CONFIRMATION HEARINGS ON FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

MAY 7, JUNE 11, SEPTEMBER 9, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 2008

PART 4
Serial No. J–110–8

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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NOMINATION OF HELENE N. WHITE, OF MICHIGAN, TO BE CIRCUIT JUDGE FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT; RAYMOND M. KETHLEDGE, OF MICHIGAN, TO BE CIRCUIT JUDGE FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT; AND STEPHEN JOSEPH MURPHY III, OF MICHIGAN, TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

WEDNESDAY, MAY 7, 2008

U.S. Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in room SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Leahy, Cardin, Specter, Hatch, Grassley, Kyl, Sessions, Cornyn, Brownback, and Coburn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

Chairman Leahy. Good morning. I have been speaking during the last several weeks about the progress we have made and are making in repairing the terrible damage done to our confirmation process and about our progress in reducing judicial vacancies.

The American people do not want judicial nominations rooted in partisan politics. They want Federal judges who understand the importance of an independent judiciary. Our independent courts are a source of America’s strength, endurance and stability. Our judicial system has been the envy of the world. The American people expect the Federal courts to be impartial forums where justice is dispensed without favor to the right or the left or to any political party or faction. They are the only lifetime appointments in our Government, and as a result, these nominations matter a great deal. The Federal judiciary is the one arm of our Government that should never be politicized or made political, regardless of whether we have a Democratic President or a Republican President.

Now, today we see a demonstration of the progress about which I have been speaking and for which I have been working. Today’s hearing moves us closer to confirming President Bush’s nominations to the last two vacancies on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. This completes the task I began when I became Chairman
in the summer of 2001, when the Sixth Circuit was in turmoil and nominations had been road-blocked for years. At that point there were four vacancies on the Sixth Circuit. I thought I would go through some of this history for those who may be new to all this or may not remember this.

When I scheduled a hearing and a vote for Judge Julia Smith Gibbons, and then for Judge John Marshall Rogers, we were able to break an impasse that had lasted for 5 years. The other party had blocked all of President Clinton's nominees. I quickly moved to President Bush's. And if we confirm Judge White and Mr. Kethledge, that would complete the process by filling the two remaining vacancies on the Sixth Circuit.

I continue in this Congress, and I will continue with a new President in the next Congress, to work with Senators from both sides of the aisle to ensure that the Federal judiciary remains independent and able to provide justice to all Americans, without fear or favor.

The Michigan vacancies on the Sixth Circuit have proven a great challenge. I do want to commend Senator Levin and Senator Stabenow for working to end the impasse. I have urged the President to work with the Michigan Senators and, after 7 years, he has. Last month our extensive efforts culminated in a significant development that can lead to filling the last two vacancies on the Sixth Circuit, both vacant so long that they have now been classified as "judicial emergencies."

This accomplishment stands in sharp contrast to the actions of my friends, the Senate Republicans who refused to consider any—any—of the highly qualified nominations to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals during the last 3 years of the Clinton administration. Those nominees included Judge White; also, Kathleen McCree Lewis, an accomplished attorney and the daughter of former Solicitor General of the United States and former Sixth Circuit Judge Wade McCree; and Professor Kent Markus. Professor Kent Markus was supported by his home-State Senators, both Republicans.

So, accordingly, I am delighted to welcome Judge Helene White to the Committee. Judge White has served on the Michigan Court of Appeals during the past 15 years, having been elected by the people of Michigan in 1992. Before that she served for a dozen years on the Wayne County Circuit Court, a court of general trial jurisdiction, the Common Pleas Court for the city of Detroit, and the 36th District Court of Michigan. But here is how she is described by the Bush White House on their website. President Bush's website described her as "an experienced and highly qualified judge, who is known for her intellect, work ethic, and demeanor." I do not want to upset President Bush by saying this, but I totally agree with the President on this issue. In addition, she has been active as a member of the legal community and of community organizations including COTS, the Coalition on Temporary Shelter, something my wife and I support in Burlington, Vermont; JVS, Jewish Vocational Services; and the Metropolitan Detroit Young Women's Christian Association.

Now, she was first nominated by President Clinton to a vacancy on the Sixth Circuit in January 1997, more than 11 years ago, but the Republican-led Senate refused to act on her nomination. She
waited in vain for 1,454 days for a hearing, before her nomination was withdrawn in March of 2001. Hers was one of the scores—actually, about 60—of qualified judicial nominees who were pocket filibustered during that time. But as I said, last month President Bush reconsidered, renominated her, and according to his website has very high praise for her.

Our second Sixth Circuit nominee is Raymond Kethledge. Mr. Kethledge is a young man who has spent 8 years in legal practice in Michigan beginning as an associate in the litigation department of Honigan Miller Schwartz and Cohn, later as a partner at the boutique litigation firm of Feeney Kellett Weiner and Bush and, since the summer of 2003, as a founding member of his own firm, that of Bush Seyferth Kethledge and Paige. He also spent a year as an in-house counsel at Ford Motor Company in their general counsel’s office. I am also glad to see that he has performed pro bono legal services, something I have always thought lawyers should do and something that the managing partner in the law firm I was in when I first came out of law school insisted that everybody perform pro bono service, as did he.

Our third nomination for consideration today is the President’s recent nomination of Stephen Joseph Murphy III to be a United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan. That vacancy is also classified as a “judicial emergency.”

When on April 15 he announced the renomination of Judge White, I commended the President. Since then I have sought to expedite consideration of these Michigan nominees in recognition of the breakthrough represented by the agreement reached between the President and the Michigan Senators. The Michigan Senators have always been interested in a bipartisan solution to judicial vacancies on the Sixth Circuit. I remember, Senator Levin, you had worked, and Senator Stabenow, with former Governor Engler, actually a Republican Governor, and reached an agreement that he was strongly in favor of but was rejected by the White House. And you had previously proposed a bipartisan commission as a way to reach consensus in Michigan. Today, I thank and commend the Senators from Michigan, and again I thank the President for finally working with them and us.

In light of that cooperation, we have taken extraordinary steps to expedite this hearing. I thank all members for their cooperation. I recently received a letter from Senator McConnell and Senator Specter in which they note the importance of our receiving updated ABA peer reviews for these new nominations. I want Senator Specter to know that I agree with him that those are important. The ABA Standing Committee has been working diligently to provide reviews on the recent nomination of Justice Steven Agee to the Fourth Circuit as well as other nominations. They have been helpful, and we appreciate their efforts. Given the ABA ratings we have received in connection with the prior nominations of Judge White and Mr. Murphy, I expect the new ratings will not present a concern about qualifications. As I have assured Senators McConnell and Specter, I will seek to ensure that we proceed in an orderly fashion, that all Senators have a fair opportunity to question the nominees, and that we have all the materials we need in order to fairly consider these nominations.
Now, I am sure there are some who prefer partisan fights designed to energize a political base during an election year. I do not. The Republican Senate majority during the last 5 years of the Clinton administration more than doubled vacancies on our Nation's circuit courts. They went from 12 to 26 to 32 during the transition. We have been able to reverse that trend. We have reduced circuit vacancies by almost two-thirds. Today there are fewer circuit court vacancies than at any time since the 1996 session. In fact, our work has led to a reduction in vacancies in nearly every circuit. We are heading toward reducing circuit court vacancies to single digits for the first time in decades. With these nominations, we are also poised to add the Sixth Circuit to the other five circuits without a single vacancy, thanks to our efforts.

I am determined to prioritize progress, not politics, and focus the Committee on those nominations on which we actually can make progress, those on which the White House has finally begun to work with the Senate. Of course, the alternative is to risk becoming embroiled in contentious debates for months and then foreclose any of the progress we have made. We saw it happen last year when we had a controversial nomination took 5½ months of debate after a hearing before Senate action was possible. We saw what happened during the last several months of the last Congress. There were many hearings on many controversial nominations, and everything slowed up. I like to make progress, and that is what we have tried to do. And during the years that I have been privileged to serve as Chairman of this Committee, we have been able to.

Senator Specter.

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think that it bears repeating that we are approaching a hearing for Judge White which does not conform with the practices of the Committee and is an unusual rush to judgment. I begin with the letter sent to the Chairman and me yesterday from the American Bar Association raising concerns and objecting to the hearing in advance of the ABA report.

I look at the sequence with Judge White's nomination on April 15th of this year, 21, 22 days ago; the questionnaire not completed until April 25th; FBI report not completed until April the 25th; and at the time sequence where nominations have been handled in the past with deliberation and not this racetrack approach.

The comments in 2001 were noted in the ABA publication which said, “Several key Democratic Senate leadership, most significantly Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, say that”—


Senator Specter. Excuse me, but I have the floor.

Chairman Leahy. I just want to—

Senator Specter. Excuse me. I know that is not regarded around here, Mr. Chairman, but I have the floor. If you have a correction, you may have a chance to do it.

“* * * say that they will wait for the ABA’s input before moving forward on any nomination.”
When a hearing was scheduled for Peter Keisler 33 days after his nomination, all of the Committee Democrats signed a letter to me asking for a postponement. One of the concerns was, “Given how quickly the Keisler hearing was scheduled, the ABA has not even completed its evaluation of this nominee.” The letter said, “We should not be scheduling hearings for nominees before the Committee has received the ABA ratings.”

Senator Schumer said, “So let me reiterate some of the concerns we expressed about proceeding so hastily on this nomination. First, we have barely had time to consider the nominee’s record. Mr. Keisler was named to this seat 33 days ago, so we are having this hearing with astonishing and inexplicable speed.” That does not compare with the speed of this hearing.

The situation is even in more stark contrast when we take a look at how long people have been waiting for hearings or action by the Committee. Peter Keisler’s nomination has been pending for more than 675 days. Robert Conrad has waited 290 days for a hearing and has been the subject of critical, really defamatory statements in this Committee room about being anti-Catholic without being given a chance to defend himself. Stephen Matthews, to the Fourth Circuit with a judicial emergency, has been waiting over 240 days.

Since the hearing has been scheduled, the Republican members are prepared to proceed. We have accommodated schedules. I met for the better part of an hour yesterday with Judge White. But it would be my hope that the Committee will schedule hearings for others like Conrad and Matthews and others.

It is hard to see the judicial wars being exacerbated and intensified in the U.S. Senate, but I see that coming if, as stated, this is the last of the circuit court nomination hearings. This has been a battle to the detriment of the American people for the last 20 years. In the last 2 years of the Reagan administration, the Democrats controlled and stonewalled. The same in the last 2 years of the Bush I administration. And in the last 6 years of the Clinton administration, Republicans were even worse. Hard to be worse, but Republicans were. And I voted with the Clinton nominations when they were qualified. And the Senate almost came apart in 2005 with the filibusters and the so-called constitutional or nuclear option.

And it had been my hope that Senator Leahy and I would have structured a new era in the Senate. In the Roberts hearing, Senator Leahy took a courageous leadership position supporting Roberts for Chief Justice. Counting the Independent in the Senate, a majority of the Democrats, 23, voted for Roberts. And it had been my hope that we would come to a truce. But the warfare goes on, and the American people are in the firing line.

There are judicial emergencies all over this country, exemplified by the Fourth Circuit where people need a day in court and are not getting it, people who have automobile accidents and are out of work and have medical bills, cannot get redress in the courts. Verdicts cannot be heard on appeal. We do not have to paint a graphic picture of what judicial vacancies mean. And this is all to the detriment of the American people. But I tell you, Mr. Chairman, a longstanding trend of some 40 years that is becoming very, very personal, and if it continues, there is going to be a new Congress,
there may be a President of a different party, and what has happened will look modest in comparison to what the scorched earth may be.

So I would urge you to reconsider. I would urge you to use some of the approach which you and I took to the confirmation of Roberts and Alito. When the White House wanted to have the Roberts hearings begin on August 28th, I consulted with you, and I thought your objections were sound. And the hearings began after Labor Day. Your view prevailed because I thought it was right over the White House view. Similarly, the White House wanted Alito—I know the time, Mr. Chairman. I also know when you arrived. The White House wanted Alito confirmed before Christmas, and you objected, and you were right. And I agreed with you. Later, the President personally told me that the timing was correct. So here you see, Senator Leahy, you and he have agreed more than once—not much more than once, but occasionally more than once.

But I do hope for the sake of the country and for the sake of the Senate that you reconsider this nomination-confirmation process. Thank you.

Chairman Leahy. Well, thank you. I am glad to hear the President said that about the timing to you. I wish he had said it to me. In fact, he seemed surprised several months after the Roberts nomination—when I told him I had voted for Roberts, he seemed surprised to hear that I had.

I would note on the ABA, we are not going to vote on any of this until the ABA reports are in. As you know, there is a precedent for this. When you were Chairman, we held five hearings under you as Chairman before ABA ratings came in, including one where the rating turned out that the person was not qualified. And I know that people have been waiting. Judge Helene White has been waiting for 11 years. Mr. Kethledge and Mr. Murphy have been pending longer than Conrad and Matthews that you mentioned on their own terms here in Michigan. But let’s hear from one of the most senior members of the Senate, Senator Levin—he has been very patiently waiting—and Senator Stabenow.
University, and earned her J.D. at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.

Judge White, as the Chairman mentioned, was previously nominated by President Clinton for a vacancy on the Sixth Circuit starting in 1997. The nominations were returned to the President without a hearing, as was the nomination of Kathleen McCree Lewis. And I want to make reference to Kathleen McCree Lewis here today for two reasons. First, I want to honor her memory in this setting. I also want to make reference to her because there is, in a letter which you have received from the widower of Judge Susan Bieke Neilson, whose vacancy is up for nomination today, a letter to the Chairman and the Ranking Member of this Committee from Judge Neilson’s husband. And Judge Neilson served on the Sixth Circuit for a tragically short period of 3 months, and, again, it is her seat on the Sixth Circuit that is the open seat to which Judge White has been nominated. This is a few excerpts from the letter from Jeff Neilson, who is the spouse, the widower of Judge Neilson.

“Senators Leahy and Specter: I thought it appropriate to correspond with you upon my becoming aware of the nomination of Judge White to fill the vacancy on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit occasioned by the death of my wife, Susan Bieke Neilson, and to state without reservation that Susan would be absolutely delighted that Helene would be her successor on the Sixth Circuit.” And then he makes reference to their fondness for Kathy McCree Lewis, and he closes by saying, “I believe that Helene will reflect the best qualities of both Susan and Kathleen in the performance of her duties, so that although death has precluded their presence on the Sixth Circuit, they will be there in spirit.”

The second nominee is Ray Kethledge. He is currently a partner at Bush Seyferth Kethledge and Paige in Troy, Michigan. Before joining the firm, Mr. Kethledge served as a law clerk to Justice Anthony Kennedy on the U.S. Supreme Court, having earlier clerked for Judge Ralph Guy of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, a very beloved judge. Mr. Kethledge also served as judiciary counsel to Senator Spence Abraham, our former colleague, whom we all know, from 1995 to 1997, and Ray Kethledge graduated magna cum laude from the University of Michigan Law School in 1993.

Finally, Stephen Murphy, who has been nominated to the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, currently serves as the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District. Prior to his service as United States Attorney, Mr. Murphy was an attorney with General Motors’ legal staff in Detroit and worked for the U.S. Department of Justice for more than 12 years. He is a 1987 graduate of the St. Louis University School of Law.

Finally, I want to again thank this Committee for your efforts to promote a resolution of this long unresolved matter, and I look forward to working with our colleagues to move these three nominations hopefully through the Senate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.

Senator Stabenow.
PRESENTATION OF HELENE N. WHITE, NOMINEE TO BE CIRCUIT JUDGE FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT; RAYMOND M. KETHLEDGE, NOMINEE TO BE CIRCUIT JUDGE FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT; AND STEPHEN JOSEPH MURPHY III, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN BY HON. DEBBIE STABENOW, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Senator Stabenow. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and while we all recognize the checkered past as it relates to judicial nominations, I would, with all due respect, just indicate that we have here today two Democratic Senators that are here introducing the President’s nominations. And it seems to me this is the process that we want to have happen, for people to be coming together. And I hope this is viewed as a positive reflection of the process of working together.

I am very pleased to join Senator Levin in being here to welcome and introduce Judge Helene White and Mr. Raymond Kethledge and also Mr. Stephen Murphy III and their families. It is wonderful to see their families and children, and we know this is a very special day for all of them.

As has been indicated, Judge Helene White brings 30 years of distinguished legal experience to the Federal bench. She has been a State judge since 1981, has served on both the 36th District Court for the city of Detroit and Wayne County Circuit Court. Since 1992, she has served on the Michigan Court of Appeals. She is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Barnard College at Columbia University. I want to welcome Judge White and her family. It was wonderful to meet her two children today.

Mr. Raymond Kethledge graduated from the University of Michigan and the University of Michigan Law School. I have to say as a Michigan State University graduate, this is a real historic moment here that I am supporting a University of Michigan graduate. Mr. Kethledge has worked for Senator Spence Abraham as his judicial counsel and followed that by clerking for both Justice Kennedy on the Supreme Court and Judge Ralph Guy on the Sixth Circuit of Appeals, and he is currently in private practice. So we want to welcome Mr. Kethledge and his family as well, and I was so pleased to meet his son and daughter today as well. We know it is a special day for them.

And, finally, I would like to introduce Stephen Murphy. He is a graduate of St. Louis University School of Law. Mr. Murphy’s practice as both a Federal prosecutor and defense attorney in his practice, business litigation as an attorney for General Motors. Since 2005, he has served as the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, we welcome Mr. Murphy and his family as well, and very much appreciate your taking the time of the Committee for this hearing.

Thank you.

Chairman Leahy. Well, thank you very much, and I know both of you, I understand, have other committees you are supposed to be at, so I appreciate your being here. Thank you.
As Senator Levin and Senator Stabenow step down, we will just take a minute so we can set up to have the three nominees come back up to the table. Thank you very, very much.

Chairman Leahy. Would you please stand and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Judge White. I do.

Mr. Kethledge. I do.

Mr. Murphy. I do.

Chairman Leahy. Thank you. Please be seated.

Traditionally what we do at this point is ask for any opening statement from any one of you, and the tradition is I would ask you to be brief. But I would ask you in doing that if you would first—and let's begin with you, Judge White—if you have members of your family or associates or friends who are here, please introduce them, because that actually goes into the record, and someday in the White Library or the Kethledge Library or the Murphy Library, somebody will look back there and say, “I was there at that hearing.”

Judge White, go ahead. Do you have family members here?

Judge White. I do.

Chairman Leahy. Please introduce them. There should be a little red button. If the light comes on, it is on. He is going to show you. Okay. Go ahead.

**STATEMENT OF HELENE N. WHITE, NOMINEE TO BE CIRCUIT JUDGE FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT**

Judge White. Thank you very much, Chairman Leahy. I will then begin by introducing the friends and family who have joined me today. Over the years, I have been blessed with their love and support, and I am honored that they took the time to come today.

I have some friends from Michigan who are with me: Jane Schelberg, Cathy Radner, and Elaine Fieldman. And I have friends, I have extended family: from Washington State Amy Regan, and from Washington, D.C., Josh Levin and his family. And, of course, I have my immediate family, and that would be my sister and her husband, Nancy and Larry Roth, from New York; and my precious children, Benjamin and Francesca. And I omitted my friends from law school: Nancy Walters from Boston, and Ruth Katz from Washington, D.C.

Chairman Leahy. When you get a copy of the transcript, you can double-check the spelling of the names, because they will all be interested in. I am delighted to see your children here. I have a granddaughter named Francesca. That is a wonderful name.

Judge White. And I would like to thank you, Chairman Leahy, Ranking Member Specter, members of the Committee, for this opportunity to appear before you. And I would like to take this moment to express my deep gratitude to President Bush for nominating me to this high office. I am both awed and honored and humbled by the trust that he has placed in me by making this nomination.

Chairman Leahy. Thank you. Is that it?

Judge White. Yes, sir. Thank you.

[The biographical information follows.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES
PUBLIC

1. Name: Full name (include any former names used).
   Helene Nita White

2. Position: State the position for which you have been nominated.
   United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit

3. Address: List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.
   Office: Michigan Court of Appeals
            3020 West Grand Boulevard, Suite 14-300
            Detroit, Michigan 48202

   1954; Jackson Heights, New York

5. Marital Status: (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.
   Divorced; 2 dependent children

6. Education: List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.
   University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1975-1978; J.D., 5/78
   Barnard College, Columbia University 1972-1975; A.B. cum laude, 7/78
   Harvard University, summer 1971, no degree, (attended between 11th and 12th grades, receiving college credit used for accelerated college graduation.)

7. Employment Record: List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other
enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

Employment:

1/93 to present
Michigan Court of Appeals
3020 West Grand Blvd. Ste 14-300
Detroit, Michigan 48202
Judge

1/83 to 1/93
Wayne County Circuit Court
City–County Building, 2 Woodward Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48226
Judge

9/81 to 1/83
36th District Court (successor court to Common Pleas Court)
421 Madison Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48225
Judge

1/81 to 9/81
Common Pleas Court for the City of Detroit
421 Madison Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48225
Judge

9/78 to 8/80
Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Hall of Justice
925 Ottawa
Lansing, Michigan 48909
Law Clerk to Justice Charles L. Levin

5/77 to 8/77
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
1701 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Summer Associate
Other Affiliations:

5/76 to 8/76; NAACP Legal Defense Fund; Volunteer Intern

JVS (formerly Jewish Vocational Services)
Board of Directors, 2002 to present, Vice President, 2005 – present;

Detroit Institute of Arts
Board of Directors 2002 to present; Board of Directors, Founders Junior Council, 1991-1997;

Michigan Legal Services; Board of Directors, 1993 to present

Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit; Board of Governors, 1995-present

American Jewish Committee
Board of Governors, 1995 to present; Detroit chapter board, 1989-95; Detroit chapter vice-president, 1992-95; Board, Belfer Center for American Pluralism, 1996-2002; Board, Blaustein Institute for Human Rights, 1996-2004;

COTS (Coalition on Temporary Shelter)
Board of Directors, 1986 to 1995 and 1998 to 2006; President, 1992 to 1994


Urban Caring Institute, Board of Directors, 1996-

Partner, NJH Associates, NJHA Associates, and RNJA, family investment partnerships;

Powder 2001 LLC – Limited Liability Corporation holding a condominium unit in Copper Mountain, Colorado;

MWCM LLC, Real estate development partnership, inactive member

Director, White-Roth Family Foundation

Director, Sigmund and Sophie Rehlik Foundation

8. **Military Service and Draft Status**: Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

I have not served in the military.
9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

- American Jewish Committee, Detroit Chapter, Centennial Celebration Outstanding Leader; Israel Bonds Attorney Division Eleanor Roosevelt Humanitarian Award;
- Spirit of Detroit Award;
- Detroit Human Rights Department Women's Committee Horizon Award;
- Rated "Outstanding" by Detroit Bar Association in Court of Appeals and Circuit Court elections.

