID, as well. These officer exchanges have proven invaluable in coordinating civilian-military activities, training and joint planning exercises.

Once military objectives have been achieved in a given conflict, we believe that DoD should continue to support and sustain foreign assistance efforts in whichever way may be appropriate, to include the development of a civilian-controlled security sector. These activities however should be limited to the security sector and should not expand into traditional civilian development activities. But adequacy of funding on the civilian side remains a challenge.

Question. Does USAID have enough people to carry out its mission? If not, what measures do you expect to take to address shortfalls in personnel?

Answer. USAID's staffing situation is facing a crisis. This is due to impending retirements and to lack of funds to recruit new officers. The impending retirements is a predicament similar to that facing the U.S. Government as a whole; years of restricted hiring at or under attrition and an anticipated wave of retirements as the "baby boomer" generation approaches retirement age has had a negative impact on USAID's ability to carry out its mission. This generation carries enormous experience and expertise that will take decades to replace. Unfortunately, we have been hiring under attrition. However, we will be proactive, hoping to make the case by launching a robust junior officer program and putting in place a comprehensive recruitment/hiring/training/mentoring/assignment program that will effectively double the size of the Foreign Service staff (from 1,100 to 2,200) in the fiscal year 2009-2011 timeframe. This will be a very important start. These projections assume that we obtain sufficient funds and staff to lay the necessary groundwork to begin to implement a hiring plan from fiscal year 2008 and beyond.

Question. Please describe what steps you would take to ensure that the agency is able to recruit top-level staff. Please also discuss what steps are needed to provide opportunities for rising junior officers, improve morale, and increase junior officer and overall staff retention rates.

Answer. While we expect to bring on board most of our FSOs through junior-level entry programs (as required by the Foreign Service Act), we recognize that a certain percentage of hiring will have to take place at the higher levels, as well. We expect to address the quality of life for staff at both levels through expanded training, mentoring, and assignment opportunities, which will complement our outreach recruitment, and targeting minority-serving institutions to increase the diversity of the applicant pool. If our budgets for these activities can increase, we can ensure the matching of increased overseas positions in our USAID missions. By ensuring adequate positions overseas and placement of our junior officers in assignments that will allow them to both build a solid base as well as learn the intricacies of USAID's business, we hope to quickly grow a cadre of young officers able to take on increasing levels of responsibility. This will be important in improving morale of the workforce as well as overall retention rates.

Question. Please describe opportunities for foreign language training for USAID personnel. Do USAID Foreign Service officers have access to the same language training opportunities as Foreign Service officers from the State Department? How does the agency determine which officers qualify for language training? If confirmed, would you seek to increase training opportunities for staff?

Answer. I do not believe our training, including language training, has been reflective of the demands of our work. Foreign language USAID language training is linked to the requirement for professional level competency in a foreign language for career tenure. This policy is the same as with the State Department. Many overseas positions are “language-designated” and competency requirements are established by the missions themselves, in consultation with the geographic bureau and the Office of Human Resources. If employees are assigned to language-designated positions, they are enrolled in appropriate language programs until the required proficiency is achieved.

Most USAID language training is done at the Foreign Service Institute, although online training is also widely available. Underway now is an initiative to expand Arabic competency in USAID’s staff.

I would like to review language proficiency requirements for all overseas positions, and to review the funding situation. This training cycle can be greatly improved if we can achieve a training float of 10–20 percent and funding necessary to ensure we give our officers the language training they would need to effectively carry out their jobs.

Question. What do you regard as your three most significant management challenges at USAID?

Answer. At present, I believe we have four significant management challenges: the need to increase, train, and reposition our staffing; to streamline our procurement; secure and improve the quality of life in our facilities around the world; and invest in technology to bring the agency into the 21st Century and onto shared U.S. Government platforms.

As program dollars have increased over the last two decades, our direct hire staff numbers have significantly declined from over 7,000 in the 1970s to just over 2,000 today. Human resource reforms are vital to transforming the delivery of USAID assistance and we must right size our overseas presence and headquarters support. In addition, we must ensure we have the right people on staff. We must be able to access the technical and professional talent that is required to carry out transnational diplomacy. We will focus on enhanced recruitment processes, increased staff training, and improved staff retention measures. We must also position our people in the right places.

Second, the management challenge of streamlining procurement and grants remains for our agency a great challenge.

The third management challenge facing USAID is the need to provide adequate and secure overseas facilities. Secure facilities will protect our people and vital records. We must continue to move forward with efforts to secure our facilities and co-locate at the new embassy compounds, and improve the quality of life for our people.

Our fourth management challenge is the need to invest in improved systems, equipment, and knowledge management to allow USAID to accurately account for and report on the use of taxpayer dollars. We must ensure that our investments in technology continue so that we can both effectively manage our programs and clearly explain our programs and their impacts to the Congress and the American people. We must, without doubt, find effective and near-term solutions to integration with the Department of State and Director of Foreign Assistance technology.

Question. Until the fiscal year 2008 budget request, USAID annually submitted a budget justification document that included program notifications for every country with sectoral funding breakdowns and detailed descriptions of proposed project activities. Under the new “F” process, budget requests are combined with the State Department’s, generalized by objective rather than by agency, and there is little or no substantive detail on proposed projects. What is your view of this new method of budget request? Do you think the interests of USAID are well-served by not having your own Congressional presentation document with which to inform Congress of your activities?

Answer. In February 2007, the President submitted the very first joint State-USAID International Affairs Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) to Congress that was on time, focused, strategic, and prioritized to shared foreign assistance objectives. The fiscal year 2008 CBJ is unique in a number of ways, both as a matter of structure and substance. In terms of structure, it was significantly revised based on consultations with Congress, and provides easier referencing. For example, it begins with a full layout of all State and USAID bilateral assistance, by account, then breaks the request down by region and finally offers a series of user-friendly tables with accounts and sectors. This CBJ has account comparative information including introductory statements identify the purpose of funds; a “snapshot” of fund alloca-

tion outlining top funding priorities; and a statement of changes which compares fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2006 by account. There is also a complete explanation of the context and purpose of the fiscal year 2008 budget. The CBJ carries an overview section which identifies the strategic principles upon which the budget was based; summarizes regional priorities; and analyzes macro-level budget information for State and USAID bilateral assistance. The revised format addressed a number of the key criticisms levied on earlier CBJs. The new format, in combination with a number of other foreign assistance reforms should facilitate improved oversight.

With all State and USAID resources directed towards any given country now requested and justified together, reviewers can see how all U.S. Government accounts and programs in the 150 account are working together to further transformational diplomacy. For example, in the fiscal year 2008 CBJ, country narratives included a discussion on Millennium Challenge Corporation programs as they related to the requested assistance programs. Next year, we hope to be able to include additional information from other U.S. Government agencies expending their own resources in these countries. With budget information presented both by funding account and by program, reviewers can make comparisons to previous CBJs and understand support for various programs from different funding accounts. As an additional new feature, each country and program narrative highlighted key changes in fiscal year 2008. With the new operational plans submitted by field missions and operating bureaus, more programmatic detail than was found in previous CBJs is now available to reviewers, including detail on management of various programs.

USAID staff fully participates in the interagency working group guiding the development and improvement of the CBJ and the notification process, and participates in consultations with Congress. USAID interests remain well served by integration. We are reviewing all formats to ensure they are user friendly and will seek continuous improvements for fiscal year 2009 and after.

Question. Under the reform process, annual operational plans are being written for every country that receives U.S. assistance. The level of detail previously provided in the above-mentioned Congressional budget request is reportedly provided now in the operational plans, but State's F Bureau has said these will not be made public. To what extent will these plans be made available to Congress or the public?

Answer. I am committed to providing as much information on our foreign assistance activities as possible to our oversight committees and Congressional partners. We are currently looking at ways to make the information obtained from the fiscal year 2007 operational plans as user friendly and available as we can. However, the plans themselves contain predecisional and procurement sensitive information that cannot be disseminated widely. We are therefore exploring formats for future years' operational plans with an eye toward making some information more readily and widely available. In the meantime, if there is particular fiscal year 2007 country or other information that you would like to discuss, we would be happy to meet with you.

Question. Overall, how does the agency determine the proper balance between shorter-term foreign policy objectives and longer-term development considerations when allocating resources? How is this trade-off managed when formulating an assistance program, for example, for strategically-important countries such as Pakistan?

Answer. With proper focus and coordination, we can achieve both our development and diplomatic objectives without sacrificing the principle of long-term development for shorter term objectives. In the past, there was a perception that development policy and foreign policy objectives were entirely separate and typically at odds. Poverty reduction, good governance, and capacity building for sustainable long-term success are long-held development goals. Foreign policy goals also now recognize that lasting peace and prosperity cannot be achieved unless we expand opportunities for all citizens of the global community to live hopeful and prosperous lives. A driving purpose behind the establishment of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance was to strengthen the U.S. commitment to long-term development. One of the key principles of foreign assistance reform has been to ensure that State/USAID resources support shared goals, and that our planning, budgeting, management, and implementation processes for foreign assistance capitalize on the respective strengths of State and USAID.

In Pakistan, the U.S. Government aims to help Pakistan become a moderate, stable, democratic country, at peace with itself and its neighbors, while reducing the appeal of violent extremism. This strategy benefits both long-term and short-term development goals. Over the long term, the United States is focused on strengthening the education system, improving health care for families, promoting economic

growth and opportunities, and building accountability in governance. Over the short term, we have used U.S. assistance to respond to immediate needs from the 2005 earthquake and threats in the war on terrorism.

More generally, as evidence of the Secretary's commitment to long-term development, you will find that 51 percent of the fiscal year 2008 request for Department of State and USAID program assistance resources is concentrated in rebuilding and developing countries.

Question. Are we on track to meet the President's goal of doubling aid to Africa by 2010? How will our programs address what many see as Africa's limited aid absorption capacity? How would you ensure that increased U.S. aid to Africa results in qualitative development improvements?

Answer. Taking into consideration all United States Government funding, including the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Account, and assuming large increases in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010, we can double aid to Africa by 2010. Relying heavily on PEPFAR to achieve a doubling of aid to Africa, however, tilts our program toward investing in people, primarily in the health sector, rather than the more broad-based assistance that is necessary to help lift African countries from poverty.

In Africa, the United States Government works with a broad range of partners: host country governments in which there is adequate capacity; civil society, non-profit, and faith-based organizations; and contractors and grantees in every sector to ensure that our funds are effectively utilized.

In each country, we ensure that development results are achieved by relying on our field staff, who are most familiar with conditions on the ground. They design programs whose aim is to move countries along the development continuum, which typically involves programming in a variety of sectors, including economic growth, democracy and governance, education, and health.

Question. Please comment on how USAID plans to work with countries to mitigate the present and future impact of climate change in the developing world. What will USAID do to help countries implement international conventions, such as those dealing with desertification and climate change?

Answer. Economic development and economic resilience are fundamental to efforts aimed at addressing climate change and desertification in developing countries. Many developing countries are dependent upon climate sensitive economic sectors for employment and growth: agriculture and forestry, fishing, and tourism; there are pressures on food security in many countries already. At USAID, we recognize that specific activities to support economic development can contribute to reducing emissions and increasing resilience to a changing environment. Actions to promote sustainable forest management both reduce emissions and increase resilience to climate change.

USAID's programs include actions to address implementation of these two international conventions (such as improved agricultural productivity, sustainable forest management, integrated coastal zone management, revegetation of degraded lands, and access to environmental data and decision support tools) in its bilateral development assistance efforts. In turn, USAID also applies the lessons learned from these development assistance efforts into the evolution of the international conventions.

For example, USAID has developed a Climate Change Adaptation Guidance Manual that will enable project planners to understand the potential impacts of climate change and to build resilience into development projects. The Adaptation Guidance Manual provides a step wise process for evaluation of climate change impacts applicable in the field; including a primer on climate-related risks, a framework for determining if a specific project is vulnerable, and guidance on interventions to increase project resilience. USAID is developing a map-based tool to facilitate the assessment step in adapting projects to climate change. This simple interface will include detailed data and projections in the background to ease assessment and adaptation.

In Central America, USAID and partners support SERVIR, (an acronym in Spanish for Regional Visualization and Monitoring System), a hub to collect and process climate information, test new and innovative tools, and then apply that information to development problems such as weather prediction, fire monitoring, red tides, and disaster response. USAID has recently begun an enhancement effort to be able to apply the SERVIR model to other regions to support climate resilient development.

Another example of a development program that promotes resilience to climate variability and climate change is the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET). This system is the product of collaboration among U.S. Government Agencies (USAID, NASA, USGS, USDA, NOAA) and local, regional, and international partners, and provides early warning and vulnerability information on

emerging or evolving food security issues. Professionals in the United States and Africa monitor remotely-sensed and ground-based data on meteorological, crop, and rangeland conditions to identify early indications of potential threats to food security. Operating in 27 countries in Africa, Asia, and South America, the program provides decision makers with the information to respond effectively to drought and food insecurity.

Furthermore, applied agriculture research will help the vital agriculture sector in developing countries to adapt to climate change and desertification. USAID is a major donor to the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR), which is developing heat and drought tolerant varieties of cereal crops, improving natural resource management and soil protection in semi-arid, sub-humid, and high-rainfall agriculture ecosystems through conservation agriculture and agroforestry.

- Drought tolerant maize and rice developed through both biotechnology and conventional breeding hold enormous promise for achieving economic growth and insulation from shocks (e.g., droughts, floods) in developing countries in South Asia and Africa.
- Improving productivity mitigates the impacts of agriculture on tropical forests and biodiversity by providing alternatives to clearing tropical forests, which reduces emissions and helps adaptation.
- The CGIAR is helping Middle East countries through development and deployment of drought- and salinity-tolerant crops and more strategic management of land and water resources in countries such as Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen.

To address desertification, USAID's Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program "GOBI FORAGE" is applying forage and animal monitoring technology to pastoral communities in Mongolia. The project addresses rural business development by adapting proven monitoring technologies so that they can be used by Mongolia's livestock producers. These technologies provide timely information on forage conditions to increase lead time for making risk mitigation decisions by herder groups and policy makers. Nutritional profiling to assess and manage livestock performance are being integrated with the forage monitoring technology via other funding sources (Mercy Corps and USDA) to enable herders to make business decisions that enhance profitability within an array of livestock enterprises. Formation of herder alliances for marketing is also being pursued in collaboration with Mercy Corps.

Question. At present, there is no high-level leadership accountable for gender analysis within the new foreign assistance structure which would have responsibility for ensuring that gender analysis is fully integrated into foreign strategies and country operational plans, as well as to ensure that specific strategies are directed to improving women's status. Can you tell us how the F Bureau intends to remedy this problem? Could you please outline the concrete steps the F bureau will take to ensure that gender analysis will be incorporated throughout all stages of country program planning, project implementation, and monitoring and evaluation?

Answer. The contributions that women make to the economic, social, and political lives of their nations, communities, families, and the next generation make them key actors in effective development, and we are committed to recognizing and encouraging their inclusion in our assistance activities. I am personally interested in encouraging this area.

Promoting a stronger and more productive role for women in development is a priority which demands a broad and flexible approach. The Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance has taken a number of steps to ensure that gender is considered at each stage of the assistance process. To that end, staff consulted with gender-based advocacy groups in the NGO community about the appropriate integration of gender considerations into our planning and practices. The Foreign Assistance Framework definitions, used to account for and evaluate programs and activities, correspondingly highlight women and girls distinctively where possible and appropriate. For example, one program element on justice systems addresses whether innovations toward equitable access to the justice system are specifically in place for women. With regard to monitoring and evaluation overall, people-level indicators are being disaggregated, to the extent possible, by sex, to best track the inclusion of women and girls in foreign assistance programs.

Question. I understand that, under the new reforms, USAID planning and implementation is conducted primarily on a country level. How does that affect planning and budgeting for important programs that often have a regional or global focus, such as environmental or human rights and democracy programs?

Answer. With a view toward improving the fiscal year 2009 process, we conducted an After Action Review (AAR) of the new budget formulation process. In response to AAR feedback, we are making a number of changes to the fiscal year 2009 process. In advance of setting initial guidance levels by country and by global/regional program, roundtables are held by objective to provide an opportunity for functional experts to highlight priorities and needs, and to provide input helpful to determining whether programs should be funded out of country, regional, and/or global budgets. In addition to each country submitting a mission strategic plan (MSP) budget and narrative, global bureaus and regional missions will be asked to submit a budget and narrative for their proposed programs. Each of these inputs will feed into budget setting and allocation. Functional bureaus which are champions for such cross-cutting issues as the environment, human rights, and democracy will participate in regional strategy sessions, assistance working groups, and senior reviews.

Question. When disasters require immediate emergency relief, the administration may fund pledges by depleting most worldwide disaster accounts. However, these resources need to be replenished so as not to curtail U.S. capacity to respond to other emergencies. Please prioritize the current top humanitarian crises. What are your views on the major trends in the humanitarian area? Is the agency adequately funding and emphasizing disaster mitigation and prevention instruments that will forestall many humanitarian disasters from occurring? What percentage of the agency's humanitarian resources is dedicated towards prevention-related programming?

Answer. The top humanitarian crises are focused primarily on internally displaced persons (IDPs) who are victims of natural disasters and internal national conflicts. The top recipients, in priority, of humanitarian assistance from USAID for on-going crises so far in fiscal year 2007 are Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, and Congo.

TRENDS

Continued Increase in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

While refugees have crossed an international border and live outside of their own country, the internally displaced are fleeing within their own country. The number of refugees in the world has been falling steadily since the beginning of the 1990s when it was about 18 million, but the number of internally displaced people has increased exponentially. At present approximately 12 million people are living as refugees while between 20 and 25 million are internally displaced. The major reasons for this are conflict and attempts at ethnic cleansing. As an example, while the crisis in Darfur has generated 234,000 refugees it has created 2.2 million internally displaced persons. (If the many people who are internally displaced following natural disasters such as flooding or earthquakes are included in the total figure, the estimated number of internally displaced people is higher.)

The two groups, refugees and internally displaced people, share many similarities. Both have been forced to leave their homes, and their welfare depends to a high degree on assistance from the international community. While well-established frameworks exist for international protection and assistance in the case of refugees, the internally displaced are in principle dependent on the will and ability of their own governments to respect and enforce their rights.

Protection and the USAID IDP Policy

Among international donors, USAID is at the forefront of the humanitarian community's effort to place greater emphasis on protection across all levels of relief planning and implementation. Vulnerable populations—including women, children, widows, elderly, disabled, and displaced persons—often bear a heavy burden in natural disasters and complex emergencies, having lost family and community support structures and burdened with the effects of poverty and low social status. In insecure environments, women and girls in particular are at risk of sexual exploitation and abuse. Since USAID adopted an agency-wide policy for IDPs in 2004, USAID has worked with the U.N. and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) partners to implement and strengthen protection activities for vulnerable populations in emergencies. The United States was the first donor government to have a policy on IDPs.

Increasing Food Insecurity

Related to food aid, the frequency and magnitude of major food crises is increasing due to growing chronic vulnerability. Devastating wars, civil strife and natural disasters have often brought in their wake food problems. But over the last 5 to 10 years, we have seen a significant increase in the numbers of people who are affected by these events, who face total destitution, a loss of household assets and livelihoods, and a chronic exposure to even the most minor of these shocks. Droughts in Africa are becoming more frequent. Where they used to come once every 10 or 20

years, they have recently begun appearing several times in a 10-year period, and more recently still, once in every 2 or 3 years. Emergency food aid needs are increasing and becoming less predictable, due to the fact that conflict and natural disasters regularly afflict and undermine the survival of a growing number of destitute and chronically food insecure people, who are often subsistence farmers, or herders and pastoralists. Despite all that is being done to win the war on hunger, the number of chronically malnourished people in the world continues to rise and stands at more than 850 million today. While the prevalence of undernourishment has fallen in 30 developing countries since the early 1990s, poverty and conflict have contributed to its growth elsewhere. Hunger-related deaths currently run to more than 25,000 each day.

Security of Humanitarian Assistance Workers

Another major trend with respect to security is a shift in the paradigm used by aid organizations to protect their staff and programs. Traditionally, aid organizations have relied on the "acceptance" model, whereby they rely on local populations who understand and appreciate their activities to provide a level of protection against attack. Organizations are increasingly adopting additional defensive measures to augment their acceptance strategies. Examples include strengthened security management capacity and protocols, more attention to properly equipping and training humanitarian personnel, and enhanced physical security.

USAID continues to be a leader in initiatives to systematically assist NGO and U.N. agencies to enhance their capacity to address security challenges. Examples include funding a Security Coordinator shared by NGOs, security training, support to the U.N. to strengthen their ability to support NGO security in the field, and requiring safety and security plans in grant proposals.

New Technologies To Save Lives

USAID is supporting innovative approaches to assist those affected by disasters. For example, malnutrition kills thousands of children either directly or indirectly through disease each year. USAID is leading a trend in treating malnourished children through home therapeutic care. Therapeutic home care is called community management of acute malnutrition. With the use of community management of acute malnutrition, thousands more malnourished children will be able to be reached.

Disaster Risk Reduction/Prevention

Among international donors, there are increased efforts to identify natural hazards and reduce risks in areas that are prone to recurring disasters. Worldwide, USAID is engaged in efforts with the international community to identify and reduce risks of recurring hazards such as floods, drought, volcanoes, and earthquakes.

USAID believes that disaster preparedness and planning provide a high benefit/cost ratio for areas which have recurrent natural disasters. Currently, USAID provides for capacity building, preparedness, and planning activities to disaster prone countries as contingencies allow. The majority of these programs are in the Asia and Latin America region. USAID is working with NGOs and local institutions in Africa as well. Historically, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has funded capacity building and preparedness activities at a level of about 10 to 15 percent of core International Disaster and Famine Assistance funds. In addition, some P.L. 480 Title programs have disaster and mitigation components. For example, in Ethiopia, USAID has worked closely with other donors and the Ethiopian Government to help develop and implement a national Productive Safety Net Program targeted at 8 million vulnerable individuals to reduce current food security while building assets so as to reduce chronic food insecurity.

In order to better utilize our finite resources, USAID's Office of Food for Peace has a new strategy that encompasses both emergency and nonemergency programs within one strategic objective to reduce food insecurity in vulnerable populations. The target groups under the new strategy are populations at risk of food insecurity because of their physiological status, socioeconomic status or physical security and/or people whose ability to cope has been temporarily overcome by a shock, disaster or setback. In addition, over the past 4 years, USAID has used the resources available under the Famine Fund to support innovative investments targeted to the root causes of famine.

Question. Why, as the SIGIR has reported, did USAID have only one contracting officer and one technical officer to oversee 20 Iraq projects worth \$1.4 billion? What is USAID doing to ensure adequate oversight of its Iraq activities?

Answer. USAID believes it had adequate staff to fulfill its responsibilities to manage the contract and ensure accountability. USAID had assembled a team of 23 pro-

professionals tasked with monitoring Bechtel's activities and providing recommendations to both the contract officer and the cognizant technical officer—far more than the two referred to in the audit report. This team was composed of United States expatriates, local Iraqi engineers, and staff from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) who were co-located with USAID.

Bechtel's contract required that it provide USAID with weekly and monthly progress reports on each job order, with detailed information on their status and financial implications. USAID personnel reviewed these detailed reports vigorously. USAID also maintained a schedule of weekly monitoring trips to the field sites despite the security challenges. The Defense Contract Auditing Agency (DCAA) questioned less than 1 percent of Bechtel's costs on its completed audit.

USAID agrees with SIGIR that there are a number of valuable lessons that can be drawn from USAID's experiences managing the Bechtel contract. As SIGIR states them in the report, USAID has no argument, in principle, with any of these three "lessons learned" which states that strong contract administration and adequate staffing are critical to success, that a clear understanding and review of costs are important to contract management and that minimizing support costs makes more money available for reconstruction.

Question. One problem faced by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq has been staffing them with experts in agriculture, local government, and economics—the types of skills that USAID normally provides. What is the current status of USAID staffing of the PRTs? Is USAID responsible for providing these specialized technical skills? If so, what is being done to ensure that current deficiencies are addressed?

Answer. USAID has completed Phase I and II of its commitments for the civilian surge 2 months ahead of schedule and has already proceeded to recruit and deploy PRT staff for Phase III originally scheduled for December 2007.

USAID PRT staff currently comprise of 10 USAID senior Foreign Service officers, 12 technical experts, and 20 technical specialists in local governance and economic development, all on the ground in Iraq. We will reach our commitment to provide a total of 55 experts and senior staff for the PRTs well before the end of the year deadline.

USAID has been very fortunate in attracting a cadre of very talented development professionals to work in Iraq. USAID draws on a number of sources for its staffing: our cadre of Foreign Service officers, the civil service staff from Washington, missions around the world, a large pool of retired USAID employees, and experts from the private sector willing and able to contribute to our efforts. As people leave Iraq, we recruit through our internal assignment process, through appeals to other USAID missions, and through public solicitations for services. The interest in our programs is strong, as demonstrated by the number of applications we receive for each position advertised.

Question. What role did you have in planning for implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative? Why do you think the Department was unprepared for the volume of passport applications that resulted?

Answer. In my role as Under Secretary for Management, I followed planning for implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), and ensured that the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) had the resources necessary to meet the challenge.

Long before I began my current position in the summer of 2005, CA had begun preparing for an anticipated increase in passport demand that would result from provisions included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act passed in December 2004. To better analyze the likely demand, CA held consultations with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal agencies, analyzed our historical data and projections, and requested a study by an independent management consulting firm. Based on that analysis and review, we predicted that we would receive approximately 16.2 million passport applications in fiscal year 2007. Through 2005 and 2006, we steadily expanded our capacity to process applications and issue passports. We hired over 2,500 employees in passport services in less than 3 years. Those include passport adjudicators, fraud prevention managers, line supervisors, and the contractors who perform nongovernmental support functions. We opened a fourteenth public counter passport agency in Denver in 2005 and expanded the physical capacity of our agencies in Boston, Chicago, Houston, New Orleans, and Seattle. Our two large passport production centers in New Hampshire and South Carolina ramped up and increased their hours dramatically. Today they work three shifts per day. We also added additional shifts at several of the other passport agen-

cies. Finally, in March 2007, we opened a third large facility in Arkansas, which will be able to print 10 million passports per year.

We projected we would receive 16.2 million passport applications in the course of fiscal year 2007, but we are now on pace to receive approximately 17.5 million—almost a million and a half more than we projected. This experienced group did not predict the record-setting, compressed demand that began last January, when applications increased dramatically in a very short time frame. In the final months before WHTI implementation in December 2006, we received approximately 1 million applications. Then receipts spiked sharply: 1.8 million in January, 1.7 million in February, 2 million in March—5.5 million applications in a very short period of time. This is approximately double any historical levels experienced. Our receipts far exceeded our ability to keep pace with them in the traditional timeframe. As a result, our average processing time lengthened from 6 weeks in December to 10 to 12 weeks. We are at 9 to 10 weeks today.

Question. When were you first alerted to the significant increase in passport applications and the fact that processing times were increasing? What measures did you take in response?

Answer. I followed planning and implementation of WHTI, and, when processing times had increased to ten weeks, Secretary Rice and I worked to meet the current challenge. Secretary Rice contacted DHS Secretary Chertoff to work out the modalities of the flexible accommodation for re-entry into the United States. In addition, Deputy Secretary Negroponte and I on several occasions have publicly exhorted Department employees to volunteer for passport task force duty.

The root of our current situation is the workload that built up when 5.5 million applications arrived within about 10 weeks. This far exceeded our ability to keep pace within our traditional timeframe. Average processing time lengthened from 6 weeks in December, to 12 weeks in late spring.

I was personally involved in the efforts to manage this unanticipated workload to help CA work on every part of our supply chain. I made calls to OPM and secured approval to waive restrictions that impeded the return of civil service annuitants to help process the work. I have had numerous conversations with our partners at Citibank and at AT&T to ensure that, at the highest level of their organizations, the urgent need to address the problem was clearly communicated. I personally engaged the Public Printer last year to request extra shifts to allow GPO to meet our need for a higher volume of passport books. Within the Department I took every step needed to ensure that CA had the funding and support it needed to hire, train, and rapidly expand workspace for new employees.

The Department is committed to return to a predictable 6-week process while maintaining the security needs of our nation. Over the past several months we have brought on hundreds of extra passport adjudicators and passport staff, set up around-the-clock operations at passport processing centers, and added telephone lines to respond to passport queries. The statistics of the past month are positive, and we expect to meet our objective of returning to normal processing time for routine applications (6–8 weeks) in September.

Question. What do you regard as your top three achievements as Under Secretary?

Answer. The three achievements that I am most proud of are the technology gains the management team has brought to the personnel of the Department at home and overseas, the successful Global Repositioning launch and continuation, and the new Foreign Service selection process. All of these initiatives reflect our future, and they are the strong foundations on which we will build our future.

On the technology gains, we have worked hard to bring the Department of State into the 21st Century so our people can access information they need and communicate anytime and from any where. Technology is essential to how American diplomacy will operate worldwide in the 21st Century. One innovative way to expand our presence is what we call a Virtual Presence Post, or VPP. A VPP is more than just a Web site, it is a tool for mobilizing available diplomatic resources (travel by mission officers, programs, media, and technology) to build our engagement with a target community where we have no permanent facilities. To date we have established 40 VPPs worldwide, with more than 20 more currently in the planning phase.

In addition, because diplomacy entails travel and mobility 24/7/365 in a global enterprise, our vision is to provide full, reliable access to all needed knowledge and computing resources at anytime from anywhere in the world. Today over 8,000 Department employees are mobile computing users, able to access our global unclassified network via standard end-user devices such as laptop computers and Personal

Digital Assistants. This is a number that is increasing daily. Two years ago, only a handful had access to these mobile computing tools.

We are also taking advantage of technology in our training program. Distance learning allows us to provide cost effective, just-in-time training to our workforce, anywhere/anytime training in 24 time zones. In the past 4 years the number of distance learning completions has grown from 1,697 in 2002 to over 11,000 in 2006—a more than fivefold increase. This number will grow even more in 2007.

Second, global repositioning of personnel is at the heart of Secretary Rice's bold Transformational Diplomacy initiative. The post cold war world we live in is changing rapidly and we must confront new global challenges at an accelerated pace. In particular, transnational threats such as terrorism, disease, climate change, international criminal cartels, drug trafficking and trafficking in persons have become important elements of international relations.

Global repositioning is a comprehensive, long-term plan for a phased repositioning of more personnel and resources to our posts overseas; once fully implemented it will change 10 percent of our overseas presence. We have begun the phases of global repositioning out of the resources we currently have and thus far we have shifted largely from Washington and Europe 285 positions, 82 percent of which are core diplomatic positions. About half of the overseas positions are distributed throughout East and South Central Asia, principally in China and India, but there were also significant increases for the Near East, African, and Latin American regions. These positions focus on transformational issues such as nonproliferation, counterterrorism, democracy-building, and getting the United States message out to local Muslim communities.

Our repositioning plans include positions for a number of American Presence Posts, which are one person posts with only a few local employees and located in important cities outside national capitals. These smaller posts allow the Foreign Service officer to communicate closely with people of the host nation and get involved with carrying the American message to local regions and communities.

Third, the Department of State has inaugurated an improved process for selecting Foreign Service officers who staff our embassies around the world. The process is now a year round multi-step recruiting system that evaluates the total person through a streamlined online written exam, personal evaluations, and interviews, thus retaining or even raising current high recruitment standards that will help us bring in new officers quickly and eliminate the 1–2 year waiting period. The first online exams under this new system will take place in September.

To begin the registration process, the candidates go online and fill out an application form that gathers basic personal data, including education and employment history. The second part of the online registration is the personal narrative, in which candidates respond to six questions, each linked to one of the competencies necessary to perform Foreign Service work. The competencies are leadership skills, managerial skills, interpersonal skills, communications skills, intellectual skills, and substantive knowledge.

After completing registration, candidates will be authorized to schedule a Foreign Service Officer Test appointment on a first-come, first-served basis according to when their registration package was received. The test will be computer-based and administered at proctored test sites across the country. The nature and difficulty of test questions remain unchanged from the pencil-and-paper test of past years, and the test still includes a written essay. The test will be given four times a year beginning this September.

Consideration of the candidates who pass the written exam will be carried out by the qualifications evaluation panel (Panel). Complete files of each candidate that include their application form, responses to the personal narrative questions, written test score, and essay scores, will be reviewed and evaluated by panel to determine which candidates will be invited to the oral assessment. The oral assessment process will remain unchanged.

We anticipate these changes will bring in the rich diversity of America which is a requirement in our new global engagement. We also anticipate those changes will bring the speed and modernization necessary for top recruiting in today's world.

Last, I would like to add one more accomplishment that gives me immense personal satisfaction. I am very proud of the dedicated women and men of the Department who worked around the clock at home and overseas and assisted 15,000 Americans to depart safely and without injury from Lebanon last summer in the wake of accelerated tensions that resulted in conflict. We did not lose one American and, in fact, we gained a brand new one in the process, born on board a ship. The Bureau of Consular Affairs, teamed up with a number of Department functional and regional bureaus, and the Department of Defense to successfully transport our citizens home to safety and their loved ones.

Question. What do you regard as the top three issues where you have failed to complete or fulfil the objectives you set out? In your judgment, why did these efforts fall short?

Answer. The three things on which I have been working hard to accomplish, but we have not yet completed are getting Foreign Service pay reform passed, closing the shortfall in resources for State Department operations, and ending the passport backlog.

On Foreign Service pay reform, the State Department and I personally made a strong effort within the administration to have the funding included in our fiscal year 2007 budget request (and now again in our fiscal year 2008 budget request) and to get the authorization language approved. We worked closely with other agencies, Senate and House staffers, and the American Foreign Service Association for months in 2006 to reach a proposal acceptable to Congress, the administration, and AFSA.

However, despite this effort, we were unable to get the pay reform authorizing legislation passed late last year. We are trying again this year, and I very much hope we can achieve this goal. The officers of the State Department, USAID, and the other foreign affairs agencies below the senior level who now take, in effect, an 18.6 percent pay cut when serving overseas deserve better, especially given the difficult and dangerous conditions in which many of them work.

One of my top goals has been to get the necessary resources for State Department operations, in particular for staffing aimed to support Secretary Rice's Transformational Diplomacy initiative and related training, especially in critical languages such as Arabic, Chinese, and Farsi. The Department needs the resources requested by the President to pursue diplomatic solutions to challenging national security issues around the world. Moreover, our diplomatic platform—which supports more than 70,000 United States Government employees from more than 40 agencies at over 260 posts worldwide carrying out America's diplomatic and foreign assistance mission—must be properly staffed, fully trained, and adequately supported with the critical infrastructure, including IT, personal security, and secure facilities required to get the job done.

We have not successfully convinced Congress how essential this funding is. The annual appropriation for the Department's principal operating account—Diplomatic & Consular Programs (D&CP)—has been underfunded, relative to the President's request, by more than one-half billion dollars altogether over the past 4 years, including the last 2 years while I have been Under Secretary. This—plus annual inflation and exchange rate losses—has had a significant impact on the Department's operations worldwide.

Third, this year we have not fulfilled our promises to American citizens to provide them with passports within the traditional 6 to 8 week standard. In fact, our average processing time had doubled to about twice that. The Bureau of Consular Affairs, based on consultations with other United States Government agencies and a study by an outside management consultant, began preparing for an expected increase due to the provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act which was passed in December 2004. Since becoming Under Secretary in August 2005, I have followed the planning and implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and our preparation to deal with the expected increase in passport demand. Many steps have been taken over the past 2½ years to deal with what was projected to be a 33 percent increase over fiscal year 2006, including hiring over 2,500 employees in passport services, adding to our physical capacity, and increasing the hours of work substantially. Nevertheless, with an increase for fiscal year 2007 now projected at 45 percent and a large spike in applications in the first 3 months of this calendar year—double any historical levels experienced for that period—our passport offices were unable to keep up with the surge of applications and have seen a substantial backlog develop. We have been taking many steps to get passport processing time back to our traditional standards, and we are now seeing good progress toward that goal.

Question. What are the most pressing human rights issues on which you think USAID should work? What are the most important steps you expect to take to promote human rights and democracy? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. USAID's democracy and governance programs address four global democracy challenges: promoting freedom and political competition in authoritarian states; preventing or addressing democratic backsliding; assisting governments in consolidating democracies; and strengthening democratic legitimacy and stability in conflict and post-conflict states. Human rights is a key component to addressing these challenges, especially in authoritarian states where the state regularly denies its

citizens' fundamental rights like personal security, freedom of expression, and the right to dissent. Therefore, human rights is addressed throughout the USAID portfolio. In the more narrow sense, \$90.3 million was spent in fiscal year 2006 to support a wide variety of human rights activities: public awareness campaigns; civic education, promoting tolerance and religious freedom; increasing access to justice for women, the poor, indigenous groups and the disabled; reducing government repression of nongovernmental organizations; increasing the sustainability of human rights organizations and improving their ability to monitor, report and advocate against abuses; providing legal defense for human rights defenders and victims of human rights abuses; caring for victims of torture; training the judiciary to respect human rights; and combating violence against women and children.

The specific steps that USAID will take to promote democracy depend on the context of the countries in which we work. The same is true of human rights, as human rights protections are only as strong as a nation's political institutions as a whole. Political change happens at the country level, so USAID democracy programs are strategically designed to address the most significant impediments to democratic progress.

In authoritarian states, this would mean a focus on supporting civil society, independent media, and democratic political movements. For example, in Egypt, USAID is building the management capacity of human rights organizations, helping civil society organizations campaign for greater freedom, strengthening independent media, promoting freedom of expression, and facilitating dialog on opening the political system to independent, democratic political parties.

In consolidating democracies, the bulk of the assistance would be geared to strengthening democratic government institutions like the courts, parliaments, and local governments. In Albania, for example, USAID is promoting judicial inspectorates as a means for courts to check abuses of power and working to deter official corruption by professionalizing and reforming prosecutorial units. USAID also is facilitating local government decentralization and anticorruption reforms to improve government accountability.

In complex emergencies and post-conflict settings, an urgent concern is the protection of civilians against targeted violence. In Darfur, USAID is combating the widespread use of rape as a weapon of war through programs to improve physical safety, monitor and investigate violations, hold perpetrators accountable through the justice system, and address the root causes of the violence.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are often particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses. USAID supports a wide range of programs for IDPs and other highly vulnerable groups including combating sexual exploitation and abuse, protecting children, delivering counseling and health services to survivors of violence, and conducting training and advocacy. In order to address human rights issues at the onset of a complex crisis, USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) include Protection Officers alongside the traditional humanitarian relief specialists. In cases where widespread human rights abuses threaten to derail critical transitions toward peace or democracy, USAID offers rapid, short-term, flexible assistance to promote security and respect for human rights and the rule of law, and to help transitioning societies establish accountability for past or ongoing atrocities.

In post-conflict settings, reconstruction and the development of basic governance would also be a priority. In Afghanistan, USAID, in cooperation with other United States Government agencies, is strengthening nascent democratic institutions at the national and subnational levels including the executive branch, Parliament, the judicial and correctional systems, the police, and civil society. Some programs are linking the formal justice sector with informal customary justice systems, and improving justice at the provincial level. Other programs focus on stabilizing the country and integrating conflict mitigation, peace, and reconciliation initiatives into rural reconstruction programs.

Like democracy programs, the specific results we hope to achieve depends on the country context. Most generally, we aim for broad democratic progress of the type that is measured by Freedom House, but our specific programs are often more narrowly focused. Democratic development is often a long-term process because success means challenging powerful entrenched interests in the countries where we are working. However, a recently completed study by Vanderbilt University has shown that every \$10 million of USAID Democracy and Governance funding produces a fivefold increase in the amount of democratic change in a given country, in any given year, as measured by the Freedom House Scale. Rapid change is the exception, rather than the rule. However, USAID is able to directly impact the long-term democratic progress in countries where we work. The work that USAID does is complemented by others within the U.S Government, such as Department of the State Bureaus of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and International Narcotics and Law En-

forcement. USAID also closely coordinates its democracy work with bilateral and multilateral donors.

Question. If confirmed, how will you assure that providing long-term assistance in the areas of democracy and governance continues to be an organizational priority in all regions where USAID works? What will you do to advance and expand the mission of the Office of Democracy and Governance?

Answer. Since the second inaugural address and the launch of the Freedom Agenda, the promotion of democracy and governance has been a top priority of the United States. Subsequently the National Security Strategy of the United States and Secretary Rice's Transformation Diplomacy Goal both highlighted the importance of democracy. USAID is a vital part of the successful implementation of the National Security Strategy and Transformational Diplomacy, so I will ensure that USAID will continue to support democracy and governance for those reasons. Moreover, experience has shown that USAID's broader development goals such as poverty reduction, basic education, etc., will not succeed without functioning and accountable governments in the countries we work. Therefore, we will try to not just focus on country or regional budgets, but also provide adequate program and operating resources for democracy programs. As of 2005, USAID had approximately 400 democracy staff worldwide and we currently manage approximately 75 percent of all U.S. Government democracy assistance coordinated by F. The total fiscal year 2008 request for democracy and governance is 17 percent greater than the fiscal year 2006 actual appropriation. Moreover, USAID constantly seeks to innovate in its democracy work. USAID was the first donor to focus on corruption, which is now acknowledged as perhaps the central development issue for democratic and economic governance. We are now beginning to expand our work in security sector reform and community policing. USAID also is managing large Millennium Challenge Corporation threshold programs. Finally, USAID is leveraging its democracy work by building elements of democracy into the work done in other sectors, with a particular focus on transparency, accountability, and participatory government.

Central to the success of USAID democracy promotion efforts is a strong Office of Democracy and Governance. This Office is charged with providing technical support to USAID missions and embassies with the design, measurement, and implementation of democracy programs; conducting cutting edge research; training and development of the USAID democracy cadre; and managing global democracy programs. The staff of the Democracy and Governance Office have played a vital role in the development of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Framework, as well as with the establishment of country-level democracy strategies and budgets. I am fully committed to ensuring that the office receives all of the resources it needs to do its job and I will continue to rely on this office to inform the decisions I make as both administrator, if confirmed, and Director of Foreign Assistance.

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

PASSPORT PROCESSING

Question. In response to Questions for the Record from her June 19 testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee about refunding the expediting fee to passport applicants who applied for expedited passports but did not receive expedited service, Assistant Secretary Maura Harty assured the committee that: "The Department is currently reviewing procedures to refund expedite fees. We are evaluating the best process for returning funds to applicants. We anticipate we will be able to publicize the new procedures on our Web site in the next several days. Everyone who requests expedited service had their application moved to the front of the line. Regrettably, that did not always result in completion in the stated timeframe. As our Web site states, anyone who paid the expedited fee and does not believe they received expedited service can apply for a refund."

Despite Ms. Harty's response to my question, the Department has still not publicized new procedures for refunding the expedited fee. You testified to the committee that you have "several options" for refunding these fees.

- What options is the Department considering for processing the refund?
- How and when will the Department choose which option to implement?
- Why, despite Assistant Secretary Harty's testimony that this would happen within several days of the passport hearing, has the Department not yet publicized new procedures for processing refunds?

Answer. After we examined several options to determine when and if to provide refunds for certain expedited applications, I determined that the most effective policy would be to continue to have applicants apply for refunds when they have reason to believe that they did not receive expedited service. The State Department will then address each refund request carefully on a case-by-case basis.

As of July 18, 2007, a total of 3,829,913 expedited passport requests have been received and acted upon in calendar year 2007; our passport agencies and passport centers have issued 2,716,448 expedited passports, 71 percent within 3 business days of receiving the applications. A total of 3,286,751 passports (86 percent) were likely to have been in customers' hands within 3 weeks of them having applied, the period outlined on the State Department Passport Web site.

A total of 543,162 expedited passports out of 3,829,913, approximately 14 percent, were not processed within 3 weeks. Even then, these individuals still received expedited treatment and most had their passports in hand by the date they specifically requested on their application. In the face of unprecedented demand (more than 40 percent increase over last year), those who requested expedited service did receive priority over the millions of other Americans who applied for passports at the same time. The expedited applications were automatically given a higher priority in the queue; these individuals received much faster service than the applicant who did not pay for expedited service and whose wait climbed at one point to 12 weeks.

To further ensure expedited service, the Department has been paying for expedited passports to be mailed via FEDEX and has not, unlike past practice, asked customers to cover this additional cost.

In reaching the conclusion to refund on a case-by-case basis, there were several options.

The first would be to issue no refunds at all given the unprecedented demand. This option did not merit consideration.

The second would have been to refund the fee paid by every applicant who requested expedited passport service, regardless of how fast the requester received the passport. We do not believe that providing a blanket refund automatically to all applicants would be either appropriate or equitable.

A third option is to provide refunds to applicants who did not receive their passports by the date they requested on their application. The Passport staff was constantly re-sorting and queuing applicants in order to provide those with the greatest/earliest need the fastest service. Thus, while some applications were not processed within 3 days, the passport was still received prior to the date the applicant requested.

A fourth option could be to have those who paid the fee and believe they did not receive expedited service request a refund. Our Web site already contains instructions on how to apply for a refund via e-mail. We will review each request thoroughly and provide timely refunds to those who meet the requirements.

COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION OF STATES FOR SCHOLARSHIPS (CASS)

Question. The Cooperative Association of States for Scholarships (CASS) has operated—with USAID support—for over 20 years bringing students from the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico to study at a network of United States community colleges and other postsecondary institutions. The program includes three institutions in Florida (Hillsborough Community College, Florida Community College, and the University of South Florida) with which I am very familiar. Foreign students receive technical training in fields particularly relevant to the development needs of their home countries.

Last November, USAID received from the Center for Intercultural Education and Development, a proposal for a new 5-year cooperative agreement for the program's continued operation. As I understand it, because of the lead time necessary to work with USAID missions to identify quality candidates in the various countries and to proceed with selection and placement at U. S. institutions, renewal needs to be complete by the fall to avoid unnecessary costs associated with entering a close-down mode and then restarting.

Could you provide me your insights as to the status of the CASS renewal proposal?

Answer. USAID has received an unsolicited proposal for the amount of \$50 million to extend funding for CASS another 5 years beyond fiscal year 2007. While CASS has been an outstanding program, the global need for educational support demands that the United States invest its education resources elsewhere. Even within Latin America and the Caribbean, competing and higher strategic priorities in the region, such as Colombia, Haiti, CAFTA-DR directives, Cuba, and the Andean program absorb our limited resources. Further, the CASS program has been in effect

for over 20 years; generally it is USAID policy that assistance awards to U.S. organizations should not be extended beyond 10 years from the original award without full and open competition. Therefore, even if resources were made available, USAID policy would favor an award based on open competition.

IMPROVING USAID'S CAPACITY AND EFFECTIVENESS

Question. We recognize that USAID has constraints on the number of technical staff as a result of its OE budget, yet we also recognize that lack of sufficient technical staff is one of the key drivers of the over-use of umbrella contracts and for-profit contractors . . . with the result that contractors manage programs that USAID does not have the staff capacity to manage directly. We understand USAID provided an estimate of the number of technical staff it would need in order to reduce its dependency on contractors.

How can we use the opportunity presented by the larger issue of restructuring to remedy USAID's overdependence on inexperienced contractors?

Answer. This is an excellent question that reflects one of the real challenges to our reduced operating budgets. USAID determined, based on information contained in the 2004 Annual Report, that the best performing project had a ratio of \$1.3 million of funding per USAID permanent technical staff. On the other hand, average performing projects had a ratio of over \$3 million per person.

USAID is moving to reposition and assign Foreign Service officers to understaffed missions and missions in strategically important countries as well as to better utilize regional platforms based on the principles of USAID's Workforce Planning Model. While this will not alleviate the broader concern of insufficient staff to completely reduce involvement by contractors, it will better position the USAID talent pool to meet the critical management and leadership needs of the foreign assistance program.

Question. Microcredit has helped millions of very poor people move out of severe poverty. Microenterprise legislation passed in 2004 required that USAID ensure that at least 50 percent of microenterprise funding benefits the very poor (people living on less than \$1 a day). The law mandates that USAID create, or certify, poverty-measurement tools in order to ensure this allocation of resources. I am pleased to learn that USAID has certified some poverty-measurement tools in the beginning of this year and is working to certify more.

Can you please tell me how you will work to make certain that USAID successfully implements the Microenterprise Results and Accountability Act of 2004?

Answer. Since passage of the legislation, USAID has been working vigorously to develop and certify accurate, practical, and low-cost poverty assessment tools, in consultation with both technical specialists and microenterprise organizations. USAID has now certified poverty assessment tools for 17 countries, and is on the verge of issuing guidance to all USAID-funded microenterprise organizations in those countries and to the USAID Missions that will help coordinate their efforts. All affected organizations will report the results of their poverty assessments through the Microenterprise Results Reporting system, with which they are already familiar.

Country coverage will be expanded as additional tools become available. One emerging challenge is that many countries do not publish the household survey data needed to calibrate poverty assessment tools. Developing tools for those countries will require USAID to collect its own household survey data—a much more expensive and time-consuming proposition than analyzing existing data.

USAID has also conducted four intensive training sessions in the use of the tools—one for U.S.-based microenterprise networks, and the remainder in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Through the FIELD-Support cooperative agreement, USAID will sponsor training in October at the SEEP annual conference in the Washington, DC, for implementing partners. Further, USAID is developing an Internet-based training program, which will be free and accessible worldwide. This Internet-based training will be added to the Internet-based help desk providing assistance to partners in English and Spanish.

By requiring our partner organizations to use the certified poverty assessment tools, USAID will obtain a clear idea of how effective our programs have been at targeting individuals who are very poor. Based on those results, USAID will then be able to consider what programs have best been able to achieve our goals and what programmatic changes, if any, may be needed.

Question. Also, can you please discuss how USAID might translate such poverty-measurement tools into its other programs in order to help track and ensure that appropriated development funds reach the very poor?

Answer. USAID has already considered the application of poverty assessment tools to other programs and will continue to look for cases in which the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Poverty assessment tools may well be applicable in certain humanitarian relief or social protection programs, in which food or commodities are distributed directly to households. In such cases, poverty assessment tools might be useful to verify that program benefits are reaching the intended households. In contrast, poverty assessment tools may be less useful as a means to target program resources: targeting such benefits on the basis of answers to survey questions raises considerable risk of misreporting, thereby undermining the reliability and integrity of the results of the poverty assessment tools.

I should also like to point out that, in addition to poverty assessment tools, USAID is actively working with its partners to develop broader measures of social performance. Social performance provides a holistic means to support USAID's efforts to reach the poor. Social performance considers not only the poverty level of clients, but also how well products are designed to meet the needs of the poor, how well organizations reach out to communities, and if staff members of partner organizations are well trained to serve poor and very poor clients. Social performance measures are broadly applicable both for microenterprise programs and for programs of other types.

RESPONSES OF HARRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR BARACK OBAMA

Question. I am concerned about evidence that White House aides conducted political briefings for U.S. diplomats that included, among other things, analyses of Congressional and gubernatorial races in this country. In one instance, according to press reporting, State Department officials attended a meeting at the White House at which political officials discussed key House races for 2002 and media segments that were deemed important for President Bush's reelection in 2004.

- What do you think about the appropriateness of these political briefings?
- How will you ensure such briefings do not occur again at USAID if you are confirmed as the next administrator?

Answer. As you know, the briefings for USAID staff were conducted prior to my appointment as acting administrator. The White House has expressed the view that it is appropriate for White House officials to provide informational briefings about the political landscape and its potential impact on our legislative relations to Federal agency appointees whose job it is to implement the President's policies.

I certainly commit to reviewing and, if need be, revising, existing guidelines and policies at USAID, and to ensuring that any similar activities proposed to me are acceptable under all appropriate laws, regulations, and policies before I would approve them. I will also ensure that political appointees at USAID are thoroughly briefed by our agency ethics officer on the Hatch Act and its requirements.

NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Brinker, Nancy Goodman, to be Chief of Protocol
Kimmitt, Mark, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs
Siegel, Ned L., to be Ambassador to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas
Thomas, Harry K., Jr., to be Director General of the Foreign Service

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-423, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson presiding.

Present: Senators Nelson, Casey, Coleman, Corker, and Isakson.
Also present: Senators Warner, Hutchison, and Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

Senator NELSON. Good morning. In the interest of time, I'm going to enter the opening statement into the record, and I would turn to Senator Coleman.

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just, very briefly, I know two of the individuals here very well and I know of the third. These are—they're all extraordinary candidates. Ned Siegel has been a friend of mine for many years. He is—he's an extraordinary community citizen, he's a man of great integrity. I think it's wonderful that he's willing to serve. And, I wholeheartedly endorse and support the President's nomination. I hope it moves forward quickly.

Ambassador Brinker, I've also known. She is an extraordinary, just an extraordinary individual who has already given great service to this country at the highest level and I'm thrilled that she's willing to continue to do so.

So, Mr. Chairman, I know we have a large panel and a lot of work to be done, but I just want to give my wholehearted endorsement and support for these two individuals who I know, and then, by reputation, General Kimmitt. This is a tremendous panel put to-

gether and I hope these nominations move forward very quickly and that they are confirmed by the full Senate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator.

I'm going to call on our colleagues for their statement. I'm going to call on you in order of seniority and then if you would like to be excused, that will enable you to go ahead and attend to the duties of the Senate and the House.

So, Senator Warner, why don't we start with you?

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. WARNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA**

Senator WARNER. Well, thank you, Chairman Nelson, Senators Coleman and Corker.

I believe Tom Lantos has about 2 years on my 29. Let's check it out. How long you been here, Tom?

Mr. LANTOS. I would yield to you. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. All right. If you say so.

Mr. Chairman and colleagues on the committee and all in attendance, these are joyous occasions. And, I've had well over 100 opportunities to come before my colleagues and place my credibility against a nominee of a President, Democrat as well as Republican. But this is a most unusual one.

I first would like to say that this fine man I've known for many years, as well as his family. And, I'd like to ask the Chair if he could take a minute to introduce his family and then I'll abbreviate my remarks.

General KIMMETT. Senator, thank you. I'd like to introduce the guests that I brought today, the members of my family. My wife, Cathy, my brother, Jay, my sister, Judy, all who have had, in some way or another, a significant association with the United States Senate. All—

Senator WARNER. I will deal with that. [Laughter.]

You can stand down now.

General KIMMETT. Thank you very much. [Laughter.]

Roger.

Senator WARNER. Years ago when I came here, Mark's father, Stan, after a 26-year career in the military, rising through the ranks from a draftee Private to Colonel and fighting in both World War II and Korea, went on to spend 15 years serving the United States Senate. First as Secretary for the majority under Mike Mansfield and then as Secretary of the Senate until 1981.

And, having had brief tours of service myself, both in World War II, at the end, and in Korea, we formed a very strong friendship. And, he was a remarkable individual, remarkable. And, those of us that were privileged to serve with him here in this institution remember him with great fondness.

And then, the nominee's mother, Eunice, served in World War II as a Red Cross volunteer in France and occupied Germany in 1945 and 1946. His brother, Bob, graduated from West Point in 1969, served a combat tour in Vietnam, went on to serve on the staff of the National Security Council, as General Counsel to the Department of Treasury, Undersecretary of State for Policy, United States

Ambassador to Germany, and currently Deputy Secretary, United States Treasury.

His sister, Kathy, worked for the National Park Service in Washington, DC, and for Senator John Melcher in Billings, MT. His brother, Jay, graduated from West Point in 1972, served overseas tours in Korea and Hawaii, and retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army. His sister, Mary, served 15 years with the National Park Service and is currently a Physician Assistant, having returned from serving as a Physician Assistant to United States troops and families in Bamberg, Germany. His sister, Judy, served 30 years in support of the U.S. Senate, working for the Sergeant of Arms and Senators Rockefeller, Kerry, and Carper, and currently serves as Deputy Chief of Staff to Senator Frank Lautenberg.

Mark's wife, Cathy, has served 31 years as a full-time elementary school teacher, including teaching military dependants in Germany and Belgium.

Now, we really don't have to know much about this nominee. His family speaks for the integrity, which was given him by his distinguished mother and father and his siblings.

So, I'd like to say from the outset, that most of my statement can go into the record. Nevertheless, the nominee's a life-long Virginian. He attended grade school and high school in Virginia, left Virginia for West Point in 1972, graduating in 1976. His 30-year military career included service in Bosnia, Germany, Belgium, and a combat tour in Iraq from 2003 to 2004. Upon retirement from the Army, he returned to reside in Arlington, VA, and currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. And, in that capacity and his previous capacities, I have met and worked with the nominee on a number of occasions.

I particularly recall when he served with General Abizaid, CENTCOM, and more recently during many meetings I've had at the Pentagon here in the last couple of years with the intelligence briefings.

He has absolutely the proven qualifications to move on to his new position. So I would like, at this point, to simply conclude, ask that the balance of my statement be placed into the record.

And we as Americans are grateful to you, General, and your family for all the service they've done. Good luck, you're on your own. [Laughter.]

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Congressman Lantos.

**STATEMENT OF HON. TOM LANTOS,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA**

Mr. LANTOS. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to yield to Senator Hutchison.

Senator NELSON. Well, you—we're going by seniority, so we would certainly invite you for your comments.

Senator HUTCHISON. Be my guest. Since I don't have all the seniority, I can't order people around like Senator Warner. So, I would just say, please proceed.

Mr. LANTOS. Thanks very much.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I believe this is the first time that the Democratic Chairman of the House Foreign Af-

fairs Committee is eagerly and happily here to endorse the nomination of a very distinguished Republican.

Nancy Brinker is an extraordinary human being. My wife, Annette, and I have had the pleasure of watching her firsthand during a very difficult period of Hungarian-American relations, perform magnificently as the American Ambassador to Budapest. It was a complex, difficult, very impressive assignment, and she discharged it magnificently.

Her achievements in the private sector are well known to all of us. She has created an organization, global in scope, in honor of her sister who lost her life at a very early age to cancer. And, this organization has provided millions of people across the globe help and hope. I don't think the President could have picked anybody better qualified and more suited to the very difficult task that she's about to undertake. And, as a Democrat, I am proud to support this nomination and I look forward, with total confidence, that we she will discharge this new responsibility magnificently.

Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Congressman.

Senator Hutchison.

**STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS**

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, am here to introduce Nancy Brinker, who is my lifelong friend. I so appreciate Congressman Lantos coming over and making this gesture and I know that Ambassador Brinker relied on Congressman Lantos for advice and counsel throughout her term as Ambassador to Hungary. So, I so appreciate his endorsement of her.

I want to say about Nancy Brinker, that she is a dynamo, a powerhouse, someone who never takes "no" for an answer. I was in her living room in 1982 when she started the process of fulfilling the promise to her dying sister, Susan G. Komen, that she would do everything in her power to end this disease. And, Nancy had a few of her friends in her living room and said, "We're going to start a foundation and we're going to raise money for breast cancer research."

Since that time in 1982, the Susan G. Komen For The Cure has a network of over 75,000 volunteers, 100 staff members, affiliate groups in 120 cities in the United States and three in other countries, including Hungary. And, they have raised \$1 billion for breast cancer research. That really shows you the organizational skills of Nancy Brinker.

She has served on Government panels under three U.S. Presidents. And of course, President Bush appointed her to be U.S. Ambassador to Hungary. I think she did a great job there and showed her diplomatic skills in that post. And, I can tell you, she has an instinct for the diplomatic. I know that she will do this job so well. She's organized, which you certainly need as Chief of Protocol. She has attention to detail, which you must have when dealing with foreign visitors of all countries that will come here. And, she will be a superb representative of the United States of America, which of course, is the role that she will serve in the State Department.

So, all of those things I think show that she is the best person for this job. And, I hope that we will have an expeditious confirmation hearing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.

Senator Martinez.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MEL MARTINEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA**

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am—find myself in an unusual position of being on the wrong side of the aisle. I'm not sure why this was chosen to be today, but I'm delighted to be here.

I'm very proud to be here to—I just want to make sure my friend, Ned Siegel, didn't think something had transpired. [Laughter.]

But I'm here, very proud and honored to have the opportunity to present to the committee a good friend and a great Floridian, Ned Siegel.

Ned is someone who has distinguished himself in his professional life as a law clerk, an attorney, and one of our most successful and distinguished developers in the State of Florida. I know, that in addition to that, he's also had a great calling for public service. He has offered himself and from time to time has answered the call to duty.

He served Governor Bush, when the Governor called on him. He also had the opportunity to serve President Bush and this administration when he served on the Board of Directors of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, OPIC, which does a terrific job of helping United States businesses invest overseas.

President Bush also appointed Mr. Siegel to serve in a diplomatic role at the United States mission to the United Nations, where he served as a senior advisor.

As the Chair knows, Florida and the Bahamas are interlinked. We're very connected. It's a very important post for us and Florida, to have an Ambassador to the Bahamas that be a Floridian, that be one of us, that understands our State, but also understands the very special relationship between our State and the nation of the Bahamas.

We have issues, whether it be tourism, economic development and cooperation, or drug interdiction, issues of migrants that we have to deal with. All of which are very, very important. And, I know that in the past we've had a close working relationship, you and I, with our Ambassadors to the Bahamas.

I believe Mr. Siegel is the right man for the job. I'm delighted that the President chose to appoint him. And, I look forward to his swift confirmation so that we can have him serving us in this very important post, in Nassau. I look forward to his confirmation and working with him as our ambassador.

Mr. Chairman, if I might just take an additional moment to join the Nancy Brinker fan club. Ms. Brinker, we sort of claim her in Florida, too. I know the Senator from Texas proudly talked to her about being a Texan, but we think of Ambassador Brinker as a Floridian, and we're extremely proud of all that she's done and look

forward to her service in this new post where I know she'll distinguish herself, as well.

General, I'm sorry, but I don't have anything else to add on your nomination, but I'm sure it will go well as well, and congratulations and thank you for serving.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to address the committee.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Martinez.

Now, Mr. Thomas, if you would join the folks at the table. We're going to do something a little different today. Because of the length that has been consumed by the Senators and the Congressman, I am going to have your statements entered into the record, so that that will be—your written statement will be—a part of the official record and we're going to turn right to questions. So, I would turn to Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you—thank you, Mr. Chairman. Have the nominees had a chance, Mr. Siegel, did you have a chance to introduce your family? Could you do that, that would—

Senator NELSON. Yes. Any of you who have family that you would like to introduce, please go ahead.

Mr. Siegel.

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, I would like to introduce my life partner and wife of 31 years, Stephanie, who, has given her support and love and the ability to make sure that I see things correctly. She is sitting right behind over there. Thank you very much.

Senator NELSON. Thank you.

Ms. BRINKER. And, Senator, I would like to introduce my son, Eric Brinker, who is just an amazing young man and has always been there for me. Thank you Eric.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Thomas.

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, Senator. I'd like to introduce my wife, Erica Smith Thomas, a musician, and my mother, Mrs. Hildonia McCleary Thomas, a retired school teacher and social worker, and my first cousin, Ray Boyd, who has been my guide and mentor and is a Senior Executive Service Member of the Department of Defense.

Senator NELSON. Welcome to all the members of the family. This is a proud day for you and it's an important in the lives of your loved ones. It's an important day in the conduct of the business of the United States.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And again, I think this is an extraordinary panel of nominees and I welcome Ambassador Thomas—thank you for being part of this. This is a good group.

For the audience, if there are not a lot of folks here, it usually there are not a lot of problems, so that's a very good thing, by the way. But this is an extraordinary group here.

Let me turn to Mr. Siegel. I just have a couple questions for a couple of the nominees. I think far too often we are—I shouldn't say ignore, but don't reflect enough—on the importance of the Caribbean, in terms of our relationship with our neighbors in the hemisphere. And, I'm hopeful Mr. Siegel, should you be confirmed, and I would hope that would happen quickly, that we'll have a

chance to work together to kind of raise the level of the relationship.

One area of concern that I do have has to do with energy and with Venezuela. Clearly, our Caribbean neighbors have energy needs. I believe the Bahamas was signatory of the Petro Carib agreement with Venezuela. I don't think they have received oil under it, but I'd be interested in your reflections on whether their participation in that would have any impact on the United States-Bahamian relations?

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, to answer the question specifically, the Bahamas did, in fact, sign Petro Carib, but in fact, have rescinded that agreement. It's important to work with, if confirmed, the Bahamas in looking for alternative energy sources. They are dependent upon oil. Their economy is such, that to continue to grow in its investments and its trade, to look at alternative energy sources. And, I think they understand that a required economic platform will be required.

So, I look forward to working with them to look for alternative energy sources. And, to answer your question again specifically, they have not followed and have rejected the Venezuelan influence.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you.

In addition to our personal relationship, and I'll state publicly a friendship with you and your family for many years, we also had a chance to work together professionally. I served as a delegate to the United Nations, as Senate representative, and you served as an advisor to the U.N. mission. How has this experience helped you to be prepared for this new opportunity that you have?

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, that's a wonderful question, because it gives me the opportunity to share with you that that experience truly gave me the ability to understand what it meant to engage and listen to the needs of foreign countries. Being involved in the Security Council vote between Venezuela and Guatemala. The ability to reach out to other missions and listen to their concerns, gave me the ability to understand what it was or what it is, to how to interact in initiatives and strategies on multidimensional and bilateral relationships. That experience, I think, will serve me well as I deal with the Government of the Bahamas.

Senator COLEMAN. I would hope, not a question here, but that in this capacity, should you be confirmed, that you would work with the Senate on the issue of continuing to push U.N. reform. It remains a high priority and it would be very helpful if our Caribbean neighbors were involved, working with us to ensure greater accountability and transparency in the United Nations.

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, I agree with that. If I just can add, the Bahamas was one of the few Caribbean countries that voted with us in the vote with Guatemala.

Also, I think we see a change in 2006 in the new government, to vote more in our, aligned with our human rights issues than they have in the past and in alignment with the NAM, the Non-Aligned Movement countries and CARICOM.

Senator COLEMAN. Let us continue to work on that.

General Kimmitt, just two more questions, one for you. I've been very much concerned about the role of IMET. It's been a tremendous tool. We've got some new security assistance authorities out

there. Could you reflect on the role of IMET? Does it remain a useful tool?

General KIMMETT. Senator, it really does. As you take a look at the relationships that we build with nations around the world, one of the primary methods that we do that, is through our IMET program. We take a look at nations as they send their officers back to our countries. They not only learn subjects of military applicability, but they get an opportunity to see what the United States is all about.

These are young officers, in many cases, who we have identified as having significant potential in our relationships in the future. We take a look at the relationships that have been fostered over the years, and frankly, in those years where we have not brought students from different countries back to the States, and the difficulties we have with those nations.

So, if confirmed, I will continue to be a strong proponent for the IMET program, and do everything in my capacity to improve that program over the years.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, and a last question.

Ambassador Brinker, in your opening statement which I read—you talked about the difference in lives of other people, other cultures, you can make if you can reach out to them, and you go on to say that your experience as a foreign Ambassador has prepared you for the position that the President has now entrusted you to undertake.

Would you just briefly, for the record, articulate how that has prepared you?

Ms. BRINKER. Senator, thank you. The opportunity to serve overseas, I think, and live in another country always adds another dimension in understanding the greatness of our country, and at the same time, all that we can do to create better relationships, better bilateral relationships.

I'm very excited, if confirmed, to take on this role, because I feel that there are many, many opportunities to develop friendships—deeper, more lasting—and enhance the relationships we already have with other countries. By being personally engaged with the diplomatic community, by doing a lot of outreach, introducing, where I can, what they would like to hear and know about our country—both in the business community, the professional communities, education, healthcare, and certainly the NGO community. And anything I can do to expand the base of knowledge that the diplomatic community has, serving in our country.

Senator COLEMAN. I think you're extraordinarily well-prepared for this position to which you've been nominated.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. Senator Corker, you have a time problem and wanted to make a statement?

Senator CORKER. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for that courtesy. I just want to thank the four nominees for offering themselves. We are very, very fortunate to have people of your backgrounds willing to do what you do. I thank you for coming before our committee, and I thank you for what you're getting ready to do again for our country.

Thank you very much.

Senator NELSON. Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank everyone who's with us today, the four nominees, and reiterate what's already been said about your service, your commitment to service, your presence here today, and your commitment to continue to serve our country.

I wanted to direct my questions to General Kimmitt, as well as Mr. Thomas, but I did want to say to Mr. Siegel, we appreciate the fact that you're here with us today. You had a great introduction by Senator Martinez, and we appreciate the fact that you're serving.

And, to Ambassador Brinker, we're grateful to your service. And I have to add a personal note—we get to do this once in a while. Where the Susan G. Komen Foundation that you founded, in honor of your sister—as I heard the testimony from Senator Hutchison, has 120 chapters, I guess, across the country. One of them is in my home area of Northeastern Pennsylvania, and as a young lawyer, I drew up the incorporation papers for that, and I'm proud to say that I played a small role.

But I have to say, to give you a sense of how successful you've been, and how successful the Foundation has been. I live in a county, my home county of about a little more than 200,000 people, and we've had thousands—literally thousands—of runners and walkers every September. And, I think per capita—I've said this to people without being able to prove it—I think per capita, it might be the biggest race in the country. But, if not, probably in the top 10 per capita.

So, we're proud of that, and we're proud of what you've done for the whole country in your public service, but in particular, if I can, personally highlight the work on breast cancer. Thank you.

Ms. BRINKER. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that very much. Thank you for your help.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

First of all, General Kimmitt, I wanted to focus my questions at the role that the bureau plays. The Bureau of Political and Military Affairs. Just in terms of highlighting, PM as it's sometimes called—Political/Military Affairs—has important roles in four strategic areas—I want to make sure I'm right about this—counterterrorism, regional stability, humanitarian response, as well as homeland security. Is that correct?

General KIMMETT. Yes, Senator, it is. Less of a impact on homeland security than in the other three areas, but you are correct.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, and I know if we had more time, you'd be able to develop this more in your, in an opening statement, which I know will be part of the record.

I want to ask you two or three questions. First of all, a question about the Portable Surface-to-Air Missiles, known by the acronym MANPADS. As you know, and as so many of us know, they continue to pose, I should say, a serious terrorist threat to civilian aircraft around the world. We saw that—we saw a version of that, I should say—in the report by the Associated Press, when a couple of members of the United States Senate were leaving Baghdad. It may not be the same technology, but the same threat that is out there.

There's been a concern raised over the years about the funding of programs in this area, in particular, that the funding of these programs has been limited to millions of dollars per year, instead of more than that.

Fiscal year 2008, the administration requested nearly \$45 million for destruction of small arms light weapons, including the so-called MANPADS, which present a direct threat—as you well know—to homeland security. I guess I'd ask you about the funding levels, whether or not you're satisfied that with the current level of funding to buy back or destroy excess MANPADS? Do you believe that more can and should be done in this regard?

General KIMMETT. Senator, I would agree with you that the threat that MANPADS have around the world, not simply in this country, but anywhere where our troops operate, where our civilians operate as well, continues to be a threat. That is one of the questions that I have asked the PM Bureau to look at. They have assured me that they have, not only the capacity, but the energy to increase this program if properly resourced.

So if, in fact, there is an opportunity to expand the budget and the resources placed against that, the PM Bureau can certainly take good use of those resources, and expand this program.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, and I guess as a way of follow-up, in terms of your work upon confirmation—how do you think our government should measure, measure progress in dealing with these small arms and light weapons? And if confirmed, how would you measure—in particular—the Bureau's progress in destroying these? If you can outline that, I think that helps us in terms of evaluating the role that you'll play.

General KIMMETT. Senator, as you know, PM Bureau has worked with over 25 countries up to this point, they've destroyed over 21,000 MANPADS, 90 million rounds of ammunition. But that—first of all, I think we need to understand what the net amount of product is out there. I'm not certain from my own intelligence briefings, that we certainly have a good feel for what's out there.

But part of this is diplomacy—working with those countries, where those MANPADS exist, making sure that those countries are is—as concerned about the problem as we are.

Number two, if additional resources were to be made available, making sure that those resources are working with the right people, the right organizations to get these out of public domain. Some of the metrics, I think, are the right metrics—sheer numbers, 90,000—90 million rounds of ammunition, 21,000 MANPADS—that's a huge number.

But, I think it's, it's only going to reach the numbers that we really want to reach if we have those countries that we're working with, have as equal a concern about the fact that these present a threat—not only to American interests, but their interests as well. So, part of the way we would measure it would be, how many of the countries are actively participating along with us, how many of the countries are acquiescing, and how many countries are preventing us from working with them? Those would be the metrics I'd be interested in.

Senator CASEY. Could you restate those numbers, in terms of what the estimate is?

General KIMMETT. Yes, sir. Since 2002, PM assesses that they have been responsible for destroying 90 million rounds of ammunition, and 21,000 Man-Portable Air Defense devices.

Senator CASEY. Twenty-one thousand. Is there any way, I mean, is there a resource that your bureau—or any bureau or office in our government can turn to for any kind of inventory, or an estimate—

General KIMMETT. Senator—

Senator CASEY [continuing]. Of how many that are still out there?

General KIMMETT [continuing]. Senator, Jane's is typically a good source for approximate numbers. Our intelligence services are the ones that can give us more specific numbers.

Senator CASEY. Do you think, if we've destroyed—you're saying we've destroyed 21,000 since 2002, is there any estimate—that's not classified—that's out there now? Are we talking about tens of thousands of these? Or thousands? Is there any ballpark figure you can give that's not classified?

General KIMMETT. Senator, let me take that question for the record, and we'll get an answer back to you.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

And I know I'm a little bit over time, but I'll just quickly ask Mr. Thomas a question. The first one being a very important question about what undergraduate institution did you attend?

Mr. THOMAS. College of the Holy Cross.

Senator CASEY. Thank you. I did, too. [Laughter.]

Senator CASEY. We both believe, of course, it's the number one higher education institution in the United States of America, is that right?

Mr. THOMAS. Without a doubt, Senator.

Senator CASEY. We have a great sense of agreement here.

Just very quickly, I know I'm over, I will try to get one question in. And this is something that all of us, as Americans, are deeply concerned about.

A series of articles recently in USAToday, as well as a recent hearing in the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Near East, South and Central Asian Affairs, raised the issue of foreign service personnel suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, especially after tours in Iraq. I'd ask you, Mr. Thomas, about how you plan to overcome concerns that—and obviously they're understandable concerns, that foreign service personnel would have, that their careers would be negatively affected, if they come forward to seek help for a very real concern that they have about their own lives?

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you for that question, Senator. The Secretary and all of us are concerned about the health of all of our employees.

According to a recent survey that we conducted, about 2 percent of those who served in Iraq and Afghanistan believe they have PTSD. Perhaps another 15 percent have it, but require a diagnosis.

To assist these officers, we've mandated a high-stress assessment health brief for people who've served in Iraq and Afghanistan, so that no one would have fear of being tarnished.

We're also looking at a Deployment Stress-Management Program that would look to assist people before they go out. Senator, that

has yet to be funded, but we hope that we'll be able to do that. We're also work with their families. We have a coffee klatch program one Sunday each month. If confirmed, I hope to attend one in October or November. We have a program to assist children—because they're often concerned when their family members are overseas—where we try to assist their children. So, we have a comprehensive program to assist our officers, and we'll look to do more, sir.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.

I'm over, I'm sorry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. That's an excellent question, because no matter where you are in a theater, the old battlefield lines don't apply to the battlefield of today. In addition to PTSD, what we are finding is that traumatic brain injury manifests itself—not necessarily immediately but later. So, any State Department personnel, for that matter—any U.S. personnel—because we have these provisional teams that have many, across many different agencies—if they're within the proximity of a blast, the traumatic brain injury may not manifest itself right away, it may be later on. So that, Mr. Thomas, you're going to have to look out for as well. In addition to the PTSD.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, Senator, we wholeheartedly agree with you. And we have—working with our medical staff—we're in the process of developing a program. We understand that 3 to 5 years hence, people might be affected. We're working closely with the Department of Labor and the Department of Defense to have a comprehensive program where we can assist these Americans. Whether they're affected today, 3, 5, or 20 years from now, so—

Senator NELSON. Well, one thing you may consider—we have very good TBI facilities, but it's in the veteran's healthcare system. Now, the question is, how could you access that for nonmilitary personnel?

Mr. THOMAS. Sir, that's something I'll have to get back to you on, but we will clearly investigate that.

Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Let me, on that subject, just as Senator Casey's question is a great question.

Just last Tuesday, I held a field hearing at the Augusta Veteran's Hospital in Augusta, GA, where they had the first seamless transition from DoD to the VA for a wounded warrior, and where a lot of the PTSD and traumatic brain injury patients from the Southern Region come. And your statement is so correct, because I met a young lady—Sergeant Harris—who was in Iraq, suffered a brain injury. She was let out of the military because of her injury, went to the VA hospital, and they cured the injury, and she went back in the military.

So, there are tremendous breakthroughs being done at the VA treating both PTSD and traumatic brain injury, and we should look to find some way for the State Department to be able to access the experience that those soldier were having in the Veterans Administration.

Senator NELSON. And there's a good example on traumatic brain injury, if you can identify it quickly enough, you can treat it. The

real problem is, when it's not identified, and the person goes on and on, then it's very difficult.

Senator ISAKSON. And the Wounded Warrior amendments and bill that we did, did a great job of broadening the number of people who can identify PTSD in soldiers for the purpose of referrals like optometrists, and ophthalmologists, and people like that, who can sometimes recognize the symptom that might have been missed in just a pure medical hospital.

Ambassador Thomas, first of all, of all of the things that have impressed me, being a member of Congress and the Senate, nothing has impressed me more than the dedication of the Foreign Service officers of this country. And every place that I have traveled, I have seen the remarkable sacrifice that they make, and the passion that they have for their business, and I know that includes you, as well.

So, congratulations to you on this nomination, and on the job you've done.

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator ISAKSON. I have one question of you. In 2002, 6 months after the 9/11 attack, I went to Ethiopia and Egypt, to follow up on NGO contractors using foreign aid of the United States in the education area, because we learned, post-9/11, that some of our foreign aid had actually gone to schools that wouldn't allow Muslim women to go to school. And part of the whole mission was to be sure the NGOs and the people receiving benefit understood that our money was conditional upon men and women receiving education. Which leads me to my question—what role do the foreign service officers perform in ensuring that U.S. foreign aid that goes to NGOs is used in precisely the way we, as America, would want it to be used?

Mr. THOMAS. Senator, thank you for that question. We work very closely with USAID and other agencies to make sure that all of our foreign assistance adheres to American law. And we are very committed to ensuring that boys and girls—in whatever society—have the opportunity to go to school.

I was Ambassador to Bangladesh, where we had several programs to obtain scholarships for poor boys and girls. We worked in boys and girls madrassas, also educating them. And I do not believe that it was a lone program. I'm sure that these programs are replicated throughout our embassies.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, the reason I ask the question is, I have been supportive of our foreign aid programs, because I think—invested, in the right way, that money can bring tremendous benefits, in terms of understanding America better, by raising the education level, and the standard of living of people in foreign countries. But my constituents and I are steadfastly opposed to that money getting in the wrong hands. Which is why it's so important to have a good flow of information back from the field to the State Department or to USAID, if we, in fact, find out that some of it is being spent less than judiciously.

Mr. THOMAS. We 100 percent agree with you, Senator.

Senator ISAKSON. General Kimmitt—one quick question for you, I was in Kosovo in January, after the initial incursion of the

United States back in 1999 or 2000. I know there was a tremendous problem with land mines left in Kosovo and people dying.

Would your job, in terms of political military affairs have anything to do with the removal of those, or efforts to remove those?

General KIMMETT. Senator, the PM Bureau does, in fact, involve itself with humanitarian mine—de-mining operations. And, to my recollection, Kosovo was one of the first countries, very quickly after the war, after the conflict—I served in that conflict, as well—to declare itself landmine free, to the point where it is, they are no longer a threat to the local Kosovars.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, that's important, because when I was there early on, there were a lot of innocent people losing their lives in the field, because of the land mines spread across the countryside.

Congratulations on your appointment, as well, and that's all of the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator.

Well, I'll start with you, Mr. Thomas. As we go around to see our embassies, the new construction standards of set-backs and so forth, I was struck by Ambassador Crocker, our Ambassador in Iraq having stated recently that sometimes diplomats are not able to do their jobs because of the security requirements in place. It is what it is, we have to protect our people.

Why don't you share for the committee, what you think is an appropriate balance between ensuring that the diplomats and their families are safe, and them being able to do their jobs.

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you very much, Senator. We do agree that the safety of our diplomats and their families must be paramount. However, we also agree with Ambassador Crocker that our people must get out into the streets and villages and talk with people and assess the situation. That is very much part of Secretary Rice's vision of Transformational Diplomacy, that we do go out.

We advise all of our ambassadors to work very closely with their regional security officers to, on a daily basis, assess the security situation, and then make a decision whether their people should be able to go out into the streets and villages.

Senator NELSON. It's just extraordinary, some the security requirements. For example, perhaps the highest security outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, that we have for a United States Ambassador is Lebanon. A huge security package, that envelopes the ambassador, at all times. On the other hand, you go to a country, for example, from which I just returned—Vietnam—the necessity of security is a lot less there. Same in Thailand, same in Malaysia. Needless to say in Hong Kong, same thing.

So, and yet, the constant threat of an ambassador, and an ambassador's family, as a representative of the United States, that ambassador is a target, no matter where they are.

Mr. THOMAS. Senator, I'd like to give an example of when I served in Bangladesh at all times, in terms of vehicles, police and resident security. I did not let that deter me from going out into villages, into streets.

But, what I also did was take advantage of the talented Foreign Service, and civil service, and locally-employed staff that we had, where I had them go to libraries, go to villages, go to hospitals, and

appear on television. I think that what we must do is take advantage—not only of the ambassador—but of everybody who belongs to that mission, to go out and reach the people. We even took our embassy, twice a year, on the road to different villages, where we set up all aspects of the embassy, including the Peace Corps, to show what we were doing. And I think that's what we have to do while we still assess security.

Senator NELSON. The call is out for the need for personnel in Iraq in the State Department. Is that need being met voluntarily?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. We have met that need every year, through volunteers. We have not had to go to directed or identified assignments. We salute the brave men and women who have volunteered to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Senator NELSON. So, there's not a shortage that is needed in Iraq? Because of the lack of volunteers?

Mr. THOMAS. Not to date, sir. However, if that did come, and we had to identify or direct assignments, we would do that. But we have not had to. In fact, among our junior officers, we have more junior officers applying to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan than we have spaces for junior officers.

Senator NELSON. What about the drain on personnel, since there's been a call out among consular officials to come in and help with the passport fiasco?

Mr. THOMAS. Well, Senator, I think we all need to participate. And, what I did—when I left my job as Executive Secretary—I spent 2 weeks adjudicating passports—a few blocks from here. I wasn't the only one. Former Ambassador Mike Marine of Vietnam, and several other senior officers pitched in. And last week, I spent time in London, doing consular work, adjudicating passports, and assisting American citizens.

So, we were able to meet that challenge through the great efforts of our civil servants, Foreign Service officers. Even retirees came out to assist us. And we're very proud that we're at 1.3 million passports and are meeting the requirements and the needs of the American citizens.

Senator NELSON. One point three million?

Mr. THOMAS. One point three million requests.

Senator NELSON. Requests?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Senator NELSON. How many in backlog?

Mr. THOMAS. That's 1.3 million in backlog.

Senator NELSON. In backlog?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Senator NELSON. And when do you think that's going to be cleared?

Mr. THOMAS. Well, we hope by September 30, that we are down to our normal 4–6 week window.

Senator NELSON. And how many is that?

Mr. THOMAS. That would be probably about 1 million. If we can—if we're at a million, we can probably get people their passports in 4 to 6 weeks. But really, Senator, when I was working there, we were—people were working overtime, unpaid, to meet this need. And if you had an extraordinary need, where you needed to travel immediately, or within a day, we were meeting that, in August.

Senator NELSON. And you're familiar with this because of your previous position?

Mr. THOMAS. I'm familiar with this because, as a Foreign Service officer, I did consular work 20 years ago. But having spent the last 3 weeks working in passports, I learned much more than I had remembered.

Senator NELSON. Refresh the committee's memory here. You worked in the past 3 weeks in passports, why?

Mr. THOMAS. I thought it was important that a senior officer who had been the Special Assistant to the Secretary show that we all need to volunteer and pitch in. But again, Senator, I was not the only one. We had many senior officers, ambassadors, and retirees who pitched in.

Because we believe that the State Department, we're often the front line of defense against terrorism, but this is something that we can show that we can do for the average American, and we wanted to meet that need.

Senator NELSON. Well, that's admirable on your part, to have pitched in like that. It's almost too bad you had to pitch in like that. Do you have any thoughts about why we got ourselves in the mess that we got ourselves in?

Mr. THOMAS. Well, Senator—we estimated that we would need a slight increase over last year, and we had a tremendous increase over last year. And we know the history. But the important thing to us, sir, is that we have met that, and we're working to ensure that this does not happen again. We've opened new passport centers in Arkansas and expanded our facilities in Florida and New Hampshire. We've hired new adjudicators. So, we are confident that we will not have to go through this again, sir.

Senator NELSON. I can certainly speak for all of the members of this committee in hoping that you are correct on that, because of the cries of anguish of our constituents, with regard to passports.

I have checked with consular officials around the globe, and I find that they feel very sanguine, very supportive of Mrs. Hardy, who is the head of that—I don't remember the title, but—

Mr. THOMAS. Consular Affairs, sir.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Consular Affairs. And they feel that she has done a great job. Do you know her?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. In fact, we're long-time colleagues, but I had lunch with her yesterday to report on my 2 weeks working here and my 1 week in London, to give her an assessment. And I told her that she really is a true hero to the people that work for her. She inspires them on a daily basis. And I was very much impressed by the work we were doing here and in London.

Senator NELSON. She has appeared in front of this committee and places the blame on herself for not anticipating the extra surge in the passports. Do you think that's fair to her?

Mr. THOMAS. Sir, it's not for me to assess blame or damage. I think the important thing is that Assistant Secretary Hardy has led the effort to meet the needs and requirements of the American people in terms of the passports.

Senator NELSON. Except that it's the responsibility of this committee in its oversight capacity, to make sure that this never happens again. And, it's interesting to this committee that she places

the blame on herself and no one above her in the chain of command will take any responsibility for the passport fiasco having occurred. Does that strike you as odd?

Mr. THOMAS. I think it's selfless, sir, that she has decided to assess the blame to herself. The Secretary of State is responsible for everything that happens in the State Department. And, Secretary Rice has been very supportive of all of our efforts to meet these needs.

Senator NELSON. Well, I don't want to put you on the spot too much, but she has a boss, who is the Assistant Secretary for Administration of the State Department, a Mrs. Henrietta Fore.

Mr. THOMAS. Undersecretary for Management, sir.

Senator NELSON. Okay, Management.

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Senator NELSON. Mrs. Hardy reports to her?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir.

Senator NELSON. Mrs. Fore does not take any responsibility. She has stated that to this committee. Do you think that's fair to put it on Ms. Hardy?

Mr. THOMAS. Sir, I can not assess Undersecretary Fore's opinion. I think that this is a State Department-wide challenge. Just like last year when we met the effort to get people out of Lebanon, when I worked very closely with Ambassador Hardy and Undersecretary Fore to get 15,000 Americans out of Lebanon. That was a State Department response. This too, assisting Americans with passports, is a State Department response, not an individual person or an individual bureau's response or duty, sir.

Senator NELSON. I appreciate your forthrightness in answering these questions. I can tell you the sentiment of this committee is that, some of us who have served in the military, is that the captain of the ship is responsible for everything that happens on that ship. And members of this committee do not like the fact that Mrs. Hardy has been the one who has had to assume all of the blame. Enough said of that.

Let me ask you about—we've got a tremendous number of retirements that are coming in the Foreign Service. It looks like, that in May, between January and May of this year, the retirement office of the Department of State processed a total of 238 Foreign Service retirements, which was an increase of 54 percent over the same period last year. Do you have a sense about these kinds of figures? Are they correct?

Mr. THOMAS. Senator, I think those figures are incorrect. I think they mean Foreign Service, they are combining Foreign Service and civil service retirements. We did have slightly over a hundred Foreign Services officers retire. We projected it at 22 percent, and it was about 23 percent. And, this was—these people who were retiring were people who met their time and class. Foreign Service, just like the military, has an up or out system. If you do not get promoted, you are congratulated and you must retire. And the great bulk of people who are retiring now are the people who have served to the full Colonel equivalent level. And, their time is up.

Senator NELSON. Your predecessor, Ambassador Staples, has been saying that he is noting the changing nature of what it means to be a Foreign Service officer and I'll quote, "Be prepared to spend

more time in more difficult posts with higher differentials, including perhaps those with danger pay or that require them to be separated from their families.” Give us your view about what the career of a Foreign Service officer will be like in the future, where there may be tours that are hardship tours and danger posts and family separations.

Mr. THOMAS. Senator, Secretary Rice likes to refer to those of us who spent the majority of our careers in tough places as her Hell-hole gang. Well today, perhaps 70 percent of the Foreign Service is her Hell-hole gang, because 70 percent are serving in hardship tours. More than 750 are at unaccompanied posts.

We live in a post-9/11 world, and what we want to ensure now is that everyone not only serves at hardship posts, but has the opportunity to serve at other posts. We believe that if you do one of every three tours at a hardship post, then everyone will serve at hardship posts and other posts. We want and we’re committed to a fair and transparent system that takes advantage of everyone’s talents in all posts.

As I said previously, sir. We are very concerned about families. We have many programs to assist families who are, whose spouses are at unaccompanied posts and we’re going to continue to make them more robust.

Senator NELSON. Will the hardship post be a requirement for promotion in the Foreign Service?

Mr. THOMAS. Sir, it will be a requirement to serve at hardship posts to enter the Senior Foreign Service. But practically now, it’s almost impossible to come out of junior officer orientation without having to serve at a hardship post in one of your first two assignments.

Senator NELSON. And, is the ratio, that you mentioned just a moment ago, three to one. Is that rule of thumb in the Foreign Service?

Mr. THOMAS. We believe that that will have to be the new rule of thumb, one out of—one out of three, to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to serve in hardship and nonhardship posts. However sir, there are people—have colleagues—who prefer only serving in hardship posts because that is where their passion is. They are very much interested in the Horn of Africa or China or Central America. And, we will not discourage these people from serving in the tours where they’re—in the places where they’re interested.

Senator NELSON. It’s been this Senator’s experience that we really have some extraordinary talent that is serving us in the Foreign Service. The career Foreign Service people have been exceptional. That I have had the pleasure of getting to know and visiting in their posts scattered around the world. So, the kind of quality that you’re getting, I think is fairly self evident. And, congratulations to you and I hope that continues.

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. General, let me ask you, the President is signing a Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty with Australia. This committee was not informed of the negotiations. And, that negotiations which he, I think, is just signing or has just signed. This committee

was not informed until yesterday after the press stories appeared. Now, you're going to be heading up a bureau that is responsible for those negotiations. Do you have any comment about that?

General KIMMETT. Senator, I will ensure that, to the extent possible within the PM Bureau, that there will be ongoing and active consultation with this committee, with the United States Senate, with regards to these types of consultations in the future.

Senator NELSON. That's the way it's supposed to work and it hasn't been working that way. And, it's the obligation of this committee to point that out to you and to thank you for the commitment that you just made. Thank you.

Foreign military financing—in the budget request for 2008, there is a proposed sharp cut in the foreign military financing for countries in the Western Hemisphere. The administration in the western hemisphere has only sought FMF for Columbia and El Salvador. And, those are all at levels less than fiscal year 2007. And, it's proposed to zero out FMF for all other countries in the region of the Western Hemisphere. What do you think about that?

General KIMMETT. Senator, I don't and am not as familiar with the FMF for the Western Hemisphere as I am with the region that I currently deal with, which is the Middle East. And, I take a look at those same arguments for countries such as Bahrain, which hosts our Fifth Fleet, that are such a critical supporter of United States policies and United States operations. I made those same arguments about the country of Bahrain, but this is a matter of the administration dealing with those highest priority items, those highest priority countries. And, in the Western Hemisphere the determination was made that the significant return on our investment, with regards to Plan Colombia as well as to reward, probably one of our strongest western hemisphere coalition partners inside of Iraq, that that's where the priorities would be placed.

So, it is a matter of prioritization. I know these decisions aren't taken lightly at the State Department nor within the interagency. We would all like to have more resources for every country that is a benefit to the United States, but I think, at the end of the day, it is a matter prioritization and rewarding those countries that not only need the most help, but those that have offered the most help to us as well.

Senator NELSON. I'm going to enter in the record a table that will show in the Western Hemisphere what is the 2006 actual funding, what was the 2007 request, and what was the 2007 appropriated amount for foreign military financing in the Western Hemisphere, and then what was the 2008 request by the administration.

Senator NELSON. And just to give you an idea: Argentina, \$40,000, this is 2007, Bahamas, \$80,000, Belize, \$175,000, Bolivia, \$25,000, Chile, \$500,000, Dominican Republic, \$725,000, Eastern Caribbean, \$990,000, Ecuador, \$25,000, Guyana, \$75,000, Haiti, \$990,000, Honduras, \$675,000, Jamaica, \$500,000, Nicaragua, \$500,000, Panama, \$775,000, Peru, \$25,000, Surinam, \$80,000. And everyone of those are zeroed out. And only Colombia at a level of \$78 million, it's a drop from \$85 million and El Salvador, \$4,800,000, a drop from \$7.2 million, in an area of the world that we are increasingly having some problems.

So, I would—it's one of the areas where we have the most drug trafficking and the threat of terrorism. What's happening is terrorism is coming out of Arabia into Africa, primarily through the Horn of Africa, moving across the Sahel and Sahara and is now being introduced into Latin America. Do you have any comments?

General KIMMETT. Senator, all I would say is that—that particularly at DoD and now in my potential future job at State, we have spent, I've spent many, many hours, days working on the issue of counterterrorism and the spread of a number of these groups. We are concerned about the trans-Sahel area in particular, the Horn of Africa, and, as you note, in the Western Hemisphere as well.

And I pledge to you that in this next job I will be mindful of the responsibilities, not only for the source countries of terrorism, but also those countries as well, that could potentially be fertile ground, ungoverned spaces, perhaps responsible places that might be prone to this type of extremist ideology and the effects on the nation's security as a result.

Senator NELSON. Well, at the same time the administration is seeking to conclude a new 10-year \$30 billion military assistance agreement with Israel, a 10-year \$13 billion military assistance agreement with Egypt, and Secretary Burns has stated, that for the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the U.A.E., that the administration, after having informal discussions with those countries, wants formal negotiations on the size and structure of new, major arms sales. What do you think that those military sales will serve in political and military purposes?

General KIMMETT. Senator, thank you for that question. I would note the distinguishing between foreign military sales, which most of that program will encompass, and for military financing, which would only affect the country of Bahrain, and possibly Oman. But I think we all are aware of the growing influence of Iran as a hegemonic player in the region. Its attempts to use all of its elements of national power, ranging from terrorism to a developing nuclear program, as a way to extend their influence in the region.

It remains our view at the Department of Defense that the growth of the Iranian, the expansionism of the Iranian influence in the region should not go unchallenged, that this should not solely be the responsibility of the United States, but the active participation of those countries in the region to help themselves, to stand, to deter, to contain Iran, is the best method by which we can ensure that Iran, in the future if we can not completely eliminate Iran as a threat, at least is not able to extend its capabilities, its capacities and influence into the countries of such significance as those that you have noted.

Senator NELSON. In your experience as a military officer—so you think that there are gaps in security that these arms sales will fill for those countries in the Gulf region?

General KIMMETT. Senator, yes I do. I take a look at the across-the-border review that was conducted by our own United States Air Force. That across-the-board review identified gaps in the Saudi capability, which are being addressed with the proposed Saudi arms sales package. As we have worked at CENTCOM and a number of the institutions that I have worked with, Department of Defense,

the intent has been to make these countries in the region capable of self-defense and capable of standing—to be contributors to regional stability, not necessarily either affected by instability or causes of instability themselves.

You take, for example, Lebanon recently—their victory over Fatah Islam at the Nahr el-Bared Camp, I think is—is a significant victory that is not very well reported. This is a country, the only Arab democracy in the region that has stood up against an al-Qaeda threat and is not negotiated itself into a position where that organization could continue to perpetuate.

The Lebanese Armed Forces made a very, very tough decision recently, that they were going to fight this threat to the end. And, as we saw over the past couple of days, they have ended up eliminating, they have not only treated the cancer, but they have ensured that it does not metastasize. That was done in many ways through United States assistance, 1206 in particular, where we have been able to give the Lebanese Armed Forces additional capability, so that they stood up to this threat themselves.

That wasn't just Lebanese soldiers that defeated Fatah Islam, it was also United States sniper rifles, it was United States artillery, it was—it was tank ammunition provided by a number of countries in the region. These countries can contribute to their own defense, they can hold back this scourge of extremism, if they're given the capacity, if they're given the confidence, if they're given the training.

And, with regards to the arms sales packages that you referred to earlier, that is a larger example of helping these countries help themselves.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, General.

Mr. Siegel, you're going to the Bahamas and we've had an extraordinarily successful Bahamian-United States cooperation on drug smuggling. Do you think this new Bahamian Government will be able to continue to cooperate in the antidrug efforts?

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, thank you for asking that question, because the operation between the Bahamian Government and the United States has been a close operational partner in the drug counternarcotic initiative.

To answer your question specifically, the Bahamas and the new government recently has shown a desire to increase its defense force spending in its base in Great Inagua, not only to support the maritime initiatives and also the OPAT initiatives, but also to reach out to Haiti and Haiti National Police to try to bring them into the process in combating the narcotics issue.

So, the relationship that we share with the Bahamas only grows, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with the government, because preventing narcotics from reaching this soil is very much interdicting it on the 50-yardline in the Bahamas, as opposed on our goal line here when it reaches the shores of Florida, Senator.

Senator NELSON. As you know, the Army is insisting that it removed the Blackhawk helicopters that are headquartered at Georgetown. Do you think that's going to undermine the progress that we've had in the antismuggling?

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, as of yesterday, I'm glad to report that next week the DEA and the Department of Defense representatives will

meet in Georgetown to finalize plans to have the DEA Aviation Division, to assume the U.S. Army's role as a rotary wing provider at the Hawknest facility. In fact, the three helicopters that have been redeployed to Iraq, there has been an understanding and agreement and not a hiatus provided. There will not be a step missed in the prevention and OPAT's operations. Three Bell-412 helicopters, and one long-range surveillance platform, with DoD funding, will be in place at the end of this month.

Also—it also has been decided, that come October 2009, the DEA will provide—as those helicopters leave—three additional helicopters will be provided. So, Senator, as you know, you have yourself been very, very active in making sure that DEA and the Department of Defense work together to make this possible. And, I would like to thank you for your assistance and help, so that when I do, if confirmed, arrive in Bahamas, we can work closely and have the infrastructure continued in place to fight this war against narcotics.

Senator NELSON. Well, that's welcome news. You have just brought us some new news, because until what you just stated that was decided yesterday, there was going to be a gap in the period of time in which they shut down the three Blackhawk helicopters, until you could get the new DEA helicopters in to replace them. And, you're saying a decision was made yesterday, that there will be no time gap?

Mr. SIEGEL. That's true, Senator. I was told, as of yesterday, there was a meeting September 10 in the Hawknest facility in Georgetown. And, that the transference will be of a timely nature. So, no gap will, in fact, occur.

Senator NELSON. Well, that is certainly welcome news, because of covering—the ability that we've had in the northern Bahamas, the central Bahamas, and the southern to cover all of that vastness of space with Coast Guard helicopters, Blackhawk Army helicopters, and DEA helicopters, have diminished the drug trade, substantially. And, our concern was that there was going to be this huge gap in the middle.

Mr. SIEGEL. Yes, correct, Senator. And, to add to the arsenal, Southern Command's Operation Enduring Friendship, at the end of this year in December, will provide \$2.5 million of equipment and communications training, personnel, maintenance, and four go-fast boats for maritime to support the air efforts, which only adds to the ability to interdict drugs.

Senator, if I may, I was given, also, recent OPAT statistics to date, which are very—quite impressive of the operation. And to date, 427 pounds of marijuana have been interdicted, along with 193 plants, 190 kilos of cocaine, so far, this year have been interdicted, and 32 drug arrests, as a result of OPAT, have occurred. So, your point, Senator, is well taken that the necessity of these helicopters are integral in the continued fight against drugs that we, at the embassy, work with the Bahamian Government.

Senator NELSON. That is good news. Thank you for bringing that to the committee.

Mr. SIEGEL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator NELSON. We—the Bahamian Government has a real problem in Haitian out-migration. And, they've been trying to repa-

triate as many as they pick up. You want to give us some of your comments on the, how the Bahamian Government would cope with this large migrant population?

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, the facts are pretty staggering. It costs the Bahamian Government approximately \$1.5 million a year to expatriate migrants. Close to 5,000 migrants, a majority of them Haitian, are interdicted every year at sea. It's also interesting to note, that in a population of 300,000 people in Bahama, 20 percent, 50,000 to 60,000 are of Haitian nationality, some legal, some illegal.

The strain that it does put on the Bahamian Government is real. We work closely with the Bahamian Government because the Bahamian Government is a transit point, not for these illegal migrants to land in the Bahamas, but also with the ultimate goal, to reach the shores of America. I think that, again—Enduring Friendship, the Southern Command's involvement in providing go-fast boats—we will be working, and if confirmed, one of my roles will be to work with the Bahamian Government to try to outlaw, the way other governments and we have, the wooden sloops that provide for these illegal migrants trying to arrive on the shores of the Bahamas. So, it is a constant situation, Senator, that needs to be worked and looked at and continued diplomacy. And, I look forward to doing that if I'm confirmed.

Senator NELSON. Well, I'm sure you're going to be confirmed and, as I am sure that all of you are going to be confirmed. And, I wish you well.

I might note, as I have shared with you privately, that we had one of our best ambassadors that we've ever had to the Bahamas and your immediate predecessor, John Rood of Jacksonville. And, he succeeded one of the worst ambassadors that we have ever had, that the State Department had to request his resignation.

And so, the good news is that there is a very good taste in the mouth of the Bahamians about the United States representation, as a result of Ambassador Rood. And, I am sure that's going to be the same case with you, Mr. Siegel.

Mr. SIEGEL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator NELSON. Ms. Brinker, thank you for being so patient. You had wanted to make some comments about diplomatic immunity. That, as among the responsibilities of the Chief of Protocol, is your determination of the eligibility of diplomatic immunity.

When those issues of diplomatic immunity come to the attention of the public, it's often because some visiting diplomat has transgressed the law, some way. And, then diplomatic is invoked, so that they don't have to go in front of the American jurisprudence system. You want to share with us, in your opinion, who is covered by the diplomatic immunity, and does it extend to their families?

Ms. BRINKER. It generally, it covers the diplomatic community in Washington, Senator, as you know, with the ambassador, the first, second—the deputy—the first, second, and third officer and their families. However, let me say that this is a subject that, if confirmed, I will be spending a lot of time, since it's a very serious subject. And, I believe that we've just circulated some important documents to the different embassies. Diplomatic immunity is not meant, as you know, so that people can avoid the law. It's simply

meant—it was simply meant to be offered to people to do their—be able to do their jobs. And, in the Vienna Convention, a hundred other countries feel adamantly, as we do, that foreign diplomats, though they're not subject to U.S. criminal or civil jurisdiction, these are opportunities and privileges extended to individuals, not for their personal benefit or to shield them from obligation as a law.

And, by the time a charge of whatever a diplomat, unfortunately, might do reaches a level of the Office of Protocol, you know, and if we hear from the prosecutors that, but for immunity, they would be charged. This is when we ask to waive the immunity by the host—their host country.

Now, if the country refuses to do this, then we often ask the offending diplomat to leave. Diplomatic—full diplomatic immunity is not, of course, given to a lot of service personnel or down the line or to consular officers in different cities. But we take it very seriously and want very much for people to understand the laws that govern our land as we try to respect the laws that govern their countries, as we serve overseas.

Senator NELSON. The flipside of that. When have we requested diplomatic immunity for our Foreign Service officers in other countries?

Ms. BRINKER. On a case-by-case basis. And, I can certainly give you the back-up of that over the last several years.

Ms. BRINKER. But, you know, it's handled by the Office of Legal Affairs in the State Department on a case-by-case basis.

Senator NELSON. Okay. For the record, if you could provide that to the Committee.

Ms. BRINKER. Yes.

Senator NELSON. I think that would round out this subject matter and be very helpful. And, you might also give the circumstances where the sending country has waived the right—

Ms. BRINKER. Yes.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Of diplomatic immunity. And, that would be good information in the repository of this committee.

Let me ask you—Blair House will be under your jurisdiction. Is that right?

Ms. BRINKER. That's correct.

Senator NELSON. What does managing Blair House involve?

Ms. BRINKER. There is a very able, able staff of 13, who manages, really a complex historical—it is almost very close to being a museum. It is a—it is a President's guest house. And, it is a 200-year-old house, which does not have a recurring budget, Senator, which often faces the problem, the staff does, of keeping up this really magnificent historical property. And it is done at a very, very low cost. In other words, a visiting dignitary—and this is, of course, one of the high points of the visit for many visiting dignitaries—to stay there, staff, all meals included, all services included, probably equals about \$250 a day, which is almost unheard of in a hotel setting in Washington, to be able to have that kind of atmosphere and experience.

And I just think that, though there is a private endowment in place, often times Blair House staff is faced with having to go to many different sources to keep the paint from peeling. And, I find

that disturbing. The needs aren't that huge that there shouldn't be some recurring budget. And, I have to commend Randy Baumgarten and his staff at the Blair House for doing such a fine job of maintaining this residence.

Senator NELSON. It was restored in the 1980s.

Ms. BRINKER. Right.

Senator NELSON. What is its condition today?

Ms. BRINKER. It's—they do an absolutely outstanding job of keeping it in presentable condition, but frankly, it is going to be facing, at least in the next few years, significant—significant repair and refurbishment in some of the outdated equipment that is there. And, it's heavily used. There were several hundred visits there last year, several, you know, thousands of meals served over the last few years. Every time there's a change in visit, it requires a movement of furniture, sometimes it requires heavy use on carpeting and—and the facilities. So, it does require, it is going to require quite a bit more support in the future. And, I would be happy to also give that to you, Senator. We've created a small paper, which we feel should be viewed by your committee. I think you'd be very interested to see it.

Senator NELSON. And what you might also do is come forth with a plan—

Ms. BRINKER. Okay.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Of renovation and the needed annual maintenance that will be supplied by the private sector that, you said there's a Foundation, and what, in your plan, would be required by the Federal Government budget.

Ms. BRINKER. I'd be happy to.

Senator NELSON. Because it is a national treasure and we want to make sure that we keep it.

Ms. BRINKER. Yes, Senator, I'm planning a—if I'm confirmed—we're planning on being able to host several, sort of, events, talks, meetings with our international and diplomatic community. And it's an important setting in which to do that. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Tell us about your position as Protocol officer. What's the proper observance of protocol? Why do we need a protocol officer?

Ms. BRINKER. The Protocol, the Chief of Protocol supports the President, Vice President, First Lady, Secretary of State, as needed, in all official functions that have to do with ceremony, visits—visits to the United States by key leaders, Prime Ministers, Presidents. And also supports the—as mentioned—the Blair House and the large, rather diplomatic affairs division, which is responsible for all the credentialing of foreign officers who come here. And keeping track of an ever-expanding, Senator, foreign community.

There are a 150,000 diplomats living in the United States. And Diplomatic Affairs is responsible for tracking all of them, issuing identity cards, making sure that their arrival in the United States is secure and goes with a very—in a smooth way. And increasingly, this is becoming a difficult, an ever-more difficult job as the mission expands and as the resources of the office have not in several years.

Senator NELSON. How does the President have time to receive every ambassador when he presents—he or she presents—their credentials?

Ms. BRINKER. That's our job. And we group the ambassadors into credentialing ceremonies to make it more—more palatable, certainly, and time-efficient for the President. We work very hard to make sure that each arriving ambassador has separate reception at the State Department, and provide for as many ceremonial opportunities, as well as visitations for the—for the diplomatic community.

And again, using a, almost a time-motion study to make sure that that happens. As I said earlier, if confirmed, I'd like very much like to see the diplomatic community even brought into more of our official events and opportunities to visit with more of our members, more of the Congressional members and key leaders and individuals in the United States.

Senator NELSON. Well, thank you to all of you. Do any of you have any questions of us?

[No response.]

Senator NELSON. Well, thank you for a most substantive hearing. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMITT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. The United States' arms export controls are widely regarded as some of the most rigorous in the world, and the United States is often held up as an example for other countries to follow. Our failure to keep track of the small arms we provided to security forces in Iraq has not only increased the likelihood of diversion of United States weapons to terrorists and insurgents but has also undermined this reputation. If confirmed, what steps will you take to prevent problems like this recurring? Do your plans include a comprehensive, systematic overview of current controls—including end-use monitoring and restrictions—on all U.S. arms exports and export programs?

Answer. We are proud of our record on export controls and share your concerns over reports of the loss of weapons transferred to Iraq. Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), all export authorizations are subject to restrictions against any re-export, retransfer, or change in end-use. The Blue Lantern program is used to perform postshipment end-use checks to confirm that no unauthorized changes in end-use have occurred. PM, along with several other bureaus in the Department, is supporting the Department of Defense Inspector General's efforts to ensure accountability of weapons provided to our friends and allies in Iraq, and we will quickly act on any recommendations they identify regarding the Department's export control procedures for Iraq.

Question. Preventing the misuse and diversion of U.S. weapons and military equipment is a critically important part of your mission. Do you think that the end-use monitoring currently performed by the State Department is adequate? If so, how did you arrive at this conclusion? If not, what do you plan to do to strengthen these controls?

Answer. The Department and the PM Bureau have done an exceptional job managing the Blue Lantern end-use monitoring program. Initiated over 20 years ago, Blue Lantern was the first program in the world to routinely check end-use of defense exports. The office that manages Blue Lantern is regularly called upon to brief the program to foreign governments, international organizations, and defense industry symposia. In the last 3 years, the Blue Lantern program has greatly increased both the number and quality of end-use checks. Since 2004, the number of new Blue Lantern checks per annum has increased over 75 percent, and the annual number

of unfavorable cases—indicating better targeting of checks—has hit record highs 3 years in a row. Although we could always do more with more resources, it is important to note that the vast majority of defense trade is wholly legitimate and only a small fraction of defense licenses warrant end-use monitoring.

Question. As Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, one of your main tasks will be to oversee U.S. efforts to help foreign governments build up their military forces, police, and other internal security forces to “combat terrorism and enhance stability.” As you know, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 gives the Department of State primacy over how and when to provide military assistance to foreign governments. However, in recent years the Department of Defense has assumed a larger role in this area. A December 2006 report by the majority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded that this trend risks “weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries,” and cautioned that “some foreign officials question what appears to be to them a new emphasis by the United States on military approaches to problems that are not seen as lending themselves to military solutions.” As Assistant Secretary of State for PM you will be placed right in the center of this debate. Do you see the growing role of the Pentagon in providing military assistance, as witnessed by programs such as 1206 assistance, as a threat to the primacy of the State Department in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries?

Answer. The State Department welcomed the Congress’s authorization of 1206 and other similar Defense Department-funded military assistance programs as important assets in our efforts to increase the capacities of key international military partners in our common struggle against terrorism. Since the authorization’s inception, it has met key United States foreign policy objectives such as improving the capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to respond to terrorist threats; expanding our southeast Asian partners’ abilities to secure their strategically important waterways; and equipping key nations in Africa’s Trans-Sahel to battle violent extremists emerging in their midst.

Although 1206-funded programs draw on Defense Department resources, funding the programs requires the Secretary of State’s full concurrence. This requirement ensures the programs’ complete fidelity to U.S. foreign policy objectives. In practice, this has meant close coordination between U.S. Ambassadors and Combatant Commanders in the field, as well as between the Departments of State and Defense in Washington. This collaboration has produced programs that closely match the military needs of our partners to the over-arching goals of U.S. foreign policy.

If confirmed, I pledge to continue the State Department’s efforts to ensure that 1206 and other similar programs are consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals, as the State Department determines them.

Question. What are the proper roles of the Departments of Defense and State, respectively, in building the capacity of foreign military forces? What is the role of the ambassador or chief of mission?

Answer. Our security assistance programs are among the most valuable foreign policy tools we have for building partner capacity. Given that the vast majority of our security assistance funding is traditionally implemented by the Department of Defense (DoD), as well as our shared strategic interest in building partner capacity, DoD should continue to play an important advisory role in security assistance policy. However, security assistance policy, as an integral element of U.S. foreign policy, remains the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs will continue to serve as the primary interface between DoD and the Department of State. Our ambassadors have an important role to play in making recommendations as to which countries should receive military assistance as well as in providing oversight over the execution of programs, end-use monitoring and human rights vetting.

Question. Do you believe that the Foreign Assistance Act provides enough flexibility in the area of capacity-building? Would some revisions be helpful? If so, in what areas?

Answer. There are several targeted revisions that the State Department has requested that would improve security assistance authorities and permit greater flexibility in building the capacity of important international partners in our battle with terrorism. For example, the State Department supports amending certain sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to allow the provision of peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds to law enforcement units such as gendarme forces to supplement military peacekeepers in peace support operations. The State Department has also requested an amendment to section 506 drawdown authority to increase the annual drawdown limit, expand the purposes for which drawdowns are authorized, and

allow the Department of Defense (DoD) to drawdown funds to procure new defense articles and services (vice having to rely on DoD stocks). This would enable quicker and more substantial responses to emergent capacity building needs.

Question. When military assistance is granted through traditional areas, your division of the State Department and DoD perform checks to ensure that weapons provided to foreign governments are used in accordance with any transfer agreement. Who performs end-use checks in military equipment granted through 1206 assistance?

Answer. All countries receiving assistance through section 1206 authority must enter into an end-use and re-transfer agreement with the United States pursuant to section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act. This agreement commits the recipient government to use equipment/training in a manner that is consistent with the purposes for which such assistance was furnished. In addition, the 505 agreement provides assurances that the recipient government will safeguard the equipment and technology, and allows for end-use inspections of U.S.-origin defense equipment. As with all assistance provided through the foreign military sales system, end-use monitoring will be conducted as needed by the United States Government under the auspices of the Golden Sentry program.

RESPONSE OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMETT TO QUESTION SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.

Question. How many MANPADS have been produced worldwide?

Answer. We estimate that over 1,000,000 MANPADS have been produced worldwide since the 1960s. Many of those already have been expended or destroyed because of technical obsolescence. Of the remaining systems, we assess that the majority are properly accounted for or safeguarded, but unfortunately a substantial number still remain in weak or loosely secured state stockpiles. Where we can, we work with countries to destroy surplus systems and to improve the security of those retained for legitimate national security. We also work on a multilateral basis, such as through the Wassenaar Arrangement, Organization of American States (OAS), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to strengthen MANPADS control guidelines.

A still smaller, but significant number of MANPADS are outside of national controls, either already in terrorist and insurgent hands or on the international black market. These are obviously our top priority. The number of these unregulated MANPADS is classified, but has been carefully considered in interagency planning activities.

To date the Department has helped destroy over 21,000 foreign-held MANPADS and has commitments from other states to destroy another 6,500.

RESPONSES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMETT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What are your views on the proper relationship between the Department of Defense and the Department of State in determining security assistance policy and in approving particular programs and operations?

Answer. Our security assistance programs are among the most valuable foreign policy tools we have for building partner capacity. Given that the vast majority of our security assistance funding is implemented by the Department of Defense (DoD), as well as our shared strategic interest in building partner capacity, DoD should continue to play an important advisory role in security assistance policy. However, security assistance policy, as an integral element of U.S. foreign policy, remains the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs will continue to serve as the primary interface between DoD and the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance.

Question. Given the need to coordinate diplomatic and military activities, how are responsibilities best apportioned? As Assistant Secretary, what will be your role in that, as you see it?

Answer. I believe my role will be to continue the inroads my predecessors have made in recent years, where the Departments of State and Defense have benefited from unparalleled cooperation and coordination on diplomatic and military activities. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs engages the Department of Defense (DoD) on political-military policy issues and coordinates strategic and operational political-military planning between DoD, State, and often USAID. The Bureau co-

ordinates State's input to DoD planning efforts to ensure they fully consider and are consonant with U.S. foreign policy objectives. The Bureau coordinated State's unprecedented participation in DoD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as well as the ongoing development of DoD's new Guidance for Employment of the Force and the Defense Planning Scenarios. The Bureau also continues to lead the whole-of-government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative.

Question. What steps do you plan to take to improve the planning and coordination of security assistance programs, so that funds are used most effectively and so that foreign policy concerns and objectives are taken into account in the planning and implementation of these programs?

Answer. Security assistance remains first and foremost a foreign policy tool. Therefore, foreign policy concerns and objectives take primacy in the planning and implementation of all foreign assistance programs, including security assistance. The State Department has made significant reforms regarding all aspects of foreign assistance, most notably with the creation of a new Director of Foreign Assistance. The Director of Foreign Assistance relies heavily on the expertise of functional bureaus such as the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs for guidance on how best to achieve our national security goals through foreign assistance. Additionally, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, as the principal departmental link with the Department of Defense, helps facilitate an interdepartmental dialog through which the advice of our principal partner in security assistance can be considered. If confirmed I will ensure that the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs continues to work closely with the Director of Foreign Assistance, as well as other State bureaus and the Department of Defense, in achieving our common goal of enhancing peace and security.

Question. You have served 30 years on active duty in the military and another year as a civilian official at the Department of Defense. What key insights or practices will you take from those experiences in managing interagency relations at the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs? What, if any, major challenges do you anticipate in representing the State Department in interagency discussions on security assistance and other matters?

Answer. I believe strongly that State and the Department of Defense (DoD) need to continue to strive to improve the ways in which we communicate and coordinate political-military activities and policies. These two departments, along with the rest of the interagency, must operate as one team in their service to the American people in creating a stable and secure international environment that is hospitable to American interests and values. The current program through which senior officials in both State and the Department of Defense serve exchange tours goes a long way in facilitating a closer relationship by providing senior foreign policy and military policy advice at the most senior levels of departmental leadership. Additionally, we currently have a robust personnel exchange program between mid-level active duty military and State Department officers, and I would look to expand it to provide a greater reservoir of interagency experience in both departments. One of the principal goals I will set for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is to leverage new interagency planning and security assistance initiatives to better coordinate the complementary capabilities and resources that are needed to address the diverse threats and opportunities we face as a nation.

Question. What actions do you anticipate taking to fulfill Acting Assistant Secretary Mull's July 26, 2007 pledge to improve the interagency jurisdictional dispute mechanism for export control classification?

Answer. I understand that Acting Assistant Secretary Mull has taken steps to energize an existing working-level group that reviews and discusses disputed cases and will establish a Deputy Assistant Secretary-level group to convene and resolve commodity jurisdiction cases that rise to that level. I pledge to review these processes to ensure that timelines, established in long-standing guidance issued by the National Security Council, are met.

Question. What administrative or organizational improvements, if any, do you plan to make in the current Directorate of Defense Trade Controls or bureau front-office structure regarding defense trade licensing?

Answer. It is my understanding the PM Bureau is in the process of delayering the Bureau's management hierarchy, to include restructuring the Directorate of Defense Trade Control's Management Office and adding to the responsibilities of the Deputy Assistant for Defense Trade Controls. I also understand that the Bureau has instituted a series of process reforms in the Defense Trade area, which have resulted initially in more efficient processing and a reduction in the overall backlog. If confirmed, I intend to review these efforts and determine what additional actions

should be taken to optimize the defense trade licensing process. The ultimate goal will be to ensure that the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls is configured and equipped to get the job done.

Question. What steps do you think need to be taken to reduce the backlog of cases pending before the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls?

Answer. I understand the importance to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests of efficiently adjudicating license applications to export defense articles and services from the United States. The PM Bureau is experiencing an annual 8 percent increase in license applications and went through a period of short staffing in 2006 that led to a backlog of some 10,000 nonadjudicated license applications. I understand this staffing shortfall has been largely addressed and the Bureau has instituted a series of measures, including the streamlining of referrals to DoD and a mandatory management review of cases over 45 and 90 days, to reduce the backlog, which now stands at 6,000 cases. The implementation of the Defense Trade treaties with the United Kingdom and Australia, should the Senate provide its advice and consent, also will reduce the number of license applications to the Bureau. If confirmed, I will make further reforms to the licensing process a priority.

Question. Are staffing levels in the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls appropriate, given that they are at such low levels relative to other agencies with similar responsibilities and fewer licenses to process? Would higher numbers of full-time employees better enable the directorate to meet its licensing processing goals and ensure the best protection possible of U.S. national security equities to commercial arms sales?

Answer. The Department recognizes the disparity between agencies with export licensing responsibilities and I understand is making progress toward reducing the number of license applications per licensing officer inline with Congressional mandates. For the first time in several years the Directorate has fully manned its military billets and continues to fill all civil service positions. If confirmed, I will make the best use of available resources to meet license processing goals, while protecting U.S. national security equities.

Question. Does the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls have sufficient financial resources to carry out its mission?

Should exporters pay greater license fees to increase the resources available to the directorate to process all or particularly time-sensitive cases? Or would that give undue influence to those exporters with the resources to subsidize State Department operations?

Should exporters assume, or be required to assume, a greater burden in inquiring about end users (and end uses) prior to the export of a defense article or defense service?

Answer. The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls is currently about 40 percent self-financed through the collection of registration fees. If confirmed, I intend to explore if the Directorate can benefit from increasing their level of self-financing and, if so, how best to collect additional fees (e.g., instituting a fee for license applications or changing the structure of fees paid by registrants). As the Department of State is charged with the regulation of defense trade to protect our national security and foreign policy interests, any fee collection process implemented must be equitable and transparent. We cannot institute a fee collection process that unfairly benefits one exporter over another.

Knowing the end user and end use of an export is a fundamental obligation of an exporter and is essential to the Department's review and consideration of any export application request. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations currently requires all parties to an export to be identified in the export application and this obligation is underscored in the regulations which explicitly make exporters responsible for the use and disposition of any exported defense article. Exporters have long understood this obligation and routinely perform due diligence on their defense trade partners and on their exports. The Department also plays a key role in this process by bringing to bear information from various sources, including classified information, to vet all the parties to an export application prior to approval. This vetting is done by screening applications against a watchlist of ineligible, unreliable, or suspicious parties. This watchlist includes information gathered from classified and other reporting not generally available to companies and private parties.

Question. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has expanded widely its use of private contractors to train foreign militaries and carry out other missions, and it has approved the transfer of arms directly to such private contractors. What are your views regarding the advantages and risks associated with this trend?

Answer. Broader policy questions regarding the expanded use of private contractors to train foreign militaries and to carry out other missions would be better addressed by the Department of Defense. Pursuant to the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, PM Bureau must approve any exports of military equipment needed to support these contractors. In deciding whether to approve such exports, the PM Bureau consults closely with DoD and other interested agencies to ensure that they are in keeping with U.S. foreign policy.

With regard to its own limited use of contractors engaged in demining operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the PM Bureau has required its contractors to take adequate measures to safeguard personnel and protect property. In support of this effort, the PM Bureau has authorized the procurement of weapons and military equipment by the Department of State for use by the contractors. Through the contract, these weapons are considered government furnished equipment and are the property of the Department of State, to be used by the contractors in the performance of the contract and returned to the U.S. Government at the end of the contract.

Question. Earlier this year, the executive branch amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations to permit more radiation-hardened computer chips to be sold to, or manufactured in, countries like China. The justification was that chips for commercial applications were becoming more radiation-hardened, like it or not, and that maintaining existing controls would only damage the competitiveness of U.S. firms. The Defense Department said that although more capable chips might be usable in spacecraft, they would still be behind the standards for U.S. space-qualified systems. Members of this committee warned that the new policy might help other countries to build space-based or nuclear systems, even if they were second-rate. The executive branch said that wasn't a problem yet, but that the regulation on rad-hardened chips might have to be amended again in a few years. So this issue could emerge again on your watch.

What are your views on the risks posed as computer chips get more capable and more radiation-hardened?

What steps will you take to address this concern before industry comes back with a new request to ease the ITAR regulations on radiation-hardened chips?

Answer. It is my understanding that the revision in the parameters of the ITAR reflected the fact that improved chip design, shrinking size, and the use of new materials in their manufacture resulted in improved radiation tolerance as well. Chips designed for civilian uses such as cell phones and laptop computers were approaching ITAR thresholds for radiation hardness that signified military application. Had the administration not acted, the end result would have been control of commercial chips as military items, with a significant impact on the next generation of consumer electronics. The interagency, including DoD space and missile experts, looked at this problem and proposed the revisions that were ultimately published.

I understand that the recent revisions on radiation-hardened chips is considered by all to be an interim solution. The review of the United States Munitions List is ongoing, and administration experts continue to examine the question of appropriate controls for radiation-hardened chips as well as other technologies. If confirmed, I will ensure that our review and any proposed solutions will take into account the possible use of radiation-hardened chips by our strategic competitors.

Question. If you are confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, you will be responsible for U.S. transfers of weapons or of weapons-relevant technology to other countries. Will you divest any holdings you or your wife may have in companies that manufacture weapons or computer chips?

Answer. Yes. If I am confirmed, I have agreed to divest my holdings in certain companies where it was determined there would be a substantial likelihood of a conflict of interest with my duties as the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. These included companies that manufacture weapons or computer chips. I also agreed to provide appropriate officials in the Department of State with a list of those interests that I may acquire in order to support my efforts to avoid conflicts of interest.

Question. The United States has recently signed defense trade treaties with the United Kingdom and Australia. What other countries have expressed interest in negotiating such treaties, and what answers have they received? What other defense trade negotiations are in progress, have been approved in the C-175 process (11 FAM 724), or are awaiting such approval?

Answer. To my knowledge, no other country has sought negotiation of a treaty similar to those signed with the United Kingdom and Australia. I am not aware of any plans to negotiate further treaties; no negotiations are in progress, and there are no other proposed treaties at any stage in the Circular 175 process.

Question. The Bureau for Political-Military Affairs is responsible for liaison with the Department of Defense, and one important aspect of that liaison is planning and implementing disaster relief efforts when there is a major earthquake, tsunami, or hurricane. The United States is famous for the extent and the efficiency of its humanitarian efforts, but we are rarely the first country to provide assistance. Sometimes weeks go by, before significant U.S. help begins to arrive.

Why is U.S. assistance often so slow to get started? Are our logistical resources stretched too thin? Are there bureaucratic roadblocks to quick, effective action, in either the Departments of Defense or State?

If you are confirmed as Assistant Secretary, what will you do to improve U.S. disaster response performance?

Answer. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is one of several coordinating agencies involved in determining the level of U.S. Government assistance to nations following humanitarian disasters. USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and DoD also have a major role in the assessment and response.

There is a process to obtain U.S. Government assistance. Following a disaster, the U.S. Government, through its embassy country team, works directly with the affected nation. The ambassador has authority to make an immediate disaster declaration and can make an offer of financial assistance.

Additionally, USAID provides assessment teams to determine if local, nongovernment organizations, and international organization contributions are insufficient for disaster relief. In cases of slow-onset natural disasters such as the approach of hurricanes, the U.S. Government is able to place assessment/response teams in multiple countries in advance of the disaster.

If the assessment team and the host nation determine additional assistance is required either due to the overwhelming nature of the event or if the required assistance is unique to the military, the ambassador works closely with USAID, the State Department, and the Department of Defense to identify the needs and ensure the flow of U.S. Government assistance is immediate and rapid. USAID has authorities to provide assistance and, as appropriate, identifies whether DoD assistance is required.

While this process may sound complicated, in fact the communication between the embassy, USAID, and the Departments of State and Defense begins immediately, or in some cases even before the disaster's onset. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' role is to facilitate the request for disaster assistance between agencies.

In consultation with our colleagues at USAID, and as an illustrative example of my points, I have included a timeline of the ongoing response to the aftermath of Hurricane Felix in Central America. My understanding is that the response to Hurricane Felix occurred while USAID was also responding to the effects of Peru's devastating earthquake.

In response to the second part of the question, I believe there are no roadblocks or delays to the U.S. Government's foreign disaster response. I hope to use my position as Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs to ensure that communications lines among DOS, DoD, and USAID remain open and clear as to intent (U.S. Government interest) and timeliness of a U.S. Government response.

HURRICANE FELIX TIMELINE:

Prior to the hurricane season:

- USAID pre-positioned approximately \$45,000 in relief supplies with the Nicaraguan Red Cross to respond to emergency needs.

August 31:

- Tropical depression six formed in the Atlantic Ocean. The U.S. National Hurricane Center began issuing public advisories at 5 p.m. Atlantic Standard Time. USAID/OFDA began monitoring the storm.

September 1:

- Tropical depression six reached tropical storm, and then hurricane strength.

September 2:

- USAID/OFDA began sending out regular hurricane update emails on Hurricane Felix.

September 3:

- USAID pre-positioned 23 disaster response specialists Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Belize, and Mexico in advance of Hurricane Felix. Some of these disaster specialists were repositioned from their previous deployment to respond to Hurricane Dean.

September 4:

- After making landfall on September 4 as a category five hurricane, Felix moved inland over northeastern Nicaragua and Honduras.
- USAID/OFDA provided \$75,000 to support emergency preparedness activities in Nicaragua, Belize, and Honduras.

September 5:

- On September 5, the hurricane severely impacted Honduras and Nicaragua, and resulted in heavy rainfall in Guatemala and Belize.
- On September 5, U.S. Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli declared a disaster due to the effects of the hurricane. In response, USAID/OFDA provided \$150,000 to support the local procurement and transportation of emergency relief supplies to affected populations.

September 6:

- On September 6, the first of two USAID/OFDA first relief flights arrived in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, with 120 rolls of plastic sheeting, 1,500 blankets, and 1,536 hygiene kits.
- On September 6, a member of the USAID emergency team traveled to three municipalities in Cortes Department, Honduras, as part of a joint assessment mission with U.N. staff.

September 7:

- In coordination with the Nicaraguan Red Cross, USAID emergency teams are conducting assessments of four of the most affected communities in Nicaragua on September 7. The teams are reaching the impacted areas via U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) helicopters, which will return to the assessed areas with relief supplies.
- A second relief flight, carrying 120 rolls of plastic sheeting, 1,500 blankets, and 1,536 hygiene kits, is scheduled to arrive in Nicaragua on September 7. The initial distribution of the USAID/OFDA relief supplies will begin on September 7 in Sandy Bay and surrounding communities.
- On September 7, DOD aircraft delivered essential supplies, including a water purification system, and provided air support for USAID/OFDA assessments of the affected areas. DOD is also assisting with search and rescue efforts for Nicaraguan fishermen who are missing due to the hurricane.

RESPONSES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMETT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR BARACK OBAMA

(Military assistance programs have traditionally been funded in the Department of State and Foreign Operations budget and overseen by the Political-Military Affairs Department of the State Department. But section 1206 of the fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to equip, supply, or train foreign country military forces to build their capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations or participate in or support stability operations in which the U.S. military also participates.)

Question. In your view, should the statutory restrictions on military assistance programs included in the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act or the State Department and Foreign Operations Appropriations apply to the program authorized in section 1206?

Answer. Section 1206, by its terms, incorporates other statutory restrictions as assistance cannot be provided if it is otherwise prohibited by any provision of law. Thus, the Department of State currently applies statutory restrictions on military assistance programs to programs executed under section 1206 authority. Since section 1206 is designed to be a flexible tool to respond to meet urgent or emergent requirements, the administration has sought more flexibility, such as the ability to waive certain restrictions when provision of section 1206 assistance would be in the national security interests of the United States. Clearly, where such assistance would not support our foreign policy goals for the country, it would not be provided.

Question. If you are confirmed, will Political-Military Affairs apply such restrictions to the program authorized by section 1206?

Answer. Since application of these restrictions is required under the law, the Department of State, working with the Department of Defense, will continue to apply such restrictions to programs executed under section 1206 authority.

Question. Please explain the procedures Political-Military Affairs currently follows to ensure that individuals or units trained and equipped in the program authorized in section 1206 meet statutory requirements for the respect of human rights.

Answer. Section 1206 includes provisions that effectively require that the assistance be provided consistent with other requirements of law. Accordingly, we apply the Leahy amendment requirements set out in the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts to the provision of section 1206 assistance. The State Department takes its responsibilities under the Leahy amendment very seriously. Diplomatic posts overseas are fully informed about the legislative requirement that foreign security units receiving training or assistance must be vetted. The embassy begins the process by reviewing its files and databases on units and/or individuals for human rights violations. The embassy then cables the regional bureau at the State Department providing its search results and requesting a similar review of the Department's files and databases. Information on the unit and/or individual is circulated for review by appropriate personnel in the Department, including the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); Intelligence and Research (INR); and Political-Military Affairs (PM). If no credible derogatory information is found, the regional bureau sends a reply cable to Post indicating that the training or assistance may proceed.

Question. Do you believe those steps are adequate?

Answer. The Department began human rights vetting 10 years ago as a way of implementing the Leahy amendment which was first added to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act at that time. Since then the process has been refined and improved; currently the Department vets over thousands of names every year, and those numbers continue to increase. The Department has established a working group which meets frequently on Leahy issues, and the Office of the Inspector General regularly inspects Leahy vetting procedures at posts. Nonetheless, the Department continues to look for ways to improve the vetting process, particularly in chaotic and violent environments.

Question. Knowing what you know about this program authorized in section 1206, do you believe that other Military Assistance Programs—including those not overseen or administered by Political-Military Affairs, like the training and equipping of Iraqi Security Forces—have effective procedures for ensuring that individuals trained and equipped with taxpayer resources meet certain minimum standards as they relate to respect for human rights?

Answer. In accordance with the Leahy amendment, the Department of State is responsible for ensuring that where there is credible evidence that a unit of security forces has committed gross human rights violations, that unit does not receive training or assistance. The State Department applies the Leahy amendment, which has been annually reenacted for many years in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (FOAA), to security assistance programs for military forces funded by Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and certain Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funds. The State Department also applies the Leahy amendment to comparable training and equipping programs for national military forces under section 1206, which is funded with DoD funds. A modified version of the Leahy amendment found in the FOAA is also found in the Defense Appropriations Act and applies to DoD-funded training programs. While dynamic operational environments pose additional challenges to vetting, the goal remains unchanged in implementing Leahy such that no security assistance will be provided to any units of military security forces where there is credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NANCY GOODMAN BRINKER, NOMINEE TO BE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, AND TO HAVE THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR DURING HER TENURE OF SERVICE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as the President's nominee to serve as Chief of Protocol of the United States. I'm grateful to the President and Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they have placed in me by nominating me for this position.

I thank Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison for her gracious introduction and support and Congressman Tom Lantos for his support during this nomination process. I am proud today to be joined by my son, Eric Brinker, from Peoria, IL—as well as by close friends and colleagues.

It was my privilege to appear before this committee 6 years ago, and I thank the members and the Senate for their support of my nomination as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Hungary. I am honored and excited by the opportunity to return

to public service and to work on issues important to the United States and the diplomatic community.

During my time in Hungary, we were able to advance a broad range of United States security and economic interests. We promoted United States trade and investment in Hungary, built significant cultural ties between the United States and Hungarian communities and worked with the Hungarians on the war on terror in the wake of 9/11.

Specific successes include expanded security cooperation, development of a closure strategy for the Hungarian Fund, resolving commerce transparency issues, and for the first time, holding a conference on the trafficking and exploitation of workers that health ministers from the neighboring Balkan States attended.

Following my assignment to Budapest, I returned to the Susan G. Komen for the Cure, which is named in memory of my sister, and is the world's largest breast cancer foundation. As its founder, I understand the challenge of leading and coordinating complex organizations.

Another challenge that I have taken on is promoting "medical diplomacy" for the State Department. This effort focuses on the global breast cancer and women's health movements from Eastern Europe to the Middle East. In this position, I have witnessed the ability of our Nation to strengthen bilateral relations by connecting with local communities.

Throughout these three decades of experiences, Mr. Chairman, I have learned a simple truth that, if confirmed, will guide my service as Chief of Protocol: You can make a difference in the lives of people from other races, religions, or cultures if you simply reach out to them with respect, learn their needs, and share the lessons of your own experience and then support them in theirs.

This truth and my experience have prepared me for the position that the President has entrusted me to undertake.

The Office of the Chief of Protocol advises, assists, and supports the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State on official matters of diplomatic procedure. During this administration, the Visits Division has supported over 2,300 visits by foreign dignitaries. This division also plans and executes Presidential delegations abroad to represent the President at events. In addition, the Chief of Protocol accompanies the President on official visits overseas.

The ceremonials division arranges official ceremonies and events for the Secretary of State, organizes the participation of the diplomatic corps in special events, and maintains the order of precedence of the United States, coordinating over 130 ceremonial events this fiscal year.

A vital part of the office of the Chief of Protocol is handled by the Diplomatic Affairs division, which oversees the credentialing of foreign bilateral ambassadors to the United States and accreditation of foreign government personnel posted here. If confirmed, I look forward to serving the President as a liaison to the 184 ambassadors accredited to our country. Protocol is also the action office for matters relating to diplomatic and consular immunities.

The office also manages Blair House, the President's guest house. All of this is accomplished by a staff of 63 people, comprised of civil and Foreign Service officers, as well as political appointees.

President Bush and Secretary Rice have highlighted transformational diplomacy as part of the White House's global democracy agenda. I therefore see this assignment as an opportunity to help our foreign dignitaries experience the full fabric of American society, beyond traditional diplomatic circles, and in doing so strengthening the mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of the world.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your consideration of my nomination. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staffs to advance our agenda with the diplomatic community.

RESPONSES OF NANCY GOODMAN BRINKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What are your top priorities for this position, if confirmed? At the end of the Bush administration, what do you hope to be able to report that you have accomplished?

Answer. If confirmed, I hope to strengthen and achieve mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of the world by helping our guests experience the rich foundation, culture, and history of America, beyond traditional diplomatic circles. I would like to bring together leaders in business, edu-

cation, government, cultural organizations, and not-for-profit organizations to help advance the principles of diplomacy.

Through personal contact with visiting foreign leaders and the diplomatic community throughout the United States, I plan to achieve a better understanding between the American people and our international community which I hope can have a positive impact on bilateral ties.

Question. I am concerned about allegations of abuse or mistreatment of workers present in the United States under A-3 and G-5 visas. Diplomats have failed to provide promised compensation to such worker, and in some cases have physically abused or mistreated these workers. Are you familiar with this issue? Do you have any views on what measures the Department might take, consistent with U.S. obligations on diplomatic immunity, to strengthen protection for such workers?

Answer. I am aware of this issue and wish to confirm that the Department of State takes this matter very seriously. As the United States seeks to be a leader in the global effort to combat trafficking in persons, we are deeply concerned by these reported abuses, some of which also suggest the possibility of trafficking. We are working to ensure the fair and humane treatment of all domestic workers who come to the United States, including those employed by persons with full immunity. It is essential for all members of the diplomatic community to fully respect U.S. laws. Not only is the welfare of the domestic workers of great concern, but our effectiveness in addressing problems like this, domestically, has the potential to affect the authority with which we speak globally.

The Department recently transmitted a circular diplomatic note to all missions emphasizing the importance of providing fair treatment to domestic workers and requiring the registration of all foreign domestic workers assigned to mission personnel. Given the gravity of the allegations, we are also exploring other possible approaches.

While serving as the United States Ambassador to Hungary, one of the successes of my tenure was that we held, for the first time, a conference on trafficking and exploitation of workers that was attended by health ministers from the neighboring Balkan States. If confirmed, it is my intention to bring together the Chiefs of Mission here in Washington to underscore the fact that the Department takes this matter seriously and to explain our policy and practice in cases that are brought to our attention.

RESPONSES OF NANCY GOODMAN BRINKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Is there a "Buy American" rule in place regarding gifts that are given to foreign dignitaries? If not, please explain how gifts are selected. What is the average annual total amount spent for such gifts?

Answer. There is no official "Buy American" rule in place regarding gifts. Members of this administration generally choose to purchase products that have been designed, crafted, and manufactured in the United States, when possible.

The Office of the Chief of Protocol, which is responsible for foreign gifting on behalf of the President and First Lady, the Vice President and spouse, and the Secretary of State, offers various gift options on the occasion of visits by foreign dignitaries or officials, foreign trips, special events, and Presidential delegations. The principal makes the choice from the options provided.

The average yearly amount spent on gifts is approximately \$500,000. This amount includes special order gifts as well as the amount spent for the purchase of standard gifts maintained by Protocol for use during the ordinary course of official interaction with foreign visitors.

Question. In your responses to Senator Nelson, you mentioned issues related to the funding of the cost of Blair House operations. Please provide a more detailed breakdown of the costs and funding sources used to cover the costs for both maintenance and accommodations.

Answer. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for the opportunity to respond to your question.

Blair House is currently maintained using funds available from the Department of State, the General Services Administration, and a not-for-profit 501(3)C organization, the Blair House Restoration Fund. The Department of State currently spends approximately \$1.3 million annually in operations and maintenance costs and small-scale capitol improvements and repairs. Annual payments to GSA are approximately \$960,000 annually of which a portion is also utilized to fund maintenance costs.

Blair House Restoration Fund provides approximately \$250,000 exclusively for use to repair and refurbish decorative elements of Blair House.

The expenses of visits by foreign chiefs of state or heads of government are paid through the Department of State allocation known as the Emergencies in Diplomatic and Consular Affairs (K Fund) which reports directly to Congress on an annual basis with an itemized accounting of expenses that includes the cost of guests at Blair House. Recent examples include: In 2006 Blair House hosted a record number of 25 world leaders over a period of 75 days at a cost of \$395,725.07. In 2005, Blair House hosted 18 world leaders in a period of 50 days at a total cost of \$285,453.42.

If confirmed, I plan to seek a complete and full evaluation of Blair House funding, maintenance, and operating costs. There must be a comprehensive maintenance and repair plan to avoid an increase in building deficiencies and unanticipated mechanical and electrical failures. A band-aid approach to operations is risky and shortsighted, putting the structure itself at risk and creating uncomfortable or even hazardous conditions for visitors and guests.

Some of the building systems and parts of the infrastructure of the Blair House have been renovated or repaired, but many of the piecemeal upgrades are no longer viable and new problems are developing as the building continues to age and settle.

RESPONSES OF NANCY GOODMAN BRINKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Question. Please describe circumstances where sending governments have waived the immunity of their diplomats?

Answer. Immunities are provided to diplomats in order to ensure the efficient performance of diplomatic missions in the representation of states. Sending states typically consider on a case-by-case basis requests to waive the immunities of diplomats. While there are many instances in which states do not waive diplomats' immunities, there are also instances in which they do. In a few very serious incidents such as vehicular manslaughter in Washington in 1997, and an earlier homicide in Florida in 1989, the sending states granted requests by the Department of State to waive the diplomatic immunity of their mission members. In these cases, the individual stood trial and was sentenced in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction.

In some lesser criminal incidents sending states often have not waived their diplomat's immunities. They have occasionally, with prosecutors' agreement, participated in diversionary programs, for example counseling. For driving offenses, if a sending state does not waive a diplomat's immunities and permit the diplomat to appear in court or otherwise reach an agreement with a prosecutor, the Department of State imposes points on the diplomat's driver license (issued by the Department of State) and will suspend or revoke a license as appropriate.

Question. When have we requested waiver of immunity for our persons overseas?

Answer. We receive requests from host governments to waive immunity for U.S. Government personnel in criminal and civil cases very rarely. The only recent case was Russia requesting, in 1998, that we waive immunity for the Consul General in Vladivostok who was involved in an auto accident resulting in a young man becoming a quadriplegic. In response, we asked Russia to provide more details about the charges that would be brought and the evidence indicating our employee was at fault. Russia did not respond and so we did not waive or refuse to waive immunity.

This is not to suggest that we have never waived immunity for our overseas employee, but we do so without a formal request from the host State. A common example is a request from local prosecutors for a DEA or other law enforcement agency to testify in a criminal prosecution (which happens almost once a month). All of our accredited embassy and consular personnel have testimonial and jurisdictional immunity regarding their official acts. This immunity must be (and almost always is to assist prosecutions) waived before the individual can subject him or herself to the jurisdiction of the local court.

Similarly, our employees sometimes receive notification that they are the subject of proceedings in local criminal or civil courts. Because they are members of a diplomatic or consular mission, they all have immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction for official acts. Diplomatic agents have complete criminal and civil immunity for any conduct, while members of an embassy's administrative and technical staff have criminal immunity for all off-duty acts. In response to these notices of litigation, the embassies are instructed to prepare a diplomatic note either asserting or waiving immunity. The notes and original documents are transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Generally speaking, we do not waive immunity for foreign

court litigation against our employees or their family members (when they are covered by immunity). On average, an assertion of immunity takes place about once a month.

There have been two recent occasions where we have waived criminal immunity for a covered individual without formal requests from the host State. In both, our ambassadors weighed in strongly urging that the immunity be waived. One case involved drunk driving where the embassy had issued clear guidance precluding such behavior. The other involved an embassy dependent who'd gotten into a fight along with several military dependents. Since the military dependents had no immunity in that situation, the ambassador felt that it was unfair that the embassy dependent (who had been equally involved in the altercation) was not punished. In both cases, immunity from criminal jurisdiction for adjudication of guilt was waived and the issue of whether execution of a criminal sentence (i.e., jail or fine) would be permitted was reserved. In both cases, however, there were plea agreements so no further waivers were issued.

Question. What is the condition of Blair House today? Can you send me a paper on Blair House?

Answer. Thank you, Senator Nelson, for the opportunity to inform you of the condition of Blair House. Because of its age, Blair House needs significant reconditioning in order to function properly as the President's official guest house for visiting foreign dignitaries. Extraordinary efforts have been put into keeping this historical house looking as good as it does, but sustained annual support is required.

What today is known as Blair House is actually four private 19th century residences that have been combined and interconnected to operate as one unit. In addition, a new wing was added to the complex in the 1980s. The oldest home was completed in 1824, another in 1859, and two others in 1860. The Federal Government purchased the earliest homes in 1942 and 1943 to create a guest house for the Nations distinguished foreign guests. The two later homes were added to the complex in 1970. The entire facility was renovated between 1982 and 1988. Seven million dollars were allocated from Congress for structural work and an additional \$7 million were raised privately to cover decorative expenses. Today, the facility contains approximately 70,000 square feet—a full 5,000 square feet larger than the executive mansion.

Question. I would like you to send me a renovation plan and needed annual maintenance supplied by private sector and what is required by the Federal budget.

Answer. Thank you, Senator Nelson, for the opportunity to provide a renovation plan and report which outlines details needed for annual maintenance. If confirmed, I plan to seek a complete and full evaluation of Blair House funding, maintenance, and operating costs. There must be a comprehensive maintenance and repair plan to avoid an increase in building deficiencies and unanticipated mechanical and electrical failures. A band-aid approach to operations is risky and short-sighted, putting the structure itself at risk and creating uncomfortable or even hazardous conditions for visitors and guests.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF NED L. SIEGEL, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to come before you as the President's nominee to serve as the Ambassador of the United States of America to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. I want to thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for their confidence and support in nominating me for this position. I also wish to thank the members of the Senate and, in particular, this committee, for the opportunity to come before you today.

I would like to introduce and acknowledge my family members who are here with me today—my wife and partner in life for 31 years, Stephanie. I am also honored

to have my brother, Marc, and my nephew, Robert, joining us. I have been extremely fortunate to have had the love and support of my family in all of my endeavors, and I realize I would not be here today without them. Over the years, I have had the opportunity to visit the Bahamas to celebrate various special family occasions. I have always considered the Bahamas as a special place, and my family and I have many fond memories of the Bahamas over the years. If confirmed, I look forward to creating many, many new ones.

The opportunity to appear before you today in this exceptional process can only be described as a privilege. This is not my first time to appear before a Senate confirmation committee, but I would like to share with the members of this committee my qualifications to serve as the United States ambassador to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.

From 1999 to 2004, I served as an appointee to the Board of Directors of Enterprise Florida, Inc. (EFI), a public-private partnership that acts as Florida's primary organization for statewide economic development. The mission of EFI is "to diversify Florida's economy and create better-paying jobs for its citizens by supporting, attracting, and helping create business in innovative, high-growth industries." I traveled to Israel on the Governor's Trade Mission in 1999 and worked throughout my tenure to bring Israeli companies to Florida.

In 2003, I was nominated by the President and appointed to serve as a member of the board of directors of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a position I currently hold. Throughout my tenure as an OPIC director, I have been able to evaluate and approve projects that mobilized U.S. capital to provide people in developing countries with first-time access to credit for new small businesses and low- and moderate-income housing. These efforts have had a tangible effect on job creation and economic growth, helping to lift people from poverty—all carried out in cooperation with the private sector.

In September of 2006, I was again honored by the President to serve as a Public Delegate to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and as a United States Representative to the 61st General Assembly. This was a unique opportunity to serve at an exceptional time in our efforts to build international support for U.S. policies through the United Nations. Through my experience at the U.N., I gained a greater appreciation for the strategy and preparation necessary to advance U.S. interests on the world stage. I also experienced firsthand the tremendous impact that small countries can have through their ITN votes on the United States' ability to carry out its foreign policy and enhance our national security. Without a doubt, my time as a delegate to the United Nations provided me an opportunity to gain exposure to the conduct of our Nation's international affairs at the highest level, and thereby to sharpen my own diplomatic skills.

Through my experiences at Enterprise Florida, OPIC, and the United Nations, I have acquired a broad knowledge of the political sensitivities of promoting sustainable investment while advancing U.S. foreign policy and development initiatives. That knowledge, coupled with my extensive business experience has prepared me to serve effectively as the United States Ambassador to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, should I be confirmed.

The United States and the Bahamas enjoy a close and productive bilateral partnership built on all four pillars of the President's Western Hemisphere Strategy: bolstering security, strengthening democracy, promoting prosperity, and investing in people. Our shared interests, common commitment to the rule of law, and geographic proximity make the Bahamas one of our closest operational partners in the Western Hemisphere.

The Bahamian public is broadly committed to the values that we as Americans hold dear—democratic governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. These shared values provide a firm foundation to build a productive partnership, but it is up to the embassy to ensure that our message is heard and our actions are understood. If confirmed, my embassy team will step up efforts to explain, promote, and defend U.S. policies and actions in order to build support for U.S. strategic goals in the region: We will focus our outreach efforts to support our counterdrug and crime efforts, promote greater public awareness of HIV/AIDS, encourage a stronger Bahamian international role on human rights and democracy, and promote improved education.

Should I be confirmed, I will work to improve the United States' vital, cutting edge efforts to combat international crime, drugs, and illegal migration. We will do this by maintaining full U.S. support for Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos in a coordinated multinational, multi-agency effort to combat international drug trafficking into and through the Bahamas. As a result of OPBAT's success, we have dramatically reduced the percentage of cocaine destined for the United States that

flows through the Bahamas from a high of 70 percent in the 1980s to the current level of less than 10 percent.

Working together, the Royal Bahamas Defense Force and the U.S. Coast Guard monitor Bahamian and international waters for illegal migration. Our Comprehensive Maritime Agreement (CMA) allows Bahamian officials to ride on U.S. vessels while they patrol in order to be in position to authorize the boarding of vessels in Bahamian waters to pursue illegal migrant and drug traffickers. Our efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and shut down illegal migration also serve to close off pathways that could be used by terrorists. Last year alone, the United States and the Bahamas together interdicted 5,762 illegal migrants.

Second, I will ensure that Embassy Nassau's Consular Section continues to provide first-rate assistance to United States Citizens in the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands—a protectorate of the United Kingdom, over which we have consular jurisdiction. Over 4 million United States citizens travel to or reside in the Bahamas every year, and I will work to expand outreach programs that educate both Bahamians and United States residents residing or visiting within the Bahamas so they have the information, services, and protection they need to live, conduct business, or travel between our countries. To protect the most vulnerable, we will intensify our dialog with Bahamian authorities on sexual assault cases and work with police to prevent assaults, care for victims, and ensure effective prosecutions.

Third, I will work to further improve United States efforts to work with the Bahamians to prevent and respond to terrorism. Cruise ships, vacation resorts, passenger jets, and commercial shipping vessels could all become potential terrorist targets if not secured and screened. The Freeport Container Port is one of the largest in the world and one of the closest foreign ports to the United States. In 2004, the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Bahamas to include Freeport in the United States Megaports Initiative to screen United States-bound cargo for radiological materials. In 2006, a Memorandum of Understanding for a Container Security Initiative (CSI) was concluded. Through CSI, over 90 percent of the cargo moving through Freeport—one of the 25 busiest transshipment ports to the United States—will be screened and suspicious containers will be segregated and searched. To expand our joint efforts to combat the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we will seek to conclude a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Ship Boarding Agreement. The Bahamas has the third largest ship registry in the world, and their participation in PSI is vital to its success.

Finally, should I be confirmed, I am looking forward to using my business experience and acumen to promote the prosperity that is essential to the Bahamas' continued stability and its ability to take on greater responsibilities as a multidimensional partner for the United States. The Bahamas has the highest per capita income in CARICOM and its consumer market is attuned to United States products. Over 80 percent of Bahamian imports come from the United States, but competitors such as China and Brazil are working to increase their market shares. My embassy team will seek to increase United States trade and investment in the Bahamas by linking Bahamian importers to United States suppliers, fostering Bahamian business development, and promoting United States-Bahamian business connections, including through our outstanding National Guard State Partnership Program with the State of Rhode Island. We will continue to work with the Bahamas to promote energy diversification and sustainable tourism, fishing, and agriculture. The embassy will continue to promote legal and regulatory changes that will promote sustainable development, an important goal of United States policy.

Our relationship with the Bahamas is strong and vibrant. The Bahamas will continue to be an active partner in our efforts to stem the flow of illegal narcotics, prevent illegal migration, ensure the safety and security of American citizens abroad, combat potential terrorism, and promote prosperity and security in our hemisphere. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to building new areas of cooperation with one of our closest neighbors and to deepening one of our closest bilateral partnerships in the hemisphere.

Throughout my life, the same threads have woven the successes in my family life, my business life, and my philanthropic service life—those common threads being the ability to assess and understand situations, and to listen and manage people to achieve acceptable and positive results.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with you as the United States Ambassador to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMITT, NOMINEE TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing today. I am deeply honored to have been nominated by President Bush and Secretary of State Rice to serve as the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs and I wish to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

THE PM MISSION

At this particular time in our Nation's history, I am honored to have been offered the opportunity to lead an organization that plays a critical role in our foreign policy and national security. With the mission of integrating diplomacy and military power to foster a stable and secure international environment, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs serves not only as the primary bridge between the Departments of State and Defense on operational military matters, but also as an interface between two of our most important instruments of national power. As a career Army officer with service in peace and war, I fully appreciate the paramount importance of skillfully coordinating the use of these two instruments to meet the challenges facing American interests around the world.

In the few minutes that I have, I would like comment on some of the ways in which the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is helping to meet the challenges we face. In broad terms, the Political-Military Affairs Bureau provides policy direction in the areas of international and regional security, security assistance, military operations and exercises, defense strategy and policy, and defense trade—all of which involve the integration of diplomacy and military power. These can be further categorized into three major areas of responsibility: counterterrorism, regional stability, and humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict.

COUNTERTERRORISM

In meeting its counterterrorism responsibilities, the PM Bureau is playing a key role in the war on terror in several ways. First, the Bureau provides diplomatic support and foreign policy guidance to U.S. military forces for military and humanitarian operations and maritime threat response. PM also negotiates base access agreements and provides legal protections to our soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen through the negotiation of Status of Forces and Article 98 agreements. To expedite this diplomatic support, the Bureau maintains a 24/7 operations center designed to facilitate communications between commanders in the field and the State Department and other agencies here in Washington. PM also enhances coordination and communication between State and military commanders through its Foreign Policy Advisors (POLAD) program which currently has 21 senior State Department officers assigned to the four Service Chiefs, the Combatant Commanders, and other senior commanders in the field. Efforts are underway to expand this program in the next several years.

PM also plays a key role in coordinating the participation of other countries in coalitions such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. After initially working to enlist the participation of other countries, the PM Bureau now maintains regular contact with troop contributing governments to ensure that they are kept abreast of operational matters and that their needs for logistical support are met.

In the policy realm, PM is working closely with the Department of Defense to better coordinate our national military strategy through its work in the Quadrennial Defense Review process and similar high-level defense planning efforts. One particularly noteworthy development in this regard is PM's Counterinsurgency or COIN Initiative which seeks to do for the civilian side of the Federal Government what General Petraeus has done for the military—to craft counterinsurgency working documents for use by State, USAID, Agriculture, and other nonmilitary agencies.

A final aspect of PM's counterterrorism efforts that I will discuss is the Bureau's program to keep excess small arms and light weapons, to include man-portable air defense systems or MANPADS, out of the hands of terrorists and insurgents who would threaten U.S. interests and destabilize other parts of the world. Since its inception in 2002, PM's Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program has destroyed over 1 million weapons, 90 million rounds of ammunition, and over 21,000 MANPADS in over 25 countries. The Bureau, working with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has also assisted countries in properly securing their stocks of weapons and ammunition to keep them from inadvertently falling into the wrong hands. If confirmed, I will seek to further expand this very important program.

REGIONAL STABILITY

The Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program also contributes directly to PM's second major area of responsibility, regional stability. In addition to eliminating weapons that could be used to create unrest, the PM Bureau promotes stability around the world by fostering effective defense relationships.

Each year PM conducts high-level regional security discussions with friends and allies that address a variety of security-related issues of mutual interest including military assistance, combined training, and, when appropriate, the basing of U.S. military forces. In the past year, these discussions have enhanced important relationships in South America, Europe, and Asia.

Another key component of PM's regional security role is the Gulf Security Dialog (GSD), a regional security coordination mechanism with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. This dialog, co-lead by the PM Bureau and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is a reflection of our broader commitment to Gulf security and is part of our larger strategy to deal with the interconnected conflicts in the Middle East. The GSD addresses conventional as well as nonconventional, asymmetrical, and terrorist threats to Gulf security. To counter these threats, the GSD is focused on six distinct, yet interconnected pillars: regional security, enhanced defense capabilities and cooperation, critical energy infrastructure protection, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and developing a shared assessment on Iraq. If confirmed, I will continue this fruitful dialog and other efforts with our Gulf partners to improve Gulf security under each of the six pillars.

Related PM efforts to promote regional stability through security dialogs with friends and allies include its management of nearly \$5 billion in security assistance. This funding, which includes the Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the International Military Education and Training (IMET), and the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) programs, provides resources necessary to ensure that our partners are equipped and trained to work toward common security goals. They also deepen our military-to-military relationships as well as increasing understanding and cooperation.

One program that is funded under the PKO program that I would like to highlight is the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which seeks to increase the number of properly trained and equipped peacekeepers available for peace support operations around the world. GPOI's goals include training 75,000 additional peacekeepers, providing transportation and logistics support for peace operations, and, in partnership with the Government of Italy, establishing an international training center for gendarmes to help fill the security gap between military forces and civilian police. This program is an important means of offsetting the need for U.S. military support for peace operations and if confirmed, I will make it one of my priorities.

Finally, PM promotes regional stability and builds the partnership capacity of our allies through its regulation of U.S. defense trade. Through its export licensing, end-use monitoring, and compliance programs, the Bureau plays a key role providing the military hardware necessary for our allies to fight the war on terror, while ensuring that U.S. defense equipment and technologies do not fall into the wrong hands. This is no small task as the volume of license applications submitted for adjudication is growing 8 percent annually and is expected to reach 80,000 at the end of fiscal year 2007. Although processing the growing number of applications is of great importance, equally so are the PM Bureau's efforts to monitor the end use of exported military equipment. Through its "Blue Lantern" program, PM checks the bona fides of potential recipients and makes sure that defense equipment that is exported is used only for approved purposes. PM also supports the efforts of Federal law enforcement agencies in criminal actions initiated pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to meet these responsibilities fully.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS OF CONFLICT

PM's third major area of responsibility is the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict. Since 1993, PM has been responsible for the management of U.S. humanitarian mine action programs around the world and since that time has committed over \$1 billion to assist in the removal of landmines in over 40 countries. In addition to removing landmines that threaten the well-being and livelihood of millions, these funds have been used to educate children as to the dangers of landmines and to assist landmine victims.

I am pleased to say that this is an area in which we are truly making a difference. Landmine casualties are decreasing and several countries have been declared landmine "impact free"—a designation that means they are no longer suffering social

and economic dislocation due to landmines. This is a program we can all be proud of and one that if confirmed, I will be most happy to provide leadership to.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, while I have only touched of a portion of PM's many responsibilities, I think they attest to the important contributions that the Bureau is making to our national security and to the furthering American foreign policy objectives.

Given the magnitude of these responsibilities, I am truly honored to have been nominated by the President and Secretary Rice to lead the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

If confirmed, I will do my utmost to demonstrate to the President and the Secretary—and to the more than 300 men and women who serve in the PM Bureau—that their trust in me was fully justified.

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HARRY K. THOMAS, JR., NOMINEE TO BE
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.

I would like to introduce my wife, Ericka Smith-Thomas, a musician, and my mother, Mrs. Hildonia Thomas, a retired social worker and teacher. Our daughter, Casey, is away at Guilford College.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to President Bush for nominating me as Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources at the Department of State. I am grateful for the confidence that the President and Secretary Rice have shown in selecting me for this position. I must also thank Father Brooks, his fellow Jesuits, and my College of the Holy Cross professors who first opened my eyes to the importance of global issues.

I have traveled a long way from the Harlem of my birth to this day, as has our great country, which has given me the opportunity to appear before you today seeking, if confirmed, the opportunity to take charge of human resources for the world's finest diplomatic service. The State Department's primary mission is to take care of American citizens and American interests abroad, and I welcome the opportunity to help prepare our employees to do so.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will continue Secretary Rice's and former Director General Staples' work to implement transformational diplomacy. We are transforming our overseas presence to meet 21st century demands. We are stressing the efficient management of our team of employees. We are sending officers beyond foreign capitals to run one person American presence posts and opening American corner libraries in rural villages and urban areas alike to give people a chance to learn about America and become more educated. We are taking advantage of new technologies with virtual presence posts, training and development opportunities for our worldwide workforce via digital video conference, and "Diplopedia," our version of wikipedia.

We have introduced an improved Foreign Service selection process, including a shorter, computer-based exam that will be offered several times a year. The new process will allow us to consider applicants' leadership and foreign language skills, as well as global work and study experience, and should reduce the time it takes to bring on new hires. We expect to have nearly 20,000 registrants for this examination annually and are very proud that we are the number one choice in the public sector for college students seeking to serve our country.

Today's State Department employees are eager to serve our country. Many work in hazardous and challenging environments. Over 25 percent of the Foreign Service has served in Iraq or Afghanistan. A number of civil service employees have also stepped forward. More than 750 of our overseas jobs are at unaccompanied posts. And some of our colleagues have made the ultimate sacrifice in service of our Nation. We are offering and expanding the counseling available to employees before and after they serve in dangerous environments. We must ensure that spouses and children receive full support. We must have safe and secure facilities for our employees.

We recognize the importance of a modernized performance-based pay system that compensates fairly our men and women working abroad and will ask your help, Mr. Chairman, in authorizing this system.

Mr. Chairman, I share the Secretary's commitment to a diverse and merit-based State Department. The Department has made tremendous strides during my 23

years of service, but we can and must continue with aggressive recruitment, development, and retention strategies. If confirmed, I will work toward that goal.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I am humbled and honored to have the opportunity to appear before you and the members of the committee. I ask for your assistance and support in ensuring that we are able to safeguard American citizens, defend our ideals and values, and manage the Department's greatest resource: our civil service, Foreign Service national, and Foreign Service specialist and generalist corps.

And, if confirmed, I look forward to helping the Secretary make certain that we are prepared for future opportunities and trials.

Thank you.

RESPONSES OF HARRY K. THOMAS, JR., TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. What are your top three priorities for this position? By the end of the Bush administration, what do you hope to be able to report that you have accomplished?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to continue the efforts of the Secretary, other senior Department of State officials, and my predecessors to ensure that the Department is prepared to take on the challenges of our critical foreign policy mission in the 21st century. Ongoing issues, such as addressing the Department's personnel shortages, ensuring adequate training and development for all State employees, and securing critical legislative changes, including Foreign Service pay modernization, are critical to maintaining the Department's operational readiness.

In addition to pursuing these ongoing challenges, one of my top priorities as the Director General will be to continue the Secretary's commitment to a diverse and merit-based State Department. The Department has made tremendous strides during my 23 years of service, but we can and must continue with aggressive recruitment, development, and retention strategies. I plan to work closely with the Office of Recruitment, Employment, and Examination, as well as the Office of Civil Rights, toward that goal.

I would also like to expand the opportunities for civil service employees at the Department of State. I hope to do more to support, develop, and take full advantage of the skills and capabilities of the 8,500 civil service employees who form the backbone of the Department's domestic operations. I plan to meet with the Office of Personnel Management, as well as to expand existing initiatives within the Department, to see what more can be done for civil service employees during my tenure as the Director General.

My third priority would be to improve the customer service provided by the Bureau of Human Resources to all State Department personnel. I hope to take advantage of online capabilities and other technology to simplify and speed up check-in/check-out procedures for transferring employees, eliminate unnecessary paperwork, and consolidate operations, as needed, to better serve our internal customers.

If I am confirmed as the Director General, I look forward to pursuing these three priorities within the scope of my greater mission of managing the Department's greatest resource: our civil service, Foreign Service national, Foreign Service specialist and generalist corps, and eligible family members.

Question. What measures is the Department taking to address the shortfall of officers at the mid-levels? Are these measures sufficient to fill staffing gaps? If not, what measures will you consider recommending to address these gaps?

Answer. The Department will continue to deal with staffing shortfalls by eliminating or not filling some less critical positions, considering "stretch" assignments on a case-by-case basis, seeking qualified civil service volunteers and eligible family members to fill vacant Foreign Service positions, and waiving language requirements for certain assignments. In conjunction with the third phase of the global repositioning exercise in fiscal year 2007, we eliminated several domestic Foreign Service and civil service positions to provide a small number of positions for language training. This small increase notwithstanding, the Department will continue to be faced with the choice between not training sufficient numbers of Foreign Service officers in our most critical needs languages, such as Arabic, or continuing to increase our language training enrollments and leaving more vacancies at overseas and domestic locations.

Of particular concern is the potential for overseas vacancies at a time when the Department is striving to increase its overseas presence and more actively engage nongovernmental organizations, foreign media, and host country populations outside of capital cities. The Department's fiscal year 2008 budget request emphasized posi-

tions to meet increased overseas mission requirements, not in place of our global repositioning initiatives, but in addition to what has been repositioned to our most strategic locations.

The Department is also faced with the critical task of fully implementing the Secretary's vision of enhanced U.S. Government civilian capacity to act in situations of reconstruction and stabilization following natural or manmade crises. Without resources dedicated to this endeavor, the Department will be limited in its ability to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize the U.S. Government's capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and help societies in transition.

Question. Where do you believe are the most significant gaps, in terms of capabilities, in the Foreign Service? What should be done to close these gaps?

Answer. The Department faces structural personnel deficits, as well as shortages of officers with particular language capabilities. Our most significant structural deficit is at the FO-02 level in the public diplomacy and management cones. The total deficit at the FO-02 level is 210 officers. This structural deficit is largely due to underhiring at USIA in the 1990s prior to the merger with the Department of State. As the new Foreign Service personnel hired under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative in 2002-2004 work their way through the system, the gap between positions and available officers should narrow significantly. In the meantime, the Department is encouraging officers from other cones to consider public diplomacy and management positions, utilizing qualified civil service employees and eligible family members to fill vacant Foreign Service positions, eliminating some domestic Foreign Service positions so that officers can serve overseas in these positions, and leaving some less critical positions vacant.

The Department is also working to address training shortfalls, particularly of Foreign Service personnel with proficiency in particular languages. Increasing demands since 9/11, as well as the lack of an adequate training complement, have stymied the Department's ability to train personnel, particularly at the pace that additional language-designated positions have been created overseas. Since 2001, the number of language designated positions that require proficiency in critical needs languages, including Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, and Korean, which are often the hardest to teach and can require upwards of 2 years to gain working proficiency, have increased by 170 percent. There has not, however, been a concurrent increase in the Department's training complement. The Department's fiscal year 2008 budget request included 94 new Foreign Service positions specifically for training, and while many will be devoted to foreign language training we must also train to meet the other requirements of transformational diplomacy. The increasing need for training will also be taken into consideration as we develop the Department's fiscal year 2009 budget request.

Question. A recent inspection report of the Bureau of Human Resources by the State Department Inspector General concludes that the "civil service system may not be adequate to meet the needs of the Department. It fails to develop the knowledge, skills and abilities of Civil Service employees to the best advantage of the employees and the Department . . . The Department needs a domestically based service that can develop personnel who can manage global political, military, economic, and social issues and provide administrative support to the Department."

(a) Do you agree with this assessment by the Inspector General? If so, what measures would you propose in response?

(b) The report recommended a high-level external review on the future of the civil service. Do you know if that recommendation has been accepted by the Under Secretary for Management?

Answer. If confirmed as Director General, one of my priorities will be to expand the opportunities for civil service employees at the Department of State. I hope to do more to support, develop, and take full advantage of the skills and capabilities of the 8500 civil service employees who form the backbone of the Department's domestic operations. Working together with the Under Secretary for Management and within the context of other management reforms underway at the Department, I plan to meet with the Office of Personnel Management to see what more can be done to best utilize the Department's civil service corps.

The Department has a number of new and ongoing initiatives aimed at developing the knowledge, skills, and abilities of our civil service workforce. Some examples of these initiatives include:

- **Civil Service Mid-level Rotational Program.**—This program is designed to provide developmental assignments for Department of State civil service employees at the GS-12 and GS-13 grade level in order to broaden their skills, increase

their knowledge, and enhance their personal and professional growth. The program, started as a pilot in 2007, will be expanded in 2008.

- Training Continuum for Civil Service Employees.—The Department's Foreign Service Institute has recently updated and expanded training and professional development guidelines by job series. The continuum addresses required, recommended, and suggested individual development needs at the basic, intermediate, and advanced level.
- SES Development Program.—The Department is offering an SES training program to highly skilled, high performing GS-14 and GS-15 employees. Upon completion of the 1 to 2 year individually-designed training program, the graduates will be noncompetitively eligible for SES positions as they become available.
- Civil Service Mentoring Program.—Now in its fifth year, the civil service mentoring program includes formal mentoring partnerships and situational mentoring on an as needed basis. To date, 1,681 employees have participated.
- Career Entry Program (CEP).—The Department's version of the Federal Intern Program actively addresses hiring and employee development specific to mission-critical occupations as determined by the Domestic Staffing Model (DSM). The 2-year structured career ladder program is designed to fast-track high potential employees to address future staffing needs.
- Upward Mobility Program (UPMO).—This program has just undergone a major policy and guideline review to address employee develop needs at the GS 7-9 levels. A shorter version of the CEP program, UPMO also represents a career-ladder program with specific training and experiential requirements to qualify and advance employees specific to a job series.
- Career Development Resource Center (CDRC).—The CDRC provides comprehensive career development services to help individuals make effective career decisions and improve on-the-job performance. The services offered by the CDRC include confidential career counseling, assistance with planning and implementing Individual Development Plans (IDP), assessment and interpretation of interests, skills and abilities, help in negotiating change and barriers to career success, group workshops on career related topics, and customized presentations for bureaus and employee groups.
- Civil Service Excursions.—Civil service employees have the opportunity to bid on and serve in vacant Foreign Service positions overseas. These excursion assignments, often at dangerous and difficult posts including Iraq and Afghanistan, broaden the participants' view of the State Department's mission and benefit the Department by filling positions that might otherwise have been left vacant.

If confirmed as the Director General, I plan to closely monitor these initiatives and expand or revise them, as necessary, to ensure they are most effectively serving the Department and the civil service.

Question. Some 2,000 Foreign Service members have volunteered to serve in dangerous jobs in Iraq since 2003, but the size of the U.S. Mission there appears to be straining the Foreign Service personnel system. Do you expect that, in future years, the Department will run short of volunteers? If so, what measures would be taken? Do you expect that it will be necessary to use directed assignments? Are there other alternatives?

Answer. To date, the Department has relied on volunteers to staff positions in Iraq. We are grateful to the dedicated men and women who, in the finest tradition of the Foreign Service and the Department in general, are committed to serving the needs of America and have answered the call to serve in Iraq. The Department cannot, however, sustain current levels of Iraq staffing over many years within our current personnel and assignments structure without asking employees to serve multiple tours or directing assignments. The challenge of staffing more than 250 1-year Foreign Service positions in Iraq with our relatively small corps of Foreign Service generalists and specialists is further exacerbated by the Department's structural personnel shortages in the Foreign Service mid-levels and among Arabic speakers.

To meet the challenge of staffing Iraq, we will continue to review the incentives for service in Iraq, including a new initiative to link some assignments in Iraq to onward assignments elsewhere, offer opportunities to qualified civil service employees and eligible family members to fill vacant Foreign Service positions, and, depending on which positions do not attract volunteers, we may also be able to utilize shorter-term employees hired under 5 U.S.C. 3161. If and when we run out of volunteers for positions in Iraq or elsewhere, we are prepared to direct assignments.

Question. What have been the effects of the requirements to staff Iraq and Afghanistan on United States diplomatic posts elsewhere, both in terms of personnel and the resultant impacts on mission objectives?

Answer. We are doing all we can to maintain operational readiness at all of our missions around the world and effectively carry out the Department's critical foreign policy mission. We are proud of our success to date, including our ability to staff Iraq and Afghanistan, but we also acknowledge that, despite our best efforts, the Department's staffing needs exceed our current resources. The recent reports from the GAO, the Foreign Affairs Council, CSIS, and other groups have highlighted the Department's deficit of mid-level Foreign Service officers and the need for an adequate training float.

The requirement to staff missions in Iraq and Afghanistan is just one aspect of the personnel issues facing the Department. We must also balance our changing needs and requirements with the limited number of positions set aside for training and determine when it is in the Department's long-term interest to leave some positions temporarily vacant to allow for training or to fill other higher priority jobs. At the same time, we are realigning our personnel resources around the world to better reflect emerging policy priorities and reach population centers beyond foreign capitals. These challenges, as well as the increasing number of positions at unaccompanied and limited accompanied posts, have required that we adapt our assignments processes, prioritize positions, and fill some Foreign Service positions with qualified civil service employees and eligible family members. While there are some vacancies overseas and domestically, we feel that our efforts and planning to date have enabled our missions to continue to maintain operational readiness and implement the Department's critical priorities around the world.

RESPONSES OF HARRY K. THOMAS, JR. TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The Department recently introduced changes to the exam process for Foreign Service generalists. Along with the performance on the examination, an applicant's educational background and work experience, including overseas experience, will be taken into account.

What aspect of the recent McKinsey study led the Department to conclude that it needed to alter the Foreign Service exam process?

At what point in the process is a candidate's resume examined? How will you guard against politicization of the process—political jobs held, knowledge of influential people, etc.?

Answer. Although McKinsey found the Department's use of a written test and an oral assessment to be best practices for identifying candidates with the greatest potential, their study recommended that we make our Foreign Service selection process faster and more accessible. For this reason we have put the Foreign Service selection process online and will be offering the test four times a year.

More importantly, McKinsey recommended we adopt more of a "Total Candidate" approach, a best practice used by many other employers, in our Foreign Service selection process. This approach uses a structured resume to explore candidates' full range of knowledge, skills, and abilities. Our new process retains the best-practice elements of a merit-based test and an oral assessment, and introduces the application form and personal narrative, our equivalent of a structured resume, and the new qualifications review panels to review them. The result is that we now will look at many facets of candidates, not just test scores, to decide who advances to the orals.

Candidates' resumes—that is, the information conveyed in candidates' application forms and personal narratives—are examined after candidates pass the Foreign Service Officer Test (FSOT) and the essay. To assess this information, we have established the Qualifications Evaluation Panels (QEPs). There are several QEPs, each consisting of three career Foreign Service officers from the mid- and senior ranks. The QEPs will evaluate the information in the application forms (principally education and work history) and the personal narratives (principally qualifying experience and skills), along with candidates' FSOT Test scores and scores in critically needed languages. By thus evaluating much more information than test scores alone, the QEP will be better able to identify the most promising candidates to invite to the orals. As the result of four pilots monitored by an outside expert, we have a well-structured QEP system that exceeds benchmark standards for reliability.

QEP members are drawn from the same group of FSOs that conduct the oral assessment, and they will carry out their duties with the same insulation from outside influence that has always applied to the oral assessment process. As an added precaution, QEP members are expressly forbidden to communicate with persons outside

the QEP about candidates and are instructed to report any attempts to communicate about candidates to the Director of the Board of Examiners.

Question. (a) Please provide the total FTE, by grade, for each fiscal year since fiscal year 2000 for both FS and GS.