10. **Bar Associations:** List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

- Michigan Court of Appeals, Rules Committee, Chair 2002 - present; member, Settlement Committee;
- American Bar Association, Judicial Administration Division, Appellate Judges Conference
- American Judicature Society
- Women Lawyers Association of Michigan
- Detroit Bar Association
- Wolverine Bar Association
- National Association of Women Judges (Chair, publicity committee, 1984-85; regional membership, 1985-88) International Association of Women Judges

**Michigan Judges Association**
- Circuit Court Docket Review Committee, 1990-92 (responsible for devising improved case management practices and procedures, monitoring the dockets of all judges, and assisting judges who fall behind)
- Circuit Court Mediation Committee, 1986-88
- Circuit Court Domestic Relations Committee, 1984-88
- Circuit Court Executive Committee, 1988-92
11. Bar and Court Admission:

   a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

      Michigan; February 14, 1979 – no lapse in membership

      Pennsylvania; February 14, 1979 – voluntary inactive status
      (Because I do not practice in Pennsylvania, I periodically assume inactive status under rules of the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board.)

   b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

      Michigan State Courts; February 14, 1979
      Courts of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; February 14, 1979

12. Memberships:

   a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

      Detroit Institute of Arts - Founders Society member for over 20 years; DIA Board of Directors, 2002 – present; Vice chair, Directors Committee 2005 - present; Founders Junior Council board member 1991-1997; Chair, Nominating Committee 1994-95; Co-chair, Grants Committee, 1995-1996; Advisory board, 1997-present;

      American Jewish Committee – member for over 20 years; Board of Governors, 1995-present; Executive Committee, 2002 – present; Chair, Emerging Leadership Counsel, 2003 – present; Task Force on Governance 2005; Board, Belfer Center for American Pluralism, 1996-2002; Board, Jacob Blaustein Institute, 1996 –2004; Detroit chapter board, 1989-95; chapter Vice-President, 1992-95; chapter Advisory Board 1996 – present;

Chair, Priorities Setting Committee for Families in Crisis; Community Resources Committee; Community Outreach and Education Committee, 1996-1999; Co-chair, Leadership Continuum II, 1994-1995; Chair, Program Committee Business and Professional Women’s division, 1992—1994; Women’s Division Board, 1992-1996;

JVS (formerly Jewish Vocational Services) – Board, 2002 – present; Vice President 2005 – present;

Detroit Golf Club – social member, 2000 to 2006; golf member, 2006 to present;

Congregation Shaarey Zedek – member 1993 to present;

Detroit Zoological Society – member for over 20 years;

Detroit Science Center – member 1996 - present

Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society, member, 1992 - present

NAACP Life Member for over 20 years

Hadassah Life Member for over 20 years

University of Pennsylvania Law School Alumni Association

American Arabic & Jewish Friends, long-time member; co-chaired Essay Contest Scholarship Committee

Other membership organizations to which I have belonged over the years:

ACLU

Barnard Alumni Association

Biddle Law Library Associates

Children's Museum Friends

Detroit Interfaith Roundtable, NCCJ

Economic Club of Detroit

Friends of the Detroit Public Library

Goodfellows

Michigan Democratic Party and local Democratic Clubs

Trade Union Leadership Council (TULC)

Women’s Economic Club

YWCA of Metropolitan Detroit, Board of Directors 1986-87, 1991-1994;

Sojourner Foundation Advisory Board 1985 - 2000

The American Bar Association’s Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization
that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

None of these organizations invidiously discriminate to my knowledge. It is possible that some of the Jewish organizations may have limited membership to members of the Jewish faith and their families. If so, this policy would not have affected the organizations’ inclusion of persons of all faiths in activities or provision of services.

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.


b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

None

c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

None

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer
sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

Over the years, I have participated as a member of various panel discussions at bench-bar, or state or local bar association, conferences and meetings. None of these have been recorded or transcribed to my knowledge, and I have not retained any notes or outlines.

e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

In 1982, after my election to the Wayne Circuit Court, I was interviewed by a Detroit News reporter and was the subject of a human-interest article. In the late eighties, I was the subject of a similar article.

14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

a. Common Pleas Court for the City of Detroit; elected 11/80, served 1/81 to 9/81
   The common pleas court was a court of limited jurisdiction and is no longer in existence. The civil jurisdiction was co-extensive with that of the 36th District Court (see below); the court had no criminal jurisdiction.

b. 36th District Court for the City of Detroit; served 9/81 to 1/83
   The 36th District Court is the successor court to the Common Pleas Court; the law creating the 36th District Court provided that Common Pleas Court judges would become 36th District Court judges.
   The 36th District Court is a limited jurisdiction trial court. Over the years, the monetary jurisdiction has been increased. During my tenure, the court had jurisdiction over civil cases involving less than $10,000. The court also had jurisdiction in civil cases transferred ("removed") from the circuit court, regardless of the amount of damages. There was a separate real estate division handling housing violations and landlord/tenant and land contract disputes. The court's criminal jurisdiction includes felony warrants, arraignments and preliminary examinations, and misdemeanor and ordinance violation trials. The court also handles civil infractions and small claims.

c. Wayne County Circuit Court; elected 11/82, reelected 11/88; served 1/83 to 1/93.
   The circuit court is the trial court of general jurisdiction and has limited appellate jurisdiction. Cases include contract and insurance disputes, products liability, medical
malpractice, employment discrimination, civil rights, general personal injury, divorce and
Child custody, criminal felony cases including drug conspiracy, homicide, criminal sexual
conduct, robbery and theft offenses, appeals from district courts and administrative
agencies and some probate appeals.

d. Judge, Michigan Court of Appeals, elected 11/92, re-elected 11/98 and 11/04,
serving 1/93 to present

The Michigan Court of Appeals is an intermediate appellate court with general
appellate jurisdiction. The Court sits in three-judge panels, except when a seven-member
conflict panel is convened. Appeals are of right and by leave from the circuit and probate
courts, and the Tax Tribunal, and by leave from the district courts, administrative
agencies, and the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission. The Court has original
jurisdiction in special cases.

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

   See attached list of citations for all opinions I have written.

b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

   See attached list.

c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your
decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant
criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

1. People v Blackston, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals issued 11/3/05
   (Docket No. 245099).

   The judgment was vacated and remanded for consideration whether trial court
   error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt 474 Mich 913 (2005), People v
   Blackston (On Remand), unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals issued
   5/24/07 (Docket No. 245099), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, Supreme Court
   scheduled oral argument on whether to grant application for leave to appeal or

2. Brown v Genesee County Bd of Commissioners (On Remand), 233 Mich App 325;

   The trial judge dismissed the jail-inmate plaintiff's defective public building
   claim, and a prior panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court
   remanded for reconsideration in light of a recently decided case. On remand, the
   panel on which I sat concluded that the recently decided case compelled a
different result, and reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the case. On
appeal, the Supreme Court, two justices dissenting, and one not participating, reversed, concluding that although the Court of Appeals correctly held that the jail is a public building under the recent case, the plaintiff was not a member of the public and therefore could not maintain the action.


In an opinion I authored, two members of the Court of Appeals panel concluded that the plaintiff veterans had standing to seek to compel the defendant counties to levy taxes to establish veterans’ relief funds in accordance with the soldiers’ relief fund act, although they had not applied for relief under the act in light of the counties’ non-compliance, and that mandamus was a proper remedy. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing (two justices dissenting, and one concurring on the basis that mandamus was an improper remedy.)


The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s determination that the defendant violated the incompatible offices act by simultaneously holding positions as the delinquent personal property tax coordinator in the county treasurer’s office and as an elected member of a township board of trustees. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that although the Court of Appeals proper concluded that both offices were subject to the act, because there was only a potential breach of duty arising from the ability of the township to contract with the county for the collection of its delinquent personal property taxes, the offices were not inherently incompatible, and the defendant could properly hold both (three justices concurring in the determination that the offices were subject to the act, but dissenting on the basis that they were incompatible.)


The Court of Appeals held that it was bound by a prior published Court of Appeals opinion addressing the admissibility of videotapes of out-of-court experiments. Two panel members disagreed with the prior opinion, viewing it as a departure from prior law, and concurred in the judgment of reversal solely because bound by the prior opinion. I concluded that the prior opinion was not a departure from, but merely applied, prior law, and concluded that the videotape was used improperly at trial.

In this case involving the interpretation and application of pollution exclusion clauses and a personal injury endorsement in insurance policies issued to the plaintiff county regarding a solid waste landfill, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's grant of summary disposition to the insurance companies. In an opinion I authored, the Court concluded that one insurance company was properly granted summary disposition because the “sudden and accidental” exception to the pollution exclusion clause was not applicable, and that summary disposition was improperly granted regarding the other insurer because the “initial discharge” that is the focus of the “expected or intended” clause is the discharge into the environment and not the deposit of waste in the landfill, and under this interpretation there were questions of fact. The Court also concluded that the trial court properly granted summary disposition under the personal injury endorsement.

The Supreme Court, by order, denied the application for leave to appeal of the insurance company as to which summary disposition was reversed, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal to the county, vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion that held that the "sudden and accidental" exclusion did not apply, on the ground that the trial court did not reach the issue, and remanded to the trial court for a determination whether the discharges were sudden and accidental.


The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's negligence action against the drunk-driver defendant, a Canadian resident who became drunk in a Michigan bar and then collided with plaintiff's car on the Canadian side of the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, on the basis of lack of in personam jurisdiction, and dismissed plaintiff's dramshop action against the Michigan bar that served him on the basis that plaintiff failed to "name and retain" the "alleged intoxication person." The Court of Appeals held that there was adequate contact with Michigan to support the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over the Canadian-resident defendant, that there was jurisdiction under Michigan's long-arm statute, and that the "name and retain" provision of the dramshop act did not preclude the continuation of a dramshop action against the bar where the alleged intoxicated person was not retained for jurisdictional reasons.

In three separate opinions, a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that there was no long-arm jurisdiction under Michigan's statute (one justice dissenting), but that the Court of Appeals had correctly determined that the "name and retain" provision did not bar the continuation of the action where the alleged intoxicated person was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (three justices dissenting).

In an opinion authored by another judge, in which I concurred, the Court of Appeals held that the "loss of chance" or "loss of opportunity" doctrine (allowing for a percentage recovery based on the percentage chance of survival lost due to the defendant's negligence), announced and applied by the Supreme Court in a wrongful death case, applies also to injury cases if the plaintiff can establish that the defendant's negligence proximately caused the loss of a substantial opportunity of avoiding a particular harm. The Court also held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint.

A majority of the Supreme Court held that the doctrine should not be extended to the loss of an opportunity to avoid physical harm less than death (two justices dissenting) and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint (one justice dissenting).


The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in dismissing the hospital's claim against the doctor's estate seeking indemnification for amounts paid by the hospital to settle a malpractice action that alleged both active and passive negligence against the hospital. The majority affirmed the dismissal of the contribution claim concluding that the hospital did not give the doctor's estate a reasonable opportunity to participate in settlement negotiations. The dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim was also affirmed. I concurred in the opinion except that I concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the hospital gave adequate notice of the settlement, and therefore would have reversed regarding the contribution claim as well.

In the doctor's estate's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the indemnification claim presented a case of first impression and that the claim could not be maintained because the hospital had not sought summary disposition of the active negligence claims or adequately notified the doctor's estate regarding settlement.


The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary disposition to the defendant doctor concluding that reasonable minds could differ regarding whether the doctor's conduct was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern whether an injury resulted to the jail-inmate patient. I concluded that there was also a genuine issue regarding the county's alleged deliberate
indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical needs. In the doctor's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that there was inadequate support for a determination that the doctor acted with gross negligence.


The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions of second-degree murder, felony-firearm and carrying a concealed weapon and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the defendant was denied a fair trial and his right of confrontation under Michigan case law when the trial court allowed the prosecution to call a witness knowing that the witness would refuse to testify in front of the jury.

In three separate opinions, the Supreme Court reversed, four justices concluding that while evidentiary error did occur, it was harmless because it was highly probable that in light of the strength and weight of the untainted evidence, the tainted evidence did not contribute to the convictions.


The plaintiff fell while approaching the doors of the Pontiac Silverdome. The circuit court granted the city's motion for summary disposition on governmental immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals remanded for reconsideration in light of a prior Court of Appeals opinion that had been reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds, concluding that remand was necessary because the area of the fall and the area's relationship to the building were insufficiently described in the record.

The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the holding of the prior Court of Appeals opinion, and also concluding that the opinion was not binding under the "first-out" rule because it had been reversed by the Supreme Court, albeit on different grounds. Two justices would have affirmed the Court of Appeals order of remand for development of the record.


The Court of Appeals initially reversed the defendant's convictions concluding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on attempted murder and erred by failing to provide a requested instruction on the lesser offense of accessory after the fact when there was evidence to support that instruction. The Court of Appeals regarded the latter error not harmless in light of the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of another intermediate charge. The Supreme Court
remanded for reconsideration in light of People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203; 551 NW2d 891 (1996), a recently decided case addressing the standards for evaluating reversible error. The Court of Appeals again reversed and vacated defendant's convictions, concluding that under either test set forth in Mateo for determining whether error was harmless, it would reverse defendant's convictions.

The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that the trial court's refusal to give an instruction on the lesser offense of accessory after the fact was harmless error.


On initial review, the Court of Appeals determined that the defendant's sentence of 40-60 years as a fourth offender was disproportionate. On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of recently decided case, the Court of Appeals (one judge dissenting) determined that the sentence constituted an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed (two justices dissenting) concluding that because the defendant had demonstrated his inability to conform his conduct to the laws of society, the court's sentence was not an abuse of discretion.


Plaintiff, a maintenance worker, was electrocuted when a ladder he was moving touched one of defendant's power lines. The circuit court granted summary disposition to the defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the injuries were foreseeable. A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff where the line was not in disrepair and plaintiff was an experienced workman who was aware of the presence of the line and whose conduct was not foreseeable.


The Court of Appeals held that defendant's statement that "It's not that I don't want an attorney to represent me, it's just that [defense counsel] never spoke to me" was equivocal, and did not constitute an adequate waiver of counsel, and remanded for a new trial. A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the record established an adequate waiver.

17. People v Ryan, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion, reved by Supreme Court, three justices dissenting, 451 Mich 30; 545 NW2d 612 (1996).

Defendant was arrested with a kilogram of cocaine by federal agents, but was
charged and convicted in state court after DEA agents turned over their file to state authorities. On appeal, he argued that the decision to pursue a state prosecution was vindictive. A panel of the Court of Appeals, of which I was not a member, concluded that defendant's assertions concerning the DEA agents set forth a prima facie case of vindictiveness and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found vindictive conduct violating defendant's right to counsel. On appeal, the Court of Appeals panel of which I was a member concluded that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous and affirmed.

A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that because the state prosecutor was not involved in the allegedly vindictive conduct, and had independent authority to prosecute, the prosecution was not barred.

18. People v Wiatroba, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion issued 12/27/96 (Docket No. 192072), revd and remanded for consideration of other issues by Supreme Court order, two justices dissenting, 450 Mich 967; 547 NW2d 649 (1996).

The Court of Appeals concluded that one of defendant's claims of error, that the trial judge improperly foreclosed the possibility of the jury having testimony read back to it, was dispositive, and reversed and remanded for new trial. The Court did not view the failure to object at trial as forfeiting the issue because the trial judge denied the jury's request summarily without argument of counsel. A majority of the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the issue was not preserved, and remanded for consideration of defendant's remaining issues.


In consolidated cases involving a class action on behalf of retired Detroit police and fire fighters seeking a recalculation of their retirement allowances, the Court of Appeals addressed the issues stated in defendants' briefs and concluded that an additional issue, which had not been raised as an issue in the briefs and concerning which relief had not been requested, had not been properly raised and preserved for review. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the opinion so holding, and remanded the case for consideration of the issue on the merits.


The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's action challenging the constitutionality of an increase in a real estate transfer tax on the basis that it was adopted without voter approval in violation of Michigan's Headlee Amendment was barred by the statute of limitations because the action was brought more than one year after the
tax was imposed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the cause of action did not arise until the tax was paid, and therefore the action was timely.


The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have held a hearing regarding juror truthfulness during voir dire when two jurors did not respond affirmatively to the question whether any of the prospective jurors would be uncomfortable with the idea of awarding money damages for loss of life, but stated during deliberations that they could never award money for death. A majority of the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that no hearing was required.

**OPINIONS WHILE A TRIAL JUDGE**

1. *Fields v Sinai Hospital*, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion (Docket No., 120557).

As a circuit judge, I presided at a medical malpractice jury trial resulting in a verdict for plaintiffs against defendant hospital based on the hospital's alleged vicarious liability for a doctor's negligence. The Court of Appeals, relying in part on a case that had been while the instant case was pending on appeal, which it found to be factually very similar, reversed on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to establish an agency by estoppel.


As a circuit judge, I affirmed a probate judge's decision not to waive jurisdiction of a juvenile, concluding that although the judge asserted that a Michigan Supreme Court decision left him with no discretion under the circumstances, his opinion, discussing the applicable factors, demonstrated that he had, in fact, exercised discretion. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the probate judge to make new findings and render a decision granting or denying waiver.


As a circuit judge, I reversed a district court judgment in favor of plaintiff landlord, concluding that defendant, who possessed the premises under a lease with an option to purchase for an amount corresponding to the total rent under the lease, had not forfeited her right to purchase the property where, although she had failed to properly exercise the option according to its terms, she had virtually paid for the property in rent. I concluded that the terms of the agreement rendered it, in effect, a land contract.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with my analysis, and reversed concluding that defendant had not acted to preserve her rights. A dissenting judge would have affirmed on the basis that defendant was entitled to equitable relief.

4. *Leslie v Henry Ford Hospital*, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion.

As a circuit judge, I granted in part and denied in part defendant hospital's motion for summary disposition in this medical malpractice action, concluding that plaintiff's informed consent claim was time barred, but that there was a genuine issue whether his claim based on the alleged improper administration of a dye was timely where he filed suit shortly after learning, during the course of discovery in his action against the drug manufacturer, that the use of the dye in his treatment was contraindicated.

The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the entire action was barred because plaintiff believed that his injury had something to do with the dye more than six months before filing suit, and therefore he either discovered or should have discovered the alleged malpractice more that six months before filing the complaint.

5. *People v Wolak*, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion.

As a circuit judge, I denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charges against him, brought on the basis that the prosecution had failed to comply with a statute requiring that a defendant be brought to trial within 180 days after the prosecution has notice that the defendant is an inmate in a state penal institution. The case had been assigned to me for trial with a procedural history that included several appeals and trial court delays. A prior order of reversal erroneously remanded the case to the wrong court. I ruled that the 180-day period did not begin to run from the date of the Court of Appeals reversal, but from the date the file was received in the proper court. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the delay was not excusable so as to stop the running of the 180-day period.


As a circuit judge, I presided at a civil jury trial, arising from a police shooting, which resulted in a verdict for plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that the police officer did not act in good faith, and that the jury was improperly permitted to assess damages under the civil rights claim for the parents' loss of their adult son.


As a circuit judge, I granted plaintiff a new trial in a personal injury automobile negligence case in which the jury found negligence, but no proximate cause. The
Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that it was an abuse of discretion to do so. In the following two cases, my decision as a circuit judge was reversed by the Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals was later reversed by the Supreme Court:


As a circuit judge, I granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to defendant drugstore, setting aside a substantial jury verdict, on the ground that plaintiff's illegal conduct in obtaining the controlled substance barred recovery. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that comparative negligence principles controlled, and further that plaintiff was insane. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the wrongful conduct rule precluded recovery.


As a circuit judge, I awarded a successful plaintiff in a Freedom of Information Act case an attorney fee that was substantially lower than the amount requested. The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that the reasonableness of the fee was not adequately disputed. The Supreme Court reversed, and reinstated the reduced award, concluding that the reduced award was appropriate.

In the following case, my authored Court of Appeals opinion was affirmed but three justices criticized an aspect of the opinion.


The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in not permitting the prosecutor to withdraw from a plea agreement that provided for a charge reduction (from a charge that carried a mandatory life sentence) in exchange for a guilty plea to a lesser charge and an agreed upon sentence, when the judge concluded that he could not agree to the sentence, but, rather, would impose a lesser sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed this holding.

The Court of Appeals also held that because the defendants had performed another part of the agreement, requiring that they assist police in drug investigations, they were entitled to seek specific performance of the original agreement on remand, including the agreed-upon sentence, and would not be forced to face trial on the greater charge. The lead Supreme Court opinion criticized that analysis.
Unpublished orders reversed. Note that the Court of Appeals database cannot be searched by unpublished orders. The lists in this section combine my recollection and information available in the database, and are complete to that extent only.

1. People v Erman, unpublished order issued 5/30/07 denying application for leave to appeal (Docket No. 274630), [White, J., would grant application for leave to appeal], vacated and remanded for reconsideration of the defendant's application for leave to appeal 478 Mich 865 (2007).


3. People v Podlaszuk, unpublished order issued 1/3/07 (Docket No. 273554), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, Supreme Court remanded for consideration of defendant's alternate ground for affirming circuit court order granting his motion to withdraw his plea 480 Mich 866 (2007).


to appeal, remanded to trial court for sentence to be vacated since prosecution conceded error in that its notice of sentence enhancement was untimely; in all other respects application for leave to appeal denied).


12. Maiden v Rozwood, unpublished order of peremptory reversal issued June 26, 1997 (Docket No. 200635), rev'd 461 Mich 109 (1999) (reinstating circuit court's grant of summary disposition). Note: The Supreme Court reporter uses the name Rozwood, while the pleadings in the Court of Appeals bore the name Radwood.


d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;


2. Long v Goodson, unpublished opinion per curiam issued 4/18/06 (Docket Nos. 261049, 261051), revd and remanded to trial court 480 Mich 1048 (2008).


granting leave to appeal, in all other respects denying leave to appeal—COA’s affirmation of conviction of 1st degree murder affirmed).


17. *Jackson v Saginaw Cty.*, unpublished opinion per curiam issued May 10, 1996 (Docket No. 182564) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), revd in part 458 Mich 141 (1998) (ruling that trial court did not err in granting Dr. Uy summary disposition and that no testimony supported COA finding that Dr. Uy violated standard of care). The COA majority and I, concurring, found reasonable minds could differ re: whether Dr. Uy’s conduct was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury resulted. I also concluded, unlike the COA majority, that genuine issues remained re: deliberate indifference of county; Sup Ct did not address this issue.


e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

The Court’s database (MAPPIS) cannot search for unpublished opinions that were assigned to a particular judge to write. Nor can it search for published per curiam opinions by authoring judge. The MAPPIS printout showing that I participated in 4,469 cases from 7/1/96 to date (4/18/08), lists opinions more than once if there was a concurrence or dissent, or if the case was a consolidation of several cases,
thus the 4,469 number is somewhat inflated. Because we sit in three-judge panels, I assume I was assigned to write in one third of the cases; however, because I wrote a significant number of concurrences and dissents, I would have written in over one third of the cases. I appear as the authoring judge in 43 published cases from January 1993 (when I began my first term on the Court of Appeals) to date (4/18/08). I authored separate published opinions in another 53 cases during that period. Additionally, I authored a significant number of published cases that were issued per curiam.

f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

Three-judge panels hear cases assigned by month, and each judge is assigned authoring responsibility for 1/3 of the cases heard. Thus, if there are 30 cases on a month’s call, for example, and all judges agree on every case with the authoring judge, each judge would write/issue 10 opinions. The overwhelming majority of cases issued by this Court are per curiam.

The Michigan Court of Appeals’ internal information system (MAPPIS) and programming cannot accommodate this type of search. However, printouts of all cases I participated in show that I participated in 4469 cases from 7/1/96 to date (4/18/08), and that I wrote separate opinions in 360 unpublished cases and 53 published cases.

16. Recusal: If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an “automatic” recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.
The court has a computer program that assures that a judge is not assigned to
cases involving parties or attorneys as to whom the judge has notified the Clerk
that the judge has a conflict. Over the years, I have listed a few attorneys with
whom I have close friendships and who had financial interest in the outcome of
their cases. Over the years, there have also been cases involving friends, or as to
which I had had conversation with the attorneys before knowing that the case
would be before the court, and I have listed these as well.

The only request for recusal of which I am aware was in Rest in the Son v Peter
Fletcher, Docket # 248117, in which the attorney for defendant brought a general
motion to disqualify on the basis that Mr. Fletcher was a member of the Judicial
Tenure Commission. None of the panel members believed that this was a basis
for disqualification. Further discussions with the Clerk revealed that Mr. Fletcher
was concerned that I might be prejudiced by criticism he had expressed regarding
my now ex-husband’s decision in a judicial tenure matter in which my now ex-
husband had served as a hearing officer. I communicated to the Clerk that I was
unaware of such criticism, and would have no problem deciding the case on the
merits. This was communicated by the Clerk, and to the best of my knowledge
the issue was thus resolved.

17. Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices,
including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or
appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed
you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for
elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

I have held no public offices other than a judicial office. I have had no
unsuccessful candidacies for public office.

In 1997, 1999, and again in 2001 I was nominated by the President to be a United
States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit. Those nominations were unsuccessful.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether
compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever
held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the
particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your
title and responsibilities.

None. I have played no role in campaigns other than my own.
18. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

I served as a Clerk to Justice Charles L. Levin, Michigan Supreme Court 1978 to 1980.

ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

I have not practiced alone.

iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

1/93 to present
Michigan Court of Appeals
3020 West Grand Blvd. Ste 14-300
Detroit, Michigan 48202
Judge

1/83 to 1/93
Wayne County Circuit Court
City-County Building, 2 Woodward Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48226
Judge

9/81 to 1/83
36th District Court (successor court to Common Pleas Court)
421 Madison Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48225
Judge

1/81 to 9/81
Common Pleas Court for the City of Detroit
421 Madison Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48225
Judge
9/78 to 8/80
Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Hall of Justice
925 Ottawa
Lansing, Michigan 48909
Law Clerk to Justice Charles L. Levin

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

After law school, from 1978 to 1980, I served as a law clerk to a Michigan Supreme Court Justice. In this position, I reviewed records, read transcripts, researched legal issues, and wrote memoranda and draft opinions in a broad range of cases.

Shortly thereafter, in 1981, I was elected as a judge of the Common pleas Court, where I presided over countless landlord-tenant and small claims cases, as well as more complex civil trials.

When the Common Pleas Court became the 36th District Court through court reorganization, I was assigned to take over the warrant, arraignments and misdemeanor division. I next moved to the division handling preliminary examinations, where I heard felony preliminary exams daily for three months. I then moved to the traffic and ordinance division where I presided over ordinance violations - accosting and soliciting, weapons offenses, housing violations; traffic misdemeanors - drunk driving, reckless driving and driving with license suspended; and some traffic ticket appeals. I also obtained considerable administrative experience as I learned that the procedures I instituted in my courtroom had a substantial effect on the quality of justice administered.

In 1983, I became a judge of the Wayne County Circuit Court, a court of general jurisdiction. As a judge of the circuit court for ten years, I presided over hundreds of trials of all kinds, civil and criminal, bench and jury, simple and complex.

For the past fifteen years, I have been a Court of Appeals judge, handling only appeals. The Court of Appeals sits in three-judge panels, rotating monthly. In addition to the many cases set for plenary consideration, a large number of cases are effectively decided by the denial of an application for leave to appeal or the entry of another dispositive order. The subject matter largely mirrors the cases I handled in circuit court, with the addition of probate, workers' compensation, regulatory and tax...
matters. A significant number of cases, civil and criminal, involve statutory construction.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

Because my legal career has been as a law clerk and then a judge, and not a practicing attorney, I have not represented clients. I have not specialized in any particular area of law.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

I have not practiced law as an attorney. My entire legal career, except for my first years as a clerk, has involved presiding over cases in state courts of record. In the trial courts, I presided in court daily. As a Court of Appeals judge, I preside in court one or two days monthly, and the remainder of my work is in an office.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts;
   2. state courts of record: 100%
   3. other courts.

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings;
   2. criminal proceedings.

As a trial judge, 80% of my work was civil and 20% criminal. As an appellate judge, over 50% of the cases are criminal, but I estimate that 65% of my time is spent on civil matters because of the relative complexity of the cases.

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

Because my legal career has been as a law clerk and then a judge, and not a practicing attorney, I have tried no cases.

i. What percentage of these trials were:
   1. jury;
   2. non-jury.
e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

I have not practiced before the Supreme Court of the United States.

19. Litigation: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

a. the date of representation;

b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and

c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

Because my legal career has been as a law clerk and then a judge, and not a practicing attorney, I have not personally handled any litigated matters.

20. Legal Activities: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organization(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

My most significant legal activities have been in a judicial capacity, as a result of my twenty-seven years of service as a judge. During that time I have had extensive experience with a wide variety of legal matters. My experience with small claims cases, which are handled without attorneys, provided me with an opportunity to deal directly with litigants. To effectively resolve these disputes, I was required to elicit pertinent facts from the litigants, determine their desires and objectives, and explain the law and the realities of litigation. While hearing preliminary examinations, I became familiar with the full range of felony offenses and was exposed to difficult search and seizure, confession, and conspiracy issues. While serving as a trial Judge on the Wayne County Circuit Court, I conducted status and settlement conferences and otherwise administered my individual docket, and presided over numerous trials. During this time, I became more involved in court administration, devising forms and procedures designed to effectively manage cases without unduly burdening attorneys. I assisted other judges and their staffs in making the transition to an individual docket. I also became very
effective in settling cases without employing heavy-handed tactics. Throughout my ten years on the circuit court, I heard motions on a weekly basis, so that I was deeply involved in the pre-trial and discovery practice.

The subject matter of the cases I handled in circuit court included felonies, medical malpractice, products liability, general negligence, civil rights, employment contract disputes and more. I am, therefore, familiar with the litigation of and the substantive law governing cases that come to the federal courts through diversity jurisdiction. Additionally, the Michigan Rules of Evidence closely track the federal rules. I also handled § 1983, ERISA and labor dispute cases, and cases presenting a variety of preemption issues and constitutional claims. In the criminal area, I presided over conspiracy and drug cases as well as cases involving more common offenses. A significant percentage of the criminal cases involved Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment issues.

As a judge on the Michigan Court of Appeals, I have spent the past fifteen years hearing appeals and writing opinions. The subject matter largely mirrors the cases I handled in circuit court, with the addition of probate, worker's compensation, regulatory and tax matters. A significant number of cases, civil and criminal, involve statutory construction.

In addition to my judicial work, I have been involved in efforts to improve the judicial system through my work on court committees. As a circuit judge, I was active in implementing the shift from a central docket to an individual docket, and in devising mechanisms to provide bar input into court administration. On the Court of Appeals, I was an active participant in the work of the Delay Reduction Workgroup, which recommended delay reduction measures that were largely adopted by the court. I also serve as chair of the Rules Committee, and have been actively involved in the Michigan Appellate Bench/Bar Conferences.

21. Teaching: What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

I have not taught full courses. I have judged numerous arguments for various advocacy and moot court classes and programs at University of Michigan Law School, Wayne State University Law School, and Cooley Law School. I have taught single sessions of criminal appellate advocacy classes at the University of Michigan Law School and University of Detroit Law School.

22. Deferred Income/Future Benefits: List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or
customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

I have a pension account with the Michigan Judges Retirement System. I also participated in the Wayne County Employees Retirement System and a deferred compensation plan while a circuit court judge.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

I have no such plans, commitments, or agreements.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)


25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement.

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

The parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during my initial service in the position to which I have been nominated would include attorneys with whom I have close friendships, cases involving family or friends, or cases where I may have a financial interest. Should any potential or actual conflicts-of-interest arise, I will abide by the Canons of Judicial Conduct, as I have done throughout my judicial career.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.
In all circumstances, I will follow the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and applicable statues, policies, and procedures.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

Over the past two decades, most of my non-work activities have centered on serving the disadvantaged. Presently, I devote an average of five hours per week to community/charitable activity. In the past, when family commitments were fewer, I devoted an average of ten to twelve hours per week.

I have served on the board of Michigan Legal Services since 1993, participating in the oversight of the organization, and was active in a subcommittee charged with exploring and making recommendations regarding the future of the organization.

Over the years, I have held various positions and been involved in numerous activities of the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit (an umbrella organization raising funds for local, national and international programs to aid Jews and others). I presently serve on the Board of Governors and in a number of other capacities. Previously, I chaired the community service allocations division. This division evaluates and prioritizes the social service and elder care needs of the community, and recommends and advocates for allocations to social service providers. Recently, I have spent a considerable amount of time helping to formulate and oversee programs for the disadvantaged in Israel, including a head start program for Ethiopian children from birth to 6 years old.

I serve on the board and am a vice-president of JVS. Although the acronym JVS stands for Jewish Vocational Services, the agency serves the entire community. JVS primarily provides training, rehabilitation, and placement services to the disadvantaged and handicapped.

I served on the board of COTS (a large homeless shelter and transitional housing and services program in Detroit) for two nine-year (maximum) terms, serving as president for two of those years. I am still involved with the organization.

Previously, I served on the board of the Metropolitan Detroit Young Women's Christian Association. The organization's programs address the financial, educational, and physical and mental health concerns of girls and women in the community, many of whom are disadvantaged.

In past years, I served as a mentor for Alternatives for Girls as part of a program aimed at providing young women at risk with a secure and confidential relationship with a role model. Each year, I participate in a program that provides individualized holiday gifts for the girls.
I also am active in other civic organizations, which, although not focused primarily on serving the disadvantaged, concern themselves with issues or services affecting the disadvantaged. Among these is the American Jewish Committee.

Additionally, I have participated in a number of programs providing new immigrants with necessary information and assistance; I have participated in a number of forums and panels concerning African-American/Jewish relations; I have spoken to a number of school and civic organizations regarding law and the courts, and have participated in Law Day programs; and I regularly participate in moot court programs and mock trials, and occasionally have taught classes on pre-trial practice and appellate advocacy.

28. Selection Process:

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

There is no selection commission for this nomination. I was previously nominated to fill a vacancy on this court. I submitted written material to and was interviewed by representatives of the Justice Department, the Office of White House Counsel, and the American Bar Association. Concerning the instant nomination, I was interviewed by the Attorney General and White House counsel, and members of their staffs, on February 21, 2008. I have had conversations with representatives of the Justice Department concerning paperwork since that time. My nomination was submitted to the Senate on April 15, 2008.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No.
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
 NOMINATION FILING

1. Name Reporting (last name, first, middle (if any))
White, Helene N

2. Court or Organization
6th Circuit

3. Date of Report
04/26/2006

4. Title (if a judge indicate active or senior status; magistrate judges indicate full or part-time)
Chief Judge - Nominee

5. Report Type (check appropriate type)

- Nomination
- Initial
- Annual
- Final

Date of Report: 04/26/2006

6. Reporting Period
05/2007

7. Chamber or Office Address
3022 West Grand Blvd
Detroit Michigan 48202

8. IMPORTANT NOTES: The instructions accompanying this form must be followed. Complete all parts,
including the NONE box for each part where you have no reportable information. Sign on last page.

I. POSITIONS. (Reporting individuals only; see pp. 9-11 of instructions)

- NONE (No reportable positions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Partner</td>
<td>NIH Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Partner</td>
<td>NGA Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Partner</td>
<td>NIKH Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Member</td>
<td>NIKW LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Member</td>
<td>Power Inc. LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Trustee</td>
<td>Trust # 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Trustee</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Trustee</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Trustee</td>
<td>Trust # 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Trustee</td>
<td>Trust # 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Custodian</td>
<td>Investment account # 1 under USMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Custodian</td>
<td>Investment account # 2 under USMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Director</td>
<td>American Jewish Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Director</td>
<td>Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Director</td>
<td>Detroit Institute of Arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Director, Vice President</td>
<td>IVS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Director</td>
<td>Michigan Legal Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Trustee</td>
<td>Edlich Foundation</td>
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II. AGREEMENTS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 30-31 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Parties and Terms</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
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<td>State of Michigan</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
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III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME. (Reporting individual and spouse; see pp. 17-24 of instructions)

A. Filer's Non-Investment Income

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1. 2006</td>
<td>Michigan Court of Appeals judicial salary</td>
<td>$151,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2006</td>
<td>Michigan Court of Appeals value of use of state car</td>
<td>$4,232</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. 2007</td>
<td>Michigan Court of Appeals judicial salary</td>
<td>$151,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 2007</td>
<td>Michigan Court of Appeals value of use of state car</td>
<td>$2,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 2008 YTD</td>
<td>Michigan Court of Appeals judicial salary</td>
<td>$48,777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Spouse's Non-Investment Income - If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, complete this section.

[ ] NONE (No reportable non-investment income.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. REIMBURSEMENTS - transportation, lodging, food, entertainment.

[ ] NONE (No reportable reimbursements.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. EXEMPT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### V. GIFTS
(See instructions for details on reporting gifts and contributions.

- **NONE** (No reportable gifts.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. EXEMPT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
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</table>

### VI. LIABILITIES
(See instructions for details on reporting liabilities.

- **NONE** (No reportable liabilities.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hibernia Bank</td>
<td>mortgage on real estate located in downtown city</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Power Inc.</td>
<td>Member capital account</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 24-27 of filing instructions)

NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (including trust assets)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount Code 1 (A-$B)</td>
<td>Type (e.g. div., rent, or int.)</td>
<td>Value Code 2 (C-$D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Brokerage account #1 USB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. American Funds Balanced Fund class B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. USB money market</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Brokerage account #2 Baid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cisco Systems common stock</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Oracle common stock</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Silicon Storage Tech common stock</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sun Microsystems</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. A&amp;M Select Equity Fund</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. A&amp;M Comstat Fund</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Blackrock Preqin &amp; Equity Trust</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Franklin Managed Tr Rising Divids Fund</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Deloitte Comsipations &amp; Info PO</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Brokerage account #3 Baid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. News Corp Class B shares</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. A&amp;M Select Equity Fd</td>
<td>None</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Franklin Rising Dividends Fd</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- A: Amount
- B: Type (e.g. div., rent, or int.)
- C: Value
- D: Type & Method (e.g., cost, fair market value, etc.)
- E: Date

Footnotes:
- K: Thousands
- T: Value
- P: Price
- C: Cost
- F: Fair Market Value
- O: Other
- H: Historical Cost
- S: Sales Price
- G: Gross Value

VerDate Nov 24 2008   10:03 May 29, 2009   Jkt 048894   PO 00000   Frm 00055   Fmt 6633   Sfmt 6633   S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT   SJUD1   PsN: CMORC
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

This section includes income, value, and transactions related to investments and trusts. It includes the following categories:

- **Assets:** Financial holdings and investments
- **Transactions:** Financial transactions and changes in investments

#### List of Investments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (Including trust assets)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Placed &quot;TD&quot; after each asset name except prior disclosure</td>
<td>(1) Amount</td>
<td>(2) Type &amp; Code</td>
<td>(3) Value Method Code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Example Entries

- **18. Premier Health Sciences Trust:**
  - A: Dividend
  - J: T

- **19. Brokerage account #1 for UOMA Fund:**
  - Dividend
  - J: T

- **20. American Balanced Fund:**
  - Dividend
  - J: T

- **21. AIM Constellation Fund:**
  - None
  - J: T

- **22. John Hancock regional bank fund:**
  - B: Distribution
  - J: T

- **23. AIM Select Equity Fund:**
  - None
  - J: T

- **24. Brokerage account #2 for UOMA Fund:**
  - D: Distribution
  - J

- **27. American Balanced Fund:**
  - A: Dividend
  - K: T

- **28. Broadway Bank Bond:**
  - A: Interest

- **29. Brokerage account #3 for Morgan Chase:**
  - Dividend
  - J: T

- **30. First Place Financial Corp:**
  - Dividend
  - J: T

- **31. Genzyme common stock:**
  - None
  - J: T

- **32. Microsoft common stock:**
  - Dividend
  - J: T

- **33. Brokerage account #4 Smith Barney:**
  - Dividend
  - L: T

- **34. JPMorgan & Chase common stock:**
  - Dividend
  - B: L: T

---

**Notes:**

- **Amounts:**
  - $0-$5,000
  - $5,001-$10,000
  - $10,001-$25,000
  - $25,001-$50,000
  - $50,001-$100,000

- **Value Methods:**
  - Cash Value
  - Market Value

- **Types:**
  - Cash
  - Dividend
  - Interest
  - Other

- **Code Descriptions:**
  - Code 1: Description 1
  - Code 2: Description 2
  - Code 3: Description 3
## V. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

### A. Description of Assets (including real assets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets</th>
<th>(1) Date</th>
<th>(2) Form of</th>
<th>(3) Value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Method Code</td>
<td>Code 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Code 2 (F-Y)</td>
<td>Code 3 (A-B)</td>
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</table>

### B. Income during reporting period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets</th>
<th>(1) Date</th>
<th>(2) Description</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>

### C. Gross value at end of reporting period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets</th>
<th>(1) Date</th>
<th>(2) Description</th>
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</table>

### D. Transactions during reporting period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets</th>
<th>(1) Date</th>
<th>(2) Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)

35. Money market funds

36. Brokerage account # 8 H&R Block

37. Money market

38. General Electric common stock

39. American Science and Engineering common stock

40. JCM Technologies common stock

41. Brokerage account # 9 Oppenheimer

42. Money market

43. American Science and Engineering common stock

44. Enron common stock

45. Cilog common stock

46. 401k Of Michigan

47. S&P 500 Indexes

48. S&P MidCap Index

49. S&P Retail 2000 Index

50. Amex Funds EuroPacific

51. Wayne County Def Comp

---

1. Johnson Controls
2. Nike Inc.
3. Verizon Communications Inc.
4. Microsoft
5. IBM
6. Cisco Systems
7. Intel Corp
8. Apple Inc
9. Google Inc
10. Facebook Inc