(b) Please provide for the committee a list of the total FS and GS personnel working for each fiscal year from fiscal year 2000, by grade.

(c) For each year, please provide the number, by grade, of FS and GS who departed (this can combine retirement, resignation, time in class, and termination) since fiscal year 2000.

(d) For each year, please provide the number, by grade, of FS and GS who were hired since fiscal year 2000.

Answer. Notes:

- The data in the following charts reflect totals at the end of each fiscal year, except fiscal year 2007 (which is as of 7/31/07).
- Civil service totals include General Schedule as well as other equivalent pay plans (including EX, AD, WG, etc.). Political appointees are included in the civil service personnel totals, except when on limited noncareer Foreign Service appointments.

(a) Number of Foreign Service and civil service positions:

FOREIGN SERVICE

Class	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007
FECM	37	48	46	41	42	41	42	43
FEMC	393	389	394	410	417	416	418	424
FEOC	457	462	475	487	513	518	547	553
FS01	1,114	1,142	1,177	1,209	1,249	1,286	1,347	1,359
FS02	2,048	2,099	2,196	2,283	2,401	2,448	2,521	2,518
FS03	2,262	2,219	2,305	2,388	2,442	2,545	2,669	2,682
FS04	1,679	1,781	2,222	2,446	2,657	2,756	2,775	2,823
FS05	792	817	836	841	859	862	801	797
FS06	418	397	397	407	418	418	407	412
FS07	96	90	80	78	75	87	88	79
FS08	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
FS09	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
F* 00	27	11	8	6	12	8	6	6
Total	9,323	9,456	10,136	10,596	11,085	11,385	11,623	11,696

The F* 00 grade level includes positions that are at various grades for training and overcomplement.

CIVIL SERVICE

Class	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007
SES	252	235	241	247	242	253	258	248
GS 15	712	706	734	769	785	838	893	900
GS 14	904	976	1,032	1,121	1,169	1,284	1,375	1,422
GS 13	1,544	1,657	768	1,889	968	2,077	2,168	2,155
GS 12	1,145	1,176	1,258	1,345	1,436	1,493	1,511	1,541
GS 11	1,052	1,082	1,183	1,235	1,301	1,258	1,351	1,258
GS 10	64	64	56	50	44	46	48	41
GS 09	859	896	928	847	805	846	868	911
GS 08	424	397	366	382	357	342	352	327
GS 07	792	735	722	729	733	694	788	835
GS 06	311	269	260	231	219	171	151	138
GS 05	242	202	207	165	130	114	123	181
GS 04	61	51	51	41	27	20	26	19
GS 03	49	45	20	15	15	12	16	12
GS 02	34	43	5	6	3	1	4	2
GS 01	28	3	1	2	1	—	6	2
AD05*	—	—	—	—	257	308	359	475
Total	8,473	8,537	8,832	9,074	9,493	9,757	10,297	10,467

*AD05 includes positions in the Iraq Transition and Assistance Office (ITAO).

(b) Number of Foreign Service and civil service employees:

FOREIGN SERVICE

Class	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007
FECM	92	55	83	33	29	28	27	28
FEMC	329	361	358	424	438	425	439	438
FEOC	459	463	470	463	468	480	477	504
FS01	1,147	1,123	1,142	1,154	1,173	1,209	1,245	1,297
FS02	1,853	1,930	1,960	2,005	2,040	2,069	2,054	2,122
FS03	1,882	1,788	1,876	1,888	1,929	1,983	2,193	2,476
FS04	1,563	1,912	2,256	2,501	2,883	3,268	3,239	3,134
FS05	1,250	1,028	1,322	1,276	1,077	1,020	921	
FS06	484	563	871	661	612	569	576	531
FS07	197	102	102	127	139	130	126	89
FS08	27	1	1	1	—	1	2	
Total	9,283	9,326	10,089	10,579	10,988	11,238	11,397	11,542

CIVIL SERVICE

Class	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007
SES	212	167	198	201	212	208	214	205
GS 15	617	595	650	679	680	715	736	788
GS 14	757	808	884	967	1,015	1,078	1,151	1,220
GS 13	1,264	1,340	1,491	1,621	1,700	1,771	1,849	1,806
GS 12	931	961	1,043	1,114	1,169	1,250	1,234	1,273
GS 11	892	906	1,034	1,090	1,125	1,069	1,092	1,090
GS 10	52	52	49	45	36	41	39	37
GS 09	712	745	734	700	665	698	660	767
GS 08	375	343	317	335	317	299	292	267
GS 07	620	588	559	599	594	574	642	680
GS 06	243	204	185	185	162	139	113	100
GS 05	188	149	159	130	102	98	100	153
GS 04	43	43	41	43	37	24	28	33
GS 03	35	26	19	18	16	10	11	11
GS 02	14	14	4	3	1	1	1	1
GS 01	3	2	1	1	—	—	—	—
AD05*	—	—	—	—	—	117	108	139
Total	6,958	6,943	7,368	7,731	7,831	8,092	8,270	8,570

*AD05 includes positions in the Iraq Transition and Assistance Office (ITAO).

(c) Number of Foreign Service and civil service employees who departed:
 [NOTE. Includes employees who departed due to resignation, retirement, removal,
 death, and termination.]

FOREIGN SERVICE

Class	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007
FECM	6	63	6	10	6	7	5	2
FEMC	31	35	43	29	49	68	61	35
FEOC	22	29	31	31	37	46	46	18
FS01	76	72	63	82	90	110	93	44
FS02	67	81	93	70	85	96	103	56
FS03	88	101	71	87	79	101	78	45
FS04	88	118	113	128	149	155	213	104
FS05	40	42	35	33	56	67	56	17
FS06	21	22	18	21	24	21	25	20
FS07	8	6	0	5	5	2	1	1
FS08	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	448	570	473	496	580	673	681	342

CIVIL SERVICE

Class	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007
SES	16	84	14	29	17	43	30	19

CIVIL SERVICE—Continued

Class	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007
GS15	23	76	40	57	71	77	78	41
GS14	37	58	43	55	64	89	82	69
GS13	44	90	63	95	114	161	121	108
GS12	27	48	55	56	98	105	101	61
GS11	34	52	33	48	64	71	86	34
GS10	2	4	4	2	5	5	4	2
GS09	31	48	38	38	52	47	61	28
GS08	17	12	16	13	23	14	18	18
GS07	21	38	31	29	48	42	42	27
GS06	11	13	16	12	14	20	14	7
GS05	18	14	6	15	9	11	7	10
GS04	7	2	2	6	3	3	1	1
GS03	5	1	3	1	2	1	1	0
GS02	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	0
GS01	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
AD05*	0	0	0	0	0	0	76	35
Total	293	541	367	456	586	689	722	460

*AD05 includes positions in the Iraq Transition and Assistance Office (ITAO).

(d) Number of Foreign Service and civil service employees hired:

FOREIGN SERVICE

Class	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007
FECM	14	—	25	—	1	—	1	—
FEMC	32	17	3	4	21	16	24	9
FEOC	89	1	2	1	2	1	2	—
FS01	201	11	14	4	22	11	11	13
FS02	224	16	13	13	13	7	6	3
FS03	176	38	70	62	51	26	32	23
FS04	128	448	217	296	322	261	224	159
FS05	289	14	377	343	282	259	255	95
FS06	145	36	437	221	255	171	202	103
FS07	38	6	45	64	73	71	51	19
FS08	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	1,344	587	1,203	1,008	1,042	823	424	—

Categories above include personnel on limited noncareer appointments (LNAs).

CIVIL SERVICE

Class	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007
SES	24	31	27	13	16	26	22	8
GS15	98	26	55	45	51	41	46	39
GS14	147	56	44	55	49	66	78	47
GS13	348	130	143	119	107	141	128	76
GS12	191	75	133	126	121	126	102	66
GS11	109	57	76	55	59	60	59	54
GS10	7	—	4	1	—	3	2	—
GS09	177	33	100	102	76	104	87	58
GS08	73	11	14	20	4	9	14	8
GS07	126	38	91	126	120	126	211	169
GS06	60	5	32	22	16	21	6	10
GS05	55	8	27	28	12	13	33	49
GS04	5	1	2	6	14	2	7	8
GS03	1	1	1	1	1	—	2	—
GS02	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
GS01	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
AD05*	—	—	—	—	—	99	58	73
Total	1,425	472	749	719	646	837	855	666

*AD05 includes positions in the Iraq Transition and Assistance Office (ITAO).

Question. What is the current representation of minorities in the Foreign Service? What initiatives is the Department undertaking to address this issue?

Answer. The breakdown of Foreign Service generalists and specialists, as of May 31, 2007, is as follows:

	Foreign Service Employees	
	Number	Percentage
White	9,457	82.2
African American	764	6.6
Hispanic	611	5.3
American Indian	38	0.3
Asian	633	5.5
Total	11,503	100

NOTE. Employees who did not identify a racial category (less than 50 employees) were not included in any category.

If confirmed, I will continue the Department's efforts to attract the most talented, diverse applicants to our exciting foreign affairs career opportunities. The Department's Strategic Recruitment Plan is modeled on successful recruitment efforts of private industry and the public sector. It seeks to achieve the long-term objectives of a workforce that meets the Department's skill needs and that represents America's rich diversity. One important focus of the plan is aggressive minority recruitment and outreach.

Key elements of our minority outreach strategy are the 17 diplomats in residence (DIRs), senior Foreign Service officers assigned to university and college campuses throughout the United States. We also have 10 full-time DC-based recruiters who cover every region of the country. The mandate of DIRs and recruiters includes recruiting, informing, and mentoring potential applicants for Foreign Service and civil service employment at the Department of State. Of the 10 recruiters, one is a full-time Hispanic Recruitment Coordinator and another is a full-time African American Recruitment Coordinator.

At the core of our minority recruitment and outreach are 59 targeted schools, 10 targeted professional organizations, and 41 targeted constituency organizations with which the DIRs and recruiters work on a regular basis to find minority candidates with the knowledge, skills, and abilities that the Department is seeking. DIRs and recruiters conduct active programs to develop and present workshops regarding employment, internship, and fellowship opportunities to minority students and professionals throughout the United States. DIRs and recruiters attend approximately 800 recruiting events every year, in addition to hundreds of one-on-one personal contacts via e-mail, telephone, and office meetings.

Working with the Minority Professional Network (MPN), the Department of State conducted special State Department networking nights in major metropolitan areas including Los Angeles, Anaheim, Atlanta, Chicago, Raleigh, San Diego, San Antonio, and Miami. The networking nights are often on the margins of conferences such as the National Society of Hispanic MBAs and the National Black MBA conferences. Through leveraging MPN and U.S. Department of State relationships with local partner organizations, these cost-effective turnkey events resulted in media recognition and interviews.

The State Department works with the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU), the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (NAFEO) and the American Indian Science and Engineering Society (AISES), to provide opportunities for summer interns in Washington or in one of the embassies and consulates overseas. This is a unique opportunity for students interested in international careers to obtain hands-on experience. Two needs-based student fellowship programs, the Pickering and Rangel programs, have also been important sources of minority recruitment for the Foreign Service.

Question. What specific changes have been made at FSI to address the new skills highlighted in the Secretary's Transformational Diplomacy proposals?

Answer. Training is key to the success of the Secretary's Transformational Diplomacy (TD) framework. The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) has developed a variety of stand-alone courses and seminars to support that framework and has incorporated TD themes throughout its curriculum. Examples include:

TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY COURSES

- FSI developed a new online course, “Transformational Diplomacy Overview,” to help employees at every level understand what TD means and how they can practice it. To date, 345 employees have completed the course.
- All Orientation Division courses (generalist, specialist, and civil service orientation courses and Washington Tradecraft) include specific sessions on transformational diplomacy. Senior level speakers (including the Deputy Secretary and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs) and subject matter experts are urged to include practical references to and examples of transformational diplomacy in their presentations. Secretary Rice explained her vision of transformational diplomacy in February 2007 to all three orientation classes (generalists, specialists, and civil service). The text and/or video recording of that speech have been presented to each subsequent orientation class.
- The Political/Economic Tradecraft course is a 3-week course that trains about 275 new Foreign Service officers per year. In line with transformational diplomacy themes, the course includes skill-building sessions on public speaking, public diplomacy, trafficking in persons, human rights, commercial advocacy, environmental issues, working with the military, and working with nongovernmental organizations. A full-day exercise featuring transformational diplomacy best practices has been added to each of the 10–12 annual offerings of this course. The exercise provides many specific ideas for ways officers can implement TD initiatives related to democracy promotion, political-military roles, counterterrorism, economic development, foreign assistance, conflict analysis, and stabilization and reconstruction work.

LEADERSHIP TRAINING

- All levels of FSI’s mandatory leadership training courses—from mid-grades through senior levels, including new ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of Mission—now incorporate discussions of transformational diplomacy. These discussions are built around the skills that leaders use to build teams and produce results and about how the leadership challenges we face today differ from those of the past.

AMERICAN PRESENCE POSTS

- FSI has developed a 3-week training program for American Presence Post (APP) officers. Expanding the number of APP posts is a core TD priority of the Secretary and this course focuses on the responsibilities and skills needed to set up and effectively function in an APP.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING

- Language proficiency is critical to successful transformational diplomacy. Language enrollments at FSI continue to increase, including a record-breaking 565 in the September 2007 intake.
- FSI has undertaken a broad range of initiatives to enhance Arabic and other language training in support of transformational diplomacy. These include: A pilot program of internships with Arabic satellite media (our first student interned with a pan-Arab television station in Dubai in June 2005); Arabic media workshops have been held in Tunis for advanced Arabic students as part of their training program and special training workshops held for officers from Arabic-speaking posts throughout the region. Both target on-camera and “ambush” interview skills; Spanish-language media workshop provided to five outgoing DCMs at the conclusion of the July 2007 DCM course; A Spanish-language media training workshop is scheduled to be held in Mexico City from Sept. 18–20, 2007 for all principal officers currently serving in Mexico, and another workshop for several WHA region Public Affairs Officers is planned for January 2008. We are exploring expanding this model to other languages such as French, Russian, and Chinese; FSI has added 14 additional distance learning language courses in seven languages since 2004. A total of 27 courses in 13 languages are currently available online. FSI has increased opportunities for advanced language training, including “Beyond-3” training in Chinese, Arabic, Japanese, and Korean.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

- Public Diplomacy training courses are constantly updated to keep pace with transformational diplomacy and to reflect the Department’s current priorities and initiatives. FSI has added new courses on “Advocacy through the Media”

and “Engaging Foreign Audiences,” and included PD modules in the new-hire Foreign Service officer orientation, the ambassadorial and DCM/principal officers seminars, plus seven other tradecraft courses (political, economic, consular, administrative management, information management, APP and PRT).

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

- FSI’s new National Security Executive Leadership Seminar, which includes participants from the State Department and other foreign affairs agencies, builds the kind of networking skills that are a central aspect of transformational diplomacy.
- Transformational diplomacy seminars also bring together leaders from across the interagency community to apply transformational leadership skills to specific policy challenges that affect fundamental American interests. Policy topics have included democracy building, fighting corruption, and countering pandemic disease. Nine such seminars have been held thus far, with over 180 State and other agency participants. Five seminars are planned for the next fiscal year.

RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

- FSI also has developed a slate of nine reconstruction and stabilization courses, intended for interagency audiences, focusing on how the U.S. Government can better respond to global situations of instability and conflict.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

- As a key element in reaching our transformational diplomacy goals, more State officers and employees overseas are being required to assume responsibility for designing, implementing, and managing a wide range of foreign assistance awards at their embassies. A new FSI course on Managing Foreign Assistance Awards Overseas directly supports transformational diplomacy in its effort to give officers the skills they need to better align our assistance awards with our foreign policy priorities.

RESPONSE OF HARRY THOMAS TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Question. How can the Department of State work to access military facilities, the ones for veterans, to get treatment and information on PTSD?

Answer. The Department of State’s Office of Medical Services (MED) has had excellent experiences working with the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences on PTSD and other issues. MED is currently in discussions with them about further assistance in the form of educational materials and training. The Department will continue to explore other options for cooperation and collaboration with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to better support State Department employees who may be experiencing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or Traumatic Brain Injuries. Legislative changes would be required to allow nonveteran State Department employees to access DOD or VA medical facilities.

**NOMINATION OF CHRISTOPHER F. EGAN TO
BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA TO THE ORGANIZA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, WITH THE RANK OF AM-
BASSADOR**

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Egan, Christopher F., to be Representative of the United States to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
with the rank of Ambassador

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:43 p.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez
presiding.

Present: Senators Menendez, Kerry, and Sununu.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

Senator MENENDEZ. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will now come to order.

Today, the committee meets to consider the nomination of Mr.
Christopher Egan. The President has nominated Mr. Egan to be
the United States Representative to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, with the rank of Ambassador.

Mr. Egan, I want to congratulate you on your nomination, and
welcome your family and friends who may be with you today.

I also want to welcome our colleague Senator Sununu, who will
be introducing Mr. Egan shortly. And I believe there are others, as
well, who would like to join in the voices of support for the nomi-
nee.

Let me start off, before I recognize myself for an opening state-
ment, Senator Kennedy asked me, on the floor while we were vot-
ing, to ask unanimous consent to enter his statement in support of
Mr. Egan into the record. Without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy appears at the end
of this hearing in the "Additional Material Submitted for the
Record" section.]

Senator MENENDEZ. Certainly, it is a glowing statement. And, while I won't read it all, it certainly says, among other things, that he is impressed with your ability, your commitment to service, and you—he believes you have the personal and collaborative skills necessary for this position, and cites your great work in the private sector and your career and relationships in the great State of Massachusetts, and is strongly supportive of the nominee.

With that, let me recognize myself for an opening statement, and then we'll turn to the introduction of the nominee. And if there are any members who come in, in between, we'll try to recognize them, as well.

Mr. Egan, you have been nominated to serve as the U.S. Representative to the OECD. If confirmed, you'll have the challenge of working with 30 market-oriented democracies from North America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim. The democracies of the OECD amounts—account, I should say—for approximately 59 percent of the world's GDP, 76 percent of world trade, and 54 percent of the world's energy consumption. And, though it is less visible than some of its global counterparts, the OECD plays a very important role in an increasingly globalized world. Clearly, this position is much more than a nice apartment in Paris, it represents the best of United States-European cooperation and partnership, with its origin as that of an organization that carried out the Marshall Plan after World War II. That plan showed the best of the American spirit, our willingness to help our allies devastated by war, and our commitment to build new democracies and economies in our vanquished enemies. As it evolved the organization took on new challenges, expanding from working in Europe to working around the globe.

I believe it's imperative that the OECD continue this expansion, opening its door to the developing world and other countries. For example, right now Mexico is the only Latin American country in the OECD, but Chile has just been invited to join, and Brazil was invited to enhance its engagement with the OECD, with hopes of membership in the future. I certainly hope we see more Latin American countries joining in the OECD. It is in the national interests of the United States to see Latin America continue on a democratic path, with strong market economies and economic growth.

The United States has always been a leader at the OECD, from the days of the Marshall Plan to today. We are the largest contributor to the organization and a key voice on issues from trade to economic policies. So, if you are confirmed, you will become the leading U.S. voice on a wide range of issues, including the promotion of trade and investment, the efficient use of resources, and the higher sustainable economic growth we seek.

We look forward to hearing your plan for how the United States should use its influence with the OECD to improve the work of the organization and advance our own national interests. The issues that my subcommittee handles overlap with the work of the OECD. If you are confirmed, I hope that we will have a positive working relationship so we can address some of the issues I've just raised.

I know you've had a successful career in the private sector, and this would be your first experience in the public sector. This hearing will provide an opportunity to not only examine your past expe-

rience, but to learn more about your goals and vision for the OECD.

You have been nominated for a crucial position, a position that demands multilateral solutions to crucial international problems, a position that requires an articulate U.S. voice on complex issues, a position which represents the best of United States-European cooperation, and which could, once again, represent the best of the American spirit.

With that, and seeing no other members before the committee now, let me recognize Senator Sununu to introduce Mr. Egan.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE**

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is a great pleasure to be here to introduce Christopher Egan at his nomination to be Representative of the United States to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. As you noted in your opening statement, the OECD is a unique forum, including—or comprised of 30 market democracies working together to address economic, social, and governance challenges of globalization, as well as to help chart the groundwork for increasing prosperity, not just in those countries, but around the world. And I'd like to join with you, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, in emphasizing the value and the importance and opportunity of expanding that membership to include additional countries from Latin America.

I've known Chris very well for 7 years, and I strongly believe that his educational background and the breadth of his experience will serve him extremely well in this important role. He's one of the founders of Carruth Capital, one of New England's top 10 commercial real estate investment and development firms. As you mentioned, he has great private-sector experience, but he also has been very active in the community in a number of roles that probably are best described as public service. Notably, he's currently a member of the board of directors of the Fallon Community Health Plan, a not-for-profit organization that provides health insurance for over 170,000 Massachusetts residents. He chairs the board's finance committee, which oversees investment strategy for the \$230 million operating fund account. He's also served as a board member of MassDevelopment, the State of Massachusetts Finance and Economic Development Authority, and has been a trustee of UMASS Memorial Healthcare, the largest healthcare provider in central Massachusetts.

Finally, Chris and his wife, Jean, have also founded and direct Break the Cycle of Poverty, a nonprofit foundation dedicated to lifting families out of poverty by focusing on education.

Finally, I'd like to mention—and there's a little bit of bias here—personal bias, as I am the only engineer in the United States Senate—Chris holds a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering from the University of Massachusetts, and I continue in my—

Senator MENENDEZ. That explains it all to me now. [Laughter.]

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. I continue—

Senator MENENDEZ. I didn't know that, but it—

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. At my lonely, but very important, effort to expand the power of engineers around the world.

Chris understands organizational management. He understands economic development. He understands the importance of strong diplomatic and economic ties with our key trading partners. He'll bring energy, focus, and a little bit of youth to this very important role. And I'm confident that, if he's confirmed, Chris will make an outstanding Ambassador of the United States to the OECD.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this time, for this hearing, and I hope my Senate colleagues—and not just those from Massachusetts, Senators Kennedy and Senators Kerry, who have been terrific friends of the Egan family—I hope all of our Senate colleagues can support this nomination.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Sununu.

And I know Senator Kerry has told me he wants to be here, as well, and will be making a statement when he comes.

But, to move things along, in view of—in view of that there's no other members here, Mr. Egan, I invite you to give your opening statement to the committee. I'm pleased to have you recognize any of your family members who may be here with you today. We ask that you keep your statement to about 7 minutes, and we will include your entire statement for the record, without objection.

Mr. Egan.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER F. EGAN, NOMINEE TO BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I'm honored to be here before this distinguished committee today to be President Bush's nominee to represent the OECD.

I'd like to pause here, introduce my friends and family. With me is my beautiful wife, Jean, my—two of my three children, Mary Catherine, who's 5, and Christopher, who's 3. Mr. Chairman, forgive me, our third child, little Michael, who is 18 months old, couldn't make the hearing. He had a very important nap to attend to, sir, and it's best if he has that nap, sir. Also is my mother and father, Ambassador Richard and Maureen Egan, are nice enough to be here today. And my lovely sister and my brother-in-law, Catherine and Rod Walkey, with their beautiful daughter, Isabel.

I also want to thank a lot of my friends from Boston who came down here, plus a lot of my colleagues from the Kennedy School of Government that decided to join me today. I really feel surrounded and welcome by Red Sox nation here this afternoon.

Senator MENENDEZ. As a Yankees fan, the Chair won't hold that against you. [Laughter.]

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a son who helped his family build the largest company in Massachusetts, and as an entrepreneur who built a successful company of my own, I feel I have the leadership and negotiating skills, if confirmed, to represent and advance the United States interests at the OECD. I believe my service as a board member at MassDevelopment, my home State's Finance and Economic Devel-

opment Authority, and as a founder and board member of the I-495/Arc of Innovation, a public-private partnership to foster environmentally smart economic development in central Massachusetts, has prepared me in a significant measure for the duties I hope to undertake.

The work my wife and I do with Break the Cycle of Poverty, the foundation we started and direct, has done much to educate economically challenged individuals and families so that they can elevate themselves from poverty.

The OECD is particularly valuable to the United States as a forum for working with our major partners to promote effective policies across a range of economic and social issues that confront us all. Through the OECD and its affiliates, like the International Energy Agency, the IEA, the United States and other members strengthen corporate governance principles, environmental standards, development of energy efficient technologies and guidelines to safeguard the public in the development of cutting-edge science and technology. The OECD is of particular value, as well, in areas that require multilateral cooperation to solve transnational problems, like antibribery convention, the model tax convention, and agreements on export credits and capital markets.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I share the President's commitment to the great work of the OECD, and understand its role in promoting economic growth and better governance. America's prosperity and national security are enhanced by the efforts of the OECD to advance these goals and to integrate emerging market economies into a strong and healthy global economy.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has turned to the OECD repeatedly for accurate and reliable data on numerous topics for best practices in combating, say, counterfeit goods, and as locus for dialog with countries from the Middle East on reforming public governance.

Mr. Chairman, in my discussion to date with officials throughout the administration, I have gained a sense of United States priorities for the OECD, and I am committed to support, if confirmed, the critical work ahead, which includes bringing more countries into compliance with the OECD antibribery convention, which has been so important in leveling the playing field of our U.S. companies abroad. We also seek to strengthen economic growth through the OECD's expert economic research and analysis. Other priority work includes promoting electronic commerce, fostering good governance, and working on sensible trade policy.

Let me also cite three key objectives I will focus on, if confirmed by the Senate.

First, an outreach to other major economies. The United States and a number of fellow OECD members believe the future and long-term relevance of the organization depends on reaching out beyond the OECD's current membership of advanced industrialized countries. To that effect, the members authorized a program of enhanced engagement with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa to steer them toward better policies and practices and invite them to undertake the disciplines that underpin our shared prosperity. If confirmed, I will work to move that engagement forward with those vital and emerging economies.

Second, the enlargement of the organization. Mr. Chairman, the OECD Ministerial Council decided, in May, to invite Russia, Israel, Slovenia, Estonia, and, as you mentioned, sir, Chile, to the—to begin discussions leading to membership. Our representatives at the OECD made clear that the United States is concerned about Russia's readiness to join the organization, in terms of its government's commitment to democracy and to maintaining an open-market economy. However, the United States and other member countries were willing to begin the process that would advance Russian reforms. And, if confirmed, sir, I will work, together with other OECD members who share our concerns, to maintain the OECD's high standards of like-mindedness and help set clear benchmarks for all five candidate countries, including Russia, on their paths toward membership.

And, third, reform the organization's financial structure. The United States is the largest computer—contributor to the OECD, as you mentioned, sir, covering almost 25 percent of its costs. The financial structure has its roots in a period when Europe was recovering from war, but today's—all members are well off. So, in a sense, a few large companies—countries, like the United States, are effectively subsidizing the few—the many European countries and other countries.

The United States is working to negotiate a fair scale of contributions in which all members will cover the costs of their own participation. And, in May, the members agreed, in principle, that each member should cover most, if not all, their costs. And, sir, if confirmed, I will work to see that agreement implemented.

Mr. Chairman, these are some of the important challenges facing the OECD. But, coming from a background in business, I am interested in the management aspects of the organization. The United States has worked hard in recent years to push through reforms in the way that the OECD makes decisions, sets priorities, allocates its budgets, and audits its own performance. With my real estate development experience, I can appreciate, for example, that the project to renovate its existing facility and build a new OECD conference center in Paris is on schedule, within budget, and due for completion in 2009. As these reforms are being successfully implemented, the OECD is becoming a model among international organizations. But, of course, there's a lot more that needs to be done. And, if confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that our work on strengthening good management of the OECD stays on track.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward, if confirmed, to representing the United States in this key industrial—international organization. It helps ensure our economic well-being and security. I am humbled to be before you today, and I am grateful for the confidence President Bush has placed in me. I look forward to continued consultations with, and advice from, this committee and its staff, both here in Washington and from congressional delegations we will certainly welcome to—in Paris.

I am pleased to answer any questions that you and the members of the committee have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Egan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER F. EGAN, NOMINEE TO BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am honored to appear before this distinguished committee today as President Bush's nominee to represent the United States at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the OECD. I am grateful for the confidence and trust that the President and Secretary Rice have placed in me.

As a son who helped his family build the largest company in Massachusetts, and as an entrepreneur who has built a successful company of my own, I feel I have the leadership and negotiating skills, if confirmed, to represent and advance U.S. interests at the OECD.

I believe my service as a board member at MassDevelopment, my home State's finance and economic development authority, and as a founder and board member of the I-495/Arc of Innovation, a public-private partnership to foster smart, environmentally friendly economic development in central Massachusetts, has prepared me in significant measure for the duties I hope to undertake. The work my wife and I do with Break the Cycle of Poverty, the foundation we started and direct, has done much to educate economically challenged individuals and families so that they can elevate themselves from poverty.

The OECD began as a successor to the Marshall Plan, the economic counterpart to NATO, to promote democracy and market economies in Europe. The Marshall Plan, which celebrated its 60th anniversary this year, was rooted in a magnificent act of American generosity. In 1947, Europe lay in ruins, and through Secretary George Marshall's vision, over \$13.3 billion, over 4 years, poured into offering Europe a hand up, not a hand out.

Today, the OECD is comprised of 30 advanced economies from North America, the Pacific Rim, and Europe. The United States administration has been encouraging the OECD's outreach to the emerging economies in Asia, Latin America, and Africa to advance the principles of open markets and good governance that the organization promotes among its members.

The OECD is particularly valuable to the United States as a forum for working with our major partners to promote effective policies across the range of economic and social issues that confront us all. Through the OECD and its affiliates like the International Energy Agency, the United States and other members strengthen corporate governance principles, environmental standards, development of energy-efficient technologies, and guidelines to safeguard the public in the development of cutting-edge science and technology. The OECD also affords an opportunity to collaborate in areas that require multilateral cooperation to solve transnational problems such as the antibribery convention, the model tax convention, and agreements on export credits, open investment regimes, and capital markets.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I share the President's commitment to the great work of the OECD, and understand its role in promoting economic growth and better governance. America's prosperity and national security are enhanced by the efforts of the OECD to advance these goals and to integrate emerging market economies into a strong and healthy global economy. The United States has turned to the OECD repeatedly for accurate and reliable data on numerous topics (for example, how much our economy could benefit if transatlantic trade barriers were reduced), for best practices in combating counterfeit goods, and as the locus for dialog with countries from the Middle East on reforming public governance.

Mr. Chairman, in my discussion to date with officials throughout the administration, I have gained a sense of U.S. priorities for the OECD that I am committed to support, if confirmed. The critical work ahead includes bringing more countries into compliance with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which has been so important in leveling the playing field for our U.S. companies abroad. We also seek to strengthen economic growth through the OECD's expert economic research and analysis. Other priority work includes promoting electronic commerce, fostering good governance, and working on sensible trade policy.

Let me also cite three key objectives that I will focus on, if confirmed by the Senate:

- First, outreach to other major economies. The United States and a number of fellow OECD members believe the future and long-term relevance of the organization depends on reaching out beyond the OECD's current membership of advanced industrialized economies. To that effect, the members authorized a program of enhanced engagement with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa, to steer them toward better policies and practices and invite them to undertake the disciplines that underpin our shared prosperity. If confirmed, I will

work to move that engagement forward with those vital and emerging economies.

- Second, enlargement of the organization. The OECD Ministerial Council decided in May to invite Russia, Chile, Israel, Slovenia, and Estonia to begin discussions leading to OECD membership. Our representatives at the OECD made clear that the United States is concerned about Russia's readiness to join the organization, in terms of its government's commitment to democracy and to maintaining an open, market economy. However, the United States and other member countries were willing to begin a process that would advance Russian reforms. If confirmed, I will work together with other OECD members who share our concerns, to maintain the OECD's high standards of like-mindedness and help set clear benchmarks for all five candidate countries, including Russia, on their paths toward membership.
- And third, reform of the organization's financial structure. The United States is the largest contributor to the OECD, covering almost 25 percent of its costs. The financial structure has its roots in a period when Europe was recovering from war, but today, the members are all well off, and many members are effectively "subsidized" by us and a few other large contributors. The United States is working to negotiate a fairer scale of contributions, in which all members will cover the costs of their participation. In May, the members agreed in principle that each member should cover "most, if not all" of its costs. If confirmed, I will work to see that agreement implemented.

Mr. Chairman, these are some of the important challenges facing the OECD. But coming from a background in business, I am also interested in the management aspects of the organization. The United States has worked hard in recent years to push through reforms in the way that the OECD makes decisions, sets priorities, allocates its budget, and audits its own performance. With my 13 years of business experience, I can appreciate, for example, that the project to renovate its existing facilities and build a new OECD conference center in Paris is on schedule, within budget, and due for completion in 2009. As these reforms are being successfully implemented, the OECD is becoming a model among international organizations. But of course there's a lot more that needs to be done, and if confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that our work on strengthening good management of the OECD stays on track.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward, if confirmed, to representing the United States of America in this key international organization that helps ensure our economic well being and security. I am humbled to be before you today, and I am grateful for the confidence President Bush has placed in me.

If confirmed, I look forward to continued consultations with and advice from this committee and its staff, both here in Washington and from the congressional delegations we will certainly welcome to Paris.

I am pleased to answer any questions that you and the members of the committee have. Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you for your statement and we welcome your family here today.

Let me start off with a 7-minute round, then we'll see if—I know Senator Kerry is on his way here, and we'll acknowledge him when he arrives, after the first 7 minutes. So, let me start off with some questions that I think are important. And you've touched upon some of them in your statement.

This is a large international organization. It is complex, in terms of its entrenched bureaucracies, and the countries with which you will be dealing with have widely varying interests. In recognition of that, and some of even your stated goals about reforming the financial structure, we don't always get our way, even though we are the largest contributor. The question is, what, in your background, you believe will assist you—prepares you to meet that challenge? And, second, how do you plan on using diplomacy or persuasion to further U.S. interests within the organization?

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, Senator.

In regard to my background, my over 20 years of private-sector experience, building my own company, I've learned the negotiate—

negotiation—skills of negotiation and diplomacy to help build a leading real estate commercial in New England. Also in my background is working within the government as a board of MassDevelopment, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Economic Development Organization, we had to—we had to use not only the—we had to work with the legislature, but also with private developers, to accomplish the goals of economic development set forth by the Speaker of the House and the Governor.

Also, in regard to my background is starting as one of the founding members of the Arc of Innovation, 495 Initiative, which was a quasi-public-private. On the board, we had elected officials and business leaders to spur smart economically developed—smart economic development projects in central Massachusetts.

In regard to the U.S. Government's agenda through the OECD, that is my No. 1 goal. Using diplomacy, it is my goal to help accomplish the United States objectives. There are many members, other than the United States, sir, that look to reform the financial structure of the OECD. And, if nominated, sir, I'm going to continue the efforts to work with those groups, those countries, in order to reform the financial structure of the OECD.

Sir, I am happy to report, though, in the last ministerial at the OECD in May, the entire ministerial agreed that the financial structure of the OECD needs to be reformed. So, we're off to a very good start. And, if confirmed, sir, I'm going to continue that good work and look for the conclusion of that project.

Senator MENENDEZ. How do you build common cause with the United States position with other countries? When we say, "Well, we're going to use diplomacy," how do you go about creating common cause? You cited some of your personal experiences, your professional experiences, back in Massachusetts. Why don't you give me examples of how you get people to do, sometimes, what is in their interests, but they don't necessarily feel it is in their best interests, and sometimes to get people to do what is not necessarily, from their point of view, in their interests, but is necessary for the organization. Give me a sense of how you would go about it. Recognizing you do not have a diplomatic career in—as your background, but give me a sense of how you bring people into common cause.

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, sir.

That's where personal relationships come in. The OECD is more like a club where 30 ambassadors representing the member states are there. There's only 30 ambassadors. My wife and I are—I will personally meet and develop a personal relationship with each one of those ambassadors. The Secretary General, Guirra, is also a very major factor at the OECD. He has been—he—Guirra has the strong support of the United States Government, and the current ambassador, Morella, at the OECD, is a good supporter of him. Using our relationship with Guirra and the major—some other major countries within the OECD, I plan to create allies and a sense of collegialness in order to help promote the United States agenda throughout the OECD.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, one of the things I'd like to hear your views on as you try to do that is, looking at the OECD as a—it's clearly a strong proponent of increasing world economic growth and welfare, and best supported by a free and open flow of goods, serv-

ices, and capital, and it's a leading proponent of free trade, open markets, and globalization, which, generally, I think we all are. The question, however, for some of us, is, how does an organization like the OECD balance the economic impact of globalization, particularly how free trade impacts poor and rural populations in developing countries? And so, my question to you—and I see that, from your background, you and your wife's foundation and the Break the Cycle of Poverty, this is a—this is a noble concern of yours. The question is, how do you make sure that the OECD is not pursuing trade policies at the expense of the poorest and least-developed countries? And how do we protect poor, and often rural, populations in the process of doing that? And, for someone who's very interested in Latin America, one of Latin America's greatest challenges is the disparity of wealth, which is huge. How don't we—how do we go about not exacerbating that in the pursuit of our policies?

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From my consultations with State Department and with U.S. Government agencies that work with the OECD, I've learned—a very important committee at the OECD is called the Development Assistance Committee, the DAC. The OECD is an incredibly economic think tank that is open to any country who wants to read its information and learn from it. Not only are there 30 countries that make up the OECD, but the OECD shares its expertise with more than 30—with more than 70 other countries.

The Development Assistance Committee assists developing countries and evaluates best practices, and prepares guidelines and toolkits on issues like poverty. For example, aid foreign assistance is giving to emerging countries—Latin America, and other emerging nations—through the OECD and through the Development Assistance Committee, it is studied on what is more effective, how aid is spent, and what the tangible results are. And the important thing about the OECD is, in terms of—it's able to compare and contrast what one country does versus what another country does, and what is more successful. In Africa, the OECD is doing incredible work studying how aid is given in Africa and how best—what results happen from it, what strategies worked well, and what strategies didn't.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the OECD is not, itself, an aid organization, does not have funds in which to give out to it, but it does have an incredible peer-review process, and, through the Development Assistance Committee, it is able to see what programs are working well in developing worlds, what programs aren't working well, and to share that knowledge, sir, not only online, through an incredible Web site that our current ambassador, Connie Morella, helped spearhead, but through over nearly 300 working groups and other bodies at work in the OECD.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, will you have as one of your concerns, as our ambassador there, looking at how—as we pursue our policies, how do we deal with the question of our policies' effect on the whole question of poverty and on this disparity of wealth and not exacerbating it?

Mr. EGAN. Yes, sir. Yes. It is a big concern of the U.S. Government. And the U.S. Government, in terms of its national security,

a prosperous and economic world is a safe world. And the OECD is a unique forum in which best practices of economic policy can be discussed, debated, and refined. That information is shared with the policy leaders, not only of our 30 member countries, but of any country willing to participate within the OECD—not as full members, sir, but as participants of the committees.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. I have one or two other questions, but let me turn to someone who is a Boston Red Sox fan—[Laughter.]

Senator MENENDEZ.—Senator Kerry.

Mr. EGAN. Thank you.

Senator Kerry: Mr. Chairman, you're suffering a miserable misfortunate life not to be a Boston Red Sox fan. [Laughter.]

Senator KERRY. I apologize for being late—I wanted to come by to support the nomination of Chris Egan to be our U.S. Representative to the OECD. And I'd just emphasize a couple of things, if I may, quickly.

First of all, the OECD, as we all know, is an extraordinarily important organization, formed after President Truman had the foresight to commit to the Marshall Plan, and the then-Economic Cooperation Initiative was transitioned, in 1961, into the OECD, and it's been, really, the principal forum for the United States—and mostly what are called developed countries—to advance issues of sustainability, transparency, economic, peace, and so forth. So, it is a major forum, and, I think, today, is playing an important role on a host of trade issues, as well as the larger challenge of global climate change, which is very much front and center to it.

It now stretches from North America to Europe to the Pacific Rim, and it has 30 countries in it, which is a pretty large forum. So, you'll have a major scope of responsibility as you undertake this job, Mr. Egan. And we, on this committee, obviously care enormously, as I think you know, because of the role it can play to promote peace and stability and bring countries together to have an important dialog on a lot of issues of significance to us.

We appreciate your qualifications—UMASS grad and Kennedy School grad, and, I think, most significantly, frankly, the private-sector experience that you've had, building a strong real estate company, Carruth Realty, one of the strongest in our State. And I think those qualifications will give you important credentials in talking to people about these kinds of economic development issues.

So, in addition to your being an avid sailor and a Red Sox fan and all those important qualifications for living in Massachusetts, we're going to be glad that you're out there representing the country. And I see that you've got the best side of your life with you here—those three kids and your wife here. So, we're delighted. I assume they're yours.

Mr. EGAN. Two out of three are.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Have any children that don't belong to you, or—

[Laughter.]

Mr. EGAN. Mary Catherine, in the pink, and Christopher, in the necktie, and my niece, Isabel, in the blue, sir.

Senator KERRY. Well, we're delighted to welcome them here, and happy to have 'em. I see we've got a tired one here already. Wait'll she travels with you.

Let me just take one moment, also, Mr. Chairman, to clarify something, because I want it to be an important part of the record.

The delay in proceeding to Mr. Egan's nomination had absolutely nothing to do with Mr. Egan's personal qualifications or appropriateness of the nomination, it had to do with a, sort of, breach of relationship, if you will, and understanding between this committee—the full committee. And I agreed with the Chairman and with other members of the committee who felt very strongly that a recess appointment, after the formal withdrawal of a nomination, which nomination was about to be voted on and defeated, and the purposes of withdrawing it was to avoid that, and, after statements to the effect that there would be no recess appointment, to have made that appointment was fundamentally a constitutional challenge to the authority of this committee and to how it might have proceeded under normal circumstances.

That has now been worked out with the administration. We're glad it's been worked out with the administration. And so, we proceed appropriately.

But I wanted to emphasize, importantly, that your nomination, and some others, became, regrettably, tied up in the effort to try to clarify that constitutional point, which I, and we all here, think is an important one.

So, we thank you for your patience, and I'm sorry for anybody who's been caught up in that, unfortunately. But I think we have now worked it out. I just noticed—is your father here?

Mr. EGAN. Ambassador Egan and my mother, Maureen, are here.

Senator KERRY. That's what I thought. I'm delighted to see you here, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you. Good to see someone else following in the footsteps. The apple doesn't fall far from the tree. And so, we're proud and grateful for your service, as well.

So, thank you for taking time to go away from private sector for a while and serve the country. We appreciate it. And I'm pleased to support your nomination.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a few questions. I assume you're going to leave the record open—they're very simple, straightforward, but it would good, for the record, just to have some answers to them. We'll submit them in writing.

Mr. EGAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator KERRY. Thanks.

[The information previously referred to appears at the end of this hearing in the "Additional Material Submitted for the Record" section.]

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

I have one or two more questions, and then we'll have the record open for any member who wishes to ask questions, and get your responses as soon as possible.

And I want to echo Senator Kerry's remarks, as the chairman of the subcommittee made it very clear to me that he was supportive of your nomination, but the broader issue was involved, and so he's made that clear to me from the very beginning, and I just want to echo what he had to say.

I have just two other lines of questioning that I would love to hear your thinking about. And you touched upon them in your opening statement. The OECD has five priority areas that they've identified for study and emphasis: trade and investment liberalization, public—excuse me—policy reform and development, managing new and evolving technologies, public governance, and social protection. That's what they've established as their five priority areas for study and emphasis. Of those, what areas do you believe are the highest priority for the United States? And how can the United States best influence the priorities of the OECD in achieving the goals and objectives that are important to the United States within those goals?

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, Senator.

As you know, sir, the OECD is a unique forum where like-minded countries can get together and talk about what's important for economic development. In terms of the United States and how I feel about the United States, and we all do, is our economic and national security. And, through the OECD, trade—as you know, trade—global trade is very important to the United States. It's just, sir, that every—seems like every U.S. agency sends the best and brightest people through the OECD to work on the best policies, whether it's the Food and Drug Administration, Department of Education, Department of Labor—any agency could get their—the best economic policy ideas to not only help the United States and the OECD member countries, but also the world.

So, if you ask me, sir, in terms of what the U.S. Government's priorities are on that, you know, I've been briefed, sir, on all the issues, and they seem to important to us. I'd have to say, sir, from my edification as what's gone on in the last 2½ months, it's the trade. But in my brief tenure at the OECD, if confirmed, sir, the pressing issues are to increase the membership of the OECD and make sure that all countries joining the OECD are like-minded and believe in the rule of law and democracy, and also to reach out, sir, to the impoverished nations, or the emerging economies, and make sure that they understand the—how countries who join the OECD became successful, the economic priorities and the rule of law that made the OECD countries so successful in this world.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I—

Mr. EGAN. Those are my—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. I appreciate that answer. I gather, from what I hear you say, trade and liberalization—investment liberalization is No. 1.

Mr. EGAN. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ. I really would urge you to spend some time, as our representative, should you be confirmed, on the public governance and social protection aspects of those five priorities. Part of our challenges in security is social unrest, and people have social unrest because their desires, hopes and dreams, and aspirations are frustrated. And public governance is critical in many parts of the world to being able to fulfill—to act in a way in which they hope to work to fulfill the hopes and dreams and aspirations of their people that create the social protection, and, I would broaden that to the opportunities to move people in a better direction. So, I hope that you'll move those upward—

Mr. EGAN. Okay.

Senator MENENDEZ [CONTINUING]. AS YOUR—AS PART OF YOUR FOCUS IN THOSE FIVE PRIORITY AREAS.

The last question, at least for the purposes of asking, although there'll be some submitted for the record, is—the agency you're going to go to is comprised of 30 different countries. They're classified as developed economies, as you talked about. Some have been invited to open discussions for membership, others have agreed to begin a process that potentially could open membership—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa. The question, for me, is: should the OECD adopt a different set of criteria for membership for such developing countries as Russia, China, and India? And what objective should the agency have as its main goal in broadening its membership?

Mr. EGAN. Thank you—thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What makes the OECD relevant is the fact that it's made up of a group of nations that are like-minded, and to—the U.S. Government's policy and thinking on this matter is, if you allow exceptions to that rule, you let people in who don't believe in the rule of law, aren't market-based economies, and the organization quickly will become irrelevant.

Sir, if I'm confirmed by the Senate, I will continue to work the U.S. Government's policy and the other members of the OECD to continue to keep the OECD relevant, in terms of its like-mindedness. So, for certain exemptions for, for example, Russia, no, sir. I would think that every country joining the OECD should have the same high standards as the current nations that belong to it.

Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, I take your words of "like-mindedness" to be translated to "the criteria should not differ."

Mr. EGAN. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. Very good.

And our objective in broadening its membership should be what, exactly?

Mr. EGAN. The membership—to broaden the number of nations that belong to the OECD, sir?

Senator MENENDEZ. Right.

Mr. EGAN. In the past—even currently, sir—the OECD has seemed to be in—a Eurocentric organization. But, as other countries throughout the world have become developed and believe in free trade and our democracies and rule of law, they've joined the organization. It doesn't matter where you are on the planet anymore with the OECD. The U.S. Government's thinking is that if you are like-minded, such as—you know, all the way to Korea, Australia, New Zealand—it doesn't have to be Europeancentric anymore, which is what it was in the roots, when the Marshall Plan first kicked in, in the late 1940s. So, to be allowed access into the OECD, sir, it could be anywhere on the planet, which is why I'm happy to see Chile being—looking to join the OECD in the near future, which is why Brazil, in terms of enhanced engagement, a very, very important emerging economy.

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay.

Let me thank the nominee—seeing no other members at the hearing, at this point—for testifying today, for his willingness to serve the country in an important position.

The record will remain open for 2 days so that the committee members may submit additional questions to the nominee. I ask that the nominee respond expeditiously to these questions, should there be some. And I'm sure, as you've heard, there will be some.

[The information previously referred to appears at the end of this hearing in the "Additional Material Submitted for the Record" section.]

Senator MENENDEZ. Without that—without any other member seeking to ask questions, if no one has any additional comments, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a privilege to be here to introduce Christopher Egan of Massachusetts, the President's nominee to be our Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

The OECD is an organization created in the finest of the American internationalist tradition. Its goal is to promote economic progress and development throughout the world. It's an outgrowth of the Marshall Plan, which transformed Western Europe after the devastation of World War II, and helped rebuild the economy of an entire continent.

Today, OECD has 30 member nations, many of which are among the most economically advanced in the world. Membership is granted only for those nations that aspire to building strong democracies, establishing market economies, and improving the standard of living of their people.

OECD will undoubtedly have an essential role in the coming decades, as all nations wrestle with the challenges and opportunities of the new global economy. How we engage—or choose not to engage—other nations will have enormous implications for our own economic health and well-being.

Working with other nations to establish cooperative approaches to trade, environmental standards, science and technology, and openness in government is essential for the United States, and for every nation that aspires to leadership in the 21st century.

It's an honor to support Chris Egan's nomination to be our ambassador to this important international organization. I'm confident he will serve our Nation well at OECD.

An able son of Massachusetts, Chris is an entrepreneur who's helped to build a very successful business, Carruth Capital, in our State. He's a graduate of our flagship University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and recently earned a master's degree in public administration at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

He began his career working side-by-side with his father, Richard Egan, at the famous EMC Corporation, which helped teach him how to build and maintain enduring institutions.

I'm impressed with Chris's ability and his commitment to service, and I believe he has the personal and collaborative skills needed for this position.

I know how excited he is at the prospect of serving his country at OECD and how deeply he feels that the United States must provide strong leadership in international development. He's ready to begin tomorrow, and to bring some of that Red Sox fighting spirit to OECD.

I'm delighted to support his nomination, and I'd also like to acknowledge his wife, Jean, and his three wonderful children who are here today as well—Mary, Christopher, and Michael. I've been assured they haven't missed any important classes by being here, and that they're ready to start making new friends in Paris. I wish them all well in this impressive new experience.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

RESPONSES OF CHRISTOPHER F. EGAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What are your thoughts about the policy role the OECD can play toward promoting and facilitating economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries? Some have suggested that the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) should expand beyond the United States and be adopted by the OECD as a whole. Do you believe this idea, or other similar proposals, have merit?

Answer. AGOA has achieved considerable success, and I believe it is a worthy model for other donor countries to adopt. Restrictive rules of origin employed in some other countries' programs fail to provide the broad scope of market access that AGOA does. Broader trade preferences would provide additional incentives for Africa to integrate itself into the world economy.

The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is already carrying out an important role as a coordinating body for international assistance policy. The United States works closely with the DAC to develop and promote best practices.

The OECD hosts the G-8 Africa Partnership Forum (APF) Support Unit and also provides support to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) through a Mutual Review Mechanism.

The international community is making progress. According to a joint report by the WTO and the OECD, the amount of trade-related technical assistance and capacity building—to help developing and least-developed countries to participate more efficiently in international trade—has increased by 50 percent since the Doha Ministerial Declaration in November 2001.

Question. What are other ways the OECD can positively affect and support developing countries? For example, what role can OECD play in fostering improved donor coordination on the ground, using a model such as the Three Ones approach on HIV/AIDS and global health?

Answer. The OECD is advancing donor coordination through the Paris Declaration endorsed in March 2005 by over 100 countries and agencies, including donors and recipients, and is hosting an international partnership to encourage and monitor its implementation. The Paris Declaration embodies the "Three Ones" logic in its principles, which encourage donor harmonization and alignment with country needs and policy, stress country ownership of the development process, mutual accountability, and results.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) affords a useful venue for the United States and other donor countries to review best practices and discuss ways to strengthen donor coordination. The DAC conducts periodic assessments to review donor coordination performance on the ground. These assessments also identify good practice and provide a framework for gauging progress, which is then disseminated throughout the DAC member network. In addition the DAC is engaged in pilot efforts in developing countries to improve country capacity to manage donor coordination and to improve country administrative systems in ways that will justify greater donor reliance on those systems.

The United States is working with other donors to ensure that aid empowers recipients and is used effectively, and to improve donor coordination. When donor coordination efforts are successful, it is nearly always due in large part to U.S. leadership.

Question. The 2006 DAC peer review of U.S. foreign assistance provided many recommendations on ways to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. aid program, ranging from how the United States can more effectively implement the Paris Declaration principles to better coordination of the three pillars of U.S. foreign policy (defense, diplomacy, development). What are the main lessons that you take out of the peer review? Which recommendations will you prioritize if confirmed as ambassador to the OECD?

Answer. The primary lesson I draw from the 2006 DAC Peer review is that the long-established OECD practice of conducting peer reviews is a valuable exercise that provides timely feedback to the member being reviewed. The DAC Peer Review was done at the time the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was focusing on accelerating the implementation of its compacts. The Peer Review encouraged broader replication of MCC lessons and offered some useful suggestions of how MCC could work more closely with other donors. It also reviewed the initial reforms launched by the newly created Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance and the unified foreign assistance budget. The Peer Review stimulated interagency discussion of the foreign assistance reforms and encouraged broader coordination around the new foreign assistance framework. The Office of the Director of Foreign Assist-

ance has already addressed one of the main recommendations of the Peer Review—making poverty reduction a more explicit aim of the strategic framework. That has been implemented and is reflected in the revised framework. More effective aid is at the core of current U.S. reforms of foreign assistance so the Peer Review's recommendations on this score were especially timely.

The responsibility for following through on the DAC peer review recommendations rests with the Director of Foreign Assistance and the USAID Administrator, along with other agencies delivering U.S. assistance. As U.S. Ambassador to the OECD, I will have the opportunity, with my staff, to support OECD and U.S. preparations for the third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness to be held in Accra, Ghana, September 2–4, 2008, which will take stock of the progress made so far in implementing the Paris Declaration and identify an action agenda for further implementation. This forum will be an opportune time for the United States to show how it has reformed and made its foreign aid more effective.

NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Boulware, Mark M., to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
McGee, James D., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe
McMullen, Ronald K., to be Ambassador to the State of Eritrea
Nigro, Louis J., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chad
Sanders, Robin R., to be Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Nigeria
Wells, Barry L., to be Ambassador to the Republic of The Gambia

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold presiding.

Present: Senator Feingold.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. Good morning and thank you for coming. I'm Senator Russ Feingold, Chairman of the subcommittee. As a freshman Senator in 1992, I had the opportunity to sit on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and some people said to me that I would, "Probably get stuck with the Africa Subcommittee." This insinuation, of course, was that work concerning the continent was, in some people's minds, not interesting or important.

I disagreed and became determined to take advantage of membership on this subcommittee to make the case that the United States must become more aware of, and engage with, the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

These diverse countries offer some of the world's most daunting challenges from terrorism and endemic corruption to humanitarian emergencies and the AIDS epidemic, as well as a wealth of possibilities from natural resource development and economic growth to new tourism destinations and democratic progress. In my 15 years on the subcommittee, I've advocated a more active U.S. role in addressing these challenges and developing these possibilities. Some progress has been made, but obviously much more remains to be done.

Some of you may have gotten similar advice when you received your first Foreign Service posting to an African country or even

your present nomination, but I hope that you also embraced the opportunity to advance broad U.S. interests and objectives in this increasingly critical part of the world. I know that each of you rose to the challenge, because you're here today. You've chosen to represent the United States Government's ideals, interests, and citizens as ambassadors to a wide-range of African nations.

If confirmed, each of you will become not only the in-country hands of the United States working to implement U.S. policy, but also the eyes and ears of our Government, myself included, who will rely upon you to keep us informed of developments on the ground and what role we here in Washington can and should play. This is a significant responsibility, particularly when many of the countries you are headed to are mired in conflicts that have implications beyond their own nation's borders.

On our first panel, we will hear from the nominees to Nigeria, the Gambia, and Mauritania, an increasingly strategic part of the world, particularly in terms of energy and security. I look forward to hearing from Ambassador Renee Sanders, Mr. Barry Wells, and Mr. Mark Boulware, respectively, about their priorities and plans for addressing both the obstacles and opportunities each will face, if confirmed, to serve as ambassadors to these countries.

On our second panel, we will have three individuals who have proven themselves willing and able to lead U.S. missions in several of the world's most challenging posts. Ambassador James McGee has been nominated to serve in Zimbabwe, Mr. Ron McMullen to Eritrea, and Mr. Louis Nigro, Jr. to Chad.

I admire all six of you for embracing these responsibilities and I want to thank you all for being here this morning. At this time, I would like to invite our first panel of nominees to present their statements. We will begin with the Honorable Robin Sanders.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBIN R. SANDERS, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA**

Ms. SANDERS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am deeply honored today to appear before you as the President's nominee to be the United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

I grew up in a family that underscored the importance of public service. My father is a veteran of two wars. I come from a long line of family members who are principals and teachers, and who have worked for other U.S. Government agencies, such as a my aunt. They are all here with me today.

Given that my historical U.S. ancestry, like many African-Americans, links back to Africa, Nigeria's future and the quality of life of its people are important to me.

With that backdrop, Mr. Chairman, and if confirmed to serve the people of the United States of America, this nomination is truly a blending of everything I am—personally and professionally.

The people of Nigeria and the people of the United States of America are connected in many, many ways. The Nigerian people want good governance, rule of law, and respect for global human values. They desire an evolving democracy that advances these goals and they see us as partners in this effort. Mr. Chairman, we

are partners, we must be partners, and we should continue to be partners with the Nigerian people on these issues.

Turning to the immediate policy issues, the Nigerian elections were deeply, deeply flawed and we were highly disappointed, as were the Nigerian people. But the Nigerian people are giving this administration a chance; they are watching it more closely, expecting greater things, and more results, so that the elections of the past are not the mark of Nigeria's future.

We also need to watch, be engaged, but also wait to see if this new Nigerian Government lives up to what it is saying. We are encouraged, however, by the steps taken thus far by this administration and will continue to urge President Yar' Adua to allow the tribunals to complete their work unimpeded.

Our post-election priorities are election reform, democracy, and human rights, and having a partnership with stewardship, meaning a propitious engagement on all of these fronts, including the rule of law, transparency, and poverty alleviation.

I have not yet had the opportunity to meet President Yar' Adua. From what I have read and heard about him and many of his actions to date indicate that he is interested in reestablishing Nigeria's progress on political, economic, and governance issues, addressing the problems in the delta, and most importantly, election reform, so that flawed elections do not happen again. Not only is he the first college-educated President of this nation of incredibly talented and diverse people, but he has voiced his recognition of the challenges at hand, challenges that must be addressed in order for Nigeria to move forward and truly become an active member of the communities of democracies. We must work with President Yar' Adua and his administration as partners to achieve these goals for the Nigerian people.

If confirmed, I will be dedicated, along with the interagency team of Americans and Nigerian staff already there, to a partnership with stewardship that works toward realizing the aspirations of this nation of 140 million people for a better quality of life, a life which respects global human values, and a life that has an enabling environment with policies and programs that provide the framework for the Nigerian people to thrive.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I stand ready and welcome the opportunity to respond to any questions that you may have. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanders follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBIN R. SANDERS, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning.

I am deeply honored today to appear before you as the President's nominee to be the United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Every now and again, one has the remarkable opportunity to be a part of a profession that makes one proud to get up each day. That is how I have felt every day of my Foreign Service career. I grew up in a family that underscored the importance of public service. My father is a veteran of two wars, and I come from a long line of family members who are principals and teachers, including my younger sister, and family members who have worked for other U.S. Government agencies, such as my aunt. They are all here with me today.

Given my ancestral links to Africa, Nigeria's future and the quality of life of its people are important to me.

With that backdrop Mr. Chairman, and if confirmed to serve the people of the United States of America, this nomination is truly a blending of everything that I am personally and professionally.

The people of Nigeria and the people of the United States of America are connected in many ways. The Nigerian people want good governance, rule of law, and respect for global human values. They desire an evolving democracy that advances these life goals and they see us as partners in these efforts. Mr. Chairman, we are—and must continue to be—partners with them in this regard. The Nigerian elections were deeply flawed, and we were highly disappointed, as were the Nigerian people. They themselves have spoken out on the deeply flawed elections. But the Nigerian people are giving this new administration a chance; they are watching it more closely, expecting even greater things and more results from it so that this past election is not a harbinger of a bleak future for Nigeria. We are encouraged by the steps taken thus far by President Yar'Adua's administration. We will continue to press him to allow the electoral tribunals to complete their work unimpeded and to reform dramatically the electoral commission so flawed elections do not happen again. I believe our role is to have a "partnership with stewardship," meaning a "propitious engagement" on all democracy and human rights fronts in support of the Nigerian people.

While I have not yet met President Yar'Adua, what I have read and heard about his actions to date indicates that he is interested in reestablishing Nigeria's progress on political and governance reforms. Yar'Adua has voiced his recognition of the challenges at hand including the development and security needs of the Niger Delta; alleviating poverty; combating corruption; improving the educational and health care sectors, particularly in regard to HIV/AIDS; and instituting election reform.

These are all significant issues that must be addressed in order for Nigeria to move forward and truly become an active member of the community of democracies and a true regional leader. We must work with the Yar'Adua administration as partners to achieve these goals for the Nigerian people.

If confirmed, I will be dedicated, along with the interagency team of American and Nigerian staff at our embassy, to a "partnership with stewardship" that works toward realizing the aspirations of this nation of 140 million for a better quality of life in an environment that respects global human values and has policies and programs that enable the people of Nigeria to thrive.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I stand ready, and I welcome the opportunity to respond to any questions you may have. Thank you very much.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador. The Nigerian elections were a real setback, in my view, and I appreciate your words. So I just want you to be aware of how disappointed I was and I think others were in the way that was conducted.

Mr. Wells.

**STATEMENT OF BARRY L. WELLS, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA**

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to appear before you today. I wish to express my gratitude to the President and the Secretary of State for the trust and the confidence they've placed in me as their nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of the Gambia.

I come from a family that has proudly served our Nation in the uniforms of our military services and in civilian agencies, including my wife, Winsome, and daughter, Judy Ann, who joined me here today.

I've been—

Senator FEINGOLD. Welcome to all the guests of the Ambassador and Mr. Wells and everybody. I appreciate your being here.

Mr. WELLS. Thank you.

I've enjoyed a career that has provided me the opportunity to serve at both the local and the Federal levels. And, if confirmed,

I will be honored to accept the responsibility to represent the interests of our Nation, as U.S. Ambassador.

The Gambia has a history, despite troubling recent developments of multiparty democracy. Presidential elections in 2001 and 2006 and legislative elections in January of this year were judged as free and fair, although with some shortcomings. I believe that firm and positive engagement with the Government of the Gambia will produce further progress on both democracy and development fronts.

Trafficking in persons in the Gambia remains a problem, but the Government of the Gambia has taken significant steps to address the issue. The Gambian National Assembly has just passed a comprehensive antitrafficking law that meets international standards. Passage of this law, in addition to the law in 2005 outlawing child trafficking, and the establishment of a victim shelter in 2006, show willingness to engage with us on this issue. In order to foster continued progress, if confirmed, I will work with the Gambia in its efforts to enforce its new legislation and to rescue and rehabilitate victims.

Prior to June 2006, the Gambia was a Millennium Challenge Account-eligible country. The Gambia's eligibility was suspended in response to what the MCC Board of Directors saw as a troubling pattern of deterioration in 8 of the 16 indicators, most notably in the area of political rights. If confirmed, I intend to engage the host government to reinstate discussions centered on improving these indicators, with a view that moving The Gambia back toward MCC eligibility will ultimately benefit its people.

As well, continued engagement with Gambian authorities on human rights, particularly in the areas of press freedom and civil liberties will constitute a central piece of our bilateral relationship. In addition, the U.S. Embassy must work to continue to help the government and the private sector to facilitate exports of food, textiles, garments, and other commodities to the United States under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. The Gambia has been AGOA-eligible since 2003 and the government and the people are very interested in the great opportunities for trade this excellent program offers. But more engagement is needed to help them take—make efficient use of these opportunities.

The Gambia has benefited from an active Peace Corps presence since 1967. Approximately 118 volunteers serve in health, agriforestry, and education sectors. Peace Corps is a central component of our person-to-person diplomacy and will remain a cornerstone of United States development assistance within the Gambia. The Gambia has been cooperative in the global war on terror and this plays a positive role in regional peace efforts. The Gambia is currently a contributor to the United States mission in the Sudan. Continued cooperation against terrorism and in support of regional stability will be another important focus of our diplomatic efforts in the Gambia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your abiding interest in America's relations with Africa and for holding this hearing. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee and other Members of Congress to advance the interest, United States interests in the Gambia, and I would be pleased to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wells follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARRY L. WELLS, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today. I wish to express my gratitude to the President and to the Secretary of State for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as their nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of The Gambia.

I come from a family that has proudly served our Nation—in the uniforms of our military service and in civilian capacities. I have enjoyed a career that has provided me the opportunity to serve at both local and Federal levels of government. My interest and involvement in the international arena dates back 30 years when as an associate professor at Howard University School of Social Work I was instrumental in establishing summer field placements for graduate students with the University of the West Indies in Jamaica. I subsequently served as Country Director for the U.S. Peace Corps in Belize followed by a tour in Jamaica. Those experiences as an American serving our Nation abroad were some of the most rewarding of my career, and shaped the continuing interest I have to this day in working on behalf of our national interests in other nations. For the last 19 years at the Department of State, I have continued to dedicate myself to that end. I believe these experiences have well prepared me to carry out the responsibilities of a United States ambassador.

The Gambia has a rich and remarkable history. A diverse set of linguistic, ethnic, and cultural groups have coexisted with minimum tension within The Gambia's borders since independence. The Gambia has a history, despite troubling recent developments, of multiparty democracy. Presidential elections in 2001 and 2006, and legislative elections in January of this year were judged as free and fair, although with some shortcomings. The Gambian Government continues to make progress on government transparency, and has directed national resources toward health, education, and other endeavors that better the lives of The Gambian population at large. I believe that firm and positive engagement with the Government of The Gambia will produce further progress on both the democracy and development fronts.

Trafficking in persons in The Gambia remains a problem, but the Government of The Gambia has taken significant steps to address the issue. The Gambian National Assembly has just passed a comprehensive antitrafficking law that meets international standards. Passage of this law, in addition to recent steps such as passage of a law against child trafficking in 2005 and the establishment of a victim shelter in 2006, show a willingness to engage with us on this issue. In order to foster continued progress, I will work with The Gambia in its efforts to enforce its new legislation and rescue and rehabilitate victims.

Prior to June 2006, The Gambia was a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) eligible country. The Gambia's eligibility was suspended in response to what the MCC Board of Directors saw as a troubling pattern of deterioration in 8 of the 16 indicators, most notably in the area of political rights. Joint efforts on the part of the U.S. Mission and the host government to reinstate discussions centered on improving these indicators, with a view that moving The Gambia back toward MCA eligibility would go far to improve our bilateral relationship as well as increase the prospects for The Gambia's continued economic development. Continued engagement with Gambian authorities on human rights, particularly in the areas of press freedom and civil liberties will constitute a central piece of our bilateral relationship.

In addition, the U.S. Embassy in Banjul must continue to work with the government and the private sector to facilitate exports of seafood, textiles and garments, and other commodities to the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The Gambia has been AGOA-eligible since 2003 and the government and people are very interested in the great opportunities for trade created by this excellent program, but more engagement is needed to help them make efficient use of these opportunities.

The Gambia, a moderate majority-Muslim nation, has been cooperative in the global war on terror, and has played a positive role in regional peace efforts. The Gambia is currently a contributor to the U.N. Mission in the Sudan. Continued cooperation against terrorism and in support of regional stability will be another important focus of our diplomatic efforts in The Gambia. The Gambia has benefited from an active Peace Corps presence since 1967. Approximately 118 volunteers serve in health, agro-forestry, and education sectors. Peace Corps works in cooperation with the Government of The Gambia and regularly reassesses its programming strategy in order to ensure that programs are in line with the domestic development strategy. In recent years, volunteers have focused on training primary and sec-

ondary school teachers in the use of information technology; coordinating international donor and community initiatives on deforestation, agricultural diversification, and improvement of The Gambia's natural resource base; and working with village-level health authorities to promote immunizations, malaria prevention, HIV/AIDS education, and child nutrition and growth monitoring. The Peace Corps is the central component of our person-to-person diplomacy and will remain a cornerstone of United States development assistance within The Gambia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for your abiding interest in America's relations with Africa and for holding this hearing. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee and other Members of Congress to advance United States interests in The Gambia. I would be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Wells.
Mr. Boulware.

**STATEMENT OF MARK M. BOULWARE, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA**

Mr. BOULWARE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it's an honor to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to serve as United States Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. I thank the President and Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they've shown by nominating me for this position.

Let me also introduce my wife, Nora Jean Boulware, who has been a full and tireless partner during my 32 years of public service. And I'd also like to acknowledge the presence of our nephew, Lieutenant Lance Beckley.

Bridging the Sahel and the Sahara, Mauritania faces a cruelly challenging environment. Ethnic tensions have at times exploded into violence, as they did in April 1989. As I saw firsthand while posted in the Gambia, ethnic violence in Mauritania and in Senegal, followed by reciprocal expulsions, displaced hundreds of thousands, including many Afro-Mauritanians, who were expelled from their own country.

The United States has always responded generously to the humanitarian needs of the Mauritanian people, and we continue to do so. This year, for example, we are providing about \$7.5 million in food aid. The Peace Corps is carrying on a tradition, nearly 40-year tradition, of doing exceptional grassroots development under the most austere conditions imaginable. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the continued success of these invaluable programs.

The United States has also responded to assist Mauritania and its neighbors through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, a program designed to confront this threat through an integrated approach linking counterterrorism assistance, development, and public diplomacy. To manage this program I will, if confirmed, draw on my experience as a U.S. Army officer and a Foreign Service officer, who has both studied and taught at senior military schools and who managed political military programs in Cameroon, El Salvador, and Brazil.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Mauritania's decision to take a constructive approach in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict and its recognition of Israel in 2000, relieved a long-standing irritant in our relationship. Mauritania remains one of only three Arab League members to recognize Israel.

Mauritania, Mr. Chairman, turned an exciting new page in its history last March when the transitional military junta made good on its promise to establish democracy. This, the world's newest democracy, under the leadership of President Abdallahi has moved boldly to address problems facing the country. Perhaps most dramatically, his government has acted, not merely to declare again that slavery is illegal, but for the first time in Mauritania's history, to make it a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment. It has added penalties for government officials who fail to implement the law. These strong actions address concerns that have historically tempered improvement in our bilateral relations.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as it moves to meet these monumental challenges, this new government looks to the United States for concrete support. The security relationship is important and we should maintain it. Mauritania also seeks our help in building democratic institutions, establishing the rule of law, and above all, promoting economic development. The success of democracy in a developing country that is both Arab and African is indeed important to our interests.

If confirmed, I would work to bring appropriate resources to bear, including restoring a modest USAID presence so that multiple assistance programs are informed by genuine development expertise. I would also work with the Millennium Challenge Corporation to lay out a road map for Mauritania to achieve threshold status as quickly as possible.

Finally, I'm keenly aware of the Chief of Mission's responsibility for the safety and welfare of all Americans and U.S. Government employees. If confirmed, Mauritania would be my tenth overseas hardship posting. I understand the obligation to ensure the fair treatment and high morale of mission staff and family members.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I look forward, if confirmed, to working with you, your distinguished colleagues, and members of your staffs to advance our agenda with Mauritania. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boulware follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK M. BOULWARE, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to serve as United States Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. I thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they have shown by nominating me for this position.

I would also like to introduce my wife, Nora Jean Boulware, who has been a full and tireless partner during my 32 years of public service. Mauritania is a fascinatingly diverse country with a rich history, but it has not been a place from which we were accustomed to receive good news. Bridging the northern reaches of the Sahel and the heart of the Sahara, Mauritania faces a cruelly challenging natural environment. Less than 1 percent of the land is arable, and large segments of the population are vulnerable to desertification and to cyclical droughts that can quickly lead to critical levels of malnutrition.

Beyond hardship and suffering, such conditions worsen economic and ethnic tensions that have, at times, exploded into violence as was the case with the terrible events of April 1989 when news of a minor episode on the Senegal border produced spontaneous acts of violence against both foreign black Africans and Afro-Mauritanians inside Mauritania, as well as attacks on Mauritanians in Senegal. As I witnessed firsthand while posted in The Gambia, ethnic violence followed by reciprocal expulsions displaced hundreds of thousands, including a substantial number of Afro-Mauritanians who were expelled from their own country.

The challenges of a harsh climate and geography, sparse natural resources, and an uneasy ethnic mix would be daunting for any government, but the unbroken string of authoritarian governments that ruled Mauritania since independence were incapable of making meaningful progress in dealing with Mauritania's internal problems. Meanwhile, in the neighboring Maghreb, an Algerian terrorist group found a new lease on life as well as regional ambitions as an al-Qaeda franchise. This group, calling itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, attacked a Mauritanian military outpost in June 2005, killing 17 soldiers. It still represents an active threat to stability in the region and to Mauritania, specifically.

The United States has always responded generously to the humanitarian needs of the Mauritania people and we continue to do so. This year, for example, we are providing about \$7.5 million in Public Law 480 title II food aid.

The Peace Corps is carrying on a nearly 40-year tradition in Mauritania of doing exceptional grass roots development work under some of the most austere conditions imaginable. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the continued success of these invaluable programs.

The United States has also responded to assist Mauritania and its neighbors through the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a program designed to confront the threat in the Sahel through an integrated approach linking counterterrorism assistance, targeted development assistance, and public diplomacy outreach to prevent terrorist groups from using Mauritania or its neighbors as a safe haven. In managing this complex program, I will, if confirmed, draw on my long experience with the military as a U.S. Army officer and as a Foreign Service officer who has both studied and taught at senior military schools and who managed political-military programs in Cameroon, El Salvador, and Brazil.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Mauritania's decision to take a moderate and constructive approach in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict relieved a long-standing irritant in our relationship. That decision took concrete form with Mauritania's recognition of Israel in 2000. Mauritania remains only one of three Arab League members to recognize Israel.

Notwithstanding these improving fundamentals in the United States-Mauritanian relationship, we were quite skeptical when a coup brought to power a military junta that promised a transition to democracy. We strongly urged a prompt return to constitutional government via free and fair elections and suspended most forms of assistance.

Mauritania turned an exciting new page in its history in March of this year when the transitional military junta did indeed make good on its promise to establish democracy. That democracy, now the world's newest, under the leadership of President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, has moved boldly to address the problems facing the country. Working closely with Parliament, he has acted to increase transparency and accountability in the management of public resources, particularly those deriving from new and modest, but potentially growing, oil revenues. His government is working with the United Nations and Senegal to return expelled Afro-Mauritanians, thereby correcting an historical injustice while eliminating an obstacle to closer relations with an important neighbor. Perhaps most dramatically, his government has acted not merely to declare again that slavery is illegal, but for the first time in Mauritania's history to make it a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment. It has added penalties for government officials who fail to implement the law. These strong actions address concerns that have historically tempered any significant improvement in our bilateral relations.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as it moves to meet these monumental challenges, this new government looks to the United States for concrete support for a democratic Mauritania. The security dimension of our relationship is an important one and we should certainly maintain our robust security assistance. Mauritania also seeks our assistance in building democratic institutions and mechanisms of good governance, establishing the rule of law, and, above all, promoting economic development.

The success of this new democracy in a developing country that is both Arab and African is indeed important to our interests. If confirmed, my job would be to work with all of the relevant agencies of government to bring appropriate resources to bear. This would include, in particular, working to restore a modest USAID presence, so that multiple development and assistance programs are rational, sustainable, and informed by genuine development expertise. It would also include working with the Millennium Challenge Corporation to lay out a clear roadmap for the Mauritanian Government to achieve threshold status as quickly as possible. I will also work with the Mauritians to help them take full advantage of the opportunities offered by AGOA.

Finally, let me note that I am keenly aware of the often difficult conditions of service for our personnel in Mauritania as well as the Chief of Mission's personal responsibility for the safety and welfare of all Americans and United States Government employees in country. If confirmed, Mauritania would be my tenth overseas posting to a hardship assignment. I understand very well an ambassador's obligation to ensure the well-being, fair treatment, and high morale of mission staff and family members. If confirmed, I pledge to play such a role.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I look forward, if confirmed, to working with you, your distinguished colleagues, and members of your staffs to advance our agenda with Mauritania. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. I regret that we only have time to ask a few questions. I certainly do not want it to reflect a lack of interest in learning more because these are all important posts, in particular with regard to Nigeria. There are many issues that I'd like to pursue, but we need these posts filled and we do have a vote at 10:45, so I can only ask a couple of questions of each of you, but I look forward to future opportunities to continue our interactions.

Ambassador Sanders, the recent elections in Nigeria failed in large part because of deep patterns of corruption and political violence and impunity that pervade Nigeria's political system. Beyond the obvious issue of electoral reform, what should the United States be doing to press the Nigerian Government into addressing these underlying issues in a meaningful way?

Ms. SANDERS. I understand your concern, Senator, and we have the same concerns. In addition to election reform, we are looking at urging the Nigerian Government to focus on the underlying causes, such as rule of law, transparency, democracy, and human rights. We have several activities that are ongoing that we will look to strengthen during that period. First and foremost, there seems to be a commitment from the Yar'Adua government to look at these issues. He has announced several things that encourage us, particularly looking at fiscal responsibility. He has a Fiscal Responsibility Act that he is not only hoping for the Federal Government, but certainly for the states to support.

On the corruption issue specifically, Nigeria is certainly 146 on the transparency international list of 163 countries, so corruption is a key issue. We have several programs that we will continue. I'd like to highlight two of them quickly for you. The Nigerians have established a commission called the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. It, to date, has recovered \$5 billion in illicit funds, \$500,000 of that has gone back to American citizens, and there's another \$1 million in the pipeline to come back to American citizens.

They have also had 150 convictions that include one former governor. And the resources of the United States have been a part of that. We have helped them with money laundering techniques and counterfeit techniques. We provided training to the Financial Crimes Commission in a lot of areas. Treasury has sent technical assistance representatives out there to help them improve their ability to catch kingpins, to identify money trails, and to certainly help with setting up cases for convictions.

The other interesting thing that they have done is the Drug and Law Enforcement Agency—their version of the Drug Enforcement Agency. They have also fired people for corruption and for smug-

gling. We are getting ready to put in place a series of x-ray machines and sensors. We have programs with all the law enforcement agencies, as well as the military, because they play a role in security there. We're retraining, not only on techniques and law enforcement principles, but we're also including a human rights component in what we are providing in the training.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador.

Last week, militants in the Niger Delta kidnapped 11 State officials, alleging that the governor had reneged on an agreement to pay them for helping rig the April election. Hundreds of foreign oil workers and Nigerians have been kidnapped, including three young children and the elderly mother of a local politician. How will you work with national and local governments to stop these violent practices and to encourage greater attention and political will from the central government toward addressing the economic, environmental, and political conditions underlying the escalating unrest in the Niger Delta?

Ms. SANDERS. Currently, Senator, we have a Gulf of Guinea Energy and Security Initiative. It is a framework for dialog with the Nigerians and the oil majors regarding energy issues and security issues. We have programs now that help and train security in the riverine area of the Niger Delta. We are working on the underlying issues, in terms of development, looking at exchange programs that bring disparate groups together so they have an understanding of respect for diversity and they understand the need for civic responsibility, as well as focusing on some of the economic issues. We're looking at offering agricultural incentive programs, income generating programs like we do in other places in Nigeria. Because without addressing the underlying causes of the problems in the Delta, the problems will continue. So, we have an active ongoing dialog with the Nigerian Government, with the oil majors, and with other civil society and a local government organizations in the Delta to address some of these underlying issues.

The last person that was kidnapped was released in early August, and there have not been any kidnappings since then. But the security and welfare of Americans are very much high on my agenda, and as we move forward in the Delta, we will ensure that their security is paramount in terms of what we do in the Delta, in protecting our people.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Ambassador.

Mr. Wells, you emphasized your proven leadership skills, but you've never served in a United States Embassy and have no real experience in Africa. Why do you believe you're qualified to manage the Embassy in Banjoul? If confirmed, how do you plan to gain credibility among your staff and diplomatic counterparts from other embassies and with Gambian officials?

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and an excellent question.

I've had the opportunity in my 20-year career at the Department of State, in addition to having served as a Peace Corps Director for two tours overseas, to be involved in a number of change initiatives and development of leaders, including ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission. I think leadership of a chief of mission requires several things, one of which is certainly a knowledge of the interest

of our country and our citizens. Second, an awareness of the resources available to us to accomplish those ends.

And finally, I think the ability to articulate a vision that is both motivating and is results-driven, in order to provide your team with a sense that accomplishment is possible under that kind of a leadership.

I believe that my experiences, both with the Peace Corps and the State Department and other venues have well prepared me to accomplish that.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I think you alluded to this next subject, but if you could comment some more. Since the alleged coup attempt on March 2006, the Jammeh government has engaged in a number of practices that raise serious human rights concerns, including the harassment of journalists. Nearly a dozen journalists are in jail and many others are in exile, while countless murders of supporters of the President are suspected of responsibility contribute to an almost permanent climate of fear. It's no wonder that The Gambia is ranked 149th out of 168 countries on Reporters Without Borders annual Press Freedom Index. What measures will you take to restore personal security to media professionals and press freedom to the citizens of the Gambia?

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We, as a matter of necessity, must continue to engage the Government of the Gambia on these issues. First and foremost, I think it is essential that we continue our efforts to promote dialog, to support National Democratic Institute programs, to engage the legislature in their own efforts to monitor elections, and to provide seminars on civil military relationships. In addition, I think we need to exercise the leverage that we may have, in terms of assisting in additional economic development efforts. The loss of the MCC eligibility, for example, and the potential to regain that opportunity, may bode well as some leverage to gain President Jammeh's confidence in our ability to assist them in moving forward.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, sir.

And now, Mr. Boulware, Mauritania has a long history of corruption in the public sector. The recently elected government is taking a number of positive reforms toward transparency in the oil sector. What concrete steps is the United States taking to, first, encourage the anticorruption reforms, and second ensure that these reforms will be implemented and enforced?

Mr. BOULWARE. Certainly we're working with the government to continually engage them on the issue of corruption, and we do applaud the strong moves that the government has made, in terms of working with transparency and oil revenues. They're working closely, not only with the United States, but with the IMF and the World Bank to address these issues.

If confirmed, I will continue to seek ways in which we can bolster their capacity to govern justly and honestly. I think, ultimately, that's one of the limiting factors, is that the capacity to pool trained and qualified individuals is not as deep as it might be in some other places. And, that's an area where I think we can—we could reinforce that.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you. I thank all of you very much, and I wish you well as we go forward through the confirmation

process, and of course ultimately, assuming everything goes well, with you new posts. Thank you very much.

I dismiss this panel and ask the second panel to come forward. Thank you very much and appreciate this panel coming forward. Let's begin with the statement of Ambassador McGee.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES D. MCGEE, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE**

Mr. MCGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor and a privilege for me to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to be Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe. I appreciate the confidence that the President and Secretary Rice have in me by putting my name forth for another ambassadorship. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the administration, this committee, and Congress in advancing United States interests and in helping our efforts to put Zimbabwe back on the path of democracy and economic prosperity.

Although Zimbabwe once enjoyed a sound economy and vibrant democratic institutions, the country today is suffering under authoritarian misrule. The government continues to commit unspeakable human rights abuses, while enforcing policies that have produced economic collapse, food shortages, and the destruction of a once strong judicial, financial, and educational institutions. Regional stability is threatened as the people of Zimbabwe flee their rapidly deteriorating country for neighboring countries.

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I would continue our Government's efforts in assisting the people of Zimbabwe in their pursuit of a democratically elected government that respects human rights and the rule of law. Such a government could promote the welfare of its people by implementing the economic reforms needed to bring prosperity to Zimbabwe and contribute to regional growth and stability.

Mr. Chairman, it must be stated, that while the prospects for democratic transformation in Zimbabwe are very challenging, we remain strongly committed to facilitating peaceful change. Our goal must be that the presidential and parliamentary elections take place as scheduled for next year and meet international standards.

However, unless the Government of Zimbabwe quickly establishes conditions for a free and fair election and rigorously implements a level playing field, the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for next year, will not reflect the will of the Zimbabwean people. It is imperative that there be a substantial period of time for all candidates to campaign on a level playing field.

I feel that we in the United States must continue our efforts. Abandoning the people of Zimbabwe to the worst affects of their government's misrule, is not in America's interest. It is essential, now more than ever, for the United States to continue to support its support for civil society and pro-democratic elements in Zimbabwe. We need to play a major role in ensuring that these organizations survive the current repression, to participate in Zimbabwe's eventual recovery.

We must also continue our humanitarian assistance to the Zimbabwean people and ensure that it reaches the people in need. Resolution of Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis would stem

the flow of migrants seeking a better life outside of the country. It would restore Zimbabwe's contribution to regional economic growth, enable the country to feed itself, rather than depending on international handouts. Would a democratic and prosperous Zimbabwe, SADC, the Southern African Development Community, would be in a stronger—would be a stronger instrument of regional economic development, providing opportunities for African growth and for United States private investment.

Mr. Chairman, Zimbabwe is at an increasingly difficult point in its history. I welcome the opportunity to take on the challenge that will be faced by the next United States Ambassador to Zimbabwe. If confirmed, I will do my best to protect Americans and American interests, while working to help the people of Zimbabwe restore their country to a democratic and prosperous member of the international community.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear before you today and I'm happy to answer any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McGee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES D. MCGEE, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor and a privilege for me to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to be Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe. I appreciate the confidence that the President and Secretary Rice have in me by putting my name forward for your consideration. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the administration, this committee, and the Congress in advancing United States interests and in helping our efforts to put Zimbabwe back on the path of democracy and economic prosperity.

Although Zimbabwe once enjoyed a sound economy and vibrant democratic institutions, the country today is suffering under authoritarian misrule. The government continues to commit unspeakable human rights abuses while enforcing policies that have produced economic collapse, food shortages, and the destruction of once strong judicial, financial, health, and educational institutions. Regional stability is threatened as the people of Zimbabwe flee their rapidly disintegrating country to neighboring countries.

If confirmed, I would continue our government's efforts in assisting the people of Zimbabwe in their pursuit of a democratically elected government that respects human rights and the rule of law. Such a government could promote the welfare of its people by implementing the economic reforms needed to bring prosperity to Zimbabwe and contribute to regional growth and stability.

In undertaking this assignment, I would call on my years of experience in Africa and elsewhere, representing the United States and working to promote democratic values. During my 26 years in the Foreign Service, I have served as Ambassador to Swaziland, Madagascar, and the Comoros. In these and other assignments, I sought to strengthen our bilateral relations while advancing U.S. interests by pressing for democratic reforms. I worked closely with pro-democracy civil society organizations in Swaziland to help write and eventually enact the first constitution that country had seen in over 30 years. In Madagascar, I helped the country to prepare for and implement successfully free and fair elections following the election crisis of 2001. I would work diligently to strengthen pro-democracy organizations in Zimbabwe. I strongly believe that there is a deep reservoir of democratic knowledge, capacity, and desire in Zimbabwe that needs continuing support to challenge the government to enact democratic reforms and to keep hope alive that change is possible.

Mr. Chairman, it must be stated that while the prospects for democratic transformation in Zimbabwe are very challenging, we remain strongly committed to facilitating peaceful change. Our goal must be that the presidential and parliamentary elections take place as scheduled for next year and meet international standards. However, unless the Government of Zimbabwe quickly establishes conditions for a free and fair election and rigorously implements a level playing field, the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for next year will not reflect the will

of the Zimbabwean people. It is imperative that there be a substantial period of time for all candidates to campaign on a level playing field.

Still, we must continue our efforts. Abandoning the people of Zimbabwe to the worst effects of their government's misrule is not in America's interests. Returning Zimbabwe to a democratic state with a strong economy is necessary to promote regional stability and economic growth. Therefore, we must use the tools at our disposal to achieve the results we seek. The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act and our targeted sanctions program have increased the pressure on those individuals that have undermined democracy and prosperity. We are working with like-minded members of the international community to increase this pressure. We must continue to lend our support to regional efforts to pressure the Government of Zimbabwe to enact needed reforms. The United States strongly supports the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) initiative to resolve the political and economic crisis, but the Government of Zimbabwe continues its repression and intimidation of civil society, religious organizations, businesspeople, and political groups. It is essential now more than ever for the United States to continue its support for civil society and pro-democratic elements in Zimbabwe. We need to play a major role in ensuring that these organizations survive the current repression to participate in Zimbabwe's eventual recovery.