---

VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description of Assets (including text note)</th>
<th>Income during operating period</th>
<th>Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>Transactions during operating period</th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52.</td>
<td>Local Attrbt Mid Cap Tt</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>53.</td>
<td>J.A. Morgan Stanley Focus Growth Fund</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.</td>
<td>Israel Bonds agmt 7/07</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>K T</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>Israel Bonds agmt 7/07</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>K T</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>56.</td>
<td>Israel Bonds agmt 4/08</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>K T</td>
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<tr>
<td>57.</td>
<td>Israel Bonds agmt 4/08</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>K T</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>58.</td>
<td>Israel Bonds agmt 4/10</td>
<td>B Interest</td>
<td>K T</td>
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<tr>
<td>59.</td>
<td>Israel Bonds agmt 4/11</td>
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<td>K T</td>
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<td>60.</td>
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<tr>
<td>61.</td>
<td>Israel Bonds agmt 4/2010</td>
<td>B Interest</td>
<td>K T</td>
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<tr>
<td>62.</td>
<td>Recaring Brook Capital Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>63.</td>
<td>Core Power Energy stock</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
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<tr>
<td>64.</td>
<td>Merz Pharmaceutical stock</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J T</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.</td>
<td>Trust # 1 FRCET, shared beneficial interest, bank unit</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>66.</td>
<td>CNSH Assm Ltd. partner</td>
<td>F Dividend</td>
<td>P1 T</td>
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<tr>
<td>67.</td>
<td>TOCOX</td>
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<tr>
<td>68.</td>
<td>CNSH- Smith Barney acct # 1</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Asset Size Codes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Asset Size Code</td>
<td>D=42,000 or less</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Asset Size Code</td>
<td>42,000 - 219,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Asset Size Code</td>
<td>219,000 - 1,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Asset Size Code</td>
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<td>5.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Asset Size Code</td>
<td>65,000,000 or more</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Asset Size Code</td>
<td>42,000 or less</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Asset Size Code</td>
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<td>10.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 19-21 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset (including trust assets)</th>
<th>Value or Market Value (C)</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Annual Code (2) Type Code</td>
<td>(3) Value (4) Method Code</td>
<td>(5) Form (6) Date (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(B)</td>
<td>(C)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Example of Entry:**
  - **Description:** Warrants Just Money Market
  - **Value:** N/A
  - **Type:** N/A
  - **Annual Code:** 11
  - **Type Code:** N/A
  - **Value or Market Value:** N/A
  - **Transactions:** N/A

---

1. Annual Code
2. Type Code
3. Value or Market Value
4. Method Code
5. Form of Transaction
6. Date of Transaction
7. Code of Transaction
IV. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS -- income, value, transactions (includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-37 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description of Asset (including trust name)</th>
<th>A. Description of Asset (including trust name)</th>
<th>B. Income During Reporting Period</th>
<th>C. Gross Value at End of Reporting Period</th>
<th>D. Transactions During Reporting Period</th>
<th>E. Net Asset at Close of Reporting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>GOLD</td>
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</tr>
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<td>77</td>
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</table>

1. Income Code: Codes: (See Volume II and III)
2. Value Code: Codes: (See Volume III and IV)
3. Value Method Code: Codes: (See Volume IV)
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-57 of filing instructions)

[ ] NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.</th>
<th>Description of Assets (including real estate)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Plan &quot;YES&quot; if each asset exempt from prior disclosures</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B.</th>
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<td>(1)</td>
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<thead>
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<th>C.</th>
<th>Value of assets at end of reporting period</th>
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<td>(Mon, Wed, Fri, etc.)</td>
<td>(P-F)</td>
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| (4) | | (5) |
| Code 1 | (A-B) | Identity of transferor (if private transaction) |

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<td>118.</td>
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1. Income Date Code:
   - A ($1,000 or less)
   - B ($1,000 to $19,999)
   - C ($20,000 to $24,999)
   - D ($30,000 to $39,999)
   - E ($40,000 to $99,999)
   - F ($100,000 to $199,999)
   - G ($200,000 to $299,999)
   - H ($300,000 to $499,999)
   - I ($500,000 to $999,999)
   - J ($1,000,000 to $2,999,999)
   - K ($3,000,000 to $4,999,999)
   - L ($5,000,000 to $9,999,999)
   - M ($10,000,000 to $19,999,999)
   - N ($20,000,000 to $49,999,999)
   - O ($50,000,000 to $99,999,999)
   - P ($100,000,000 to $199,999,999)
   - Q ($200,000,000 to $499,999,999)
   - R ($500,000,000 to $1,999,999,999)
   - S ($2,000,000,000 or more)

2. Value Method Code:
   - C - Market Value
   - D - Appraisal
   - E - Cost (Real Estate Only)
   - F - Other (Specify)
   - G - Estimated

3. Value Code Number:
   - A - $1,000,000 or less
   - B - $1,000,000 to $19,999,999
   - C - $20,000,000 to $24,999,999
   - D - $30,000,000 to $39,999,999
   - E - $40,000,000 to $99,999,999
   - F - $100,000,000 to $199,999,999
   - G - $200,000,000 to $499,999,999
   - H - $500,000,000 to $999,999,999
   - I - $1,000,000,000 or more

4. Date of Acquisition:
   - A - June 30, 2008
   - B - July 1, 2008
   - C - July 2, 2008
   - D - July 3, 2008
   - E - July 4, 2008
   - F - July 5, 2008
   - G - July 6, 2008
   - H - July 7, 2008
   - I - July 8, 2008
   - J - July 9, 2008
   - K - July 10, 2008
   - L - July 11, 2008
   - M - July 12, 2008
   - N - July 13, 2008
   - O - July 14, 2008
   - P - July 15, 2008
   - Q - July 16, 2008
   - R - July 17, 2008
   - S - July 18, 2008
   - T - July 19, 2008
   - U - July 20, 2008
   - V - July 21, 2008
   - W - July 22, 2008
   - X - July 23, 2008
   - Y - July 24, 2008
   - Z - July 25, 2008
   - AA - July 26, 2008
   - BB - July 27, 2008
   - CC - July 28, 2008
   - DD - July 29, 2008
   - EE - July 30, 2008
   - FF - July 31, 2008
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- **Type**: Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependents children. See pp. 16-27 of filing instructions)
- **NOTE**: (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (including description)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value as of end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan &quot;V&quot; after each asset exempt from prior disclosure</td>
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<td>(H)</td>
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| 120. | UNFI |  |  |  |
| 121. | WYE |  |  |  |
| 122. | YUM |  |  |  |
| 123. | YMH Smith Barney acct # 2 |  |  |  |
| 124. | Western Asset Mid |  |  |  |
| 125. | YLP |  |  |  |
| 126. | WACX |  |  |  |
| 127. | NBMCX |  |  |  |
| 128. | RHECX |  |  |  |
| 129. | AB¥X |  |  |  |
| 130. | BORFX |  |  |  |
| 131. | BMMFX |  |  |  |
| 132. | ARFX |  |  |  |
| 133. | GFAFX |  |  |  |
| 134. | LRMX |  |  |  |
| 135. | RYTX |  |  |  |
| 136. | Puerto Rico HSD Rev bond |  |  |  |

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1. Source Date Code:
   - A = 2007
   - B = 2008
   - C = 2009
2. Value Column:
   - B = $50,000 - $99,999
   - C = $100,000 - $499,999
   - D = $500,000 - $1,999,999
   - E = $2,000,000 - $2,999,999
3. Value Method Code:
   - I = Cost
   - U = Fair Value
   - Y = Cash
VIII. INVESTMENTS AND TRUSTS

NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Description of Assets (including trust assets)</th>
<th>Value as of report date</th>
<th>Type of Transaction</th>
<th>Description of Transaction</th>
<th>Date of Transaction</th>
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VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 54-57 for filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (including trust marit)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
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<td>(2) Date</td>
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</table>

154. ——— ABC
155. ——— NLY
156. ——— ANN
157. ——— AMAT
158. ——— ADSK
159. ——— BIS
160. ——— BP
161. ——— BHI
162. ——— BAC
163. ——— BBY
164. ——— BKB
165. ——— BID
166. ——— BRCM
167. ——— CVC
168. ——— CB
169. ——— CSCO
170. ——— KO

1. Income Data Codes
   (See Column 3 and 4)
2. Value Data
   (See Column 5 and 6)
3. Value Mdi Data
   (See Column 7)
4. Value Code
   (See Column 8)
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (Includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-37 of filing instructions)

- **NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (Including Trusts)</th>
<th>B. Income During Reporting Period</th>
<th>C. Gross Value at End of Reporting Period</th>
<th>D. Transactions During Reporting Period</th>
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<td>Files &quot;C&quot; if not exempt from prior disclosure</td>
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- **Income Data Codes**
  - (See column B and C)
  - (See column C1 and C2)
  - (See column C2)

- **Value Codes**
  - (See column D)

- **Value Manufactured**
  - (See column D1)

- **Value Market**
  - (See column D2)

- **Value Other**
  - (See column D3)

- **Value Written Down**
  - (See column D4)

- **Value Written Up**
  - (See column D5)

- **Value Other**
  - (See column D6)

- **Value Market**
  - (See column D7)
VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — income, value, transactions (Includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-37 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (including trust name)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plain &quot;CD&quot; after each asset except those prior disclosure</td>
<td>(1) Account Code 1</td>
<td>(2) Description</td>
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<td>(C)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
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188. JGNZ
189. HD
190. HCN
191. HACI
192. GRF
193. IMCL
194. INTC
195. IBM
196. INI
197. IPI
198. KMD
199. KPT
200. LLL
201. LWN
202. LRI
203. LRTYA
204. LRTYK

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1. Income: Gain (Loss) on Sale (Included as income from Securities in Schedule D) $0-$1,000 or less $1,001-$2,500 $2,501-$5,000 $5,001-$10,000 $10,001-$15,000 $15,001-$20,000 $20,001-$25,000 $25,001-$50,000 $50,001-$100,000 $100,001-$150,000 $150,001-$200,000 $200,001-$250,000 $250,001-$1,000,000 $1,000,001-$10,000,000
2. Value: Code: Description
3. Value: Market Code: Description
4. Value: Market (A) Less: (B) Description
5. Value: Market (A) Greater: (B) Description
6. Value: Market (A) Less: (B) Description
7. Value: Market (A) Greater: (B) Description
8. Value: Market (A) Less: (B) Description
9. Value: Market (A) Greater: (B) Description
10. Value: Market (A) Less: (B) Description
11. Value: Market (A) Greater: (B) Description

---
**VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS**

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 14-17 of filing instructions)

- **NONE** (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of assets (including real assets)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Name</td>
<td>(2) Type (e.g., div., rent, or int.)</td>
<td>(3) Value Method Code 1 (C-W)</td>
<td>(4) Transaction Details</td>
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</table>

1. Income Only
   - Column A: Name
   - Column B: Type of Income
   - Column C: Value Method
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS – Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 14-17 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Description of Asset (Including Trusts)</th>
<th>Value Method Code (See Column C)</th>
<th>Value (Including Time Dependent Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>222.</td>
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<td>238.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Description of Assets (including type assets)</td>
<td>B. Income during reporting period</td>
<td>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</td>
<td>D. Transactions during reporting period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan &quot;50&quot; after each asset exempt from prior disclosure</td>
<td>(1) Amount</td>
<td>(2) Type of low, eq., rent, or nsc.</td>
<td>(1) Value Code 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>239. ENH Smith Barney Act 84</td>
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<td>240.</td>
<td>Writs asset NM</td>
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1. Issuer SIC Code
2. Value Code
3. Value Method Code
4. Date of Sale
5. Date of Transfer
6. Date of Sale
7. Date of Transfer
8. Date of Sale
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255. Date of Sale

VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
## VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-37 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (identifying true nature)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross Value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Name of Code</td>
<td>(2) Date Code (a)</td>
<td>(1) Value Code (b)</td>
<td>(2) Value Code (c)</td>
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<td>(1) Cash</td>
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<td>(2) 0001</td>
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<td>(2) Property</td>
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<td>(2) 0002</td>
<td>(2) 0002</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Debt Instruments</td>
<td>(2) 0003</td>
<td>(2) 0003</td>
<td>(2) 0003</td>
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</table>

- **256.** Cash
- **257.** Property
- **258.** Debt Instruments

### Income/Value Codes

- A: 0001 = Income
- D: 0001, 0002, 0003 = Value

### Value Codes

- D: 0001 = Income
- D: 0002, 0003 = Value

### Transactions Codes

- D: 0001 = Income
- D: 0002, 0003 = Value

- (a) Date Code
- (b) Value Code
- (c) Value Code
- (d) Type of Code
- (e) Date
- (f) Value Code
- (g) Date Code
- (h) Nature of Activity
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- **NONE** (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (including real estate)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Plan &quot;529&quot; after each asset except fee for plan services</td>
<td>(1) Amount ($)</td>
<td>(1) Value ($)</td>
<td>(1) Date (MM/DD/YYYY)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Type (e.g., div., int., or income)</td>
<td>(2) Method Code (#)</td>
<td>(2) Code (#)</td>
<td>(2) Code (#)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Date (MM/DD/YYYY)</td>
<td>(3) Code (#)</td>
<td>(3) Code (#)</td>
<td>(3) Code (#)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Type (e.g., sale, purchase, etc.)</td>
<td>(4) Code (#)</td>
<td>(4) Code (#)</td>
<td>(4) Code (#)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(7) Date (MM/DD/YYYY)</td>
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<td>(14) Code (#)</td>
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</table>

- **JER**

- **MMPT**

- **MCO**

- **NNDA**

- **JY**

- **PM**

- **PO**

- **FGR**

- **JER**

- **THM**

- **JNN**

- **JMC**

- **WB**

- **WMT**

- **WFC**

- **BUSH SMITH BARNEY ACCT # 5**

---

**Note:** The table contains code numbers for various categories, which are not directly translatable into plain text. The codes are likely used to indicate different types of transactions or asset values.
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS – income, value, transactions (Includes those of the spouse and dependent children. For pp. 54-57 of filing instructions)

**NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Asset (including real estate)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Open value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
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<tr>
<td>290. Western Asset MIM</td>
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<td>291. ANZCY</td>
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<td>292. BECTY</td>
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<td>306. MLEY</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. **Income Data Codes**
   - 1 = Income from a business
   - 2 = Income from office, professional, financial, or consulting services
   - 3 = Income from rental income
   - 4 = Income from royalties and similar income
   - 5 = Income from real estate
   - 6 = Other income

2. **Value Code**
   - 1 = Valued
   - 2 = Nonvalued

3. **Value Method Code**
   - 1 = Book Value
   - 2 = Cost
   - 3 = Fair Market Value
   - 4 = Fair Market Value, net
   - 5 = Other

4. **Date Code**
   - 1 = Date of asset
   - 2 = Date of sale
   - 3 = Date of transfer
   - 4 = Date of asset
   - 5 = Date of sale
   - 6 = Date of transfer
## VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 24-27 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset (Including Trust Assets)</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>Gross Value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Amount Code 1 (A-D)</td>
<td>(2) Type e.g., div, int, orunc</td>
<td>(1) Value Code 2 (F-P)</td>
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<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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- 307. NABET
- 308. NIG
- 309. NTT
- 310. NVS
- 311. NTS
- 312. ERL
- 313. SWOY
- 314. BRL
- 315. SRL
- 316. SNOY
- 317. SICLY
- 318. TSJ
- 319. NET
- 320. SIF
- 321. TEIY
- 322. TUT
- 323. TM

### Notes

1. Interests Only
2. Interests Only
3. Value Codes
4. Value Codes
5. Value Methods
6. Value Methods
7. Value Methods
8. Value Methods
9. Value Methods
10. Value Methods
11. Value Methods
12. Value Methods
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Asset (Including real estate)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Amount Code 1 (A-R)</td>
<td>(2) Type (e.g. div., int., cap, unreal) Code 2 (P-T)</td>
<td>(3) Value Method Code 3 (Q-V)</td>
<td>(4) Date (for present, acquired, redeemed) Code 4 (W-X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Date (for Restricted, Inception, etc.) Code 5 (Y-Z)</td>
<td>(6) Date (for Mon.-Day)</td>
<td>(7) Value (Agora, etc.) Code 7 (P-T)</td>
<td>(8) Date (for Mon.-Day)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

324. —— U.S. Treasury Bills

325. —— CHEF

326. —— PSYCH

327. Trust #2 RWT/LT GST A, trustee
   D. Dividend N T

328. ——4% partnership interest in RNBH Associates, LP

329. ——For assets RNBH Associates. LP see lines 07-326

330. Trust #3 RWT/LT GST B, Trustee
   D. Dividend N T

331. ——Limited partnership interest in RNBH Associates, LP

332. ——For assets of RNBH Associates, LP see lines 07-336

333. Trust #4 RWT/TTA, trustee
   D. Interest P1 T

334. Credit Suisse, US Treasury Money Market Fund
   D. Interest P1 T

335. Trust #5 RWT/LTH/SH shared beneficial interest
   M. T

336. Credit Suisse US Treasury Money Market Fund
   B. Interest P1 T

337. ——South Battery tract
   T

338. IVY Assent Strategy Fund
   A. Dividend M T

339. ——TAX Advisory Funds
   D. Dividend M T

340. ——Income High Yield Must Bond Fund
   B. Dividend L T

1. Issuer Date Code
   (See column 1 and 2)

2. Value Code
   (See column 3 and 4)

3. Value Method Code
   (See column 5 and 6)
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

#### Income, value, transactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (excluding trust assets)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transaction during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Amount</td>
<td>(2) Type of Code</td>
<td>(3) Value Method Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan YDC, 7th year audit except from prior disclosure</td>
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#### List of Investments

- **341. Trust in P&G Retirement Account**
  - Type: Interest
  - Value: $T

- **342. Columbia Cash Reserve Money Market**
  - Type: Interest
  - Value: $K

- **343. Sharkrock Inclined Municipal Income Trust**
  - Type: Dividend
  - Value: $K

- **344. Santa Monica Exception Municipal Bond Fund**
  - Type: Dividend
  - Value: $L

- **345. Debit System**
  - Type: None
  - Value: $J

- **346. NYSEIA Bond**
  - Type: Interest
  - Value: $L

- **347. Tappan Zee Rev Bond**
  - Type: Interest
  - Value: $M

- **348. Public High School Bond**
  - Type: Interest
  - Value: $K

- **349. Florida Tax Free Income Fund**
  - Type: Distribution
  - Value: $K

- **350. Investment in unimproved California property**
  - Type: None
  - Value: $M

- **351. Pacific Growth LLC, SIC 6799, California**
  - Type: None
  - Value: $W

- **352. California Growth LLC, SIC 6799, California**
  - Type: None
  - Value: $W

- **353. Condor Corporation, SIC 6799, California**
  - Type: None
  - Value: $W

- **354. Miller Associates, SIC 6799, California**
  - Type: None
  - Value: $W

- **355. Brookfield Associates Real Estate NYC**
  - Type: None
  - Value: $W

- **356. Lichtenstein Ave. Assoc. Real Estate NYC**
  - Type: None
  - Value: $W

---

1. **Income Code**
   - (See Column A and B)
2. **Value Code**
   - (See Column C and D)
3. **Value Method Code**
   - (See Column E)
4. **Other**
   - (See Column F)

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**VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC**
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- **NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of assets (including real estate)</th>
<th>B. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>C. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Name</td>
<td>Last Name</td>
<td>Code 1 (A-N)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Example: 318. First Name Last Name

- **First Name** Last Name, Real Estate NYC
- **Code 1 (A-N)**: None
- **Code 2 (P-S)**: K
- **Code 3 (E)**: W

---

**Notes:**
- All values are as of the date of report.
- Transactions are reported separately for each investment.
- Include any transactions that occurred during the reporting period.
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

**Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 94-95 of instructions)**

**NONE** (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Descriptions of Assets (indicating net assets)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Type of (2) Description (3) Value (4) Value Method</td>
<td>(1) Value (2) Code (3) Value (4) Value Method</td>
<td>(1) Date or Range of Date</td>
<td>(1) Date of Transaction (2) Description (3) Value (4) Value Method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Date</td>
<td>(6) Date</td>
<td>(7) Code</td>
<td>(8) Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Description</td>
<td>(10) Date or Range of Date</td>
<td>(11) Code</td>
<td>(12) Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>376. &quot;BOA account&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>377. &quot;WEB: Associate 2 office&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>378. &quot;NHI&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>379. &quot;RNAI, Inc. general partner of RNHI by 2006&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>K</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>380. For holdings of RNHI, see items 67 - 53 above</td>
<td></td>
<td>K</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>381. - Marriott stock</td>
<td></td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>382. - OSS HOLDINGS</td>
<td></td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>383. - Merck Pharmaceutical stock</td>
<td></td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>384. - Smith Barney brokerage acct</td>
<td></td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>385. - outside network Inc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>386. -outside Inc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>387. - chime technologies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>388. - Child Foundation, Ltd., Washington Securities</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>389. - Child Accumulation Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390. - ATVI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>391. - LMT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1. Income/Net Value:**

- (2) Description:
  - (3) Value: $45,000 or less
  - (4) Value Method: A

- (2) Description:
  - (3) Value: $45,000 to $100,000
  - (4) Value Method: B

- (2) Description:
  - (3) Value: $100,000 to $250,000
  - (4) Value Method: C

- (2) Description:
  - (3) Value: $250,000 to $1,000,000
  - (4) Value Method: D

- (2) Description:
  - (3) Value: $1,000,000 to $5,000,000
  - (4) Value Method: E

- (2) Description:
  - (3) Value: $5,000,000 to $25,000,000
  - (4) Value Method: F

- (2) Description:
  - (3) Value: $25,000,000 to $100,000,000
  - (4) Value Method: G

- (2) Description:
  - (3) Value: $100,000,000 to $500,000,000
  - (4) Value Method: H

- (2) Description:
  - (3) Value: $500,000,000 to $2,500,000,000
  - (4) Value Method: I

- (2) Description:
  - (3) Value: $2,500,000,000 to $10,000,000,000
  - (4) Value Method: J

- (2) Description:
  - (3) Value: $10,000,000,000 or more
  - (4) Value Method: K
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 54-77 of filing instructions)

- **NONE** (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset (including trust status)</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>Value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Asset (including trust status)</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Code 1: 1: 2:</td>
<td>Type of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset (including trust status)</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>Value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Asset (including trust status)</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Code 1: 1: 2:</td>
<td>Type of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **None**
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS – Income, value, transactions (Includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 24-27 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets (including trust assets)</th>
<th>Type of Income or Transaction</th>
<th>Value (C)</th>
<th>(F)</th>
<th>(G)</th>
<th>(H)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dated (Y/M/D) after which asset was first owned or inherited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:****
- **A** - Description of Assets
- **B** - Type of Income or Transaction
- **C** - Value
- **D** - Date
- **E** - Code
- **F** - Code
- **G** - Code
- **H** - Code
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

**NONE** (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (including interest)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Income during reporting period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Transactions during reporting period</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Source Code (A)</th>
<th>(2) Type of Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3) (4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Value (Col. 2)</th>
<th>(2) Type of buy, sell, exchange, redemption</th>
<th>(3) Date</th>
<th>(4) Value (Col. 2)</th>
<th>(5) Gain (Loss)</th>
<th>(6) Identifying number (Private transaction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- 426. --- IEI
- 427. --- PFE
- 428. --- FDR
- 429. --- FL
- 430. --- RIG
- 431. --- ESW
- 432. --- SRE
- 433. --- SFD
- 434. --- JAVA
- 435. --- PTEK
- 436. --- TMO
- 437. --- TXN
- 438. --- SOD
- 439. --- VWO
- 440. --- WRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E. Dividend</th>
<th>O. Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 441. W-4 Foundation, Dir. Credit Score
- 442. --- US Taxa, assets held

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income State Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(See Column 6 and 13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(See Column 14 and 15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Method Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(See Column 16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(See Column 17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- **Income, value, transactions** (Includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See p. 54.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset</th>
<th>Initial Value (Including net asset)</th>
<th>Value during reporting period</th>
<th>Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent Code 1: (A-B)</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type (e.g., div., int., or eq.)</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>(F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(G)</td>
<td>(H)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(I)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **If not exempt from disclosure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Date (month, day) (J)</th>
<th>(K) Gains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

|                      | Identity of income/transaction (L) |

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>—— AIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— ANON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— BHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— CEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— CER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— DEJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— ENTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— FHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— IFK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— OTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— VID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— WFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— YST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— ZET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— ZF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. **Income Code Columns**
   - (Value Code)
   - (Value Code) (C) and (D)
   - (Value Code) (C)
   - (Value Code) (C)

2. **Value Codes**
   - A: $10,000 or less
   - B: $10,001 to $19,999
   - C: $20,000 to $29,999
   - D: $30,000 to $39,999
   - E: $40,000 to $49,999
   - F: $50,000 to $59,999
   - G: $60,000 to $69,999
   - H: $70,000 to $79,999
   - I: $80,000 to $89,999
   - J: $90,000 to $99,999
   - K: $100,000 to $199,999
   - L: $200,000 to $299,999
   - M: $300,000 to $399,999
   - N: $400,000 to $499,999
   - O: $500,000 to $599,999
   - P: $600,000 to $699,999
   - Q: $700,000 to $799,999
   - R: $800,000 to $899,999
   - S: $900,000 to $999,999
   - T: $1,000,000 or more

---

VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Page 33 of 34

VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS. (Include part of Report)

Part VII, line 351, interest purchased for $100,000 in 2007.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Page 34 of 34

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to any spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it was not applicable or statutory provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that earned income from outside employment and business and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app. § 301 et. seq., 5 U.S.C. § 7353, and Judicial Conference regulations.