We must also continue our humanitarian assistance to the Zimbabwean people and ensure that it reaches the people in need. In fiscal year 2007, United States food aid amounted to over \$170 million. Today the United States is helping to feed nearly one-in-five Zimbabweans. Nonfood aid humanitarian assistance is approximately \$5.1 million, and HIV/AIDS programs were increased to \$31 million in fiscal year 2007. This funding is helping to deliver antiretroviral treatment to 40,000 Zimbabweans. These actions demonstrate the generosity and compassion of the American people.

Resolution of Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis would stem the flow of migrants seeking a better life outside Zimbabwe. It would restore Zimbabwe's contribution to regional economic growth and enable the country to feed itself, rather than depending on international handouts. With a democratic and prosperous Zimbabwe, SADC could be a stronger instrument of regional economic development providing opportunities for African growth and for United States private investment.

Zimbabwe is at an increasingly difficult point in its history. I welcome the opportunity to take on the challenges that will be faced by the next United States Ambassador to Zimbabwe. If confirmed, I will do my best to protect Americans and American interests while working to help the people of Zimbabwe restore their country to a democratic and prosperous member of the international community.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. I am happy to answer any questions you might have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador. I appreciated the strength and candor of your statement. The situation in Zimbabwe is one of the biggest disappointments that I've witnessed in 15 years, when so many other countries in Africa have had real positive development. So it is enormously important that that signal be sent and that, of course, that you follow through with what you said you were going to do with regard to this very challenging post.

Dr. McMullen

**STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD K. McMULLEN, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE STATE OF ERITREA**

Dr. McMULLEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you hear today. I'm honored that President Bush is nominating me for the position of Ambassador to Eritrea, and I'm grateful to Secretary Rice for her confidence and trust.

With the Chairman's indulgence, I'd like to acknowledge the presence of my wife, Jane, and our son, Owen, another son—excuse me, Wyatt, is here—Owen is in Australia and could not be here today.

Over the years as an American diplomat, I've developed a deep appreciation for the hardships and sacrifices faced by Foreign Serv-

ice families around the world. The support I have received from my wife and sons has been invaluable. They have made important contributions, in their own right, to enhancing America's standing abroad. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will work to promote U.S. interests, drawing on nearly 25 years of diplomatic service, much of it in hardship posts in the developing world.

As Deputy Chief of Mission in Rangoon, Burma, I strongly supported persecuted ethnic minority groups and the oppressed democratic movement, headed by Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, while maintaining a relationship with the ruling Hunta. If confirmed by the Senate, I will do my best to advance America's multiple goals in Eritrea amid a very difficult environment.

Eritrea once cooperated with the United States on regional stability in the Horn of Africa. The cooperation was important and appreciated. Today, the unresolved border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia poses a threat to regional stability. A repeat of the bloody 1998 to 2000 war would be ruinous to all involved and would undermine a number of U.S. objectives in the region and beyond. Reports of air train support for militant extremists in Somalia, including some with alleged links to terrorism, are very concerning. If confirmed, I will work to advance our national interest to reestablish cooperation with Eritrea on these issues and to ensure that the message of strong U.S. opposition to terrorism and its sponsors is consistently and unambiguously sent to all.

Mr. Chairman, we have grave concerns about human rights issues in Eritrea, including democracy, rule of law, freedom of the press, and religious freedoms. If confirmed, I will seek to promote greater respect for human rights, the establishment of democratic political cultures, and conditions conducive to addressing the country's diverse human development needs.

I strongly believe that the national interest of both the United States and the state of Eritrea would benefit from a return to a more cooperative bilateral relationship that characterized the early years of Eritrean independence. If confirmed, I will ensure that we undertake a strong public outreach program, emphasizing mutual respect, shared interest, and obligations in our common humanity.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, while the United States and Eritrea do not enjoy a close cooperative relationship, as we have in the past, Eritrea's strategic Red Sea location, its active regional role, and its economic and human potential require us to remain engaged. Working with you and other members of Congress, in conjunction with the dedicated employees of Embassy Asmara, I trust we can move toward achieving key American objectives, while encouraging Eritrea to realize its considerable potential.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. McMullen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD K. McMULLEN, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE STATE OF ERITREA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you here today. I am honored that President Bush has nominated me for the position of Ambassador to Eritrea and am grateful to Secretary Rice for her confidence and trust.

With the Chairman's indulgence, I would like to acknowledge the presence of my wife, Jane, and our son, Wyatt. Our son, Owen, who is studying in Australia, could not be with us here today. During nearly 25 years as a career diplomat, I have developed a deep appreciation of the hardships and sacrifices faced by Foreign Service families around the world. The support I have received from my wife and sons has been invaluable; they have also made important contributions to enhancing America's standing abroad.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will work to promote U.S. interests, drawing on nearly 25 years of diplomatic service, much of it hardship posts in the developing world, and in particular on my experience as Deputy Chief of Mission in Rangoon. In Burma I strongly supported persecuted ethnic minorities and the oppressed democratic movement headed by Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, while maintaining a working relationship with the ruling junta.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will do my best to advance America's multiple goals in Eritrea amid a very challenging environment. The cooperative bilateral relationship we once enjoyed with Eritrea has grown strained over the last decade.

Eritrea once cooperated with the United States on regional stability in the Horn of Africa. This cooperation was important and appreciated. However, the unresolved border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia poses a threat to regional stability; a repeat of the bloody 1998–2000 war would be ruinous to all involved and would undermine a number of United States objectives in the region and beyond. Reports of Eritrean support for militant extremists in Somalia, including individuals and groups with links to designated terrorists, are very concerning. If I am confirmed, I will work to advance our national interests, to reestablish cooperation with Eritrea on these issues, and to ensure that the message of strong United States opposition to terrorism and its sponsors is consistently and unambiguously sent to all.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we have grave concerns about human rights issues in Eritrea, including democracy, rule of law, freedom of the press, and religious freedoms. Thousands of individuals have been imprisoned, including two Eritrean employees of the United States Embassy detained since 2001. Several thousand prisoners of conscience are being held without charge in indefinite and incommunicado detention. If confirmed, I will seek to promote greater respect for human rights, the establishment of a democratic political culture, and conditions conducive to addressing the country's diverse human development needs.

I strongly believe that the national interests of both the United States and the State of Eritrea would benefit from a return to the more cooperative bilateral relationship that characterized the early years of Eritrean independence. If confirmed, I will ensure that we undertake a strong public outreach program emphasizing mutual respect, shared interests and obligations, and our common humanity.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, while the United States and Eritrea do not enjoy the close cooperative relationship of the past, Eritrea's strategic Red Sea location, its active regional role, and its economic and human potential require us to remain engaged. Working with you and other Members of Congress, in conjunction with the dedicated employees of Embassy Asmara, I trust that we can move toward achieving key American objectives while encouraging Eritrea to realize its considerable potential.

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. McMullen, I appreciated your statement very much.

And Dr. Nigro.

**STATEMENT OF DR. LOUIS J. NIGRO, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD**

Dr. NIGRO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm deeply honored to appear before you today. I thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for entrusting me with this important responsibility. If confirmed by the Senate, I would work with the committee and others in Congress to advance the interest of the United States in Chad and its troubled region.

Mr. Chairman, permit me to introduce to you my wife, Tarja, my brother, Robert, and his wife, Anita, who are here with me today before you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Welcome to all of you.

Dr. NIGRO. Thank you.

My wife and I met in Chad, where I served from 1988 to 1990 and we were married in Haiti in 1994 while serving in our embassy there. She has been an essential part of my Foreign Service career. Without her love, support, and counsel I could not be here before you today.

Mr. Chairman, United States interests in Chad have expanded considerably in the past few years. Chad today is the scene of a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. In eastern Chad, Darfur refugees and Chadian displaced persons flee violence in their homelands, while refugees from the Central African Republic seek safety in southern Chad. The country's vast spaces and porous borders leave it vulnerable to infiltration by terrorists. And Chad is now home to the largest—largest single United States private sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa, the Cameroon-Chad oil pipeline project.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has three key strategic goals in Chad. First, to maintain adequate levels of protection and assistance to all Sudanese and Central African refugees and displaced Chadians, and to encourage Chad to contribute to a durable solution to the Darfur conflict. Second, to strengthen Chad's capacity to deal with terrorist threats. And third, to support Chad's political evolution to democratic governance that respects human rights and upholds the rule of law.

This last is essential. A more democratic, and therefore more stable Chad, would be a more effective partner in addressing regional problems, including the Darfur conflict, chronic instability in the Central African Republic, and foreign terrorist threats.

There is much I hope to accomplish in Chad, if the Senate confirms—were to confirm my nomination. First and foremost, I would commit myself to ensuring the continued safety and welfare of the American community there. Second, I would reinforce our efforts on the ground to provide humanitarian relief to refugees and displaced persons and to expedite the deployment of peacekeeping forces to protect them and the humanitarian workers assisting them. Third, I would focus the embassy's work in support of multilateral efforts to restore peace and stability in Chad and in the region, to permit all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes safely. Fourth, I would maintain bilateral and multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism efforts. And finally, I would continue our efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, while helping Chad to deliver better health, educational, and other social services to its people, and promoting increased trade, investment, and economic growth.

With these as my goals, should the Senate decide to confirm my nomination, I would hope to help Chad to be more secure, more prosperous, and more democratic, as well as a more effective partner for the United States in the region.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and I welcome any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Nigro follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. LOUIS J. NIGRO, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the President's nominee to be the next Ambassador of the United States of America to the Republic of Chad. I thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for entrusting me with this important responsibility. If confirmed by the Senate, I will work with the committee and others in Congress to advance the interests of the United States in Chad and the region.

Joining me here today are my wife, Tarja, my brother, Robert, and his wife, Anita. My wife and I met in Chad where I served in 1988–1990; we were married in Haiti 1994 while serving there. She has been an essential part of my Foreign Service career; without her love, support, and counsel, I could not be here before you today.

Since joining the Foreign Service in 1980, besides my service in Chad and Haiti, I have served overseas in Guinea, Cuba, the Holy See, and the Bahamas, as well as in Washington in the Department of State's Policy Planning Council and Operations Center, and in the offices of Western European Affairs and of Canadian Affairs. I have also represented the Department of State at the U.S. Army War College and as Diplomat in Residence at the University of Houston.

Mr. Chairman, the Republic of Chad is situated in the heart of Africa and shares borders with six other countries, including Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic. Chad affects and is affected by events in all of its neighbors. Most of its estimated 10 million people—who form a rich mosaic of languages, religions, and ethnic groups—are herders or farmers, suffering levels of poverty, illiteracy, disease, and infant mortality that are among the highest in the world.

Chad, for many years, was synonymous with isolation and civil disorder. The USAID Mission was closed in 1995; the Peace Corps suspended operations indefinitely in 2006. But United States interests in Chad have expanded considerably in the past several years. Chad, today, is the scene of a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. In Eastern Chad, Darfur refugees and Chadian displaced persons flee violence in their homelands while refugees from the Central African Republic seek safety in southern Chad. The country's vast spaces and porous borders leave it vulnerable to infiltration by terrorists. And Chad is now home to the largest single United States private-sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa, the Exxon/Mobil-managed Cameroon-Chad oil pipeline project; Chad and the World Bank have agreed to an innovative system for monitoring and managing the revenues it produces.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has three key strategic goals in Chad. First, to maintain adequate levels of protection and assistance to the hundreds of thousands of Sudanese and Central African refugees and displaced Chadians, and to encourage Chad to contribute to a durable solution to the Darfur conflict. Second, to strengthen Chad's capacity to deal with terrorist threats. And third, to support Chad's political evolution to democratic governance that respects human rights and upholds the rule of law. This last is essential. A more democratic Chad would be a more stable and more effective partner in addressing regional problems, including the Darfur conflict, chronic instability in the Central African Republic, and foreign terrorist threats.

There is much I hope to accomplish in Chad, if the Senate decides to confirm my nomination as ambassador. First and foremost, I would commit myself to ensuring the continued safety and welfare of the American community. Second, working closely with my counterparts in the region and beyond, I would reinforce our efforts on the ground to provide humanitarian relief to refugees and displaced persons and to expedite the deployment of peacekeeping forces to protect them and the humanitarian workers assisting them. Third, I would focus the embassy's work in support of multilateral efforts to restore peace and stability in Chad and in the region, to permit the refugees and displaced persons to return home safely. Fourth, I would maintain bilateral and multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism efforts. Finally, I would continue our efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, while helping Chad to deliver better health, educational, and other social services to its people and promoting increased trade, investment, and economic growth.

With these as my goals, should the Senate confirm my nomination, I would hope to help Chad to be more secure, more prosperous, and more democratic—and therefore a more effective partner for the United States in the region.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I welcome any questions you may have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Doctor.

None of these are easy posts. They are tough and they are also very interesting and complex. I spent a fair amount of time in each of these countries and I certainly believe that each is very important, not only to security and issues within the region, but to the security of the United States. So I again thank you for your willingness to serve.

Ambassador McGee, the reality is that the United States has little positive influence with President Mugabe. Which nations or organizations do you think have the most weight in Harare and how can the United States actively engage with an affect their messages to the Zimbabwean Government?

Mr. MCGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that the regional platforms in southern Africa, such as the Southern Africa Developing Community, has tremendous amount of weight. They have influence, but unfortunately I do not believe that they've brought all of this influence to bear on the situation in Zimbabwe. I think it's incumbent upon the United States Government to continue to work with groups, such as SADC, to improve civil societies ability in Zimbabwe to prepare for the upcoming elections.

SADC has done this before. I can't say that they've done an excellent job on it. President Imbeke in South Africa has taken on a leadership role and to date, that leadership role still remains uncertain in our mind on how effective it has been. I do believe that we should continue to reach out to these organizations, as well as civil society elements within Zimbabwe to prepare the country for the upcoming elections.

Senator FEINGOLD. I too have had some concerns about the strength of SADCs approach with regard to Zimbabwe and appreciate your saying that. As you know, your predecessor, Ambassador Christopher Dell, was known for his persistent public criticism of the Government of Zimbabwe. Do you think that this was effective, and how would your approach resemble and how would it differ from that of Ambassador Dell?

Mr. MCGEE. I think Ambassador Dell's approach was absolutely necessary. The excesses of the Government of Zimbabwe had to be made known to the international community. And the fact that Ambassador Dell was willing, at a very personal price, to continue to put these excesses front and center reflects his long history of service to—and excellent service—to the United States Government. I think he was very effective in what he did.

My approach, if confirmed Mr. Senator, would be somewhat different. I believe that we still need to continue to make certain that any excesses are presented so that the international community is aware of them. At the same time, I think that we need to develop contacts within the existing government, looking for the day that there is regime, peaceful regime change within Zimbabwe. I think that we need to reach out and make certain that we do have interlocutors—that we have people that we can deal with in a new representative Government within Zimbabwe. And to that end, if confirmed by the Senate, I will work diligently to establish those types of contacts, looking for the day that we will have a government in Zimbabwe that's representative of the people of Zimbabwe.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador.

Dr. McMullen, a humanitarian crisis is unfolding in the Somali region of Ethiopia as the Ethiopian military intensifies its offensive against the Ogaden National Liberation Front rebels, which the Ethiopian Government claims is being backed by Eritrea. This crisis is linked to the simmering conflict in Somalia, which many say is a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. As United States Ambassador to Eritrea, what approach and specific measure would you use to manage the escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, at a time when the United States views the Ethiopians as an ally in the war on terror, and essential to ensure minimal stability in Somalia, but also, considering that Ethiopian troops are being accused of committing horrendous human rights abuses in both Somalia and in Southeastern Ethiopia.

Dr. MCMULLEN. It's a—the Horn of Africa right now is a very tangled web. And Eritrea has long had a practice of supporting opposition groups in the region, insurgent groups as well. They've done so in Ethiopia, in southern Sudan, in Darfur, eastern Sudan, where they were—played a key role in the recent eastern Sudan peace accord, also in Somalia.

Now, we need to make sure that they understand there's a clear distinction from the United States, between supporting opposition groups and being a state-sponsor of terrorism. Some of our concerns and public officials comments recently about reports of support for Islamic—the Islamic Courts in Somalia, other more extreme groups with alleged links to terrorist groups is something that is very concerning. One of my jobs is to make sure that the message of American opposition to terrorism and supporters of terrorism is loud and clear. And that should Eritrea decide to go that route, they do so with their eyes wide open.

Now, the border with Ethiopia, the bloody terrible war from 1998 to 2000, could reignite, and we hope to work closely with the other witnesses to the Algiers agreement that ended the 2000 war. That's the United States, Algeria, the African Union, European Union, and the United Nations, to help find ways to have both parties, Ethiopia and Eritrea, meet their obligations under that peace accord. We are strongly supportive of Secretary General Ban Ki Moon's offer of—to work, to develop mechanisms that will help build confidence between the two parties and lead to an implementation of the Algiers Accord, which right now both sides are not fulfilling their obligations. So, we hope that the border tensions can be diffused and we'll be very clear in our opposition to sponsors of terrorism and terrorism acts in the Horn.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Doctor, in September 2004, Eritrea was designated as a "Country of Particular Concern" under the International Religious Freedom Act.

Dr. MCMULLEN. Yes.

Senator FEINGOLD. What has been the impact of this designation on United States relations with Eritrea and on United States interests in the region?

Dr. MCMULLEN. The designation of being a country of particular concern brings with it the possibility of sanctions. The United States has imposed sanctions on Eritrea, in terms of some defense sales. Right now we have been working on the International Freedom of Religion's report. The Embassy in Asmara is one of the key

sources of information about that. We are concerned, not only about the—right now the Government of Eritrea allows four religions or denominations to practice religion there. There are others who are seeking to become registered, and even those four registered denominations or religions find that their freedom to operate and to worship as they wish are being imposed and encroached upon by the Government of Eritrea. As, if confirmed as ambassador, I will meet with religious leaders of all varieties in Eritrea and with government leaders in Eritrea, to continue to make them aware of our strong interest and support for international religious freedoms.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Doctor.

Dr. Nigro, while much attention has been focused on the refugees from Darfur and eastern Chad, instability in Chad itself is longstanding and worsening. In fact, in addition to 230,000 refugees from Darfur living in eastern Chad, there are now 180,000 Chadians who have been displaced from the internal conflict. There are currently no peace negotiations being conducted that include all armed opposition groups and there are no mechanisms in place to address and resolve the inter-ethnic conflict that has caused much of this internal displacement. What would you do as ambassador to work toward a comprehensive peace in Chad and what incentives would you offer—or consider offering—to all parties?

Dr. NIGRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is of course an important subject. If confirmed as Ambassador to Chad, I would continue to encourage all Chadians to engage in dialog aimed at bringing about political stability in Chad. Specifically, there are three paths to this end that are being pursued. Just last month, the Government of Chad, the ruling party, and most of the opposition parties agreed to an electoral reform program that could lead to free, fair, and credible legislative and communal elections in 2009. This would be an excellent first step on Chad's evolution toward sustainable democracy.

Also, we support fully the idea of a European Union-United Nations joint peacekeeping operation in eastern Chad, which would be aimed at protecting the refugees and displaced persons and would have the side-effect, the additional effect of reducing tensions in the region.

And finally, we support the African Union and United Nations-sponsored Darfur peace talks that should resume next month, as a way of reducing tensions in the area and giving Chad a chance to work more seriously on a transition to democracy.

Senator FEINGOLD. Doctor, in 2006 the Chadian Government substantially changed its much-heralded petroleum revenue law, which was designed to ensure a high-level of antipoverty spending. According to the IMF, Chad is now spending around 12 percent of its gross domestic product on the military, which makes it nearly impossible that the government will meet its target of spending 70 percent of its revenues on poverty-reduction activities. In your position as ambassador, how would you work to see that oil revenues are spent efficiently towards poverty reduction in Chad?

Dr. NIGRO. Thank you. If confirmed, I would work in at least two areas with the goal of encouraging Chad to do just that. Chad and the World Bank are still working under their agreement for levels

of government spending—70 percent on poverty reductuio sectors, and 30 percent on all other sectors. Now, the Chadians have not met that fully, but they are working toward it. So, we would encourage the World Bank and Chad to continue collaborating seriously under this agreement, as a way of helping the Chadians arrive at a reasonable level of spending in both sectors.

Second, I would urge the Chadians to arrive at full participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. They've gone part of the way. They need to go all the way to be able to access the assistance and the support that they would need to ensure that their petroleum revenues are managed in a responsible way and in conformity with recognized international standards.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Doctor.

I want to again apologize for the necessarily limited time we had for this hearing today, and I again encourage you as you go forward. The only other thing I want to say is, having just returned from a trip to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where we went to Northern Uganda, what you people do with the support of your families and staff is a tremendous contribution to our country. The places many of you are going are very challenging, so I sincerely wish you the best.

So thank you again , and I look forward to working with you as this process continues.

That concludes the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 10:23 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. ROBIN R. SANDERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Nigeria? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Nigeria? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. There are several areas of concern regarding human rights in Nigeria. They range from addressing unequal treatment and violence against women; improving prison conditions and the welfare of children, particularly trafficking in persons; fostering respect and appreciation for the strength that diversity brings to a nation; and better civil-military/police relations throughout the country so that the population does not feel intimidated.

If confirmed, I would seek to work with the United States Government inter-agency team at the United States Mission in Nigeria, the private sector, and NGOs to not only partner with the Nigerian Government and encourage its leadership and visibility on these issues, but also to provide United States stewardship and expertise in addressing the key issues noted above through dialog and programs.

On the democracy front—human rights and good governance to me are pillars of this—improving the rule of law, combating corruption, and increasing transparency with regard to the use of Nigeria's strategic resources are key challenges. If confirmed, I will work with "U.S. Team Nigeria" and a range of stakeholders on these issues. It will be important to ensure the new government's commitment to addressing these issues from both a policy and programmatic perspective, and for the United States to have a fluid approach to our activities that includes capacity building in key sectors, particularly justice, election reform, anticorruption, education, and health. All of these things must work in concert with good Nigerian Government leadership in order for Nigeria's evolving democracy to progress.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Nigeria in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. Nigeria and its people are in a phase where the new government is finding its footing in a range of sectors connected to better and just governance and improved human rights. The legacy inherited by the new government includes such major challenges as high unemployment, rampant poverty, health issues (HIV/AIDS, malaria), poor education, security challenges, and a crumbling infrastructure. Our “partnership with stewardship” and our “propitious engagement” will aim to assist Nigeria in addressing these fundamental challenges to improved human rights, economic growth and development, and a better way of life for the Nigerian people. If confirmed, I believe that our current operations plan which has specific focus on these areas will play a key role in supporting the government’s efforts to move the nation forward.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all employees of Mission Nigeria (Abuja and Lagos) promote not only the importance of, but also respect for, human rights. I see human rights issues as the core of a democratic society. I will not only encourage a human rights focus in what we say but also in what we do outwardly as well as within the Mission itself (among our own employees).

One of the things I hope to do—if confirmed—is develop an “embassy on the road” type activity where officers get out of the Mission and travel throughout the country to talk about U.S. values and human rights at the people-to-people level, not just with the government at the policy level. We need to do both. I believe in recognizing and highlighting superior service and certainly will do so in the area of human rights. I will provide leadership in ensuring that all are recognized for their important contributions toward advancing our human rights objectives in Nigeria.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. In virtually every assignment as a Foreign Service officer, I have been involved in promoting democracy and human rights. My engagement has ranged from the very personal to the policy level.

In my 28 years in the Foreign Service, I have mostly worked in countries in transition—fragile or nascent democracies that were addressing human rights, rule of law, and struggling with the principles of freedom of speech and association. In particular, in the Republic of Congo (ROC)—a post conflict country—I worked with the NGOs, academics, women’s groups, and journalists on civil-military/police relations (training and workshops); respect for ethnic diversity (programs for at-risk pygmy to breakdown stereotypes via ethnically diverse “school garden projects”); participatory democracy (strengthening the capacity of the national assembly); and, encouraging dialog and inclusion of the opposition. In addition to working in the war-torn Pool Region of ROC, which in many ways is similar to the Niger Delta, Embassy Brazzaville focused on community and grassroots organizations to help restart microenterprise programs; design excombatant training and education programs for youth, young women, and child soldiers; and workshops on freedoms of speech and association. In other posts such as Namibia and Senegal, we developed activities that highlighted respect for ethnic diversity; the importance of an independent judiciary and media; and the role of a robust national assembly. In all cases, the groundwork we laid played a role in where these countries are today.

Question. Oil companies operating in Nigeria have been severely criticized for alleged environmental destruction resulting from their operations. At the same time, immense oil profits from the Niger Delta region have certainly not flowed back in to the people living there. If confirmed, what steps would you take as ambassador to promote environmentally sustainable development and the equitable distribution of resources and to help Nigeria avoid the “resource curse”?

Answer. The environmental problems and lack of equitable distribution of resources in the Niger River Delta are amplified by poor infrastructure, lack of transparency in allocating oil revenue for development by local governments, poor education, high unemployment, security issues, and criminality. The Delta’s wetlands face serious environmental problems, but there are few modern empirical studies that fully document and detail the damage. Since oil majors have made some progress in preventing accidents, pipeline sabotage has emerged as the significant cause of environmental damage. Many of the oil companies do provide resources to state governments for development under the umbrella of the Niger Delta Develop-

ment Corporation (NOGG), but there are transparency issues within NDCC as to how these funds are used. We will continue to push for transparency in this area.

In addition, the United States regularly meets Nigeria and its international partners, including the oil majors. In fact, there is a framework for dialog called the "Gulf of Guinea Energy and Security Initiative," under which we are discussing various ways to bring our "partnership with stewardship" to these issues. For example, we have offered to provide training to strengthen customs enforcement and border security, raised the need for improved transparency in state and local budgets so that more resources can be directed to Niger development, and USAID is looking at options for addressing agricultural challenges in the region. We will continue to offer programs under this framework to address both these issues. We also are cooperating with the Government of Nigeria on coastal surveillance and on "train and equip" programs for a Nigerian riverine unit that could address fisheries violations, oil theft, piracy, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and environmental damage from unauthorized pipeline tapping. We encourage U.S. private sector partnerships in the Delta to focus on profitable agricultural livelihoods, technology transfer, constructive use of currently "flared" natural gas, creating more domestic refining capacity, developing biofuels for domestic use, building greater public access to telecommunications networks and health care, and curbing oil theft. From the United States Government side, both Ex-IM and TDA are focused on providing their products to address both the "flared gas," refining, and waste management issues.

Nigeria's federal government has an important role to play in addressing the challenges in the Delta, but we believe that the support of the powerful and well-resourced state governors is the key to any durable solution. USAID has worked with the governors and legislatures of several states to improve coordination, accountability, on development funding on poverty alleviation programs, and to projects to address agriculture challenges in the region with the hope of expanding some of its income generating projects to the area. These initiatives now must be implemented and incorporated into a regional strategy. There remains a widespread lack of transparency of budgets, particularly at the state and local level. The federal government must establish and empower more effective auditing and inspector general functions. Overall, Nigeria needs to radically refocus its efforts to use oil revenues in a transformative way to promote development and address poverty, and by all indications the new government has taken some steps in that direction by seeking to put in policies to address these revenues. Continued use of oil revenues to build patronage and personal wealth is a recipe for serious instability in the country. Consequently, we are funding participation by local Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in Nigeria's Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to promote transparency in the oil sector. Nigeria is the only country in the EITI that has to date invited NGOs in as stakeholders in this process.

If confirmed, I will continue to press the Nigerian federal and state governments, as well as the oil majors, to follow through on these efforts, particularly under the framework of the "Gulf of Guinea Initiative," and further cooperate with us through its Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and other institutions, to combat corruption, smuggling, and other illegal acts.

Question. Sadly, corruption is almost a hallmark of business and government in Nigeria. At the same time, HIV/AIDS has hit Nigeria with massive force: an estimated 3 million Nigerians are HIV positive. Through PEPFAR, United States assistance to Nigeria to help fight HIV/AIDS has dramatically increased in recent years, from \$163.6 million in fiscal year 2006 to \$304 million in fiscal year 2007, and will likely climb still higher next year. If confirmed as ambassador, what do you envision would be the particular challenges of fighting HIV/AIDS in a country so known for corruption? How would you address those challenges and others associated with managing such a large program?

Answer. The potential impact of HIV/AIDS is indeed a major security and health issue both for the country and the region as a whole. Issues of governance and accountability in Nigeria create specific challenges in the fight against HIV/AIDS in programming with either public or NGO sectors. The management of U.S. Government PEPFAR assistance on the ground is highly cognizant of this challenge and has a solid strategy to ensure accountability and results.

Although they coordinate many of their activities with the Government of Nigeria to ensure that there is a link with country's national HIV/AIDS plan, the Departments of State (DOS) and Defense (DoD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) generally do not fund the Government of Nigeria directly, but rather have almost all of their funds going primarily through international implementing partners either via contracts or cooperative agreement grants.

There are some limited exceptions. During fiscal year 2007, DoD provided \$100,000 to the Nigerian Ministry of Defense for HIV/AIDS activities.

In fiscal year 2008, CDC is planning to issue a Request for Applications that would make available significant resources to the Ministry of Health's National AIDS program. The U.S. Government supports institutional capacity-building within the Government of Nigeria to improve its systems for greater transparency and accountability.

United States Government PEPFAR programming decisions are run through the interagency United States Government Nigeria Country Team for management and strategy development, which ensures that there is full transparency and communications regarding the selection of implementers and in the funding allocations, and types of programs to ensure they are in line with our goals and objectives for PEPFAR resources. Of note, the interagency United States Government team in Nigeria most recently won the PEPFAR "Best Program" award for their effectiveness in advancing the goals and objectives of PEPFAR.

It is critical to the success of the PEPFAR program that partners implementing HIV/AIDS programs adequately meet the management standards, including financial management standards, set by the U.S. Government. While it is PEPFAR policy worldwide to engage with and expand the capacity of local organizations, there is a dearth of local organizations in Nigeria that can meet these high standards. The United States Government has engaged with local and international partners to strengthen the management capacity of Nigerian civil society organizations. U.S. Government agencies generally conduct comprehensive and extensive pre-award surveys for all local partners, as well as direct monitoring and supervision by cognizant technical officers with regular and in-depth site visits to ensure that expenditures match activities and results on the ground.

Given the security situation in the Niger River Delta, PEPFAR funds are not being used directly there. However, the United States continues to engage with the Government of Nigeria on addressing the challenges in the Delta.

U.S. Government funding decisions and programmatic initiatives are shared with other key bilateral and multilateral donors to ensure that proposed activities are additive and harmonized with other donor-funded efforts. The U.S. Government team is actively involved in several initiatives to expand the breadth of donor coordination, with both CDC and USAID sitting on the Development Partners Group for HIV/AIDS whose mandate is to maximize efficiencies in donor funding for the HIV response.

RESPONSES OF BARRY L. WELLS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps—State Department Relations?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this cable?

Answer. I fully understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this cable in order that the Peace Corps may maintain its independent posture from the concerns and strategy of our foreign policy.

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that "the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy" and that "the Peace Corps' role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. Government agencies"?

Answer. I fully understand and accept that "the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy" and that "the Peace Corps' role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. Government agencies."

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise your chief of mission "authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies"?

Answer. Per Secretary Rice's requests in 3.B of the cable, I pledge to exercise my chief of mission "authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not

conflict with U.S. objectives and policies." Autonomy and flexibility are essential to the Peace Corps' ability to work effectively at the grassroots level, and the U.S. Mission under my leadership, if confirmed, will not interfere with the day-to-day operations of the Peace Corps so long as they do not conflict with U.S. foreign policy objectives and policies. I believe my experience as a Peace Corps country director and as a State Department employee will help me understand and follow the guidelines if I am confirmed as ambassador.

RESPONSES OF BARRY L. WELLS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in The Gambia? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in The Gambia? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. The recent deterioration of press freedom and political rights are the most pressing human rights issues in The Gambia. The negative human rights trend has been particularly evident since the failed coup in March 2006, as authorities have cracked down on the media and other forms of public dissent. Many of the suspects arrested for participation in this plot have received hefty sentences, and the fairness of their trials and respect for their rights remains questionable. Press freedom in The Gambia has deteriorated significantly in recent months. Several journalists have been arrested arbitrarily, and the Committee to Protect Journalists ranked The Gambia as the No. 1 country for press freedom deterioration in May 2007.

If confirmed as United States Ambassador to The Gambia, I will ensure that engagement with the Jammeh government on these slippages remains a central priority of the United States Mission. I will pay close attention to developments in this area and continually stress to the Government of The Gambia (GOTG), at both ministerial and working levels, that press freedom, civil liberties, and transparency are essential pieces of functional multiethnic state. To promote human rights within the government and amongst the population at large, I will use all of the diplomatic tools available. I will encourage the GOTG to improve its human rights and civil liberties records in order to reestablish Millennium Challenge Account eligibility. I will encourage democracy assistance by organizations such as the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute utilize other available funds to support trainings for journalists. It is my hope that as a result of these actions, the GOTG will make measurable progress toward respecting the political rights of its citizens and nurturing an independent press.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in The Gambia in advancing human rights and democracy in general? Gambia appears to be engaged in a downward slide in terms of increasing human rights abuses, restrictions on political rights and liberties, and corruption. If confirmed as ambassador, how would you seek to reverse this downward trajectory or respond to it if it continues?

Answer. Lack of resources, training, and institutional capacity in The Gambia limit our ability to address human rights in The Gambia. The United States and other donor nations have programs in place to assist in overcoming these challenges. The U.S. Embassy works with both national and international NGOs that monitor press freedom and seek to improve institutional capacity. If confirmed, I will continue this cooperation.

Another potential obstacle to addressing the recent decline of The Gambia's human rights record is an adverse reaction by the Jammeh government. If confirmed as ambassador I will engage the Gambian Government on human rights in the most sensitive of possible manners. I will emphasize that The Gambia is a sovereign state but at the same time, I will urge the GOTG to increase government transparency and to protect its peoples' political and press rights as a means of furthering its legitimacy and resultant long-term stability. On a personal level, I will seek to mend the United States' tense relationship with President Jammeh while making clear that the U.S. Government holds human rights and government transparency in the highest regard.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. Promoting democracy and human rights in The Gambia is a top priority for the country team in Banjul. Promoting human rights is a key element of the job description of several country team members. Their efforts to promote human rights are evaluated in the annual review process, and I will recommend awards for those embassy staff who have performed in an exemplary manner.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. For the last 17 years I have been a member of the Board of Directors of the National Multi-Cultural Institute (NMCI) which is dedicated to promoting human rights and cultural awareness. A core agenda for NMCI has been bringing attention to and the eradication of human slavery. As part of NMCI's semiannual conferences, a 2-day workshop is dedicated to antislavery issues—"Cultural Considerations in Assisting Victims of Slavery." Under board leadership, NMCI has also established one of the most comprehensive Web site search engines on resources related to human trafficking. I personally moderated a panel discussion on ending trafficking at one of our semiannual conferences. I believe my efforts on behalf of victims of slavery have brought much needed attention to this inhumane practice.

Question. Please explain, in what manner has the Jammeh government "provided steadfast, tangible support for the global war on terrorism," as reported by the Bush administration in its fiscal year 2008 budget request? If confirmed as ambassador, how would you seek to strengthen this relationship and to balance security interests and concerns about human rights and democratization?

Answer. The Government of The Gambia has, over the last several years, cooperated closely with United States security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies to guard against the spread of extremism in The Gambia and to ensure that The Gambia does not become either a recruiting ground or a transit zone for international terrorist organizations.

If confirmed, I would seek to continue this cooperation, and help to strengthen The Gambia's technical ability to both control its own borders and prevent the flow of funds to terrorist organizations.

I firmly believe that, in the long run, stable democracies are our best and most dependable allies in the war on terror. Promotion of human rights and democratization is thus a long-term investment in our own security. Conversely, security is necessary for democracy and human rights to flourish. I therefore see our security and human rights goals as complementary, rather than in competition, and believe we can pursue both simultaneously in The Gambia.

RESPONSES OF HON. JAMES D. MCGEE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What, in your view are the most pressing human rights issues in Zimbabwe? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. The Government of Zimbabwe has engaged in a systematic campaign of violence and intimidation against the democratic opposition, labor unions, university students, and others, coupled with the use of repressive legislation, designed to abridge freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, political organization, and access to the media. Government security forces have engaged in killings, abductions, torture, beating, and unlawful arrests and detention. With much of the population facing critical food shortages, the government has also used food distribution to manipulate support for the ruling party.

If confirmed, I would speak out against regime injustices and work diligently to support and strengthen pro-democracy civil society organizations. I would also work to identify additional members of the regime responsible for developing and implementing Zimbabwe's antidemocratic policies and coordinate with Washington to isolate them by including them on the list of regime supporters subject to U.S. economic and travel sanctions.

I would also urge the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to seek an end to the Government of Zimbabwe's political repression and violence, and to ensure that conditions are put in place to allow a free and fair election to take place in Zimbabwe in 2008.

In taking these steps, I would hope to increase United States and international pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe to implement the reforms needed to conform to internationally recognized human rights standards.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Zimbabwe in advancing human rights and democracy in general? Please explain your understanding of why the administration's fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget Justification for Zimbabwe does not include funds for human rights or rule of law programs, given the systematic violation of human rights by the Government of Zimbabwe and its apparent lack of respect for the rule of law?

Answer. The biggest obstacle to addressing human rights issues in Zimbabwe is the Mugabe regime's determination to stay in power, regardless that Zimbabweans are suffering and the economy is dying. The authoritarian Mugabe government's dominant control of the political process and the impunity with which its security forces suppress efforts to promote democracy are challenges that must be faced in advancing human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe.

The administration's fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) includes funds to promote human rights and the rule of law through the work of partners within Zimbabwean civil society.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. The United States plays a crucial role in advancing human rights throughout the world. If confirmed, the advancement of human rights in Zimbabwe would be one of the top priorities of my tenure. I would lead the Mission's work on human rights by speaking out and engaging with the country's civil society community on human rights issues. To the extent possible I would encourage Government of Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) officials to urge the implementation of needed reforms. I would encourage my staff to engage on human rights issues by ensuring that addressing human rights is included in the work requirement statements of appropriate Foreign Service officers (FSO) and stressing the importance of that work in employee-supervisor counseling sessions. I would note the accomplishments in the field of human rights in annual FSO personnel evaluations and would look for opportunities to nominate for Department of State and Mission awards those officers who excel in promoting human rights.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. During my 26 years in the Foreign Service, I have consistently sought to advance U.S. interests by pressing for human rights and democratic reforms. The most significant actions were in Swaziland and Madagascar, where I had the honor of serving as United States Ambassador. In Swaziland, I worked closely with pro-democracy civil society organizations to help write, and eventually enact, the first constitution that country had seen in over 30 years. This effort was an important achievement in a country that has a deeply ingrained traditional society, ruled by an absolute monarch. The new constitution, while largely confirming the king's authority, specifically delineated some basic rights for the people.

In Madagascar, I helped the country prepare for and successfully implement free and fair elections following the election crisis of 2001.

These elections have proven to be an important event in the country's democratic development.

In each case, the advance of democracy has strengthened U.S. relations with those countries and improved the lives of the people.

Question. In your statement before the committee, you offered a forceful condemnation of the Zimbabwean Government's economic policies and political repression. If confirmed as ambassador, what would you do to monitor and seek to improve the economic and humanitarian plight of the people of Zimbabwe, given a limited range of available tools?

Answer. If confirmed, I would place special importance on monitoring the accelerating economic collapse and humanitarian tragedy wrought by the Mugabe regime's politically inspired policies. With both Zimbabwean and multilateral inter-

locutors, I would press publicly and privately for the political and economic reforms needed to restore democracy and economic prosperity.

As ambassador, I would seek to ensure that United States programs providing humanitarian assistance and HIV/AIDS treatment were sustained with strong support and sufficient resources in an effort to relieve the suffering of those left vulnerable by the Government of Zimbabwe's misguided policies and poor governance. I would pay particular attention to the delivery of legal, medical, and psycho-social assistance to human rights defenders and members of civil society who have suffered abuse and torture at the hands of the government.

Question. In your opinion, what are the most important steps that the international community should take within the coming months to promote a greater chance at free and fair elections in Zimbabwe in 2008 or, at least, to provide a broader foundation for democratization as a whole in the country?

Answer. I believe the international community should strongly support the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) efforts to resolve the political and economic issues confronting Zimbabwe.

The international community must impress upon SADC and the Mugabe regime the fact that the next elections will not be accepted unless a level playing field is established, and the Government of Zimbabwe rigorously implements the reforms that result from the SADC talks between the ruling and opposition parties. International monitoring of the pre-election electoral environment, as well as election-day voting will be critical to certifying the legitimacy of the upcoming elections.

In the meantime, the international community should lend its weight to supporting democratic elements in Zimbabwe and pressing the Government of Zimbabwe to end regime-sponsored violence against its critics.

RESPONSES OF MARK M. BOULWARE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corp-State Department Relations?

Answer. Yes, I have.

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this cable?

Answer. Yes, I understand and agree to abide by the principles in this cable that guide the Department's dealings with the Peace Corps.

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that "the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy" and that "the Peace Corps's role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies"?

Answer. Yes. I understand and accept this.

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise our chief of mission "authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies"?

Answer. Yes, I pledge to do so.

RESPONSES OF MARK M. BOULWARE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Mauritania? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Mauritania? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. President Abdallahi has already begun to address the two most pressing human rights issues—the eradication of slavery and the repatriation of Mauritanian citizens unjustly expelled from their own country. The United States is contributing \$500,000 to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assist with the repatriation effort and, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the success of this project.

The Government of Mauritania's decision to criminalize slavery is a welcome move and an imperative first step. Criminalization is a necessary tool for instances

of outright slavery but is less useful for addressing passively accepted hereditary servile relationships based on caste. In order to make real progress in establishing equality, educational outreach will be required to erode the traditional myth that dependency relationships are the natural order. Additionally, it is essential that viable economic alternatives exist both for those trapped in servitude and those grown dependent upon the exploitation of others. If confirmed, I would use the tools of public diplomacy to assist the government in its efforts to educate the people. I see our development assistance as a necessary component to promote economic growth.

Democracy itself is the most powerful tool for the promotion of human rights. The former regime of President Taya had a poor human rights record. Succeeding governments have attempted to improve respect for human rights generally in the country. The recently elected government has generally created a more tolerant atmosphere in Mauritania. Parliamentary elections in 2006 coupled with the Presidential elections in March, have created a situation where numerous parties are becoming involved in the political process. Recognized and unrecognized political parties and NGOs are operating freely. Freedom of expression has generally been respected. Most political prisoners (primarily Islamic radicals) have been released, although prisoners charged with suspected terrorist ties remain incarcerated.

Consolidating Mauritania's new democracy will require both robust economic growth and the development and strengthening of mechanisms of good governance. If confirmed, I will work with all of the appropriate agencies of the U.S. government to bring the necessary human and financial resources to bear in support of these objectives. I believe that through these actions the United States can contribute to the long-term flourishing of democracy in Mauritania while also assuring that it remains resistant to extremism and the destabilizing efforts of terrorists.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Mauritania in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. As noted above, the hereditary dependency relationships that give rise to the worst abuses of human rights are rooted in longstanding tradition reinforced by economic hardship. Convincing Mauritians to break with these traditions will be a significant challenge to the new government and those who seek to assist it in this historic endeavor. As Americans, we have considerable experience in dealing with similar problems. If confirmed I would seek opportunities to share that experience in order to help Mauritania chart a course toward genuine equality, social and political inclusion, and economic opportunity. Advocacy and education alone, however, will not be sufficient to end dependency relationships and their attendant abuses unless there are viable economic alternatives. For that reason, achieving sustainable economic growth is an imperative but difficult challenge.

Drought, desertification, sparse resources, and a generally low level of education are complicating factors that must be addressed.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the entire mission understands that democratization and promoting human rights are key priorities on our agenda in Mauritania and are essential elements in our effort to counter terrorism in the Sahel. I would spearhead a robust public diplomacy effort to raise these issues in public forums to mirror our similarly themed engagement with the government and civil society. I would ensure that these goals are clearly articulated and included in the work requirements statements of officers engaged in human rights activities. If confirmed, I would use counseling, evaluation, and recommendation of awards for outstanding performers to promote active engagement on human rights and the promotion of democracy.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. As Deputy Chief of Mission in Cameroon and El Salvador and as Consul General in Rio de Janeiro, I had significant responsibilities for the promotion of human rights and democracy. I monitored the developments relating to human rights and oversaw human rights reporting, frequently engaging host governments, political parties, and representatives of civil society on these issues.

In Cameroon, for example, I organized the embassy's comprehensive election observation program for legislative and presidential elections. These efforts demonstrated the strong U.S. interest in democratization and helped to preserve political space for opposition parties. When the editor of an opposition newspaper was jailed, I made a public visit to the newspaper's office to underscore U.S. concerns. I maintained personal relationships with the principal opposition party leaders to learn of their concerns and to demonstrate U.S. support for political inclusion. I managed our use of democracy funding to foster emerging civil society groups such as a young journalists association and an NGO advocating for the rights of the handicapped.

In El Salvador, I coordinated efforts to foster mature and productive relations between the party in power and opposition parties composed of former rebels. I worked closely with USAID to strengthen the professionalism of the legislative branch and to build infrastructure for effective outreach to constituents. I oversaw the implementation of programs to support workers' rights in the garment industry, personally calling on the manager of one factory to underscore U.S. concerns about anti-union activities.

In Rio de Janeiro, I worked closely with public diplomacy colleagues to address issues of racial inequality by sharing U.S. experience with this challenge through a robust speakers program. The U.S. Consulate collaborated with the Library of Congress and a local university to highlight the achievements of Afro-Brazilians. Working with the Motion Picture Association and local artists, we sponsored an African American/Afro Brazilian film festival.

These activities and others were important for a number of reasons, not least among them the goal of ensuring that foreign publics knew that the United States stood squarely on the side of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. Similarly, foreign governments and officials knew that our close monitoring of these issues ensured that lapses or abuses would not go unnoticed and would affect our bilateral relations.

While my actions were not always as completely transformative as I might have hoped, I believe that their impact was nonetheless significant and useful. Although elections in Cameroon were seriously flawed, our active engagement helped to deter some abuses and helped to preserve some political space for opposition parties and candidates. Similarly, our very close monitoring of workers' rights in El Salvador and our active engagement with employers and the host government contributed to concrete improvements in working conditions. Our efforts in Brazil contributed significantly to the initiation of a public dialog about racial equality and inclusion and subsequent policy decisions to promote affirmative action.

Question. Mauritania is a country with a deep and ongoing history of ethnic and social segregation, discrimination, and even slavery. If confirmed as ambassador, how would you seek to promote social, political, and economic inclusion and the elimination of the caste system?

Answer. In addition to the enforcement of laws criminalizing slavery, educational outreach, and economic development are essential tools for the effective promotion of social, political, and economic inclusion. If confirmed, I would draw on my experience in Brazil of sharing America's history of successfully confronting similar issues in our own national development. I would seek to set a positive personal example by reaching out to all segments of Mauritanian society to ensure that all activities of the Mission demonstrate the kind of inclusion that we want to promote. I would continue and seek to increase our support for girls' education. Above all, I would seek to bolster the efforts of the Mauritanian Government to ensure that democracy brings meaningful improvement to the lives of all Mauritians.

Question. What are the key steps that Mauritania must take to consolidate its reportedly successful democratic transition? How can the United States most effectively support this process?

Answer. The successful March elections mark the first time since independence that a regime has been brought to power by free and fair elections. Mauritania is in the midst of what looks to be one of the most successful democratic transitions in recent African history.

Consolidating democracy in a country where four of the last six governments were brought to power by military coups will require working to ensure that the military understands its proper role in a democracy and is subordinate to civilian authority. Political party development is important to democratic consolidation as is the development of responsive and transparent government. Democracy also requires a judicial system that is not only independent but also capable, and a press that is both free and responsible.

The United States can effectively support all of these objectives. The emergence of a still small but real terrorist threat in the subregion provides the military with a legitimate role in defense of the nation. Our military engagement under the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership provides the United States with the means to assist Mauritania's military in playing that role while simultaneously providing complementary training to promote respect for human rights and subordination to civilian leadership. Moreover, the growing development component of the partnership will increasingly provide the United States with the means not only to assist Mauritania in building the institutions that are essential to good governance but to promote sustainable economic growth as well.

RESPONSES OF DR. RONALD K. McMULLEN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Eritrea? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Eritrea? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. The Government of Eritrea's human rights record is abysmal and getting worse. Fourteen years after independence, national elections have yet to be held, and the constitution has never been implemented. The government has severely restricted civil liberties, and arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture are serious problems. Security forces detain and arrest parents and spouses of individuals who have evaded national service or fled the country, despite the lack of a legal basis for such action. Religious freedoms are restricted, and the United States has annually designated Eritrea as a Country of Particular Concern since 2004 and has imposed sanctions accordingly.

If confirmed, I will ensure that human rights remain a fundamental focus and an essential element in all of our activities. I will raise these issues in frequent discussions with Eritrean authorities, the press, opinion makers, and civil society. Public diplomacy efforts offer a mechanism to raise the profile of human rights issues and stress the importance the United States places on human rights in Eritrea. Despite tight government control of all media outlets in Eritrea, external media and the Internet still provide mechanisms for disseminating our human rights messages within the country. I will also seek out opportunities to engage Eritrean Government officials on a broad spectrum of human rights issues. If confirmed, I will work diligently to persuade key officials that upholding international standards of human rights is in the best interest of the country and the government.

If confirmed, I will also seek to build bridges to the islands of civil society allowed to function in this single-party state and engage the Eritrean public, private, and official spheres on human rights issues. Religious leaders, teachers, the business community, and farmers' cooperatives play a key role in the lives of many Eritreans. If confirmed, I will work to persuade Eritrean officials to adhere to their commitments under the Vienna Convention and allow American diplomats to travel outside Asmara to visit churches, mosques, schools, hospitals, prisons, police stations, military facilities, businesses, civic associations, and farm cooperatives to listen and to send the message that the United States is committed to working with those who seek to promote international standards of human rights in Eritrea.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Eritrea in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. There are numerous serious obstacles to addressing specific human rights concerns in Eritrea. The travel restrictions imposed by the Eritrean Government on embassy staff make it very difficult to move about the country and meet with people from different regions and backgrounds. Eritrean nationals may not leave the country without permission from their government, making free participation at workshops, seminars, or educational activities difficult. Individuals can be pressed into national service for decades on end, with little warning or compensation. All land and most productive assets are state controlled.

If confirmed, I face the prospect of being declared "Persona Non Grata" by Eritrean officials for the vigorous pursuit of human rights objectives, as do all American members of Embassy Asmara. The embassy's Eritrean employees face even more imposing obstacles, including arrest and imprisonment. The arrest of locally engaged staff, such as the two Foreign Service nationals detained since 2001, may intimidate and discourage some staff members from vigorously pursuing our strong human rights agenda and may cause potential contacts to avoid meeting with us.

When Americans are arrested or in trouble in Eritrea, the Government of Eritrea rarely informs the embassy and rarely allows access to American citizens, particularly if the American citizen has some family or historic tie to Eritrea or the region. The lack of press and other media freedoms means that local news is state-controlled and often anti-American. In short, the Eritrean Government's draconian controls on all aspects of society make our efforts to promote human rights extremely difficult—and all the more important.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. Upon my arrival in Asmara, if confirmed, my first country team meeting will include a request for a detailed briefing on Mission activities in support of our human rights objectives and an invitation to a brainstorming session on how we, as a team, could better achieve these goals. Further, I will ensure that each officer's Work Requirements Statement includes the promotion of human rights, as appropriate. If confirmed, I will insist that a sizeable portion of our discretionary funding is available for public diplomacy, travel, and other activities that directly support human rights goals. Likewise, these goals will be included in the Mission Strategic Plan and other important planning documents. The timely completion of a comprehensive Human Rights Report will be one of my top priorities. I believe in the old adage, "an organization becomes what it rewards." If confirmed, I will ensure that the embassy's awards committee is informed of the high value I place on the vigorous promotion of human rights.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. While serving as Deputy Chief of Mission for 3 years in Rangoon, Burma, I was personally involved in numerous activities to promote human rights and democracy in that Orwellian society. Working with oppressed ethnic minorities, religious leaders, former political prisoners, and members of Burma's hard-pressed democracy movement, I provided life-sustaining assistance, hope, and a clear signal of American commitment to democracy in Burma. I had very close personal and professional relations with key leaders of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy. I met with leaders of the Democracy 1988 generation and ethnic minority groups struggling for their rights. Many of these activities I undertook without the knowledge or consent of the junta. Some of those with whom I interacted would be sent to prison should the details of these activities be made public. I would be willing to provide details in a classified briefing if desired.

A couple of nonsensitive incidents can be made public without repercussion. When the junta decided to build a military-owned condo complex on the site of a large cemetery, family members were given just 48 hours to exhume and move the remains of their loved ones. I went to the cemetery to express my outrage, personally paid the exhumation expenses for a number of families, and listened to the life stories of many of those being exhumed—a large number of whom were from the oppressed Karen ethnic minority group. Many of the families expressed gratitude for my presence and moral support.

I also supported Rangoon's Free Muslim Hospital, an impoverished facility that provided service to Rangoon's destitute of all religions and was the caregiver of first and last resort for many sick former political prisoners, including Buddhist monks imprisoned for their anti-junta activities. I gave excess medicines and supplies from the embassy's medical unit whenever possible. After one Fourth of July celebration, I brought two vans full of floral bouquets (donated to the Independence Day reception by other embassies and companies) and distributed them to patients in the Muslim Free Hospital. Many destitute young mothers and elderly patients in the hospice ward seemed particularly grateful. This also angered the junta, and their press lackeys speculated for days about this strange act of American goodwill to the dregs of Burmese society in a Muslim hospital.

While serving as Charge d'Affaires in Suva, Fiji, I played a role in keeping that country from descending into a racial civil war. During an armed take-over of parliament that lasted 58 days, an American reporter was seized by armed rebels inside Parliament. Using local contacts, I obtained the cell phone number of the rebels spokesman and persuaded him to release the American journalist within 20 minutes. A few days later, after receiving a call for help, I drove an embassy car around rebel and military roadblocks, through a ditch, and over a rugby field to evacuate

two American missionary families who were trapped when a bloody firefight broke near their homes.

Several months later, when the subsequent government agreed to a U.N.-monitored election to resolve fundamental issues, powerful chiefs of the central highlands threatened to disrupt the elections. I went on a week-long trip to call on many of the powerful chiefs to convince them that this was against their best interests. I drank gallons of kava—a traditional drink made from the ground root of a pepper plant—as I persuaded the chiefs not to disrupt the elections. The Foreign Service Institute now uses this experience in a training segment called “Kava Diplomacy.”

Question. Bilateral relations between the United States and Eritrea are currently very poor. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, has indicated that the United States Government is considering designating Eritrea as a “state sponsor of terrorism” for its alleged support of al-Qaeda-linked Islamist militants in Somalia. How do these developments shape your approach to preparing for a potential post as Ambassador to Eritrea?

Answer. As I prepare for a potential posting to Eritrea, I will continue to meet with United States officials who can offer insights on Eritrea’s actions in the region and on the potential impact of designating Eritrea a state sponsor of terrorism.

To date, the United States has not designated Eritrea a state sponsor of terrorism, but we are very concerned about its support for armed opposition groups, some with reported links to terrorism. We will continue to monitor Eritrea’s behavior and interaction with suspect groups. Eritrea’s actions have contributed to instability in the region, and it is critical for Eritrea to understand that there are consequences to this policy. If confirmed, I will seek to influence the Eritrean Government on counterterrorism, democratization, and human rights, despite uncertain prospects for immediate Eritrean policy change. Along with my team at Embassy Asmara, I will monitor and assess developments, provide advice on effective means to engage the Eritrean people and leadership, and ensure that the message of strong United States opposition to terrorism and its sponsors is understood by all. In the event that Eritrea takes overt and explicit action to reverse its past practices, I will, if confirmed, seek an appropriate, renewed bilateral relationship with robust engagement to advance American objectives in the Eritrea and the region.

Question. Tensions over the Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute are again rising alarmingly. In your opinion, how can the United States most effectively assist efforts to prevent such tensions from escalating into direct conflict?

Answer. We, along with the other witnesses to the Algiers Agreement (Algeria, African Union, European Union, United Nations, and United States) and other interested actors, have been encouraging both parties to agree to resume cooperation with the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). We are disappointed that no progress was made at the September 6–7 meeting of the EEBC. We are also urging the parties to accept the offer of U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to engage with them to help lessen tensions along the border and move toward normalized relations.

We will continue to stress to the parties that the boundary impasse is a potential flashpoint that could further destabilize the entire region. Close cooperation with other governments and international institutions is essential to this effort.

RESPONSES OF DR. LOUIS J. NIGRO TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Chad? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Chad? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. Chad’s human rights record remains poor. The root cause of most of Chad’s human rights deficiencies is lack of democratic governance with credible elections, alternation in power, and respect for the rule of law. If confirmed as ambassador, I would continue to urge all Chadians to engage in dialog to address political grievances; work with the European Union and the United Nations to encourage the Government of Chad to adhere to its electoral reform agreement with opposition parties; focus limited mission assistance resources on activities that support credible legislative and communal elections in 2009; and work closely with Chadian human rights groups and lend support wherever possible and as resources allow to help build their capacity. I would also work with the European Union and United Nations to encourage Chad’s full support for deployment of a multilateral peacekeeping operation to protect Darfur refugees and Chadian displaced persons in eastern

Chad, and other vulnerable populations in northeastern Central African Republic, as soon as possible, which would reduce tensions and include measures to professionalize Chadian police forces.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges will you face in Chad in advancing human rights and democracy in general?

Answer. Chad has no history of peaceful and democratic political change; every leader since independence has come to power through force and none has demonstrated sufficient commitment to enforcing respect for human rights or the rule of law. Chad's sharp ethnic and regional diversities have not contributed to the development of a tradition of peaceful and legal conflict resolution. Chad's human rights record remains poor, as our Human Rights Report makes clear. The only durable solution to Chad's human rights deficiencies is a democratically elected government—executive and legislature—that takes human rights and respect for the constitution and the rule of law seriously and that denies impunity to official and nonofficial law breakers.

If confirmed as ambassador, I would work with all Chadian parties to increase awareness of human rights, to facilitate a level political playing field, and to convince all parties that a democratically elected government that rules in the interests of all Chad's people is the only hope for increased respect for human rights, social peace, and sustainable development in Chad. I would encourage all Chadians to engage in dialog to address political grievances and, in particular, I would work with the European Union and the United Nations to help the Government of Chad to adhere to its electoral reform agreement with opposition parties, which could lead to credible legislative and communal elections in 2009, the essential first step on the road to democratic governance.

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. Embassy N'Djamena is a small mission with one officer specifically charged with analyzing and reporting on human rights in Chad. However, one of the major interests of the Mission under my direction would be the promotion of human rights. If confirmed, I will nominate for awards those officers who qualify for them and who oversee self-help, civil society, and public diplomacy projects that promote human rights and democracy.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. I have served in a number of countries where promotion of human rights and democracy was a key element in our policy. In Cuba, as Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), I supervised our human rights and public diplomacy programs, which was important because the former offered assistance and support to Cuban dissidents struggling against a totalitarian regime and the latter sought to deny a monopoly of information to that same regime. Our assistance and support helped to make the dissidents more effective and to increase scrutiny of the regime's repression. We also were able to provide a continuous stream of accurate and unbiased information and diverse opinion to the Cuban people.

In Guinea, as DCM, I met regularly with opposition party leaders and human rights activists, and I managed our monitoring of presidential elections, which was important to demonstrate to the Government of Guinea that the United States did not seek regional stability at the price of stifled democracy and disregard for human rights and the rule of law there. We succeeded in encouraging continued participation in the electoral process on the part of the opposition and in focusing international attention on the Guinean elections.

In Haiti, as political counselor, I participated in efforts to resolve the political crisis created by the military overthrow of the legitimate President, which was important because the military junta ruled with impunity and presided over massive human rights abuses. Our efforts resulted in eventual multilateral military action to force the military junta to step down and led to return of the legitimate President to power under the constitution.

Question. Chad is the site of both internal and external displacement crises: hundreds of thousands of refugees from Darfur and the Central African Republic have crossed into Chad and large numbers of Chadians have been internally displaced

or crossed into Darfur. If confirmed as ambassador, what role would you seek to play in resolving this regional humanitarian, military, and political crisis?

Answer. If confirmed as ambassador, I would work with the European Union and the United Nations to encourage Chad's full support for deployment of a multilateral peacekeeping operation to protect Darfur refugees and internally displaced Chadians in eastern Chad, and other vulnerable populations in northeastern Central African Republic, as soon as possible. I would also continue to focus the work of the embassy on the provision of humanitarian assistance to at-risk populations in Chad. I would also continue to encourage the normalization of Chad-Sudan relations and urge Chad to deny support for Darfur rebel groups on its territory.

I would as well continue to advocate full Chadian Government support for a Darfur Peace Agreement supported by all the stakeholders involved in the Darfur crisis as the only hope for a durable solution to the refugee crisis in eastern Chad. Finally, I would continue our policy of engaging President Deby and other political players on the need for inclusive democracy in Chad.

Question. As it seeks to develop its oil sector, can Chad avoid the "resource curse?" If confirmed as ambassador, what steps would you take to help the government promote sustainable development that will benefit the Chadian people?

Answer. Chad's innovative Oil Revenue Management Agreement with the World Bank provides an opportunity for it to avoid the "resource curse," by the terms of which it is committed to spending 70 percent of its royalties investing in its people and on social and economic development. If confirmed as ambassador, I would work with the World Bank, the IMF, and other lenders to help Chad to implement fully and faithfully this agreement. I would also urge Chad to meet all the benchmarks for full participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Additionally, I would work with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to assist the Chadian Government to make doing business in Chad easier, faster, and safer, in order to attract trade and investment beyond the oil sector.

NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Fannin, P. Robert, to be Ambassador to the Dominican Republic
Johnson, David T., to be Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Simons, Paul E., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chile

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin Cardin presiding.

Present: Senators Cardin, Menendez, Corker, and Vitter.
Also present: Senator Kyl.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Senator CARDIN. Today the committee meets to consider the nominations of three individuals for key leadership positions in the administration. The President has nominated David Johnson to be the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Robert Fannin to be Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, and Paul Simons to be the Ambassador to the Republic of Chile.

I want to congratulate all of you on your nominations, I want to thank you for your public service, and I want to extend a warm welcome, not only to you, but to your families. And I know this is a family effort, and the sacrifice made by the members of the family, and we welcome all of you to the committee.

It's also nice to have Senator Kyl with us today, our colleague and distinguished member from Arizona. He will be introducing Mr. Fannin.

First let me, let me take this time to commend you for your dedication to public service, and your willingness to sacrifice so much to represent our country in a senior administrative position, and the two ambassadorships.

Mr. Johnson, you have been nominated for a very important and difficult assignment—the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement must monitor a broad range of problems, old and new. Whether it's preventing international narcotics trafficking, or trafficking in people, international

organized crime groups must be deterred from crossing international borders to violate human rights and international law.

As the U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE mission, you already have had a breadth of experience and contacts, and your nomination seems to be a good fit. It's good to see you again, and I enjoyed working with you when you were in the OSCE, and I held a position in the House on the OSCE Helsinki Commission.

Mr. Fannin, I'm happy to see that you're joined by my colleague, Senator Kyl, as the United States and the Dominican Republic maintain a very good economic and political relation. The small Caribbean nation contributed 300 troops to the Coalition Force in Iraq until May of 2004. This participation demonstrates the Dominican Republic's commitment to maintaining strong ties with the United States.

Nevertheless, there are challenges. Venezuela's desire to play a stronger role in the region is worrisome. Bolstered by the petrodollars and grant ambition, Venezuela's leadership would benefit from a strategic regional relationship with the Dominican Republic.

Illegal immigration and corruption are two issues the United States has sought improvements on from the Dominican Republic Government. With your background as a highly-respected and skilled lawyer, it appears that you are well-suited to have a positive impact in the Dominican Republic, and I look forward to your testimony.

Following, Mr. Simons, you have the distinction of being nominated to one of Latin America's great economic and political success stories. Thirty years ago, few could have known Chile would have undergone such a miraculous turnaround. Chile has reduced its poverty rate from 39 percent to 14 percent. Chile has been invited to discuss membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Chile has graduated to a middle-income country, and does not receive economic assistance from the United States. The only notable assistance Chile received recently from Washington was a small grant to help facilitate Chile's military participation in the U.N. stabilization mission, Haiti, an assistance to aid in international law enforcement and counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts.

Also, Mr. Simons, I appreciate you taking the time out of your schedule last week to pay a courtesy visit to our staff. I thank you and I look forward to your testimony.

Before I recognize Senator Kyl, let me recognize Senator Corker for an opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE**

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's customary here in the Senate that we give opening statements, I rarely do that. And I just want to say to Senator Kyl, who I know had to wait a few minutes for me to get here, that I'm putting us right back on time by not making one.

I want to thank you for coming today, and thank all of you for your public service. I look forward to a great hearing, and thank you for putting yourselves forward to represent our country in this way.

Senator CARDIN. Senator Menendez.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to today's hearing. By someone who has spent 15 years both in the House, and now here in the Senate focused on our relationships abroad, but particularly as it relates to Latin America, I'm looking forward to hearing from our two nominees for the Dominican Republic and Chile—two very different countries, with a very different set of challenges, and important in our hemispheric policy.

I've had the opportunity to speak with Mr. Fannin yesterday, so we had a little sense of what he's thinking about, I look forward to speaking with Mr. Simons. And, of course, Mr. Johnson, on the whole question of international narcotics and law enforcement, that's far beyond this hemisphere, but nonetheless a good part of the hemisphere's challenges are intertwined with that, and I look forward to hearing some of his remarks.

And I'll save the bulk of my time, Mr. Chairman, for the questions.

Senator CARDIN. Senator Kyl, it's a pleasure to have you on our committee.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA**

Senator KYL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the opportunity to introduce my friend, Bob Fannin, to you. And with your indulgence, I'd like to begin by reading a very short letter from our colleague, Senator McCain, ask that that be inserted in the record, and then I'll make some brief concluding remarks.

Senator CARDIN. Without objection.

Senator KYL. Thank you.

Senator KYL. He says, "To the committee, thank you for holding today's hearing. I would like to express my strong support for the swift confirmation of Mr. Robert Fannin as United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic.

"I've been privileged to know Bob for over 25 years, and I can personally attest that he is a natural leader, a man of integrity and a true patriot. I commend the President for nominating such an outstanding candidate for this important post.

"Bob has a long history of service to Arizona and our Nation. From his early days as an officer of the United States Air Force, to his current position as a respected attorney in Phoenix, Bob has distinguished himself as a leader in both civic and business communities.

"He's served on the boards of local charitable organizations, financial institutions, and played an essential role in the region's economic development through his involvement with the Arizona Chamber of Commerce.

"His professionalism, thoughtfulness, and experience will make him an effective diplomat and a wonderful representative of the United States abroad. I have every confidence that, if confirmed,

Bob Fannin will contribute immensely to the continuation of our warm relations with the Dominican Republic.

"I urge the committee's expeditious action in moving this nomination to the full Senate, and ask all of my colleagues to support his prompt confirmation."

Mr. Chairman, my colleague, John McCain—I can not say better than his statement, why I believe Bob Fannin would make an excellent Ambassador to the Dominican Republic.

Let me just add two things, however. I've known Bob for well over 30 years, and we've worked together in a variety of civic and community and even political activities in the community. I know of no one—Democrat or Republican—that does not respect Bob Fannin.

He follows a tradition of service. His father served as Governor of the State of Arizona from 1958 to 1964, and served in this body, as a Member of the United States Senate from 1964 to 1976. I don't know of anybody that didn't respect his father, Paul Fannin, during his service here in the United States Senate. Because they are both highly decent, respectful of others' positions, and—as Senator McCain said—natural leaders.

So, I am confident that as he serves, representing our Nation in the Dominican Republic, our friends there will see him the same way that we've seen him in the State of Arizona—as someone who is enjoyable to be with, who you can trust completely, who will always give it to you straight, who will work very hard on matters of mutual interest, and who—at the end of the day—you know that you were glad you were able to work with. He will represent our country very, very well. And I know this, as I said, from over 30 years of personal experience in working with my friend, Bob Fannin.

And, a final note, his wife, Lisa, is here. She is a prominent surgeon, recently—sort of—retired in Phoenix. But, she has served at the Barrow Neurological Institute in Phoenix—one of the finest neurological institutions in the country. And Bob, among his many activities in serving as charities, is emeritus on the board, and was chairman of the board of the Barrow Neurological Institute.

So, his experience in the community goes far beyond policy involvement, but to the eleemosynary activities that are so important to a community, as well.

Thank you, and I thank all three of you for being here. Having been in your position before, it is very important that Senators take the time to learn about our nominees for various positions. And I respect the fact that all three of you are here today doing this. Thank you.

Senator CARDIN. Well, Senator Kyl, we appreciate you being here, and your willingness to help, as far as expediting this nomination. Thank you very much.

Senator KYL. Thank you.

Senator CARDIN. We will now hear from the nominees, first starting with David Johnson.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON, NOMINEE TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS**

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it's a privilege to appear before the committee today, as the President's nominee as Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. I'm honored by the confidence placed in me by the President and the Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, no one arrives at any good point in their life without a great deal of help and encouragement from others, and I've been blessed by much more of that than I deserve.

I'm joined today by my mother, Dixie Johnson, without whom, literally, none of this would have been possible. And, I'm also joined by my wife, Scarlett Swan, with whom I share a wonderful life, three children, and a partnership both at home and abroad. Without her, none of it would have been worthwhile.

I also wish to thank my colleagues and mentors in the State Department in the Foreign Service, as well as throughout our Government. Ours is a collegial profession. No one accomplishes anything themselves, and I wish to acknowledge their friendship, their patience, and their patriotism.

Mr. Chairman, the portfolio I've been nominated to discharge is unique in our Nation's government, or indeed, in any government. What began in the 1970s as an effort to confront a prospect that narcotics from outside our borders could undermine our own society has grown and it has changed. And what once was a very difficult, but narrowly-focused effort, has mushroomed for two reasons.

First, as the instruments of international commerce, communication, and transportation have grown, so have the opportunities grown to undermine our society, and to destabilize friendly, as well as unfriendly, governments.

Second, we've come fully to recognize that ungoverned and ill-governed territories are a threat, not just to their own citizens, but to ours as well.

The State Department's Bureau that, if confirmed, I will lead, has unique skills, talents, and resources to address these threats; to help contain them, and to give our partners abroad the wherewithal to help keep Americans secure by working with us.

Our challenge is to spend our Nation's treasure wisely in both senses of that thought—to be prudent and economical in the programs we craft, and the efforts we undertake, but also to ensure that we stay ahead of the problems of narcotics, crime, and ill-governed and ungoverned societies, so as to limit the threats which Americans face.

You and your colleagues have entrusted us with significant resources, but also given us significant challenges. The almost \$4 billion in taxpayer funds for which, if confirmed, I will be responsible, is an extraordinary sum. But the challenges these monies must address are daunting.

First, we face a continued threat to American society from uncontrolled narcotics, as well as the chemicals to make synthetic drugs. While Plan Colombia has shown what our resources can do when combined with a partner's political will, much remains to be done

in Colombia, as well as elsewhere in Latin America, where problems continue.

Second, we are working along with allies and partners, to help provide Afghanistan and Iraq with the civilian police that can give these war-torn countries the security needed to establish the rule of law. And, in the case of Afghanistan, also to deal with a troubling narcotics problem that, if unaddressed, could undermine every success we've had there.

Third, we face a threat to ourselves, our allies, and our partners from the uncontrolled growth of public corruption, organized crime, and illicit trade in people and in goods. These threats often bound together with terrorism in the same criminal enterprise, may pose the greatest long-term challenge to our society.

In none of these efforts are we working alone. Our partners in the law enforcement community, as well as our diplomatic and military partners, confront the same issues, and are working with us to deal with them. These are long-term threats, sometimes easily ignored in the short-term, but very costly if left unmet. If confirmed, it will be my task to lead an extraordinary group of men and women to confront them, with the goal of making our country safer, and its future more secure.

Mr. Chairman, I've been fortunate in my diplomatic career to have been a manager of people and resources quite early. But nothing compares in scope to the challenge which, if confirmed, you will entrust me in this position. If I am confirmed, I will make myself available to this committee, to your colleagues in both Houses, and your staffs, soliciting your views and support.

I'm grateful for your patience in hearing this statement, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a privilege to appear before you as the President's nominee as Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The position for which I have been nominated is one of significant responsibility, and I am honored by the confidence placed in me by President Bush and Secretary Rice.

Mr. Chairman, no one arrives at any good point in their life without a great deal of help and encouragement from others, and I have been blessed by much more of that than I deserve. I am joined today by my mother, Dixie Johnson, without whom, literally, none of this would have been possible. And I am also joined by my wife, Scarlett Swan, with whom I share a wonderful life, three children, and a partnership both at home and abroad. Without her, none of it would have been worthwhile. I also wish to thank my colleagues and mentors in the State Department and the Foreign Service. Ours is a collegial profession. No one accomplishes anything by themselves. And I want to acknowledge their friendship, their patience, and their patriotism. It has been my privilege to have worked with them in my more than 30 years as a public servant.

The next several years are certain to be a challenging period for the Department and for the Bureau I have been nominated to lead. In addition to the ever-evolving threats of drug trafficking and international organized crime, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is playing an increasingly important role in stabilizing post-conflict societies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, through criminal justice sector development. Continued high levels of drug production and trafficking in Latin America and in Afghanistan will continue to warrant United States attention and support, and INL remains in the forefront of efforts to confront these threats. If I am confirmed by the Senate, I will seek to build

upon the successes of my predecessors while also bringing a fresh perspective to these challenges to see where improvements might be made.

INL's core mission is to combat international narcotics production and trafficking, reduce international crime and terrorism, and strengthen international criminal justice institutions. To accomplish these goals, INL relies on a broad range of bilateral, regional, and global assistance programs designed to strengthen the law enforcement capacity of foreign governments. INL also works through the U.N. and other international organizations to set international standards for combating drugs, crime, and terrorism and develop programs and to implement these standards.

To carry out its mission and meet these challenges, INL supports programs at 80 posts. The Bureau maintains a domestic staff of 188 direct hire and an additional 54 Foreign Service officers and 428 foreign service nationals overseas. INL also employs approximately 4,600 contract employees supporting domestic and overseas operations, including aviation support and international peacekeeping operations. In keeping with its increased responsibilities over the past decade, INL's budget has grown from \$130 million in the mid-1990s to over \$2.6 billion in fiscal year 2007, largely due to pressing demands for criminal justice programs in Iraq and Afghanistan and new counternarcotics challenges in Afghanistan.

In addition to bilateral programs, the Bureau also supports four regional International Law Enforcement Academies around the world, as well as a specialized facility in Roswell, New Mexico, that provides advanced training for mid-level and senior foreign law enforcement officials. Applying U.S. and international standards, U.S. law enforcement agencies such as DEA, the FBI, and the Secret Service, as well as state and local law enforcement as needed, provide training keyed to address regional issues and problems.

INL maintains an aviation fleet of 295 rotary and fixed-wing aircraft operating in seven countries (Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) that assist foreign government counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and border security efforts in support of United States' objectives. INL has recently implemented numerous changes to improve the management of this fleet in terms of standardized policies and procedures, planning, budget formulation and transparency, and use of best business practices.

The Bureau works closely with a broad range of other United States Government agencies that have expertise and interests in these areas, including the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the Departments of Justice, including FBI and DEA; Defense; Homeland Security, including the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Secret Service; Treasury, and Commerce; and our Nation's intelligence community.

COMBATING NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

U.S. counternarcotics assistance in the Western Hemisphere is focused on confronting drug production at its source. Targeting resources at the initial stages of the drug trafficking chain reduces the amount of drugs that enter the system, allowing enforcement and treatment efforts to be more effective. Through Plan Colombia, and subsequently the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), we have employed a comprehensive regional approach of eradication, interdiction, alternative development, extradition, and judicial reform.

The greatest focus of these efforts has been and remains Colombia—the source for approximately 90 percent of the cocaine consumed the United States. Prior to Plan Colombia, Colombia was under siege by major narcoterrorist organizations and some believe it was in danger of becoming a failed state. Car bombs, kidnappings, and political murders were a daily occurrence as these illegally armed groups openly defied the government in many areas of the country, including in some key cities. In 2001, rapidly growing coca and opium poppy cultivation in Colombia reached an all-time high.

Since that time, Colombia has achieved remarkable progress. Public safety has greatly improved, with kidnappings, massacres, and murders down significantly. For the first time ever, the Colombian Government has established a functioning security and police presence in each of its 1,099 municipalities or country seats. Colombia's economy, which was so battered during the 1990s, is now growing at a healthy rate and attracting foreign investment. The Colombian people are now more optimistic about a lasting peace in their country, and the paramilitary AUC, which has been responsible for drug trafficking and human rights abuses, has been largely disarmed and demobilized. Clearly the American taxpayers' investment in Colombia is paying significant dividends.

A key component of INL's efforts in Colombia is eradication. In 2006, manual and aerial eradication programs in Colombia covered over 200,000 hectares of coca,

thereby preventing about 320 metric tons of cocaine from reaching the United States, Europe, and other parts of Latin America. Coupled with the seizure of 178 metric tons of cocaine, our joint efforts have taken about \$850 million in 1 year alone out of the hands of drug trafficking organizations, including the AUC and the FARC. Recent intelligence indicates that the FARC's drug profits may have fallen by about 25 percent from 2003 to 2005 because Colombian security operations, bolstered by Plan Colombia, have increased their costs of doing business.

Despite this marked progress, major challenges remain. Coca growers have embarked on an aggressive replanting campaign to counter eradication. The United States and Colombia are looking now at strategic, technological, and legal changes to address the resilience of coca cultivation. Another goal is having Colombia take greater responsibility of the counternarcotics programs. As Colombia has doubled the share of GDP devoted to security over the past few years, it has also begun to take responsibility for some key programs. Training and maintaining sufficient numbers of qualified Colombian pilots and mechanics key to successful nationalization—has proved difficult for a variety of reasons. Our challenge will be to ensure that eventual reductions in United States assistance are gradual and closely coordinated with Colombia, so that the overall level of effort is maintained as needed.

Colombia's Government continues to address human rights abuses and impunity and has made considerable progress in this area. If confirmed, I will continue to make these issues a priority and will work to see that those who commit serious abuses or are involved in drug trafficking are held accountable, and the rights of victims and their families are protected.

We remain concerned about increased coca cultivation in Bolivia and the corresponding increase of cocaine production by criminal traffickers. As the President indicated in the annual "Major's List" determination this month, Bolivia's cooperation in interdiction and voluntary eradication are not enough to counter this trend. We will continue to urge Bolivian authorities to make the reduction and eventual elimination of excess coca crops its highest priority.

Coca cultivation is also increasing in Peru, where remaining members of the former Shining Path terrorist group continues to support coca growers and drug traffickers leading to violent resistance to counternarcotics efforts. Despite these increases, cultivation in both Bolivia and Peru remains below the highpoint of the mid-1990s, when these countries were the world's primary producers.

INL is also working with countries that are heavily impacted by cocaine that originates in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. By some measures, Brazil is the world's second-largest consumer of cocaine. Much of this consumption is driven by violent gangs that traffic in drugs and weapons, and terrorize cities such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. INL is beginning to work directly with states and cities in Brazil to enable them to combat these gangs more effectively on the streets and in prisons.

Counternarcotics cooperation with Venezuela has declined significantly under the regime of President Chavez. Venezuela's role as a transit zone for cocaine trafficking, particularly to Europe via West Africa, is growing, and Venezuela is, and has been, a conduit for arms and other equipment destined for antigovernment groups operating in Colombia. Evidence also suggests Mexican drug cartels are exploiting Venezuela as a transshipment point for Colombian cocaine. Poor border enforcement has permitted some of these groups to operate with impunity from inside Venezuela. For these reasons, the President determined that Venezuela had "failed demonstrably" to adhere to its obligations under international and bilateral drug control agreements for the third consecutive year.

Mexico is a major transit and source country for illicit drugs. Roughly 90 percent of South American cocaine reaching the United States market transits Mexico. Mexico is also a source and transit zone for the majority of marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine consumed in the United States.

Our law enforcement cooperation with Mexico is well integrated, and President Calderon has taken unprecedented actions against organized crime networks. Since January, the Government of Mexico has deployed joint law enforcement/military antidrug operations in 10 key states in Mexico, extradited 64 fugitives to date, already ahead of last year's record figure of 63, and taken strong measures to root out corruption and to reform the federal police. We have initiated a series of expert-level discussions with the Government of Mexico to follow up on a commitment made by President Bush to President Calderon to improve bilateral cooperation concerning public security, law enforcement, border security, and counternarcotics. This is an historic opportunity to confront criminal organizations that work across our border and through the region. As a strategy is finalized, we intend to stay in close contact with Congress and this committee.

The nations of Central America are also struggling with drug trafficking and associated gang-related crime, corruption, and insecurity. In July of this year, the De-

partment announced the Strategy To Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico. Under this comprehensive strategy, the United States will work with partner countries to combat transnational and other gangs that commit crimes in Central America, Mexico, and the United States. It will help prevent youth—beginning with children as young as 9 years old—from entering gangs and strengthen enforcement against gang-related violence and other crimes.

In Haiti, INL is supporting U.N. efforts to transform the Haitian National Police into an institution capable of ensuring stability, public security, and human rights, and working with the entire justice sector to promote the rule of law. To combat the corrosive effects of drug trafficking through Haiti, the Bureau is providing equipment and technical assistance to improve the capacity of Haitian law enforcement to conduct drug interdiction operations and to investigate and prosecute traffickers and money launderers.

BUILDING STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH ASIA

Building stability and democracy in South Asia is one of the President's highest priorities. The United States has embarked on an ambitious and historic mission to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a haven for terrorists or a source of regional instability or repression against its citizens. Combating the drug trade and standing up a professional civilian police force in Afghanistan are critical elements of this mission. Although very little Afghan heroin reaches the United States, the drug trade has undermined virtually every aspect of the Government of Afghanistan's drive to build political stability, economic growth, rule of law, and its capacity to address internal security problems. Proceeds from narcotrafficking are fueling the insurgency and corruption that undercut international reconstruction efforts. In order to lock in Afghan progress against these threats, a national police force is essential to secure the rule of law.

The United States has committed itself to a major, multi-year counternarcotics effort in which INL plays a leading role. This effort centers on a five-pillar program designed to attack the drug trade on several fronts and at several levels.

These pillars include:

- (1) A public information campaign emphasizing the social and health threat posed by the drug trade.
- (2) An alternative development pillar to establish viable, licit economic alternatives to poppy cultivation.
- (3) An eradication pillar that focuses on reducing poppy cultivation by providing both incentives for farmers not to plant and disincentives for those who do.
- (4) An interdiction pillar that aims at destroying labs, seizing precursors and refined drugs, and arresting high value targets.
- (5) Law enforcement and justice sector reform to build an effective police, corrections, and court system capable of delivering justice and rule of law.

This five-pillar program is in its third year and has struggled in an environment of significant insurgency. The results, thus far, have been mixed, with some localized success. We have seen declining poppy cultivation in the northern half of the country, where central government authority is strong, that could make the region virtually free of poppy by 2009. This is a major turnaround for an area that has been a traditional source of opium poppy.

At the same time, there has been a tremendous surge in cultivation in the southern province of Helmand, where the insurgency is strong and government authority weak, and the rest of southern Afghanistan that more than offsets the successes in the north.

If Helmand were a separate country, it would be the world's second largest producer of opium poppy, after Afghanistan itself. Contrary to the myth that poppy is grown by poor farmers with no other economic choices, Helmand is Afghanistan's richest province, and receives more United States foreign assistance than any other. Much of the poppy farming there is new in the last couple of years and carried out by larger growers who are relatively well off. The illegal activities of these relatively wealthy individuals must be confronted by Afghan authorities and the international community with greater determination, including through forced eradication where necessary.

To better address changing trends in cultivation, the security situation, the political climate, and requirements of economic development, the United States has made adjustments in strategy which will be carried out over the next several weeks and months. These refinements to the current strategy include three main elements. First, we aim to dramatically and simultaneously increase the scope of both the incentive of development assistance and the disincentives of stepped up interdiction,

eradication, and law enforcement, including expansion and improvement of the Good Performers Initiative. Second, working with our NATO allies, we intend to improve coordination of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency information sharing and operations. Finally, we must develop consistent, sustained political will for the counternarcotics effort among the Afghan Government, our allies, and international civilian and military organizations. This will include working with the international community on a coordinated strategy to ensure that government officials in Kabul and the provinces appoint strong, law abiding officials and remove weak or corrupt ones to carry out interdiction and eradication programs.

In Afghanistan, it is important to differentiate between our long- and short-term goals. Based on the experiences of states such as Thailand and Laos, we will need staying power to achieve the goal of an Afghanistan free from all opium poppy cultivation. This long-term effort must be broken down into incremental steps. For the short- to medium-term, if we can succeed in reducing the cultivation of poppy to a more manageable level that would be less of a threat to the Afghan Government, that would be a genuine, if incremental, victory. I believe that within the next 2 years, it is possible to move from uncontrolled cultivation in Afghanistan to a situation where the drug economy could be a more manageable problem.

To achieve this reduction, we must achieve greater success in eradicating poppy crops. This is an essential prerequisite in order to achieve effective results with our sustainable livelihood assistance. Until Afghan poppy growers are convinced that they face the credible threat of forced eradication, they will not embrace legal alternatives. Based on surveys that it has conducted, the U.N. estimates that the eradication threshold we need to reach in order to successfully convince growers to abandon poppy cultivation is 25 percent of the overall crop. Currently, we are achieving an eradication rate of approximately 10 percent or less. This needs to improve, and in order for this to happen, the Afghan Government and our other international partners need to demonstrate greater political commitment toward pursuing forced eradication.

Eradication is an essential component of the strategy, but it must be accompanied by economic and institutional development to achieve sustainable results. The opium trade is deeply embedded in Afghan society and dominates a small economy with only limited economic options. Institutional development—critical for establishing rule of law—is also at a low level following two decades of civil war and Taliban rule. This is in contrast to Colombia, where cocaine trafficking is of more recent vintage and plays a relatively smaller role in its more diversified economy and where justice sector and related institutions are more resilient.

In cooperation with DOD, INL has helped train more than 81,000 Afghan National Police (ANP) to date. ANP training includes selected specialized training initiatives, such as literacy, domestic violence, and anticorruption, in addition to the basic training program. In the near future, INL intends to focus more heavily on the development of advanced capabilities such as criminal investigative skills, records management, computer skills, internal affairs, professional responsibility, intelligence gathering and analysis, and counternarcotics skills.

I am confident that we can achieve our goals in Afghanistan. We know that a comprehensive, long-term approach can and does work, as it has elsewhere in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Afghanistan is not more predetermined to becoming a failed state with a narco-economy than Colombia was in the late 1990s. Colombia is now a stable democracy with a thriving economy and a strong state presence across its territory; Afghanistan can achieve similar progress, given sufficient political commitment, international support, and time.

Next door to Afghanistan, Pakistan is playing an increasingly important role as a front line state in the war against both terrorism and the drug trade. Pakistan is a major transit zone for Afghan opium. Its 1,500-mile border with Afghanistan remains open to cross-border movement and operations by Afghan insurgents and other armed groups and uncontrolled areas along the border serve as sanctuaries for those groups.

To help secure Pakistan's border region, INL is helping open up inaccessible areas through road projects and by providing vehicles and aviation support to increase mobility, monitoring, and interdiction by border and other police. INL programs are also helping to modernize and professionalize the Pakistani national police, including the development of a national database of terrorists, traffickers, and other criminals. In this respect, our counternarcotics program is directly assisting counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan.

STABILIZING IRAQ

INL is playing an important role in the stabilization of Iraq through assisting in the development and enhancement of Iraq's criminal justice sector. Establishing an effective criminal justice system in which the Iraqi people have confidence is essential to providing the Iraqis a reliable alternative to militias, sectarian groups, and other extra-governmental forces to resolve disputes. INL is providing support to all aspects of the criminal justice system—police, justice sector, and corrections.

In support of Central Command's Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) efforts to develop and professionalize the Iraqi police, INL is providing close to 1,000 International Police Advisors who, under the Coalition Forces' direction, train, assess, and mentor Iraqi police personnel, including border police.

INL is working with United States Government interagency partners to develop and strengthen the Iraqi justice sector by training judges, investigators, and court personnel, to help the Iraqis secure their judges and courts, to improve coordination among police, courts, and prisons, and to help the Government of Iraq strengthen legislation governing the judiciary and criminal codes. INL's support for an FBI-led interagency Major Crimes Task Force is helping Iraqis investigate and process the most serious, high-profile cases such as the murder of the Chief Justice's son and attacks on Coalition and Iraqi security forces.

Since 2004, INL has also implemented a program to professionalize the administration of prisons in Iraq and help ensure that prisoners are held securely and humanely. Several thousand Iraqi Corrections Service personnel have been trained and mentored through this program. The Bureau is also funding and managing a large prison construction program that will increase Iraq's prison capacity by over 6,500 beds over the next 2 years. Stepped up security efforts are straining existing Iraqi corrections capacities and our challenge over the coming months will be to help the Iraqis manage this growth.

Iraq's security situation seriously complicates implementation of INL programs, but tangible progress is being made. Helping Iraqis create a system that is sufficiently effective and fair, and inspires trust so citizens turn to it instead of militias and other destructive actors, is essential to stabilizing the country and securing our national interests. If I am confirmed, this challenge will be among my foremost priorities.

INL EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Following a spate of destabilizing terrorist assassinations in 2005–2006, Lebanon sought United States assistance to strengthen its security forces. The INL program there, which includes training and other technical support for Lebanon's Internal Security Force is designed to bolster efforts by the democratically elected government to establish full sovereignty within its borders.

INL will soon begin implementation of a program designed to help moderates within the Palestinian Authority enforce law and order, and stability in the West Bank. Through this program, the United States will provide nonlethal equipment, police training, and construction or rehabilitation of police training facilities, and will support institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Interior, which oversees security forces. As with other INL programs, this program will include a significant and meaningful vetting process to screen participants and exclude any with possible terrorist ties or human rights violations.

THE THREAT FROM SYNTHETIC DRUGS

The Department shares the strong concern of Congress about the growing threat of synthetic drugs, particularly of methamphetamine. These drugs offer enormous potential profits to drug trafficking organizations, and unlike coca or opium poppy, their production is not easily contained to specific areas. Recent history shows us that when faced with law enforcement or regulatory pressure in one country, producers and traffickers can quickly adapt to new to find new precursor chemical supplies, new production sites, and new smuggling routes. Methamphetamine, in particular, is distinct from other illicit drugs because its production requires no specialized skill or training, and instructions on how to produce it are easily available on the Internet. This is a true global challenge, and INL is committed to working aggressively in both bilateral and multilateral settings to enhance international chemical control regimes to prevent the illegal diversion of chemicals needed to produce methamphetamine.

Most of the methamphetamine consumed in the United States today is controlled by Mexican drug trafficking organizations producing the drug in "superlabs." Smaller amounts are produced here in "small toxic labs," but these have been declining

in recent years due in large part to U.S. efforts to control the sale of those pharmaceuticals and chemicals that can be used to produce methamphetamine.

Because Mexico is the principal foreign supplier of methamphetamine to the United States, INL is working with Mexico to strengthen border security and enhance counterdrug operations, including providing specialized mobile equipment and establishing a Chemical Response Team to detect and raid drug labs and lead investigations into chemical diversion. With a growing methamphetamine abuse problem of its own, Mexico has taken this problem very seriously and has recently announced that it will take the unprecedented step of banning all methamphetamine precursors, pseudoephedrine, and ephedrine, beginning in January 2008. This is an unprecedented step, and shows Mexico's commitment to address this issue.

INL has been working closely with multilateral organizations, including the U.N. and OAS, to make international chemical controls a priority. In 2006, the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution requesting that states provide the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) with estimates of their domestic, legitimate requirements for chemicals precursors that can also be used for the manufacture of synthetic drugs. Over 100 countries did so in 2006, establishing a new baseline that allows exporting and importing countries to quickly check whether the chemicals and quantities proposed in commercial transactions would indicate possible diversion. These checks enable authorities to determine whether further law enforcement scrutiny is warranted. To help the INCB carry out this reporting responsibility, INL has doubled its annual financial contribution to the organization since 2006.

In March 2007, the Department issued its first report under the 2006 Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA) identifying the major importers and exporters of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine coupled with a Presidential determination backed by sanctions on whether such countries are fully cooperating with the United States on counternarcotics. The CMEA has helped focus international attention on this issue, and is a valuable tool in confronting this challenge.

MANAGING INL RESPONSIBILITIES

INL's global responsibilities have grown substantially over the last several years. The Bureau's overall budget has grown from approximately \$130 million in the mid-1990s to over \$2.6 billion in fiscal year 2007, including supplemental funding. INL is also responsible for managing programs funded by the Department of Defense for police training in Iraq and Afghanistan. This dramatic expansion has presented INL with certain challenges in ensuring that our management and oversight controls are equal to the scope of our program work. INL has already devoted considerable effort to right-sizing and reorganizing our staffing to better reflect the priorities of the Bureau's expanding mission. In this effort, our work has been guided by inspections by the OIG, GAO, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. INL has benefited from this input as well as from the concerns and recommendations expressed by Members of Congress and their staffs. I believe that the Bureau is well on its way to meeting the expectations of both Congress and the public. If confirmed, I fully intend to continue this reform process and ensure that we have the personnel and oversight mechanisms in place to fulfill our mission.

The greatest challenge facing INL have been the enormous growth of its programs in Afghanistan and Iraq. Last year, INL increased staffing for program, contract and asset management in both countries. Concurrently, INL also established a United States-based contract management support group that provides additional contract oversight and technical support. This dual effort has resulted in contract savings, cost avoidance and recapturing contract expenditures. More recently, the Bureau also established a separate Iraq office to focus specifically on civilian police operations and rule of law programs for that priority country. With the support of the Department, INL has been steadily increasing its full-time staffing to meet the requirements of these programs, and this is a process that, if confirmed, I will take a very direct interest in continuing. We need to find the best people available to manage these high-priority initiatives, and we need to place them where they are most needed—both overseas and here in Washington.

INL has also improved its financial and asset management by establishing and implementing an improved financial reporting tool; conducting its own program reviews, audits, investigations, and verifications; improving field support and training; and placing greater focus on outputs and metrics to better align the Bureau's financial resources with its program performance. As a result, INL is implementing and standardizing improvements for ensuring strong management controls.

Finally, as noted by GAO, INL revamped the Bureau's aviation management by centralizing all aviation planning, reporting, and administrative responsibilities, leading to a more transparent resource decision making process.

These are the kind of efforts that, if confirmed, I will continue and build on to ensure that the extensive resources under the Bureau's responsibility are managed appropriately.

CONCLUSION

Again, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to address these diverse challenges that directly impact us here at home. Please be assured that I will strive to keep you fully informed of our progress and our setbacks, and I certainly welcome your thoughts and advice. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Fannin. Yes, please, and also if you would introduce your family, we would appreciate that.

STATEMENT OF P. ROBERT FANNIN, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Senator Kyl for his introduction, and I'd also like to introduce my wife, Dr. Lisa Fannin, and my son Paul, and his wife, Sharon, who have been very supportive during this process.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I'm honored to be the President's nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. I would like to express my gratitude to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the confidence they have shown in me.

Mr. Chairman, I see this nomination as a unique opportunity to serve my country. I come from a family which deeply values and respects the call to public service. My father's service as Governor of Arizona and United States Senator inspired all of his children. I have sought to follow his example with my own dedication to public service.

The Dominican Republic and United States have a special relationship with economic, cultural, and social ties that are strong and growing. Indeed, only last week, President Fernandez had a very cordial meeting with Deputy Secretary John Negroponte at the State Department.

Dominican-Americans in the United States are a growing, thriving community. The ties of music, baseball, art, and literature bring our two countries closer every year. We face the challenges of the world together, a fact never more clear than when some 41 persons of Dominican descent lost their lives on September 11, 2001.

Many persons of Dominican descent proudly serve in our Armed Forces. Approximately 100,000 Americans live in the Dominican Republic. Over a million Americans visited the Dominican Republic in 2006. If confirmed, one of my chief priorities will be the well-being and security of both official and nonofficial Americans in the Dominican Republic.

I hope to utilize the leadership skills I have learned as a military officer, as chairman of many nonprofit organizations, as a leader promoting intelligent economic development, and as a managing

partner of a law firm. I would use these leadership skills to bring together the many agencies of the U.S. Embassy into one cohesive country team.

My experience as a lawyer would provide me with the background to assist in the implementation of many reforms in progress in the Dominican Republic. These include programs promoting a more transparent, accountable, and effective judicial system. My experience in the law and military would help me work effectively with the United States and Dominican military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies in the areas of anticorruption, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, countertrafficking in persons, extradition, illegal migration, legal migration, and others.

Mr. Chairman, I recognize that as the United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, I would have the duty to promote and protect America's values and interests. America has a paramount interest in promoting social justice in this hemisphere. If confirmed, I will work to advance the cause of social justice in the Dominican Republic. This would include the continuation of our Government's cooperation with the Dominican Republic in the areas of education, healthcare, housing, economic freedom, human rights, good governance, and democracy. As Senator Kyl mentioned, I'm particularly interested in the health sector because my wife is a physician and a board member of a health-related nonprofit, and a philanthropic foundation.

I hope to use my experience in the banking industry—including serving as an officer and as a director of two major financial institutions—to assist with the implementation of the Central American Free Trade Agreement in the Dominican Republic, CAFTA-DR. My experience as an officer and a board member of Chambers of Commerce would also be very helpful in the areas of trade and economic development.

I would also work to assist United States businesses in the Dominican Republic, in particular, by encouraging Dominican efforts—through CAFTA-DR framework—to create and enforce laws and regulations that are pro-business, and pro-investment. I would work to resolve existing commercial and investment disputes involving U.S. interests. I would encourage stronger Dominican support for intellectual property rights, particularly in light of Dominican efforts to attract high-tech investment.

At the same time, I recognize that growth in the economy and trade would mean little, if not accompanied by improvement in the lives of all of the people. Economic liberty must not mean that business rules at the expense of the poor, the middle-class, and of the environment. If confirmed, I would work to maximize the benefits of our development assistance, targeting labor rights and the environment.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you, Senator Cardin and this esteemed committee. If confirmed, I hope to work with you and your colleagues on the committee and in the Congress, on a full range of issues. I am looking forward to your questions. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fannin follows:]

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Mr. Chairman, I see this nomination as a unique opportunity to serve my country. I come from a family which deeply values and respects the call to public service. My father's service as Governor of Arizona and U.S. Senator inspired all of his children. I have sought to follow his example with my own dedication to public service.

The Dominican Republic and the United States have a special relationship with economic, cultural, and social ties that are strong and growing. Indeed, only last week, President Fernandez had a very cordial meeting with Deputy Secretary John Negroponte at the Department of State. Dominican Americans in the United States are a growing, thriving community. The ties of music, baseball, art, and literature bring our two countries closer every year. We face the challenges of the world together, a fact never more clear than when some 41 persons of Dominican descent lost their lives on September 11, 2001. Many persons of Dominican descent proudly serve in our Armed Forces. Approximately 100,000 Americans live in the Dominican Republic. Over a million Americans visited the Dominican Republic in 2006. If confirmed, one of my chief priorities will be the well-being and security of both official and nonofficial Americans in the Dominican Republic.

I hope to utilize the leadership skills I have learned as a military officer, as a chairman of many nonprofit organizations, as a leader promoting intelligent economic development, and as a managing partner of a law firm. I would use these leadership skills to bring together the many agencies of a U.S. Embassy into one cohesive country team. My experience as a lawyer would provide me with the background to assist in the implementation of many reforms in progress in the Dominican Republic. These include programs promoting a more transparent, accountable, and effective judicial system. My experience in the law and military would help me work effectively with United States and Dominican military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies in the areas of anticorruption, counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, countertrafficking in persons, extradition, illegal migration, legal migration and others.

Mr. Chairman, I recognize that as the United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, I would have the duty to promote and protect America's values and interests.

America has a paramount interest in promoting social justice in this hemisphere. If confirmed, I will work to advance the cause of social justice in the Dominican Republic. This would include the continuation of our Government's cooperation with the Dominican Republic in the areas of education, health care, housing, economic freedom, human rights, good governance, and democracy. I am particularly interested in the health sector because my wife is a physician and board member of a health related nonprofit corporation and a philanthropic foundation.

I hope to use my experience in the banking industry, including serving as an officer and as a director of two major financial institutions, to assist with the implementation of the Central America Free Trade Agreement in the Dominican Republic, CAFTA-DR. My experience as an officer and board member of chambers of commerce would also be helpful in the areas of trade and economic development.

I would also work to assist United States businesses in the Dominican Republic, in particular by encouraging Dominican efforts through the CAFTA-DR framework to create and enforce laws and regulations that are pro-business and pro-investment. I would work to resolve existing commercial and investment disputes involving United States' interests. I would encourage stronger Dominican support for intellectual property rights, particularly in light of Dominican efforts to attract hi-tech investment.

At the same time, I recognize that growth in the economy and trade would mean little if not accompanied by improvement in the lives of all the people. Economic liberty must not mean that business rules at the expense of the poor, of the middle class, and of the environment. If confirmed, I would work to maximize the benefits of our development assistance targeting labor rights and the environment.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before Senator Cardin and this esteemed committee. I hope to work with you and your colleagues on the committee and in

the Congress on a full range of issues. I also look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Thank you.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Fannin.

We'll now hear from Mr. Simons.

**STATEMENT OF PAUL E. SIMONS, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE**

Mr. SIMONS. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear, once again, before this committee on this occasion, as the President's nominee to be our next Ambassador to Chile.

I'd like to introduce my wife, Victoria, who is with us today. We are very much a multicultural family, with very strong Latin roots. Victoria is originally from Colombia, while our daughters, Andrea and Camila, were born in Ecuador. All three have been my most stalwart supporters, interrupting careers and studies to serve our country. All of us look forward to representing United States interests in Chile, if I am confirmed.

Mr. Chairman, this is an exciting moment to be considered for a leadership role in United States-Chile relations. As you, yourself, pointed out in your opening statement, Chile is a notable success story in the hemisphere, and our bilateral relationship is particularly strong across three principal areas.

Politically, Chile is a thriving democracy with resilient institutions, and a proven record of support for democratic principles. Economically, Chile's record of trade-driven growth is generating concrete benefits for its own citizens—as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the decline in the poverty rate—as well as opportunities for United States companies, under our bilateral free trade agreement. And, our security relationship, finally, is very solid, with bilateral military cooperation among the very best in the hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, we are fortunate to have a valued partner in Chile to work with, to promote our shared vision of democracy and free markets in this hemisphere.

I'd like to lay out three priority areas which, if confirmed, I would propose as major themes to pursue.

First, providing strong leadership to the United States' community in Chile, from residents and tourists, to American businesses. My experience in Israel reinforced the importance of uniting the American community, while much of my 30-year professional career has been spent advancing United States business interests around the globe.

Second, broadening and deepening our bilateral partnership. Building on our very successful bilateral free trade agreement, and our new education initiative, I would look for ways to deepen our links with Chile across the range of issues—from energy to environmental cooperation, from innovation, to law enforcement.

Third, working with Chile on broader hemispheric and global challenges where we share common interests. Drawing on my background in multilateral diplomacy, I would hope to find ways to work with our partners in Chile to share their successful experiences with economic and political freedom with a broader regional and global audience.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by thanking President Bush and Secretary Rice for their vote of confidence in proposing my candidacy for this position. If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with you, the members of this committee, and other members of Congress to deepen the very strong partnership the United States enjoys with Chile.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simons follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL E. SIMONS, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear once again before this committee, on this occasion as President Bush's nominee to serve as our next Ambassador to Chile.

Let me introduce my wife, Victoria, who is with us today. We are a multicultural family with strong Latin roots—Victoria is originally from Colombia, while our daughters, Andrea and Camila, were born in Ecuador. All three have been my most stalwart supporters, interrupting careers and studies to serve our country. All of us look forward to representing United States interests in Chile if I am confirmed.

Mr. Chairman, this is an exciting moment to be considered for a leadership role in United States-Chile relations. Our bilateral relationship is particularly strong across three principal areas:

- Politically, Chile is a thriving democracy, with resilient political institutions and a proven record of support for democratic principles in the Organization of American States and other multilateral fora.
- Economically, Chile's record of trade-driven growth is generating concrete benefits for its citizens and opportunities for United States companies. Poverty has been cut by more than two-thirds in the last 15 years, while two-way trade with the United States has increased by over 150 percent in the 3 years that our bilateral Free Trade Agreement has been in effect. Continuing these successful economic policies will help Chile meet the remaining economic and social challenges it is currently looking to address.
- Our security relationship is very solid, with bilateral military cooperation among the best in the hemisphere. Chile supports a number of important security initiatives, from the Proliferation Security Initiative to peacekeeping in Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, we are fortunate to have a valued partner in Chile to work with us to promote our shared vision of democracy and free markets in this hemisphere. I would like to lay out three priority areas which, if confirmed, I would propose as major themes to pursue:

First, providing strong leadership to the United States' community in Chile. During my tenure in Israel, the American community bonded closely to sustain morale during a challenging period. If confirmed, I intend to provide equally active leadership to the resident American community in Chile and quality consular support to United States residents and visitors there.

That leadership would extend as well to strengthening bilateral business ties—a natural fit for me, as much of my 25-year Foreign Service career has been spent advancing U.S. business interests around the globe. I am a firm believer in working with the U.S. private sector to introduce American corporate values and innovation to our partners around the world.

Second, broadening and deepening our bilateral partnership. Building on our successful bilateral free trade agreement, I would look for ways to deepen our links across the range of issues, from energy to environmental cooperation, innovation, and law enforcement. Chile and the United States have already launched an innovative educational exchange program that could well be a model for cooperation in other sectors. Drawing on my policy experience, I would hope to develop creative tools to deepen our cooperation, working with our Chilean partners, United States agencies, and our respective private sectors.

Third, working with Chile on broader hemispheric and global challenges where we share common interests. Chile is an active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and is a candidate country for entry into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Drawing on my own multilateral background, I would hope to find ways to draw Chile into sharing its successful experiences with economic and political freedom to a broader global audience.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by thanking President Bush and Secretary Rice for their vote of confidence in proposing my candidacy for this position. If confirmed, I pledge to continue to work closely with you, the members of this committee, and other Members of Congress to deepen the very strong partnership the United States enjoys with Chile.

Senator CARDIN. Once again, let me thank all three of you for your willingness to come forward, and for your testimony today.

Mr. Johnson, if I might start with you. We had a chance to work together when you were at OSCE, and I appreciated the relationship that we had. I thought it was always one of trust and mutual respect, and I thank you for that service.

I want to talk to you about two countries that you mentioned in regard to our war on drugs—one being Colombia, and the other being Afghanistan. You mentioned both in your statement. In Colombia, we've spent \$5 billion alone—90 percent of the cocaine coming into the United States is estimated to come in from Colombia. And, our objective of Plan Colombia was to reduce coca cultivations by 50 percent, and we have not reached those goals.

So, I guess my question to you is, how do you intend to try to refocus our efforts, to have a successful program in Colombia to stop the cocaine coming into the United States—reduce it?

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You're quite correct—the American taxpayers invested significant sums in Colombia, and the Colombians themselves in the plan that we developed, have invested even more.

While the goal that we set for ourselves has clearly not been met, I think that we also should recognize just how far Colombia has come during this period of time. It's a different place than it was when President Clinton proposed Plan Colombia back in the late 1990s, and it's in significant measure because of the monies that have been put forward by our taxpayers and the programs that have been undertaken by my predecessors.

I think it's—where we are focused now as we look forward, is to try to work with the Government of Colombia to make this more of a national program—to have them take over, take it over piece by piece, and in a manner where it can be sustained by them, and be taken on as their own program, if you will. But, I think that we're going to have to have a pretty long time horizon for that, it's not something that we can do, effectively, over the course of a very short time.

We're working with the Colombians on this, we have a very seasoned and senior diplomat whose project is to come to terms with this issue, and to make a recommendation about how we can recast things. But, I think we also shouldn't forget, while we haven't had as much of a success in terms of the elimination of the cocaine trade from Colombia as we would have liked to, it's been significantly cut over what it otherwise would have been.

Where we would have, I think we can do things forward is that the traffickers themselves have adapted. They've changed the way they've done business, they've changed where they've tried to grow, and so I think, working with the Colombians, we're going to have to have a—if I could borrow a phrase from Toyota—a kind of a continuous product improvement, so that we can adapt as well, and do better than we have in the past.

Senator CARDIN. Well, was the plan objective right to reduce cultivation by 50 percent? Is that doable?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think, I would hesitate to issue a quantity. I think that we can do better than we have in the past, I think we can work more effectively with the Colombians—taking nothing from all of the hard work that's been done before—but I think we can learn from what we've done by adapting further. But I think that we also have to be modest in what we can, in fact, achieve. This is a very difficult problem. And a very—in a place that's hard to work.

Senator CARDIN. You're suggesting that we have to be flexible to modify the plan strategies as those who are participating in drug trafficking are adjusting toward our strategies to try to counter them? Is that what you're basically—?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think we can make some adjustments. I think that we can be even more effective than we have been in the past. I'm not sure that the measure of 50 percent is—was necessarily the correct one to aim at. But, what we would like to do is be more effective in curtailing the amount that's grown, and more effective in the interdiction effort.

And really, what this plan is all about, is not just interdicting drugs, or stopping them from being grown, an eradication program, it's about extending the writ of the Colombian Government further into its own country, and where people are more secure, where we can help provide the security that is needed, the alternative development programs that we have, and can take hold. And I think that's the kind of traction that we need, as we look into the future.

Senator CARDIN. Let me quickly turn to Afghanistan. We had a hearing in this committee on Afghanistan, and the poppy crop, and the failures of our policy, to date, to eliminate the poppy trade coming in from Afghanistan. At that time, there were many issues that were raised in our committee, including economic opportunity for the people of Afghanistan. I'm wondering how high of a priority Afghanistan will have. Obviously, this is a country that has incredible importance to the United States efforts. And the poppy crop is obviously one of the areas that are preventing us from achieving our objectives in that country. You'll have a key role, I hope, to play in a strategy to deal with that problem. Could you elaborate a little bit more as to how you intend to make this a priority?

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, we have just come forward over the course of the last several months, where an invigorated program in Afghanistan, one that has multiple prongs, if you will, public information, alternative development, which is the key I believe, that you were referring to there, in terms of providing a livelihood for people who might otherwise be in the drug trade.

But it also has to have a law enforcement element, which we are developing, as well. As well as elimination and eradication. The U.N. estimates that in order to really deter individuals from wanting to grow poppy, we're going to have to make them believe that about a quarter of their crop is at risk, and we have not reached that level yet.

But I think what we've found in Afghanistan is that security is the key here. In the provinces in Afghanistan, which are relatively

secure, a significant number of them are poppy-free. Where violence is more prevalent—particularly in the South—that’s the area which has had the burgeoning poppy growth over the course of the last couple of years. So, I think it’s going to require a combined effort on the counternarcotics side, as well as the security side. I think one of the things we’ve learned over time in Afghanistan, in particular, is that if you can’t create security on the ground, none of these programs can really be successful.

And so we have to work in close partnership with our military, as well as the NATO operation, there on the ground. I think this is going to—can be a successful program, but it’s going to require a great deal of patience, and a lot of work in a broad array, not just focused exclusively on eradication, but having that element as part of it.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. I appreciate our Chairman asking the questions he did about Afghanistan and Colombia, and obviously those are the two areas where there’s been—how that drug trade going unhampered, if you will, but continuing to flourish, as it is today. How that affects us as a country, overall, and affects those two countries themselves, as they continue to evolve?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I think I speak with a little more confidence about Afghanistan, because it’s an area that I’ve worked on before. And I think that it represented a different kind of threat to us than Colombia does. The threat of the narcotics trade in Afghanistan is really a threat to the stability that we are trying to promote there. The narcotics themselves are largely destined for other parts of the world—the heroine on the streets that is sold in the United States, largely, does not come from Afghanistan. That’s a threat to its neighbors, to the Russian Federation, as well as to Europe, more than it is us in terms of a direct narcotics threat.

But if we’re unsuccessful, if we do not address narcotics in Afghanistan, the efforts that we have undertaken there to create a stable environment for a government to grow won’t take hold. The money that sloshes around, the opportunities for corruption, the money that flows in the direction of the insurgency, will just be too much to overcome without addressing this problem, as well.

So, I think when we’re talking about Afghanistan, we’re talking largely from our selfish point of view about a stability issue that we have to address.

In terms of Colombia, there is an element of stability threat there, because I think that the level of violence, the threat to the government itself in Colombia that has been in significant measure addressed over the course of the last 7 years, genuinely threatened that government, genuinely threatened to make Colombia a place where people could not live in safety.

But it is also a direct threat to the health of Americans, with cocaine, with coca flowing out of that country, across the Caribbean, or up into Mexico, and into the United States. So, it is both a crime and a social and health threat, to the United States, as well as one potentially of stability. But, I think that when we are looking at Colombia today, we have to recognize that the progress that we’ve made over the last several years, has put it in a much different cat-

egory. You cannot even, you know, think about Afghanistan and Colombia in the same pocket, in terms of the stability of the State and the institutions there.

Afghanistan—one of the first countries on the planet—the literacy rate, maybe 20, 25 percent, 30 years of war, and Colombia, a significant threat from the narcotics area from a group of insurgents on the left and the right, but not in the same category, I believe, as Afghanistan.

Thank you.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

Mr. Fannin, I enjoyed hearing about your background. And, it's obviously very diverse and seems most applicable to the changes that are taking place in the Dominican Republic with CAFTA. And I wondered if you might address how you see the Dominican Republic adapting to these changes, some of the things that you think you'll be focused on when you first hit the ground there?

Mr. FANNIN. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the question, because I think one of the things that I can help with is the implementation of CAFTA. The—most importantly, I think the laws and the regulations that are required by CAFTA to improve the economic system in the Dominican Republic are very important, and still there needs to be a lot of work done to enact those laws and regulations. And it would be my—if confirmed—it would be my job and I hope to have that opportunity to ensure that those laws are passed, the regulations are passed, and that the United States companies have the opportunity to take the full benefit of those laws, and that Dominican companies share in those same benefits in terms of transparency, accountability, and the like that is necessary to have a better economy.

As I was mentioning to Senator Menendez yesterday, many investors in the Dominican Republic have complained that there are laws or rules that are unclear, and lacking in enforcement. And it would be my job, as a lawyer, I think, to help with that situation and others. But I think I can be a value in that regard as a lawyer, and as a person who has led an economic development in Arizona. Same kind of thing—attracting businesses, and I hope I can use that experience as well.

Senator CORKER. Now, I know you haven't, aren't there yet, and hopefully will be there very soon, but have you sensed, like in our country, when we enact new trade agreements, there's always concern about loss of jobs and concern about how it affects the economy, based on the limited research you've done prior to being there—is there that same type of dilemma, if you will, that exists there, on the ground, in the Dominican Republic?

Mr. FANNIN. Well, Senator, I think that from what I've read in the newspapers and some of the reports I've seen, there have been some complaints about the loss of jobs in certain areas. On the other hand, there is a lot of excitement and hope that all of the new technology, efficiencies, and so forth, that inure because of CAFTA, it will be far more a spread of benefits, more efficiency, more accountability, laws that American—other, not just American companies, U.S. companies, but people from all over the world—will seek to do business in that country, and thus improve their situation, not only in the major urban areas, but in the rural areas.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Simons, Chile is one of our major trading partners, and yet only 15 percent of their exports make their way into our country. I know they have a strong relationship with China and I'm wondering if there's, there are any issues there that you see on the horizon that are affecting our lack of trade, if you will, with them, or their growth in trade with China in a way that, somehow, creates a rub, if you will, with their own country?

Mr. SIMONS. Thank you, Senator Corker.

Let me say just a couple of words about how Chile has approached the trade issue worldwide.

Chile has entered into free trade agreements with virtually all its major trading partners, and has been willing to expose its economy to the benefits and vagaries of free trade, and has benefited substantially. Chile's total trade is running something on the order of 65 percent of GDP, if you add imports and exports, it's a very high reliance on trade. So, Chile itself is very comfortable and confident that it can succeed on the trade front.

With respect to the U.S. FTA, I think we've done quite well with the bilateral free trade agreement in the 3½ years it's been in existence. We've had total trade increase by about 150 percent, and during that period U.S. exports also have gone up by about 150 percent—from about \$3 billion a year to about \$7 billion last year—and I think that's a significant increase.

Chile is our fifth largest trading partner in the hemisphere. So, we've seen good growth on the United States export side, and this has been very positive, I think, for United States' businesses.

We're also making some inroads. Our market share in Chile is going up after many years of decline as a result of the FTA.

Now, with respect to China, China clearly has a voracious appetite for inputs of all sorts—raw material inputs, energy inputs, copper inputs from Chile—and China is now the major importer of Chilean copper. But, of course, China needs that copper to fuel its economy, its economic growth. I think it's natural that China would become a larger purchaser of Chilean copper, and I think it's to be expected that two-way trade with China will increase.

But I think it's important that the United States maintains its market share, and that we get our businesses down there competing effectively, using the tools that we have under the bilateral FTA. And, if confirmed, I will be pushing very hard—I have a background with the business sector, I served in the private sector, and I've done a lot of work helping U.S. businesses over the years, and I would pledge to continue and intensify that, if confirmed.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CARDIN. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of the gentlemen who are here before us for their willingness to serve, and their families for their willingness to have what is also a degree of sacrifice in some respects, in terms of moving and being displaced, and sometimes interceding in their own professional lives. So, we appreciate their sacrifices, as well.

Let me start with you, Mr. Fannin. I appreciate your opening statement. I think it reflects a lot of the things we talked about yesterday, and I appreciate, obviously, you listened well, and that's

a good sign of an ambassador who starts out by—if you can do it here, you can do it in the Dominican Republic, so I appreciate your statement, incorporating some of the things.

And I just want to say, I know from our conversation yesterday you have not been able to visit the country yet, and are stopped from doing so until you get through this process. You're going to be able to go to a—if you are successful, which I believe you will be—a great country with an incredibly warm and hardworking people. From a historic city in Santo Domingo, to a great places like Cenamal which has a mountainside that leads to a bay where there is a whaling season, to Santiago, which was the first capitol of the Dominican Republic and is the heart of tobacco growing, to Punta Cana which must have been still how Columbus discovered it, except for all of the hotels that are being added to the area, and where most Americans go to travel.

So, it's an idyllic place. And yet, it has some very significant challenges. And so, I heard your statement, and I hope that you will add to your portfolio while you are there—certainly the economic component is very important to us, as it is to the Dominicans. But I hope that there are two other items, one which you did touch upon, and I appreciate that.

I just want to say, you know, it was President Bush who declared the Dominican Republic last year as one of the four major drug transit countries in the hemisphere. And our own United States Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South said that the number of drug-smuggling flights from Venezuela to Haiti and the Dominican Republic increased by 167 percent. A hundred and sixty-seven percent, between the years 2005 and 2006.

So, I hope that as part of your portfolio you're going to continue to press this issue with President Fernandez. I think it's in their interests, obviously such transiting is corrosive in their own society, but certainly it's a concern to us in our own country.

And the flip side of that is Transparency International 2006 Corruption Perception Index, which listed Dominican Republic as "rampant." I know of U.S. companies that have provided services, products or investments, and who arbitrarily and capriciously have seen either their nonpayment, or interference in their investments. It's bad for the Dominican Republic, because it sends the wrong message about the ability and the desirability of United States companies to go and make investments, and certainly to lend services.

So, I hope that that will be also part of your portfolio. Can I expect you to include that, as well as the economic aspects?

Mr. FANNIN. Yes, sir. You sure can.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Mr. Simons, you're going to a great country, as well, as I'm sure you know. And I listened to the three points that you talked about—I agree with you. The third point on economic and political freedoms and using Chile as a place that is an example of that at a time in which we are challenged within the hemisphere. I believe that is true, except that Chile, under President Bachelet has been hailed as a modern leftist government, but recent protests do not bode well for the future of her administration, at least as it would seem now.

I'm wondering what your view is, given the success story that Chile has been—what explains for the unrest within Chile? And in that context, how will we be able to get the Chileans to play a role that is more significant in the hemisphere, particularly with Chavez being a next-door neighbor with a lot of—trying to—exert a lot of influence in the hemisphere that I personally don't believe is in our national interest.

Mr. SIMONS. Thank you, Senator Menendez, it's a very thoughtful question. With respect to—

Senator MENENDEZ. I only ask thoughtful questions. [Laughter.]

No, I'm just kidding. Thanks for the compliment.

Mr. SIMONS. With respect to President Bachelet's internal situation, I would just point out that Chile is a strong, vibrant democracy, it's had four successful changes of government in the past 17 years, and as it has matured, in any kind of open democracy with free expression, you have people that are speaking out and expressing their views. And so you have poll numbers that fluctuate.

But, we have had an excellent relationship with the Bachelet administration across a broad range of areas, and the fact that Chile is a vibrant democracy, I think, helps us work with the Chileans.

Now, with respect to Venezuela, I think you point out rightly, Venezuelan relations are a challenge for many of our friends in this hemisphere. President Bachelet has, herself, used the expression, "A different path"—Chile is pursuing a different path. It's a path that involves freedom of expression, political pluralism, obviously a different economic path.

Undersecretary Hughes in the State Department has used the expression, "diplomacy of deeds." She's charged many of us career officers with pursuing that. And to some extent, Chile is pursuing a diplomacy of deeds in the hemisphere—is showing what the results are of this different path.

And so, I think this is something that, if confirmed, I would work to encourage Chile to do, pursue this path, and to find ways to demonstrate that this different path yields improved results for the publics of Chile, and other countries. So, I would definitely work on that.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that. I don't mean for my comments to be misunderstood on President Bachelet. I actually think she's doing a good job, but it's within the success that Chile has had economically and politically, opening up, that you see these protests, and you wonder—what are the underpinnings of that? Outside of the—little bit of the transportation fiasco that they had there for awhile.

It is—if one chalks it up strictly to the fulfillment of democracy, that's great. But I'm, you know, I'm concerned that there are other underpinnings, and you know, we'd look forward to, as you get on the ground, getting a sense from you whether it's strictly the fulfillment of democracy, and a boisterous democracy, or whether there are other issues there that are involved, as well.

Finally, Mr. Johnson, let me—I have the toughest questions for you. But then, you have one of the toughest assignments here, and I recognize that.

I have been, since my House days, a strong supporter of Plan Colombia. But I have to be honest with you, my support is—I am in-

creasingly becoming skeptical of that support. I look at the results of the Office of National Drug Control Policy's 2006 government survey of cultivation in Colombia that indicates that statistically there was no change in the amount of coca being grown between 2005 and 2006.

In a recent briefing before the Senate, we were told the startling fact that, "70 percent of fields that have been reconstituted within 6 months of spraying, according to the State Department's most recent verification mission." I think that's a pretty serious problem. If we're going through all of this effort, and that after we spray a field, 70 percent is reconstituted in some way, shape, or form, makes me wonder about the nature of our policy there.

And then, when I look at that, I put that on the side for a minute, I'm going to let you answer all of this in a holistic way—then I understand the administration is in the midst of some negotiations with Mexico about a cross-border efforts on drug gangs that operate on both sides of the United States-Mexico border. I'd love to know where we're headed there, because the administration ought to come to this Congress to ask for that money. This is a key issue, but what's that policy going to be, and I don't know if you know what it is at this point, or what you think it should be from your experiences, but I'd like to hear that.

And last, Guatemala. You know, the—sort of like the sexy parts of this are Colombians, the Andean Region, Afghanistan, and others, but I am concerned that we are not looking at Guatemala. From what I understand, entire swaths of the country are run by drug traffickers. Not only do they control the area where they transit their planes, they try to control the people. They do everything from pay for a deala la huela, to soccer fields, they try to buy the government off at the local level, and I feel that often Guatemala is forgotten in our discussion of the hemisphere, particularly when we see crime and violence levels that are startling, a judicial system that is weak, and impunity remaining a serious problem.

So I'd like you to give me—because none of these things, this is like Jell-O in my mind. You push it in one place, it pops out in another, when it's within the hemisphere—and so I'd like to hear your views on all of that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator.

First of all, when you started out with the first question, you said some kind things about our families, and it reminded me that I had neglected to note that my son, Andrew is with us today, and—but my daughters, Carrie and Rachel, couldn't make it, they're in school—

Senator MENENDEZ. We'll correct the record. [Laughter.]

Mr. JOHNSON. I need to correct the record so I can go home tonight.

Senator MENENDEZ. You can go home. [Laughter.]

Mr. JOHNSON. With respect to those very difficult questions that you raise, eradication of coca is not like poppy. When you knock down a poppy field, whether you do it manually or chemically, it's done for the year. The coca can be reconstituted more easily, you can grow multiple crops a year, so I'm not sure how to balance the 70 percent reconstitution against the art of the possible, but I would note that as part of the issue that we're dealing with. And

that while—if you can grow multiple crops in a single year, if you—some of the counting rules have to be rethought there just a little bit.

But our main goal there remains not just to spray crops, or to manually eliminate them for its own purpose, we want to extend the writ of the Colombian Government. And, I think your support and the support of your colleagues over the last several years for the resources for Plan Colombia and now its successor, have been key in essentially making Colombia a different place than it was when Undersecretary Pickering would come up here and testify on behalf of Plan Colombia. This is a—I think we shouldn't over-do the challenge we—I mean, we shouldn't underestimate how far we've come here, even though the statistics are very, very difficult.

I also feel a little bit, when I'm looking at these statistics, like someone who is trying to deal with financial statements where the rules have been changed, where the way that we've estimated this has changed during the period of time. Now, that says one thing in terms of what you're trying to do. But, if you're the investor, what you're asking yourself are, which rules are correct? I mean, am I making money, or am I not? Are we eliminating this problem, or are we not? And I think we've made some progress there, but I think that we still have a long way to go.

And so, as you consider where you wish to be as a legislator on the future appropriations for Colombia, I think that I'm going to have to be asking for your generosity to continue. Because I think it remains in the selfish interest of our country. But, I think it is still with—not just legitimate, but it's the thing you ought to do, to push us to see if we can craft better, more effective ways to confront this problem, always bearing in mind that what we're trying to do is deal with the problem itself, rather than the accounting, perhaps, that we may be focused on here.

In the case of Mexico—I understand that sometime, perhaps, as early as later this week there may be some further information on this issue. I know that the State Department has been working during the course of the summer with the Mexican authorities to try to come up with a program which will, indeed, be effective. I'm not in a position to announce that, if you will.

But the question that I think that you are raising is to whether this will be a good idea, whether we will be effective here. I think it's—it is appropriate to reflect on the new situation politically we're faced with in Mexico, with President Calderon, and his very clear determination to make a difference in his country.

I think it is in our own interest to take advantage of this opportunity and to see if we can find ways to work together. Because this—anything going on in Mexico, particularly in this case, because it is, these are issues that are really on the border—affect our citizens quite quickly and quite clearly. So working together to see if we can craft a program which is in our own interest and in the interest of the people of Mexico, I think, makes a great deal of sense.

With respect to Guatemala, you are quite right that our efforts in this, in the Caribbean Basin, are going to have potential for displacement if we push the balloon in one direction that has the potential, at least, for popping out someplace else.

And so, I think if you—as we work on the initiative for Mexico, it will be combined with one for all of Central America, so that we can address this in a more complete manner.

Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Mr. Fannin, if you need someone to promote domestic, Dominican Republic for investment by United States companies, you might want to take Senator Menendez with you. It seems like he has a good understanding of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. FANNIN. Yes, sir, Senator, I agree. Thank you very much.

Senator CARDIN. I have one or two more questions, if I might.

You talked about the CAFTA–DR free trade agreement, and we have—we are the major trading partner for the Dominican Republic, and it's somewhat balanced. The trade agreement has not been confirmed yet by the Dominican Republic, there appears to be some concerns locally about revenue loss and other issues.

I was very encouraged by your comments and your statement about working to implement the CAFTA–DR agreements including dealing with labor and environmental issues. I'm just interested in your commitment or understanding as to where the Dominicans are in the enactment of the necessary laws to implement the free trade agreement?

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. Chairman, I think that there are—I couldn't give you a percentage, because I am not knowledgeable as to what has—all of the things that have passed in terms of regulations and laws. I do know that there has been an effort to cooperate with the efforts of USAID, in terms of those things that we talked about earlier that are really important to business. One, that we would have people who are trained judges, trained prosecutors, public defenders—people where we have a reliable judicial system.

In fact, I think one of the people that I talked to indicate that there still needs to be some things done to get the full benefit of this, in terms of the enactment of regulations and laws. I couldn't tell you exactly what those things are, but I know there is a real effort on the part of the government and President Fernandez to make it work. And his conversations with the Deputy Secretary recently, I know that was mentioned—he wants to do everything he can to make it work, and is working hard on that.

Senator CARDIN. Let me just, you—I think you mentioned this in your statement, but let me just underscore it. We have tried to monitor, very carefully, corruption issues within countries that we have business with, and the Dominican Republic has not ranked very well in fighting public corruption.

Unfortunately, in too many countries they think it's somewhat of a way of existence. And, I think that the U.S. presence, through the ambassador, can play a very important role in making it clear that a country that intends to continue progress must fight public corruption—all corruption—but clearly needs to deal with it within the governmental sector.

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. Chairman, I hope—if confirmed—to be very much a part of trying to help with that situation. I think that's the thing that Senator Menendez talked about drugs and corruption are really problems—serious problems. And as Mr. Johnson was

saying, the impact on our country from the drugs being transited through there, really has a lot to do with the corruption—the money that’s available that comes through for the transiting of drugs through the country.

So, I would do—I use my legal background—to make sure that they are doing what they’re supposed to be doing, in terms of the training of prosecutors and judges, in providing them with the technical systems to ensure that those who violate the law are, in fact, prosecuted. And effectively prosecuted.

Senator CARDIN. I would add also, the independence of the judiciary, which is critical if you’re going to fight public corruption issues.

Mr. FANNIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Mr. Simons, I want to come back to the free trade agreement with Chile for just one moment. Chile has been—had a growing economy, so we do expect that there would be increased economic activity between the United States and Chile. We’ve seen that—I’m not sure I would credit all of it to the free trade agreement—but clearly the free trade agreements opened up opportunities, there’s no question about that.

At the same time, as you point out, Asia—particularly China—has been very aggressive in its relationships with Chile. Seems to me that we need to increase our attention to Chile, as far as Chilean trade is concerned, and that the competition—particularly with Chile being so aggressive internationally—is one that could be a challenge to the United States. I would appreciate your views on that.

Mr. SIMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think I agree with everything that you’ve said. The free trade agreement, our bilateral free trade agreement, does provide us a unique platform to bring different kinds of American businesses down to Chile. We have a very strong investment chapter, for example, of our free trade agreement, that provides features that are commonly found in bilateral investment treaties.

We have strong intellectual property rights provisions of the FTA that we’re working with the Chileans to get implemented. This is an area where we need to devote some more work.

And, we have openings in our agricultural sector, for additional exports there. And, I think, services is a very interesting area, as well. As you pointed out in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, Chile has now reached middle income status, but it’s still realized, largely, on the export of primary products, and it does some processing of those primary products and sells them abroad.

But, to take the next leap, to leap into the knowledge-based kind of society where our services, exports, will be a lot more competitive is something that we need to work on together. I think the free trade agreement provides us a platform to do that. And clearly, this is an area where we have a competitive advantage over the Chinese or others.

So, I think we need to look at the sectors in which we have comparative advantage, and work closely with the business community. I agree, Washington needs to pay attention to Chile. It would be

terrific if we could get some visits from Members of Congress, as well. If confirmed I would love to see that, and your staffs.

But, I agree with you, and it will definitely be an issue of priority, attention to me, if confirmed.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSON, I've got to put my Helsinki hat on just for a moment, and ask you about trafficking of human beings. As you know, the United States took the leadership in sensitizing the international community to our collective responsibility to stop the trafficking of people. And that comes under some of your work, and I just wanted to make sure that that will remain a very high priority, in working to combat trafficking.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, it certainly will. That's a multipronged effort in the United States Government, and one where I think our greatest contribution in the Bureau that I will lead, since the primary responsibility for the center on that, I think, is going to shift from us to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in the next few months—is to help them and to help the other elements here, to work with finding out where these organizations are, and where the trafficking in persons is—fits with trafficking in other illicit products, in particular, narcotics—so that we can attack this together.

So that will very much remain something that I am interested in, and working on, if I am confirmed.

Senator CARDIN. I just want to make sure that any transfer of responsibility is not to diminish the importance of the issues, but to work more effectively to combat it, and continue U.S. international leadership in that area.

Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, I'll do my best to do so.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Senator CORKER.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I think we have three excellent candidates, I really think the questioning has been very good. I appreciate you having this meeting, and I want to thank their families for being here in support of them. I know it means a lot to all of us when that occurs, and for their sacrifices. And I hope we have a very speedy approval process so that these men can begin some great work on behalf of our country.

Senator CARDIN. Well, Senator Corker, I'm going to agree. I've been through several confirmation hearings, and normally you get somewhat prepared, recorded replies. I was impressed by all three of you, and the depth of your knowledge of the subjects, and your commitment to the priorities of your post. And, I thank you very much for your candor here today, they're extremely difficult assignments, all three, with real challenges and opportunities, and we thank you very much for being willing and prepared to serve your country.

The record will remain open for 2 days, so the committee members may submit additional questions for the record. I've asked that each nominee respond quickly to those questions, if they are submitted, so that we can move forward on the confirmation process as quickly as possible.

If there's nothing further, the committee will stand adjourned. Thank you all very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. You have never worked in the INL Bureau, and you have never served in a country that is a major drug producer or transit country. What qualifies you for this position? Have you ever administered programs overseas of this size and scope?

Answer. During my almost 30 years in the Foreign Service, I have held several positions with responsibility for significant resources—both human and monetary. That is particularly the case with my assignments over the last 10 years—United States Ambassador to the OSCE, Coordinator for Afghanistan, and Chargé and Deputy Chief of Mission in London.

London's 800-plus person Embassy engages in almost every aspect of American policy, including our multiple joint efforts with the United Kingdom in Latin America, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where INL's programs are working to advance American interests. During my tenure there, I worked directly on every one of them. As Coordinator for Afghanistan, I worked to ensure that INL programs were properly executed by the interagency community and fully integrated into our overall national and multinational efforts. The large-scale efforts INL is now supporting in Afghanistan date their beginnings to this period.

As U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, I played a key, personal role in the integration of INL programs into that organization's significant conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The OSCE Police School in Kosovo is the international community's most successful police training effort. The OSCE Senior Police Advisor program provides emerging democracies with advice and training on modern, service-focused policing. And the OSCE has integrated police training and advice into most of the OSCE Missions. All of these initiatives were driven by the United States with firm, personal backing from me.

Finally, my first Foreign Service assignment, on the United States-Mexican border at Ciudad Juarez, gave me a firm grounding in the extraordinary challenges and opportunities that arise from our border relationship, especially the challenges of cross-border crime and narcotics trafficking. It is a grounding one never forgets.

Question. What are your top three objectives, if confirmed? A year from now, what do you hope to be able to report that you have accomplished?

Answer. If confirmed in this position, I will strive to achieve the following top objectives:

- An effectively crafted, effectively implemented program of cooperative law enforcement and counternarcotics with Mexico that enhances Mexico's ability to confront narcotics-related violence and trafficking within Mexico and along our shared border and strengthens Mexican ability to cooperate more effectively with United States, state, and local law enforcement agencies working along that border.
- In Colombia and Afghanistan, measurably lowering the quantity of narcotics available for market and, in the case of Colombia, placing ever greater levels of responsibility in the hands of the Colombians.
- Developing and supporting civilian law enforcement and justice sector reform programs—both large, as in Iraq and Afghanistan and smaller, as in Lebanon and Kosovo—that provide both greater value for the taxpayer's dollar and a more effective partner in providing public safety in ungoverned or inadequately governed territories.

Reaching these objectives will require sustained, long-term approaches, some of which are already underway. Within the next year, if confirmed, I would like to be able to report the following near-term accomplishments:* A more effective counternarcotics program in Afghanistan, including an improved eradication effort in Helmand and other southern provinces in Afghanistan, that will slow or even halt the rapid growth in opium poppy cultivation there in recent years.

- In Colombia, continued reductions in the level of civil violence and consequent increases in public safety as a result of United States counterdrug and counterterrorism support for Colombia over recent years. I would also like to report that nationalization efforts have begun to reduce the need for U.S. financial

support for certain aspects of aviation programs as described in the answer to question No. 4.

- Enhanced law enforcement and counternarcotics cooperation with Mexico. President Calderon has stated his commitment to continue the close cooperation between Mexican and United States law enforcement agencies begun under his predecessor. Over the next year, I hope to see this enhanced cooperation beginning to pay dividends through improved security along our shared border and further progress in our ongoing programs to modernize and professionalize the Mexican federal police and court systems.
- To ensure that INL can manage its increasing responsibilities around the world, if confirmed, I plan over the first several months to complete the restructuring of the Bureau begun by my predecessor, to expand the Bureau's new web-based local financial system to include more posts, and to continue to strengthen oversight mechanisms, especially for larger programs such as the civilian police programs in Iraq and Afghanistan and the INL aviation program.

Question. In April 2007, the administration submitted a report to Congress on the next phase of assistance to Colombia. This report suggests that United States assistance to Colombia will continue at substantial levels, though slowly decrease between fiscal year 2007 and 2013. Do you think that the strategy it outlines takes the right approach, and if so, why?

Answer. The strategy outlined in the administration's report was one based on continued support for the accomplishment of United States' goals and the development of a sustainable nationalization of our programs in Colombia. This is the right approach and one that also recognizes the need to reduce United States funding in Colombia, while guaranteeing the sustainability of the successes in this important bilateral program with a key regional partner. Much has been accomplished in Colombia in the areas of counternarcotics, governability, democracy, and progress in human rights, economic development, and counterterrorism. We cannot afford to let this progress be reversed by withdrawing support too quickly.

INL is in the process of reviewing its programs in Colombia and our nationalization efforts to ensure that we are on the right track. If adjustments are necessary, I look forward to working to strike an appropriate balance.

Question. For several years, the United States has worked with Colombia toward the objective of having that government manage and operate its aerial eradication and other counterdrug programs. Why have we not yet achieved this goal and when can we expect to meet it?

Answer. Every year the Colombian Government has taken over additional responsibilities for its counternarcotics programs, and we are actively accelerating this process. Since the beginning of Plan Colombia the Government of Colombia has invested over \$7 billion in its fight against narcoterrorism and for control of its territory. However, nationalization of complex aviation programs that are, in effect, only 5 years old is challenging. For example, it takes 4 years to select and train a pilot to command a helicopter, and even longer for a master helicopter mechanic. The administration's plan is to have successfully completed nationalization by 2013 and to reduce the annual United States Government investment accordingly, as outlined in the April 2006 Report to Congress on United States Assistance Programs in Colombia and Plans to Transfer Responsibilities to Colombia. In the time since that report was submitted, we have made further progress in nationalization. For instance, we are moving forward on the nationalization of the program for the protection of the Caño Limón pipeline and the Air Bridge Denial program. We are also in discussions for Colombia to assume counternarcotics fuel costs beginning in April 2008. In the area of aviation support, K-MAX helicopters are being returned to the United States as of October 2007 and the Government of Colombia will assume complete support for 13 selected Colombian National Police aircraft in March 2008. Also under discussion is whether to withdraw or hand over the UH-1N helicopters presently under the Colombian Army program in April 2008. Possible reductions in funding from the amounts projected in that report, and a subsequent one sent to the Congress in April 2007, may mean additional adjustments to our plans.

Question. The 2007 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime World Drug Report indicates that Afghanistan's share of global opium poppy cultivation grew by 59 percent in 2006. Did the United States and other coalition partners in Afghanistan wait too long to address the drug problem after removing the Taliban from power? What do you see as the major obstacles to achieving any meaningful reduction in drug cultivation, and what can be done to remove those obstacles?

Answer. Ever since coalition forces overthrew the Taliban, the United States has worked with the United Kingdom, which assumed the lead in counternarcotics in

Afghanistan, and with other coalition partners to address this difficult problem. Since then, there have been setbacks as well as gains in this effort. In the past year, the number of poppy-free provinces increased from 6 to 13, poppy production in the center and north of Afghanistan is rapidly decreasing, and the Afghan Eradication Force and the provincial governors eradicated 19,047 hectares of poppy, 24 percent more than last year.

Unfortunately, the gains in the north have been more than offset by setbacks in the southern and eastern provinces, where the security situation is the principal obstacle to lowering drug cultivation. For example, more than half of all poppy cultivation is in Helmand province, where the security situation makes most nonmilitary activities impossible. The United States counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan is an interagency effort specifically designed to confront opium production in the current security environment.

Improved counternarcotics-counterinsurgency coordination along with a plan to conduct forced eradication in areas where negotiated eradication has been unsuccessful will help us to overcome the problems presented by the lack of security, especially in Helmand. Forced eradication is necessary in some areas where farmers believe the Taliban will protect their fields. In addition to improving the speed and efficiency of eradication, forced eradication will allow us to go after the wealthiest farmers who are profiting the most from poppy and send a signal to poor farmers that eradication is performed equitably. Additionally, the Good Performers Initiative is designed to incentivize provincial leaders by rewarding provinces that are poppy free or have made significant reductions in poppy cultivation. We must also improve Afghanistan's ability to take down high-level traffickers to demonstrate that our effort is not exclusively focused on eradicating drug crops and that anyone along the supply chain is vulnerable to prosecution.

Question. A recent joint report of the Inspectors General of the Departments of State and Defense (issued July 2007) found that the "priority granted to counternarcotics and concomitant responsibilities of various United States Government elements is not sufficiently clear and specific. Interlocutors, both in Washington and Afghanistan, were unable to point to a clear, overarching strategy." The report recommended that the State Department take the lead in developing a policy document on roles and responsibilities, a recommendation with which INL disagreed. Have you reviewed this report? What is your view about this recommendation?

Answer. INL concurred in part with the Inspectors General recommendation in its July 2007 report but disagreed as to rank-ordering priorities. In January of this year, when we received information that the 2007 poppy harvest would likely exceed the previous year's record high, Office of National Drug Control Policy Director John Walters and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, asked that an interagency group be convened to evaluate all aspects of the counternarcotics strategy and to propose recommendations to achieve better results. As a result, a high-level interagency group, comprised of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Agriculture, and Treasury; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Office of National Drug Control Policy; and the U.S. Agency for International Development, labored over many months to ensure long-term success, while looking for ideas to also achieve successes in the short-term. The President also appointed a Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform with the rank of ambassador to oversee this effort, and in July 2007, the interagency U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan was adopted as United States policy.

This document provides greater guidance with regard to respective United States Government roles and responsibilities. However, providing a precise rank-ordering of the priority of counternarcotics vis-a-vis other U.S. objectives is complicated by the interrelated nature of our top four policy priorities in Afghanistan—democracy building, counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, and rule of law. For example, there is mounting evidence of the linkage between the insurgency and narcotics trafficking. The counternarcotics/counterinsurgency nexus also feeds corruption and diminishes democratic governance, illustrating the interconnectedness of these issues. In this context, seeking to assign a rank-order priority to objectives would undermine current efforts to integrate United States Government activities in a way that is most productive and cost-beneficial, and best advances our policy interests.

Question. In August, the State Department issued a new counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan. What is new about this strategy? Why, in your judgment, will it make a difference?

Answer. There are three significant pieces of the updated counternarcotics strategy that will make a difference both in the near- and long-term in Afghanistan. An enhanced "carrots and sticks" approach will dramatically increase development as-

sistance to provide incentives for licit development while simultaneously amplifying the scope and intensity of both interdiction and eradication operations. The Good Performers Initiative will provide development assistance to provinces that have made dramatic reductions in poppy cultivation or that are poppy-free. The United States has committed \$35 million dollars so far to this effort. The strategy also seeks to improve counternarcotics and counterinsurgency planning and operations in a manner not previously accomplished, with a particular emphasis on integrating drug interdiction into the counterinsurgency mission. Finally, the strategy encourages sustained political will for counternarcotics efforts among the Afghan Government, our allies, and international civilian/military organizations, and strengthens public information efforts at the grassroots level.

I believe the refined strategy will certainly improve the coordination of our overall counternarcotics efforts and is likely to make a positive impact as many of these elements have already proven successful in parts of Afghanistan.

Question. It has been reported that the United States Government and the Mexican Government are in discussions about a substantial package of assistance by the United States to help Mexico's counternarcotics efforts, as well as the countries of Central America. Is such a package in development? When do you expect that it will be announced? What level of funding, and what types of assistance, do you expect will be requested?

Answer. The Governments of the United States and Mexico are discussing cooperative steps to address what President Bush described as a "common problem on our shared border"—drug and other illegal trafficking, and the violence associated with it. We are also considering the best way to support the countries of Central America in confronting the transnational threats we share, including narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and criminal gangs.

President Bush first discussed security cooperation with then President-elect Calderon in November 2006. These discussions continued during the President's visit to the region in March 2007, as outlined in the joint United States-Mexico Communiqué of March 2007. In May, the Government of Mexico approached the United States with suggested areas for greater cooperation, and technical experts from both governments subsequently began meeting to define needs and areas where we might usefully work together. At the North American Leaders' Summit in Montebello, Canada, on August 20–21, Presidents Bush and Calderon agreed to address the drug trafficking and narcotics-related violence affecting both countries. Separately, in August, the member countries of the Central American System for Integration (SICA) held internal discussions about developing their own regional strategy to combat crime. United States Embassies in Central America have also advised on the types of projects that could assist the Central American initiative and support our policy goals.

Our continuing discussions with the Governments of Mexico and Central American countries are focusing on three broad areas: counternarcotics and border security; public security and law enforcement; and strengthening institutions and rule of law. Possible areas of joint work could include strengthening Mexico's southern border, enhanced computer and database networks to make Mexico's law enforcement agencies more efficient and transparent, and measures to professionalize Mexico's federal law enforcement personnel. The administration is also considering programs that would help law enforcement and court institutions to ensure due process, transparency, proper oversight, responsiveness to citizen complaints, and protection of human rights. For Central America, a number of options are being considered, including the provision of tools, training, and technical expertise.

The nature and extent of cooperation with Mexico and Central America have not been finalized, so no official announcement has been scheduled. The administration is assessing how to fund any resulting programs in a fiscally responsible manner as well as which accounts might be appropriate to execute these programs. The administration intends to continue its dialog with the Congress as the outlines of our proposed cooperative effort take shape. I look forward to providing additional details to you and your staff as soon as possible.

Question. INL funds and supports several International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) around the globe. What is the utility of these academies? What have they accomplished?

Answer. The ILEAs help advance U.S. interests through international cooperation while promoting social, political, and economic stability by combating crime. To date, ILEAs have trained over 21,000 officials from over 75 countries. They have promoted unprecedented law enforcement cooperation with U.S. and regional counterparts and have enhanced the technical expertise of investigators in practically

every corner of the world. The primary purpose of the ILEAs is to build strong institutions and bring order and stability to emerging democracies and countries afflicted by endemic criminal problems. To accomplish these goals, ILEA graduates have either directed or been instrumental in a wide range of effective actions, such as:

- Enactment of new laws and regulations.
- Changes in curricula at national academies.
- Enhancements in land border and airport security.
- Identification of terrorist groups and sympathizers.
- Improvement in community relations.
- Changes in methods and procedures regarding human rights and fair treatment of the public.
- Effective measures against organized crime.
- Improvement of cooperation with U.S. authorities.
- Creation of task forces and other specialized groups.
- Participation in transnational investigations.
- Apprehension and successful prosecution of notorious criminal figures.
- Seizures of drugs, firearms, explosives, and dangerous materials.
- Prevention of human trafficking and child exploitation.

Listed below are a few of the many accomplishments of ILEA graduates worldwide:

- Philippines—Seized a major methamphetamine super lab using techniques learned at ILEA Bangkok.
- Malawi—Thwarted a terrorist event as a result of having developed sophisticated explosives investigatory skills at ILEA Gaborone.
- Georgia—Participated in and greatly contributed to the successful American-Georgian investigation concerning the assassination attempt on President Bush during a visit to Georgia in 2005. The perpetrator was arrested and convicted, and the investigation was instrumental in the interdiction and seizure of smuggled highly enriched uranium in Georgia.
- Ukraine—Set up the first witness protection program in the country.
- Nicaragua—Formed the core group of a specialized vetted unit of law enforcement and prosecutors working on an anticorruption and money laundering task force.
- Lesotho—Conducted several high-profile arrests at ports of entry for suspected money laundering.
- Tanzania—Replicated the training received at ILEA Gaborone to instruct 100 park rangers and 20 other officers involved in the protection of wildlife and natural resources.
- Hungary—Established an unprecedented United States-Hungarian cooperative task force targeting international organized crime.
- Mozambique—Started the development of an antiterrorism task force within the Ministry of Interior.
- El Salvador—Worked with Mexican counterparts to capture and prosecute two Salvadoran murder suspects who had kidnapped two young girls in San Salvador. The suspects were detained in Mexico and extradited to El Salvador.

Question. A State Department Inspector General report (an inspection report of INL, issued in 2005) noted that the ILEA graduate facility in Roswell, NM, has “trained only about a quarter of the number of students envisioned in the original 5-year cooperative agreement (with the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology).” Why has that ILEA fallen short in its efforts?

Answer. The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Roswell, NM, is administered pursuant to an agreement between INL and the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology (NMT). NMT is the primary entity in an effort involving a consortium of subcontractors, including Sam Houston State University, Eastern New Mexico University-Roswell, New Mexico Tech Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center, and the University of New Mexico Survey Research Center.

Original plans for ILEA-Roswell were optimistic. The Request for Proposal (RFP) for ILEA-Roswell, published August 16, 2000, in the Federal Register, specified that 12, 4-week classes of 50 students (600 students per year) would be conducted during the initial year of operation. Planned program expansion in the second year of ILEA-Roswell operation envisioned that two simultaneous classes held concurrently would increase the number of students to 100 per class (1,200 students per year). Unfortunately, ILEA-Roswell expenses have strained the resources made available to support the program and has resulted in an agreement modification to reduce the number classes to 10, 4-week classes of 35 students (350 per year).

Question. INL programs have grown substantially in the last decade. In fiscal year 1996, just over a decade ago, INL's programs totaled about \$115 million. A State Department Inspector General report (an inspection report of INL, issued in 2005), stated that procurement officials in the Bureau of Administration do not believe that INL has sufficient managers to administer its programs, and that "most INL program managers are inexperienced and not well informed about government contracting requirements." Have you reviewed the staffing and experience of program managers in INL? Does the bureau have the personnel necessary to manage these programs and oversee the many contractors involved in implementing them?

Answer. INL increased its domestic staffing by 35 personnel subsequent to the 2005 OIG inspection report. The personnel increases focused on improving INL's program, resource, and contract management. In 2006, INL established an Afghanistan, Iraq, and Jordan contract management support group located in the United States and, working with Embassies Baghdad and Kabul, increased program and contract management staffing at these posts by a total of 20 personnel. Within the past year, INL increased the number of in-country contract officer's representatives by 10. INL continues to hire specialists to strengthen program and contract management efforts for both overseas and domestic operations. In addition, personnel involved in contract management are required to take the Department's contract officer's representative course. I believe that INL has made significant progress in improving its program and contract management functions. The Department's Office of the Inspector General and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction have also noted the improvements made in their reports.

If confirmed, I will continue efforts to improve INL's program and contract management operations.

RESPONSES OF P. ROBERT FANNIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps-State Department Relations?

Answer. Yes, I have read 04 STATE 258893.

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this cable?

Answer. Yes, I understand the content of this cable and, if confirmed as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, will execute United States policy as requested and directed by the Secretary of State.

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that "the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy" and that "the Peace Corps's role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. Government agencies"?

Answer. Yes, I understand, and if confirmed will execute all applicable U.S. policy with regard to the Peace Corps.

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise your chief of mission "authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies"?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed I will exercise my chief of mission authorities as requested and directed by the Secretary of State.

RESPONSES OF PAUL E. SIMONS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has been in force for over a year. By most accounts, it has been of major benefit to both countries, increasing bilateral trade by 30 percent in 2006. The United States remains Chile's No. 1 trading partner with two-way trade in merchandise topping US \$8 billion. The FTA also encourages foreign investment in Chile, another component of Chile's economic success.

How will you improve upon this FTA's success? Describe the outreach activities you would lead in order to introduce Chilean business officials to investment opportunities in the United States. Describe the outreach activities you would lead in

order to introduce United States business officials to investment opportunities in Chile.

Answer. In the 3 years since it has been in place, our bilateral Free Trade Agreement with Chile has been successful in helping to expand two-way trade between our countries. If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure a level playing field for United States firms and investors already doing business in Chile. I will place a high priority on expanding United States Government engagement with the business sectors in both Chile and the United States, working with my strong Embassy team. I am planning to counsel United States firms regarding the advantages and new opportunities for American products and services in Chile as a result of the FTA. I intend to deepen our work with the already active United States Chamber of Commerce chapter in Chile, as well as local Chilean chambers, in order to leverage and expand our outreach to increase both trade and investment flows. If confirmed, I will encourage more bilateral trade missions between Chile and the United States. I also hope to lead and participate in targeted "Ambassador Tours" to key United States cities, both individually as well as with my colleagues from other United States Embassies in Latin America. Regarding investment in the United States, I want to work proactively with individual states, as appropriate, also developing relationships with state offices in Chile and other parts of the Southern Cone. If confirmed, I will lend the embassy's support in welcoming individual and sectoral investment missions from the United States to Chile, as well as working to disseminate details of individual investment opportunities in Chile throughout the United States.

Question. Some aspects of the FTA with Chile are still below expectations. In the area of intellectual property, differences of interpretation have arisen between the Chilean Government and Washington regarding the fulfillment of some commitments, and some in Santiago have expressed disappointment regarding access to the United States Government procurement market. If confirmed, what initiatives will you pursue to address these concerns?

Answer. United States Government agencies, including the Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), are working through our Embassy in Santiago to encourage Chile to improve its protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), including by fully implementing its FTA intellectual property commitments. In January 2007, United States agencies placed Chile on the Priority Watch List as a result of the 2007 Section 301 Review Process, in recognition of weaknesses in Chile's patent protection and copyright regimes. Currently, our Embassy in Santiago is engaged in a close dialog with the Chilean Government as well as with stakeholders in the private sector, media, and academic circles on intellectual property issues. The embassy has sponsored seminars and training on IPR issues and has coordinated closely with U.S. companies and sectors most directly affected by IPR violations. The Department of State also approved \$200,000 in fiscal year 2007 funding to provide IPR law enforcement training to Chilean border and customs enforcement officials. Along with Commerce and USTR, we are also working with Chile to ensure antipiracy legislation before the Chilean Congress is in keeping with Chile's obligations under our bilateral FTA.

If confirmed, I will intensify these efforts and seek to enhance the constructive dialog we have with Chile on IPR by drawing in United States private sector and Chilean stakeholders. Drawing on my experience with this issue in previous assignments in Ecuador and Israel, I will look for opportunities to deepen public outreach on intellectual property issues, highlighting its importance to Chile's efforts to build a knowledge-based economy. I will also reach out to partners such as the European Union and Japan, which also have FTAs with Chile and similar concerns about its IPR protections.

As for accessing the United States Government procurement market, if confirmed, I will work with our team in the embassy to ensure that Chilean companies have the same transparent opportunities to access our official procurement procedures as do United States companies. In this regard, I will work with our embassy team and Chilean authorities to improve Chilean companies' understanding of the United States Government procurement market and their preparation to participate in it.

Question. Chile is nearly ready to announce its decision on which digital television standard it would choose—the Japanese, European, or American one. Officials at Chile's Telecommunications Sub-Secretary have stated that they are waiting for final test and consultant reports and hoped to announce the decision sometime in November or December 2007.

President Michelle Bachelet said recently the standard chosen would be the one that best fits the country's needs and allows the best access to viewers of nonpaid

broadcast television. How does the U.S. meet those standards better than its competitors?

Answer. Working closely with the industry association representing the companies behind the Advanced Television Systems Committee (ATSC) digital television broadcast standard, the United States Embassy in Santiago, in cooperation with the Departments of State and Commerce, has been actively working to promote selection of ATSC by the Chilean Government for over a year. As you noted, Chile is currently evaluating the three competing standards—ATSC, Europe’s DVB, and Japan’s ISDB. The European standard is considered the ATSC’s main competitor in Chile, as Japan has had limited success in promoting its standard, with the important exception of Brazil.

Chile’s Government has consistently noted that “social” considerations will factor into its decision making process on digital television. The ATSC Standard fully meets this consideration by providing much better picture quality via high-definition television, plus a much greater quantity of program options and a limitless variety of new information services. These new services can help bridge the digital divide by delivering health care, education, training, government information, and the most popular Internet content to the poorest segments of society, including people who may never own a personal computer.

The ATSC Standard meets Chile’s social objectives better than the competing standards from Europe and Japan, because the ATSC system can reach many more viewers with the same transmitted power. ATSC also delivers a substantially higher data payload, which translates directly into a greater quantity, and higher quality, of services.

Of course, certain costs associated with any country’s termination of analog television broadcasts and beginning digital-only broadcasts are unavoidable, irrespective of which standard is chosen. In addition to broadcasters having to purchase and install new studio and transmission equipment, consumers also need to adapt by buying either new digital television sets or a set-top converter that will enable them to continue using their existing analog TV sets. One of the Chilean Government’s primary concerns has been the cost to consumers, particularly the poor, as they transition from analog to digital.

The ATSC Standard offers the lowest prices both for integrated digital televisions and digital set-top converters, because of the economies of scale that flow from using the same standard that is already widely deployed in North America and South Korea. This is demonstrated regularly in the United States as prices for new digital televisions continue to drop. Thirty to forty million ATSC digital converter boxes are expected to be sold in 2008 in the United States, ensuring the availability of low-cost converters (\$50 or less) in Chile.

While there are very real economic costs associated with transitioning to digital television, the choice of the broadcast standard can have important consequences in terms of minimizing those costs. In addition to the economies of scale argument, the ATSC standard also requires less powerful transmitters and much less energy than its competitors to deliver larger amounts of data to wider or remote geographical areas. The European and Japanese standards both require transmitters that are four times more powerful than ATSC to achieve the same coverage area, increasing the acquisition and operating cost for broadcasters.

In summary, the ATSC standard offers Chile a world-class television system with full access to high-definition television, multiple programs of standard-definition television, and new information services, including interactive services. It provides the lowest cost solution for both consumers and broadcasters, while fully meeting the Chilean Government’s objectives for social inclusion. Especially important for developing countries, ATSC has the greatest reach, ensuring that even people in isolated areas can benefit from the new services and superior performance provided by digital television.

Question. Chile has limited domestic energy resources and is heavily dependent on imports for its energy needs. Chile currently imports almost two thirds of its primary energy consumption. In 2005 Chile imported 98 percent of its oil, 96 percent of its coal, and 75 percent of its natural gas. As a result, it is extremely vulnerable to the volatility of international prices and/or supply interruptions.

Please explain what role the United States can play, working in concert with the Chilean Government and private sector in both countries, to help insulate Chile from risks posed by its heavy energy import dependence.

Answer. Like many other countries around the world, Chile faces substantial challenges identifying and securing the energy resources necessary to support its remarkable record of economic growth. As noted in the question, Chile is heavily de-

pendent on imported fuels to support both its transportation, as well as its power generation needs.

A strong interagency team in Washington works closely together on a variety of international energy challenges. For the past 4 years, I have had the privilege of working as a member of that team. It includes officials from the Departments of State, Energy, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Environmental Protection Administration, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, with overall coordination provided by the National Security Council. I have also worked closely with the International Energy Agency and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, multilateral bodies which handle energy issues, as well as with U.S. private sector firms and think tanks active on international energy issues.

If confirmed, I would hope to draw on that body of experience to identify areas of cooperation that the United States could pursue, either bilaterally, multilaterally, or through our respective private sectors, to advance energy sector cooperation. Among the areas we might explore for further work are energy efficiency, renewable energy (including wind, solar, and geothermal power), liquefied natural gas infrastructure, biofuels, clean coal technologies, nuclear energy, and other energy technologies.

Question. Chile's Government is implementing an ambitious Energy Security Action Plan that seeks to diversify Chile's energy matrix and encourage efficient use of energy. This effort pays particular attention to biofuels and renewable fuel options. In April 2007, I wrote to Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere, Thomas Shannon, to encourage closer ties with Chile regarding biofuels and other energy concerns. A delegation of United States Government officials recently signed a biofuels research and development cooperation agreement with Chile.

If confirmed, how will you seek to ensure successful cooperation on energy issues between the United States and Chile? What will be your primary areas of focus for such cooperation? Do you believe that energy cooperation with Chile should be central in United States foreign policy to that country?

Answer. President Bachelet has recognized Chile's need to improve its energy security. Earlier this year, she announced that Energy Minister Tokman would be responsible for implementing an "energy security plan."

If confirmed, I would draw on the expertise of the U.S. energy-policy community to identify areas of potential cooperation in the energy sector, through some combination of bilateral, multilateral, and private sector initiatives. On the transportation side, potential areas of cooperation include energy efficiency and biofuels. With respect to power generation, some areas we might explore include energy efficiency, renewable energy (including wind, solar, and geothermal power), liquefied natural gas infrastructure, nuclear energy, clean coal technologies, and other energy technologies.

Question. Your duties as Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Energy, Sanctions and Commodities covered a wide range of issues, including energy. As DAS of State for Energy, Sanctions and Commodities, what percentage of your time do you estimate was spent on energy issues? What were your primary responsibilities? Last year Secretary Rice created an International Energy Coordinator. Please describe how that position affected operations of your office.

Answer. As Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy, Sanctions and Commodities for the past 4 years, I have divided my time among three principal issues: energy, sanctions, and conflict diamonds. While the workload has fluctuated considerably during this period, on balance, I spend approximately two thirds of my time on energy issues, with the remainder devoted to sanctions and diamonds.

My primary responsibilities on the energy front include managing the U.S. relationship with the International Energy Agency, including serving on the IEA Governing Board and as chairman of the principal policy committee of the IEA, the Standing Group on Long-Term Cooperation. I am also heavily involved with United States-China energy issues, G-8 energy policy, the opening of Libya to United States energy investment, and energy policy issues with Russia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, among other countries.

On the sanctions front, my office is responsible for coordinating the State Department's role in the interagency terrorist financing policy process, and we have primary responsibility for implementation of the Iran Sanctions Act. On conflict diamonds, I lead the interagency delegation to the annual Kimberley Process plenary meetings and coordinate interagency policy.

The EEB energy office works very closely and productively with the newly created position of International Energy Coordinator; areas of particular coordination in-

clude biofuels, other new energy technologies, and innovative public/private partnerships.

Question. Earlier this year, Secretary Rice signed an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) on biofuels cooperation with her Brazilian counterpart, and President Bush announced the initiatives with the President of Brazil.

What role do you believe that cooperation on biofuels and other energy security issues can have on improving United States relations with countries of the Western Hemisphere and standing amongst the general public?

What role do you believe that Chile should play in the United States-Brazil led biofuels initiative?

What impact would reducing or removing current United States import restrictions on biofuels have on United States relations with Chile and other nations of the Western Hemisphere?

Answer. Cooperation on biofuels has already had an important, positive influence on U.S. relations with countries of the Western Hemisphere. Biofuels cooperation demonstrates our desire to work with other governments that share institutional, democratic values toward the improvement of the daily lives of people in our hemisphere. Our partnership with Brazil is recognition of that nation's important role in the hemisphere and its innovative record in the area of renewable energy. Additionally, our work to help develop viable biofuels industries in specific countries in the Western Hemisphere—the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, and St. Kitts and Nevis—reflects our interest in promoting economic development and energy diversification.

While Chile is not a target country of our biofuels initiative with Brazil, that initiative has the potential to benefit Chile. The initiative has three parts: (1) helping target countries establish biofuels industries for domestic consumption; (2) research and development of cellulosic ethanol technology; and (3) harmonizing international standards for ethanol. Our efforts on research and development should benefit Chile and other countries over time by bringing down the costs of cellulosic ethanol production, a development of potential value to Chile given its prospects for developing a cellulosic ethanol industry. The international standards harmonization efforts should also assist all countries interested in biofuels production and trade.

While Brazil would clearly welcome the removal of import restrictions on biofuels, such action would have minimal impact on Chile, which currently is not a biofuels producer.

If confirmed, I would plan to explore with United States agencies and the Chilean Government other concrete steps we could take to strengthen bilateral cooperation on biofuels with Chile.

Question. Chile has become an important transshipment country for cocaine destined for Europe; economic prosperity and increasing trade have made Chile more attractive to traffickers seeking to launder drug profits, especially through the Iquique Free Trade Zone.

If confirmed, how will you work with the relevant Chilean authorities to improve controls on money laundering and tracking and halting the importation of precursor chemicals for the manufacture of cocaine, especially those passed on to Bolivia? Should the United States Government consider developing a major cooperative agreement with the Chilean Government centered on stemming the transit of drugs through the north of Chile? Should the United States Government enter into talks with the Chilean Government regarding establishing a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office in Chile?

Answer. Antinarcotics cooperation with Chile is strong. DEA's office in Chile works closely with the two national police agencies and with prosecutors nationwide. DEA cooperation with the investigative police's money laundering unit recently led to the disruption and dismantlement in Chile and the United States of a money laundering ring.

Chile is aware of the increase in drugs flowing through its northern border. DEA has helped establish a multiagency Chilean law enforcement initiative in Arica, Chile's northernmost city. Chile's investigative police, coast guard, and customs agents now work together to fight land and sea shipments of drugs. If confirmed, I will pursue increased cooperation between Government of Chile law enforcement agencies and members of the embassy's law enforcement community, and support Government of Chile efforts to improve interagency cooperation.

State Department International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) funding has been used to train police, prosecutors, and members of Chile's Financial Intelligence Unit in anti-money laundering efforts. INL funding has also provided needed equipment to counternarcotics police. The training and professionalism of Chilean

law enforcement are commendable. However, resources are insufficient to expand investigative initiatives. The issue of cooperation with Chilean authorities to improve anti-money laundering efforts is discussed in the answer to Question 10.

All companies exporting precursor chemicals must register with the Government of Chile. Chile's police investigate all exports of precursor chemicals to Bolivia, and pass on real-time intelligence on suspicious shipments to Bolivian police that have been DEA-vetted. Both Chilean police forces participate in DEA-sponsored enforcement initiatives to coordinate monitoring of precursor chemicals all over South America. The embassy continues to emphasize and develop communication between Chilean and Bolivian police.

The Government of Chile has recently begun formulating a national security plan. One focus of this plan is securing Chile's northern borders from drugs and increasing interagency cooperation in counternarcotics efforts. The Government of Chile has been in regular communication with the embassy (State, FBI and DEA) about their plan.

Question. In 2005, Peru's Congress voted to unilaterally redraw the maritime boundary with Chile, claiming more than 10,000 square miles of ocean space now under Chilean control. Chile claims the disputed area quoting a 1929 treaty, whereas Peru says the treaty established land limits but not maritime boundaries. In June 2007, Peruvian President Alan Garcia declared that he would take Peru's case to the International Criminal Court at The Hague, and relations have deteriorated since. Early last month, Peru published an official map with the new marine boundary, provoking a diplomatic protest from Chile. The Atacama border dispute was a border dispute between Chile and Bolivia in the 1800s which ended in Chilean annexation of all of the Bolivian Coast and the southern tip of Bolivia's ally Peru during the War of the Pacific 1879–1883.

Over a century later, for some, these border disputes remain unresolved. What should the United States Government position be regarding these border issues (Peru and Bolivia)? Should the United States mediate if the situation deteriorates?

Answer. The United States Government first and foremost considers these border disputes between Chile and Peru and Chile and Bolivia as matters to be resolved between those respective nations.

Fortunately, we have seen on the part of all three nations a willingness to discuss the issues cordially and frankly and in accordance with international law and practice. This reflects the good relations extant between Chile and Peru and Chile and Bolivia, respectively.

While we do not seek a role in mediating these disputes, the United States' good offices are always available to our friends.

Question. Reports submitted to the United States Congress by relevant United States Government agencies highlight an increase of activity to support Islamic terrorist groups in the tri-border region of South America (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay). This support is happening mostly in the form of money laundering and transfers to and from regions overseas.

Is cooperation between the United States and Chile regarding international terrorism satisfactory? Are Chilean laws and financial sector monitoring sufficiently strong to insulate it from being used by terrorist groups to launder money and transfer money to and from regions overseas? In what areas can you work with the Chilean Government to help strengthen their response to terrorist threats?

Answer. Cooperation between the United States and Chile on money laundering, including that related to international terrorism, is excellent. Chile's relative geographical isolation and reputation for probity have for some time lessened Chile's vulnerability to money laundering, drugs, and terrorism. But its integration into the global economy has changed that, and the Government of Chile has come to recognize these new threats. Many United States Government agencies work with Chilean law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, financial intelligence unit (FIU), and government officials to combat these crimes.

A few examples:

Chile has a special unit, the Grupo de Operaciones Especializadas (GOPE), a 300-person unit of the Carabineros police force, which serves as Chile's primary counter-terrorist reaction force. GOPE participates each year in Exercise Fuerzas Comando, a SOUTHCOM-sponsored special operations seminar designed to refine the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by special operations counterterrorism forces.

The State Department and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) run regular seminars to train police officials in counternarcotics investigative techniques. A unit trained by one of these seminars produced Chile's first-ever arrest for trafficking crack cocaine.

Inside the judicial system itself, the State Department and Treasury Department have trained police, prosecutors, and members of Chile's FIU in how to develop and successfully prosecute complex money laundering cases. Prosecutions of money laundering have increased in the last year.

The United States Government continually shares information about criminal activity with appropriate authorities within the Chilean Government. In sum, Chile has shown itself to be a reliable partner interested in working with us to address these global challenges.

The embassy cooperates with Chilean police and prosecutors in monitoring possible terrorist finance activity, and is currently examining with the Chileans the possibility of prosecuting one of these cases.

With regard to financial sector monitoring, Chile passed anti-money laundering laws in December 2003 and August 2006, but we believe there is still room for improvement. The FIU, prosecutors, and police are hindered in investigations by Chile's strict bank secrecy laws. Draft legislation that would facilitate lifting bank secrecy for the FIU and public prosecutors is currently sitting in Chile's lower house of Congress. If confirmed, I will emphasize to the Government of Chile the importance of enacting legislation that fully meets international standards and doing everything possible to facilitate investigations. Terrorist financing legislation appears to be solid, but has yet to be tested.

We have a positive and constructive relationship with Chile's Treasury Department, Central Bank, and Financial Intelligence Unit. Chile's FIU requires additional institutional support and capacity-building to be more effective. Additionally, nonbank financial institutions, such as money exchange houses and legal cash couriers, currently do not fall under the supervision of any regulatory body for compliance with anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing standards.

Our next area of focus will be the judiciary. Police and prosecutors have benefited from United States Government training in the last 2 years, but are finding that many judges have an insufficient understanding of these relatively new crimes to effectively adjudicate cases. Additional training of judges in financial crimes would strengthen Chile's ability to protect itself from being used by drug traffickers and terrorist financiers.

Question. The potential onslaught of the increase in sea level that is expected to result from a global warming of the atmosphere is of chief concern to countries with long coast lines like Chile. In what areas could the United States work with the Chilean Government jointly in this regard?

Do you believe that the United States should encourage Chile to participate in negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change with the intent of agreeing to binding agreements to limit greenhouse gas emissions?

Answer. In association with the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA), we negotiated an Environmental Cooperation Agreement (ECA) that established a framework for United States-Chile cooperation on environmental issues. Under the FTA and ECA, we have worked with Chile on a number of projects that could help combat climate change. For example, we have worked together to promote the development and use of clean energy. In addition, the 2007-2008 ECA Work Plan calls for us to consult with Chile on approaches to clean energy. Under the umbrella of the ECA Work Plan, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency has funded a "reverse trade mission" on geothermal power for a delegation of Chilean officials from the private and public sectors. The group will be in the United States September 28-October 1, meeting with U.S. Government officials as well as U.S. company representatives. Other specific activities contemplated in the plan include promoting other renewable energy opportunities and sharing prospective policy, regulatory, and financial models for the adoption of renewable energy technologies. Additionally, the plan calls for binational consultations on ways to improve energy efficiency in selected industry and construction sectors; exploration of establishment of a program on appliance standards and labeling; and support for the Clean Fuels Partnership initiative to help reduce pollution in the transport sector.

Question. Chile and the United States enjoy an excellent relationship. Today, more than ever, our countries work together on a range of important issues, not the least of which is promoting free trade. In that regard, Chile is a noteworthy success story. Nevertheless, political relationships and cooperation between our two countries could be deeper—Chile's coalition government did not support Guatemala's candidacy to be a member of the Security Council of the United Nations over Venezuela and does not support United States efforts to condemn human rights abuses committed by the Cuban Government.

What are your suggestions to deepen political ties between our two countries? Is there interest in the United States Government to award Chile with Major Non-NATO Ally status? If so, if confirmed, what initiatives will you develop to meet this objective?

Answer. Since President Bush's meeting with President Bachelet in the White House in June 2006, the United States and Chile have exchanged several high-level visits designed to deepen consultations on a wide range of bilateral and multilateral issues, including promotion of democracy, human rights, regional security, non-proliferation, free trade, energy, science and technology and, most recently, education. In this context, we have boosted military exchanges and exercises, and strengthened consultations between senior-level officials at the State Department, Defense Department, and U.S. Southern Command and their Chilean counterparts.

Chile and the United States share a common vision on the importance of working in multilateral fora. Chile has a proven record of support for democratic principles in the Organization of American States and is an active participant in the Community of Democracies, which it chaired in 2005.

We have a vigorous military-to-military relationship with Chile, which includes several annual exercises and bilateral agreements. Secretary Gates is planning to visit Chile in early October to further that relationship. There is no current proposal on Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status; however, we are not opposed to pursuing MNNA if it is in the best interests of both the United States and Chile.

If confirmed, I will work with the administration, Congress, and the Chilean Government to identify additional opportunities for cooperation in the political and security spheres.

Question. Chile and the United States enjoy an excellent relationship, but in recent times the United States's image in Chile has suffered.

Different ambassadors have taken interest in promoting activities to advance understanding between our two countries. Ambassador Craig Kelly promoted Little League baseball in Chile during his tenure with positive results. If confirmed, in addition to the traditional issues that make up our foreign policies to Chile, what new initiatives will you pursue to enhance the United States's image by means of public diplomacy?

Answer. As the question indicates, the overall relationship between Chile and the United States is excellent. Surveys indicate that the majority of Chileans consider the United States to be the country's most important partner in economics, trade, defense, security, and other areas. The United States is the country of choice for Chileans who pursue academic and research programs (particularly at the graduate level), and the United States is a very popular destination for Chileans who can afford recreational travel. American films, television, and other media are immensely popular in Chile. Nevertheless, some aspects of United States politics, culture, society, and values are not as well understood in Chile as they might be, which underlines the need for effective public diplomacy activities that will bring the ambassador, other embassy officials, and visitors from the United States into direct contact with a variety of audiences throughout Chile.

I believe it is important that our public diplomacy programs in Chile reach a broad variety of audiences—from influential policymakers in Santiago to young people, men, and women from diverse cultural groups, and those in economically disadvantaged communities throughout the country.

If confirmed, I will look for ways to work with embassy staff and visitors to reach out to diverse audiences in Chile with a positive message of United States engagement. In this regard, I would expect to draw on a variety of existing and new exchange initiatives, including our flagship Fulbright academic exchange program, our bilateral environmental agreement, various English language teaching programs, our active network of 10 Binational Centers, and 5 American Corners, and sports diplomacy programs. One of the most promising developments in this area is our new Equal Opportunity Scholarship program with Chile, which will support doctoral study in the United States by a diverse group of up to 100 Chilean students annually, in fields addressing Chile's priority national needs. Participating students will come from all walks of life and from all parts of Chile; they will be placed in a wide range of United States' universities with high-quality graduate programs in their fields, including science and technology, public policy, education, environmental studies, and public health.

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. It has been reported that the United States Government, the Mexican and Central American Governments are in discussions about a bilateral cooperation program of assistance by the United States to help Mexican and Central American counternarcotics efforts. Is such a package in development? When did dialog on the Mexico/Central America aid package begin? Please give specific dates. What are the aid package's components? When do you expect that it will be announced? What level of funding, and what types of assistance (what accounts), do you expect will be requested?