Signature: [Signature]
Date: 4/24/08

NOTE: ANY PERSON WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FALSIFIES OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (18 U.S.C. app. § 10)
## FINANCIAL STATEMENT

### NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and all liabilities (including debits, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-sec</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liened securities-sec schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unliened securities-sec schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Real estate mortgage payable-sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-sec schedule</td>
<td>Chattel mortgages and other liens payable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td>Other debts-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto and other personal property</td>
<td>LLC capital account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash value-life insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets immovable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See attached schedule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets</td>
<td>11 395 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total liabilities and net worth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 395 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCERNENT LIABILITIES</td>
<td>GENERAL INFORMATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As executor, curatrix or guardian</td>
<td>Are any assets pledged? (Attach schedule) NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On loans or contracts</td>
<td>Are you defendant in any suits or legal actions? NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Claims</td>
<td>Have you even taken bankruptcy? NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for Federal Income Tax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other special debt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed Securities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See attached AO-10, Financial Disclosure Report</td>
<td>$ 1,020,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted Securities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel Bonds</td>
<td>$ 80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Owned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>$ 800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado condominium</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Real Estate Owned</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 1,500,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Mortgages Payable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>$ 415,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado condominium</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Real Estate Mortgages Payable</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 615,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Estate of JJW</td>
<td>$ 6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in RNJH Assoc.</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest under RW GRAT</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401K and pension accounts</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in NJH and NJHA Assoc.</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in MWCM LLC</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Other Assets</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 8,700,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AFFIDAVIT

I, Helen Nita White, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

__/24/08 (DATE)

______________________________
(HNAME)

______________________________
(NOTARY)

LOUISE M. HARRIS
Notary Public, State of Michigan
County of Oakland
My Commission Expires: Jul 18, 2012
Acting in the County of 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.
Mr. Kethledge, would you please tell us if you have members here?

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND M. KETHLEDGE, NOMINEE TO BE
CIRCUIT JUDGE FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Mr. KETHLEDGE. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to introduce my wife, Jessica; my daughter, Ella; my son, Ray. I am also joined by—I am going to get in trouble if I forget anyone here. I am joined by—
Chairman LEAHY. That is why we keep the record open, Mr. Kethledge.

[Laughter.]
Chairman LEAHY. And at some point, you can say, “See, you did not hear me say your name, but here it is in the record.” Go ahead.
Mr. KETHLEDGE. I am joined by my father, Ray Kethledge; my sister, Laura Strasius; and my mom, Diane Kethledge. I am also honored to have with me today two of my partners who made the trip out from Michigan: Patrick Seyferth, who loves attention, and Rick Paige. And I am joined by a whole bunch of other friends: Jim Neill, Ward Bobitz, Steve Hessler, Karen Lloyd—now I am going to forget somebody. They know who they are, and I am grateful that they are here.
I would like to thank the Chairman, I would like to thank the Committee for having this hearing. I would like to thank the President for nominating me. I am deeply grateful for that. I would very much like to thank Senators Levin and Stabenow for their gracious introduction and for their hard work and openness in getting us to this point. And I would very much like to thank my wife for standing by me through this process.
Chairman LEAHY. Well, thank you, Mr. Kethledge. It has got to be great also to have your parents here. I know how thrilled my parents were when they were able to see me sworn in several times in the U.S. Senate. It was a thrill for me, and I think a thrill for them.
Mr. KETHLEDGE. Thank you.
[The biographical information follows.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).
   Raymond Michael Kethledge

   Before October 1993, my name was spelled Raymond Michael Ketchledge. The deleted "c" was silent.

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.
   United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit.

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.
   My office address is 3001 West Big Beaver Road, Troy, Michigan, 40084.
   My place of residence is Novi, Michigan.

4. **Birthplace:** State date and place of birth.
   1966; Summit, New Jersey.

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse's occupation, employer's name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.
   My wife is Jessica Levinson Kethledge. Prior to our marriage, her name was Jessica Davi Levinson. She is home with our two children full-time. Those are my only dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.
   Wayne State University Law School; September 1990 to May 1991; no degree
University of Texas at Austin; September 1987 to December 1987; no degree.


7. Employment Record: List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

From July 2003 to the present, I have been a partner in the law firm of Bush Seyferth Kethledge & Paige PLLC, 3001 West Big Beaver Road, Suite 600, Troy, Michigan, 48084.

From June 2002 to June 2003, I was a partner in the law firm of Fenney Kellett Wiener & Bush, 35980 Woodward Avenue, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, 48304.

From June 2001 to June 2002, I worked in-house for the Ford Motor Company, handling product-liability matters. My title was Counsel. My office address was 3 Parklane Boulevard, Suite 300, Dearborn, Michigan, 48126.

From August 1998 to May 2001, I worked for the law firm of Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn, 2290 First National Building, Detroit, Michigan, 48226. I was an associate until early 2001, when I was elected partner. I also worked as a summer associate at Honigman from May 1992 to August 1992.

From July 1997 to July 1998, I served as a law clerk to Justice Anthony Kennedy of the United States Supreme Court.

From January 1995 to June 1997, I worked for United States Senator Spencer Abraham in Washington, D.C. My title was Judiciary Counsel.

From September 1994 to December 1994, I was an associate with Sidley & Austin in Washington, D.C. The firm's current address is 1501 K Street N.W., Washington, D.C., 20005.

From September 1993 to September 1994, I served as a law clerk to Judge Ralph B. Guy, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

From January 1992 to April 1992, while a student at the University of Michigan Law School, I served as an intern to Judge Gerald Rosen of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
From June 1991 to August 1991, I served as a law clerk to Michigan Governor John Engler.


From September 1989 to November 1989, I was a waiter at Carnegie's Restaurant (now defunct) in Alexandria, Virginia.

8. **Military Service and Draft Status:** Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

In January 1986, I enlisted in the Platoon Leaders Class program of the United States Marine Corps. Under this program, I was to attend Marine Corps Officer Candidate School in Quantico, Virginia during the summers after my freshman and junior years in college. Each session would be six weeks in duration. Accordingly, I attended and successfully completed the first six-week session of OCS after my freshman year in college, from approximately June 1, 1986, to July 10, 1986.

In February 1988, I voluntarily withdrew from the Platoon Leaders Class program after having decided to attend law school after graduation. I was honorably discharged as an Officer Candidate, E-5, and transferred to the Marine Corps Reserves. I was on inactive status from February 1988-February 1991 when I was honorably discharged.

9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

I was a member of the Order of the Coif at the University of Michigan Law School. I also received Certificates of Merit (awarded to the student with the highest grade in the class) in *Federal Courts and Introduction to Constitutional Law*.

I was named Community Legal Service's *Pro Bono Attorney Of The Year for the Year* 2000.

10. **Bar Associations:** List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

American Bar Association
Michigan State Bar
District of Columbia Bar
I have served as a member of the Michigan State Bar Civil Procedure and Courts Committee since December 2005. Its chair is Ronald Longhofer, with whom I practiced at Honigman.

11. Bar and Court Admission:

   a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

      Michigan State Bar: December 13, 1993 to present;
      District of Columbia Bar: April 4, 1996 to present.

      I have not had any lapses of membership with respect to these organizations.

   b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

      Michigan state courts, 1993
      District of Columbia courts, 1996
      United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: September 29, 1994;
      Supreme Court of the United States: March 13, 1998;
      United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: March 9, 2001;

      I have not had any lapses of membership with respect to these courts.

12. Memberships:

   a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

      None, other than those listed in Questions 10 and 11.

   b. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response
to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

In college, I was a member of the Sigma Chi fraternity, which was all-male. Otherwise, I have not been a member of any organization that discriminates on the described bases.

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

I wrote an article entitled “U.S. Supreme Court Review: October 1998 Term” for the November 1999 edition of the Michigan Bar Journal. There is not any other published material that I have written or edited.

b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

I have not prepared or contributed to any such material.

c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

I have not issued or provided any such material, nor have others presented such material on my behalf.

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not
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speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

I have not delivered any such speeches or talks.

e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

On December 13, 2005, I attended a press conference at the National Association of Manufacturers’ offices regarding the nomination of Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court of the United States. I did not speak at the press conference, but was briefly questioned afterwards by a reporter for the Investor’s Business Daily Newspaper. The reporter then quoted me in a related article dated December 28, 2005. Otherwise, I have not given any such interviews.

14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

I have not held a judicial office.

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

I have not been a judge.
16. **Recusal:** If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

   a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

   b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

   c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

   d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

I have not been a judge.

17. **Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:**

   a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

I have not held any public offices.

   b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

I have not had any such offices, memberships, or positions.

18. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

   a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after
graduation from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

I served as a law clerk to Judge Ralph B. Guy, Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit from September 1993 to September 1994.

I served as a law clerk to Justice Anthony M. Kennedy of the Supreme Court of the United States from July 1997 to July 1998.

ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

I have not practiced alone.

iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

From July 2003 to the present, I have been a partner in the law firm of Bush Seyferth Kethledge & Paige PLLC. Cheryl Bush, Patrick Seyferth, and I founded this firm in July 2003. We now have 10 lawyers and 31 employees. Our address is 3001 West Big Beaver Road, Troy, Michigan, 48084.

From June 2002 to June 2003, I was a partner in the law firm of Feeney Kellett Wiener & Bush. The firm is now defunct. Its address was 35980 Woodward Avenue, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, 48304.

From June 2001 to June 2002, I worked in-house for the Ford Motor Company, handling product-liability matters. My address at Ford was 3 Parklane Boulevard, Suite 300, Dearborn, Michigan, 48126. My title was Counsel.

From August 1998 to May 2001, I worked for the law firm of Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn. I was an associate until early 2001, when I was elected partner. I also worked as a summer associate at Honigman from May 1992 to August 1992. The firm's address is 2290 First National Building, Detroit, Michigan, 48226.

From July 1997 to July 1998, I served as a law clerk to Justice Anthony Kennedy of the United States Supreme Court.

From January 1995 to June 1997, I worked for United States Senator Spencer Abraham in Washington, D.C. My title was Judiciary Counsel.
From September 1994 to December 1994, I was an associate with Sidley & Austin in Washington, D.C. The firm's current address is 1501 K Street N.W., Washington, D.C., 20005. I left Sidley after being approached about the possibility of working for Senator Abraham, who was elected in November 1994. I sought and received the firm's permission before leaving the firm.

From September 1993 to September 1994, I served as a law clerk to Judge Ralph B. Guy, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

My practice has taken several forms over the years. After clerking for Judge Guy, I joined the Washington, D.C. office of Sidley & Austin as an associate in their litigation department. While at Sidley, I worked primarily on commercial litigation cases.

I served as Judiciary Counsel to Senator Abraham from 1995-1997. My responsibilities included advising Senator Abraham regarding proposed legislation, as well as drafting and working to advance legislation that Senator Abraham supported. In that capacity I worked closely with staff from other Senate offices, including many Democratic offices. I also had some involvement in reviewing judicial nominations from States other than Michigan.

I left Senator Abraham’s office in June 1997 to clerk for Justice Anthony Kennedy during the Supreme Court’s October 1997 Term. When my clerkship ended, my family and I moved back to Michigan, where I became an associate in the litigation department of Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn in Detroit. I worked primarily on commercial litigation, for a variety of different clients. My responsibilities included briefing and arguing motions, taking depositions, briefing appeals, and, in one case, a one-day bench trial in federal bankruptcy court. I was elected to partnership at Honigman in 2001.

In May 2001, I left Honigman to join the Ford Motor Company’s General Counsel office in Dearborn, Michigan. My title was Counsel. My responsibilities included management of cases involving rollover accidents or allegations of restraint-system defects. I did not appear in court during this time.
I later decided I wanted to return to an active court practice. In May 2002, I joined a boutique litigation firm, Feeney Kellett Weiner and Bush, as a partner. I primarily briefed and argued appeals, class actions, and complex motions while at Feeney Kellett. I also handled commercial litigation cases and second-chaired a three-week jury trial in Racine, Wisconsin during this time. My principal clients were DaimlerChrysler Corporation and, to a lesser extent, Ford and General Motors.

In the spring of 2003, Feeney Kellett was approached about the possibility of merging with a larger Detroit firm, Dykema Gossett PLLC. A number of Feeney Kellett's attorneys elected to join Dykema. Cheryl Bush, Patrick Seyferth, and I chose to start our own firm.

Our firm commenced operations on July 1, 2003, and was first known as Bush Seyferth & Kethledge PLLC. My partner Richard Paige joined the firm in July 2004, at which point we changed the firm's name to Bush Seyferth Kethledge & Paige PLLC. We are a litigation-only boutique. We began the firm with five lawyers and approximately 18 employees; we now have 10 lawyers and 31 employees. My practice has focused on briefing and arguing appeals and class actions in cases around the country. My practice also includes commercial litigation at the trial-court level. In April 2005, I second-chaired a one-week jury trial in a criminal case, in which the defendant, Tapendra Sharma, was charged with negligent homicide. Thomas Cranmer, who served as President of the Michigan State Bar in 2005-06, and I represented Mr. Sharma. Mr. Sharma was acquitted.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

My practice has specialized in appellate and class-action litigation, on the defense side. I have also done a good deal of commercial litigation. My firm does substantial work for DaimlerChrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Guardian Industries, Entertainment Properties Trust, and Genworth Financial, among other clients. I have also represented numerous individual clients. As noted above, these include one criminal defendant, Tapendra Sharma.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

100% of my practice has been in litigation. Apart from my time as a law clerk and with the Ford Motor Company (during which time I did not appear in court at all), I have appeared in court frequently.
i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 50%
   2. state courts of record: 50%
   3. other courts.

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings: 95%
   2. criminal proceedings: 5%

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

I have tried three cases to verdict. In each case I played a second-chair role with substantial responsibility for examining and cross-examining witnesses.

i. What percentage of these trials were:
   1. jury: 67%
   2. non-jury: 33%

e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

I have prepared one amicus brief and one brief in opposition to a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.

19. Litigation: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

a. the date of representation;

b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and

c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

1. *FDIC v. First Heights Bank, FSB*, 229 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000). This case involved a dispute between Pulte Corporation and certain of its affiliates, on the one hand, and the FDIC, on the other, as to Pulte’s obligations to share with the
FDIC certain tax savings that Pulte obtained as a result of its purchase of certain failed thrifts during the 1980s. The District Court had awarded summary judgment to the FDIC in the amount of $255 million, and Pulte had appealed. Pulte’s lead counsel on appeal was John G. Roberts, Jr., now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Pulte’s co-counsel included Norman Ankers, Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn, 2290 First National Building, Detroit Michigan, 48226, (313) 465-7000, Stephen Wasinger, 26862 Woodward Avenue, 100 Beacon Center, Royal Oak, Michigan, 48067, (248) 414-9942, and myself. Lead counsel for the FDIC was Kirk K. Van Tine, Baker Botts L.L.P, 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 639-7700. I assisted in writing and editing Pulte’s brief on appeal, and in strategizing about the appeal generally. In doing so I had the privilege of working closely with now-Chief Justice Roberts. In an opinion by Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., joined by Judges Merritt and Siler, the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment below.

2. *United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States*, 532 U.S. 822 (2001). The question presented in this case was whether, in the case of an “affiliated group” that files a consolidated tax return, the existence of a “product liability loss” under 26 U.S.C. § 172(b)(1)(I) is determined by comparing (i) the income and expenses of the group as a whole, or (ii) the respective income and expenses of each of its members. Kent Jones, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, 1275 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, was principal counsel for the United States. Eric R. Fox, Irvins, Phillips & Barker, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Suite 600, Washington D.C. 20006, was counsel for United Dominion Industries, Inc. I wrote an amicus brief on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers and the Manufacturers’ Alliance, in which we argued, based on a close reading of the statutory text, that such losses should be computed by comparing the income and expenses of the affiliated group as a whole. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court agreed with our position and reversed the contrary decision of the Fourth Circuit.

3. *Gray v. General Motors Corporation*, 312 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 2002). This was a products-liability case in which the plaintiff alleged the seat belts in his vehicle were defective, which in turn allegedly enhanced his injuries in a rollover crash. I argued (but did not brief) the case for General Motors in the Sixth Circuit. Phyllis Robinson, P.O. Box 130, Manchester, Kentucky 40962 (current phone number unavailable), was lead counsel for the plaintiff. In an opinion by Judge Daughtrey, joined by Judges Gilman and Siler, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of General Motors.

4. *Heider v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation*, Racine County (Wisconsin) Circuit Court, 99 CV-1702, February 2003. This case involved a frontal collision between the plaintiffs’ vehicle, a 1996 Plymouth minivan, and another vehicle driven by a drunk driver. Tia Heider, then age 8, was rendered a quadriplegic in
the crash. The plaintiffs alleged that the passenger-side airbag in the minivan was too powerful, and that its deployment caused Tia Heider’s injuries. Cheryl Bush was lead counsel for DaimlerChrysler and I was her second chair. I examined or cross-examined approximately 40% of the witnesses in the case, including several experts. After a three-week trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of DaimlerChrysler. I later briefed and argued DaimlerChrysler’s opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial, which the court denied. The case was tried before Judge Charles Constantine, Racine County Courthouse, 730 Wisconsin Avenue, Racine, Wisconsin, 53403, (262) 636-3131. My co-counsel (and lead counsel for DaimlerChrysler Corporation at trial) was Cheryl Bush, Bush Seyferth Kethledge & Paige PLLC, 3001 West Big Beaver Avenue, Troy, Michigan, 48084, (248) 822-7800. Thomas Devine, Hostak Henzl & Bichler, 840 Lake Avenue, P.O. Box 516, Racine, Wisconsin, 53401, (262) 632-7541, was lead counsel for the plaintiffs. Jay Starrett, Whyte Hirschboeck & Dudek, 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1900, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 53202, (414) 273-2100, was counsel for co-defendant Hubbard Chrysler-Plymouth Jeep, Inc.

5. Anderson v. Pine Knob Ski Resort, 469 Mich. 20, 664 N.W.2d 756 (2003). The question presented by this case was whether an immunity provision in the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act, MCL § 408.321 et seq., barred the claims of plaintiff Robert Anderson for injuries he sustained in a skiing accident at the defendant Pine Knob Ski Resort. I briefed and argued the case for the plaintiff, Robert Anderson, in the Michigan Supreme Court. Robert L. Bunting, P.O. Box 7, Oxford, Michigan, 48371, (248) 628-5150, was lead counsel for Pine Knob. By a 4-3 vote, with Justice Taylor writing the majority opinion and Justices Cavanagh, Kelly, and Weaver dissenting, the Court ruled in favor of Pine Knob and held the claims were barred.

6. Sherr v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, 1 CA-CV-03-0566 (Arizona Ct. App., October 2004). This case was an appeal of a jury verdict in favor of DaimlerChrysler Corporation in a products-liability case. The plaintiff alleged the airbag in her 1997 Chrysler minivan was too powerful, and that its deployment caused her injuries. I briefed and argued the case for DaimlerChrysler in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Patrick X. Fowler, Snell & Wilmer, One Arizona Center, Phoenix, Arizona, 85004, (602) 382-6000, was co-counsel for DaimlerChrysler Corporation. G. Lynn Shumway, 6909 E. Greenway, Ste. 200, Scottsdale, Arizona, 85254, (480) 368-0002, was lead counsel for the plaintiffs. In the Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court had improperly sanctioned them for the subject vehicle’s spoliation and committed various other evidentiary errors at trial. In a unanimous opinion by Judge Barker, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict in favor of DaimlerChrysler Corporation.