Answer. The Governments of the United States and Mexico are discussing cooperative steps to address what President Bush described as a "common problem on our shared border"—drug and other illegal trafficking, and the violence associated with it. We are also considering the best way to support the countries of Central America confront the transnational threats we share, including narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and criminal gangs.

President Bush first discussed security cooperation with then President-elect Calderon in November 2006. These discussions continued during the President's visit to the region in March 2007, as outlined in the joint United States-Mexico Communiqué of March 2007. In May, the Government of Mexico approached the United States with suggested areas for greater cooperation, and technical experts from both governments subsequently began meeting to define needs and areas where we might usefully work together. At the North American Leaders' Summit in Montebello, Canada, on August 20–21, Presidents Bush and Calderon agreed to address the drug trafficking and narcotics-related violence affecting both countries. Separately, in August, the member countries of the Central American System for Integration (SICA) held internal discussions about developing their own regional strategy to combat crime. United States embassies in Central America have also advised on the types of projects that could assist the Central American initiative and support our policy goals.

Our continuing discussions with the Governments of Mexico and Central American countries are focusing on three broad areas: counternarcotics and border security; public security and law enforcement; and strengthening institutions and rule of law. Possible areas of joint work could include strengthening Mexico's southern border, enhanced computer and database networks to make Mexico's law enforcement agencies more efficient and transparent, and measures to professionalize Mexico's federal law enforcement personnel. The administration is also considering programs that would help law enforcement and court institutions to ensure due process, transparency, proper oversight, responsiveness to citizen complaints, and protection of human rights. For Central America, a number of options are being considered, including the provision of tools, training, and technical expertise.

The nature and extent of cooperation with Mexico and Central America have not been finalized, so no official announcement has been scheduled. The administration is assessing how to fund any resulting programs in a fiscally responsible manner as well as which accounts might be appropriate to execute these programs. The administration intends to continue its exchange with the Congress as the outlines of our proposed cooperative effort take shape. I look forward to providing additional details to you and your staff as soon as possible.

NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Mathieu, Gail D., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Namibia
Mozena, Dan, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Angola
Reddick, Eunice S., to be Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic,
and to serve concurrently and without additional compensation
as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and
Principe
Steiger, William R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Mozam-
bique

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold, presiding.

Present: Senator Feingold.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. I call the committee to order, and thank you very much, everyone, for being here.

In the past 6 months, more than a dozen distinguished individuals have appeared before this committee to discuss their nominations to be U.S. Ambassadors to African countries. Some were on their way to countries that regularly make headlines, albeit usually buried far back in the world section, and usually for the wrong reasons, like Nigeria and Zimbabwe and Chad, while others move their lives and their families to places that a lot of people would have trouble finding on a map, like the Gambia, Swaziland, or Comoros. Each of these positions was important, and the same is true for today's nominees, who make up the last four of this year's Foreign Service rotation.

Despite five coups since independence in 1975, the people of Sao Tome and Principe have established a relatively functional multiparty democracy that is working to overcome internal political divisions. On my way to Kinshasa this summer, I made a brief overnight stop in Sao Tome. I was able to meet with the foreign minister, with whom I discussed regional and maritime security implications in the Gulf of Guinea, a relevant and timely issue, to say the least. So, Ms. Reddick, I look forward to discussing your nomination to be Ambassador to Gabon and Sao Tome and Prin-

cipe. And I assume you already know that when you go to Sao Tome, the sign says, "Welcome to Sao Tome, and Don't Forget Principe." That's what it actually says on the sign.

Just down the coast is one of Africa's largest countries, an unfortunate example of the so-called "resource curse," which enjoyed a 14 percent GDP growth last year, while more than 40 percent of its population struggles to survive on less than one dollar a day. When Mr. Dan Mozena was sent to neighboring Zambia for his Foreign Service tour in 1982, Angola was embroiled in a full-blown civil war. When he returned as Deputy Chief of Mission in 2001, Mr. Mozena was a witness to the final resolution of this conflict and the extensive healing and reconstruction that followed. So, I look forward to hearing how Mr. Mozena, if confirmed, will apply lessons learned from those previous tours to help address the problems and possibilities that Angola faces today.

Angola's southern neighbor, Namibia, is noted for having one of the lowest levels of corruption on the continent. It also has some of the world's greatest income inequality. This will present a challenge for Ambassador Gail Dennise Mathieu, if confirmed as United States Ambassador to Namibia. Her most recent overseas posting, as Ambassador to Niger, the world's poorest country, will surely be useful for devising innovative ways the United States can contribute to enhanced development and more even distribution of Namibia's resources.

On the opposite coast, Mozambique is recovering, with notable success, from the devastations of civil war, natural disasters, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic, thanks, in part, to assistance from the United States. The country has received more than \$350 million in United States funding as a focus country for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, is home to USAID and Peace Corps programs, and recently accepted a Millennium Challenge Compact worth \$507 million designed to reduce poverty in Mozambique by promoting sustainable economic growth. If confirmed, Dr. William Steiger will have the responsibility to oversee the use of these funds and ensure that they contribute to the objectives for which they were intended. Dr. Steiger's 6 years of experience as the director of the Office of Global Health Affairs at the Department of Health and Human Services, would be very useful in this regard.

I'd also like to point out that we have two nominees today with ties to my home State of Wisconsin. Of course, Dr. Steiger is a native Wisconsinite, and served as education policy advisor for Wisconsin's Governor Tommy Thompson in the 1990s. Dr. Steiger's father, whom I remember well, was a respected member of the Wisconsin State Assembly before a very distinguished tenure as a Member of the United States House of Representatives for 11 years.

Although not originally from Wisconsin, Mr. Dan Mozena earned his master's of public affairs at my alma mater, the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Football team is 5-0, and fifth in the Nation, just for the record. [Laughter.]

It is nice to have our State so well represented here this morning.

At confirmation hearings, I'm consistently struck by how professional, knowledgeable, committed, and enthusiastic the nominees

are. It is when I encounter diplomats in their posts, however, that I am really able to appreciate that individual and collective contribution to the achievement of critical U.S. objectives on the continent.

So, I'd like to thank each of you for not just accepting, but embracing the responsibilities of serving as United States foreign ambassadors. I'd like to thank you for coming here today, and extend a warm welcome to your families and friends who have come with you. I know that these people play a very important role in enabling you to do your jobs well, so they also deserve recognition, and I'm glad they're here. And, when you make your remarks, if you want to introduce anybody—family or friends—please do.

So, I now invite each of you to deliver your testimony, beginning with Ms. Reddick, to be followed by some questions about your priorities and plans, if confirmed to these positions.

Ms. Reddick, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF EUNICE S. REDDICK, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE GABONESE REPUBLIC, AND TO SERVE CURRENTLY AND WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION AS AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Ms. REDDICK. Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before you today. I wish to express my gratitude to the President and to Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as their nominee for Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe.

If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress to advance the interests and values of the American people in Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe.

I would like to take this time to introduce my husband, Marc Wall, who recently returned from Chad, where he served as Chief of Mission, my daughter, Sarah, and son, Gregory.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I remember the Ambassador when I went to Chad, now that I look at him. Welcome.

Ms. REDDICK. Gabon is one of Africa's most stable countries, and it has been a helpful partner to the United States in the central Africa region, and Africa as a whole, and in multilateral bodies such as the U.N. United States military engagement with Gabon, which has developed in several areas, is crucial to promote the security of the strategic Gulf of Guinea region. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Gabonese civilian and military leadership, our military, notably the new Africa Command, to ensure our relations with Gabon help contribute to a safe and secure Gulf of Guinea region.

Gabon is one of sub-Saharan Africa's most prosperous nations. Although oil earnings have given Gabon one of the highest per capita GDPs in sub-Saharan Africa, income distribution is extremely skewed, and 60 to 70 percent of Gabonese live below the poverty line. Transparency, accountability, and corruption must be addressed if Gabon is to surmount its economic challenges.

To increase economic opportunity for its citizens, Gabon has taken steps to move from a petroleum-based economy to a diversified economy. If confirmed, I will support Gabon's economic diver-

sification efforts by encouraging good, transparent governance, sound economic management, and private sector-led development. I will encourage greater use of measures provided under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act to increase Gabon's trade with the United States and spur American investment in Gabon. I will also support Gabon's efforts for environmentally responsible management of its rich and diverse forest resources.

Let me now turn to the other country to which I am nominated to serve as ambassador. The island state of Sao Tome and Principe is the second-smallest and one of the poorest countries in Africa. Nevertheless, as you mentioned earlier, it is a vibrant multiparty democracy, and, since the democratic reforms of the early 1990s, has had a history of free and fair elections. Sao Tome and Principe is now at the threshold of a dramatic change, with prospects for development of oil resources. Carefully managed, impending oil revenues could build infrastructure and reduce poverty. Mismanaged, an oil boom could threaten Sao Tome and Principe's young democracy, security, and stability. The United States is committed to assisting Sao Tome and Principe to improve institutional capacity needed to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth. If confirmed, I will support the recently approved Millennium Challenge Corporation threshold program for Sao Tome and Principe and other efforts to improve economic performance and efficiency. I will support U.S. business interests and find ways to encourage U.S. investment. I will also work with the government and the donor community to ensure that Sao Tome and Principe is prepared to invest oil revenues wisely in the country's development and its people.

If confirmed as ambassador, no goal will be more important than protecting the lives, interests, and welfare of Americans living and traveling in Gabon, in Sao Tome and Principe. In addition, I will work with the leadership and peoples of the two nations to foster stability throughout the region, support good governance and democratization, and increase economic prosperity.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed I look forward to serving as our next Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Reddick follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EUNICE S. REDDICK, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE GABONESE REPUBLIC, AND TO SERVE CONCURRENTLY AND WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION AS AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today. I wish to express my gratitude to President Bush and to Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as their nominee for Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress to advance the interests and values of the American people in Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe.

I would like to take this time to introduce my husband, Marc Wall, who recently returned from Chad where he served as Chief of Mission, my daughter Sarah, and son Gregory.

Gabon is one of Africa's most stable countries despite its location in a volatile region. When nearby conflicts have threatened the safety of American citizens, Gabon has provided safe haven for evacuees. Gabon has been a helpful partner to the

United States in the Central Africa region, in Africa as a whole, and in multilateral fora such as the U.N. President Bongo's seniority among African leaders and his knowledge of regional issues have allowed him to play an important role in attempts to resolve regional conflicts. The United States has trained Gabonese forces under the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, and today Gabon leads the peacekeeping forces in the Central African Republic, providing the majority of deployed forces there. Members of the Gabonese armed forces receive professional training under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. To promote the security of the strategic Gulf of Guinea region, origin of a growing share of United States oil imports, United States military engagement with Gabon has developed in several areas, including training exercises, ship visits, and high-level exchanges. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Gabonese civilian and military leadership, our European Command and the new Africa Command to ensure our relations with Gabon help contribute to a safe and secure Gulf of Guinea region.

President Bongo has held office since 1967, and in December 2005 he was re-elected for a new 7-year term. Although the 2005 Presidential election was marred by irregularities, legislative elections in December 2006, in which the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) won two-thirds of the seats, were deemed free and fair by independent observers. However, a single party—the PDG—has remained in power since 1968, and democratic institutions, particularly civil society, remain weak. There are some restrictions on press freedoms, and the legal and judicial system is weak and susceptible to government influence. Of particular concern is trafficking in persons, and child labor resulting from trafficking. Gabon has taken steps to address the problem of trafficking of children from neighboring African countries, such as arresting alleged traffickers and providing facilities for victimized children, but more must be done to combat this problem. The United States has worked with Gabon on this issue mainly via a regional, Department of Labor-funded project. If confirmed, I will continue to engage the government to do more to halt child trafficking; I will also continue to engage leaders from government, opposition parties, and civil society to increase respect for human rights issues, and further strengthen democratization.

Gabon is one of sub-Saharan Africa's most prosperous nations, thanks to its oil wealth. Oil accounts for 77 percent of Gabon's exports, 56 percent of government revenues, and 45 percent of GDP. Although oil earnings have given Gabon one of the highest per capita GDPs in sub-Saharan Africa, income distribution is extremely skewed. Gabon's ranking on human development indicators is not commensurate with its per capita GDP ranking. Recent high oil prices have increased production, but oil production and revenues are expected to continue their gradual decline. To increase economic opportunity for its citizens, Gabon must move from a single-resource petroleum-based economy to a diversified economy driven by the private sector and focused on poverty reduction. There is the potential for economic diversification and growth in ecotourism, natural gas, fishing and aquaculture, timber, minerals, and palm oil production. However, diversification efforts will face significant challenges in terms of the lack of skilled laborers, and the lack of infrastructure.

Transparency, accountability, and corruption must be addressed if Gabon is to surmount its economic challenges. Although much work remains to be done regarding implementation, the Government of Gabon has publicly committed itself to the principles and criteria of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which leverages multi-stakeholder partnerships to encourage governments and companies to publish what they pay and what they receive in relation to extractive industries. We hope that Gabon will take full advantage of its new 3-year program approved by the International Monetary Fund to move ahead with necessary economic reforms. If confirmed, I will support Gabon's economic diversification efforts by encouraging good, transparent governance; sound economic management; and private-sector led development. I will also encourage greater use of measures provided under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to increase Gabon's trade with the United States and spur American investment in Gabon.

Nearly 85 percent of Gabon is covered by forests with rich and diversified resources. In 2002, President Bongo set aside 10 percent of Gabon's territory to create a national park system, but the nation's continued commitment to environmentally responsible management requires support. Gabon seeks to develop ecotourism as part of its economic diversification strategy. However, high raw material prices have spurred interest in exploration and resource extraction in many new areas, and these sometimes generate conflicts with conservation projects. Continued political and financial support from the United States and continued engagement with international NGOs will be required to sustain progress in this area. In 2002, the United States launched the Congo Basin Forest Partnership at the World Summit on Sus-

tainable Development, recognizing the importance of the world's second largest tropical forest. Since then, the United States has worked closely with Gabon and five other countries of the Congo Basin, other donor countries, private sector entities, and NGOs to help conserve and sustainably manage the Congo Basin forests. The United States Government-funded Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) plays a pivotal role in implementing United States Government programs on the ground. If confirmed, I will continue to support this important work.

Let me now turn to the other country to which I am nominated to serve as ambassador. Sao Tome and Principe is an island state located off the west coast of Africa. It is the second smallest and one of the poorest countries in Africa. Nevertheless, it is a vibrant, multiparty democracy and since the democratic reforms of the early 1990s has had a history of free and fair elections. A coup attempt in July 2003 and a near collapse of the government in 2005 challenged the country's fragile democracy, but successful presidential and legislative elections in 2006 created a foundation for long-term stability.

Sao Tome's economy historically centered on cocoa exports, but production today is weak and the government depends heavily on foreign donors to meet its obligations. Despite scarce resources, the government has done a relatively good job of meeting its people's needs, and Sao Tome and Principe ranks as a "medium human development" country in the U.N. index.

Sao Tome and Principe is now at the threshold of a dramatic change with prospects for development of oil resources. Carefully managed, impending oil revenues could build infrastructure, fund education and training, and reduce poverty. Mismanaged, an oil boom could threaten Sao Tome and Principe's young democracy, security, and stability.

The country is already experiencing the impact of oil money through multi-million dollar oil contract signature bonuses that have recently been agreed. Corruption presents a growing threat in this environment. To address this threat, the Government of Sao Tome and Principe has adopted an exemplary oil revenue management law designed to combat corruption and promote the sound management of oil revenues. In addition, the Government of Sao Tome and Principe has publicly committed itself to the principles and criteria of EITI. Furthermore, in January 2005, Sao Tome and Principe set a new standard among EITI-committed countries when the government signed a production-sharing contract with three oil companies that included a clause on transparency that makes specific mention of the EITI principles. U.S. oil companies have already established a presence and are investing in the development of Sao Tome and Principe's potential offshore petroleum resource.

The prospect of oil wealth is increasing expectations among the nation's citizens, but production is not expected for at least another 5 years. Whether or not oil revenues flow in the future, broad and sustainable development requires the creation of a business climate that can attract private investment. Today, high taxes, poor public services, and onerous business regulations compound the disincentives inherent in Sao Tome and Principe's small market size, with a population of less than 200,000 people.

The United States is committed to assisting Sao Tome and Principe to improve institutional capacity needed to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth. On September 12, the Board of Directors of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) approved a 2-year, \$8.66 million Threshold program to help the Government of Sao Tome and Principe to increase revenues through improved tax and customs administration and enforcement as well as to reduce the time and costs associated with starting a business. The MCC Threshold program will complement a World Bank-funded project to enhance public expenditure management.

If confirmed, I will support the MCC program, and other efforts to improve economic performance and efficiency. I will support U.S. business interests and find ways to encourage U.S. investment. I will also work with the government and the donor community to ensure that Sao Tome and Principe is prepared to invest oil revenues wisely in the country's development and its people.

The United States is engaged in increasing the capacity of the security forces of Sao Tome and Principe with an emphasis on maritime security forces in the Gulf of Guinea. We are working together closely to help develop a Coast Guard. Sao Tome and Principe welcomes our ship visits, and participates in high-level military exchange programs and training exercises. The purpose of these programs is to enhance the professionalism of the Sao Tome and Principe armed forces.

Since the early 1990s, Sao Tome has been the home of a \$50 million transmitting facility for Voice of America. The island's location makes it ideal for transmitting and relaying programs over long distances.

If confirmed as ambassador, no goal will be more important than protecting the lives, interests, and welfare of Americans living and traveling in Gabon, and Sao Tome, and Principe. In addition, I will work with the leadership and peoples of the two nations to foster stability throughout the region, support good governance and democratization, and increase economic prosperity. While terrorists have not focused on either country, I will work with both governments to seek to deter and prevent terrorist activities and maintain counterterrorism cooperation.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed, I look forward to serving as our next Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have.

Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Ms. Reddick.
Ambassador Mathieu.

**STATEMENT OF HON. GAIL DENISE MATHIEU, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA**

Ambassador MATHIEU. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased and honored to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Namibia. I sincerely appreciate the confidence that the President and Secretary Rice have shown in me by putting forth my name for your consideration. I am here this morning with my husband, Erick.

Senator FEINGOLD. Welcome.

Ambassador MATHIEU. Mr. Chairman, during my assignments over the past 10 years, I have been committed to strengthening democratic processes, advancing economic development, trade, and investment, and building law enforcement and security cooperation in Africa. If confirmed, I will continue this work with dedication.

Since independence from apartheid South Africa in 1990, Namibia has pursued a path of democracy and free-market economics. As Namibia struggles to address multiple challenges, unexpected events and historical ties could lead it down a very different path in the future. Sustained well-tailored American engagement will help ensure that Namibia remains on a positive course.

Today, I would like to focus on three areas where the United States can play a critical role in the success of Namibia's future.

First, I am pleased to note that funding for Namibia under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, also known as PEPFAR, is projected to grow to \$104 million, up from \$91 million in fiscal year 2007. Namibia's estimated HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 19.7 percent dramatically undermines economic growth and social progress. If confirmed as ambassador, I will ensure that all mission activities are complementary and mutually reinforcing in order to maximize the effective use of PEPFAR funds, as well as other available resources, for the prevention, care, and treatment of HIV/AIDS.

Second, it's in our interest to promote economic growth to help Namibia reach its full potential as a stable partner for the United States and the region. Conclusion of the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact Agreement currently under negotiation could lead to the investment of approximately \$275 million that will positively transform the Namibian agricultural, tourism, and educational sectors.

Namibia has seized some opportunities offered by the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and, if confirmed, I will work to as-

sist Namibia diversify its exports and derive even greater benefits. I would also focus on activities to advance the empowerment of women in an effort to accelerate Namibia's economic development.

Third, it's essential that Namibia, a maturing democracy, consolidate its democratic gains and ensure that economic development takes root in a society that is justly ruled. If given the opportunity of leading our mission in Windhoek, I will work to foster free and fair elections, good governance, and continued respect for human rights.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will use every opportunity to strengthen United States-Namibia cooperation, roll back the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, bolster democratic institutions, and promote economic prosperity, including opportunities for American businesses. I will also fully commit myself to the protection of American citizens and interests in Namibia.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Mathieu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GAIL DENISE MATHIEU, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased and honored to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Namibia. I sincerely appreciate the confidence in me that the President and Secretary Rice have shown by putting forth my name for your consideration.

I am here this morning with my husband, Erick.

Mr. Chairman, During my assignments over the past 10 years as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Niger, Deputy Chief of Mission in Accra, and Deputy Director of West African Affairs, I was committed to strengthening democratic processes; advancing economic development, trade, and investment; and building cooperation on law enforcement and security matters in Africa. If confirmed, I will continue this work with dedication.

Since independence from apartheid South Africa in 1990, Namibia has pursued a path of democracy and free market economics. As Namibia struggles to address multiple challenges, unexpected events and historical ties could lead it down a very different path in the future. While our cooperative efforts and assistance programs are essential, our diplomatic skills are also needed to keep Namibia's doors open to the United States and our interests. Sustained and well-tailored American engagement will help ensure that Namibia remains on a positive course.

Today, I would like to focus on three areas where the United States can play a critical role in the success of Namibia's future. First, I am pleased to note that funding for Namibia under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, also known as PEPFAR, is projected to grow to \$104 million, up from \$91 million in fiscal year 2007. This funding will continue to support Namibia's own efforts to mitigate the suffering and enormous cost to society caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Namibia has an estimated 19.7 percent HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, one of the highest in the world, which dramatically undermines economic growth and social progress. While tuberculosis is the leading direct cause of death in Namibia, an estimated 60 percent of TB patients are co-infected with HIV/AIDS. If confirmed as ambassador, I will ensure that all mission activities are complementary and mutually reinforcing in order to maximize the effective utilization of PEPFAR funds and other available resources, for the prevention, care, and treatment of HIV/AIDS.

Second, it is in our interest to promote economic growth to help Namibia reach its full potential as a stable partner for the United States and the region.

Conclusion of a Millennium Challenge Corporation compact agreement, currently under negotiation, could lead to the investment of approximately \$275 million that would positively transform the Namibian agricultural, tourism, and educational sectors. Namibia has seized some opportunities offered by the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and if confirmed, I would work to assist Namibia diversify its exports and derive even greater benefits. I would also focus on activities to advance the empowerment of women in an effort to accelerate Namibia's economic development.

Third, it is essential that Namibia, a maturing democracy, consolidate its democratic gains and ensure that economic development takes root in a society that is justly ruled. The current government has expanded the political space for civil society to participate in shaping public policy and deterring corruption. If given the opportunity of leading our mission in Windhoek, I would work to foster future free and fair elections, good governance, and continued respect for human rights. A strong democracy in Namibia would serve as a regional model.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed, I will use every opportunity to strengthen United States-Namibia cooperation, roll back the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, bolster democratic institutions, and promote economic prosperity, including opportunities for American businesses. I will also fully commit myself to the protection of American citizens and interests in Namibia.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Ms. Mathieu.
And now, Mr. Mozena.

**STATEMENT OF DAN MOZENA, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA**

Mr. MOZENA. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

I am honored to appear today as the President's nominee as United States Ambassador to Angola. I am grateful to the President and Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staff to advance United States' interests in Angola.

If I may, I wish to introduce my wife, Grace—

Senator FEINGOLD. Welcome to you.

Mr. MOZENA [continuing]. My daughter, Anne, who's here from Milwaukee, my cousin, Sean Coleman, and also Mahmud, my friend from Bangladesh, who's taking advantage of his presence in Washington to see American democracy in action.

Senator FEINGOLD. Welcome to all of you.

Mr. MOZENA. For the past 36 years, Grace and I have journeyed far from our roots in rural Dubuque County, Iowa, where I was raised on a dairy farm and where we both attended one-room country schools. We began our public service as Peace Corps volunteers in then-Zaire, helping villagers raise chickens more successfully. That experience made clear that the capital city might not be representative of the country. Thus, at each posting—Zambia, Zaire, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh—I sought to understand the country beyond the capital. If confirmed, I will work hard to know Angola beyond Luanda.

As director of Southern African Affairs, I visited Angola and I worked from the Washington perspective to further our interests there. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts.

United States relations with Angola are good, and improving. Angola matters to American interests. A stable, democratic Angola is essential to stability in central and southern Africa. Its military can help keep the peace on a troubled continent. Angola is an important supplier of oil. It could also be a major food exporter in a food-insecure region. If confirmed, I would foster dynamic trade and investment links between our countries.

Ending over four decades of conflict in 2002, Angola has achieved much: resettling over 400,000 refugees, reintegrating former soldiers into society, and removing thousands of land mines. Angola's GDP grew, as you rightly noted, at a very high rate in 2006. The

budget is in surplus; reserves are growing; inflation is down from triple-digit figures only a few years ago to 12 percent today.

Nonetheless, much remains to be done. Angola ranks near the bottom of social and development indicators. The people of Angola are not benefiting from the nation's wealth. Thanks to high oil prices and increasing oil production, Angola has money, but money alone does not build a country. Corruption remains a challenge as Angola seeks to bolster the institutions of good governance.

Angolan President dos Santos announced legislative and Presidential elections in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The country has registered 8 million of its citizens to vote, paving the way toward elections that could signal Angola's emergence as a democracy. If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I would promote democracy, respect for human rights, and good governance. I would work to jumpstart agriculture, bolster Angolan peacekeeping capacity, and fight HIV/AIDS and malaria.

In my comments for the record, I have expanded on these challenges.

There are no quick fixes. Perseverance is needed to help Angola build institutions and human capabilities. Mr. Chairman, should I be confirmed, I will work hard to build a strong, bilateral relationship with Angola for the betterment of both America and Angola.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to address you, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mozena follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAN MOZENA, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the President's nominee to serve as United States Ambassador to Angola. I am grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staff to advance United States interests in Angola, especially in the promotion of a stable, democratic, and transparent Angola that uses its rich resources to better the lives of its citizens.

If I may, I wish to introduce my wife, Grace, and my daughter, Anne. For the past 36 years, Grace and I have been on a journey that has taken us far from our roots in rural Dubuque County, Iowa, where I was raised on a dairy farm and where we both attended one-room country schools.

Grace and I began our careers of public service as Peace Corps volunteers in what was then called Zaire, where we helped village farmers develop better methods of raising chickens. Although Peace Corps life in remote Zaire was far removed from the world of diplomacy, those experiences taught us that life in developing country capitals is hardly representative of the situation in the nation as a whole. Thus, at each of my postings—Zambia, Zaire, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—I reached out to know and understand the host country beyond the capital city. If confirmed, I will work hard to know Angola beyond Luanda. My most recent assignment as Director of the Office of Southern African Affairs enabled me to work from a Washington perspective to further our interests in Angola. As Director, I visited Angola to see firsthand the challenges Angola faces and our role in helping the Angolan people have hope for a brighter future. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts.

United States relations with Angola are good and improving. Angola matters to United States interests. A stable, democratic Angola is essential to stability in central and southern Africa. Its effective military has great potential to provide forces for peacekeeping in Africa. It is an important supplier of oil, and it has potential to become a major food exporter in a region that is often food insecure. Angola can be a more dynamic partner for United States trade and investment, and if confirmed I would seek to bolster trade and investment links between our countries.

Since the end of four decades of war in 2002, Angola has achieved much: bringing home and resettling over 400,000 war refugees; disarming and reintegrating former soldiers into Angolan society; and removing thousands of land mines, thus restoring

vital transportation routes and reopening rich farm land. Angola's GDP grew at a rate of 19.5 percent in 2006; the budget is in surplus, and reserves are growing. Inflation is down from triple digits only a few years ago to 12 percent today.

Nonetheless, much remains to be done. Despite its wealth, Angola ranks near the bottom of most social and development indicators. Angola must address this disparity to ensure its people benefit from the nation's natural wealth. Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos publicly announced legislative and Presidential elections in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The country also just concluded a successful electoral registration campaign in which over 8 million citizens registered, paving the way for elections. Free and fair elections would signal Angola's emergence as a democracy and bolster its claims to regional leadership.

Thanks to high oil prices and increasing oil production, Angola has financial resources, but money alone does not build a country after decades of war and centuries of colonization. Corruption remains a challenge as Angola seeks to build and strengthen the institutions essential to good governance. If confirmed, I would use modest levels of United States assistance to help create greater capacity within the Angolan Government, civil society, and private sector to consolidate democracy, respect for human rights, and good governance. I would also use this assistance to jumpstart agriculture and other non-oil sectors of the economy, bolster Angolan readiness to conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and defeat the diseases that limit Angola in utilizing its best resource—its people.

I believe the United States can play an important role in facilitating Angola's successful transition to democracy before and after elections. Before elections, we should continue our work strengthening civil society's ability to organize and participate fully in local and national decision-making. We should help political parties build their capacity to ensure full, vigorous consideration of the issues important to Angolans. We should provide requested technical assistance to Angolan authorities to assist them in ensuring that national elections take place over a vast and diverse territory, and are free and fair. Democratic transitions do not end with elections, of course, so we should continue to foster the growth of a vibrant independent media and civil society. Both are essential to fostering government institutions that are responsive and accountable to their people.

Democracy's enduring success must be complemented by broad-based economic growth. Angola's mineral wealth is finite, employs few people, and will not create long-term opportunities for the next generation.

Instead, a better future for Angola lies in a return to its former proud status as a breadbasket of Africa. The United States is already helping promote the growth of the agricultural sector through an innovative public-private partnership. If confirmed, I would deepen this partnership.

Angola seeks to be a regional leader in southern and central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. It could assist in peace support operations on the continent. Because we share many security interests, such as in the Gulf of Guinea, if confirmed, I would work closely with the Department of Defense and others to improve our military-to-military cooperation and Angola's maritime security.

Angola's success in tackling the challenges of democratic transition, broad-based economic growth, and continental leadership depends upon the health and well being of its people. If confirmed, I would work hard to realize the President's goal of reducing malaria deaths among Angolan children by half before 2010. Malaria is the number one killer of Angolan children under 5, but with a sustained effort toward education, prevention, and treatment, we can help Angola beat it, and indeed we are already achieving notable success. A more ominous and rising threat is HIV/AIDS. This disease has ravaged much of southern Africa, but, until now, has largely spared Angola due to the severing of commercial and transportation links during Angola's 27-year civil war. However, with the country finally at peace, those links are being reestablished rapidly, and thus we must act preemptively to help Angola avoid the scourge of double-digit HIV/AIDS infection rates present in most of its neighbors. Already, rates of HIV/AIDS are three to four times higher in border areas than in central Angola.

Contemplating these challenges, I see few quick fixes. We will need patience and perseverance in helping Angola build institutions and human capabilities. Our view must be long-term in order to be effective as we help Angola join the international community of democracies.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, should I be confirmed, I will work hard to build a strong, mutually beneficial relationship with Angola for the betterment of Americans and Angolans. Thank you for this opportunity to address you. I look forward to answering any questions you might have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Mozena.

As we turn to Mr. Steiger, let me just say I noted the presence in the room, previously, of Congressman Petri, who succeeded Mr. Steiger's father, I believe, with the untimely loss of Mr. Steiger's father, who was a superb Congressman. And I want to say that Congressman Petri has been a distinguished and very independent Congressman in the Wisconsin tradition, and I am sure he was here to lend his support to the nomination of Mr. Steiger.

Mr. Steiger.

**STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. STEIGER, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**

Dr. STEIGER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I can say, I think, without fear of contradiction, that I'm probably the most pleased of the four nominees at this table to be here this morning, and I want to thank you for your efforts to make that possible.

It's a great privilege and an honor to appear before you as you consider my nomination to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Mozambique. I am most grateful for the President's nomination, for the support of Secretary Rice, and I want to thank you and the committee for granting me this hearing.

I'd also like to thank former Secretary Tommy Thompson and current Secretary Mike Leavitt for their personal and professional support in this process. And I'd like to recognize a number of my friends and staff who are here with me, behind me. And I do greatly appreciate, as you pointed out, that Congressman Petri, from the 6th District of Wisconsin, who did, indeed, succeed my father in the House of Representatives, stopped by to lend his support, as well.

If confirmed by the Senate, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with this committee and the many others in Congress who are interested in Mozambique's progress. Ever since the United States helped broker the 1992 Peace Accords that ended 16 years of civil war, relations between our two countries have been excellent. Now our relationship is even closer and more robust, as demonstrated by the June 2007 visit of First Lady Laura Bush, then the signing of a Millennium Challenge Compact in July, and, finally, the August visit of Health and Human Services Secretary Leavitt. That staff members from this very committee have visited Mozambique in recent weeks further emphasizes the increasing importance and dynamics of our relationship.

The past 15 years, Mr. Chairman, have seen real democratic advancement in Mozambique. The country is a functioning multiparty democracy that has provincial elections planned for January of next year, to be followed by municipal elections and then Presidential and legislative balloting in 2009. Recent elections in Mozambique have been judged as generally free and fair by international observers, and, if confirmed, I pledge to help ensure that future elections are transparent and open to all political parties so Mozambique can secure and enjoy a position among the world's democracies.

Additionally, Mozambique has enjoyed remarkable economic growth in the past decade by pursuing policies that have earned it the respect and support of international financial institutions. Despite remaining one of the world's poorest countries, Mozambique's

gross domestic product per capita has more than tripled since 1992. If confirmed, I will work to encourage an open and favorable business climate necessary to attract foreign direct investment and to encourage responsible economic stewardship that will bring further prosperity.

Although, Mr. Chairman, Mozambique has enjoyed political and economic improvement, it must also aggressively address the devastating reality of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. Nationwide, HIV prevalence is now greater than 16 percent within the adult population, and it is extremely troubling that the number of new infections each year still appears to be increasing. Malaria also takes a huge economic and human toll in Mozambique. And, for those reasons, helping the country fight AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are among the U.S. Government's highest priorities.

Mozambique is currently one of only two nations in the world, along with Tanzania, that is a focus country for both the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the President's Malaria Initiative, and has also signed an MCC Compact. Because of the size of these investments, the United States is the largest bilateral donor to Mozambique, and Mozambique is among the top recipients of United States Government assistance in Africa, and one of the top 10 recipients of United States assistance around the globe.

Since the year 2000, Mr. Chairman, I have gained much experience coordinating our international programs and policies at HHS, and such experience has provided me with the knowledge and insight to advocate for our Government's goals in Mozambique, while helping to fortify and expand the successes we've already achieved. My service on the Interagency Steering Groups for the President's Malaria Initiative and the President's Emergency Plan, as well as my time as the United States Representative on the Board of Directors of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, have given me an intimate understanding and knowledge of our largest investments in Mozambique and the challenges associated in realizing them.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, my fluency in Portuguese will enable me to interface with Mozambicans on a more personal level than a non-Lusophone, although I'm sure my Brazilian accent will be the source of a lot of good-natured humor at my expense.

If confirmed, in addition to those top priorities, I will work diligently with the Mozambican Government on the transnational and regional issues most important to the United States; among them, human trafficking remains a serious problem in Mozambique, and, if confirmed, I will advocate for the legal and administrative reforms necessary for the government to address this challenge.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed by the Senate, I will maintain a sense of perspective on our excellent bilateral relationship with the Government of Mozambique and its international relations, while continuing to rigorously press our national interests in health, economic opportunity, democracy, and the preservation of human dignity.

Thank you, again, for this opportunity to address you. I'd be pleased to answer any question you and your colleagues might have, and I look forward to your assistance, and that of your staff,

in helping to find takers for my Packers season tickets, if I am confirmed.

Senator FEINGOLD. That's a little more challenging than I can handle. [Laughter.]

[The prepared statement of Dr. Steiger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM R. STEIGER, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of this committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today as you consider my nomination to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Mozambique. I am grateful for President Bush's nomination, and for the support of Secretary Rice, and I want to thank the committee for granting me this hearing.

If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working with this committee and the many others in Congress who are interested in Mozambique's progress. Ever since the United States helped broker the 1992 peace accords that ended 16 years of civil war, relations between our two countries have been excellent. Now our relationship is even closer and more robust, as demonstrated by the June 2007 visit of First Lady Laura Bush, then the signing of a Millennium Challenge Compact in July, and, finally, the August visit of Health and Human Services Secretary Leavitt. That staff members from this very committee have visited Mozambique in recent weeks further emphasizes the increasing importance and dynamics of United States-Mozambique relations.

The past 15 years have seen real democratic advancement in Mozambique. The country a multiparty democracy under the constitution of 1990, and in 1994 Mozambique held its first democratic elections. Provincial elections are planned for January 2008, to be followed by municipal elections, and then Presidential and legislative elections in 2009. Recent elections in Mozambique have been judged as generally free and fair by the Carter Center and international observers, and if confirmed I pledge to help ensure future elections are transparent and open to all political parties, so that Mozambique can secure and enjoy a position among the world's functioning democracies.

Additionally, Mozambique has enjoyed remarkable economic growth by pursuing policies that have earned it the respect and support of international financial institutions. Despite remaining one of the world's poorest countries, Mozambique's gross domestic product per capita has more than tripled since the conclusion of the peace accords. If confirmed, I will work to encourage an open and favorable business climate necessary to attract foreign direct investment and responsible economic stewardship that will bring further prosperity to the country.

Although Mozambique has enjoyed political and economic improvement, it must aggressively address the devastating reality of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. Nationwide, HIV prevalence is now greater than 16 percent within Mozambique's adult population. It is extremely troubling that the number of new infections each year still appears to be increasing.

Malaria also takes a huge economic and human toll in Mozambique. The disease is responsible for an estimated 40 percent of all outpatient visits to health facilities and for some 60 percent of admissions to hospital of children. There are as many as 6 million cases of malaria each year in Mozambique—a country with a population of just under 20 million.

Helping Mozambique fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic, malaria, and tuberculosis are among the United States Government's highest priorities. Mozambique is currently one of only two nations in the world that is a focus country for both the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) and has also signed a Millennium Challenge Compact. Mozambique's MCC compact includes a \$204 million water/sanitation project over 5 years, aimed at providing fresh drinking water and curbing the incidence of malaria, and also includes a 5-year \$176 million project for road construction and rehabilitation. Because the MCC and our Mozambican partners realize that improved roadways mean greater movements of people, the road construction and rehabilitation project will also develop HIV/AIDS awareness programs along heavily traveled routes to educate people in disease prevention. In brief, because of the size of these investments, the United States is the largest bilateral donor to Mozambique. Mozambique is among the top recipients of United States Government assistance in Africa, and is also one of the top 10 recipients of United States assistance worldwide.

Mr. Chairman, since 2000, I have gained much experience coordinating our international programs and policies at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Such experience has provided me with the knowledge and insight to advocate for our Government's goals in Mozambique while helping fortify and expand the successes we've already achieved through our considerable efforts. My service on the interagency steering groups for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the President's Malaria Initiative, as well as my time as the U.S. Representative on the Board of Directors of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, have given me an intimate understanding and knowledge of Mozambique while continuing to vigorously press our national interests. Thank you again for this opportunity to address you. I would be pleased to answer any questions you and your colleagues might have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Steiger.

Thanks, all.

As we turn to the questions, let me just say—and I know you'll have the same experience—when you've actually visited one of these countries, it stays with you for life, and it turns out that I had been to Namibia, Mozambique, Angola twice; I have not been to Gabon, but, as I indicated, I've been to Sao Tome. So, my interest in these places is genuine, and I want you to know that, as you proceed, I am very interested in learning from you about these places, should you go through this whole process and achieve these posts.

Ms. Reddick, Gabon hosts a United States Cooperative Security location and participates in the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, ACOTA. EUCOM is active in Sao Tome and Principe, with projects to bolster coastal and maritime security, and both countries receive United States military training. What does this bilateral cooperation entail, and what positive effect has it had for security in Gabon and Sao Tome, the region, and the United States?

Ms. REDDICK. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we have very good relations with both countries, Sao Tome, Principe, and Gabon, in terms of our security strategic interests in the region; and I mean the central Africa region and also the Gulf of Guinea region.

You mentioned the ACOTA program, the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance program. We have been able to train peacekeepers that Gabon has deployed regionally. Gabonese military now lead the peacekeeping operation in Central African Republic. So, we've been able to assist Gabon in taking on the responsibility in assisting and maintaining the peace and stability of the region.

We have also provided training, through our Navy resources, actually on the waters of the Gulf of Guinea, both Sao Tome and Principe, and Gabon have taken advantage of that training, which, again, allows them to improve their capacity to secure the region. So, it's a valuable partnership for us. The Gulf of Guinea is a strategic area, because of the oil resources. We're almost at the point of the Gulf of Guinea region providing about 15 percent of the United States' oil supply.

So, this is an area of close cooperation. And, if confirmed, I look forward to continuing that in a dialog with the military and civilian leadership in both countries, in conjunction with our military. Again, the new Africa Command has just been stood up. But, I think, for—it will still include, to a certain degree, the European Command.

Senator FEINGOLD. On that issue—I mean, using this as a specific example, as well as a broader point—what would be your role, as ambassador, in coordinating with United States and Gabonese military personnel involved in these programs?

Ms. REDDICK. I expect to be engaged at the highest level. We have a defense attache and, of course, our embassy officers, who will be engaged in a dialog at the working level, but I think it's going to be very important to maintain those contacts at the highest levels of both governments.

Senator FEINGOLD. I'm pleased to hear you say that, because I think the Chief of Mission authority is extremely important, and should be preserved while we pursue other important interests of the United States.

As I mentioned in my opening statement, I've spent a little time in Sao Tome, and learned, during my recent stay, of our efforts to bolster their maritime capacity. Can you say a bit about these efforts and how you see them fitting into the larger Gulf of Guinea security effort?

Ms. REDDICK. Through programs such as IMET, the IMET program has trained military in both countries. In Sao Tome and Principe, our efforts focus on improving the professionalism of the small military, working at a very basic level, and also on improving the capacity of Sao Tome and Principe to patrol its coasts. We are also providing some assistance to the Government of Sao Tome and Principe to be able to monitor its waters, to know what's happening there, where are the ships and what they're doing. Again, it's a very basic level, at this point. But our assistance is very important for Sao Tome and will contribute to our ability to shore up the capacity of the governments in the Gulf of Guinea region to monitor its waters and to know what's happening. There are problems with illegal fishing, smuggling, and it's certainly of concern to the governments in the region, and to the United States, as well.

Senator FEINGOLD. China is a major investor in the volatile extractive industries in both Gabon and Sao Tome. Drawing on your knowledge of these countries, and perhaps your previous posting in Beijing, what is your perspective on China's involvement in, and impact on, these two countries?

Ms. REDDICK. China has brought economic interests, in Gabon, in particular, in the extractive industries, fishing, aquaculture, timber, and wood. The Chinese oil company, Sinopec, has rights to explore near a protected area—Loanga National Park. And this is of concern. Again, it's important for Gabon, which has set aside 10 percent of its land for national forests, to be able to protect those forests. On the other hand, it wants to be able to diversify beyond oil and forest products—timber, wood—could provide needed revenue in another sector. But it's going to be a delicate balance, so it will be important to monitor what companies like Sinopec are doing in or near a protected area. Again, that's an area of concern. I know the organizations such as World Wildlife Fund, the World Conservation Society, are also engaged in a dialog that the U.S. Government is participating in, along with other donors. So, with China's large needs for resources, you know, sometimes that could come into conflict with other interests, such as forest conservation.

I think it's going to be important to make sure that governments like Sao Tome and Principe and Gabon, that have laws that protect its resources and encourage environmentally sound investment, not only ensure these laws are implemented, but also respected by the commercial interests that come into both countries. And, if confirmed, I expect to be part of this dialog with NGOs and the governments. I also hope that we can include the Chinese into this dialog concerning environmentally sound commercial enterprises in the two countries.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your answers, Ms. Reddick.

Ms. Mathieu, the Legal Assistance Center has reported that rapes more than doubled between independence in 1990 and 2005 in Namibia. Civil society organizations have termed the high level of child rape a national emergency. What will you do to press for education on gender-based violence, as well as police and justice-sector reform in Namibia?

Ambassador MATHIEU. Mr. Chairman, since independence, Namibia generally has maintained a good human rights record, but the issue of child abuse and sexual abuse against women remains a very serious concern. Using the resources at the embassy, if confirmed, for example, our public diplomacy tools, we will try to raise public awareness of this issue, and we will also work with civil society and nongovernmental organizations, as well as advocate with the government to implement programs that would provide protection and shelter for these children; and, again, raise public awareness. And I would ensure, if confirmed, that the entire mission would be involved in this effort.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me switch to the relationship between Namibia and Zimbabwe. What explains the close relationship between these two governments? And what concerns, if any, does this relationship raise for the United States?

Ambassador MATHIEU. Mr. Chairman, due to historical ties, the Government of Namibia continues to publicly support the Government of Zimbabwe. But Namibia has taken a very different path within its own country, particularly with regard to land reform. Namibia is following a constitutional path, ensuring that all farmers have been compensated for land, either purchased outright or either taken by eminent domain or, as they call it, expropriation. I believe that this, if continued—and certainly if I were confirmed, I would encourage the Government of Namibia to follow this course of action—that this could serve as a model for the region and for Zimbabwe. Also, if confirmed, I would encourage the government to take a more active stance against the actions and policies in Zimbabwe.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador.

Mr. Mozena, Angola was the first country that I spent any real time in, in Africa, in 1994, and I was just struck by how richly endowed it is with oil and diamonds and gold and timber and other natural resources, despite the enormous tragedy that I witnessed then and when I returned in 1999. Last year, Angola recorded 14 percent GDP growth, largely due to oil exports. Unfortunately, the World Bank has identified major problems in the management of Angola's oil sector: a general lack of fiscal transparency and the fact that the government maintains off-budget financing through

the National Oil Company, Sonangol, in violation of Angola's own financial legislation. What actions will you take to ensure that the Angolan Government implements concrete measures and policies to bring about greater transparency in the oil sector and in the management of oil revenues?

Mr. MOZENA. Mr. Chairman, first, with your indulgence, earlier I failed to mention the two people who helped so much in preparing me to come here. And I would like to do that. And that would be Angola desk officers, Matt Shields and Chris Karber.

Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Duly noted.

Mr. MOZENA. Your question really gets to the nub of the issue in Angola. Why is such a rich country filled with people who are so poor? Corruption is a key part of that, as you rightly point out.

Some progress has been made in Angola in increasing transparency. I'm pleased that our Government has played an important part in those measures. For example, the government now has engaged the World Bank's integrated financial systems process, which tracks, transparently, the flow of the oil revenues. That is now visible. You can now go online, and you can see transactions, you can see revenues coming in. The bidding process—the most recent bidding process in Angola was fully transparent. It was quite impressive. These are all positive steps. But there's so much more to do.

And you cited what I would have cited as a major concern, and that is that the oil company, Sonangol, is still engaged in quasifiscal activities. And, as ambassador, I will deepen United States efforts and those of international organizations, and those of other donors, to work aggressively with the Government of Angola to bring ever-greater transparency, to shine the light in the corners. If Angola wants to succeed in creating a stable democracy, its people have to benefit from its rich wealth. And that is in the interest of the Government of Angola, and I will work with that government to help them better appreciate that reality.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. And how do you plan to work with the various domestic and international human rights advocates on key issues facing Angolan nationals, including police brutality, forced evictions, and threats to freedom of association and freedom of the press?

Mr. MOZENA. Mr. Chairman, in our annual Human Rights Report, we have spoken to the human rights situation in Angola. It remains poor. There have been areas of progress. There have been increased prosecutions of police. A human rights ombudsman has just been activated. The number of police violations is down. They've announced a new campaign of zero tolerance toward domestic violence, which I intend to engage on personally, should I be confirmed. These are improvements.

Nonetheless, the situation there is serious, in terms of human rights abuses. We have very active programs right now—I'm very proud of these programs—working with human rights organizations to improve their ability to monitor and report on the human rights situations, especially in the Lundas, the diamond-producing area where there have been serious human rights problems, and in Cabinda, as well. I think those are concrete measures that will

shed more light on what is going on, and I certainly intend, if confirmed, to deepen those efforts.

Senator FEINGOLD. In particular, will you be encouraging the authorities to clarify, publicly, the legitimacy of independent NGOs in Angola?

Mr. MOZENA. Yes. You may recall that, earlier this year, there was an incident involving an international NGO, Global Witness. I think incidents such as that are unfortunate, and they show the need for the Government of Angola to understand better the key role that NGOs play—domestic NGOs, international NGOs—the key role that they play in a democracy, and I intend to work toward that end.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir, for your answers.

Dr. Steiger, as I know you're aware, some questions relating to your service at HHS have come to the attention of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And the committee staff are looking into these issues. But I wanted to give you a chance today to address them now, on the record.

On July 29, 2007, the Washington Post reported on a draft Call to Action on global health issues that then-Surgeon General Dr. Carmona commissioned on 2006, but was never released. The article alleges that you had some role in preventing its publication because the report did not promote the Bush administration's policies. What was your role in this matter? And, if you were involved, what concerns did you have with regard to the draft that Dr. Carmona had produced?

Dr. STEIGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the opportunity that you've given me to speak to this issue here in this forum.

As you know, I have supplied members of the staff with six binders full of materials for them to review concerning this and other questions that they have about my time at HHS.

I have to say, Mr. Chairman, that no one was more surprised or disappointed with the Surgeon General's recent statements than I was. I believed we had quite a good relationship, and I took him at his word when he said, in his farewell e-mail to the members—fellow members of the Commission Corps at the Public Health Service, that he had operated in his term without any political interference.

On the question, more specifically, of the draft Call to Action, a couple of things, Mr. Chairman. First, it is important to realize what a Call to Action is, and what it isn't. It's not a full peer-reviewed Surgeon General's report. The reports that the Surgeons General put out are, as I suggest, reviewed very rigorously by scientific peers in a process much akin to the publication of scientific and technical articles, and they are meta-analyses of scientific and technical data on an important scientific or medical or public health question that breaks new ground and draws new conclusions. Calls to Action are policy documents informed by the best possible science, but, nevertheless, not subject to peer review. They are, however, as all publications are in the Department, subject to an interagency clearance process, and the draft that the Surgeon General prepared of his Call to Action—an idea, by the way, which I supported vigorously from the very beginning of the Surgeon Gen-

eral's term—went into an interagency clearance process that suggested that it, as a document, had serious flaws, factual errors, a weak—weaknesses in technical depth and breadth, and that it was not ready for publication. And that was the consensus of 10 of our operating and staff divisions, including the National Institutes of Health and the Food and Drug Administration.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, by June of 2006, the Surgeon General himself recognized that that draft was not ready for prime time. And I have in front of me an e-mail from the Surgeon General, dated June 12 of last year, which suggests that it needed more work. He said, "Normally, these Calls to Action are expected to have revisions and may take a few drafts. In this case, more input may be needed." He says, further, that his staff is "passionate about moving this forward when it is ready," the last four words, in capital letters.

So, Mr. Chairman, the normal processes of review of these kinds of documents brought to light significant technical and factual flaws in the Surgeon General's draft, and that is what prevented publication of that document at the time last year. My understanding, though, is that there are elements within our Department, particularly the National Institutes of Health and others—and I stand ready to do what I did with the Surgeon General, and provide my staff to help out in this process, should the new Surgeon General wish it—that, if confirmed, the new Surgeon General would have an opportunity to revisit this document, and perhaps publish it at a later date.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Steiger.

Also in 2004, I understand the Department of HHS limited the number of scientists who traveled to the International AIDS Conference in Bangkok. Press reports say the number was 50, as compared to 236 at the 2002 conference, although documents you submitted to the committee show the number may be higher than 50. Nonetheless, the result of the limitation, at least according to the information you sent to the committee, was that accepted presentations by HHS scientists were withdrawn, including presentations on testing options for measuring HIV incidents and advancing HIV prevention and care in the Asian context. I don't really want to get into all the exact numbers, as I am sure there was a reason these limitations were imposed, including saving the taxpayers money, something that I and the people of Wisconsin are very supportive of. Nonetheless, Dr. Steiger, could you explain what led you to make this decision, and particularly given that the travel restrictions included U.S. scientists who had, presumably, relevant presentations to make?

Dr. STEIGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I appreciate your question and your commentary.

I think, if you or your staff were listening, this morning, to National Public Radio, you heard another—yet another story about travel abuses in the Federal Government, and calls for further scrutiny of international travel expenditures. And I'm proud to say that we, at HHS, have never been involved in one of those stories, since 2001. This particular one, I believe, involved the Department of Agriculture.

So, our policy, Mr. Chairman, on international travel and on examining very closely the number of delegates or scientists or other staff who go to any international meeting, is based on balancing the interests of presenting our work in public health and science with the best possible value for money for the taxpayer.

In the case of the conference in Bangkok, and similar ones that have been put on by the International AIDS Society, I do wish to stress that they are not the only places that our scientists go to present their work, and, in fact, are not even the most important ones, and that much of the work that our technical experts consider to be their most cutting-edge and their most important, they choose to reserve for other meetings that are really the heart of the scientific interchange on HIV/AIDS, and they have chosen, as Laurie Garrett suggests in a column that she wrote after the—during the Bangkok Conference in 2004, to present that work at other places, because they found that the value of those particular meetings, sponsored by the International AIDS Society, has been eroding over time.

So, we made a decision, in consultation, Mr. Chairman, with our interagency partners, including the State Department and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, to limit our participation to a number, around 50, in order for us to strike that balance, and that our scientists and others would have other opportunities to present their work, as they did. And we now believe that the annual Implementers Meeting, organized by the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator and sponsored by a number of international organizations, is, in fact, the premier place to present exactly the kind of work that you suggested.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your candor, Dr. Steiger.

And now I'd like to just spend a minute or two on more substantive issues relating to your nomination to be United States Ambassador to Mozambique.

President Armando Guebuza promised to fight corruption, but Transparency International has given Mozambique progressively worse ratings. And a USAID-funded study clearly indicated that the average Mozambican feels the impact of corruption most when dealing with public service providers. How would you maintain the beneficial relationship we have with Mozambique, while, frankly, pressuring them to tackle corruption more aggressively?

Dr. STEIGER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Corruption does remain a major concern in Mozambique. As in—as you have pointed out, international observers are—and Mozambiquans themselves—are increasingly worried about it. So, if confirmed, this would be one of our major areas of interchange with the government at the embassy in Maputo, without a doubt.

We, as you know, spend an extraordinary amount of money—of United States taxpayer money through our foreign assistance programs in Mozambique. If we—depending on how well the Millennium Challenge Corporation implementation goes this next year, we could be spending as much as \$300 million a year on foreign assistance. And, as I say, we're the top donor there, and Mozambique has jumped into the top 10 recipients of aid from the United States around the world.

We do fund government institutions, and we also fund a large number of nongovernmental institutions. And in all cases, we must be ever vigilant about the possibility of corruption. But what I think is most important is making sure that—not just at the central government level, but down at the village level, where people are receiving health and education and other social services from the government and other partners—that corruption is not affecting the implementation of our major programs there at that level.

And one of the challenges we face in Mozambique, as you know, on this and every issue, is the inability of the United States Government, given the great geographic size of the country and understandable budgetary constraints, to be everywhere in that country, watching what's going on. So, in connection with fighting corruption and other things, I would, if confirmed, encourage and find creative ways for our embassy personnel to be out in the field more, so that we had better eyes and ears about what—and a better read about what's going on, on the ground.

Senator FEINGOLD. When G-8 countries and the IMF canceled Mozambique's debt in 2005, the president of Mozambique promised the savings would be used for education, for getting water to the population, and for improving health services. Instead, his government has been pursuing capital-intensive showpiece mega-projects. How would you use your leverage as U.S. Ambassador to encourage more government attention and resources for social infrastructure and programs?

Dr. STEIGER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

You're absolutely right, this is not a new story, as you know, in Africa, but it's one that is recently—has recently come to light in Mozambique, as you say, because of the debt relief.

If confirmed, I would make a great priority on pushing the government toward being transparent and open in its own investments, and increasing its investments in the social sector; in health and education, in particular. Mozambique has not, like many of its neighbors, met the 2001 Abuja target that governments agreed to in 2001 to increase the spending of their own domestic budgets—the share of their own domestic budgets spent on healthcare to 15 percent. They're not close yet. That would be part of our goal.

In addition, we would have to work at the embassy with all of the other major donors because, even though we're the largest, every major foreign assistance provider in the world has a presence in Mozambique, and some of them are quite significant—the Europeans, the Japanese, the Chinese, as you referred to earlier. And all of us, as a donor community, not just the United States, need to work together, to send those messages about the importance of transparency, getting rid of corruption, and increasing the domestic social investments from the government itself.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Dr. Steiger.

Thank you all. I wish you all well as this nomination and confirmation process goes forward. And, should you be confirmed, I, of course, wish all the best to you and your families in your new posts.

The hearing is concluded.

[Whereupon, at 9:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DR. WILLIAM R. STEIGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Mozambique? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in Mozambique? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions?

Answer. The strong Mozambican law enforcement response to a major surge in crime in 2007 has led to accusations of abuse on the part of police and other security forces, including allegations of torture and unlawful killings. Separately, prison conditions in Mozambique are harsh. An understaffed and inadequately trained judiciary system has resulted in cases of arbitrary arrests and detention, and in lengthy pre-trial detentions. There continue to be occasional reports of the harassment of journalists in Mozambique, many of whom practice some form of self censorship. In addition, societal problems such as domestic violence, discrimination against women, the abuse and exploitation of children, trafficking in women and children, and discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS remain widespread problems.

If confirmed, I would increase our dialog with Mozambican Government Ministries and the Parliament, to reiterate the U.S. Government's commitment to human rights and remind the Guebuza administration that United States lawmakers pay attention to the issue when considering how much aid a country receives. I would undertake outreach activities to the dedicated Mozambican civil society groups that focus on human rights issues, such as the Mozambican Human Rights League, by speaking publicly on the issue, as well as by hosting and attending roundtable discussions and working groups. I would also continue to support other organizations in Mozambique that are working on human rights, democracy, and civic participation through the embassy's small Democracy and Human Rights Fund grants.

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Mozambique in advancing human rights and democracy, in general?

Answer. Many of the above-named human rights concerns share a common cause—lack of resources. Most of the problems with the Mozambican police and security forces, the prison system, and the judiciary stem from a general shortage of trained/qualified personnel (police officers, prison guards, judges, and judicial workers), and an overall lack of funding directed at these problems.

Another big challenge to overcome is precedent. Before independence, colonial authorities used ruthless tactics to control and subdue the population; in some cases, Mozambican police inherited these tactics, and have not completely evolved their procedures to incorporate respect for human rights into their everyday practices. Providing sporadic training to officers, prison workers, and judges on human rights is not enough—there needs to be constant, reinforcing engagement.

If confirmed, one of my first goals as ambassador in the area of human rights would be to press for the Mozambican Parliament to pass pending legislation to criminalize human trafficking, which has been a goal of the embassy and the office to monitor and combat trafficking in persons at the United States Department of State for some time. The State Department's annual Trafficking in Persons Report this year has placed Mozambique on the Tier Two Watch List, which reflects concerns that the Government in Maputo is not paying sufficient attention to the well-documented trafficking problem.

Changing long-held Mozambican social practices and traditions in the areas of child labor, trafficking in persons, domestic violence, and discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS, however, is another challenge. Because half of Mozambique's adult population is illiterate, and the majority of Mozambicans live in rural areas, without regular access to information and news sources, achieving behavioral changes in these areas is extremely difficult.

Question. If confirmed in your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy's activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service?

Answer. If confirmed, I would begin an initiative right away to make the subject of human rights part of every discussion I have with Mozambican Government officials, so they know the United States Government is taking the issue of funda-

mental human freedoms in their country seriously. Ambassadors should not be discussing human rights in earnest only once a year, following the release of the U.S. Department of State's annual Human Rights and Trafficking in Persons Reports, but rather should make the matter a focal point of our ongoing, everyday bilateral agenda with countries around the world. I would also work more closely with the public affairs section of the Embassy in Maputo to ensure that, when we host a luncheon or roundtable on human rights, or when we provide grants to nongovernmental organizations that focus on human rights, the Mozambican public knows about these efforts.

If confirmed, I would make sure that embassy officers engaged in human rights reporting receive the full support of the Mission, and are duly rewarded for superior performance through the embassy awards program and their yearly evaluations.

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions?

Answer. Throughout my time at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, I have played a role in promoting human life, dignity, and fundamental freedoms in international fora, and in our bilateral relationships. I was the lead HHS representative on the U.S. Government negotiating teams for the United Nations General Assembly Special Sessions on HIV/AIDS (in 2001, and its follow-up in 2006) and on Children (in 2002), which produced groundbreaking documents that promoted human rights. Over the course of 2005 and 2006, I managed the participation of HHS staff, under the leadership of the U.S. Department of State, in the negotiations that produced the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which should encourage developing countries to raise their standards of legal protection for the disabled to the levels we have afforded them here in the United States.

I have also supported Secretaries Thompson and Leavitt as they carried out an aggressive agenda to combat human trafficking, a violation of human rights that is tantamount to modern-day slavery. I have been an active participant in the Senior Policy Operating Group that manages the inter-agency implementation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and its reauthorization, and have planned and executed anti-trafficking events for both Secretaries on their overseas trips, including in Ukraine, Cambodia, and Mozambique.

Question. Mozambique is, of course, one of 15 focus countries under the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). How can PEPFAR be most effectively integrated in the country team environment? The PEPFAR budget in the country has rapidly climbed from estimated \$34 million in fiscal year 2004 to \$162 million in fiscal year 2007 and is expected to climb substantially higher in 2008. What are the challenges in managing such a significant scale-up? Please evaluate the success of PEPFAR's efforts in Mozambique to date. What are the particular challenges in combating HIV/AIDS and other health problems in the country?

Answer. The President's emergency plan in Mozambique has been very successful to date, and is a testament to the commitment of the in-country emergency plan team, the host government's efforts to fight HIV/AIDS, and the presence of strong, nongovernmental and faith-based implementing partners. As of August 2007, more than 75,000 persons were receiving anti-retroviral therapy (ART) in Mozambique through the President's Emergency Plan; the country will likely achieve its emergency plan phase I treatment target of 123,000 persons on ART by September 2009, and will come close to meeting its own national treatment targets. The Government of Mozambique has now made ART freely available in all 128 districts in the country, a remarkable achievement that stems, in large part, from strong emergency plan support, as the United States provides direct financing to 103 of the 198 sites that currently offer ART. Mozambique is also on track to achieve HIV-related care targets in nearly all emergency plan program areas.

In addition, upstream (indirect) emergency plan support to the Mozambican Ministry of Health and Women and Social Action, the National AIDS Council and other agencies in the government helps ensure a comprehensive, national response. This indirect emergency plan support includes substantial funding for training, physical infrastructure, the procurement of medicine and supplies, and the strengthening of distribution systems.

There are several challenges to the rapid scale-up of the emergency plan in Mozambique, however. Three pressing issues I should highlight are the following: (1) ensuring the adequate staffing of U.S. Government departments and agencies and implementing partners to support the expansion of the emergency plan; (2) ensuring close communication between U.S. Government staff, with the host government, and

with other donors; and (3) the paucity of physical infrastructure and human resources in Mozambique.

As the principal for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on the Policy and Strategy Group for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, I have been intimately involved in conceptualizing and defining "Staffing for Results," a priority initiative under the emergency plan for 2007. "Staffing for Results" seeks to ensure that, as U.S. Government country teams on the ground in an emergency plan define their priority areas of intervention, they optimally align the staffing and skills across all U.S. Government departments and agencies that are supporting HIV/AIDS in the country in a way that ensures the most effective implementation of these priorities. This "One U.S. Government" approach is particularly important for ensuring the clear and effective management of partners as the emergency plan scales up with expanded budgets. The United States Embassy in Maputo is currently putting into practice two components of "Staffing for Results": restructuring its cross-agency emergency plan team to create a more effective, efficient, cross-agency implementation of the program; and, better integrating this structure into the embassy overall, and aligning it with other U.S. Government priorities, including the President's Malaria Initiative and the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact with Mozambique.

The Mozambique interagency emergency plan team includes active participation from all agencies at post: the U.S. Departments of Defense; HHS; State; Peace Corps; and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The team won the Emergency Plan Spirit Award during the first 2 years of implementation of the program, and has continued strong, interagency collaboration, despite staffing turnover in recent years. New coordination structures recently implemented in Maputo include: (1) the establishment of a full-time emergency plan coordinator position; (2) weekly meetings between the front office and the principals of each U.S. Government emergency plan implementing department or agency at post; and (3) regular interagency emergency plan task force meetings, in addition to strong technical working groups. These different fora and groups assist the team to reflect upon, discuss, and make recommendations on the overall vision, strategy, and major programmatic directions for the emergency plan in Mozambique. In addition, the interagency emergency plan team in Maputo organizes both regular meetings and ad hoc retreats with partner agencies in-country; the next team retreat is scheduled for January 2008.

Mozambique is a country with very limited physical infrastructure and human resources. It has one of the lowest ratios of health care workers (doctors, nurses, pharmacists, laboratory technicians) to population in the world. In addition, the World Health Organization estimates that less than 50 percent of the population in Mozambique has access to health facilities. Mozambique has a high burden of many infectious diseases (malaria and tuberculosis) in addition to HIV/AIDS. All of these realities make the implementation of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in Mozambique more difficult, but the emergency plan strategy and country operational plans managed by the United States Government team in Maputo contain elements to address infrastructure deficits.

A key activity in this regard is the training of health care workers (especially community health workers, care extenders, technicians, and the equivalent of physician assistants) in an effort to get around the shortage of doctors and nurses through "task-shifting," or appropriately training and supervising lay people to perform many aspects of basic medical care.

The emergency plan has also helped to finance the education of students at the Catholic University of Beira, the first medical school to open in Mozambique since independence. Innovative "twinning" relationships funded by the emergency plan with institutions in Brazil and the United States have contributed to the training of local health workers and laboratory technicians, as well. Emergency plan funds have also helped in the renovation and refurbishment of medical facilities across Mozambique, including hospitals, clinics, and laboratories.

Question. What are the most positive and the most challenging aspects of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Mozambique? What would be your chief goals as Ambassador to Mozambique?

Answer. Mozambique and the United States have had a close and positive relationship since the United States helped broker the peace accords in the early 1990s, and we have only strengthened that relationship further in the intervening years, as reflected by the recent visit to Mozambique of First Lady Laura Bush and United States Secretary of Health and Human Services, Mike Leavitt. Additionally, in July of this year in Washington, we signed a \$507 million MCC compact with Mozambique, an event attended by Mozambique's President Armando Guebuza. The MCC

compact underscores the United States Government's commitment to alleviating poverty in Mozambique through promoting just governance, investing in people, and economic growth. The United States is the largest bilateral donor to Mozambique, and Mozambique has now become one of the largest recipients of United States foreign assistance on the African continent.

However, the investment climate for United States and other foreign investors in Mozambique is less than ideal, and as I have noted above, there are many human rights concerns. If confirmed, I would work to ensure Mozambique continues on the path towards becoming a vibrant, multiparty democracy that aggressively addresses the health challenges of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, that has an energetic and free press, and that has an ever-improving environment for doing business.

RESPONSES OF DR. WILLIAM R. STEIGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps-State Department Relations?

Answer. I have read 04 STATE 258893, as well as 07 STATE 78240, dated June 6, 2007, which both concern relations between Peace Corps and the U.S. Department of State.

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this cable?

Answer. Yes, I understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in 04 STATE 258893 and 07 STATE 78240.

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that “the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy” and that “the Peace Corps's role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies”?

Answer. I fully understand that Peace Corps activities must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy. I also understand the mission of Peace Corps is not comparable to other government agencies. However, where Peace Corps itself has agreed to establish linkages with other U.S. Government-funded programs, such as the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, I will endeavor, if confirmed, to support those ties. The Peace Corps implements Emergency Plan programs in 9 of the 15 Emergency Plan focus countries, including Mozambique. Peace Corps posts in these countries are using Emergency Plan resources to enhance their HIV/AIDS programming and in-country training; field additional Crisis Corps and Peace Corps volunteers specifically in support of Emergency Plan goals; and provide targeted support for community-initiated projects. As I saw during a visit to the CAPRISA site in rural KwaZulu Natal Province in the Republic of South Africa on a trip led by Secretary of Health and Human Services Mike Leavitt this summer, Peace Corps volunteers who work with the Emergency Plan provide long-term capacity development support to nongovernmental, community-based, and faith-based organizations, with particular emphasis on ensuring that community-initiated projects and programs provide comprehensive support to people who are living with and affected by HIV/AIDS. Peace Corps volunteers also aim to develop the necessary management and programmatic expertise at organizations that are recipients and beneficiaries of Emergency Plan financing to ensure long-lasting support, particularly in rural communities.

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise your Chief of Mission “authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies”?

Answer. If confirmed, I pledge to exercise my Chief of Mission authorities to provide Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies.

RESPONSES OF HON. GAIL D. MATHIEU TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps-State Department Relations?

Answer. I have read 04 STATE 258893, as well as STATE 78240 dated June 6, 2007—Peace Corps-State Department Relations.

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this cable?

Answer. Yes, I understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in 04 STATE 258893 and 07 STATE 78240—Peace Corps-State Department Relations.

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that “the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy” and that “the Peace Corps’s role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. Government agencies”?

Answer. Yes, I fully understand that Peace Corps activities must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy. I also understand that the mission of Peace Corps is not comparable to those of other government agencies. In coordination with other government agencies, the Peace Corps plays a key role in planning and implementing activities under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) as well as participating in activities to improve Namibia’s basic education system.

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise your Chief of Mission “authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies”?

Answer. I pledge to exercise my Chief of Mission authorities, if confirmed, to provide Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies.

NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Obsitnik, Vincent, to be Ambassador to the Slovak Republic
Speckhard, Daniel V., to be Ambassador to Greece
Stephenson, Thomas F., to be Ambassador to the Portuguese Republic

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey, presiding.

Present: Senators Casey, Feingold, Menendez, and DeMint.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA

Senator CASEY. This Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

The committee today will consider the nominations for three key U.S. Ambassadorships in Europe. President Bush has nominated the Honorable Daniel Speckhard to be Ambassador to Greece, Mr. Thomas Stephenson to be the Ambassador to Portugal, and Mr. Vincent Obsitnik to be the Ambassador to Slovakia.

I want to congratulate all of you on your nominations, and express the gratitude of the Senate at your willingness to engage in public service on behalf of the Nation.

The relationship that we have—the Trans-Atlantic relationship, while somewhat neglected, in my judgment, in recent years—remains paramount to our national security interests.

Greece, Portugal, and Slovakia are all NATO allies, and NATO continues to bind the United States together with its partners in Europe, and still constitutes the most important alliance for the United States. NATO today plays a crucial role in supporting our objectives in Afghanistan for a representative government that can exert sovereign control, and ensure that al-Qaeda never again uses its territory as a launching pad for terrorist activities and acts.

NATO, along with the European Union, continues to facilitate the consolidation of democratic reforms, and economic prosperity in Eastern Europe, one of the last areas of the world where regard for America remains very strong. We stand together with our European allies against any effort by Russia to intimidate its neighbors or otherwise engage in hostile acts.

So, there's a broad agenda for the United States and Europe to undertake together in a spirit of cooperation and partnership.

And, of course, Greece, Portugal, and Slovakia will play crucial roles in the evolution of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance in coming years. So, it is especially important that the United States be represented by our finest public servants in Athens, Lisbon, and Bratislava.

Greece, of course, remains central to hopes for political and economic stability in the Balkans, especially as the talks on Kosovo's final status come to a conclusion at the end of this year. While the Greek Government will not always agree with aspects—or every aspect of American foreign policy, our two nations share cherished democratic values and retain a common heritage of liberty and freedom. Three million Americans call Greece their ancestral home.

The Honorable Daniel Speckhard, the nominee to be the Ambassador to Greece, has cultivated a distinguished civil service career in the United States Government that dates back to 1982; from 1997 to 2000, he ably represented the United States as Ambassador to Belarus, even as relations between the two nations deteriorated over antidemocratic behavior of the Lukashenko regime.

From 2000 to 2005, he served in a vital leadership position within the NATO Alliance, as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, and the Director of Policy Planning.

For 2 years—for the past 2 years, I should say—Ambassador Speckhard has served in an especially important position in Baghdad, first as Director of the Iraq Reconstruction Management office, and more recently, as Deputy Chief of Mission at our embassy. He is an accomplished public servant, and I'm grateful he's been nominated for this vital position in Athens.

Next, Portugal has long been a steadfast ally to the United States. Portugal's contributions to NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have been significant, especially in light of the modest size of its military. The American air base in the Azores Islands remains essential to our military deployments around the world.

As a current holder of the rotating presidency of the European Union, Portugal has maintained its 500-year-old tradition of leadership as the center of the trans-Atlantic relations.

The nominee who's with us today for the post of Ambassador to Portugal, Mr. Thomas Stephenson, is an accomplished venture capitalist, and investment banker. For the past 19 years, he's been a prominent member of the business community in Silicone Valley as a venture capitalist there. He has served on, I should say, dozens of private and public corporate boards, including the Hoover Institution, and the Woodrow Wilson Center.

Although this position would represent his first opportunity for government service, Mr. Stephenson has shown an admirable commitment to public service through his community and volunteer activities.

Finally, Slovakia is a recent addition to NATO, having only entered the alliance in 2004. Today, Slovakia is governed by a ruling coalition that is quite outspoken in its criticism of United States foreign policy. The United States and Slovakia must continue to co-

operate on a range of issues, ranging from energy security in Central and Eastern Europe, to the final status of Kosovo.

My home State of Pennsylvania happens to be one of those States that can boast the largest population of Slovak-Americans in the United States, and I might add, so is our nominee.

Mr. Vincent Obsitnik can speak the language, possesses a special understanding of the Slovak culture, he's an equally qualified to make an immediate and positive impact on popular perceptions in Slovakia of the United States and the actions we undertake, and he's a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, and a veteran submariner. His post-naval career saw him become a senior executive in the information and telecommunications systems industry.

And with Americans dying in combat in foreign lands today, and our international prestige, in my judgment, at an all-time low—this country demands capable representatives to advocate for our interests overseas. And I speak to each of you when I say this, as well: If you are confirmed for your respective positions, I trust you'll dedicate yourselves fully to your positions, even as this administration enters its final months in power.

I look forward to hearing your views, and how you intend to serve as ambassadors of our great Nation.

At this time, I will turn to my colleague, Senator Feingold, for his introduction, and then I'll go back to Senator DeMint when he's here, and also Senator Menendez.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RUSS FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN**

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Senator Casey, for chairing this hearing and thanks to all of the witnesses for your willingness to serve the U.S. Government overseas. These are challenging positions, and I have great admiration for those who are willing to spend years abroad, serving as the eyes and ears—and sometimes mouth—of the U.S. Government.

Senator Casey, I'm especially pleased to be here today to introduce Ambassador Dan Speckhard, the nominee for the position of Ambassador to Greece. As I'm sure you will know from his resume, Ambassador Speckhard and I share a number of commonalities—we are both Wisconsinites, we share the same great alma mater, and we believe we can serve U.S. citizens by working in the Federal Government.

Ambassador Speckhard—it's good to see you again.

Mr. Chairman, I had the opportunity to meet with the Ambassador when I traveled to Iraq in 2006, when he was taking on a very challenging responsibility involving the reconstruction of Iraq. As always, I was pleased to encounter a Wisconsinite so far from home. But I was even more pleased to know the Ambassador was following a long and proud tradition of Wisconsinites committing their lives to public service, and I could tell from his presentation how, not only dedicated and capable he was, and is.

Senator Casey, I don't know whether you've ever visited Wisconsin, but if you have, your time was more than likely in Madison or Milwaukee. Well, the Ambassador, here, grew up in Wausau, a north-central town that is a little bit less known than those other two cities. Wausau is not only one of the most scenic towns in our

State; it is also vibrant, and eclectic members of the Wausau community strongly believe in the importance of community service, and understand the impact world affairs plays in their day-to-day life. I am proud that the Wausau community has generated such a committed and dedicated public servant.

Given his long history with the Department of State serving in a range of offices and embassies, I am confident that Ambassador Speckhard will dutifully and effectively represent our interests in Greece.

Thank you, Ambassador, for your ongoing commitment to public service. I would also like to thank your family—and I see your wife, Ann—for the sacrifices they have made to support you and your career.

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for chairing this hearing, and thank you to all the nominees here today. I wish you all the best of luck.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Feingold, and I appreciate that introduction. I haven't been to Wisconsin yet, but I apparently have to get there now. [Laughter.]

Thank you.

Senator Menendez.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate all of our nominees coming before the committee, I appreciate their willingness to serve, and I'm looking forward to the question and answer session. I have several questions, particularly to Ambassador Speckhard, who I had the privilege of meeting the other day.

United States-Greece relationships are something I've followed for the last 15 years in the Congress, I think it's an important post, particularly what's happening in the Balkans, our relationships with Turkey, a whole series of issues there, so I look forward to some of his answers.

As well as Ambassador Stephenson—we have a very large Portuguese-American community in New Jersey who have done exemplary things, and Portugal has played a very constructive role in Europe for us, and with us, so they're both very important assignments, as well as, of course, Mr. Obsitnik, who is going to be the Ambassador to the Slovak Republic.

But those are two interest points, and I'll have an opportunity to ask questions at that time.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator.

We'll turn to our nominees now, and I'd ask you to deliver your statements in the order you were introduced, so I guess we're going right to left, if I'm correct. And I'd encourage you to keep your remarks as brief as you can, and succinct, so we can move to questions. If you're summarizing your statement, of course, the full text of your statement will be included in the hearing record.

But, I have to say, because of where you sit today, I know this is a very proud moment for each of you, and I would hope that, if you're able to do it, when you're making your statements today that you would introduce your family in whatever way is suitable for you. Because it's an important day for you and your families we

want to make sure that we give you that opportunity, or a reminder—I've been in places where I should have introduced my family and didn't, so—

[Laughter.]

Senator CASEY. If you want to take that as part of your statement, we'd certainly encourage that.

Ambassador.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL V. SPECKHARD,
NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO GREECE**

Mr. SPECKHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators. It's an honor to appear before you as the President's nominee for the United States Ambassador to the Hellenic Republic.

I would like to thank Senator Feingold for his generous introduction, and taking the time to be here today. I'm proud to be a fellow Wisconsinite and appreciate the personal devotion and attention that he's given to representing our State, and I'm proud to be a colleague in that respect.

I would like to introduce—and thank you for the reminder—my wife, Ann, who is sitting here behind me, and she's with me here today. And, unfortunately, my children—Leah, Jessica, and Daniel, who weren't able to be here—because they have made a lot of personal sacrifices to support me in my public service career, most notably over the last 2 years when I was in Iraq, and was not able to live with them. Ann carried much of the burden of the family during that period, and has done so, actually, during much of my public service career.

So, any small contribution that I've been able to make to public service, and to my country, really starts with the support they've given me.

Mr. Chairman, I'm humbled that the President and Secretary Rice have placed their confidence in me for this important post. If confirmed, I will put all of my energy towards strengthening our relations with Greece, and working together to promote regional stability and tackle global problems.

I believe my career has helped me prepare for this important assignment. For 25 years as a public servant, and nearly a decade of that overseas as Ambassador of Belarus, Deputy Chief of Mission to Iraq, and a Senior Official at NATO, I have honed my diplomatic and leadership skills. And, I've worked closely during those periods with Greek diplomats and have spent time working on trying to promote stability in the Balkans, and consolidating democracy across Europe. And I think that experience will put me in a good starting point to begin work, if confirmed, in Athens.

Our partnership with Greece stems from our close ties that our nations share as allies and members of the Euro-Atlantic community, and from the millions of Americans who can trace their ancestry to the Hellenic Republic. Both Greeks and Americans share a common heritage, based on a belief in values such as liberty, freedom, and equality. We have stood together with the Hellenic Republic time and time again to defend those values across the globe.

As we look to the future, the Balkans in particular, require continued attention to ensure peace, economic transformation, and in-

tegration of all of the countries into the region, and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The unresolved nature of the future status of Kosovo remains a barrier to development of the region, and in the coming months it will be critical to see a resolution as envisaged by the special U.N. Envoy Antisaari.

As an anchor in the region, Greece has an important interest in seeing this resolved. Greece is one of the largest investors in Balkan economies, and its leadership will be crucial to seeing history there unfold on a positive course.

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Government of Greece to increase our cooperation to bring stability to this critically-important region.

Greece also has an important interest and role to play in bringing diversified sources of energy to the European market. The United States wholeheartedly supports these efforts to diversify and to introduce true market competition to this vital economic sector.

Development of the Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline is a significant step in that direction, and as well as a sign of the improved relations between Greece and Turkey. Both countries recognize the vital interests they share. Greece's support for closer bilateral relations with Turkey, as well as its support for Turkey's integration into the European Union, is further recognition of their common interests.

By bridging the divides that are left between those two countries, the conditions can be created to solve other longstanding problems. In the case of Cyprus, I hope a just and lasting resolution and settlement acceptable to majorities in both communities, can be achieved through the efforts of Cypriots, and the support of the international community.

Greece's location at the crossroads of Asia, the Middle East, the Balkans and Europe, along with its preeminent global shipping industry, make it a crucial ally in combating terrorism, and trafficking in persons. It is also well-situated to be an important partner in the international communities' effort to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to fight trafficking in drugs and illicit arms.

But cooperation should not be limited to regional or global matters. My family and I were deeply saddened, along with our fellow Americans, while watching the wildfires ravage Greece. I'm pleased that the United States provided \$1.9 million to assist the Government of Greece, and improving firefighting capabilities, meet humanitarian needs, and for rehabilitation and reforestation efforts.

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Greek Government, other United States agencies, Congress and the Greek-American community in strengthening our cooperation in what is a common threat and challenge for both our countries.

I would like to close, Mr. Chairman, by mentioning the important role that Greek-Americans play, both in our own country's history, and in ensuring that our relationship with the Hellenic Republic is strong. In my career as a diplomat, I've come to realize that nothing is more important, or effective, in presenting the best face of

America than the personal ties and connections that private Americans establish every day on their own.

Mr. Chairman, it's been an honor to appear before you today, and if confirmed, I want to assure you that I look forward to working with you, members of the committee and the Congress in representing my fellow Americans as the Ambassador to Hellenic Republic.

Thank you, and I welcome any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Speckhard follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL V. SPECKHARD,
NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO GREECE

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators, it is an honor to appear before you today as the President's nominee for the United States Ambassador to the Hellenic Republic. I am humbled that President Bush and Secretary Rice have placed their confidence in me for this important post. I look forward to earning the confidence of this committee and the Senate as you fulfill your important responsibilities as part of our democratic system. If confirmed, I will put all of my energy and experience toward strengthening our relations with Greece and working together to promote regional stability and tackle some of the global problems that we face together.

Mr. Chairman, as you know Greece is a strategic partner of the United States. Our partnership stems from the close ties our nations share as members of the Euro-Atlantic community, as NATO allies, and from the millions of Americans whose ancestry can be traced back to the Hellenic Republic. Both Greek and American people share a common heritage, based on a belief in values such as liberty, freedom, and equality. The concept of democracy originated in Ancient Greece and the ideals the Ancient Greeks embodied profoundly influenced the founders of our great Nation. Since then, we have stood together with the Hellenic Republic time and time again to defend democracy across the globe: in both world wars, on the Korean Peninsula and in the Balkans. Today the Greek people are allied with us in combating terrorism, including in Afghanistan where they have contributed troops and resources.

While humbled by the prospect of representing our country, I believe my career has helped prepare me for this important assignment. I have spent 25 years as a public servant—nearly a decade of that overseas. As Ambassador to Belarus, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Iraq, and a senior official at NATO, I have honed my diplomatic and leadership skills in both bilateral and multilateral affairs. At NATO, I worked closely with senior Greek diplomats to promote stability in the Balkans and strengthen and consolidate democracy across Europe as part of NATO's Partnership for Peace program and NATO enlargement. This experience provides a good basis to begin my work in Athens should the Senate confirm me in this position.

Our country's relationship with Greece clearly is important for our interest in stability in Southern and South Central Europe. The Balkans, in particular, require continued attention in the coming years to ensure peace, economic transformation, and integration of all countries in the region into Euro-Atlantic institutions. The unresolved nature of the future status of Kosovo remains a barrier to the development of the region, and in the coming months it will be critical to see a resolution as envisaged by the U.N. Special Envoy, Maarti Ahtisaari. As an anchor in the region, Greece has an important interest in seeing this resolved. Greece is one of the largest investors in Balkan economies, and its leadership will be crucial to seeing history there unfold on a positive course. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Government of Greece to increase our cooperation to bring stability to this critically important region.

Greece also has an important interest and role to play in bringing diversified sources of energy to the European market. The United States wholeheartedly supports these efforts to diversify, and to introduce true market competition to this vital economic sector.

The inauguration of the Turkey-Greece-Italy Pipeline (TGI) between Greece and Turkey will allow Caspian gas to be directly transported to the European market via a new, diversified route. It is a positive step in the development of relations between Greece and Turkey, reflecting the constructive relations they have developed in recent years. By recognizing the vital interests they share in the 21st century and displaying strong political will, the Government of Greece has supported closer bilateral relations with Turkey as well as championing Turkey's integration with

the European Union. If confirmed, I will strongly support Greece as it continues to increase its engagement with Turkey.

By bridging the divides that are left between these two countries, we can create the conditions in the region to resolve other, longstanding problems. In the case of Cyprus, I hope a just and lasting settlement, acceptable to majorities in both communities, can be achieved through the efforts of Cypriots and the support of the international community.

I also look forward to working with Greek officials on issues of global importance which threaten the safety and well being of all. Greece's location at the crossroads of Asia, the Middle East, the Balkans, and Europe, along with its preeminent global shipping industry, make it a crucial ally in combating both terrorism and trafficking in persons. Greece is also well situated to be an important partner in the international community's efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to fight trafficking in drugs and illicit arms. These are some of the greatest challenges of our world today, requiring diligence and significant effort from all countries.

In the same vein, the stability and health of the environment and the challenge of climate change will become increasingly important in the next few years. Greece's natural beauty is well known the world over, and to ensure it remains a treasure for Greeks and all those who visit, we need to work together to find new and creative ways to sustain the soundness of global and local environments alike.

Cooperation on issues should not be limited to regional or global matters though. The recent, devastating wildfires that ravaged Greece remind us that natural disasters can strike anywhere and at any time. As a good partner and friend, I am happy to say that the United States has provided over \$1.9 million in assistance, including cash donations to the Hellenic Red Cross, nonperishable commodities, and funding for a team of experts to provide technical assistance and build the foundation for robust cooperation in the future. I have met with the members of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and United States Forest Service who traveled to Greece to offer technical assistance to their Greek counterparts. The team's message to me was clear: Greek firefighters are some of the best in the world, and they performed admirably under rigorous conditions. Our common experience in dealing with forest fires and the similarity between the landscapes in Greece and the western United States means that there is a great benefit to continued cooperation and mutual support. My hope is that the constructive dialog between Greek and American firefighting and burned-area experts, initiated as a result of this tragedy, continues to deepen as Greece begins to focus on vital reconstruction, reforestation, and rehabilitation.

In that vein, I would like to mention the important role that Greek-Americans play, both in our own country's history and in ensuring that our relationship with the Hellenic Republic is so strong. In my career as a diplomat I have come to realize that no matter what we, in our capacity as public servants, do to represent this great country, nothing is more effective at presenting the best face of America than the personal ties and connections Americans establish every day on their own. I would note the beneficial role Greek-Americans have played by contributing to all sectors of our own society, and the continuing role they play in strengthening relations between the United States and Greece.

Mr. Chairman, it has been an honor to appear before you today, and it would be a privilege to represent my fellow Americans as the United States Ambassador to the Hellenic Republic.

Thank you again and I welcome any questions.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Stephenson.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. STEPHENSON, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC**

Mr. STEPHENSON. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you. I would like to introduce my wife, Barbara, and my son, Alexander, who will be going with me to Portugal, who are very excited about the prospect, and doing it as a family.

I am honored to appear before you today as the President's nominee to be the next Ambassador to Portugal. I want to express my deep appreciation to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me to perform this impor-

tant job. If confirmed, I will work hard to promote and defend American interests in Portugal.

In some ways, I have been preparing to be an ambassador for many years. I am an avid student of foreign policy, and have had the great advantage of being actively involved at the Hoover Institution for some time. Frequent exposure to, interaction with, and in some cases, close friendships with many Hoover Fellows, have provided me with a wonderful opportunity to learn from some of the brightest minds in their fields.

I feel particularly fortunate to be close to former Secretary Shultz, and current Secretary Condoleezza Rice, and have had the great opportunity to learn about and see through their eyes, so many of the important issues of the day. In addition, several outstanding economists and former administration officials now at Hoover have had a huge impact on my understanding of both domestic and international economic issues. I'm currently working with Secretary Shultz to mobilize an energy task force at Hoover that will explore all aspects of what we hope will be a comprehensive and coherent set of recommendations for policy makers.

Portugal and its fellow European Union members are wrestling with many of the same complex energy and climate issues that we face in this country, and I hope to be better able to contribute in various ways to that important dialog, as a result of my engagement with the Hoover Energy Taskforce. I'm also hopeful that my almost 40 years in the venture capital business, working mostly with technology companies, will enable me to make a meaningful contribution as an ambassador for United States business and commercial interests in Portugal.

Portugal and the United States share a long tradition of close political and cultural ties. Uniquely placed on the far western edge of Continental Europe, Portugal has demonstrated in word and action, its solid commitment to the trans-Atlantic relationship. Portugal has personnel serving in Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Balkans, Timor-Leste, and Iraq. In addition, thousands of United States aircraft annually transit Portugal's largest airbase in the Azores, in support of our armed forces around the world.

Portugal has been an outstanding partner in the war on terror, and collaborates actively with us, as a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Container Security Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Last month, Portugal ratified the United States-European Union Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance agreements. These agreements will markedly improve our counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation.

I come before you during an opportune time in our bilateral relationship. Portugal's 6-month European Union presidency, Lisbon has traditionally exhibited its strongest influence over the European Union agenda when it serves in this capacity. If confirmed, I will use the time remaining in Portugal's presidency—and afterwards—to continue the outstanding work of Ambassador Hoffman and his embassy—his U.S. Embassy team, to promote our interests in Lisbon, both bilaterally, and in the European Union context.

We congratulate Portugal on the excellent work it is doing as European Union president—it is no easy task. In holding the Euro-

pean Union presidency, Portugal is working hard to help resolve the situation in Kosovo, and bring long-term stability to this volatile region. It also widely recognizes that some of the European Union's biggest foreign policy concerns are along its southern and southeastern borders, which are threatened by radical Islam and poverty. The Portuguese are reaching out to develop a strategic partnership with Africa, and strengthen European Union ties with Brazil, India, China, Russia, and Ukraine, through high-profile summits.

With the European Union, Lisbon's primary goal is to secure endorsement of a final text of the European Union treaty by December.

Both before, and during, its presidency, Portugal has kept open the lines of communication. Prime Minister Socrates' meeting with President Bush in September maintained this excellent record of close collaboration.

As United States Ambassador to Portugal, I will continue to deepen and broaden our dialog.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your colleagues in Congress to serve the American people, and advance our national interests overseas. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stephenson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. STEPHENSON, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the President's nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to Portugal. I want to express my deep appreciation to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me to perform this important job. If confirmed, I will work hard to promote and defend American interests in Portugal.

In some ways, I have been preparing to be an ambassador for many years. I am an avid student of foreign policy and have had the great advantage of being actively involved at the Hoover Institution for some time. Frequent exposure to, interaction with, and, in some cases, close friendships with many Hoover fellows have provided me with a wonderful opportunity to learn from some of the brightest minds in their fields. I feel particularly fortunate to be close to former Secretary George Shultz and current Secretary Condoleezza Rice, and have had the great opportunity to learn about and see through their eyes so many of the important issues of the day. Outstanding economists and former administration officials have had a huge impact on my understanding of both domestic and international economic issues.

I am currently working with Secretary Shultz to mobilize an Energy Task Force at Hoover that will explore all aspects of what we hope will be a comprehensive and coherent set of recommendations for policymakers. Portugal and its fellow European Union members are wrestling with many of the same complex energy and climate change issues that we face in this country, and I hope to be better able to contribute in various ways to that important dialog as a result of my engagement with the Hoover Energy Task Force. I am also hopeful that my almost 40 years in the venture capital business, working mostly with technology companies, will enable me to make a meaningful contribution as an ambassador for United States business and commercial interests in Portugal.

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around the world. Portugal has been an outstanding partner in the war on terror and collaborates actively with us as a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Container Security Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Last month, Portugal ratified the United States-European Union Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements. These agreements will markedly improve our counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation.

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We congratulate Portugal on the excellent work it is doing as European Union President. It is no easy task. In holding the European Union Presidency, Portugal is working hard to help resolve the situation in Kosovo and bring long-term stability to this volatile region. It also wisely recognizes that some of the European Union's biggest foreign policy concerns are along its southern and southeastern borders, which are threatened by radical Islam and poverty. The Portuguese are reaching out to develop a strategic partnership with Africa, and strengthen European Union ties with Brazil, India, China, Russia, and Ukraine through high-profile summits. Within the European Union, Lisbon's primary goal is to secure endorsement of a final text of a new European Union "treaty" by December.

Both before and during its Presidency, Portugal has kept open the lines of communication with us. Prime Minister Socrates' meeting with President Bush in September maintained this excellent record of close collaboration. As United States Ambassador to Portugal, I will continue to deepen and broaden our dialog.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your colleagues in Congress to serve the American people and advance our national interests overseas. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF VINCENT OBSITNIK, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Mr. OBSITNIK. Thank you, Senator Casey, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the honor to appear before you, as President Bush's nominee to represent the United States in Slovakia.

I would also like to express my appreciation to the President and Secretary Rice for the confidence they have showed in me, by putting my nomination forward.

With me today is my wife, Anna Marie, whom I would also like to thank for her support and encouragement throughout our over-46 years of marriage and the raising of our four sons, who are not here because they are out making a living. Without doubt, but with some humility, I would like to say that I have been privileged to live the American dream, and I'd like to take a minute just to address that.

Although I was born in Slovakia, my roots go back to Western Pennsylvania. My grandparents immigrated there in the late 1890s, where my father was born in 1901. A year later, his parents returned to Slovakia, where he grew up and married. My parents then decided that America was the country in which they wanted to live and raise their family, and in March 1938, 2 months after I was born, we immigrated to the United States. I give great credit to my parents for the wisdom of this decision, so that I could appear before you today, especially back at that time in 1938, of approaching crisis and war in Europe.

We settled in Nanty-Glo, Pennsylvania, where my father worked as a coal miner. In 1946, we moved to Lilton, New Jersey, where I graduated from high school, after which I received an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy which was, for me, a life changing experience.

After graduating from the Academy, I had the honor of serving in the U.S. Navy for 5 years as an officer, and my time in the Navy taught me about service, and the true meaning of duty, honor, and country.

After serving the Navy, I went out to have successful corporate careers with the IBM, Unisys, and Lilton/PRC Corporations, after which I established my own consulting firm. At these corporations, I was involved with providing electronic systems for our armed forces during the cold war, and also had international responsibilities in manufacturing and marketing.

As you can see, I truly have lived the American dream from an early age and throughout my career. I believe that my personal background and professional experience have prepared me well for the duties of United States Ambassador to Slovakia, should I be confirmed by the Senate.

Mr. Chairman, the United States-Slovak relationship is a strong one that has weathered challenges over the years, but continues to move forward on a range of key issues of importance to the United States. It is a relationship that is also enriched by generations of Slovak-Americans, and the enduring ties they maintain with their land of origin.

United States-Slovak relations are defined, to a large extent, by our common membership in NATO, and by the fact that Slovakia is part of the European Union. One of our key challenges, however, is to underscore to the government and the people of Slovakia, that as allies with shared values and thriving democracies, our national interests do coincide.

The United States-Slovak relationship does have its challenges. A new leftist coalition government in Slovakia has taken slightly different directions than the previous government. Our foreign policy, in particular, the Iraq war, has caused disagreement, and Slovaks are increasingly looking to travel and study in the European Union, rather than the United States.

Despite our differences, however, I believe that the United States and Slovakia can and must work together on our disagreements, thus maintaining our strong relationship.

If confirmed, my No. 1 priority will be to foster and sustain such a relationship, by reaching out personally to the Slovak Government and people, to explain the United States' perspective, to promote United States policy interests, to remind the young people of our common history and the support that we provided to the Slovak people during Communism, and to ensure that—above all—American goodwill is understood.

In addition, I will continue to support our embassy's efforts to expand academic, scientific, and cultural exchanges, all of which will serve to bring our people closer together.

Slovakia has been a proud European Union and NATO member since 2004, with all that this implies with privilege and obligation. It has approximately 525 troops deployed overseas in NATO, Euro-

pean Union, and U.N. missions. Slovakia has joined us and sacrificed with us in the war on terror. Its troops have been deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in Kosovo.

If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to continue strong Slovak and United States cooperation in the fight against terror, and to encourage the Slovak Government to further deepen its commitment to NATO by increasing its participation in NATO missions, particularly in Afghanistan.

And, I'd just like to add that we've just received a cable this morning from our Embassy in Bratislava, and apparently the Slovak Government, under Prime Minister Fico, has agreed, and decided to increase their participation substantially in Afghanistan, which still must be approved by their parliament, so that is a step in the right direction.

One of the difficult issues that affect United States and Slovak relations is admission to the visa waiver program. Slovakia is working constructively to meet the list of requirements that will enable us to join the visa waiver program.

Should I be confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to assist the efforts of the Slovak Government to meet these standards as soon as possible. In my public outreach, I will reinforce the administration's commitment to facilitating travel between our two countries while, however, maintaining the security of international travel. Such a development, I'm convinced, will enhance understanding between our peoples, and serve our bilateral relations.

On the economic front, Slovakia's economy is the fastest-growing in Europe, with a growth rate of 9.4 percent in the second quarter of 2007. Economic reforms and a corresponding influx of foreign investment have led to impressive growth. A dramatic decrease in unemployment, and a healthy macroeconomy that has put Slovakia on target to adopt the Euro on January 1, 2009.

Despite these positive developments, corruption continues to be a problem, and just recently, the embassy cohosted an anticorruption conference that was opened by the Prime Minister of Slovakia, Mr. Robert Fico. If confirmed, I will continue to work diligently with our Slovak partners on anticorruption initiatives and efforts, to benefit not only the people of Slovakia, but also American businesses.

There are, today, approximately 120 United States companies with investments, and/or sales offices in Slovakia, and it is estimated that United States investments total more than \$3 billion. There are various efforts underway to deepen our economic cooperation, and just last month, Commerce Assistant Secretary Hernandez led a trade mission on renewable energy and alternative fuels to Slovakia, and other countries in Central Europe.

If confirmed, I will work to increase opportunities for U.S. companies, and further expand our trading and investment relationship, resulting in benefits to both our peoples.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to pursuing these and other goals, to leading an embassy that represents the finest values of the United States, and do everything that I can to increase the friendship, warmth, and strength of our ties with Slovakia.

I thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Obsitnik follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VINCENT OBSITNIK, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the honor to appear before you as President Bush's nominee to represent the United States in Slovakia. I would also like to express my appreciation to the President and Secretary Rice for the confidence they have shown in me by putting my nomination forward. With me today is my wife, Annemarie, whom I would also like to thank for her support and encouragement throughout our over 46 years of marriage and the raising of our four sons.

Without doubt but with humility, I would like to say that I have been privileged to live the American dream. Although I was born in Slovakia, my roots go back to western Pennsylvania. My grandparents immigrated there in the late 1890s, where my father was born in 1901. A year later, his parents returned to Slovakia, where he grew up and married. My parents then decided that America was the country in which they wanted to live and raise their family and, in March 1938, 2 months after I was born, we immigrated to the United States. I give great credit to my parents for the wisdom of this decision, especially at a time of approaching crisis and war in Europe.

We settled in Nanty-Glo, PA, where my father worked as a coal miner. In 1946, we moved to Linden, NJ, where I graduated from high school. I then received an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy which was, for me, a life-changing experience. After graduating from the Academy, I had the honor of serving in the U.S. Navy for 5 years as an officer. My time in the Navy taught me about service and the true meaning of duty, honor, and country.

After serving in the Navy, I went on to have successful corporate careers with the IBM, Unisys, and Litton/PRC Corporations, after which I established my own consulting firm. At these corporations, I was involved with providing electronic systems for our Armed Forces during the cold war and also had international responsibilities in manufacturing and marketing.

As you can see, I truly have lived the American dream from an early age and throughout my career. I believe that my personal background and professional experience have prepared me well for the duties of United States Ambassador to Slovakia, should I be confirmed by the Senate.

Mr. Chairman, the United States-Slovak relationship is a strong one that has weathered challenges over the years but continues to move forward on a range of key issues of importance to the United States. It is a relationship that is also enriched by generations of Slovak-Americans and the enduring ties they maintain with their land of origin.

United States-Slovak relations are defined to a large extent by our common membership in NATO and by the fact that Slovakia is part of the European Union. One of our key challenges is to underscore to the Government and people of Slovakia that, as allies with shared values and thriving democracies, our national interests coincide. The United States-Slovak relationship does have its challenges: a new leftist coalition government in Slovakia has taken slightly different directions than the previous government; our foreign policy, in particular the Iraq war, has caused disagreement; and Slovaks are increasingly looking to travel and study in the European Union, rather than the United States. Despite our differences, I believe that the United States and Slovakia can and must work together on our disagreements, thus maintaining our strong relationship.

If confirmed, my No. 1 priority will be to foster and sustain such a relationship by reaching out personally to the Slovak Government and people to explain the United States' perspective, to promote the United States' policy interests, remind young people of our common history and the support that we provided to the Slovak people during Communism, and to ensure that American goodwill is understood. In addition, I will continue to support our embassy's efforts to expand academic, scientific, and cultural exchanges, all of which will serve to bring our peoples closer together.

Slovakia has been a proud European Union and NATO member since 2004, with all that this implies in privilege and obligation. It has approximately 525 troops deployed overseas in NATO, European Union, and U.N. missions. Slovakia has joined us and sacrificed with us in the war on terror. Its troops have been deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in Kosovo. If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to continue strong Slovak and United States cooperation in the fight against terror and to encourage the Slovak Government to further deepen its commitment to NATO by increasing its participation in NATO missions, particularly in Afghanistan.

One of the difficult issues that affect United States-Slovak relations is admission to the Visa Waiver Program. Slovakia is working constructively to meet the list of

requirements that will enable it to join the Visa Waiver Program. Should I be confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to assist the efforts of the Slovak Government to meet VWP standards as soon as possible. In my public outreach, I will reinforce the administration's commitment to facilitating travel between our two countries, while maintaining the security of international travel. Such a development will enhance understanding between our peoples and serve our bilateral relations.

Mr. Chairman, Slovakia has a unique set of experiences in democratization and economic reform that its vibrant and talented NGO community is now sharing with countries in transition, from Ukraine to Belarus to Cuba and the Balkans. Consistent with our transformational diplomacy goals, we will continue to support the NGO community in Slovakia by offering diplomatic support, grants, and other resources to the extent United States Government funds are available.

On the economic front, Slovakia's economy is the fastest growing in Europe with a growth rate of 9.4 percent in the second quarter of 2007. Economic reforms and a corresponding influx of foreign investment have led to impressive growth, a dramatic decrease in unemployment, and a healthy macroeconomy that has put Slovakia on target to adopt the euro on January 1, 2009. Despite these positive developments, corruption continues to be a problem. Just recently the Embassy cohosted an anticorruption conference that was opened by the Prime Minister of Slovakia, Mr. Robert Fico. If confirmed, I will continue to work diligently with our Slovak partners on anticorruption initiatives and efforts, to benefit not only the people of Slovakia but also American businesses.

Slovakia's strong economy presents many opportunities for United States businesses. There are approximately 120 United States companies with investments and/or sales offices in Slovakia and it is estimated that United States investment totals more than \$3 billion. There are various efforts underway to deepen our economic cooperation. Just last month, Commerce Assistant Secretary Hernandez led a trade mission on Renewable Energy and Alternative Fuels to Slovakia and other countries in Central Europe. If confirmed, I will work to increase opportunities for U.S. companies, and further expand our trading and investment relationship, resulting in benefits to both our peoples.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to pursuing these and other goals, to leading an embassy that represents the finest values of the United States, and to doing everything I can to increase the friendship, warmth, and strength of our ties with Slovakia. I thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, sir, very much. I appreciate all of the statements that were made.

I'll turn now to my colleague, Senator DeMint, who is the ranking member of the European Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA**

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank all three of you for your willingness to serve our country in this way, and I know it involves sacrifices of your family, and we very much appreciate it. And I, frankly, heard what I wanted to hear today. I appreciate the mention of American interest—I think there's sometimes a perception that, because the United States is the largest and most powerful country that—whether it's our State Department or trade office, we tend to give more than we get back.¹²¹ And, to know that—while building good relationships, and supporting other countries, that your job is to represent American interests in these countries, is very important.

I also appreciate the emphasis on economic ties—that we know that many times government gets in the way of good relations, but businesses—doing business together and people doing business together, often is the best way to grow that relationship and it's probably a true statement that when products cross borders, armies don't have to. So, I appreciate the emphasis on economic ties, and hopefully you can—as ambassadors—be a part of facilitating a

growing trade. It's a way to create a win-win situation for both countries.

I think if I have a question of the three of you, and I've only had a chance to meet with Mr. Speckhard about this—around the world, we found out in person as we visit other countries and we hear the perception of the United States is not as positive as we would like, on many fronts, particularly in Europe.

And I would just maybe ask each of you to briefly, just comment on things we need to do in each of your respective countries that might help develop the respect of other countries and cooperation and maybe in addition to what we're already doing.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today and moving the process forward on these important nominations.

Nominees, good afternoon to all of you, I appreciate you being here today and for your willingness to serve our Nation as ambassadors. I know the role of an ambassador is daunting; I am humbled by your desire to serve, and your families' support to go through this process.

Without a doubt, there are many challenges and opportunities in Europe and each of the countries you have been nominated to lay at the crossroads on many of these issues. You will be in very crucial positions to help foster the trans-Atlantic relationship. Your willingness to listen and be passionate advocates is crucial.

Despite the diplomatic issues and political posturing that occurs in the international arena, economic relations are always an undercurrent that makes progress possible.

Often European leaders express how the United States and Europe share a common set of values. I agree with them; we have a long history of common values that include the ideals of freedom and economic opportunity.

European societies and their economies currently face many hurdles that we may face in the future. There are lessons we can learn from them, but also ideas we can share. The ideas of free markets and free societies can unleash creative solutions.

I believe the three countries we are discussing today have incredible potential to grow and be even more productive. However, it requires a willingness to draft policies that unleash their people and trust what they are capable of.

Mr. Obsitnik, the structural reforms and economic success of Slovakia is something to be applauded. However, it will be important that they know economic freedom cannot be separated from other freedoms. And that the road to success is not through the welfare state.

Maintaining a similar path of reform in Portugal is just as important. And with their leadership of the European Union right now, Mr. Stephjenson, you will be in a unique position to advocate for issues including Sudan and Western Sahara.

Mr. Speckard, as you know, recent developments in the region will put even more importance on the United States-Greek relationship. You will have important matters to address the second

you arrive. I found our discussion a couple weeks ago very enlightening and believe you will do well.

As ambassadors, it is important you share and advocate the values that serve as the foundation to our prosperity. With your influence, Europe can be an even larger driving force in the world economically and socially and that would benefit everyone.

I also hope you will spend more of your time outside of the embassy and government offices in Bratislava, Lisbon, and Athens than inside. American culture is loved in Europe, but the same is not always true of American policy. However, the two cannot be conveniently separated.

And successful diplomacy is no longer an activity just between heads of state, but between the people of each nation. If you are committed to fostering even stronger relations and be successful American advocates, you will need to deliver your messages to the Slovak, Portuguese, and Greek public directly.

I look forward to working with each of you.

And, I'll start with Mr. Speckhard, and just a brief comment would be helpful.

Mr. SPECKHARD. Thank you, Senator. I think we did have a chance to talk before, and wanted to emphasize, again, that I think one of the most important things I can do, if confirmed as ambassador, is to try to start changing some of those perceptions, which have been a legacy of some of the more modern history between our country and Greece and, I think don't actually fairly reflect some of the fundamental values that we share.

So, I guess, to be real brief, I would focus on trying to move the understanding between our countries beyond just the foreign policy issue of the day, or the particular problem or challenge that we face, that we have different perspectives on how to address, and try to get our attention back to the fundamental relationship, and what is in common between our countries, which are some of those common values, and the strength of the U.S. system in, sort of, dealing with issues in a democratic fashion, which we share a lot with them.

And I would focus, in particular, on the young generation—there and here—in terms of building that dialog, because I do believe that in Greece, that's where, oftentimes, change starts. And I think that's where you have the most opportunity to start—generating new thinking.

Thank you.

Senator DEMINT. Excellent, excellent.

Mr. Stephenson.

Mr. STEPHENSON. Senator, our current Ambassador, Ambassador Hoffman, I know has focused very much on outreach for—

Senator DEMINT. Is your microphone on?

Mr. STEPHENSON. Sorry. Thank you. Ambassador Hoffman, our current Ambassador, I know has placed a lot of emphasis on reaching out to a cross-section of communities within the Portuguese community, specifically students. He's had a number of programs at the embassy where he's gone out, given a lot of speeches to a lot of different groups, worked with some of the charitable institutions in Portugal, worked with a number of the, strictly the small business groups, and with a number of minorities, as well.

He's particularly focused on an outreach to the Muslim community. There are 35,000 or 40,000 Muslims in Portugal, and he specifically has reached out to them.

So, it's an important part of his agenda, and I certainly hope to be able to build on the efforts that he's made to create an openness and a perception, a different kind of perception on the part of the Portuguese people about what a wonderful country and what a wonderful people we are, and how we reach out and will try and help all those we can.

Thank you.

Senator DEMINT. Thank you.

Mr. Obsitnik.

Mr. OBSITNIK. Yes, thank you, Senator. I think that in addition to all the efforts that are currently ongoing in the embassy to reach out to the Slovak people, of which there are a number of efforts in place. I think, if confirmed by the Senate, that my ability to go there, given my background, given my ability to speak the language, should give me some leverage to meet people very aggressively, very directly, which I plan to do. I plan to be, if confirmed, very visible in the country, to explain United States policy, to make them understand that our policy really is for the benefit of Slovakia, as well. It's not, we're not looking there to take anything out of there for our own interests. We're there to serve the—to work with that country.

So I think, with my unique background, I can add a lot to that and add to all the efforts that are currently going on in the embassy with the, such things as public diplomacy, ensuring that all people in the embassy get out and have contacts with the local people, to make sure that they understand America at every level.

Senator DEMINT. I thank you all.

And Mr. Chairman, I'm very satisfied with my answers, so I'll yield the rest of my time.

Senator CASEY. Senator, thank you very much.

I wanted to move into a round of more questions. And I, we'll try to limit ourselves to 10 minutes on each round. I'll start and turn it over to Senator Menendez and Senator DeMint for any questions they might have.

Mr. Speckhard, I think I'll start with you. Just in terms of the—some of this is redundant ground that you've plowed a little bit today already—but the relationship between the United States and Greece today. We've seen some evidence, I guess,—which has been referred to before—as some anti-Americanism. What's your sense of that, generally, the relationship itself, but also that particular concern that we have?

Mr. SPECKHARD. Thank you, Senator. I do think that it reflects some of the recent history between our two countries. And it has its roots there, which are, from the Greek perspective, understandable, and sometimes there are also differences, honest differences of opinion over foreign policy approaches and problem solving.

At the same time, I think that's sort of a latent anti-Americanism, that needs to be addressed again. Because if you look at our interest, both the long-term ones and the values that I talked about earlier, in terms of common values on democracy, liberty, freedom, and so forth, and then you compare it with also our real

interest today, in terms of stability in the Balkans, the stability or insecurity of the international community, and against the threat of terrorism, global challenges, energy issues, and so forth, we really do share common challenges and common interests.

So, my sense is that if we can start improving the dialog and having people take a step back and saying, "Why do they think that and how much of that is due to a particular approach to a particular problem, and how much of that is something more significant?" we'll find that perhaps we can bridge some of that gap.

So, I hope over the three years, that I can make, start to make a turn in that particular challenge with our Greek partners.

Senator CASEY. And just in terms of your own experience, especially as a diplomat, but also your work with NATO, what in your experience do you think will help you deal with that—that kind of fundamental question, about how our two countries relate to each other?

Mr. SPECKHARD. Well, I think being a diplomat, the starting point has to be to understand the arguments and views of the other partner that you're dealing with. And so, having worked in NATO, I've had an opportunity to understand the views of the Greek Government many times. And more generally, I've come to understand that once I understand where they're coming from, I'm a better—better presenter of the U.S. interests and the U.S. position on issues. And then I can find, oftentimes, more common ground than one would have thought at the beginning of the process.

We do have very strong interests that are common in the Balkans. We have some differences on some specific issues, but the fundamental issues in the Balkans are the same. We have common interest in the broader region more generally, and in the Middle East, where Greece is really at the front lines of some problems that are emanating from that area.

And so, again working together with them on that issue, I think, is one we're going to find a lot of common ground, even if sometimes we disagree on the approaches.

So, my experience, I think, will help me to develop that as I go along, when I get to Athens.

Senator CASEY. I may have a chance to come back to you about energy dependence on Russia and also the question of Kosovo, but I'll move on because I'm going to try to get, in this round, to each of our nominees.

Mr. Stephenson, I guess one of the concerns that we all have, beyond just the fundamental concern we have about terrorism, is how we relate to, interact with, work with, and establish working relationships with countries around the world to combat the worldwide threat of terrorism.

What's your sense of where that relationship is with Portugal now, in terms of our cooperation on terrorism? And if it's not where it ought to be, what steps do you think we need to take and what steps would you take to try to strengthen or develop that relationship? Just on the question of terrorism.

Mr. STEPHENSON. Senator, my sense is that the—the relationship with regard to those issues with Portugal is outstanding. They are, as I mentioned in my remarks, a signatory to most of the critical

agreements that we have around the world today, dealing with various elements of security and terrorism and so forth.

Portugal is arguably one of our best friends and most loyal allies and supporters in Europe. They have been very responsive, overall, to everything that we have asked of them. They have budgetary constraints that are a constant hurdle or obstacle for them to do all the things we'd like them to do. But I think that there is very little that we have asked them to do, that they haven't taken a lot of the initial steps.

There will always be ways to improve that. Our relationship with the—with this government are excellent, hope to be able to build on the dialog that Ambassador Hoffman has helped create with this—with this government. I have every reason to believe that they will continue to be responsive, whether it's drug enforcement issues, whether it's port security, or whether it's illegal transportation of human beings.

The whole list of issues that are high on our agenda have been very—we've had excellent response from the Portuguese Government.

Senator CASEY. I know that from the reports we all see from Europe, over many, many months now, many years actually, the last several years especially, that several countries have had trouble just within their own population, with regard to Islamic extremism. We've seen it in Spain and Great Britain and others. What's your sense of that within Portugal? Do you think they're having similar problems when it comes to Islamic extremism, or have they dealt with it in a way that's been more effective, or do you think there's still a significant problem there?

Mr. STEPHENSON. Senator, I think they start from a better situation, certainly than their neighbors to the east. There is not as large an Islamic or a radical population in Portugal as there is in Spain. There has been, in recent months, some concerns that some of the Basque elements in Spain, have sought refuge and are using Portugal as a—as a base to stay away from some of the threats that they face in Spain. So, I think it something that we have to continue and they have to continue to be diligent on, but I think if you compare Portugal—not only with Spain, but some of its other neighbors in Europe—I think the situation is much less dire today than it is in many other countries.

Senator CASEY. Thank you. And I want to try to come back too.

But Mr. Obsitnik, we're—talking earlier, and your testimony referred to it and others have as well, the membership in the European Union for Slovakia and how that's impacted their economy. Can you comment on that, with regard to just the economic impact and how you think that's proceeding?

Mr. OBSITNIK. I think the economic impact from joining the European Union has been tremendously positive. There's no question about that. I—it's opened up markets to them that were not there before. They're a member of the European Union family of nations and they're working cooperatively together. It's done nothing but help—help that economy.

Senator CASEY. And I know you had tremendous experience as a naval officer, and in addition to your own experience as a citizen and as a business person, what do you point to in your own em-

ployment history or your life history that you think will help you be an effective Ambassador to Slovakia? Beyond the obvious ties of your ancestry.

Mr. OBSITNIK. Right. Well beyond the fact that I know the country well, I know the people, I know the history. In my career, I've had the good fortune of dealing with the international community in South America and the Far East and the responsibility I had with IBM International Manufacturing. We've been involved with countries that were developing and we negotiated with them, relative to what we wanted to do, in terms of putting manufacturing operations there, developing our business there. So, that experience, I think, has been tremendous and gives me a good sense of understanding what developing countries need and what directions they need to go in.

Relative to my experience working with IBM during the cold war years, I think I picked up a good sense of the geopolitics of the world, in terms of the threat, in terms of responses by—by the America to that threat. And I think it will help me very well to explain our foreign policy and our point of view to the Slovak people.

Senator CASEY. And I have to, before—I've got 10 seconds—but I'll just say, I wasn't aware of your roots in Western Pennsylvania. I think you mentioned in your opening, Nanty-Glo, Pennsylvania?

Mr. OBSITNIK. Nanty-Glo, yes sir.

Senator CASEY. Cambria County, right?

Mr. OBSITNIK. Cambria County, yes sir.

Senator CASEY. And I—how long did you live there?

Mr. OBSITNIK. We lived there about 8 years, 1938–1946. And then the great garden state of New Jersey attracted us away. [Laughter.]

Senator CASEY. Well, as I turn to Senator Menendez for his questions, I have to ask you today—your confirmation will not be dependent upon this—but I'd ask you to come back to Nanty-Glo, Pennsylvania, if you can.

Thank you.

Mr. OBSITNIK. I will.

Senator CASEY. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Obsitnik, I see you're covering all of the bases, are there any other members that you've lived in the States here? [Laughter.]

But, we're glad to see you've had success.

Ambassador Speckhard, I have several questions for you. First, the Balkans: would you agree with me that it's still a place where we've made progress? It's still a place of instability, a challenge for us?

Mr. SPECKHARD. I would, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. And, would you agree with me that NATO is particularly—from your experience at NATO—is particularly important to us, both in a security context, as well as stability in the Balkans, and throughout Europe?

Mr. SPECKHARD. I would, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. And, with that as a premise, you're going to a country which I think is incredibly important in both of those contexts. There is—I think it's fair to say, there is probably no

other country that invests more in the Balkans, than Greece. And, at the same time is part of NATO.

And so, if the Balkans is a place of instability and a challenge to the United States as one of its foreign policy challenges, and if NATO is very important to us for both security purposes and stability in Europe, and particularly the Balkans, then part of my challenge of understanding administration policy and an assignment that you're going to have, is puzzling.

And that's with the whole issue of Skopje, and the position the administration has taken, in November of 2004, to refer to FYROM as the Republic of Macedonia which, in essence, undermined the whole process of the Nimetz Proposal. And has placed a very serious issue forward for the United States and its relationships with Greece, and certainly with Greece's own national view, as to what is in their national interests.

How do you see yourself, as the nominee to be the United States Ambassador to Greece, playing a role in this regard, and what do you believe that role will be?

Mr. SPECKHARD. Well, thank you, Senator. I agree with you on all of those points in terms of the importance of the Balkans and the stability there, the challenges that remain, the importance of NATO as an institution that can help—and, I would add, the European Union, as well, in terms of promoting stability there.

I do understand the concerns of the Government of Greece, and the people of Greece, in terms of their desire to both be a stabilizing force in the region, as well as to protect some of their cultural patrimony, which they have such a rich background in.

So, in terms of the starting point on this particular issue, I would take where we are today as the starting point, and the issues that we're facing. I think the first point would be to help try to facilitate and promote direct dialog between the parties involved, and the name dispute. That is, in fact, part of the basis of the 1995 interim accord that was worked out between those two countries, in terms of the importance of direct dialog, and not looking to others to try to find the solution.

At the same time I would emphasize the importance to the Greek Government of finding a solution, while not doing anything to destabilize the situation in the Balkans, and I think that's why the administration has placed an important emphasis on the process of moving towards membership for the countries—in NATO—for the countries in the Balkan region. That there is a sense that membership in NATO in the future is a way to solidify that stability. That it's actually in Greece's interests, probably, as much as anyone's, that their neighboring countries become part of NATO, because in that way—

Senator MENENDEZ. But you understand that you are going in as have been given a challenge right off the bat. Because we are trying to promote the NIMITS proposal, and then we undermine that by having our government unilaterally call Skopje and FYROM the Republic of Macedonia.

This would be like if some people describe this as emotion, I think it's far beyond emotion, I think there are legitimate issues here. This would be like the United States facing Mexico, describing in its classrooms large swaths of the United States belonging

to Mexico. Or, for that fact, Canada. That's what happens in FYROM. Where large swaths of Greece are taught in Skopje as being part of what they consider Macedonia, their country.

Now, if I was living next door to that country, I'd have a real concern. I'd have a real concern if what you're teaching the next generation of FYROM schoolchildren is, in essence, an expansionist view, as you want me to vote—me, a country—to vote to let you into NATO, and to give you certain privileges and power, by virtue of doing so.

So, I know you didn't devise this policy, so my purpose here is by, via your nomination, to send a message to the State Department, that I think we're on a perilous course here.

President Karamanlis has not said that Greece will use its veto in NATO, but I've got to be honest with you, from my—as part of the Hellenic caucus in the House for 13 years, and the House International Relations Committee, I've spent a fair amount of time here in the Senate on United States-Greek relations. I have to be very honest with you—my sense of talking to members of their parliament, talking to their foreign ministers, talking to their ambassadors, talking to a wide cross-section of Greek society, it would be very hard for Greece to just simply accept FYROM into NATO without some accommodation on those names.

And, I think that's going to be an enormous challenge for you. I hope that you will tell the Department that there are Members of Congress who feel this way.

Mr. Stephenson, I know that you, various times in your testimony, cited the Hoover Institution as background. One of—the Mission Statement of the Hoover Institution, among other things, says "Ours is a system where the Federal Government should undertake no governmental, societal, or economic action, except where local government or the people cannot undertake it by themselves."

And, I'm just wondering—it's considered a very influential, conservative think tank on foreign policy—I understand the private sector aspects of this—but you do know that you're going to a government—to a country whose government has a ruling socialist government. And you, I hope, are bringing an open mind. Because economic questions are one thing, but certainly the U.S. Ambassador has many other roles to play beyond the economic engagement between our respective countries.

Mr. STEPHENSON. I'm well aware of that, Senator, and the overall views of the Hoover Institution may not necessarily be what mine are on certain issues. My particular focus and interests at the Hoover Institution have been in the areas of foreign policy, on economics on a worldwide basis, and particularly, in the energy area in recent years.

But, I am fully aware of the current government in Portugal. I have no philosophical problems or worries about my ability to work with them on a reasonable basis, and what my views of what the role of government are on a spectrum that's not the area of Hoover activity that I happen to be particularly interested or focused upon.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that answer.

Mr. Speckhard, let me go back to—in addition to the FYROM issue, and the NATO enlargement issue, that Greece is going to play a very important role in—Greece is involved, obviously, in the

Aegean, the United States relationships in that part of the world, with Turkey—which right now is strained for a variety of reasons—but also the relationship between Greece and Turkey, the issue of Cyprus and the reunification of Cyprus are important issues. I'd like to hear your perspectives on that part—clearly there has been a historical basis under which our U.S. Ambassadors to those countries have all interplayed with each other because of the inter-relationship of these issues. I'd like to hear how you'll approach that, should you be successful in your nomination.

Mr. SPECKHARD. Thank you, Mr. Senator. I'm actually looking forward to the opportunity to support Greece, as it tries to improve, to further its relations with Turkey, and as it also plays an important role in the issue related to Cyprus.

I think the elections that recently took place, both in Greece and Turkey, do provide an opportunity for renewed momentum in the Greek/Turkish relationship. It allows them, in both countries, to set aside or diminish some of the effect of domestic politics, in terms of the bilateral relationship, and work toward the interests of both their communities.

I am pleased that what I've seen over the last few years is improved mechanisms for dialog, and diffusing of potential crises when they occur. I think NATO, again, is a key point, as you mentioned earlier, in that framework for how you resolve things between Greece and Turkey, as allies they've committed themselves to resolve disputes peacefully.

And, I guess, as an ambassador, I would be working closely with my counterparts in Ankara and Nicosia, to make sure that we're talking and working together in a mutually reinforcing way to allow the parties involved to have the most progress possible. I really see this as centering in Ankara and Athens, in terms of their bilateral relationship, and in Nicosia in terms of Cyprus, and think that the success is going to come from there, and the United States really can only play a helping and facilitating role when asked.

But, I'm going to be ready to do that, and I look forward to acting very energetically in that.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I have one final question and then I'll wrap up.

Do you foresee the, Greece being able, for example, to support Turkey's entrance into the European Union without a solution of the Cyprus question?

Mr. SPECKHARD. I would hate to speculate on that at this point. What I can say, is that Greece has been one of the most, as you know Senator, proactive supporters of Turkey's aspirations into the European Union, with recognition that Turkey needs to take additional steps to meet the criteria. I think that's been very helpful to that bilateral relationship, it's very helpful to the region, and it's a very enlightened policy on their part.

I think in part, how this all plays out, is that if they make progress on some of the bilateral issues, I think it will facilitate and help promote a resolution of the Cyprus issue. And vice versa, even in spite of some of the challenges that remain, they can, as well, work to support the Cypriots find a solution to their challenges.

So, my sense is that if we work on all fronts simultaneously, they will help each other and you'll get to success sooner than if there's some conditions involved in this process.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your answers. I think we should have a before and after picture, before your assignment there and after your assignment there.

Between the FYROM issue, the NATO enlargement issue, the issue of the cross-border Aegean issue, and the issue of Cyprus, that's a full plate and I find it very difficult for the Greek Government, at the end of the day, to deal with the FYROM issue, because it has, within its own country, a very significant part of Greek citizens who consider themselves Macedonians.

And second, for Greek Cypriots to believe that the Greek Government will not stand by them in an effort to reunify the country. So this assignment is very, very important and that's why I've pursued these questions with you, to get a sense of understanding administration policy, where you'll be on it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

I have a few more and I'm sure we can wrap up soon.

Mr. Ambassador, I wanted to ask you about the question I left on the table but didn't have a chance to ask you, and that's the energy question as it pertains to Russia, and especially in light of the pipeline deal. What's your sense of how our administration in America views that—the relationship between Greece and Russia as it pertains to energy and the recent deal that's been entered into? And how do you perceive that yourself? I guess I'm looking for both what the administration thinks and whether or not you have a difference of opinion on that or not.

Mr. SPECKHARD. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I think the starting point is that the United States actually welcomes the close ties between Greece and Russia on the energy sector. I think there's an understanding that, both for Greece and the European Union in general, the importance of Greek, of—excuse me—of Russian energy supplies is critical to the economic success of Greece and the European Union at large.

So, we welcome the development of those ties, the development of the strengthening of the gas produced, and developed for those markets, and the ties between Russia that make that happen.

Where sometimes we have a view that we try to make sure is understood, is that our sense is that the best way for Greece and the European Union to be successful in their economic future, is to ensure that they have diversified energy supplies. So, while it's important for them to have Russian supplies, it's important, as well, that those supplies are diversified beyond Russia, and that there are other producing states that also should be able to contribute to the needs and demands of the European Union and Greece.

So, the key point for Greece as they move forward, is to ensure that economic deals they conclude on the energy sector side, are done in a transparent way, and in a fair, market-based way, because that will be, in the long term, in their interest, and in the European Union's interest.

But there is no attempt on our part to try to develop a zero-sum game, in this respect. We feel that the market is large enough, and

the needs are great enough, that there should be plenty of room for multiple suppliers and multiples routes.

Senator CASEY. And just, by way of follow-up, how would you characterize the Bush administration's response to that deal, I mean, in a word or two?

Mr. SPECKHARD. I think, our sense is that it's important that this is done, as I said earlier, in a transparent way, and that we understand that it's going to be done, as it carries forward, in a market-based way. That there is some concern that, if this is done in any other way, it could jeopardize existing opportunities that, on a fair basis, perhaps would do better.

Senator CASEY. So, you think the administration is concerned mostly about how it's implemented, as opposed to the relationship itself? I just want to—

Mr. SPECKHARD. Absolutely, you know, absolutely. I honestly believe that the issue here is not the relationship. We recognize the importance of the Greece-Russia relationship in the energy sector, and it's a good one in the context of what the interests of Greece are, and the European Union. Our concern is that it does not become a monopolistic relationship. And, I think that would not be in the interest of Greece, or the European Union, and we think there's plenty of room for Russia, as well as other suppliers. So, this should not be seen as a competition between the United States and Russia, but, in fact, a regular market-oriented type of approach to ensuring diversified supplies of energy.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, and I know we're almost out of time, but I wanted to first of all, let everyone know that the record will be open, and it'll be open, actually for 2 days. Committee members can submit additional questions for the record.

I'd ask each nominee for your help in responding in as prompt a way as possible to these questions. I may have others, and I'm sure members of the committee who are not here today will have questions.

But, I mostly want to express our gratitude for, not just your testimony today, and your willingness to go through this process, but especially for your willingness to commit yourself to public service. In some cases, continued public service, and in other cases, beyond military and other civic engagement that you've had.

But this is a particularly notable and distinctive—and, I think important, kind of public service. And it comes at a time where we live in an increasingly more dangerous world, which both makes the service all that more admirable, but at the same time heightens or increases the responsibility that each of you will have if you're confirmed. And, I appreciate that and recognize that, and appreciate the commitment that you are making individually, and that your families are making and, in some cases, have already made.

Thank you very much.

Unless there's any additional comments, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Heath, Daniel D., to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the
International Monetary Fund

Kennedy, Patrick F., to be Under Secretary of State for Manage-
ment

Mulvaney, Sean R., to be Assistant Administrator for Management
of the U.S. Agency for International Development

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez presiding.

Present: Senators Menendez and Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

Senator MENENDEZ.: The hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations will now come to order. Today, the committee meets to consider the nomination of Mr. Patrick Kennedy to be the Undersecretary of Management at the State Department, Mr. Sean R. Mulvaney to be the Assistant Administrator for Management at USAID, and Mr. Daniel D. Heath to be the U.S. Alternate Executive Director to the International Monetary Fund. We welcome them, as well as any of their family members and friends who have accompanied them.

I'll start off with an opening statement, and then recognize the distinguished ranking member of the full committee, and ask unanimous consent on behalf of Senator Hagel to have his opening statement be included in the record, which without objection will be included.

[NOTE. The prepared statement of Senator Hagel appears in the "Additional Material Submitted for the Record" section at the end of this hearing.]

Senator MENENDEZ. The United States plays a crucial role in promoting development and alleviating poverty around the world. USAID, the State Department, and the IMF make a significant contribution to this work, and each nominee before us will play a key role in these organizations. We look forward to the witnesses' testimony in hearing how they will contribute to these missions.

We are at a decisive moment for the future of USAID as an agency. I strongly believe that this year may very well make or break USAID. The Foreign Assistance Reform Process, or as it is known as the F Process, has been in place for over a year, but as I said in a hearing I chaired on June 12 to examine this issue, this new foreign assistance process is, in my view, flawed, and may be in serious trouble.

As I stated then, if USAID and State simply move full speed ahead and make only minor changes around the edges, then the administration will have significant problems with Congress.

Tragically, one of the consequences of this reform process has been the decimation of USAID resources as its funding, role, and mission have been reduced. As a result, USAID faces serious morale problems and questions about its future. And this, in turn, cripples our ability to expand democracy and improve the lives of the citizens of the developing world. Again, as I've said before, I refuse to preside over a slow death of USAID.

It's important to note that USAID has been, is, and should continue to be the backbone of our foreign assistance. AIDS mission dates back to the Marshall Plan reconstruction of Europe after World War II. In 1961, the Foreign Assistance Act was signed into law, and USAID was created. It is the one agency inside the United States Government that was designed with development and fighting poverty around the world as its core mission. And, at a time when international development and U.S. credibility are so needed, it does not make sense to take money, power, control, and expertise away from this agency. What is needed to revitalize the mission and health of USAID is strong leadership.

That's why, Mr. Mulvaney, your nomination today is so important for the future of the USAID as you and I have had that conversation. I hope you're prepared to make some hard decisions, along with Henrietta Fore, who has been before the committee, and to work to make sure that the expertise that USAID does have, is valued and fully utilized. And, we look forward to discussing today how you would try to accomplish this.

Mr. Kennedy, there is no question that you'll be assuming a large amount of responsibility. Simply put, you'll be responsible for overseeing the people, financial resources, training, information technology, and security of the Department of State in support of our foreign policy objectives, and as recent years have documented, and there will be no shortage of challenges. We look forward to hearing your assessment of them, as well, as you come before the committee in this nomination and how you might very well proceed to tackle them, should you achieve the success of being confirmed.

And as we talk about America's role in international development, we should recognize that our foreign assistance also extends to supporting multinational institutions that will improve the economies of other countries, and direct the aid and development.

That's why I believe that America must continue to play a strong role in the major development banks and multilateral financial institutions that work toward this goal. In this hearing, we look forward to specifically discussing the work of the International Monetary Fund.

In the interest of time, I'll leave specific issues for the questioning, and with that, I'm proud to recognize the distinguished ranking member of the full committee, Senator Lugar.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Biden for scheduling this timely hearing. I thank you especially for your eagerness and willingness to chair it. These hearings are extremely important—one of the features about the Foreign Relations Committee not often known as in the last Congress, this committee had more hearings than any other committee in the Senate. And it was largely because we had the scope of the whole world, but likewise, because we have so many distinguished nominees.

From the roles that you are fulfilling, each of our ambassadors to other countries abroad, a lot of international groups that we name members to—that's why these hearings are especially important, because they offer an opportunity for you, as witnesses, to make statements to clarify your own intentions, with regard to the offices that you seek, and it gives an audience and a forum to the groups that you're talking about, today, three very important ones: the Department, USAID, and the International Monetary Fund.

And so, it's a privilege to be a part of the hearing. I look forward to the testimony. And I thank you, again, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

We will now hear the testimony of our nominees, we'd love to have you introduce family members that may be in attendance, and when you start your testimony, please do so. In the interest of time, we ask you to keep your statement to about 5 minutes. Without objection, your full statements will be included in the record.

And with that, Mr. Kennedy, you may proceed with your opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK F. KENNEDY, NOMINEE TO BE
UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT**

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar.

I'd like to introduce my wife, Mary Elizabeth Swope, who is a retired State Department Foreign Service officer, who joins me today.

Mr. Chairman, it's a distinct honor to appear before you today, as President Bush's nominee to be Undersecretary of State for Management. I want to thank the President and Secretary Rice for the confidence they have placed in me.

As a career Foreign Service officer who has worked in the administrative and management field for over 35 years, I regard this as a unique opportunity to serve our Nation. Over the years, my service at the Department of State and on loan to the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, has given me perspective on the many and varied challenges that America faces internationally.

Also, working and living abroad as part of a Foreign Service couple, I know well what it takes for our Foreign Service colleagues to live and work in foreign cultures, have assignments in different

countries, and experience the changing profile of American diplomats over the last three decades.

As a management officer, and as Assistant Secretary of State for administration, I worked on the full spectrum of management issues needed to support our diplomatic presence around the world, and—I can tell you sincerely—serving our country is a privilege in any capacity, and a career in the State Department is one of the best opportunities there is.

If confirmed, I look forward to working on the numerous challenges that lie ahead. I believe the State Department can meet those challenges only by working with the Congress, and other U.S. Government agencies.

I believe wholeheartedly that we cannot implement successful foreign policy without addressing the management and infrastructure issues on which it depends.

It is often said that an institution's major asset is its people, and I think this is no where more true than with the Department of State.

With a few important exceptions, we are not a programmatic agency. The Department advances the U.S. national interests through policy formulation and execution, public diplomacy outreach, consular support, and management services. We serve the American people through the men and women of the Civil and Foreign services, and our foreign national colleagues abroad.

They're our most powerful and scarcest resource, representing the United States abroad is an honor and a challenge in today's international environment. To do it well, our people must be deployed, recruited, trained, provisioned, and safeguarded. They must be sent to those assignments and posts where they can make the maximum contribution, including some of the most dangerous places on earth. They must be trained in languages and professional skills so that they can perform their diplomatic and consular roles effectively. They must be provided with the proper tools and best possible support to operate at peak efficiency, and they must have safe and secure facilities from which to operate.

I want to underline my strong commitment to recruiting, developing, and retaining a highly skilled workforce representative of America's diversity. To recruit the people the country needs, the Department must continually expand its outreach to all parts of American society. We cannot afford, and morally must not leave any stone unturned in seeking out the people that we need to advance our national interests.

Our Civil and Foreign Services provide a dynamic workforce to accomplish the Department's missions in 170 countries abroad, and at the United Nations and also around the United States.

I am pleased today that the Department fully participates in the President's Management Fellows program, and has developed its own Career Entry Program to bring in and set on the right track, the next generation of Civil Service employees. The Department has also begun an innovative program to provide Civil Service rotational opportunities.

The Foreign Service continues to recruit entry-level personnel from around the country. They must also receive additional train-

ing, especially in hard languages, and in working with other agencies on various national security issues that face our country.

The National Foreign Affairs Training Center is critical to fully developing the skills we need for our entire workforce. Among the many training opportunities offered are leadership and management training at the entry, mid- and senior levels, which provides employees with essential skills throughout their careers. And we must look forward to ways to leverage the significant skills that family members bring when they accompany employees overseas.

There are enormous challenges ahead, and we are not a perfect organization. Just recently, the surge in passport applications resulted in unacceptable waiting times for the American people we serve. Systemic changes have been made to forestall that happening again. The extremely dedicated and competent employees who worked incredible hours to reduce the backlog of applications are now being supplemented by additional staff and additional facilities. The Department also benefited from numerous other employees and retirees who were mobilized.

We can never lose sight of the fact that there are always new and better ways to carry out our responsibilities—these must be constantly pursued, and it is equally important that we engage in contact and vigorous oversight and accountability. There will always be missteps, but if we are honest and forthright, and display the dedication that has been the hallmark of the Department, we can catch problems early, and fix them.

The American people have entrusted the State Department with many responsibilities in carrying out our diplomatic mission. Accomplishing them requires the full commitment of all of our employees, and also requires the continuing support of the Congress, particularly our committees of jurisdiction.

If confirmed, I pledge to lead the Department's management team in carrying out our assigned tasks. I will take it as the number one goal to provide the Secretary of State with the management advice and management support she needs.

Thank you very much, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK F. KENNEDY,
NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

It is a distinct honor to appear before you as President Bush's nominee to be Under Secretary of State for Management. I want to thank the President and Secretary Rice for the confidence they have placed in me. As a career Foreign Service officer who has worked in the administrative and management fields for almost 35 years, I regard this as a unique opportunity to serve our Nation.

Over the years, my service at the Department of State, and on loan to the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, has given me perspective on the many and varied challenges that America faces internationally.

Also, working and living abroad as part of a Foreign Service couple, I know well what it takes for our Foreign Service colleagues to live and work in foreign cultures, have assignments in different countries, and experience the changing profile of American diplomats over three decades of service.

As a management officer and as Assistant Secretary of Administration, I worked on the full spectrum of management services needed to support our diplomatic presence around the world. In all of this, I can tell you sincerely that serving our coun-

try is a privilege in any capacity and that a career in the State Department is one of the best opportunities there is.

If confirmed, I look forward to working on the numerous challenges that lie ahead; but I believe that the Department of State can meet those challenges only by working with the Congress and other U.S. Government agencies. I believe wholeheartedly that we cannot implement successful foreign policy without addressing the management and infrastructure issues on which it depends.

It is often said that an institution's major asset is its people, and I think that is nowhere more true than with the Department of State. With a few important exceptions, we are not a programmatic agency.

The Department of State advances the U.S. national interest through policy formulation and execution, public diplomacy outreach, consular support, and management services. We serve the American people through the men and women of the Civil and Foreign Services, and our foreign national colleagues abroad.

They are our most powerful, and scarcest, resource. Representing the United States of America abroad is an honor and a challenge in today's international environment. To do it well, our people must be deployed, trained, provisioned, and safeguarded.

They must be sent to those assignments and posts where they can make the maximum contribution, including some of the most dangerous places on earth.

They must be trained in languages and professional skills so that they can perform their diplomatic and consular roles effectively on behalf of the President and the American people.

They must be provided with the proper tools and best possible support to operate at peak efficiency.

And they must have safe and secure facilities from which to operate.

I want to underline my commitment to recruiting, developing, and retaining a highly skilled workforce representative of America's diversity. To recruit the people the country needs, the Department must continually expand its outreach to all parts of American society. We cannot afford—and morally must not—leave any stone unturned in seeking out the people that we need to advance our national interests.

Our Civil and Foreign Services provide a dynamic workforce to accomplish the Department's mission; in addition to our diplomatic presence in over 170 countries abroad and at the United Nations, they are also deployed around the United States in passport agencies, visa offices, diplomatic security field offices, and dispatch agencies.

I am pleased that the Department fully participates in the Presidential Management Fellows Program and has developed its own Career Management Entry Program to bring in, and set on the right track, the next generation of Civil Service employees. The Department has also begun an innovative program to offer rotational opportunities to Civil Service employees.

The Foreign Service continues to recruit entry-level officers from all around the country. They must also receive additional training, especially in hard languages and in working with other agencies on various national security issues facing our country.

The National Foreign Affairs Training Center is critical to fully developing the skills we need for our entire workforce—Civil Service, Foreign Service, and Foreign Service Nationals. Among the many training opportunities offered, our leadership and management training at the entry, middle, and senior levels provides employees with essential skills throughout their careers.

And we must look for ways to leverage the significant skills that family members bring when they accompany employees overseas.

There are enormous challenges ahead and we are not a perfect organization. Just recently, the surge in passport applications resulted in unacceptable waiting times for the American people we serve. Systemic changes have been made to forestall that happening again. The extremely competent and dedicated employees who worked incredible hours to reduce the backlog of applications are now being supplemented by additional staff and additional facilities. The Department has also benefited from numerous other employees and retirees who were mobilized from all over the United States and overseas, to complete the mission of getting us back to the timely processing of passports.

We can never lose sight of the fact that there are always new and better ways to carry out our responsibilities. These must be constantly pursued. And it is equally important that we engage in contact and vigorous oversight and accountability.

There will always be missteps, but if we are honest and forthright, and display the dedication that has been the hallmark of the Department, we can catch problems early and fix them.

The American people have entrusted the Department of State with many responsibilities in carrying out our diplomatic mission.

Accomplishing them requires the full commitment of all our employees and it also requires the continuing support of the Congress, particularly our committees of jurisdiction.

If confirmed, I pledge to lead the Department's management team in carrying out our assigned tasks in support of American diplomacy throughout the world. I would take it as my No. 1 goal to provide the Secretary of State with the management advice and management support she needs.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. Mulvaney.

STATEMENT OF SEAN R. MULVANEY, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. MULVANEY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator Lugar, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee.

On July 16, 2007, President Bush nominated me for the position of Assistant Administrator for Management of USAID. I am honored by his confidence in me, and am appreciative of the support that has been given me, during the nomination process.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you, Senator Menendez, and this esteemed committee. If confirmed, I hope to work with you and your colleagues on the committee and in the Congress, on a full range of issues. I am looking forward to your questions. Thank you very much.

At this time, I would like to recognize and acknowledge my family for their support. Without their love and encouragement, I wouldn't be here today.

This is my wife, Susan, my daughters, Kate and Rachel, and my sisters, Sue and Lisa, are here today. My mother was unable to attend. I'd also like to recognize and thank my deceased father.

As a former staff member in the House of Representatives, I understand the importance of this hearing, and the role it plays in our constitutional process. If confirmed by your committee, I pledge my best in helping the agency modernize, to keep it the world's premier development agency.

In his National Security Strategy of 2002, the President stated that including the world's poor in an expanding circle of development and opportunity is one of the top priorities of U.S. international policy. Since then, the President and the Congress have nearly tripled the resources allocated to development. Secretary Rice has reaffirmed the President's desire to elevate development as a foreign policy objective. It now plays a key role in our national security architecture as part of the three D's—defense, diplomacy, and development.

The humanitarian and development mission of USAID has, and will continue to be, a moral imperative of this country. Post-9/11, it is also a national security imperative.

If confirmed as Assistant Administrator for Management, I will hold a position that is critical to the functioning of USAID, because the management bureau provides the tools with which our development professionals work. The position oversees 6 major operational units that include financial management, acquisition and assistance, information technology, overseas management support, ad-

ministrative services, management, policy, budget, and performance.

Generally speaking, the position and the Bureau are responsible for strengthening and maintaining agency management systems. The management function is so critical because every other operational unit within the agency relies on it, as a service provider, an enabler, and a facilitator in the pursuit of U.S. foreign assistance objectives.

Without good logistical support, USAID's efforts would be stymied, as it tries to catalyze the full range of America's public and private capabilities, and the resources it allocates to development.

If confirmed for this position, I see myself as playing a small but pivotal role to improve the lives of countless individuals, by improving the management practices of the agency.

I can assure you that I am energized and I'm exhilarated by the tasks that lie before me, and the opportunity to bring my professional experience to bear in the service of my country.

In my professional career to date, I have had a set of experiences that have drawn upon many different skills. I worked on Capitol Hill for 10 years, in several positions covering a range of office, committee, and leadership functions, with a focus on foreign policy, international economic policy, budget, and appropriations.

Five of these years were dedicated to assisting a former Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. That experience enabled me to build a solid knowledge of the U.S. foreign assistance process and development practice.

I also developed a clear understanding of executive branch operations, and the special role that Congress plays in the design and implementation of U.S. development policy abroad.

As a complement to this public policy experience, I obtained a master's degree from Thunderbird, the American Graduate School for International Management. I've also worked in brand management for a worldwide consumer products and pharmaceutical firm, Glaxo Smithkline.

The combination of my public policy experience, particularly in the legislative area of foreign assistance, as well as my private sector management experience, I believe has prepared me for the serious responsibilities I would assume as Assistant Administrator for Management.

Should the Senate choose to confirm me for this position, it would be an honor to serve side-by-side with the roughly 8,000 dedicated USAID employees who—at great risk and personal sacrifice—answer the development challenges around the world. I will endeavor to serve them with the same distinction and purpose that they serve the American people.

In closing, I would like this committee to know that, if confirmed, I intend to make myself fully available. I'd like to consult with interested staff and members on the management challenges that the agency faces, or any proposed decisions that it would take. This is part of my own personal policy of pursuing communications with all major stakeholders interested in improving the management of the agency.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement for the committee, and I welcome any questions at the appropriate time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mulvaney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEAN R. MULVANEY, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF MANAGEMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator Lugar, and other Senators of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon. I respectfully request that my remarks be included in the record.

On July 16, 2007, President Bush nominated me for the position of Assistant Administrator for Management at the U.S. Agency for International Development. I am honored by his confidence in me and am appreciative of the support that has been given me during the nomination process.

At this time, I would like to acknowledge and thank my family for their support. Without their love and encouragement, I would not be here. I would like to recognize my wife, Susan, and our two lovely daughters, Kate and Rachel, as well as my sisters, Sue and Lisa, who are all here today. I would also like to thank my mother, Kay Mulvaney, who was unable to attend, and my deceased father, James.

As a former staff member in the House of Representatives, I understand the importance of this hearing and the role it plays in our constitutional process. If confirmed by your committee, I pledge my best in helping the agency modernize to keep it the world's premier development agency.

In his National Security Strategy of 2002, the President stated that "including the world's poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is one of the top priorities of U.S. international policy." Since then, he has nearly tripled the resources allocated to development initiatives. Secretary Rice has reaffirmed his mandate to elevate development. It now plays a key role in our national security architecture as part of the three "D's"—defense, diplomacy, and development—and is vital to her vision of "transformational diplomacy."

The humanitarian and development mission of this country has been and will be continue to be a moral imperative of this country. Post 9/11, it is also a national security imperative.

If confirmed as Assistant Administrator for Management, I will hold a position that is critical to the functioning of USAID because it provides the tools with which our development professionals work. It oversees six major operational units that include Financial Management, Acquisitions and Assistance, Information Technology, Administrative Services, Overseas Management Staff, and Management Policy, Budget, and Performance. Generally speaking, the Bureau is responsible for strengthening and maintaining agency management systems.

The management function is integral to every other operational unit within the agency. It is a service provider, an enabler, and a facilitator in the pursuit of U.S. foreign assistance objectives to advance democracy, prosperity, and human well-being in the world's developing countries. Every other operational unit of the agency is a customer of the Management Bureau. Without good logistical support, USAID is stymied in its efforts to catalyze the full range of America's public and private capabilities and the resources it allocates to the cause of development.

If confirmed for this position, I see myself as playing a small but pivotal role in helping to improve the lives of countless individuals by improving the management practices of USAID. I can assure you that I am energized and exhilarated by the tasks that lie before me and the opportunity to bring my professional experience to bear in the service of my country.

In my professional career to date, I have had a set of experiences that have drawn upon many different skills. I worked on Capitol Hill for 10 years in several positions covering a range of office, committee, and leadership functions with a focus on foreign policy, international economic policy, appropriations, and budgeting.

Five of these years were dedicated to assisting a former chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State Department and Foreign Operations. That experience enabled me to build a solid knowledge of the U.S. foreign assistance process and development practice. I also developed a clear understanding of executive branch operations and the special role that Congress plays in the design and implementation of U.S. development policy abroad.

As a complement to this public policy experience, I obtained a masters degree from Thunderbird, the American Graduate School for International Management. I also worked in brand management for a worldwide consumer products and pharmaceutical firm, Glaxo Smithkline. The combination of broad public policy experience, particularly in the legislative area of U.S. foreign assistance, as well as my private sector management experience, has prepared me for the serious responsibilities I would assume as Assistant Administrator of Management at USAID.

Should the Senate choose to confirm me for this position, it would be an honor to serve side by side with the roughly 8,000 dedicated USAID employees who at great risk and personal sacrifice answer the development challenges around the world. I will endeavor to serve them with the same distinction and purpose that they serve the American people.

In closing, I want this committee to know that, if confirmed, I intend to make myself fully available to consult with interested staff and members on management challenges at USAID and proposed decisions. This is part of a personal policy of mine to pursue communications with all major stakeholders interested in improving the management of the agency.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement before the committee. I now welcome any questions that you and the other Senators here today may have for me.

Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you very much.

Kate and Rachel decided when you started to speak to pay attention, so you must have a lot of influence there.

Let me turn to Mr. Heath now, for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL D. HEATH, NOMINEE TO BE UNITED STATES ALTERNATIVE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Mr. HEATH. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Lugar, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored that President Bush has nominated me to serve as the United States Alternate Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund, and if confirmed, I pledge to work with this committee, the full Congress, Secretary Paulson, and the rest of the administration in furthering U.S. international economic policy goals, and the well-being of the American people.

I want to thank my wife, Jane Allman Heath, and our sons, Jared, Ken, and Nathan, who are here today a couple of rows back. I want to thank them for their support of my commitment to public service.

Unable to be present in person today, unfortunately, are Jane's parents, Charles and Gwen Allman, who have become parents to me, as well.

For much of the past 6 years, I have served as Associate Director of the White House National Economic Council. In this capacity, it has been my privilege to promote policies leading to economic growth and stability for the good of all Americans. Throughout my previous roles in Federal Government and in the private sector in Europe, I worked to expand international trade and investment of benefit to our country.

If confirmed, I look forward to bringing my skills, knowledge, and experience to help pursue policies that are a priority for the United States.

As you know, the IMF is entering a new period, one that's marked by new leaders, recent credit market turbulence, and the growing strength of emerging market countries. Its mandate to promote international monetary cooperation and to expand job-creating trade will require the IMF to intensify its own leadership toward transparency in public policy for market-based reforms that will generate sustained growth, and on fiscal and monetary policies that strengthen government accounts and reduce the risk of crises.

With its near-global membership, and effective U.S. guidance, I believe the IMF is well-positioned to set standards in these impor-

tant areas. The United States strongly supports recent IMF decisions to better assess countries' economic policies, including exchange rate activities. And, if confirmed, I look forward to working with my colleagues and with this committee to implement these vital reforms.

Mr. Chairman, dedicated administration officials and Congressional leaders, over many years, have helped to expand economic opportunity in the United States through domestic policies, and the policy fundamentals for economic growth and stability in other countries.

There are new challenges now to global economic performance. And, if confirmed, I will demonstrate enthusiasm and good judgment in doing my part to improve IMF policies and practices that are needed in our time.

I'm grateful to have the privilege of your considering my nomination. I'd be pleased to answer any questions, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heath follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL D. HEATH, NOMINEE TO BE UNITED STATES
ALTERNATE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Hagel, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored that President Bush has nominated me to serve as the United States Alternate Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund, and if confirmed, I pledge to work with this committee, the full Congress, Secretary Paulson, and the rest of the administration in furthering U.S. international economic policy goals and the well-being of the American people.

First, I would like to thank my wife, Jane, and our sons for their support of my commitment to public service. For much of the past 6 years I served as Associate Director of the National Economic Council. In this capacity, it has been my privilege to promote policies leading to economic growth and stability for the good of all Americans. Throughout my previous roles in Federal Government and the private sector in Europe, I worked to expand international trade and investment of benefit to our country. If confirmed, I look forward to bringing my skills, knowledge, and experience to help pursue policies that are a priority for the United States.

As you know, the IMF is entering a new period, marked by new leaders, credit market turbulence, and strength of emerging market countries. Its mandate to promote international monetary cooperation and expand job-creating trade will require the IMF to intensify its own leadership toward transparency in public policy, market-based reforms to generate sustained growth, and fiscal and monetary policies that strengthen government accounts and reduce the risk of crisis. With its near global membership, and effective U.S. guidance, the IMF is well-positioned to set standards in these important areas. The United States strongly supports recent IMF decisions to better assess countries' economic policies, including exchange rate activities. If confirmed, I look forward to working with my colleagues to implement these vital reforms.

Mr. Chairman, dedicated administration officials, and Congressional leaders over many years have helped to expand economic opportunity in the United States through domestic policies and the policy fundamentals for economic growth and stability in other countries. There are new challenges to global economic performance, and if confirmed, I will demonstrate enthusiasm and good judgment in doing my part to improve IMF policies and practices needed in our time.

I am grateful to have the privilege of your considering my nomination. I would be pleased to answer any questions.

Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. We welcome your families, as well. We understand the sacrifices that are engaged, not only for those who serve, but also for their families. And, so we appreciate them being with you, and they all look great—I'm sure they'll look different on Halloween, but they all look great today.

Let's start with 7-minute rounds, and I'll recognize myself.

Mr. Kennedy, first of all, I've had several people tell me of your distinguished service, so the questions go toward the position you're going to be taking more than—I understand that you're not necessarily at the heart of these issues, but you will be dealing with these issues. So, I want to get a sense of how you'll be dealing with them, as you approach the positions—I want to create under why these questions come to you.

I read with interest the Washington Post article that talked about FSO forced assignments. That has not happened since 1969, as far as directed assignments. I'm wondering why is it that, I mean, obviously this is a tough theatre, so it's understandable, why is it that, having not seen those direct assignments in the Foreign Service since 1969, we're seeing them now, and do you believe that continued forced assignments in the future are something that's going to be more commonplace?

If you would put your microphone on.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Since 2003, the State Department has been dispatching people to Iraq, first as individuals on loan to the Department of Defense under the Coalition Provisional Authority and then since 2004, as part of the American Embassy there. And the number of people we have had serving in Iraq continues to grow every year.

This year we will be adding close to 50 additional Foreign Service personnel to serve, not only in Baghdad, but on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as well. And, I think we have reached the point, sir, where the number of people who simply have it as their first choice on their Foreign Service assignment list, no longer keeps pace with the demands of the State Department diplomatic surge, which is mirroring the military's own surge.

And so, we have a process that—as you note, sir—has been in place for many years, and has been clarified, and I believe that State Department people will step up, once we go through the identification process, and I think it is logical, sir, that since we're serving 1-year terms, that this might happen again next year. But I have every confidence that when the individuals who are identified in this process will serve well and honorably.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I don't doubt they'll serve well and honorably, but they're serving not as their choice. And so, the question is, do you believe that, in fact, this is—what I gathered from your answer was that this is a result of growth? Is it a result of growth only? Do you believe this is a one-time set of circumstances? Or do you believe that this may be a continuing set of circumstances?

Mr. KENNEDY. I think, sir, that if it is the national policy to continue to deploy 250 or more Foreign Service personnel in Iraq every year, that it is possible that we would have to use directed assignments again next year, yes, sir.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you about diplomatic security, it's one of the areas that you will have jurisdiction over. Certainly, recent reports regarding activities in Iraq of the private security contracting firm Blackwater, USA, have been covered extensively in the news. In my mind, the incident points to a larger management issue.

As the government seeks to privatize U.S. Government activities and control personnel costs, contractors have often been turned to deal with those responsibilities. The Secretary's panel on personnel protective services in Iraq recommended that, "When the FBI investigation into the September 16 shooting incident involving Blackwater is completed, the United States Embassy in Iraq should submit its recommendation as to whether the continued services of the contractor involved is consistent with the accomplishment of the overall United States mission in Iraq."

Now, that statement, which I'm quoting, is that a reference to Blackwater itself? Do we believe that Blackwater's presence in Iraq ultimately would be curtailed? Is additional contracting staff needed to monitor and audit these contracts?

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That statement is a reference to Blackwater. I was a member of the panel, and participated in the review in Iraq, at the Secretary's direction, and in the writing of that report.

The four members of the panel felt that since there was an ongoing investigation by the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it would be inappropriate for us to prejudge the result of that investigation, but should the results of the investigation go in one direction, we called upon the United States Ambassador to make a recommendation to the Secretary, whether or not we should, at that point, change contractors or not.

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. Go ahead.

Mr. KENNEDY. Going to the second point, one of the points that the panel was very strong on in its long series of recommendations is we thought that we had in place various policies and procedures that were relatively robust. At the same time, you can always improve a policy or procedure. One has to keep an open mind in looking at those things.

But the most important issue was that we had to increase oversight and accountability. We simply did not have enough special agents—Federal officers in the Diplomatic Security Service, to accompany each convoy which was moving someone with State Department personnel, and therefore, one of the recommendations that we made was that additional special agents should be deployed. The Secretary has accepted that recommendation, and those agents are either in Iraq now, or more are being moved there, as we speak, literally.

And, therefore, we will have significantly increased oversight and accountability by placing a diplomatic security special agent as the agent in charge on every move that takes place by one of our contractors.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, talking about oversight, today's article talks about the possibility that the FBI investigation into the Blackwater incident may have been compromised, because guards received immunity for statements that they made to State Department officials investigating the incident. Now, it seems to me that how we act in terms of giving immunity grants to individuals, and the process under which we give immunity grants to individuals, if it is as reported, shows that either it's procedurally flawed or substantially problematic.

Mr. KENNEDY. When the Secretary took steps after the incident on September 16, she—after talking with the Prime Minister of Iraq—set three parallel channels moving. One is a joint United States-Iraq Commission to look at issues there.

The second is an investigation which the FBI is heading now, to look into the facts on the ground of the specific incident and whether or not there was any activity involved which would be a violation of law.

The third action that she took was to commission a panel, of which I was a part, to review the processes that we use—the oversight and accountability. Our groups was specifically walled off from looking at the specifics of the investigation that the FBI was involved in. We did not wish to do anything that would potentially render a prosecution more difficult.

And so, I can only tell you, sir, that the investigation by the FBI is still ongoing, but I did not participate in that investigation.

Senator MENENDEZ. My time is up, but I don't want to leave this dangling, so I'll just take one more minute here, and then I'll turn to Senator Lugar.

Is there a clearly-defined process under which a person of Protective Services ultimately are told when they can and when they cannot offer grants of immunity, and is there a chain of command that is well-established, as well as documented, in terms of standard operating procedures.

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, can I get that answer for you for the record? Because my responsibilities, to date, have not involved that. But, I can assure you that, should I be confirmed by this committee, that is an issue that I would find within my jurisdiction to immediately address, because the Secretary does seek to ensure that there is the utmost accountability and control and responsibility for the State Department for the actions that take place under its jurisdiction.

Senator MENENDEZ. We'll look forward to your written answers. Clearly, this is a field you will be dealing with.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to above follows:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, October 31, 2007.

Hon. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing in response to questions you posed to Ambassador Patrick Kennedy at his October 30 confirmation hearing. You asked for information about news accounts that the Department of State has promised employees of Blackwater USA immunity from prosecution in connection with a September 16 incident in Baghdad.

The Department of State is not in a position to immunize individuals from Federal criminal prosecution. The kinds of statements that the press is writing about would provide limited protection that does not preclude prosecution. The Department would not have asked FBI to investigate this case unless we and they thought that they could investigate the case and potentially prosecute individuals if warranted. I have attached a statement issued by the Department of Justice confirming that Blackwater employees have not been given immunity from prosecution and that the FBI's criminal investigation of this matter continues.

Without regard to whether particular statements may be used in a criminal proceeding, cases like the one currently under investigation are complex given that the

applicability of U.S. criminal law to the activities of private security contractors overseas is not always clear and may depend on the facts at issue in any particular case. The administration is currently working with the Congress on legislation to ensure that we have the laws we need to hold private security contractors overseas accountable where appropriate.

Sincerely,

JEFFREY T. BERGNER,
Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs.

Attachment: As stated.

STATEMENT BY JUSTICE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN DEAN BOYD ON THE BLACKWATER INVESTIGATION

“The Justice Department and the FBI cannot discuss the facts of the Blackwater case, which is under active investigation. However, any suggestion that the Blackwater employees in question have been given immunity from federal criminal prosecution is inaccurate. The Justice Department and the FBI continue the criminal investigation of this matter knowing that this investigation involves a number of complex issues. We are unable to comment further at this time.”

Senator MENENDEZ. If you are confirmed, and I have real concerns that the immunity claims that I understand that arrests, apparently are called “Garrity Warnings,” and “Calkine Warnings” both named for Federal court cases from the 1960s and 1970s that recognize the special circumstances of Government employees in criminal cases involving their jobs.

And it seems to me that we have to, you know, we want to promote the rule of law throughout the world, and it starts with observing it at home, so that, in fact, you can hold that standard to the rest of the world. But, if we have a process that allows immunity grants to be given without the appropriate authorities, including the appropriate law enforcement authorities being advised before that grant is given, then we are giving immunity to people that ultimately may very well, and should be, subject to prosecution. And that is fundamentally wrong.

Mr. KENNEDY. I—

Senator MENENDEZ. Though I know as you go into this, I know that you don’t have this job now, but the reason I’m raising these questions now is, you may very well have this job, and this is not going to be, unfortunately, in my concern, an isolated incident and how we proceed in the future is going to be very important.

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, I absolutely agree. In addition to providing information in writing, I believe that we could arrange for a representative of the Department of Justice, which has control of this investigation at the moment, to call upon you or one of your counsels to review the material that they are in charge of.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that.

Mr. KENNEDY. And I fully agree that responsibility and accountability and the rule of law are paramount.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that, I don’t want the other nominees to think I don’t care about them. I will return to you after Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Just following through on the accountability side of, sort of, past business with your predecessor, what is the latest information regarding passport production numbers? How many new adjudicators have you hired, and what is the current backlog, if there is one?

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

There is no backlog at the moment. The normal waiting time for a passport has historically been approximately 6 weeks. We believe we are actually under that number. I check the figures every Friday, and on Friday, the number of applications in-process were around 500,000, and we are moving through those with regularity.

We've done some spot-checking, and people are telling us they are receiving their passports in as little as 2 and 3 weeks.

We have been able to accomplish this partially because we've already brought on board some 300 new employees, and we believe we will hit 500 by the end of the calendar year. These are adjudication personnel, because Senator, there's a two-part process for a passport: physical production of the book, and the adjudicator who takes a governmental act to say, "You are who you say you are, and the documents you represent establish that you are an American citizen."

We have capacity to produce over 25 million passports, including a new facility we just opened in Arkansas, which will have the ability to produce 10 million passport books a year. So, we have the physical capacity to print the books. What we were short on, Senator—and it was our failing, absolutely our failing—we did not have enough human adjudicators to do that. We mobilized State Department personnel, retirees, other officers, and we have 300 new people, and are heading for 500.

So, we believe we have addressed this systemically with new production facilities and new personnel, but we will, however, monitor it weekly to make sure we don't see any adverse trends.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I'm sure the American people appreciate that good report. I trust that these employees are sustainable, that is, this is not a so-called surge capacity that may tailor off, but that you're geared up now, both in the production side, the Arkansas plant, for example, plus the human side, adjudicators.

Are you in touch, do you believe, coordinating with the Department of Homeland Defense or others who may—in the course of their affairs, plus some of us—bring up new requirements for various Americans to have passports, or to have other documentation so that, if these early warning signals come along, you're in a position to surge prior to the avalanche hitting you?

Mr. KENNEDY. Absolutely, Senator. The individuals we are hiring now are permanent, full-time employees. We negotiated an arrangement with the Office of Management and Budget that permitted the State Department to retain additional fees that citizens were paying for their passports, and made the appropriate notifications to the Congress. With these additional fees, we were able to add to our physical plant, and add the additional personnel.

Our Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs is in daily contact with the Department of Homeland Security, and should I be confirmed, I know the Undersecretary at DHS well, and my plan would be to establish full and open communications with him so that if there are any changes that they feel necessary, to make sure that we have secure borders, that the State Department has the time and is well-positioned to respond to those new requirements.

Senator LUGAR. Excellent.

Let me ask, what is the role that the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization should play in post-conflict sta-

bilizations and reconstruction, and do you anticipate more budget resources being requested by the Department for this function?

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, I think you've touched on a very important area. The State Department has, essentially, no surge capacity inherent to it. When we need to surge, we take people from within the Department and shift them from one important mission to what is, at that moment, a higher mission.

We need to establish a reserve corps—not exactly equivalent to the National Guard or the military reserves—but we need that inherent capability.

CRS, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, is now working with other Government agencies, and we are awaiting final passage of authorizing legislation which we welcome. It will formalize this. We have set aside funds in the supplemental that was passed last year that covers fiscal years 2007 and 2008, so those funds are still available, and we will be seeking additional funds to turn this into a permanently staffed “on-call” mechanism, staffed by professionals in fields as diverse as agronomy and veterinary sciences and law enforcement, so that we would be prepared to work with our colleagues at AID and at other agencies, and deploy those personnel to regions in need.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that's good news, also. As you know, many members of this committee are very strongly supportive of this, and feel that this is a requirement for United States diplomacy when, in fact, we may have taken the position in the past, we're not going to do nation-building, but now we're doing a lot of nation-building. And the personnel resources to do this aren't there. So, the surge capacity, or what have you, is required, but I appreciate the progress reports, and your cognizance of this.

One final question, and that is—what is the status of the Department's embassy construction program at this time? These come along from time to time, but how many new embassies have been replaced, and how many remain to be replaced, or to be built to begin with? And when will the program end? Do you have any flow chart of embassy-building?

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, let me get you a complete flow chart for the record, but I am pleased to report that, to date, we have completed 53 embassies, there are another 37 which are in the process of design or construction, and we plan 11 more construction awards this year.

[The information referred to above follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF OVERSEAS BUILDINGS OPERATIONS—STATUS OF
EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM, NOVEMBER 14, 2007

After the 1998 East African embassy bombings, the Department was faced with an unprecedented challenge of having to replace approximately 195 embassy facilities as a result of security concerns.

Since 2001, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations has:

- Built 53 new facilities with 37 more underway; see attached list.
- Moved nearly 15,000 United States Government employees to safer facilities.
- 11 more construction contract awards are planned for fiscal year 2008.

As of October 2007, OBO manages \$ 5.1 billion in construction projects compared with \$ 0.7 billion at the beginning of fiscal year 2001. The typical project delivery time has been reduced from 4 to 5 years to approximately 2 years. The Department is very appreciative of the Congressional support we have received for the program.

OBO has two New Embassy/Consulate Compound (NEC) construction programs—the Capital Security Construction Program and the Strategic Capital Construction Program. The Capital Security Construction Program is restricted by Congress to projects on a list of 80 (in bands of 20) of the most vulnerable posts. The Strategic Capital Construction Program involves projects not primarily undertaken for security reasons and not on the “Top 80 list” (e.g., a functional requirement or structural deficiencies). However, the Strategic program follows the same discipline and oversight as the Capital Security program.

NEC construction is funded by:

- Congressional appropriations for the Department of State’s Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance Account.—
- Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program (levy on other agencies occupying U.S. facilities on a per capita basis).
- Proceeds from the sale of excess property and/or underutilized property holdings.

The Capital Security Cost-Sharing (CSCS) Program was developed in 2001–2002 in accordance with the President’s Management Agenda Initiative on Rightsizing and the 1999 Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, and was included in the President’s fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 budgets. Fiscal year 2005 was the first year that the Department and other agencies contributed to the CSCS Program.

The Department, with OMB oversight, manages the Program, which will generate a total of \$17.5 billion over the 14 years from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2018 (beginning with a 5-year phase-in period) to fund approximately 150 NECs in the Capital Security Construction Program. The time to construct these 150 NECs is reduced from 26 to 14 years with CSCS in place (compared to the pace of construction under pre-CSCS budget levels).

OBO Capital Construction Projects

Completed since 2001: Kampala NEC, Doha NEC, Lima USAID (Annex), Bogota USAID/NAS (Annex), Tunis NEC, Dar es Salaam NEC, Dar es Salaam (USAID), Nairobi NEC, Zagreb NEC, Istanbul NEC, Sao Paulo NAB, Abu Dhabi NEC, Kabul ARG CMP, Baghdad IOB (Supplemental), Dili IOB, Sofia NEC, Yerevan NEC, Abidjan NEC, Luanda NEC (Strategic/Asset Mgt), Frankfurt NAB, Abuja NEC, Cape Town NEC, Phnom Penh NEC, Kabul NEC (Strategic/Asset Mgt), Kabul Cafeteria, Tbilisi NEC, Tashkent NEC, Yaounde NEC, Dushanbe NEC (Strategic/Asset Mgt), Conakry NEC, Tirana Annex, Phnom Penh USAID, Kampala USAID, Nairobi USAID, Bamako NEC, Astana NEC, Conakry USAID, Freetown NEC, Belmopan NEC, Lome NEC, Bridgetown NAB, Kingston NEC, Accra NEC, Athens Annex, Bogota Annex, Kathmandu NEC, Kathmandu USAID, Panama City NEC, Managua NEC, Rangoon NEC, Algiers NEC, Managua USAID, Accra USAID.

In Design or Construction: Bamako USAID, Baghdad NEC (Supplemental), Kingston USAID, Port-Au-Prince NEC, Ciudad Juarez NEC, Berlin NEC (Strategic/Asset Mgt), Taipei (Strategic/Asset Mgt) (design), Kigali NEC, Mumbai NEC, Quito NEC, Skopje NEC, Skopje NOX, Beijing NEC, Khartoum NEC, Khartoum NOX, Jerusalem Annex, Djibouti NEC, Libreville NEC, Surabaya NEC, Abuja NOX, Tbilisi NOX, Johannesburg NEC, Suva NEC, Koror NOB (Strategic), Kolonia NOB (Strategic), Guangzhou NEC (design), Brazzaville NEC, Karachi NEC, Addis Ababa NEC, Antananarivo NEC, Jeddah NEC, Manila NOX, Ouagadougou NEC, Riga NEC, Sarajevo NEC, Tijuana NEC, Valletta NEC.

NEC—New Embassy/Consulate Compound

NOX—New Office Annex

USAID—USAID Annex Bldg.

NOB—New Office Bldg.

NAB—Newly Acquired Bldg.

IOB—Interim Office Bldg.

We believe this program will probably run out to as late as 2018, because we were starting from a very, very low base. When I was the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, we had funds to construct one new embassy a year. And it requires a major effort when you have 160 embassies and approximately 100 consulates, many of them not in the best condition, unsafe, and not prepared to deal with the volumes and the concerns that we have in the modern world, as you referenced earlier.

This construction program has very much benefited from the support of our oversight committees, which have been tremendous in giving us direct appropriations, and also in getting for us, in effect, fees from other Government agencies which occupy our facilities, so it's the support you have given us have enabled us to construct 53 and be working on 37 more.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator.

Let me return to Mr. Kennedy for a second round, here. I heard your answers to Senator Lugar about the passport issue, and am I to understand from your answers that you believe that systemic changes have been now put in place that makes the possibility of reliving the fiasco that we have, unlikely?

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, I'm glad you added the word "unlikely" at the end of it. If confirmed, this would be my responsibility, but I jokingly and seriously say I can only ever offer a 99 percent guarantee. But, following the surge, I was charged by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, and the Under Secretary for Management with assembling a State Department task force, and I have looked into this very, very deeply, and was part of the working group that mobilized the personnel to do it.

I believe with the production capacity that we now have, which is probably 25 million, with the additional personnel that we're hiring, with additional checks we have put into place at various points along the line, and with the ability to potentially bring on more personnel, including remobilized personnel from within the Department, I believe that I can offer you a very solid guarantee, that barring some incredibly unforeseen circumstance, there will not be a repeat of this.

Senator MENENDEZ. And, in that context, then, you would say to me the Department is ready for the next phase of the Western Hemisphere Initiative?

Mr. KENNEDY. We are building to that, yes sir, we are building to that phase right now. We have the production capacity, and we plan to expand the production capacity. Because as the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs looks out into the future, they see the demand for passports over the next 5 years rising to as possibly as many as 30 million a year. So, we have brought back out of retirement a senior retired Foreign Service officer whose specialty is management and administration in regard to buildings, and he has now been detailed to the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and is looking to see what additional facility capacity we need to put into place to keep us ahead, well ahead of that growth curve, sir.

Senator MENENDEZ. One last question to you, as you approach this position. For 15 years, 13 in the House, on the House International Relations Committee, and now having had the privilege of sitting on this committee, I have a real issue—I appreciated very much in your opening statement, the comments you made about having a workforce that is as diverse as America is, but I still believe that—this is going back over several administrations now—one of the worst Departments in the Federal Government—particularly as it relates to Latinos in the Foreign Service and senior executive management ranks—is the State Department.

And every time we broach this issue, you know, we talk a lot about recruitment, and recruitment is great, I actually got into law several provisions to give the Department the money for recruitment. The problem is that recruitment, in and of itself, doesn't solve the problem. When you want to get weeded out from the Department, you're told by panels that you either cannot communicate effectively, or cannot write effectively. And I understand both skills, but I think they're subjective at the end of the day.

And so, I hope that in your new position that you'll work toward—and I understand there is a timeframe here that, up until a new administration, but you may very well be there after that new administration—I hope that you will work with us to try to truly diversify the Foreign Service and the senior executive management, because in a country that increasingly has a large number of Americans of Hispanic descent, it does not represent that at the Department. Something I'd like to see you work with us on.

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, I fully agree. If I look at the numbers, the numbers are wrong. We have to improve them. You're right, we have to do the right kind of recruitment, you have to spread your net widely, you have to also offer training once you do have people in the service.

If confirmed, one of the things that I have in the back of my mind, which I might bring to the front, very quickly, is I don't think that we cast a wide enough net, we have 17 diplomats and residents arrayed around the country, numbers of them at Hispanic and Historically Black Universities, but I don't think that we have fully tapped our potential for recruiting—major colleges and universities employ their alumni, who are spread all over the country, to be their best recruiters.

I think that the State Department should seriously consider, and this was something that I'm very interested in doing, tapping the network of retired Foreign Service officers who live in every State in the union, and using them as, in effect, deputized recruiters to go to every college and every university, and not just certain ones to make sure that we are taking every option and every opportunity to get the diversity and get the people we need.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you. I appreciate your answer, it's very forthright. I look forward to working with you.

Mr. Mulvaney, let me ask you, with reference—you and I have had some discussions about the position that you'll have, and it's a very important one at a critical time, in my view, for USAID—I heard your opening statement and I appreciated some of the things that you included in there. How do you think that reduced resources have affected USAID's ability to carry out its mission?

And, while you're dealing with that reality, I would hope that if you are confirmed in this position that you will be engaged with members of the committee and members of the Congress, who are concerned about the future of USAID, about its mission, about being the premier entity that has been at the forefront of development assistance in the world on behalf of the United States and putting that side of America's face out there throughout the world.

And, including the AID mission in the budget process that's so critical—could I hear your views on that? It's a lot, but I've talked

to you about it before, I'd like to hear your view on the record, if I may.

Mr. MULVANEY. Let me start out by addressing the three issues you mentioned, and I'll try to go through each one of them that I internalized.

First, how has declined resources impacted the ability of the agency to implement its development programs and its mission? I would say that the agency has been running on scarce OE for a number of years. And this situation has created a number of challenges on the ground.