7. State v. Sharma, Oakland County (Michigan) Circuit Court, 04-194301-FH, April 2005. In this case the defendant, Tapendra Sharma, was prosecuted for negligent homicide regarding an accident in which an Oakland County Road
Commission electrician was fatally injured. Thomas Cranmer, Miller Canfield Paddock & Stone PLC, 840 West Long Lake Road, Suite 200, Troy, Michigan, 48098, (248) 267-3381—who now serves as President of the Michigan State Bar—and I defended Mr. Sharma. Mr. Cranmer was lead counsel and I was his second chair. I examined all of our experts in the case (including an accident reconstructionist, biomechanic, and conspircity expert) and cross-examined the prosecution's accident reconstructionist. After a one-week trial, the jury acquitted Mr. Sharma. The case was tried before Judge Nanci J. Grant, Oakland Circuit Court, 1200 North Telegraph Road, Dept. 404, Pontiac, Michigan, 48341, (248) 858-0358. Michael Goetz, Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office, 1200 North Telegraph Road, Pontiac, Michigan, 48341, (248) 858-0656, was lead counsel for the prosecution.

8. Flury v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, 427 F.3d 939 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (June 26, 2006). This case was an appeal of a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged the airbag in his 1996 Dodge Ram truck should have deployed after he fell asleep at the wheel and struck a tree, and that the airbag’s non-deployment enhanced his injuries in the crash. I briefed and argued the case for DaimlerChrysler Corporation in the Eleventh Circuit. M. Diane Owens, Swift, Currie, McGee & Hiers, LLP, 1355 Peachtree Street, Suite 300, Atlanta, Georgia, 30309, (404) 874-8800, was co-counsel for DaimlerChrysler. Richard D. Phillips, P.O. Box 69, Ludonia, Georgia, 31316, (912) 545-2191, was lead counsel for the plaintiffs. On appeal, DaimlerChrysler argued that the testimony of Plaintiff’s only expert should have been excluded as unreliable under Fed. R. Evid. 702, and that the District Court should have imposed more meaningful sanctions for plaintiff’s spoliation of the subject vehicle. In a unanimous opinion by Judge Fay, joined by Judges Birch and Carnes, the Eleventh Circuit held that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss the case as sanctions for the vehicle’s spoliation. The Eleventh Circuit thus ordered judgment to be entered in favor of DaimlerChrysler. Plaintiff later filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court; I wrote DaimlerChrysler’s Brief In Opposition. On June 26, 2006, the Supreme Court denied the petition.

9. Laura v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, 269 Mich. App. 446, 711 N.W.2d 792 (2006). This was a putative class action brought on behalf of owners and lessees of Dodge and Plymouth Neon vehicles in Michigan. Plaintiff alleged the head gaskets in the subject vehicles were defective. DaimlerChrysler Corporation had moved for summary disposition on statute-of-limitations grounds, which the trial court denied. I briefed and argued the case at all stages on appeal. Lynn Shecter, Roy Shecter & Vocht P.C., 36700 Woodward Avenue, Suite 205, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, 48304, (248) 540-7660, was counsel for the Plaintiff. The appeal began with an application for leave to appeal, which the Court of Appeals denied. DaimlerChrysler then filed an emergency application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. That Court ordered the Court of Appeals to hear the appeal. After briefing and oral
argument, the Court of Appeals (per curiam) (Fitzgerald, O’Connell, and Kelly, JJ.) reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered judgment entered for DaimlerChrysler.

10. Cober v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, 617 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. App. 2005), aff’d, 627 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. 2006). This was a putative class action brought on behalf of owners and lessees of 1995-2000 Chrysler, Dodge and Plymouth minivans. Plaintiffs alleged the minivans were defective because they lacked a “brake-shift interlock” device. Plaintiffs had not, however, suffered any injury or expense as a result of the alleged defect. The trial court granted summary judgment to DaimlerChrysler Corporation on standing grounds, among other grounds. I briefed and argued the case for DaimlerChrysler Corporation in the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court. Sidney S. Eagles, Jr., Smith Moore L.L.P., 2800 Two Hanover Square, Raleigh, North Carolina, 27601, (919) 755-8771, was co-counsel for DaimlerChrysler Corporation. Gary Shipman, Shipman & Associates L.L.P., 11 South Fifth Avenue, Wilmington, North Carolina, 28401, (910) 762-1990, was lead counsel for Plaintiffs. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of DaimlerChrysler in an opinion by Judge John Tyson, joined by Judge Richard Elmore, with Judge Robin Hudson dissenting. Plaintiffs appealed by right to the North Carolina Supreme Court. After briefing and oral argument, that Court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion.

20. Legal Activities: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organizations(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

I had considerable experience reviewing and, to a significant extent, drafting proposed legislation while working in the Senate. On some occasions I prepared drafts of individual provisions for proposed legislation; on at least one occasion, I substantially drafted a proposed bill. To the best of my recollection, none of the provisions that I drafted became law. I do not have any copies of them today.

In addition, as noted above, I currently serve as a member of the Michigan State Bar Civil Procedure and Courts Committee. In that capacity, I review and comment upon proposed revisions to the Michigan Court Rules and legislation affecting the practice of law in Michigan.

I have not been involved in any lobbying activities.
21. **Teaching:** What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

I have not taught any courses.

22. **Deferred Income/ Future Benefits:** List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

If confirmed, I will enter into an agreement with my current partners for a buyout of my interest in Bush Seyferth Kebler & Paige PLLC. I will ensure that any such agreement conforms to Advisory Opinion No. 24 of the Committee on Codes of Conduct for United States Judges. I do not anticipate any other receipts or arrangements of the kinds described in this question.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

I have no plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment during my service with the Sixth Circuit if confirmed.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)

Please see the attached financial disclosure report.

25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

Please see the attached financial net worth statement.

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

   a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service
in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

Parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during my initial service, if confirmed, would include cases involving Bush Seyferth Kethledge & Paige PLLC, DaimlerChrysler Corporation, and Ford Motor Corporation, among others. In addressing any such conflict, I would follow both the letter and the spirit of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and any other relevant guidelines if confirmed.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

I would follow both the letter and the spirit of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and any other relevant guidelines if confirmed.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

I have been involved in a number of pro bono activities. While at Honigman, I worked with Community Legal Services, a provider of legal services to the disadvantaged in Michigan, to clear title on a number of homes in Detroit that had been subject to tax foreclosures. I litigated multiple cases in Wayne County, Michigan Circuit Court to clear title on such properties and to allow new owners to begin to rehabilitate the homes. For this work I was named Community Legal Service’s Pro Bono Attorney Of The Year for the Year 2000.

More recently, I have worked with New Leaders New Schools, a charitable organization that assists in placing school principals in economically depressed areas. Specifically, I have assisted NLNS in obtaining documents and evidence in Michigan for purposes of defending a lawsuit against NLNS in the District of Columbia.

My partners and I, through our law firm, are active in charitable activities within the Detroit-area legal community. For example, each year our firm hosts the BSKP Annual Golf Classic for the benefit of the Detroit Foundation For Exceptional Children. This event is typically attended by 150 guests each year, most of whom are lawyers and judges. My firm pays for 18 holes of golf, lunch, and dinner at a leading golf facility for all of the attendees. In return, we ask each attendee to make a donation directly to the Foundation for Exceptional Children. Every dollar thus donated goes directly to the
Foundation. In 2006, the event raised more than $30,000 for the Foundation. The Foundation itself assists children with mental or other developmental handicaps.

Our firm also funds two scholarship programs at area law schools: The Bush Seyferth Kethledge & Paige Appellate Advocacy Scholarship at the University of Michigan Law School, and the Women's Trial Advocacy Scholarship at Wayne State University Law School.

28. Selection Process:

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

I am not aware of any selection commission in Michigan for federal judicial appointments.

I sent my resume to the White House unsolicited in February 2006. Approximately two weeks later, I was contacted to arrange interviews at the White House and the Department of Justice. On March 7, 2006, I interviewed at the White House; the following day, I interviewed at the Department of Justice. After completing all nomination paperwork and undergoing a background investigation, I was informed that the President had decided to nominate me to a seat on the Sixth Circuit. My nomination was forwarded to the Senate on June 28, 2006. My nomination was returned to the President on December 9, 2006. I was renominated on March 19, 2007.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No one during the selection process has discussed a case, issue, or question with me in a manner that could be interpreted as asking how I might rule on anything.
**FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT**

**NOMINATION FILING**

1. Name Reporting (Last name, First name, Middle initial)  
   Kerridge, Raymond M.
2. Court or Organization  
   Math Court
3. Date of Report  
   5/1/2007
4. Title: (Article II Judges indicate active or senior status; magistrates indicate full- or part-time)  
5. Report Type (check appropriate type)  
   a. Full Name  
   b. Date  
   c. Initial  
   d. Final
6. Reporting Period  
   5/1/2007 to 5/1/2006
7. Chambers or Office Address  
   100 N. Main Street,  
   Troy, AL 36086
8. On the basis of the information contained in this report and any modifications pertaining thereto, I certify, to the best of my knowledge, in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

**I. POSITIONS.** (Reporting individual only; see pp. 9-13 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Shareholder</td>
<td>Bank Seufrit, Kerridge &amp; Paige PLC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2. Trustee | |}
| 3. | |}
| 4. | |}

**II. AGREEMENTS.** (Reporting individual only; see pp. 14-16 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTY AND TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>Bank Seufrit, Kerridge &amp; Paige PLC (if applicable), I certify that I have not entered into an agreement consistent with 1Q. Op. No. 18, 24 for any of my interests in the firm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME

**A. Filer's Non-Investment Income**

- **NONE** - (No reportable non-investment income.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>OTHER INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2007</td>
<td>Bush Seyfeth Esfahani &amp; Page PLLC wages</td>
<td>$66,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2007</td>
<td>Bush Seyfeth Esfahani &amp; Page PLLC wages</td>
<td>$22,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2006</td>
<td>Bush Seyfeth Esfahani &amp; Page PLLC wages</td>
<td>$163,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 2005</td>
<td>Bush Seyfeth Esfahani &amp; Page PLLC wages</td>
<td>$199,620</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B. Spouse's Non-Investment Income** (If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, please complete this section. Dollar amount not reportable except for bonuses.)

- **NONE** - (No reportable non-investment income.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### IV. REIMBURSEMENTS

- **TRANSPORTATION, LIVING, FOOD, ENTERTAINMENT.**

(Include those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 15-17 of instructions.)

- **NONE** - (No reportable reimbursements.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>EXEMPT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### V. GIFTS.
( Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 20-21 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- NONE - (No such reportable gifts)

### VI. LIABILITIES.
( Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 32-34 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- NONE - (No reportable liabilities)
### Financial Disclosure Report

**Page 1 of 2**

#### VII. INVESTMENTS AND TRUSTS

- Current, past, or prospective (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-37 of filing instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Transactions of Shares (including unit contracts)</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Gross value as of end of reporting period</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **NONE** (No reportable person, assets, or transactions)

1. Brokerage Account #1
   - Dividend: J
   - T
   - 300/07

2. **Investment Co. American Corp**
   - Dividend: C
   - L
   - T

3. IRA #1
   - Dividend: L
   - T

4. **EuroPacific Growth Fund**

5. **Investment Co. American Corp**

6. **Short Term Inc. Pimco Money Market**

7. Bank Synergy Kalamazoo & Page 61 (E3) plus
   - Dividend: C
   - L
   - T

8. **Alliance Bernstein LP Investment Value**

9. **Noranda Resource MultiCap Value**

10. **American Century Collage Growth II**

11. **B Morgan/Morgan Equity Core Cap Value**

12. **Principal Global Real Estate Beta**

13. **Principal Global Asset Co.**

14. **Short-Term Inc. Bond Market**

15. **Short-Term Inc. Bond Market**

16. **Euro Pimco Growth Factor Income Inc**

17. **IRA #1**
   - Dividend: J
   - T

18. **Euro Pimco Growth, Inc**

---

**Notes:**
- Valuation Code
  - **A** = $500,000 or less
  - **B** = $500,001-$1,000,000
  - **C** = $1,000,001-$2,000,000
  - **D** = $2,000,001-$5,000,000
  - **E** = $5,000,001-$10,000,000
  - **F** = $10,000,001-$15,000,000
  - **G** = $15,000,001-$25,000,000
  - **H** = $25,000,001-$50,000,000
  - **I** = $50,000,001-$100,000,000
  - **J** = $100,000,001-$250,000,000
  - **K** = $250,000,001-$500,000,000
  - **L** = $500,000,001-$1,000,000,000
  - **M** = $1,000,000,001-$5,000,000,000
  - **N** = $5,000,000,001-$10,000,000,000
  - **O** = $10,000,000,001-$25,000,000,000
  - **P** = $25,000,000,001-$50,000,000,000
  - **Q** = $50,000,000,001-$75,000,000,000
  - **R** = $75,000,000,001-$100,000,000,000
  - **S** = $100,000,000,001-$150,000,000,000
  - **T** = $150,000,000,001-$200,000,000,000

- **Value:**
  - **A** = Appraised
  - **B** = Cost (Based on Date of Acquisition)
  - **C** = Assessed
  - **D** = Estimated

---

**Source:**
- VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Person Reporting</th>
<th>Date of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knobloch, Raymond M</td>
<td>3/2/2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it met applicable statutory provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that earned income from outside employment and honoraria and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 3 U.S.C. § 501 et. seq., 2 U.S.C. § 7353, and Judicial Conference regulations.

Signature: Raymond M. Knobloch  Date: 3/21/07

NOTE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FALSIFIES OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (3 U.S.C. app. § 104)

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:

Commission on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 2-301
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of issue (including trust assets)</th>
<th>B. Security holdings at end of reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peak &quot;CF&quot; after each event except from prior disclosure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Funded assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Michigan Education Savings Program #1</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>Held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. UC/CE/CollegeAmerica 529A Education Savings Account</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. New Perspective Fund-529A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Jefferson Company of America-529A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Real Value of America-529A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- **A** = $1,000 or less
- **B** = $1,001-$2,500
- **C** = $2,501-$5,000
- **D** = $5,001-$10,000
- **E** = $10,001-$25,000
- **F** = More than $25,000
- **G** = $50,001-$100,000
- **H** = $100,001-$250,000
- **I** = $250,001-$500,000
- **J** = $500,001-$1,000,000
- **K** = $1,000,001-$2,500,000
- **L** = $2,500,001-$5,000,000
- **M** = $5,000,001-$10,000,000
- **N** = $10,000,001-$25,000,000
- **O** = $25,000,001-$50,000,000
- **P** = $50,000,001-$100,000,000
- **Q** = Dividend
- **R** = Interest
- **S** = Capital Gain
- **T** = Other
**FINANCIAL STATEMENT**

**NET WORTH**

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Real estate mortgage payable-add schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-add schedule</td>
<td>Chattel mortgages and other loans payable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgage receivable</td>
<td>Other debts-insecure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autos and other personal property</td>
<td>Personal Credit Line—Comerica Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash value-life insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets-insecure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSCP membership interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Assets</th>
<th>Total liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>930 100</td>
<td>217 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net Worth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>713 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONTINGENT LIABILITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERAL INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An insurance, creditor or guarantor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are any assets pledged? (Add schedule)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On leases or contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you defendant in any suit or legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever taken bankruptcy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for Federal Income Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other special debt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
## FINANCIAL STATEMENT
### NET WORTH SCHEDULES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Listed Securities</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Bernstein LP LargeCap Sep Account</td>
<td>$7,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuberger Berman Management MidCap Sep Account</td>
<td>$7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Century Investment Mgmt. LargeCap Growth II Sep Account</td>
<td>$6,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP Morgan/Mellon Equity Sm-Cap Value I Sep Account</td>
<td>$7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Global Investors Real Estate Securities Sep Account</td>
<td>$8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBS/Emerald Advisors Small Cap Growth II Sep Account</td>
<td>$4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Global Investors International Small Co. Sep Account</td>
<td>$8,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Fund of America—529A</td>
<td>$1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Perspective Fund—529A</td>
<td>$1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Company of America—529A</td>
<td>$1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuroPacific Growth Fund Account #1</td>
<td>$3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuroPacific Growth Fund Account #2</td>
<td>$2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental Investors Account</td>
<td>$2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuroPacific Growth Fund Account #3</td>
<td>$3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Co America Com Account #1</td>
<td>$56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Co America Com Account #2</td>
<td>$1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Listed Securities</strong></td>
<td><strong>$125,600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real Estate Owned</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Residence #1</td>
<td>$450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Residence #2</td>
<td>$800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Real Estate Owned</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,250,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real Estate Mortgages Payable</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Residence #1</td>
<td>$225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Residence #2</td>
<td>$716,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home-Equity Line</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Real Estate Mortgages Payable</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,091,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AFFIDAVIT

I, Raymond M. Kethledge, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

April 4, 2007

Raymond M. Kethledge

(LAUREL O. SCALL)

(NOTARY)

Laurel O. Scall
Notary Public - Madison
Wisconsin County
My Commission Expires Dec 3, 2015
Serving in the County of MADISON
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN JOSEPH MURPHY III, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much, Chairman Leahy.

First, I would ask my wife, Amy, and my two precious children, Stevie and Natalie, to stand up. There is Natalie and Stevie. Can we see you? Come out here so everybody can see you. That is Stevie Murphy.

My mother and father join us from St. Louis. Mom and Dad. And my sister, Tina, and her husband John Godar, who is a very close friend and lawyer in St. Louis, join us as well.

Two of my colleagues from the Justice Department, Rita Foley and Myra Stith, are here as well. And I think that is it.

I would like to give thanks, Chairman Leahy, to the members of the Committee, to the Ranking Member, and, Senator Leahy, I would really like to thank you for scheduling this hearing and for treating us fairly, as you have. I am extremely grateful to Senators Levin and Stabenow for introducing us and for working to get us here today. My great thanks goes to the President of the United States for this incredible gift and humbling bestowing of a nomination on me. And, of course, my family I am terrifically grateful for. So thank you for everything.

Chairman Leahy. Well, thank you very much, and let me ask this question of Mr. Kethledge and Judge White. The courts are really the only undemocratic branch of our Government, and in the Constitution, the Founders set it up that way. So they have a special responsibility to be open to those Americans who have the least power. They cannot vote for them or against them. They have—and with those Americans who have the least power, they also have the need for the greatest protection. I think the nominees have to show sensitivity to people of different backgrounds and show they have a commitment to equal justice under the law.

Can you describe any situations where, as either the lawyer or as the judge, you have taken difficult positions on behalf of comparatively poor or powerless individuals or members of racial minorities?

Judge White. Senator, thank you for asking that question. I began my judicial career as a judge on the Common Pleas Court and the 36th District Court for the city of Detroit. In that capacity, most of the cases that came before me were with pro per litigants, and I quickly learned how difficult it might be for someone who is uncounseled to appear before the court, how intimidating it might be. And in that service, I took great pains to both make people comfortable and to help them state what was on their minds, to help bring out what brought them before the court.

In fact, when I was on the traffic court, I saw that the system was not responsive to pro per litigants in the sense that they would come to court with a number of problems that were just lurking in the file room, and they would leave thinking that they had taken care of them. And I instituted procedures in my courtroom that meant that when they came to court, all of the legal problems that
they had relating to the matter but not necessarily brought before the court because of the problems were addressed.

I mention it because it was unpopular to those who thought that the system should just bring people in and out. But I have to say that at the end of my tenure, all the other courtrooms were using the same procedures, and I knew when I went home at the end of the day that the people that came before me received the justice that they were entitled to.

[The biographical information follows.]
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UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).

   Stephen Joseph Murphy, III
   Steve Murphy

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.

   United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.

   Office: 211 West Fort Street, Suite # 2001, Detroit, MI 48226-3211
   Residence: Grosse Pointe, Michigan

4. **Birthplace:** State date and place of birth.

   1962, St. Louis, Missouri

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse's occupation, employer's name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.

   Married to Amy E. Murphy (formerly Uhl), who works in the home as a full time mother. We have two dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.

   St. Louis University, 1984-87, J.D. granted May 1987.

7. **Employment Record:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms,
or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

March 2005 to present – United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan
211 West Fort Street, Suite 2001, Detroit, Michigan, 48230-1216

- Chairman, Eastern Michigan Federal Law Enforcement Council
  ("FLEC").
- Chairman, Anti-Terrorism Task Force ("ATAC").
- Co-Chair, Building Respect in Diverse Groups Enhancing Sensitivity ("BREGES").
- Co-Chair, Michigan Association Against Hate Crimes ("MIAAHC").
- Executive Board, Michigan High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area ("HIDTA").

May 2000 to March 2005 – General Motors Legal Staff, Global Headquarters; Counsel
400 Renaissance Center, 2nd Floor, Detroit, Michigan, 48265

211 West Fort Street, Suite 2001, Detroit, Michigan, 48230-1216

January 1990 to January 1992 – United States Department of Justice, Tax Division,
Western Criminal Enforcement Section; Trial attorney
10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., 6th floor, Washington, D.C., 20530

October 1987 to January 1990 – United States Department of Justice, Civil Division,
Federal Programs Branch; Trial attorney
10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., 3rd floor, Washington, D.C., 20530

October 1986 to September 1987 – Coburn Croft and Putzell; law clerk
One Mercantile Tower, 29th floor, St. Louis, Missouri, 63101

May 1986 to August 1986 – Ralston Purina Corp. Legal Department; law clerk
Checkerboard Square, St. Louis, Missouri, 63144

May 1985 to August 1985 – Adams County Circuit Court; law clerk
500 Vermont Avenue, Quincy, Illinois, 60633

May 1984 to August 1984 – National Courier Systems; courier
9000 Page Boulevard, Overland, Missouri, 63114
55 West Monroe Street, Suite 2600, Chicago, IL, 60603

January 1995 to May 2003 – University of Detroit Mercy School of Law; Adjunct Professor of Law
651 East Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, Michigan, 48226

Fall term 2002 – Ave Maria School of Law, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Adjunct Professor of Law
3475 Plymouth Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48105

Ave Maria School of Law, Member Board of Visitors, 1999-2003
3475 Plymouth Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48105

The Northwest Center, Inc., Chairman of the Board, 1991-1992
1314 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C 20004

8. Military Service and Draft Status: Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

None.