One can look at the growth in programmatic funds that the agency has had to implement, and it's been dramatic since 2001. When I first started in 2001, I think the figures were around \$7 or \$8 billion, and we're almost at a doubling of that, \$13 billion in terms of what the agency actually implements, all spigots, all programs around the world, in over 150 countries. Its regular OE budget has more or less remained the same, its staffing levels have, more or less, remained the same. It has desperately tried to backfill attrition as people retire, so it's been a struggle to maintain the quality of our development programs.

But, I think the agency is committed to doing more with less, to trying to be more efficient. That's not to say that, perhaps in the future, more resources couldn't be used to help revitalize the agency, and I think the senior leadership is committed to that goal.

In second point, you talked about morale at the agency, and how it has suffered in recent years. And the importance of maintaining it as the premier development agency—I'm aware of this issue, and it is serious. What I can add to improve it is an approach. While serving the President, and being a part of an administration team I would essentially play a strong role in listening to the career Foreign Service officer, and the career civil service, becoming an advocate for the equities of the agency, within an overall administration framework.

I would make it clear to the staff that I'm present to facilitate their work, and my sense of public service is not only to the American taxpayer, but my sense of public service is also to the rank and file of the agency.

Your last point was on the budget process—and I assume that the motivation of your question relates to making sure that the long-term development objective is front and center in the DFA framework as things go forward.

My sense of the agency is that, in the senior leadership of the agency, and the Director of Foreign Assistance, his office—her office, now—is that they understand that, the rollout of the DFA framework did not go well. Congress was upset about a number of actions that were taken. A number of external stakeholders, NGOs, and think-tanks were also not happy, and I think the senior leadership is committed to making changes to that process after hearing Congressional concerns.

To the extent I play a role in that process, I will carry your concerns to them, and try to help the agency think about it. My portfolio is different, though, from the actual programmatic decisions.

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, let me just follow along your question. You've just responded, Mr. Mulvaney, that there has been considerable consternation about, as you say, the roll-out of the Director of Foreign Assistance and that creation. And the morale problems, at least that some have reported to us, seem to come from personnel at USAID who have been affected in this roll-out situation.

When we have hearings on the Millennium Challenge Program, many members refer to the old days. The old days were USAID, we had appropriations annually for a list of countries. Things happened, money went out, and sometimes there were oversight situations in which all that was accomplished was now precisely what had been hoped for, or there were malfeasance in countries—all sorts of difficulties.

Now comes along Millennium Challenge and 15 criteria for receiving funds, including what some have said is a rather laborious process of democracy-building within the potential recipient, people making decisions as to how the money ought to be spent, whether for infrastructure of roads, or water supply for the people or whatever, which sometimes takes time. So, as a result, criticism has come that not much money is being spent. That a lot of time is going by, some feel the terms of members the House and the Senate may go by before something occurs there, oversight is rather difficult.

Now, if that is difficult for us to contemplate, it must be very difficult for the career employees who are involved in this process, as different criteria, different expectations occur—how would you estimate the success of this process, of working through the Millennium Challenge criteria and programs which, at the end of the day many people do contend is probably a good idea for countries to take responsibility for decisionmaking, take responsibility to fight corruption, so that even after we've deemed that a road should be built, in fact, if it isn't built and the money is out in a Swiss bank that, for some reason nothing occurs—I just ask you, as a professional in this, trying as you say, to listen to, not to salve the wounds of the process, but in this coming year, really, try to meld together all of this—what do you have in mind? Do you have any action points that you can share with us?

Mr. MULVANEY. Senator, thank you very much for the question, I understand your concern.

The portfolio, I would assume, is actually more in the back room of the foreign assistance process, it's not the front-line policy process. So, a lot of the decisions, ideas, and points that you make wouldn't actually relate to the position I would fulfill, but I will share a couple of thoughts with you, in the spirit of trying to answer your question.

My own view of the MCC, and I think it's shared by other folks, is that it was not a replacement of traditional core accounts of U.S. foreign assistance, particularly those accounts administered by USAID. The intention of the MCC was to be an incremental spigot of ODA that would have a number of characteristics that would incorporate lessons learned in development, which is an imperfect process, as we all know.

Some of those characteristics were that the MCC would be non-earmarked money. It wouldn't be tied aid, and it would be flexible, in the sense of being able to work with developing countries, allowing for the principle of local ownership to be incorporated into compacts.

The existence of the MCC has, I think, impacted agency morale. The agency views the MCC a bit enviously, to be frank. They would like to have some of those same flexibilities. But, one thing I would point out is that, AID is the backbone of the U.S. foreign assistance architecture. There's no substitute for it. We need it and it can't go away. The MCC, to my knowledge, as a staffer in the process, helping the institutions in the House and Senate contemplate how that would fit in a niche of U.S. foreign assistance policy—the intent of that institution was that it would only operate in a limited number of countries—20, 25, some of the better performers—but AID operates in over 150 countries. It has a direct, higher presence in 75 or 80.

Let me stop there, and see if I answered your question, sir.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that's very helpful, and obviously, this is, sort of, an essay-type exam in which you could go on through several chapters. But, I think that's thoughtful. The backroom, essentially, the difference between the numbers—25 as opposed to 160—sort of the backbone stability give, I think, a good outline of sort of where you're headed, and some counts you might give.

Let me just ask one more question, and that is, we talked to Mr. Kennedy about the building of embassies, and the question often arises—should the new U.S. embassies include the USAID missions in the embassies? Obviously, historically, several of the missions have not been in embassies. Some have argued that's good, some have argued that's not so good. What is your general judgment, and for that matter, if you can't make a general judgment, what are the facts, in terms of embassy planning that you will have to deal with as you counsel USAID officials?

Mr. MULVANEY. Senator, thank you for the question, it's an important one. I will be assuming this position in a continuum of decisions that have gone on before me. It was Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage that made the initial decisions about having new embassy compounds constructed, and having co-location between the State Department and USAID. There is no doubt that these co-locations into new embassy compounds that are going to be affecting the delivery model of USAID, because in many countries around the world, they have had separate missions, and now they are going to be co-located.

I think the agency and the State Department are committed to a good faith effort, though. To the extent that there is co-location, and perhaps a consolidation of administrative services that serve both State and AID, there must there must be an importance placed on the objectives of efficiency, cost savings, and respect for each organization's different but complimentary mission. And, if those aren't achieved, that there's an objective of security for all U.S. Government personnel serving in these compounds.

I will be assuming this post and working as a team member with my colleague here who is at the table, if I'm confirmed. So, I hope I answered your question, sir.

Senator LUGAR. Yes, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator. I have one final round of questions, and I don't want you to think that Senator Lugar and I actually choreographed this tag-team, but when he raises something that is of interest that I had, I want to raise it, follow-on.

In his questions to you, Mr. Mulvaney, about the Millennium Challenge Account, if I understand correctly, you actually led the final negotiations of a staff agreement with the executive branch, establishing the President's new development assistance initiative, known to us now as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, when you served as an advisor to then-Congressman Colby.

Now, one of the—ironically, one of the programs that's cut into the sovereignty—not just about money—but the sovereignty of AID, is the Millennium Challenge Account and, in fact, an overwhelming majority of countries that have received MCC monies have seen their own USAID funds slashed.

Now, I really, my ears perked up when you said—in response to Senator Lugar—this is not meant to be a replacement, and certainly those of us who supported the MCC believed it to be additive, not as a replacement. So, I'm glad to hear that that's your framework of mind, as well.

But, can we have a better coordination between AID and MCC? It just seems to me that we're missing out on some opportunities here, I'd like to hear your insights on that.

Mr. MULVANEY. A couple of thoughts—and again, this is beyond my portfolio that I would be confirmed for, so these are all my own personal views. Interagency coordination in foreign assistance has been a very difficult process and challenge from the Congressional viewpoint—and I haven't been in the executive branch—but in the design of the MCC, one of the things that Congress created was an Interagency Board that would provide oversight over those foreign assistance programs, and that includes Department of Treasury, State, USAID, and USTR.

And that board structure was intended to enhance interagency coordination, AID being on the board, particularly, would give it the opportunity to interact with the MCC at a very high level, so that there would be coordination.

Can there be better coordination? I think we always can see better coordination as a possibility.

You raised a point about bilateral funding levels of, say, the agency, where MCC countries have compacts. I would say this point was one that was left open as to what would be the interface of USAID in that particular country, if it would change, if it would be modified to the extent that the agency would pivot and focus on potentially non-MCC-type programs. It was an open question, largely because the administration did not have a clear blueprint on how it was going to implement the MCC. So, it was an area that was destined for further Congressional oversight and interaction.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, that's a good cause for me and the subcommittee to do some of that. I appreciate that insight, because we have, I believe that those of us that supported MCC believe that, in fact, what has happened is that it has become a replacement versus additive, in its totality of its nature.

And the coordination, have a USAID sit on the board, that's one thing. But, when we have missions in-country, that are then also having an MCC compact, that's the type of coordination I'd like to see us more succeed.

Mr. Heath, I didn't want you to think you were out there all by yourself. At the—I know you were saying, “Wow, I'm going to get away with it.” [Laughter.]

But, I was impressed with your answers privately, I just want to go one or two things with you publicly.

The United States is the single-largest country contributor the IMF, with cumulative contributions of over \$55 billion to the quota of the organization, so this is a very significant position.

I'd like to hear from you, what do you believe are the top three priorities of the Office of the U.S. Executive Director in the year ahead, since that, as the alternate you will may—you will be called upon to cast your vote or advocate policies there, I'd like to hear what you believe are the three top priorities we should be pursuing?

Mr. HEATH. Thank you, Senator. The priorities for the Executive Director's office certainly touch on all of the disparate issues now that are coming at the IMF.

For my own view, I would believe the first priority is on exchange rate surveillance. I strongly support the Executive Board's decision to incorporate exchange rate surveillance activities in its Article 4 consultations, the decision of June 2007, and it is vital to implement this decision in a firm manner.

This issue of exchange rate surveillance is an old one, in fact, for the IMF, something they've grappled with for about a generation, and I think the time is certainly overdue for firm action in this area.

Second one, I would say, was the reform of the IMF governance. We are witnessing in the current turbulence in credit markets, the emergence of emerging market countries as a stabilizing force, and as a group accounting for more than half of global growth, it's only appropriate, in fact, vital, that these emerging market countries assume leadership and responsible positions in the global community of finance, and certainly having representative positions in the IMF would reinforce that.

Finally, a third priority would be the integration of capital markets and financial markets analysis into the surveillance, Article 4 surveillance, and indeed, the full range of work done by the IMF. Again, we have seen, the latest turbulence in the market, a need for more profound or deeper examination of capital markets, of their functionings and how they affect players around the world.

Ironically, this latest crisis emanated from the most sophisticated economy in the world, that is, the United States economy, when others are looking for low-income countries to generate crises, it comes from an unexpected quarter. And so, it underscores the importance of integrating much more serious and profound analysis and examination of capital and financial markets into the work of the IMF.

And, if confirmed, those would be the areas I would be keenest on.

Senator MENENDEZ. When you speak about reform of governance, can you give me a sense of what you mean by that?

Mr. HEATH. The emerging market countries certainly should have a larger voice and a larger vote. One of the analyses that impressed me was a simple one of comparing the voting power of China, Brazil, and India with Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. I found that the former countries had 19 percent less voting power than the latter countries, even though the former countries have GDP four times that of the latter group of countries.

We are expecting emerging market countries to be responsible players in the International Monetary System, it's important that they have the vote and responsibility to support the institutions that now are residing with other high-income countries.

Senator MENENDEZ. Two other questions—do you believe the IMF has a role in promoting and facilitating economic development?

Mr. HEATH. Yes, I do. And, as we enjoyed in a conversation last week, the importance of fundamental policies, macro-economic policies as preconditions for growth is important to that kind of growth, within the United States and in low-income neighborhoods in the United States, as well as around the globe.

The primary responsibility of the IMF, of course, is macro-stability, and encouraging growth through that kind of stability, as well as through sound debt management and strengthened macro-economic institutions.

So, I believe its role is distinct from that of the World Bank and the recent commission by Pedro Moran, underscores the need for collaboration, but a distinct role where the World Bank has, really, the tools for a long-term development finance, whereas the IMF, while it has loan facilities for short-term needs and balance of payments needs, really has the expertise and mandate to encourage macro-stability in those countries as a fundamental for growth.

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally, debt relief has been at the forefront of the development debate for many years. The IMF has participated, starting in 1996 in the heavily indebted poor country initiative.

Now, there are some who believe that this has not had the success that they think it should have. What do you believe are the success and failures of that program, and how do we make sure that debt relief promotes economic growth and poverty reduction?

Mr. HEATH. The most recent round of debt relief involving the multilateral debt relief initiative, which, I think was from 2005, joined the earlier initiative of the heavily indebted poor countries, the HIPC initiative, and are strongly supported by the administration. The debt workouts that—and policy changes, I think—that accompany the forgiveness of debt strikes me as someone who's not intimate with the details not being in the position nonetheless, as the weak part of the program, and would require much more attention, I think, than they've been receiving.

It's important, not only that countries work, be free of debt, but operate in such a way that they don't return to an indebted situation. So, it requires building institutions, the technical assistance necessary to create stability and the economic power, the depth of financial markets to avoid returning to that situation.

Senator MENENDEZ. In other words it's not just the relief, it's the structure of the relief?

Mr. HEATH. Yes, sir.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Heath, you've raised, I think, some very sophisticated points that, undoubtedly you've already made in consultation with your colleagues at the IMF, or will shortly.

But, I just want to reiterate some, and gain further comment from you, because I don't think it's well understood in this country, quite apart from, on the board of the IMF, the extraordinary change is that you exemplified in the contrast of three countries, and their contribution to world economy, as opposed to three that are underrepresented, and the disproportion is staggering and growing.

Now, without offering investment advice, either one of us, the fact is that so-called emerging funds, mutual funds, as opposed even to international mutual funds, as opposed to, say, something based on the Dow Jones of our basic countries, have extraordinarily different returns, not only in this year, but, say for the past 5 years.

And so many investors who note this arithmetically are aware of it, but on the other hand they don't ponder, why is this so? How can this be sustained, this separation that is growing very large with the Dow Jones being our companies, as opposed to some that are represented clearly by emerging markets. But, it used to be part of the clientele of the IMF.

Now, this leads many questions, why haven't IMF—is that part of world history ???passe??? And, obviously you would respond, as you have, if not so, then you have experts there, an extraordinary talent pool of people delving into current problems in the world that still include debts of many countries—a situation in which, even as we describe, the rich becoming much richer, the poor really may be at the bottom of the heap.

And some of these countries are afflicted by problems of HIV/AIDS and malaria and tuberculosis, problems of agricultural failure that come up in this committee, or some of our other committees, in other words, huge, huge problems that don't necessarily affect the IMF, but they do in the sense of debt or interrelationships, those budgets, those countries with others.

I'm just curious, as you take a look at your responsibilities, the advice you will get from our country—how receptive is the current leadership of the IMF? Or others who have responsibilities, or are sitting around the table? May not be officers, but nevertheless, certainly large shareholders, to these kind of changes? Do you feel that there is a fairly universal recognition of what we're talking about today, in terms of the changes that sovereign funds bring, for example, as opposed to the kind of capital the IMF or the World Bank or others used to dispense?

Mr. HEATH. Well, thank you Senator Lugar for that question. It gets to the heart of everything, I suppose. And I would like to actually return and—after, if confirmed, in such a job, I could give a better assessment of the receptivity of leadership there, or in other

countries to change, but certainly for some of the reasons you mentioned, it strikes me as, there is a high level of receptivity. I do think that the surprise of the current credit market turmoil that—as I mentioned before—coming from a most sophisticated of markets, and not the least sophisticated, is something that catches the attention of people around the world.

In the emerging markets stock performance that you mentioned, now I see talk of bubbles in Chinese housing and other asset markets. So, it's prudent for people to pay attention, not only on the extraordinary up side, but what dangers are inherent in that kind of rapid growth.

Generally, these support the notion of caution about imbalances around the world, financial imbalances, and an orderly unwinding of these imbalances. The new leadership at the IMF, Monsieur Strauss Caan begins in a couple of days, has indicated a receptivity to a number of reform proposals, not only in the governance of the IMF, but looking beyond that to the role.

And that's going to be the real test for the IMF is, does it really step up to a new type of leadership that the world, in some sense, wants in dealing with vulnerabilities and crises and avoiding them, or is it going to be passive and more or less a think tank with a lot of expertise that offers advice, but no urgency about implementation? I think that's the key of the emerging market issue—are the players invested enough in the organization, so not only can they discuss policy, but make deals that stick.

Senator LUGAR. This intrigues me, just to ask this question. For example, some have pointed out that one of the reasons why the emerging market banking systems are doing so well comparatively during this system, is that perhaps they were not so "sophisticated." We can drive these subprime loans, package them in all sorts of attractive packages, flog them off around the world to other sophisticated bankers, who now have them in their portfolio, as the triggers are going off, and explosions occurring unexpected, here and there and, in other words, many of the so-called emerging markets were not receptive of this, maybe were not considered so sophisticated, thus do not have all of these time bombs sitting around in their safes every day, wondering what will happen to the rest of their economies.

Could the IMF, in an ideal situation, be a counselor to banking systems throughout the world? Maybe they wouldn't have spotted our sophisticated subprime loans, and the packages, and all of the fallout, but maybe some might have been bright enough to do so. That is, to understand, as you say, these imbalances in the world. Imbalances that are further exacerbated when this type of thing with the subprime business in the United States causes explosions all over the world, not just with regard to our own economy.

And, I'm wondering if this is a potential role for the sophisticated people who were sitting around the table, maybe dealing with other problems in the world at a different point, but now realizing that these imbalances themselves could throw things awry and create great suffering, as huge recessions occurred in various parts of the world, simultaneously, trade dried up, credit situations, ditto—that is the kind of thing, I think, that worries many of us, I'm sure you

as a professional in this situation. What do you see as the possibilities here of a role for the IMF?

Mr. HEATH. Yes, Senator, I think you've explained very well the possibility here for a high-level coordinating function for work already being done, perhaps by the Bank of International Settlements or other bodies, but there certainly has, is no parallel to the IMF's credibility in this area. And, I would be interested in pursuing that, or helping to define that emerging role for the IMF.

It's bound to be significant in, not only highlighting concerns as they've done, but as I say, actually making efforts to reach agreements on activity, actions that should be taken by member states.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that.

Mr. Chairman, as a point of personal privilege, I would compliment you on pointing out the responsiveness of the daughters of Mr. Mulvaney when he was testifying, which was exemplary.

I would like to also add, that the sons of Mr. Heath, when they were introduced, stood proud and straight and they looked like candidates for public service if I ever saw them. [Laughter.]

Mr. HEATH. Senator Lugar, their grandfather is a graduate of Purdue University and takes an active interest in the next generation of Purdue University students.

Senator LUGAR. Great Hoosier roots, I knew it. That's great.

Senator MENENDEZ. If you had said that at the beginning, you would have saved yourself all of the questions that were—

[Laughter.]

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Well, we appreciate, this is refreshing to hear some rather straightforward answers to questions. The administration would be well-served to send more people like you up here to give us straightforward answers to some questions.

With that, I understand that it is Chairman Biden's desire to move these nominations quickly. However, the record will remain open until 6 p.m. this evening, so that committee members may submit additional questions to the nominees, I myself have a few, but in the fairness of time, here, we'll submit it for the record. We ask the nominees to respond expeditiously to these questions.

If no one has any additional comments, the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

Mr. Chairman, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets today to consider the President's nominees for three important positions—Mr. Sean R. Mulvaney to be the Assistant Administrator for Management of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Mr. Daniel D. Heath to be the Alternate Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund, and Patrick Kennedy to be Under Secretary of State for Management.

Sean Mulvaney has been nominated to be the Assistant Administrator for Management at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Endemic global poverty remains one of the biggest challenges we face in the world today. It is in America's national interest to help developing countries to achieve stable and effective economic, political, and social institutions in order to reduce poverty and ease the strain of human despair. Foreign assistance is central to our

efforts to address the fundamental challenge posed by poverty in our world, and USAID will continue to play the lead role in this effort for the United States.

USAID faces a number of internal challenges over the course of the next several years, including long-needed foreign assistance reform and the continuing need to make the agency's financial management and administration as transparent and efficient as possible. Recruiting and sustaining USAID professional staff will be a key priority and one that requires closer attention. Contracting oversight will also require close examination, particularly in light of recent developments in Iraq and elsewhere. The role of the Assistant Administrator for Management of USAID is integral in addressing these issues.

Mr. Mulvaney has a strong management and administrative background, with degrees from Washington University in St. Louis and the Thunderbird School of Global Management. Notably, from 2005 to 2007, Mr. Mulvaney handled budget, appropriations, and U.S. trade policy as an Assistant to the Speaker for Policy in the U.S. House of Representatives. As adviser to House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee Chair, Congressman Jim Kolbe, Mr. Mulvaney helped in the development and negotiation of a number of important appropriations bills and programs including the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

Mr. Mulvaney will need to ensure the integrity of the agency's administrative and management operations in a rapidly changing and highly complex international environment.

We are also here to consider the nomination of Mr. Daniel Heath to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Today, we live in a globally interconnected society underpinned by a global economy. The IMF plays an important role in the stability and prosperity of that economy.

The mission of the IMF is to promote economic growth, international financial cooperation, and economic order. The organization will face a number of challenging issues over the next several years, including internal institutional and structural reform, the possibility of deteriorating finances, a new IMF Managing Director, and a rapidly growing developing world. The organization will need a strong, steady U.S. presence in order to navigate these difficult challenges.

The United States is the IMF's largest contributor, with substantial influence on the body's decisionmaking. As the primary U.S. representative at the IMF, the office of the U.S. Executive Director has a very influential and important role to play in the stability and growth of the global economy. The Alternate Director must have a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of international economic and financial issues, represent U.S. interests abroad, and be able to collaborate and cooperate with each of the other 184 IMF member countries—as well as America's own Treasury Department and other U.S. Government officers and agencies.

Mr. Heath will bring a strong record of government, academic, and business experience to this important position. Heath has served on the National Economic Council at the White House as Associate Director for nearly 6 years. He also served at the Office of Management and Budget for over a decade as a Senior Economist. Heath has also served as the Director of Economics at Oxford Analytica, an influential international consulting firm.

Finally, the committee will consider the nomination of Patrick Kennedy to be the Under Secretary of State for Management.

This is a vital position to effective and efficient operations at the State Department. With State Department officials posting in embassies and consulates spanning the globe and several thousand employees in Washington, DC, the Under Secretary for Management must be highly experienced in administration and committed to these challenging tasks.

Contracting oversight will be an immediate task that Ambassador Kennedy will have to address. Our reliance on contractors has led to deep problems, with foreign policy implications, particularly in Iraq.

Ambassador Kennedy is not new to this job, having served as acting Under Secretary for Management from 1996 to 1997. Since that time, he has served in several top management positions, including as Director of Management Policy at the State Department, as Acting Chief of Staff at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and as Chief of Staff of the Transition Office in Baghdad.

The committee looks forward to hearing the testimony of Mr. Mulvaney, Mr. Heath, and Mr. Kennedy. I believe that each of the nominees is qualified and deserves speedy consideration by the committee. I wish all three of these professionals continued success and look forward to working with them at this critical time in our country's history.

Thank you.

RESPONSES OF PATRICK F. KENNEDY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. Secretary Gates has recently stated that, at the moment, State Department security contractor methods and the United States military's effort to protect the Iraqi population are at odds. Do you agree with this assessment and, if so, what will you do to address this serious problem?

Answer. The utilization of security contractors is essential to the Department of State's ongoing diplomatic and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Without security contractors, the Department would simply not be able to interact with our counterparts in the Iraqi Government and population in furtherance of our critical mission and obligations to our Iraqi partners. That being said, the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense have agreed to implement all of the recommendations in the Report of the Secretary of State's Panel on Protective Security Services in Iraq which involve both Departments. This follows on Secretary Rice's previous decision to implement all of the panel's recommendations which were solely State Department responsibilities. A number of these steps were intended specifically to better coordinate our security measures with MNF-I operations.

Additionally, the Deputy Secretaries established a working group with three teams to implement those recommendations and recommend any further necessary steps. Meetings have already begun on ways to increase coordination and oversight. The deputy secretaries and secretaries will continue to be actively involved on this issue.

Question. Has the Department of State conducted a legal analysis of whether the excessive use of force, if committed by private security contractors, could be prosecuted under the War Crimes Act? If so, please provide that analysis. If a private security contractor in Iraq acted with reckless disregard of civilian life and that conduct resulted in the death of a civilian who was not participating in hostilities, would this be a violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions covered by the War Crimes Act?

Answer. Private security contractors hired by the Department of State in Iraq are civilians. They are not civilians accompanying the U.S. armed forces, nor are they participating in armed conflict. Their primary mission is to protect diplomats from harm, not to engage in combat operations. Indeed, the individuals they are protecting are generally civilians, not military officials. The ordinary duties of these security contractors therefore are generally governed by any relevant agreements between the United States and the host country related to their activities and by applicable U.S. and host country rules governing law enforcement-type activities (as the Secret Service presumably would be when protecting the President overseas), rather than by the laws of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions and their Common Article 3. If one of the Department's private security contractors committed a serious crime, the Department of State would refer the matter to the Department of Justice which would evaluate, among other provisions, whether the contractor had violated the War Crimes Act.

The Department of State has not conducted a formal legal analysis of whether the excessive use of force, if committed by private security contractors hired by the Department, could be prosecuted under the War Crimes Act.

Question. U.S. military commanders have complained that contractors have fired unaimed shots to clear their way in Baghdad. One of the changes you suggested to the rules for the use of force is that all shots must be aimed shots. Do unaimed shots in urban areas violate the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. A basic principle of the law of international armed conflict is that combatants are to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants and between military objectives and civilian objects when carrying out an attack. Whether unaimed shots by a combatant in urban areas violate this principle depends on the specific facts and circumstances prevailing at the time.

In making the specific recommendation, the review panel had been comparing Department of State policies and procedures with those of the Department of Defense. The panel found that the State Department's written guidelines for when to use force were robust and more detailed than those of the Department of Defense. However, the panel found that DOD's rules on how to use force were more clearly written, and thus recommended that DOD's language be added.

Question. To date, both the State Department and the Defense Department have relied on a self-reporting system to ensure oversight of contractors' actions. U.S. officials have stated that they do not think that all incidents are reported. Self-reports from two of the three State Department security contractors, DynCorp and

Blackwater, both average around one shooting a week. Has the Department conducted an analysis of whether these shootings were justified? If so, please provide any reports that the Department prepared. What percentage of those incidents involved unaimed shots or aimed shots conducted without sufficient prior warning?

Answer. Personal Security Specialist (PSS) contractors working under the WPPS contract are required to immediately report operational incidents of weapons discharges, attacks, serious injury, or death. Contractors are also required to report incidents of a negative nature, including incidents that would reflect negatively on the United States, the State Department, RSO, or the contractor. Each post has a Chief of Mission approved post specific Mission Firearms Policy that includes reporting requirements for weapons discharges. The RSO, Contracting Officer, and the program office receive such notifications simultaneously.

Significant incidents involving security contractor personnel are reviewed by the RSO and by relevant management and oversight offices within the Department to ensure that specific use-of-force incidents are consistent with Department policies. Incidents of security personnel misconduct are addressed through procedures in accordance with our contractual arrangements.

The addition of a State Department special agent to every movement will improve leadership and oversight, and not require us to rely on self-reporting by the contractor.

The WPPS base contract and guard contracts require all security personnel to follow the Mission Firearms Policy of the post to which they are assigned. Any use of force by security personnel in the course of operations must comply with this policy.

Embassy Mission Firearms Policies are defensive in nature, while at the same time taking into account specific circumstances surrounding our security operations in an active war or high-threat zone. The Mission Firearms Policy is founded upon the Department of State's respect for the paramount value of all human life, and our commitment to take all reasonable steps to prevent the need to use deadly force. Accordingly, the touchstone of the policy is necessity; deadly force can only be used in situations where there is no safe alternative to using such force, and without which the security personnel and the individuals they are charged with protecting would face imminent and grave danger.

In Iraq, nine personnel have been removed from the Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) program for shootings not in accordance with the rules of engagement in the Mission Firearms Policy. Based on a program office review, two individuals that had been removed from the WPPS program after a 2005 incident were declared eligible to return to WPPS, although they have not returned to date. One incident, which occurred on December 24, 2006, in Iraq, is under review by the Justice Department. The September 16, 2007, incident in Iraq is currently under investigation.

One individual, employed in Iraq by Triple Canopy Inc. under the Baghdad Embassy Security Force contract, was removed due to the discharge of a weapon. The incident occurred on November 7, 2005, and involved a third country national guard who, during an indirect fire attack, discharged his weapon at a vehicle from which the guard believed an RPG had been fired. There were no injuries as a result of this incident.

DOS is currently conducting a comprehensive review of all use-of-force incidents in Iraq. As this process is ongoing, the Department will provide you with an update once that review is complete.

Question. I understand that the reports provided by the contractors are reviewed by State Department management. In the past, what has kept contractors from reporting that all of the shootings were justified if in fact some were not justified?

Answer. Personal Security Specialist (PSS) contractors working under the WPPS contract are required to immediately report operational incidents of weapons discharges, attacks, serious injury, or death. Contractors are also required to report incidents of a negative nature, including incidents that would reflect negatively on the United States, the State Department, RSO, or the contractor. Each post has a Chief of Mission approved post-specific Mission Firearms Policy that includes reporting requirements for weapons discharges. The RSO, contracting officer, and the program office receive such notifications simultaneously.

Significant incidents involving security contractor personnel are reviewed by the RSO and by relevant management and oversight offices within the Department to ensure that specific use-of-force incidents are consistent with Department policies. Incidents of security personnel misconduct are addressed through procedures in accordance with our contractual arrangements.

The addition of a State Department special agent to every movement will ensure that any shooting is reported.

Question. In your view, if there is no independent oversight of the activities of private security contractors in the field, will their behavior change?

Answer. The Secretary's decision to implement the coordination and oversight recommendations, such as the addition of DS agents to motorcades, vehicle cameras, and the establishment of the Embassy Joint Incident Review Board, will ensure the highest level of accountability for the Department's protective security contractors.

The Department of State and Department of Defense have already initiated a series of meetings to increase coordination and to enhance current contractor methods as appropriate. Moreover, the Embassy in Baghdad and the Iraqi Prime Minister's office have established a joint Government of Iraq and United States Government Commission of Inquiry to examine issues of security and safety related to United States Government-affiliated protective security operations and to make joint policy recommendations.

Question. Pursuant to your recommendations to the Secretary, will the RSO staff accompanying the security details have command control over the security details?

Answer. Pursuant to the Secretary's mandate following the September 16 incident, a diplomatic security special agent is currently serving as the agent in charge (AIC) of all protective security details (PSD) for Chief of Mission personnel and has command control over the security detail.

Question. If so, will this include command over the contractor helicopters that overfly some of these convoys?

Answer. RSO air assets are currently under command control of the Regional Security Office's (RSO) Tactical Operations Center (TOC). If assistance from air assets is required, the AIC will request support from the TOC.

The diplomatic security special agent in charge of the TOC will then authorize air support.

Question. What are the rules for the use of force for contractors operating those helicopters?

Answer. The rules for the use of force outlined in the RSO Baghdad Mission Firearms policy apply to all personnel under Chief of Mission authority, to include RSO air assets.

Question. You did not recommend that State Department security personnel accompany the advance teams that clear the route ahead of the motorcade, correct? If so, that means at least half of the movements of private security details will not be accompanied, correct?

Answer. Pursuant to the Secretary's mandate following the September 16 incident, a diplomatic security special agent is currently serving as the agent in charge of all protective security details for Chief of Mission personnel and has command control over the security detail. This includes the advance teams, principal's motorcade, and the tactical support teams (TST). As a result, all movement phases of protective security details are being accompanied by DS agents.

Question. Of the over 300 incident reports since January 2005, how many were filed by advance teams?

Answer. DOS is currently conducting a comprehensive review of all use-of-force incidents in Iraq. As this process is ongoing, the Department will provide you with an update once that review is complete.

Question. Is it correct that, during the September 16 incident, the Blackwater advance team members were among those that fired their weapons?

Answer. At this time, the Department of State cannot comment on any aspect of the ongoing Department of Justice investigation and review of the facts surrounding the events of the September 16 incident.

In addition, my mandate to study the operations of security contractors in Iraq did not include investigating the September 16 incident.

Question. Will the Department continue to rely on the self-reports of advance teams since those teams will not be accompanied by DSS personnel?

Answer. Pursuant to the Secretary's mandate, a diplomatic security special agent is currently serving as the agent in charge of all protective security details for Chief of Mission personnel and has command control over the security detail. This includes the advance teams, principal's motorcade, and the tactical support teams. As

a result, all movement phases of protective security details are being accompanied by DOS agents.

Question. What about subcontractors at any level who provide security for State Department contractors?

Answer. At this time, the application of oversight policies to State Department and Defense Department subcontractors is under review by the joint Department of State and Department of Defense working groups.

Question. Will the recommendation to have DSS employees accompany all motorcades apply to USAID security details and details for other civilian personnel under Chief of Mission authority?

Answer. All personnel, including USAID and civilian personnel, under Chief of Mission authority are required by Mission policy to travel with a regional security office protective security detail.

Question. Does it apply to State Department subcontractors at all levels? If not, how many subcontractors will not be covered by this requirement?

Answer. At this time, the application of this policy to State Department subcontractors is not being considered. DS does not have the manpower or resource requirements to establish and sustain such a requirement.

Question. How many employees are there in Iraq under Chief of Mission authority?

Answer. As of October 26, 2007, there are 1,183 authorized U.S. positions and 196 locally employed staff in Iraq.

Question. how many security details do they require on a daily basis?

Answer. There are 49 total protective security details (PSDs) currently operating in Iraq: Baghdad—34 PSDs; Basrah/Tallil—5 PSDs; Al-Hillah—5 PSDs; and Kirkuk/Erbil—5 PSDs. PSD missions are configured based upon such factors as the venue, threat environment, and may include the deployment of an advance team, principal's motorcade, tactical support team, and explosive detection dog (EDD K-9) teams.

Question. I commend you for recommending that the Embassy Joint Incident Review team include employees of Federal agencies other than the Department of State. This makes sense given the fact that as protectees of contractors, State Department employees have a conflict of interest when they investigate their wrongdoing. Indeed, the Associated Press reported that one of the witnesses at the Nisoor shooting said that State Department personnel "tried to intimidate him into changing his story" and that his account was consistent with other accounts that the initial State Department investigation appeared to be an attempt to "vindicate the Blackwater guards." Has the State Department investigated these allegations? If so, what conclusions did the Department reach?

Answer. At this time, the Department of State cannot comment on any aspect of the ongoing Department of Justice investigation and review of the facts surrounding the events of the September 16 incident. In addition, my mandate to study the operations of security contractors in Iraq did not include investigating the September 16 incident.

Question. Has the State Department permitted private security contractors to remove employees who have allegedly used excessive force from Iraq?

Answer. In Iraq, nine personnel have been terminated from the WPPS program and one individual from the BESF contract, for shootings not in accordance with the rules of engagement in the Mission Firearms Policy. In each case, the personnel left post, as the contractual basis and purpose for their remaining in Iraq had ended. Incidents of security personnel misconduct, to include their termination and removal from post, are addressed through procedures in accordance with our contractual arrangements.

Question. There has been press indicating that State Department employees investigating the September 16 incident may have conducted their investigation in a manner that may make it harder to prosecute contractors involved in that incident and/or offered those contractors immunity. Did any State Department employees offer any Blackwater employees immunity? Did they coordinate with the Department of Justice before doing so? Do State Department employees have authority to offer immunity to individuals alleged to have engaged in wrongdoing?

Answer. The Department of State is not in a position to immunize individuals from Federal criminal prosecution. The kinds of statements about which the press

has written would provide limited protection that does not preclude prosecution. The Department of State would not have asked FBI to investigate this case unless we and they thought that they could investigate the case and potentially prosecute individuals if warranted. The Department of Justice has issued a public statement confirming that Blackwater employees have not been given immunity from prosecution and that the FBI's criminal investigation of this matter continues.

Question. Your panel recommended the use of "go teams" to investigate any shooting incident and to promptly offer "appropriate condolences and compensation." This could create a conflict of interest. Why shouldn't these functions be delegated to separate entities?

Answer. The report's recommendation is for the "go team" to work with counterparts designated by the Government of Iraq to identify potential individuals affected by an incident and to initiate the "appropriate condolences and compensation" process. This process would not be in conflict with the other investigative responsibilities of the "Go Teams." The payment of such compensation is not indicative of fault and is in accordance with traditional Iraqi norms and cultural expectations. The Department's program is modeled on the Department of Defense's claims and condolence payment program currently administered in Iraq.

Question. Please describe the training in evidence collection and crime scene protocols that State Department personnel charged with overseeing private security contractors receive.

Answer. Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) special agents receive crime scene preservation/management and evidence collection training. This training is provided at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), during DSS Basic Special Agent Course (BSAC) training and again in the DSS Basic Regional Security Officer (BRSO) training prior to deployment abroad. The training is broken down into the following subject areas:

FLETC

- Fingerprint Lecture
- Rolled Fingerprint Lab
- Video Techniques Lecture
- Video Techniques Lab
- Basic Physical Evidence Collection Lecture
- Basic Physical Evidence Collection Lab
- Digital Photography Lecture
- Photography Lab

BSAC

- Evidence Database Lecture

BRSO

- Crime Scene Management

The evidence collection and crime scene management training is part of the FLETC, DSS basic agent, and basic RSO training courses. Although this training provides an excellent overview of the crime scene and evidence collection fields of study, it is not a substitute for the expertise that forensic scientists and/or crime scene technicians utilize in processing crime scenes. Additionally, it should be noted that the current security situation in Iraq can make it problematic to properly secure a crime scene in accordance with established practice in the United States.

Question. Would you agree that any Iraqi families who lost loved ones as a result of the wrongful use of force are entitled to know that the perpetrator was tried for any wrongdoing, not just monetary compensation?

Answer. The Department of State strongly supports efforts to provide greater legal accountability for unlawful acts its security contractors may commit abroad. The applicability of U.S. criminal law to the activities of private security contractors overseas is not always clear and may depend on the facts at issue in any particular case. The administration is currently working with the Congress on legislation to clarify any ambiguities and expand the coverage of U.S. criminal laws so that we have the laws we need to hold private contractors overseas accountable where appropriate.

Question. Does the Department support elimination of the immunity created by CPA Order 17?

Answer. CPA Order 17 (Revised) currently gives private security contractors for diplomatic missions, including for U.S. missions, immunity from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed pursuant to the terms and conditions of their con-

tracts. The U.S. military operating in Iraq, and U.S. Government contractors working on reconstruction, humanitarian, and development projects also receive immunity under this order.

One of the principal recommendations of the Secretary of State's panel on personal protective services in Iraq was that the U.S. Government (State and Defense) determine how to commence discussions with the Government of Iraq on a new regulatory framework for private security contractors. The panel found that CPA Order 17 and Memorandum 17, which provide this framework, need to be updated or replaced.

We are already engaging with the Government of Iraq on this issue. The U.S.-Iraqi Joint Commission, co-chaired by the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission and the Iraqi Minister of Defense, is examining issues of safety and security related to U.S. Government-affiliated personal security detail operations in Iraq. Its work includes examination of the impact of CPA Order 17 on such operations. More broadly, as the United States and Iraq engage in discussions on their long-term strategic relationship, we expect to address how to update or replace many of CPA Order 17's provisions, including its provisions on jurisdictional immunities. We have seen reports that the Maliki government has a legislative proposal to reformulate the Iraqi regulatory framework for private security contractors, but have not yet reviewed a draft.

Question. Are any steps under consideration to bring greater control and coordination over the operations of private security contractors in Iraq other than those on the WPPS contract and those on DOD contracts—including many who are providing security to contractors and NGOs on DOS (including USAID) contracts? Is there any reason to believe there is any lesser need to control and coordinate their operations than those of the WPPS contractors?

Answer. As advised in the response to your first question, the Department of State and Department of Defense have already initiated a series of meetings to increase coordination and to enhance current contractor methods as appropriate. This process will also include a review of those policies and a determination on their appropriate applicability to State Department subcontractors.

Question. Are any similar steps being taken in Afghanistan for WPPS contractor operations there? If so, what is the status of implementation? If not, why are these good ideas for Iraq but not Afghanistan?

Answer. The Secretary's decision to implement coordination and oversight recommendations, such as the addition of DOS agents to motorcades, vehicle cameras, and the establishment of the Embassy Joint Incident Review Board, is currently focused on ongoing WPPS contractor operations in Iraq. Enhancements in Iraq will be evaluated and considered for deployment to WPPS contractors operating in Afghanistan and other countries as appropriate.

RESPONSES OF SEAN R. MULVANEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Is the USAID operating expense budget roughly the same now as it was in 2001? If no, please clarify.

Answer. Yes. The fiscal year 2001 (inflation adjusted to 2005 dollars) OE level as compared to the fiscal year 2007 enacted level for the OE fund is:

- Fiscal year 2001 OE = \$589,000,000.
- Fiscal year 2007 OE Appropriation = \$626,832,000.

The difference between 2001 and 2007 OE dollars = \$37,832,000. This is approximately a 6 percent increase over 2001 dollars and is attributed to annual payroll adjustments.

Amounts do not include Office of Inspector General or the Capital Investment Fund.

Question. Is it correct that USAID program funds were about \$7–8 billion in 2001 and are about \$13 billion now? What does the \$13 billion figure include? Specifically, does it include some PEPFAR programs and MCC Threshold programs?

Answer. Yes, it is correct. In fiscal year 2001, USAID managed approximately \$7.362 billion of program funds. In fiscal year 2007, USAID estimates that it managed approximately \$12.772 billion of program funds.

The \$12.772 billion figure includes PEPFAR funds of approximately \$1.3 billion and MCC programs. These figures are based on total dollars obligated.

RESPONSES OF SEAN R. MULVANEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. It is critical that USAID is able to recruit and retain the highest-caliber personnel if it is to carry out its mission and fulfill its development objectives. As you know, attrition rates at the agency are extremely high. Please describe what steps you would take to ensure that the agency is able to recruit top-level staff. Please also discuss what steps are needed to provide opportunities for rising junior officers, improve morale, and increase junior officer and overall staff retention rates.

Answer. Over the past few years, attrition for the Foreign Service and Civil Service has been around 7 percent per year, with over 82 percent of Foreign Service attrition and 33 percent of Civil Service attrition due to retirement. These levels are commensurate with other similar U.S. Government agencies.

USAID has traditionally attracted very high quality candidates. Over the past many years, however, agency budgets have seriously constrained hiring Foreign Service officers above attrition, as well as Civil Service hiring in critical areas such as procurement, even as the size and scope of our programs have increased dramatically. If confirmed, I am committed to helping USAID reverse this trend by targeting resources to meet the Foreign Service and Civil Service recruitment needs of the agency.

USAID values all of its employees and has strived to provide professional growth opportunities for its entire staff to avoid any increase in attrition. We greatly appreciate the flexibility Congress granted USAID to more rapidly assign our junior officers overseas and we intend to continue to use it to the fullest extent possible. Training is understood to be of utmost importance. In fiscal year 2007, USAID doubled the training budget for staff development focusing efforts on technical and leadership skill enhancement. I am committed to sustaining our focus on increased training for staff, including additional foreign language training.

Question. At USAID field missions, administrative staff complains that the State Department and USAID have very different needs and that consolidation programs fail to address these differences.

- What administrative requirements of USAID are not shared by State?
- How do these differences make consolidation difficult for USAID?
- Will consolidation efforts impede USAID activities in any way?

Answer. USAID and State negotiated 15 administrative support functions (warehouse management, expendable supplies, leasing, motor pool, property maintenance, customs and shipping, reproduction services, administrative procurement, mail, messenger and pouch services, Foreign Service National (FSN) payroll and FSN initiatives, cashiering, recruitment, the Eligible Family Member program, and language training) that would be subject to consolidation, and further agreed that functions that are unique to supporting USAID operations would not be subject to consolidation. USAID does not share hiring and classification authority for all staffing actions, and will continue to perform its non-ICASS equivalent HR functions. USAID technical and program management, legal advisory support, procurement, grant-making and financial management activities that support programmatic USAID functions and staff are not subject to consolidation with State.

Integration of Information Technology (IT) systems and services to support the consolidation initiative is a significant challenge. State and USAID have made considerable progress in developing and deploying an IT solution to enable the use of shared IT applications to support the consolidated administrative support services. The IT solution has provided the enabling environment to eliminate redundancies through the use of standardized applications. Uniform use of these applications in the coming year will be a significant accomplishment of the consolidation initiative.

Consolidation of overlapping services is a sound objective. Nonetheless, the consolidation of these 15 administrative services will require ICASS in many instances to change its service standards to meet USAID's business requirements as the implementing United States Government agency for foreign assistance. Providing the necessary administrative support to USAID's activities while ensuring cost effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of services will be a continuing challenge for ICASS.

NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Glendon, Mary Ann, to be Ambassador to the Holy See
Larson, Charles W., Jr., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Latvia

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr. presiding.

Present: Senator Casey.

Also present: Senators Harkin and Grassley.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order to consider nominations for two important diplomatic posts. The President of the United States has asked that Mary Ann Glendon serve as United States Ambassador to the Holy See, and that Charles Larson represent the United States as Ambassador to Latvia. And I want to welcome Professor Glendon and Mr. Larson here, and if you have family here, and others, we welcome them, as well.

And I know that Senator Tom Harkin—I refer to him as Chairman Harkin, we're on—we serve together, but he's done a wonderful job in a number of posts that affect people's lives, but he and I just came through the process of having the Farm bill voted on by the United States Senate, and as the Chairman of the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, he's done a wonderful job on a very difficult piece of legislation. Not to mention, some of the people, like me, he has to deal with in that process. He has served so honorably over many years in the United States Senate, we're honored to have him here.

And I guess I just wanted to provide some background, but I wanted to make sure that we're—I was cognizant of Senator Harkin's time and his schedule.

Senator, I'm just asking you if you're—do you have—how much time do you have to—

A couple of minutes, okay.

Maybe we'll do, instead of providing some background, maybe I'll just go right to you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. TOM HARKIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA**

Senator HARKIN. I'd appreciate that, very much.

Senator CASEY. And you can provide your statement or testimony, and then we'll move forward.

Senator HARKIN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate, first of all, your expediting this hearing for these two candidates—one of whom I know, the other one I don't, but I congratulate her for her position, and for expediting this, and hopefully we can get the full committee to further expedite it.

Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for your kind words on the Farm bill. That was a long exercise, and I want to personally thank you for all of the good work that you did on the committee and helping us pull it together and finally get it through, and hopefully we'll get it done here sometime in January, as we get through the conference committee.

But I just wanted to be here this morning to introduce to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the committee—through you to the committee—Chuck Larson, the President's nominee to be our next Ambassador to Latvia.

I've known Chuck Larson and his father for quite some time. His father served as the U.S. District Attorney in the 1980s, first under President Reagan, then under President Bush, and then there was a hey, this there, for the 1990s, and then his dad came back again as District Attorney under President Bush.

And I can just tell you—so Chuck comes from a family of really dedicated public service—people that are interested in public service, and Chuck himself has taken up that himself.

He served—graduated from the University of Northern Iowa when he was a member of the legislature, member of the House, Iowa House for a long time, I think, from 1993 to 2003, a member of the Iowa House. He chaired the Judiciary Committee and, in fact, had pushed through one of the toughest antimethamphetamine laws anywhere in the Nation, and we've had a real problem with that in Iowa, and Chuck did a great job in leading the charge on that.

He also chaired the Iowa House Economic Development Committee, making Iowa a more competitive environment to attract and retain some high-paying jobs.

Now then, from 2003 to 2007 he served in the Iowa Senate, and served as chairman of the Iowa Republican Party from 2001 to 2005. Again, to show you his dedication to public service, while he was a State Senator he was also in the Army Reserves, and served for a year in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Was awarded the Bronze Star for meritorious service in combat, and the combat action badge. He was stationed in LSA, Anaconda in the heart of the Sunni Triangle, in charge of the command's legal affairs and spearheaded its humanitarian missions.

As I've stated earlier, I've known Chuck Larson for over, well over a decade—more than that. He is a qualified public servant, and I urge this committee to report his nomination with a positive recommendation.

And if I just might add, parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, you see I have some, I have perhaps some personal interest in this also.

You see, Chuck Larson is a very active, dedicated Republican, served as chair of the Republican Party. I happen to be up next year, I figure if he's in Latvia, I might have a better time of it next year. [Laughter.]

But he's served with distinction as chair of the Republican Party, and I can say this—he's landed a few blows on me in the past, but they were always, as I always say, in-bounds and between the goal posts—which is the way political contests ought to be conducted. And he's done so in his own political career in Iowa, the same way.

So, I just have no hesitation at all in endorsing him—great family, great person, great father, good family, two kids, and I can't think of a better representative of what we stand for in America, to represent us abroad than Chuck Larson, so I just give him my wholehearted support for this. And we'll get him to Latvia so he's not around Iowa next year. [Laughter.]

Thanks, Chuck.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, we want to thank you for being here, especially today when it's rather quiet in the Capital after a late night, and we were passing legislation late into the evening last night, actually almost into the early morning, and it's another sign of Chairman Harkin's dedication that he's here at all this morning, not heading back like some others are. And we're just grateful that you're taking the time to be here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it very much.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HARKIN. See you later.

Mr. LARSON. Thank you, sir. Have a great Christmas and New Year.

Senator HARKIN. Hopefully we can get this thing done in a hurry.

Senator CASEY. I, first of all, wanted to formally welcome both Professor Glendon and Mr. Larson to the hearing today. I think, speaking about both of you—and I'll try to speak about each of you individually, but together you both provide a whole broad range of experience that you bring to this hearing and to this confirmation process that spans all kinds of life experience, subject matter expertise and experience in public affairs and public policy. So, we're grateful that you've demonstrated the willingness to put yourself forward to be confirmed and to serve the United States Government and the people of our country.

And I know you look forward to, even, the challenges that you'll be confronting, not just the challenge of the confirmation process, but the challenge of serving. And I know you see that as both an opportunity for meeting challenges, but also as an opportunity for meeting challenges, but also an opportunity to render capable and effective and competent public service.

I wanted to start with the Ambassador of the Holy See, that position, Professor Glendon. I think as the seat of the Catholic Church we know that the Holy See is unique among diplomatic postings around the world. Its influence reaches into the lives of over a billion individuals worldwide, who look to the Vatican for spiritual guidance, including one out of every four Americans. As a Roman Catholic, I am one of those of every four Americans.

Worldwide, the Catholic Church has been at the forefront of efforts to promote human rights, to protect human dignity, and to provide humanitarian assistance across the world.

The Church, I think, has challenged people of all faiths to care about and to fight for the least, the last, and the lost in our society, and of course that goes for the world over. We know that under the leadership—just by way of important examples—under the leadership of Pope John Paul II, the Holy See played a particularly significant role in ending decades of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. And although our Government over the years, and I think even at present, doesn't always agree with the Church on every issue, I think when you talk about the priorities I just mentioned—whether it's the role played by the church in ending communism, the role in Eastern Europe, the role it plays in human rights and human dignity or the work that it does on humanitarian causes around the globe—I think on those priorities, the Vatican has been an invaluable partner for the United States of America, and we expect that to continue.

Professor Glendon, I think based upon your own experience, just your resume alone, you're well-prepared to continue that long and cooperative relationship between the United States and the Holy See.

Due to your extensive past work on behalf of the Catholic Church, and your experience and expertise in domestic and international law, you are already well-acquainted with many of the issues that you'll confront as ambassador.

You've gained wide respect as a legal scholar of the first order. I'm a lawyer—I've never been accused of being a legal scholar—but I have great respect and regard for those in our legal circles who have that capacity.

But, I think, in addition to the academic underpinning of your experience, you've been honored as an advocate, and I think you've been honored as a servant. And, of course, by taking on the responsibility of putting yourself forward as a candidate, a nominee to be an ambassador, you're, of course, amplifying and enlarging and public service that is so important in the United States today.

I want to recognize in a personal way the work that you did with my father, when he was the governor of Pennsylvania and thereafter, he remained active as an advocate in the nonprofit world after he left his 8 years as governor, but I personally want to thank you for the way that you worked with him, and the respect that you accorded him.

And I know that he had high regard for you, as I mentioned a couple of moments ago, as a lawyer. He was a really, really good lawyer, and had great respect for good lawyers. But he also, I think, respected your integrity and your honesty and your commitment to principle.

Like him, you've never shied away from taking tough stands. You've been honest about where you stand, and I think he was a great example of that, on a whole range of public policy matters going back, in his case, going back a couple of decades in public office.

He was a someone—if I can just add a personal note here—probably the only person in, I think, certainly the history of Pennsyl-

vania, but maybe the history of any other State, who ran for governor of Pennsylvania in four different decades. Not all of those successful, but he had a great determination and a great identification with the underdog. And I think if—the church, when it's at its best—in this country, and worldwide, does that when it's focused on the underdog, the person who doesn't have a voice, or at least doesn't have power.

So, we're grateful for that personal connect that you made to him, and I'm especially grateful.

I think your work as ambassador would probably require that you draw upon those skills and that experience and that passion that you bring, and that you have brought to your work. So, we're grateful for your presence here today and looking forward to your testimony.

Mr. Larson, I want to thank you for your willingness to serve. It doesn't happen very often that a United States Senator from the other party gives the kind of testimony that Senator Harkin just gave on your behalf, and I think that speaks volumes about both of you. It doesn't happen enough in Washington, and usually when it happens there is no coverage of it—or limited coverage.

But I've been a witness, and those of us here today are bearing witness to that kind of—not just bipartisanship, but I think an affirmative statement about your qualifications.

The country of Latvia is one of the many countries in the world—as we were speaking about the Vatican—benefit from the Vatican's efforts to roll back the Iron Curtain. This country has amassed—Latvia has amassed—an impressive list of accomplishments even more recently, since reestablishing its independence from the Soviet Union, joining NATO and the European Union. It's been at the forefront of regional efforts to promote democracy—so important across the world—and its economic growth rate is the envy of Western Europe.

Latvia has also been an important security partner for the United States of America, and has currently almost 100 troops serving in Afghanistan.

Despite these achievements, Latvians face considerable challenges, as you know. Like other countries in the region, it struggles with corruption, the problem of energy dependence on Russia, and the successful integration of a large Russian minority.

Resolving these issues won't be easy, and the people of Latvia deserve our support as they work to meet these challenges.

Mr. Larson, your past experience as a prosecutor—and dare I say it, a politician, which I think actually is a good qualification, despite what we read in newspapers sometimes—and also as a soldier will be valuable preparation for representing our country, the United States of America, as an Ambassador to Latvia. The legal, political, and security challenges facing Latvia's young democracy will draw upon all of your varied professional skills, and we thank you for your willingness to serve.

And I would say to both of our nominees today, both of your nominations come at a critical time in the history of American diplomacy. Now, more than ever, the United States needs ambassadors who exemplify the principles that made our Nation great, and still make it great. Providing that type of representation in the

Holy See, and in Latvia, will require all of your energy, creativity, and determination, but I'm confident that both of you are up to that task.

We'll turn to our nominees at this moment, and I ask you both to deliver your statements in the order you were introduced, Professor Glendon, you can start. And if you can be somewhat brief and succinct, that would be helpful, and if you feel the need to summarize your testimony, please know that the text of your full statement will be included in the hearing record.

And I know that this—and we probably don't do this enough—this is not just a day for the particular United States Senate committee, or just a day for the discussion about a confirmation—this is a personal moment, and an important personal moment in your life, so if you have family or friends that you'd want to introduce—I'm glad the room isn't full of hundreds that we have to introduce, but if you have someone or a group of individuals you'd like to introduce, certainly we'd welcome your using that, your time to present them at this time.

So, at this time, Professor Glendon, the floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF MARY ANN GLENDON, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE HOLY SEE**

Ms. GLENDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this hearing. It's a real honor and a privilege to be before you today as you consider my nomination to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See and I will try to be brief.

My hope is, if I am confirmed by the Senate, that my 30 years of experience in a variety of international settings could aid me in promoting American interests and the American image, the best of American values with the Holy See.

Most of my legal work, my research, and my pro bono activity have, as it happens, been concentrated in areas that are common interest to the Holy See and the United States, and so if I were confirmed, I would expect to be vigorously involved in the collaboration that already exists between the United States and the Holy See on such issues as human rights, religious freedom, trafficking in human persons, development and alleviation of hunger, disease, and poverty.

From the beginning of my legal career—which was quite a long time ago—I've been engaged in cross-national dialogs. I studied European law at the University of Brussels and interned at what was then the European Common Market, now the European Union, and since then I've had leadership roles in many organizations that are dedicated to improving international relations.

I'd just mention three experiences, in particular, that seem to be relevant to the Holy See post. I was elected the President of the UNESCO-sponsored International Association for Legal Science by a multinational membership, a worldwide membership. I was a member of the Board of Directors of the Southern Africa Legal Assistance Program, which during the apartheid era, provided scholarships and other kinds of aid to aspiring African lawyers, and I'm a member of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, a group whose members are drawn from five continents and a variety of religious backgrounds—I've been their President since 2004. And cur-

rently, I'm involved with Harvard Law School's efforts to internationalize its curriculum.

In all of those capacities, I have organized many international conferences here and abroad, and I would hope that that sort of activity would be part of the work of the Ambassador to the Holy See.

Among my writings relevant to the post, I will mention just one, my history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is a diplomatic history and a biography of Eleanor Roosevelt, covering the years when she chaired the Human Rights Commission and represented the United States in the United Nations.

I would also like to mention that my participation in the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, my pro bono work for the Catholic Church has, I believe, given me a certain insight and understanding of the Holy See that should be helpful to me in advocating for our Government, and help to fortify the cooperation that has already been achieved.

Mr. Chairman, the Holy See is a vital partner for the United States. It's a vital partner because of its global reach and impact, its presence in areas that are of concern to the United States that affect U.S. interests and the U.S. image abroad. The Holy See is actively engaged on five continents in humanitarian work, as you said, Mr. Chairman, for the least, the lost and the last, for the defense of human dignity and for the promotion of dialog among diverse faiths and cultures.

Its concerns in those areas form a natural alliance with many of our policies, and if confirmed, I would work vigorously to develop those areas for our mutual benefit.

I believe that Pope Benedict's forthcoming visit to the United States in April will provide an excellent opportunity for us to develop our mutual interests, and explore new areas of cooperation.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, if I were confirmed, I would devote my best efforts to building on the relationship that already exists, reinforcing those ties. It would be a privilege to be entrusted with that responsibility, to carry on the work of Ambassador Rooney, and the other fine representatives that have served the United States at the Holy See since we began diplomatic relations in 1984.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would look forward to working with you and with your colleagues in Congress to serve the American people and to advance our national interests abroad. And I would be very pleased to answer any questions that you have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Glendon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY ANN GLENDON, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE HOLY SEE

Mr. Chairman, and members of this distinguished committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as you consider my nomination to serve as United States Ambassador to the Holy See. I am grateful for President Bush's nomination, and for the support of Secretary Rice.

If confirmed by the Senate, my hope is that my experience in a variety of international settings will aid me in promoting American interests with the Holy See. Most of my legal work, academic writing, and pro bono activity has concentrated in areas where the United States and the Holy See have common concerns. If confirmed, I would expect to be vigorously involved in the collaboration that has already been established on a range of issues, such as human rights, religious freedom, trafficking in human persons, development, and the fight against hunger, disease and poverty.

For many years, my work in international legal studies has engaged me in cross-national dialogs in those areas. After studying European civil law at the University of Brussels, I worked as a press liaison in the headquarters of the European Common Market, now the European Union. Over the course of my academic career, I have had leadership roles in many organizations dedicated to improving international relations.

Three experiences in particular that I would mention are the UNESCO-sponsored International Association for Legal Studies (to which I was elected president by a multinational membership), the board of directors of the Southern Africa Legal Assistance Program (which aided aspiring African lawyers in the apartheid years), and the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences (a group whose members are drawn from five continents and from a variety of religious backgrounds). Currently, I have been closely involved with Harvard Law School's efforts to adapt its curriculum to the needs of students who will be practicing law in increasingly globalized environments.

An important part of representing our country as ambassador is bringing people together on matters of common interest to the United States and the Holy See. I have been the principal organizer of numerous international conferences over the past 20 years for Harvard Law School, for the International Association of Legal Science, and for the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.

Among my writings on subjects relevant to the post for which I have been nominated, I would mention especially my history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a book that combines diplomatic history with a biography of Eleanor Roosevelt covering the years when she represented the United States in the United Nations.

I would also like to mention that since 1994, when I was appointed to the Pontifical Academy of Social Science, I have acquired a knowledge and understanding of the Holy See that will aid me in advocating for our Government, while helping to fortify and expand the cooperation that has already been achieved.

Mr. Chairman, the Holy See is actively engaged on every continent in the defense of peace, justice, and human rights. Because of this global perspective, the Holy See is a vital partner for the United States.

The Vatican is committed to defending fundamental human rights, promoting human dignity, and working to advance dialog among people of differing faiths, races, and ethnicities. These priorities create a natural alignment with our policies that, if confirmed, I intend to exploit to its fullest potential in our mutual benefit.

The Pontiff's visit to the United States next April will provide an excellent opportunity to expand areas of cooperation and explore new ones. President Bush and Pope Benedict met in Rome in the summer of 2006 and this visit will deepen the tie between the two leaders.

If confirmed, I would devote my best efforts to build relations at all levels and deepen the ties that have existed between the United States and the Holy See ever since formal diplomatic relations were established in 1984. It would be a privilege and an honor to be entrusted with the responsibility of carrying forward the fine work of Ambassador Rooney and all the other U.S. representatives who have served so ably in that post.

Mr. Chairman, Embassy Vatican is at the front lines of this important shared agenda. Though few in numbers, its outstanding staff does excellent work on a modest budget. If confirmed, I will work with them to move forward our current priority issues and seek new areas in which to engage the Vatican.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your colleagues in Congress to serve the American people and advance our national interests. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Senator CASEY. Professor, thank you very much, I appreciate your testimony.

Mr. Larson.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES W. LARSON, JR., NOMINEE
TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA**

Mr. LARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, first, want to thank you for the time you've taken on the eve of the holiday and the New Year after a very long session, which I can appreciate from my service in the legislature, so I'm very, very thankful. I also want to thank the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff for

their hard work in organizing today's hearing, and Senator Harkin, for his kind words. This has been a tremendous experience and I only have the highest regard and compliments for Senator Harkin and his staff—they have literally bent over backward to assist me, and without their support, I recognize that this hearing would not be occurring on such short notice.

I'm deeply honored to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Latvia. I'm grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they have placed in me, and if confirmed, I pledge to maintain that trust by working to advance and defend American interests in Latvia, while deepening the ties between our two nations.

For 14 years, I served the citizens of Iowa as a representative, as well as a Senator in the Iowa legislature. Through that experience, I learned the importance of being responsive to the legitimate needs of the people.

As State representative, I had the opportunity to chair several committees. My work as chair of the House Judiciary Committee increased my appreciation for the essential role of the rule of law, and the importance that it plays in a democratic nation.

As chairman of the House Economic Development Committee, I participated in a mission to Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, and witnessed the importance of trade in strengthening relationships between nations. My respect and appreciation for cultures outside of the United States began in my youth, when I lived in Saudi Arabia for 2 years, and further developed when I spent a year in France.

In 2004, I deployed to Iraq as a citizen-soldier with the United States Army, serving as the Command Judge Advocate for an engineer and aviation command for 1 year.

In addition to my military justice duties, I spearheaded our command's humanitarian mission, working with Iraqis to build 12 new schools, 3 city halls, and to distribute more than \$100,000 in school and medical supplies to approximately 17,000 Iraqi children.

Through this work, a bond of trust developed between the Iraqis and American forces, and a foundation was laid to develop some of the key elements of democracy at the lowest level.

My experience in Iraq ingrained in me the critical importance of security and counterterrorism, as well. The welfare and protection of American citizens will continue to be one of my key priorities, if confirmed.

Overall, my legislative and cross-cultural experiences have taught me the importance of diplomacy, strengthening political and economic ties with other nations, and of achieving results by moderation, tact and compromise. It is in that knowledge that I will apply to my position, if confirmed as United States Ambassador to Latvia.

Since regaining its independence in 1991, Latvia has rapidly moved away from the political economic structures and sociocultural patterns of the former Soviet Union. Today, Latvia fully embraces democratic and open market principles. It's a member of the IMF, the World Bank, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and in 2004 Latvia officially joined the Eu-

ropean Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in 2006 it hosted NATO's summit in its capital of Riga.

As a NATO ally, Latvia has stood shoulder-to-shoulder with us in the war on terrorism. This country of 2.3 million has deployed more than 10 percent of its national armed forces to coalition and NATO peacekeeping missions abroad. Having supported the liberation of Iraq for several years, Latvia has now shifted its deployment focus to Afghanistan, where it plans to increase its deployments from the current 98 soldiers to 200 by October 2008, with no caveat.

In addition to using its troops to promote democracy in the world, Latvia provides developmental assistance and expertise to other countries of the former Soviet Union, as they work to build their own democratic states. Latvia's microfinance projects provide economic assistance to Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine. Latvia also funds projects to transfer to these countries the knowledge it gained from the political reforms it undertook in order to accede to NATO and the European Union.

If confirmed, I will work to support and encourage continued robust Latvian engagement in the fight against terror, and the promotion of freedom worldwide.

Latvia still has to work to overcome the legacy of World War II and the Soviet rule, particularly in promoting social integration, historical reconciliation and the rule of law.

Almost 29 percent of Latvia's residents are ethnic Russians, and a large portion of them are noncitizens. The Latvian Government has been making an effort to achieve a more complete social integration of this minority population. Latvia's policies on minority language, education, naturalization and citizenship requirements for voting are consistent with international norms.

I hope to use my position as ambassador to support the government in outreach efforts, not only with the Russian community, but all minority interests.

Latvia is also making progress in coming to terms with the horrors of the Holocaust. The Latvian Historical Commission, under sponsorship of the Government of Latvia has promoted Holocaust awareness throughout all elements of society. Although the restitution of Jewish property has been substantially completed, approximately 200 communal and heirless private properties have yet to be compensated for. If confirmed, I will work with the government and the local Jewish community to further address Holocaust legacy and property restitution issues.

Latvia continues to take steps toward strengthening the rule of law, and increasing transparency. Latvia similarly has taken important steps to ensure a productive relationship with neighboring Russia, including forming an intergovernmental commission with Russia to address bilateral issues. Today, the two countries exchanged the instruments of ratification on a historic treaty, delineating their common border, in fact that occurred yesterday with very, very positive comment.

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, I know the high importance each of you place on service to the United States of America. I, too, place a high value on service to our country, whether as a citizen-soldier, or as an ambassador.

If you confirm my nomination, I pledge to dedicate myself to promoting the ideals of the United States, while protecting and developing our relationship with Latvia. Thank you for granting me the honor of appearing before you today, I'm pleased to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Larson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES W. LARSON, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am deeply honored to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Latvia. I am grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they have placed in me. If confirmed, I pledge to maintain that trust by working to advance and defend American interests in Latvia while deepening the ties between our two nations.

For 14 years, I served the citizens of Iowa as a representative as well as a Senator in the State legislature. Through this experience I learned the importance of being responsive to the legitimate needs of the people. As a State representative, I had the opportunity to chair several committees. My work on the House Judiciary Committee increased my appreciation for the essential role the rule of law plays in a democratic nation. As chairman of the House Economic Development Committee, I participated in a mission to Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, and witnessed the importance of trade in strengthening the relationships between nations.

My respect and appreciation for cultures outside the United States began in my youth, when I lived with my family in Saudi Arabia for 2 years and further developed when I studied in France for a year.

In 2004, I deployed to Iraq as a citizen soldier with the United States Army, serving as the command judge advocate for an engineer and aviation command for 1 year. In addition to my military justice duties, I spearheaded our command's humanitarian mission, working with Iraqis to build 12 schools, 3 city halls, and to distribute more than \$100,000 worth of donated school supplies to approximately 17,000 Iraqi school children. Through this work, a bond of trust developed between the Iraqis and American forces and a foundation was laid to develop some of the key elements of democracy at the local level.

My experience in Iraq ingrained in me the critical importance of security and countering terrorism, as well. The welfare and protection of American citizens will continue to be one of my key priorities.

Overall, my legislative and cross-cultural experiences have taught me the importance of diplomacy, of strengthening political and economic ties with other nations, and of achieving results by moderation, tact, and compromise.

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As a NATO Ally Latvia has stood shoulder-to-shoulder with us in the war on terrorism. This country of 2.3 million people has deployed more than 10 percent of its national armed forces to coalition and NATO peacekeeping missions abroad. Having supported the liberation of Iraq for several years, Latvia has now shifted its deployment focus to Afghanistan, where it plans to increase its deployment from the current 98 troops to 200 by October 2008, with no caveats.

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Latvia still has work to do to overcome the legacy of World War II and Soviet rule, particularly in promoting social integration, historical reconciliation, and the rule of law. Almost 29 percent of Latvia's residents are ethnic Russians, and a large portion of them are noncitizens. The Latvian Government has been making an effort

to achieve a more complete social integration of this minority population. Latvia's policies on minority language education, naturalization, and citizenship requirements for voting are consistent with international norms. I hope to use my position as ambassador to support the Government in its outreach efforts with not only the Russian community but all minorities.

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Thank you for granting me the honor of appearing before you today. I am pleased to answer any questions.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Larson. We'll start the round of questions now. The rounds normally at a hearing like this go per Senator, 7 minutes or even 10 minutes, but usually about 7 minutes. I don't want to alarm you, though, I'm not going to multiply 7 by every chair here, so—I have some discretion today as chairman, but also as the lone Senator sitting here, so I might have some—a couple of questions beyond the 10 minutes, but I'm grateful for your testimony.

I guess I'll start, Professor Glendon, with you. A couple of questions. One would be—we live in a world now where, because of what we're seeing playing out not only in the Middle East, but especially there and across the world, conflicts that have some of their origin in religious differences, in fact, sometimes even disputes—violent disputes—about the meaning of one, tenets of one particular religion, we're seeing that all of the time.

And I guess, in light of the conflict, but also just in terms of the integrity of our debates about these issues, I wanted to ask you about—I guess, one or two questions about how you'd assess the Holy See's kind of broader relationship with the Muslim world. I know it's an expansive question but it becomes very important, because I think the Holy See becomes—not an arbiter, but becomes an important player in those kinds of situations where you have not just countries competing for power or resources, but also when it comes to relationships, or the kind of ecumenical efforts that we try to make, not only in this country but as a world leader.

But, I guess, I want to get your just, general sense of the relationship between the Holy See and the Muslim world.

Ms. GLENDON. I'd start by recalling that the Holy See has had a long, long experience with dialog with the Muslim world. It's a dialog that's had its phases and its ups and downs. But, at the present time, that dialog has been marked by a very intensive search by the Holy See for discussion partners who are open to the idea of meeting on the plane of reason—this has been a particular mark of the Pontificate of Benedict that he looking for persons who

can advance their religiously grounded viewpoints in a manner that is intelligible to all men and women of goodwill.

The present state of affairs with the Muslim dialog, I believe, is that in December, Benedict extended an invitation, or proposed a conference between Holy See and Muslim representatives in response, I believe, to a letter that 138 Muslim leaders sent to him, and that process certainly affords some hope of achieving agreement on some very basic things, such as religion is never, ever an excuse for violence.

Senator CASEY. And I know there were some questions raised recently about the—Pope Benedict had made several statements that cast doubt on whether he would welcome Turkey's entry into the European Union, what's your understanding of the Vatican's current position on that, and anything else you'd want to add about how you see that issue?

Ms. GLENDON. My understanding is that the Holy See is very concerned about religious freedom, and of course, the European Union is committed to certain basic standards of religious freedom, and I believe the Holy See's position is that countries should meet those standards, or show significant progress toward meeting those standards.

Senator CASEY. And I guess I also wanted to get your sense of—when you make a list of some of the challenges the world faces, virtually, you can't point to one that the Holy See is not involved in or making efforts to try to improve the condition of human dignity or the condition of people that are suffering. And, this is a very difficult question to answer succinctly, but I would ask you if you could kind of highlight or even rank—when you look at the globe and you look at the challenges that so many people face, whether it's poverty or AIDS or violence, go down the list—what do you think is the most challenging for the Holy See and how do you see your role in helping this country relate to what the Holy See needs to focus on in terms of those—the biggest challenges, when we think of poverty or the others I mentioned?

Ms. GLENDON. Well, that's a really challenging question, Mr. Chairman--

Senator CASEY. It could take a couple of hours.

Ms. GLENDON. In view of your indication you'd like a brief response, I will refer to the Pope's World Day of Peace message, the text of which was just issued.

And he highlighted three concerns, and I would expect that these would be the same concerns that he will bring to the United States when he visits here in April, and they were, of course, peace—as you would expect in a World Day of Peace message. Concern for the environment, climate change, and the third—something that has always and everywhere been at the heart of the Church—the concern for poverty, disease, lack of development.

The Holy See, I think, in its interventions on occasions like the World Day of Peace or the speech that the Pope is likely to give at the United Nations—it is constantly calling the developed world to be attentive to be attentive to what you referred to as the least, the last and the lost, and that's a major theme in the World Day of Peace message.

As for what the United States Embassy could do, I think those areas are all areas where—they are three of the many areas where the Holy See and the United States share common concerns and have already established cooperative relationships.

My own view is that in 2008, an excellent way of our highlighting those concerns and achieving something fairly important in—not only in the relationship between the two entities, but to advance the issues, in general, is 2008 happens to be the 60th anniversary, both of the Genocide Convention, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it would seem to me that that provides the occasion for the United States and the Holy See to join forces in advances their own commitment, and promulgating the principles that underlie those two documents.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much, and I may come back to you.

I'm going to move to Mr. Larson about some questions about Latvia—one of the issues that I mentioned in some of my opening comments was the issue of corruption. If you could speak to your knowledge of that and efforts underway, if any, to address that—because we, any democracy faces that in the early, in the infancy of a democracy, but even, as we know here in the United States, even very well developed, in our case a republic that has had centuries of development now, more than two at least, we still have that problem here—local governments, State government, and even the Federal Government—what's your sense of that, and what's your sense of kind of a mission that you'll have to try to impact it positively?

Mr. LARSON. That's an excellent question, Senator, and as you know, the foundation of a democracy is the rule of law, and having confidence in the government, and I can tell you that many of the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, or even in Iraq—one of the greatest problems we were confronted with was the rule of law and stopping corruption.

Latvia has worked very aggressively, they have an Office of Anti-Corruption that is investigating and trying to root it out. There have been many reforms put in place in the 1990s to help combat that, and if confirmed as ambassador, I will work to leverage resources, technical assistance that we have here in the United States from the Department of Treasury, FBI, and the Department of Justice to assist them in their investigations to provide that the technical assistance that could be key in building the cases and key to success in developing the rule of law is to prosecute and to root it out, and to help set an example that will give confidence to the people of a nation and their government.

Senator CASEY. You mentioned Treasury, FBI—who's the third?

Mr. LARSON. The Department of Justice, Treasury.

Senator CASEY. Okay, and I want to get back to that, but I know we have, who just came in the room, Senator Grassley, who I think may want to provide some testimony.

Thank you, Senator, appreciate you being here.

Sure, we're honored to have Senator Grassley here who, as a—in my case as a first-year Senator you have to do your best not just to learn where the hearing rooms are and what to do every day, but you have to try to learn from those who have been here ahead

of you, and he's been a great inspiration to a lot of people here, even those who have been here longer than I have. And we've worked together on a number of issues, and whether it's in the Agriculture Committee, I've watched his work for many years in the Finance Committee, so we're grateful for his presence here, and his testimony.

Thank you, Senator.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK GRASSLEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA**

Senator GRASSLEY. You know, many times since I've been in Congress, I've had an opportunity to introduce many Iowans to the Senate and to various committees of the Senate, and even this committee, but very seldom can I say I've introduced people who are friends of mine. I hope they've all been friends, but I mean a real friend, and Chuck Larson's an example of a real friend—both personally as well as politically, and so I'm glad to be here to introduce him and have that special relationship with him.

I want to commend you and the committee for considering Chuck Larson for this ambassadorship, and of course, holding a hearing at this late stage to fill this position in Latvia is very important, because Latvia—even though a new country, well, relatively new in the sense of not being out of the Soviet Bloc very long, and you held this hearing so early because this just came before the Senate on November 30, so thank you.

You'll find out as ambassador or anything else he's done that Chuck Larson is an intelligent, accomplished leader, first being elected to the Iowa General Assembly in 1992, and I told him at that time—his mother was campaigning for him—if he wins this because his mother is working so hard for him, because I know how that is, my mother worked hard for me when I was first running for the Iowa House of Representatives half a century ago.

While in the Iowa House, he served as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and chairman of the Economic Development Committee, and then he was elected to the United States Senate. And then while he was in the Senate, he was called into full-time military service, because he had been in the military, going way back to 1987. He's currently a Major, as you know, from his BTA, and he had to miss sessions of the Senate because he served in Iraq. He was deployed for a year with the 332nd Engineering Group, he also happens to be a graduate of law school, and he has practiced law, and he has practiced law, and he's been a business man.

Chuck Larson has served Iowa, then, not only as a State Senator and not only as a member of the military, but in a lot of specific ways, as well.

So, I'm pleased that he's now been called by the President to serve his country once again, in this particular case, as an ambassador. I'm confident that my friend, Chuck Larson, will represent the United States well, and excel in this position just as he has throughout his career.

So, Mr. Chairman and members of your committee, I want you to know that I strongly support this nomination, and I hopefully have the ability, since, you know, we're getting toward the end of one President's constitutionally limited term of office that we can

get him approved so he can serve a full time over there for the rest of this President's term, and who knows, if our side of the aisle is lucky enough, he might be able to serve longer than one year.

So, thank you very much for considering this, and thank you very much for wanting to serve.

Mr. LARSON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator GRASSLEY. And let me say congratulations to you, too, for your important nomination.

Ms. GLENDON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator GRASSLEY. You bet.

Senator CASEY. Senator, thank you very much, and we appreciate your presence here on a day when many are not, and we're grateful for your leadership and it's a great testament to this nominee and to the State of Iowa, that both of the United States Senators were here today to provide that testimony, so we're grateful. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Larson, I wanted to also explore the relationship, obviously, that I think many people have had concerns about and they're well-founded, the relation between Russia and Latvia, and in particular in the area of energy—gas and electricity and what that means in terms of political leverage.

How concerned are you by Latvia's significant and really heavy dependence on Russia for its energy supplies, and how do you see that playing out in the time that you would serve, upon confirmation as ambassador?

Mr. LARSON. That's an excellent question and key to it is the development and improvement of the relations between Latvia and Russia. Yesterday, the Russian-Latvian border treaty was signed with very, very, positive comments by Foreign Minister Zavrov from Russia—he invited the President of Latvia to Russia next year. So, we're seeing, overall, not only positive comments, but improvements in relations.

The two nations have developed an intergovernmental commission that's addressing approximately 10 issues right now that affect both of their communities.

Latvia is working aggressively to diversify their sources of energy. They've received assistance and expanded their hydroelectric to provide approximately 25 percent of their needs, but you're correct, Mr. Chairman, the vast majority of their electrical needs is coming from Russia, natural gas, as well.

They're exploring opportunities with Finland to expand electrical transmission from Finland, through Estonia to Latvia and Lithuania, and Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia are also investing in a new nuclear plant that will be based in Lithuania and provide expanded electrical transmission for them.

So, I believe the key is for expanded diversification, and if confirmed, I will work with U.S. companies to help provide technical assistance, potential investment opportunities for U.S. companies, and additionally, I'll draw from my own State, where we have a very diversified renewable fuels agenda, and some of the leading experts in the Nation are in Iowa for biodiesel, ethanol, and whatnot, and I know that they have a tremendous interest in Latvia, as well.

I guess, I want to ask you a follow-up on the use of the—in place now, an intergovernmental committee?

Mr. LARSON. There's a commission—

Senator CASEY. Oh, commission, sorry.

Mr. LARSON [continuing]. Made up of representatives from both countries, yes, sir.

Senator CASEY. Can you tell me more about that?

Mr. LARSON. It's a bilateral commission that has about 10 issues underway that they're actively working on—

Senator CASEY. Representation from Russia?

Mr. LARSON. Both Latvia and Russia, yes sir.

Senator CASEY. And, but you fell confident that they are on a path where they have a—at least a plan or a strategy to diversify, sufficient to diminish or reduce that dependence?

Mr. LARSON. I believe that they are actively pursuing that plan right now, from an electrical transmission perspective with Finland, and also from a more expanded source of energy, with a plan to, in Lithuania, to provide nuclear energy.

Senator CASEY. You mentioned in your testimony the, obviously, the horrific history—the world history, really—with regard to the Holocaust, but in particular, in Latvia, the attempt to raise both awareness, but also the property restitution issues it's surrounding. Can you tell us more about that just in terms of where it is now, and how you see it developing?

Mr. LARSON. There's great education that needs to be done. When I served in the Iowa Senate, I spearheaded an effort to bring part of the traveling Holocaust Museum to Iowa, because I recognized that not every Iowan would have the opportunity to visit the museum and learn. And at the crux of the issue is that the best way to ensure that we do not experience, as a society, another Holocaust, is education. And that's where the Latvian Government is proactively working to educate the people about what occurred, and to help ensure that it does not happen again.

There remains some tension, tension I think would be appropriate, that we see in many European countries regarding anti-Semitism. And so, more work needs to be done.

Additionally, although the vast majority of the private property issues have been resolved, as far as restitution, there is still approximately 200 communal properties, or heirless properties that I mentioned, where restitution has not been made. And as ambassador I will—if confirmed—will do two things in this area, and I'll work very closely with the local Jewish community to help encourage expanded education, and then second, that the issue of communal property must be resolved.

Senator CASEY. And there's still a good bit of work to be done there?

Mr. LARSON. There is, there is.

Senator CASEY. Thank you. I'm going to go back to Professor Glendon, and maybe go back to Mr. Larson, as well.

Professor, one issue that obviously has consumed a lot of our time in the Senate, and the same is true of the House, which is as it should be, is the war, the war in Iraq. And I know that there's a—upon confirmation, you'd be in a—maybe not a unique position, but an easy position in terms of what the Holy See has said about

the war and what the administration's position is on the war. How do you see that playing out and how do you—not just with regard to that issue, but how do you approach those issues, where you see—at a minimum, a tension, and in some cases there may be issues where there's a direct conflict. How do you—how do you resolve those kinds of disputes or tensions?

Ms. GLENDON. Well, let me start by saying that it seems to me that leaving aside the Holy See's well-known opposition to our invasion of Iraq that in the period of time since then it certainly has supported our goals of achieving a peaceful, religion-respecting, free society in Iraq. And the Holy See has a presence in Iraq that could, in fact, it has access, I think, in the capillaries of the society to keep a sense of what's going on that could be very beneficial for us to get in touch with.

So, I think that despite the initial conflict over the entry into the situation, the Holy See can be a reliable and valuable partner in working our way through toward some kind of peaceful outcome.

Senator CASEY. Your broad experience as a lawyer, I think, should come in handy when you deal with issues like that.

And, I guess I'd ask you what—in terms of your own experience as a lawyer, as an advocate, as someone who's weighed in on public policy, what do you think your most—this is probably not a question anybody wants to answer—but what do you think is going to be your most difficult challenge upon confirmation?

Ms. GLENDON. I think the most difficult challenge, frankly, arises from the short period of time that these ambassadorial appointments are likely to last, and I have given a good deal of thought to what could be accomplished in a short period of time. It seems to me that it's fortuitous that we have these two anniversaries that I mentioned—the Genocide Convention, and of the Human Rights Declaration—it seems to me that in itself would provide a couple of projects that would enable us to explain and defend American positions, and to lift up American values, in a way that if it could impress the Holy See it could, through the Holy See, influence the image of the United States everywhere that there are Catholics—all over the world—but also especially in Europe, where I think that the image of the United States needs some improvement.

Senator CASEY. And I know that you're anticipating the visit by Pope Benedict here, in the United States, and I'm not asking you to provide an itinerary—but how does that work in terms of your involvement? How much of your time has to be devoted to helping that journey be well-planned or executed, or is that of—I'm just curious as to your involvement in that, because it's a—I can't even begin to imagine how difficult it is to—for those who were charged with that responsibility to set up that itinerary and make it go smoothly, but I just didn't know the role you have to play in that, or—if any.

Ms. GLENDON. Well, frankly, I'm not sure what exactly the role I would have to play would be, but I would expect it to be the first thing that the new ambassador would have to attend to. And I would hope that—you were kind enough to mention my background as an advocate—I would hope that I would be able to be helpful in translating from one frame of reference to another, I think I would be able to ease communication between the two entities.

Senator CASEY. Well, thank you, I appreciate that, and I don't envy those who are planning that kind of a trip, with the detail and the work that goes into that kind of a trip must be overwhelming, so we wish them all the luck in the world.

I guess, one more Professor, I was going down a list, and I don't want to—we can't cover everything today, but there was one other that I had—oh, with regard to the Peoples Republic of China, I guess there's some speculation that the Vatican might reestablish diplomatic relations with China—do you have any sense of that, yet? Or do you think, is it too early in your consideration of that, or your information about that to comment, but what do you know about that? The likelihood of that happening, if any? Or, what's your sense of that?

Ms. GLENDON. I think the most significant thing is that these conversations are taking place, and that there does seem some disposition on the part of China to discuss the question of the status of the most neuralgic question concerning the internal government as a church, the appointment of bishops—I would expect the negotiation process to be protracted, the questions are difficult, and I do believe that the Holy See is much more interested in religious freedom in China, than it is in establishing diplomatic relations, and that some progress—a good deal of progress—would have to be made on the religious freedom front before a change was made on the diplomatic front.

Senator CASEY. Thank you. I know we're a little tight on time, but Mr. Larson, I guess my last question pertains principally to the issue in Latvia, not just in terms of how it's dealing with Russia as it relates to energy policy and diversification, but just generally, how would you characterize that relationship now, even beyond the issue of energy? Where, you can't pick up an American newspaper without reading yet another story about what's happening in Russia, specifically as it pertains to Mr. Putin and what his intentions are, especially in light of a close ally of his now, being on a path to assume power.

And there's real concern, frankly, in this country, for a lot of reasons. Not just because of things he has said and intentions he seems to have in mind, but what it does for that region, and stability and the relationship between our two countries.

And, I guess as Ambassador to Latvia, you'd be dealing with some of those same concerns, and some of those—weighing those considerations when you're ambassador to that country on behalf of the United States and you have to deal with the Kremlin, and you've got to deal with the leadership in Russia, and how do you see that relationship now, both between Latvia and Russia, but also how the United States handles that?

Mr. LARSON. That's an excellent question. I would describe it, Mr. Chairman, that it's improving, and as Foreign Minister Zavrov said, we cannot turn a blind eye to the historical challenges we've had in the past, and he just made that comment yesterday.

And I think it fairly sums up the growing warmth between the relationships or the growing improvement in their relations. As I mentioned, yesterday we saw a very positive sign that they signed the Latvian-Russian Border treaty; Russia also more recently, last week, suspended their participation in the Conventional Forces Eu-

rope treaty and yesterday they said that they would be willing to return to the table to continue those discussions.

On the Intergovernmental Commission, we're seeing continued dialog as these two nations work to iron out a number of issues that nations would face that border each other. So, I would describe it, clearly, as improving and if confirmed, as United States Ambassador, I would work with the Latvian Government to encourage that continued dialog and improvement of relations, and building relations across borders.

Senator CASEY. We especially appreciate your service to the country in Iraq, and there are few people, I think that have the combination of government service, and service in a current or recent conflict, so I think both sets of experience in addition to other life experience should serve you well.

But, we're grateful, and we're thinking at this holiday season about those who are still serving in Iraq and Afghanistan and around the world, but we're wanting to note as other shave here, your service.

Mr. LARSON. Thank you.

Senator CASEY. Unless there are other comments that either of you would like to make, you could certainly amplify the record by way of written followup or statement if you wanted to. I may have questions that I submit for the record, other members of the committee might, to amplify what we talked about, but we're particularly grateful for your presence here today and your willingness to serve the people of the United States and also the diplomatic posts, the areas of the world you'd be serving in upon confirmation, so we're grateful.

Unless either of you have anything else, I'd ask that we—I make my own motion to adjourn this hearing, but thank you very much.

Mr. LARSON. Thank you.

Ms. GLENDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 10:33 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]