9. Honors and Awards: List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

White Family Fellowship in Public Law, St. Louis University School of Law, 1986-87.

U.S. Department of Justice Special Achievement Award for Sustained Superior Performance, July 1997.

Motion Picture Association of America, appreciation for achievement in prosecution of film and video piracy, January, 1999.

Marquis Who’s Who In American Law.

U.S. Department of Justice, Employee Volunteer Service Award, April 23, 1999.

Michigan Association of CPAs, Premier Partner Award, bestowed at Annual Dinner, September 8, 2003 (awarded for sustained service in organizing and moderating educational panels sponsored by MACPA for lawyers and CPAs on business issues of current interest).


United States Postal Service, in appreciation for efforts and achievement on Hurricane Katrina Response Team, 2005.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Detroit Division, in appreciation for partnership and efforts to combat gun violence in the Eastern District of Michigan, 2005.


10. Bar Associations: List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

State Bar of Michigan, 1998-present.
Board of Commissioners, 2002-2005.

The Missouri Bar, 1987-present.

American Bar Association


Detroit Metropolitan Bar Association.

Catholic Lawyers Society of Detroit, Michigan.

Incorporated Society of Irish American Lawyers.

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American Inn of Court, University of Detroit Mercy Chapter

11. Bar and Court Admission:

a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in
   membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

   Supreme Court of Missouri, 1987
   Michigan State Bar, 1998
   No lapses in membership.

b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates
   of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for
   any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative
   bodies that require special admission to practice.

   United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, August 2004.
   United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, April 1992.

   The following courts granted temporary admission while I was a government
   lawyer representing federal agencies and instrumentalities:

   United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, September 1990.
   United States District Court, Central District of California, September 1990.
   United States District Court, District of Nevada, March 1990.
   United States District Court, District of Utah, March 1990.
   United States District Court, District of North Dakota, February 1989.
   United States District Court, Northern District of California, January 1988.

12. Memberships:

a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other
   organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to
   which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have
   significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of
   membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include
   clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees,
   conferences, or publications.
Federalist Society.
Executive Committee, Criminal Law and Procedure Practice Group; co-

Marquette University Alumni Association, Detroit, Michigan.

Detroit Athletic Club.
Member, Enrichment Fund Committee, 2002-2005.

Center for Faith and Action at University of Detroit Jesuit High School and
Academy, 1992-93.

St. Paul Catholic Church, Christian Service Committee, Grosse Pointe Farms,

Big Brothers and Big Sisters of Metro Detroit, 1993-1996.

John Carroll Society of Washington, D.C.

Citizens for a Common Defence

b. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial
Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any
organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or
religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response
to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of
race, sex, or religion - either through formal membership requirements or
the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any
action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

I have been told that the Detroit Athletic Club formerly, as late as the 1970s,
discriminated on the basis on race and sex. This discrimination occurred long
before I joined the club in 2001 and I was unaware of it when I joined.
Nevertheless, I have worked to sponsor women members of the club and I have
discussed with the directors and employees of the club strategies for community
outreach and promoting a more diverse membership. I have solicited members of
minority groups to see if they might be interested in club membership.

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the
editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or
edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.


“Rule Change Doesn’t Undermine Right to Attorney,” Detroit News, April 19, 2005, at 10A.


“Letter to the Editor,” Safety During Super Bowl Week, Detroit Free Press, February 12, 2006, at 3C.


b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of or on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

None
c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

None

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.


"Suspicious Activity Reports," Comerica Bank Senior Leadership Meeting, Detroit, MI, October 24, 2006.

Project Sentry: spoke to middle school children in Detroit and Highland Park, MI, on two or three occasions in 2005-06 on preventing gun violence.

Face to Face: met with recent parolees on 5-6 occasions in 2005-06 on avoiding criminal activity and turning life around to make positive societal contributions.


Moderator, "Sarbanes-Oxley: Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going?" Panel Discussion featuring U.S. Senator Debbie Stabenow and others, sponsored jointly by Federalist Society and Michigan Ass'n CPAs, Livonia, Michigan, September 17, 2002.


"Implementing the New Fraud Standard: When Auditors Don't Detect Their Clients' Criminal Schemes," Michigan Assn. of Certified Public Accountants, Traverse City, Michigan, June 24, 1996; Troy, Michigan, June 25, 1996.


e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.


David Shepardson, One-Time Terror Suspect Gets Apology from Judge, Detroit News, Mar. 23, 2005, at 1A.


David Shepardson, 2 Charged in Michigan Drug Ring; Authorities Say Duo Sold Dope, Laundered Money in Cleveland and Metro Detroit, Detroit News, May 13, 2005, Metro, at 1B.

David Shepardson, Former Metro Security Screener Guilty of Lying; Jury Convicts the Dearborn Ex-Airman Over False Statements on Job Application, Detroit News, May 20, 2005, Metro, at 1B.


David Shepardson, Murphy OK’d as U.S. Attorney, Detroit News, Jun. 10, 2005, Metro, at 6D.


David Ashenfelter, Marijuana Ring Stopped, U.S. Says; 33 People Face Charges; Crackdown is One of Largest in Area, Detroit Free Press, Jul. 19, 2005.


David Shepardson, Mike Martindale, Ronald J. Hansen, 32 Charged in Metro Drug Ring; Federal Prosecutors Say Suspects Netted $178 Million, Making it the Largest Drug Case in State History, Detroit News, Jul. 19, 2005, Metro, at 1B.

David Shepardson, Smuggler Suspect Nabbed at Border, Detroit News, Aug. 19, 2005, Metro, at 1B.

David Shepardson, Man Admits Smuggling Women; The Lithuanian Immigrant Pleads Guilty to Forcing European Women to Work as Strippers to Repay Debts, Detroit News, Sep. 9, 2005, Metro, at 1B.

David Shepardson, Feds Target Stash Seized from Gang, Detroit News, Sep. 12, 2005, Metro at 1B.
David Shepardson, U.S. Attorney Faces a Lot of Challenges; Murphy is Formally Sworn In; Michigan Politicians Praise Top Law Enforcement Officer, Detroit News, Sep. 16, 2005, Metro, at 8B.


David Ashenfelter, Overhaul to Offer Access to Disabled, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 16, 2005, Real Estate, at 54.

David Shepardson, Detroit Crime Declines in '04, Detroit News, Oct. 18, 2006, Metro, at 1B.

Tom Krishna, Federal Charges Brought Against 20 in Mortgage Fraud Cases, AP, Oct. 18, 2005, State and Regional.

Joel Kurth, David Shepardson, FBI Probes Sheriff Deputies' Ties to Drug Ring; During Raid of County Jail Worker's Home, Agents Seize Evidence They Believe Will Link Officers, Two Inmates, Detroit News, Oct. 19, 2005, Metro, at 2B.

David Shepardson, 20 Face Mortgage Fraud Charge, Detroit News, Oct. 19, 2005, Metro, at 1B.

Christy Arbuckle, 20 are Charged in Fraud Scheme, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 19, 2005.

David Shepardson, Local FBI's No. 1 Job: Terror War; More Than 100 Agents Juggle 300 Investigations; Detroit Bureau Creates Full Time Al-Qaeda Squad, Detroit News, Oct. 23, 2005, at 1A.


David Shepardson, Feds to Monitor City's Busing, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 4, 2005, Metro at 1B.


Betty DeRamus, Program for Kids Pulls No Punches About Gun Violence, Detroit News, Nov. 9, 2005, Metro, at 1B.

Niraj Warikoo, Murphy to Host Meeting on Bias, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 15, 2005, at 1.

Ben Schmitt, State Ranks No. 3 in Hate Crimes; Most Centered on Race, the FBI Says, Detroit Free Press, Dec. 7, 2005, at 6.

Ron Hansen, Hate Crimes in Michigan Intensify; High-Profile Cases This Year Highlight Growing Problem; State Ranked Third in Nation in 2004, Detroit News, Dec. 12, 2005, Metro, at 1B.


David Shepardson, Doctor Faces Charges in Insurance Fraud Case; Detroiter Accused of Billing Blue Cross Blue Shield $1 Million for Work That was Never Performed, Detroit News, Dec. 20, 2005, Metro, at 6B.


David Shepardson, Loan Provider Owns Up to Fraud, Detroit News, Jan. 5, 2006, Business, at 1C.

David Ashenfelter, ABN AMRO Averts Lawsuit; Mortgagor to Settle with $41 Million, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 5, 2006, Business, at 1.


Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, International Smuggling Ring Busted, WXYZ-TV, Channel 7 in Detroit, Mich. (Feb. 14, 2006).


Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, Project Safe Neighborhoods to Help Parolees. WXYZ-TV, Channel 7 in Detroit, Mich. (Feb. 23, 2006).


Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, Gambling Operation Busted. WXYZ-TV, Channel 7 in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 3, 2006).


Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, Big Crackdown on Child Pornography. WXYZ-TV, Channel 7 in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 24, 2006).


Elliott Almond, Bonds' Trainer Anderson is Subpoenaed to Testify; BALCO Vice President Testa is Scheduled to Appear Before the Federal Grand Jury Next Month. Contra Costa Times (California), Apr. 26, 2006, Sports, at F4.


Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, CNBC, Kauffman & Company (Jul. 6, 2006).

Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, *Metaldyne Employees Charged with Selling Trade Secrets, Comments on Enron*, WJR Radio 760, Paul W. Smith Show (Jul. 6, 2006).

Paul Egan, *3 Accused of Selling Trade Secrets to China*, Detroit News, Jul. 6, 2006, at 1A.


Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, CNN, Paula Zahn Now (Jul. 26, 2006).


Paul Egan, Marlinga Cleared, Detroit News, Sep. 28, 2006, at 1A.


David Shepardson, Detroit FBI Chief Earns a Promotion, Detroit News, Nov. 7, 2006, Metro, at 1B.

Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, Protecting Integrity of 2006 Elections, WJR Radio 760, Paul W. Smith Show (Nov. 7, 2006).


Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, Dangers of Methamphetamine Use, WJR Radio 760, Paul W. Smith Show (Nov. 9, 2006).


Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, **Wife of Restaurant Owner Pleads Guilty to Tax Evasion**, WDET Radio 101.9 (Dec. 13, 2006).

Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, **Cyber Crime**, WDET Radio 101.9 (Dec. 15, 2006).


Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, Feds Charge 19 for Loan Fraud, WXYZ-TV, Channel 7 in Detroit, Mich. (Jan. 10, 2007).


Paul Egan, Feds End Probe of McNamara Staffers, Detroit News, Jan. 11, 2007, Metro, at 1B.

Zachary Gorchow, McNamara’s Widow Calls Clearance Late, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 12, 2007, State and Regional.

David Ashenfelter, Lending Executive Accused of Fraud; U. S. Loss May Hit $76.8 Million, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 10, 2007, Metro Final, at 2.


Paul Egan, Detroit FBI Chief Comes Home: Metro Area Native Andrew Arena Says Job is ‘Dream Come True,’ Detroit News, Apr. 9, 2007, at 1B.


Marlinga: Was Case Political? He Wonders Now If Politics Played a Part in His Prosecution; Current U. S. Attorney Denies It, Detroit News, May 2, 2007, at 1B.

Paul Egan, Marlinga: Was Case Political?; He Wonders Now If Politics Played a Part in His Prosecution; Current U. S. Attorney Denies It, Detroit News, May 2, 2007, at 1B.

Paul Egan, Gregg Krupa, Arabs Aren't Sighted Out, Gonzales Says; Metro Leaders Frustrated With Slow Citizenship Process, Detroit News, May 9, 2007, at 1B.

Paul Egan, Court Orders Cost Detroit Cops $24 Million; Assistant Chief Cites Spending in Asking Judge to Ease Federal Oversight, Reforms, Detroit News, May 18, 2007, at 1B.


Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, Spotlight on the News, WXYZ-TV, Channel 7 in Detroit, Mich. (August 17, 2007).

Paul Egan, Feds Explain Charity Giving; Terrorism Officials Meet With Area Muslims to Clarify Donation Policy, Detroit News, Sep. 5, 2007, at 1B.

Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, Stephen Murphy tells Paul W. Smith he is working hard to make sure the Detroit area is well protected against terrorism, WJR, Radio 760 in Detroit, Mich. (September 12, 2007).


Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States for the Eastern District of Michigan, Tipped Off About Tests?: How Was She Hired?: CNN, (November 14, 2007).

Interview with Stephen J. Murphy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, Former FBI and CIA Agent Guilty of Fraud, Stealing Secrets, Fox News Channel (November 15, 2007).


Paul Egan, NAACP, Feds Must Toughen Noose Law, Detroit News, Nov. 20-, 2007, at 1A.


Paul Egan, 5 Charged in $10 Million Medicare Fraud Case; Livonia Clinic 1 of 6 in Detroit Area that FBI Ties to Billing Scheme, Detroit News, Feb. 23, 2008, at 1A.

3 Deputies Indicted in Beatings, Ann Arbor News (Michigan), Mar. 18, 2008.


14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

I have never held judicial office.

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

I have not served as a judge.

16. Recusal: If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:
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a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

I have not served as a judge.

17. Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

2005 – Present, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan; appointed by President George W. Bush.


2001 – sought to be nominated as United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, but was unsuccessful.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

Re-Elect Judge Chris Murray, Michigan Court of Appeals, fall 2002, Volunteer (yard sign, mailings).

Co-Chair, Host committee, Stephen Markman for MI Supreme Court Justice, fundraiser, May 2004.

Chair, Host committee, Mike Rogers for U.S. Congress, MI 8th District, fundraiser, February 2004.

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Chair, Host committee, Robert Young for MI Supreme Court Justice, fundraiser, June 2002.

Chair, Host committee, Stephen Markman for Michigan Supreme Court, fundraiser, June 2000.

Campaign volunteer for Jack Stelzer, State Representative candidate, 72nd district, Missouri State House of Representatives.

Campaign volunteer for my father, Stephen J. Murphy, Democratic candidate for State Representative, 98th district, Missouri State House of Representatives, 1978 and 1982.

18. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

   a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

      i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

         I have not served as a clerk to a judge.

      ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

         I did not practice alone.

      iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

         March 2005 to present
         United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan
         211 West Fort Street, Suite 2001, Detroit, Michigan, 48230-1216

         May 2000 to March 2005
         General Motors Legal Staff, Global Headquarters
         400 Renaissance Center, 2nd Floor, Detroit, Michigan, 48265
         Counsel

         January 1992 to May 2000
         United States Attorney's Office,
         Eastern District of Michigan
         211 West Fort Street, Suite 2001, Detroit, Michigan, 48230-1216
         Assistant United States Attorney

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January 1990 to January 1992
United States Department of Justice
Tax Division, Western Criminal Enforcement Section
10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., 6th floor, Washington, D.C., 20530
Trial attorney

October 1987 to January 1990
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., 3rd floor, Washington, D.C., 20530
Trial attorney

December 2002 to March 2005
National Association of Securities Dealers Dispute Resolution
55 West Monroe Street, Suite 2600, Chicago, IL, 60603
Public Arbitrator (Part Time)

January 1995 to May 2003
University of Detroit Mercy School of Law
651 East Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, Michigan, 48226
Adjunct Professor of Law

Fall term 2002
Ave Maria School of Law, Ann Arbor, Michigan;
3475 Plymouth Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48105
Adjunct Professor of Law

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

As United States Attorney, I oversee an office of almost 100 Assistants
and a similar number of support staff. I am responsible to serve as the
final authority on all budget, human resource, litigation, policy and public
relations matters. I also frequently engage the community both through
public outreach work and communication through the media.

As an in-house lawyer at General Motors, my position was dedicated to
handling all worldwide “white collar” criminal and civil matters that
impacted GM. My responsibilities included responding to state and
federal investigative matters, corporate crisis and compliance issues,
conducting internal investigations, overseeing active civil and criminal
litigation matters, and handling pro bono matters. In fulfilling my
responsibilities, I managed teams of people from various disciplines
within the company, including the Audit Staff and Global Security, as well
as retained outside counsel (which are often some of the most well reputed firms in the world).

As a federal prosecutor, 1990-2000, I engaged in a similar and related practice in which I prosecuted almost all federal offenses, with emphasis on criminal tax and other white collar frauds, including securities, banking, health care, insurance, foreign currency trading, high-tech computer crimes and intellectual property. I tried numerous complex felony cases before juries and I have spearheaded large trial and investigative teams in various bank/bankruptcy fraud, tax fraud, securities fraud, and health care fraud trials. I also served as sole federal government counsel at countless hearings and bench trials.

As a federal civil defense lawyer, 1987-1990, I defended various federal agencies and their programs against civil suits in federal court. I wrote briefs, argued motions, took and defended depositions and answered complaints.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

As a government lawyer, my client is and was the people of the United States. Another former client is the General Motors Corporation, the world's largest manufacturer of automobiles and related products. Throughout my career, my specialties have included federal trial practice, criminal tax, and white collar crime.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

Almost 100 percent of my practice over the years has been in litigation.

As United States Attorney and as a corporate attorney, I rarely appeared in court.

As an Assistant United States Attorney, 1992-2000, I appeared in court several times a week and sometimes on a daily basis.

As a Department of Justice Attorney located in Washington, D.C., 1987-1992, I appeared in court several times per month.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts; 99%
   2. state courts of record; 1%
   3. other courts.
ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings; 15%
   2. criminal proceedings. 85%

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or
   judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel,
   chief counsel, or associate counsel.

   I tried approximately 20 cases to verdict or judgment - one trial as chief counsel;
   17 trials as sole counsel, and two trials as associate counsel.

   i. What percentage of these trials were:
      1. Jury; 95%
      2. non-jury. 5%

e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United
   States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and,
   if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in
   connection with your practice.

   I have never practiced before the Supreme Court.

   Citizens for a Common Defence filed two amicus briefs in the Supreme Court
   during the 2003 term when I was a member of the association. Other than having
   my name listed in an appendix to the briefs as a member of the association, I had
   no input or contribution into the preparation and filing of the briefs.

19. Litigation: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you
   personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket
   number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each
   case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the
   nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case.
   Also state as to each case:

   a. the date of representation;

   b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the
      case was litigated; and

   c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of
      principal counsel for each of the other parties.

      After a colleague investigated and indicted the case and then left the federal
      government, I conducted a six-week conspiracy and securities fraud trial against a
former stockbroker at Dean Witter Reynolds. Defendant was a former professional hockey player and his mother was a Detroit television personality. Accordingly, the case was covered closely by various media. I presented 35 witnesses and more than 140 documentary exhibits. Defendant was sentenced to 24 months in jail. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to prison, unsuccessful appeal. I represented the United States.
I was sole counsel responsible for every aspect of the case.
U.S. District Court, E.D. Mi., Judge Avern Cohn.
John R. Mineck, Cramer & Mineck, 339 East Liberty Street, Suite 200, Ann Arbor, MI, 48104, (734) 668-2290, counsel for defendant.

2. United States v. Sanford Weinstock.
153 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 1998)
Appeal of a criminal health care fraud conviction, after a week-long trial, in a case involving a Michigan podiatrist. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion established important precedent favorable to the United States on evidentiary issues surrounding the use of summary statistical charts against medical provider. I handled all aspects of the case from indictment to final appeal, including trial, briefing, and oral argument before the Sixth Circuit.
Defendant convicted and sentenced to prison, unsuccessful appeal. I represented the United States.
I was sole counsel responsible for every aspect of the case.
U.S. District Court, E.D. Mi., Judge Anna Diggs Taylor.
Richard M. Lustig, 240 Daines Street, Birmingham, MI 48009, Phone: (248) 258-1600, counsel for defendant.

Six-week conspiracy, money laundering and securities fraud trial against five men who ran an illicit advance fee scheme that took $11 million from various high income individuals who were led to believe that they were investing in safe foreign currency trades. I assisted a colleague in presenting approximately 60 witnesses and nearly 500 pieces of documentary evidence. Sentences ranged from 24 to 87 months.
All defendants convicted and sentenced to prison.
I represented the United States.
I was “second chair” trial counsel responsible for half the witnesses, an expert, closing argument and some motion practice.
1998.
U.S. District Court, E.D. Mi., Judge Barbara Hackett.
Co-counsel:
David C. Tholen, Federal Defender’s Office, 645 Griswold Street, Suite 2255, Detroit, MI 48226, (313) 961-4150, counsel for defendant.
James C. Thomas, 535 Griswold Street, Suite 2632, Detroit, MI 48226, (313) 963-2420, counsel for defendant.
Tom Wilhelm, 2636 Dixie Highway, Waterford, MI 48328, (248) 618-7280, counsel for defendant.
Timothy F. Murphy, 20816 East 11 Mile Road, Suite 111, Saint Clair Shores, MI 48081, (586) 779-8416, counsel for defendant.

4. United States v. Janshun Desai
   No. 94-80617, November 25, 1997.
   Complex mail and health care fraud trial against physician who ran medical clinics for industrial workers in Detroit’s “Downriver” suburbs. The Wayne County Prosecutor also prosecuted the defendant for murder, but he was not convicted on those charges. The defendant pled guilty on the third day of trial after I presented two witnesses and about forty pieces of documentary evidence against him. Defendant sentenced to 18 months in jail after a hotly contested two-day sentencing hearing. Defendant convicted and sentenced to prison.
   I represented the United States.
   I was sole trial counsel responsible for all aspects of the case.
   U.S. District Court, E.D. Mi., Judge Paul D. Borman.
   Martin E. Crandall, Clark Hill, PLC, 500 Woodward Avenue, Suite 3500, Detroit, MI 48226, (313) 965-8413, counsel for defendant.
   Thomas G. Plunkett, Williams, Williams, Ruby & Plunkett, PC, 380 North Old Woodward Avenue, Suite 300, Birmingham, MI 48009, (248) 642-0333, counsel for defendant.

5. United States v. Jack Webb
   No. 95-80771, August 17, 1995.
   Complex criminal tax fraud mail trial against auto dealer from Ypsilanti, Michigan, in which the defendant presented expert medical testimony in favor of an “alcoholism” defense. The trial lasted one week and I presented fifteen witnesses and more than one hundred pieces of documentary evidence to the jury. Defendant was convicted on all counts, was sentenced to probation, and did not appeal.
   Defendant convicted and sentenced.
   I represented the United States.
   I was sole trial counsel responsible for all aspects of the case.
   1995-97.
   U.S. District Court, E.D. Mi., Judge Avern Cohn.
   Robert E. Forrest, Kerr Russell and Weber, Detroit Center, 500 Woodward Avenue, Detroit, Michigan, 48226, 313-961-0200.

6. United States v. Patricia E. Boyle
   Bank and bankruptcy fraud case against the former owner of a Chevrolet dealership in
Belleville, Michigan, that went to trial. Defendant stole more than three million dollars from a federally-insured financial institution in order to finance a flamboyant lifestyle. I presented 31 witnesses and about 125 documentary exhibits. After the defendant was sentenced to 30 months in jail, she failed to show up for her sentence. I also prosecuted her for the failure to appear, which resulted in an additional nine-month sentence. Defendant convicted and sentenced to prison, unsuccessful appeal.

I represented the United States.
I was sole counsel responsible for every aspect of the case.
U.S. District Court, E.D. Mi., Judge Gerald E. Rosen.
Neil H. Fink, 185 Oakland Avenue, Suite 250, Birmingham, MI 48009, 248/258-3181, counsel for defendant.

Complex drug conspiracy, firearms and continuing criminal enterprise scheme tried against local Detroit drug dealer. The trial lasted three weeks and we presented more than thirty witnesses and almost one hundred pieces of tangible and documentary evidence. Defendant was convicted on all counts, was sentenced to probation, and brought several appeals, all of which I handled. Co-counsel at the time, AUSA Jennifer Granholm, has subsequently been elected governor of Michigan.
Defendant convicted and sentenced.
I represented the United States.
I was lead and first chair trial counsel responsible for all aspects of the case.
U.S. District Court, E.D. Mi., Judge Paul V. Gadola.
Co-counsel:
Hon. Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of Michigan, Executive Office, 111 South Capitol Avenue, George W. Romney Building, Lansing, MI 48933, (517) 373-3400
Opposing counsel:
Sheldon Halpern, 916 South Main Street, # 300, Royal Oak, MI 48067, (248) 545-2900
Margaret Raben, Gurewitz & Raben, PLC, 333 West Fort Street, 11th Floor, Detroit, MI 48226, (313) 628-4740.

8. United States v. Darryl S. Buchanan
Six day criminal trial against a former IRS agent accused of violating the Privacy Act and gaining unauthorized access to official IRS taxpayer information in an effort to “spy” on his neighbors. Along with a colleague, I presented approximately 15 witnesses and nearly 100 pieces of documentary evidence. The defendant was acquitted on all counts.
Defendant acquitted, no appeal.
I represented the United States.
I was lead or “first chair” trial counsel responsible for half the witnesses, closing argument, plea negotiations and a great deal of motion practice.

28
9. **Williams v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson**
   Civil action against federal land bank, its parent association, and other federally chartered
   institutions in which borrowers alleged wrongful refusal to release security in farmland
   serving as collateral for indebtedness to land bank and that the refusal caused borrowers
   to suffer injury. We moved to dismiss the suit. The district court found that no implied
   right of action existed under the Farm Credit Act, that the borrowers failed to state a
   cause of action for breach of contract or breach of covenant of good faith, and the court
   granted the motion.
   Suit dismissed.
   I represented all of the United States government agencies.
   I was sole counsel responsible for all aspects of the case.
   U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, Sr. Judge Barrington D. Parker, Sr.
   (deceased).
   Co-counsel:
   Richard Dagen, Sidley and Austin. (No longer practices law, I cannot locate him).
   Opposing counsel:
   Preston Davis Rideout, 305 West Market Street, Greenwood, Mississippi 38935-8407,
   662/453-3000.

10. **DeCuellar v. Baker**
   A Cuban refugee who was the sole remaining beneficiary of a personal trust, the corpus
   of which consisted of Republic of Cuba bearer bonds issued prior to 1960 under an
   indenture contract between Cuba and Manufacturer Hanover Trust, sought review of a
   decision by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control denying her
   petition for a specific license authorizing liquidation and distribution of the trust assets.
   The district court held that a provision of federal Cuban Assets Control Regulations
   creating a general license extended to the trust and was not limited to only private trusts,
   and that the plaintiff was "legally entitled" to her distributive share of the fund within
   the meaning of the regulations. The decision was later reviewed and overturned by the
   United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, which found that the district court
   had erred and that no license extended to this particular trust.
   Suit dismissed.
   I represented all of the federal defendants.
   I was sole counsel responsible for all aspects of the case.
   1987-90.
   U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Sr. Judge Clyde Atkins.
   Co-counsel:
20. Legal Activities: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organization(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

I have not performed any lobbying activities.

As United States Attorney, I revised the office’s plea policy during the first year of my term in office to account for changes mandated by the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in the Booker/Fanfan line of decisions. I convened a committee of AUSA’s to look into the issue, oversaw meetings with the criminal defense bar in my district, met personally and individually with the entire district court, and oversaw meetings with my office’s Criminal Division. As a result of the consultative approach and a thoughtful process, we implemented the entire new policy with a minimum of opposition from defense attorneys and district judges.

Working with senior level managers in the office and with chiefs of the criminal litigating units, as United States Attorney I implemented a policy for review of all indictments to be presented by Assistant United States Attorneys to grand juries sitting in the Eastern District of Michigan.

I issued a formal new media policy for the district to comply with legal, Justice Department, and ethical requirements and I personally participated in training the entire office on the new policy.

I launched important new district initiatives in terms of prosecuting and preventing crimes of terrorism, child exploitation and the distribution of methamphetamine.

I worked to improve the external affairs capabilities of the office, enhancing our public outreach programs – especially in the inner city and Arab American communities – and promoting state, local, federal and regional law enforcement cooperation under the Project Safe Neighborhoods program.

I reorganized the United States Attorney’s office in Detroit and created an innovative cross functional civil rights task force to manage the most pressing civil and criminal civil rights matters in eastern Michigan; I merged the district’s organized crime strike force with the office’s Special Prosecution Unit to better streamline prosecution of
organized criminal acts; and I reorganized the office’s management structure, paying special attention to promote women and minority lawyers to positions of responsibility.

I conducted and oversaw an internal investigation at General Motors during 2002-03 involving suspected kickbacks that were allegedly paid from a supplier to General Motors’ employees. I personally interviewed numerous witnesses, examined a great deal of documentary evidence and wrote a detailed report, which is protected by the attorney-client privilege.

I conducted and oversaw an internal investigation at General Motors during 2004 involving suspected gifts and gratuities that were allegedly paid from various suppliers to a General Motors’ executive. I personally interviewed numerous witnesses, examined a great deal of documentary evidence and made a report to management, which is protected by the attorney-client privilege. The executive was fired.

In 2001-02, I personally handled a sensitive negotiation with a group of suppliers that had defrauded General Motors of a significant sum of money by operating a bid-rigging scheme. The settlement documents are confidential but required significant restitution payments to be made to General Motors.

In 2004-05, I participated with outside counsel in representing General Motors against state Attorney General investigations in at least three different matters involving potential civil or criminal charges against General Motors for alleged improprieties. I personally met with and presented argument to various assistant attorneys general involved in the cases. All three matters have been resolved (so far) agreeably and confidentially without litigation.

Since 1995, I have taught more than ten law courses at two metropolitan Detroit law schools.

Since 2002, I committed a significant amount of time to working on a Committee appointed by the Michigan Supreme Court to revise the State Rules of Criminal Procedure.

As a part time public arbitrator with the National Association of Securities Dealers, I have participated as a panelist in resolving approximately ten securities arbitrations in the past two years.

21. **Teaching:** What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

This course sought to teach students the rudiments of trying a civil or criminal case before a jury and required students to participate in actual courtroom exercises as well as
the completion of an entire mock trial at the end of the term. Major topics included direct and cross examination, opening statements and closing arguments, admission of evidence and jury selection.

Business Crimes, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, 1998-2003. This course sought to teach students the rudiments of substantive economic or “white collar crime” topics through reading and discussion of leading cases in the area. Major topics included mail and wire fraud, RICO, federal grand jury practice, criminal tax prosecutions, conspiracy, financial institution and corporate fraud.

Evidence, Ave Maria School of Law, 2002. This course sought to teach students the rudiments of the law of evidence. Major topics included authentication of evidence, relevance, the probative and prejudicial nature of relevant evidence, the rules on impeachment, and the hearsay rule.

22. Deferred Income/ Future Benefits: List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

I have no such arrangements, except for my participation in the Thrift Savings Plan (“TSP”) which is the government’s 401k plan for the position I now hold. I maintain approximately $37,000 in that account.

23. Outside Commitments During Court Service: Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

I have no plans of this sort.

24. Sources of Income: List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (if you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)

See attached Financial Disclosure Report

25. Statement of Net Worth: Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement
26. Potential Conflicts of Interest:

a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

Conflicts during my initial service, should I be confirmed, will likely arise in cases handled by the office of the United States Attorney, Eastern District of Michigan, the office I now lead. Additionally, conflicts might arise if companies in which I own stock appear as a party. I would address all conflicts or potential conflicts-of-interest in accordance with the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and other guidelines that might help to determine these areas of concern.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

In the event of any potential conflict of interest should I be confirmed, I intend to consult with ethics officials within the federal judiciary and on the court for which I am being nominated. In addition, if confirmed, I would rely on the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and other guidelines that might help to determine these areas of concern.

27. Pro Bono Work: An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

I have donated significant amounts of time and money to represent the poor and indigent.

In 2002, along with a colleague of mine from General Motors, I represented an indigent paraplegic man confined to a wheelchair who had been convicted of sexual assault and incarcerated in a maximum security prison in Michigan to gain habeas corpus relief in Detroit’s federal court. At issue was whether the prisoner should be moved to a lower security facility that would better accommodate his paraplegia and provide better facilities for showering, toileting and eating. I ended up serving as lead counsel on this matter and my duties included meeting with the litigant in his prison, writing and filing an extensive motion for summary judgment on the man’s behalf, arguing the motion at a special session that the district court held within the walls of the prison, and corresponding at length with the prisoner’s parents. Our client asked that new counsel be appointed after the district court declined to rule on the motion and urged us to enter into settlement negotiations with the State, which later proved to be unsuccessful. Hahn v. Martin, et al., 01-cv-74656-AJT-DAS, Eastern District of Michigan. During 2002-03, I
worked in excess of 80 hours on this file.

In 2003, I represented Leroy Corbeil, an indigent convicted marijuana dealer serving a twenty-year prison term, on the appeal of his conviction in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Because my analysis of the case revealed that a successful appeal could have opened Mr. Corbeil to the possibility of re prosecution and a life term in prison, I advised Mr. Corbeil to drop his appeal and drafted appropriate papers with the Sixth Circuit to do so. I also corresponded with Mr. Corbeil at length throughout the pendency of the appeal. United States v. Corbeil, 03-1388, USCA, 6th Cir., 2003. I worked in excess of twenty hours on this file.

In 2004, I represented Timothy Soto, a 19 year-old indigent convicted of assaulting a postal officer with a firearm, on the appeal of his conviction in the United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit. After thoroughly reviewing the record, I wrote and filed opening and reply briefs and a joint appendix. I argued the case before a panel of the court and lost. I also corresponded with Mr. Soto at length throughout the appeal. United States v. Soto, 03-2295, USCA, 6th Cir., 2003-04. I worked in excess of seventy hours on this file.

28. Selection Process:

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

There was not a selection commission in my state.

In April, 2006, I was contacted by the White House Counsel’s office regarding my interest in being considered to be appointed as a United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, and to arrange for an interview. Later that month, on April 20, 2006, I interviewed with staff from the White House Counsel’s Office and Department of Justice. During the interview, I was asked about my interest in consideration for a position on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. I had a follow-up interview with members of the White House Counsel’s Office on April 21, 2006. I had a telephone interview with the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Policy on April 24, 2006.

On April 27, 2006, I was advised that the President had provisionally decided to nominate me as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, pending a complete background check. After completing the background investigation and nomination paperwork, my nomination was submitted to the Senate on June 28, 2006. My nomination was returned to the President on December 9, 2006. I was renominated on March 19, 2007.

In March, 2008, I was contacted by the White House Counsel’s office and advised that my nomination would be withdrawn. My nomination was withdrawn on April 15, 2008 and I my nomination to be United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan was simultaneously submitted to the Senate on that date.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No one had any such discussion with me.
**FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT**

**NOMINATION REPORT**

1. **Person Reporting**
   - Last name, first, middle initial: Murphy III, Stephen J.

2. **Court or Organization**
   - Michigan, Eastern District

3. **Date of Report**
   - April 18, 2009

4. **Title**
   - District Judge - Nominee

5. **Chambers or Office Address**
   - 211 West Fort Street
   - Suite 2001
   - Detroit, MI 48226

6. **Reviewing Officer**
   - Date

### I. POSITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>None (No reportable position.)</td>
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### II. AGREEMENTS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTIES AND TERMS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>None (No reportable agreements.)</td>
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### III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME

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<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
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<td>A. Filer's Non-Investment Income</td>
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<tr>
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<td>None (No reportable non-investment income.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| B. Sponsor's Non-Investment Income |
| If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, please complete this section. (Dollar amount not required except for honoraria) |
| X    | None (No reportable non-investment income.) |
| 1    | $                |
| 2    | $                |
### IV. REIMBURSEMENTS

Transportation, lodging, food, entertainment.

(Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 25-27 of Instructions)

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<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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### V. GIFTS

(Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 28-31 of Instructions)

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<tr>
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### VI. LIABILITIES

(Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 32-33 of Instructions)

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<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X NONE (No reportable liabilities.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VII. Page 1 INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — income, value, transactions (Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-37 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Person Reporting</th>
<th>April 18, 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stephen J. Murphy, III</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exempt or Reportable (including past year)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Fifth Third Bank Savings Account          A Interest K T Exempt
2. AIG Common Stock                          None J T
3. Amertrust Bank Common Stock               None J T
4. Cincinnati Financial Common               B Dividend M T
5. Comcast Common Stock                      None J T
6. Disney Common Stock                       None J T
7. Dow Chemical Common Stock                 None J T
8. Exxon Mobil Common Stock                  None J T
9. Fidelity Inv. Grade Bond Fund             None J T
10. Fifth Third Bank Common Stock            None K T
11. Harley-Davidson Common Stock             None J T
12. JPMorgan Flexible Income Fund            A Dividend J T
VII. Page 2 INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — income, value, transactions  
(Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 14-17 of Instructions.)

<table>
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<td>14</td>
<td>JNJ Common Stock</td>
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<td>JP Morgan Chase</td>
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<td>T</td>
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<td>SEI Mutual Funds</td>
<td>B Dividend</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
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<td>T</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Vanguard Equity Income Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>Bank America Money Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Accenture</td>
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**FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT**

*Stephen J. Murphy, III*

*April 18, 2008*

**VII. Page 3 INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — income, value, transactions** *(Includes those of spouse and dependents; see pp. 34-57 of Instructions)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Transactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Cisco Systems</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>ConocoPhillips</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>EMC Corp</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Oracle</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Schlumberger</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Wellpoint, Inc.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

Name of Person Reporting: Stephen J. Murphy, III
Date of Report: April 18, 2008

VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS (Indicate part of Report.)

Part III.A. - Income was received during the reporting period as compensation for current employment by the United States.

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it was not applicable; statutory provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that earned income from outside employment and bonuses and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app., § 301 at app., 3 U.S.C. § 7333 and Judicial Conference regulations.

Signature ___________________________ Date _____________

NOTE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FALSIFIES OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (5 U.S.C. App., § 194.)
FINANCIAL STATEMENT

NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>71 522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-adv schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listened securities-adv schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities-adv schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Real estate mortgage payable-adv schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-adv schedule</td>
<td>Charter mortgages and other forms payable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Real estate mortgages receivable | Other debts-

| Assets and other personal property | 34 000 |
| Cash value-life insurance | 16 832 |
| Other assets itemize: | |

| | |
| Total liabilities | 100 222 |
| Net Worth | 116 474 |
| Total Assets | 216 696 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTINGENT LIABILITIES</th>
<th>GENERAL INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are you, a spouse or guarantor</td>
<td>Are any assets pledged? (Adv schedule)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On lease or contracts</td>
<td>Are you defendant in any suits or legal actions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Claims</td>
<td>Have you ever taken bankruptcy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for Federal Income Tax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other special debt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FINANCIAL STATEMENT
NET WORTH SCHEDULES

Listed Securities

AIG $7,698
Accenture 10,551
American Funds – IRA and 529 268,836
Anheuser Busch (BUD) 2,135
Cincinnati Financial (CINF) 213,074
Cisco Systems 9,636
ConocoPhillips 11,431
Disney Co. (DIS) 1,725
Dow Chemical (DOW) 1,326
EMC 8,604
Exxon Mobil (XOM) 5,920
Intel (INTC) 190
Johnson and Johnson (JNJ) 2,075
JP Morgan Chase (JPM) 1,632
Oracle Corp. 11,736
Schlumberger 11,745
SEI Funds 401K rollover 198,479
US TREASURY STRIP 4,417
US TREASURY STRIP 1,509
US Department of Justice TSP 63,887
Wellpoint 5,736

Total Listed Securities $842,342

Real Estate Owned

Personal residence $250,000

Real Estate Mortgages Payable

Personal residence $100,222
AFFIDAVIT

I, STEPHEN E. MURREY, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

4/27/08
(DATE)

[Signature]
(NAME)

[Stamp]
(NOTARY)

MERLE INEZ BROWN
Notary Public - Michigan
Wayne County
My Commission Expires Sep 30, 2011
Acting In The County of

151
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Mr. Kethledge.

Mr. KETHELDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would point to a couple of experiences that I have had. The first is while I was at Honigan Miller, I worked with people in Detroit who were trying to take ownership of homes that had been subject to tax foreclosures by prior owners. And it was actually a difficult process to clear those prior tax liens from the titles of these folks who were trying to renovate their homes. I worked with a number of those people to get them clear title so that they could renovate their homes. For that work, I was named Pro Bono Lawyer of the Year for Community Legal Services in Detroit, and I am very proud of that.

Chairman LEAHY. And as I said, I feel very strongly that lawyers should do pro bono. Let me ask you one question, though, Mr. Kethledge. The overwhelming majority of your practice focused on civil litigation and commercial litigation, civil class action and so on. I went through your Senate questionnaire. About 5 percent of the cases were criminal. Of course, the Federal criminal docket has grown very substantially, and a lot of the appeals that are going to the circuit courts are from our criminal appeals.

What will you draw on, what kind of experience, knowing that you are going to be hit with a whole lot of criminal cases when they come up on appeal?

Mr. KETHLEDGE. Well, Mr. Chairman, one experience I will draw on is also partly in answer to your earlier question. I did represent a man who was charged with negligent homicide. His name was Takendra Sharma. He was a man without many resources. He was involved in a fatal accident while he was driving a semi truck. I represented him, and that gave me a perspective on how important criminal litigation obviously is to the person who is the subject of the State's power and the prosecution, and an appreciation for the difficulty that an individual finds himself in when they are prosecuted. It humanized that side of criminal law for me. I would draw on that personal experience regarding what Mr. Sharma went through. He was acquitted.

The other thing I would draw on, Mr. Chairman, is that when I was clerking, I did have very extensive exposure to criminal law doctrines. As the Chair mentioned, that is a big part of what Federal courts do. While I was clerking for Judge Guy and Justice Kennedy, I did become, I hope, reasonably well versed in the criminal doctrines themselves so that I would be able to draw on that legal experience.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Mr. Murphy, I have not ignored you, but my time is up, and I have some questions for you on my next round.

Senator Specter.

Senator SPECTER. Judge White, in a case captioned People v. Santiago, the court of appeals in a panel on which you were a member upheld a jury conviction of a defendant for first degree felony murder and armed robbery and his life sentence without parole. You dissented, saying, “While the evidence supports the conclusion that defendant dropped the two perpetrators who clearly committed the robbery and murder off near the house knowing that
they intended to rob and possibly kill the victim, it is also clear”—referring to the defendant—“did so without any intent or desire to assist them in committing the offenses.”

The majority say, “To convict the defendant on an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecution must show that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that aided or assisted in the commission of the crime, and that he either intended to commit the crimes or knew the principal intended to commit the crime at the time he gave the aid or assistance.” The Michigan Supreme Court denied the leave for appeal.

Judge White, isn’t it really pretty much standard, clear-cut law that when somebody drives a co-defendant to a place where there is a robbery and a murder, that that kind of assistance constitutes guilt on the part of the co-conspirator, accessory before the fact?

Judge WHITE. Senator, I don’t have the specific case in mind other than what you have just related to me. I can tell you that—

Senator SPECTER. It is your case, isn’t it?

Judge WHITE. Yes, sir. I have been on the court of appeals for 15 years and have sat in over 4,300 cases. So I don’t have each one of them directly in mind, but I—

Senator SPECTER. I understand that, but I have given you the facts. You have a co-conspirator who drives a co-defendant who robs and kills. What is your rationale for saying that that does not constitute complicity in the principal offenses?

Judge WHITE. Senator Specter, I went to law school in Pennsylvania, and the law in Michigan—let me say I approached that case by applying the law as enunciated by the Michigan Supreme Court regarding guilt for the principal offense. It is very, very true that many, many defendants who in that position where some of the facts were driving the person to the scene, dropping them off, would be—would constitute enough evidence. I don’t have the exact evidence in mind, but in Michigan, to be responsible for the principal offense, one has to either share the intent to commit the principal offense or provide aid and support with knowledge that the principal offense was going to be committed.

Senator SPECTER. Judge White, the problem with your explanation is that the Michigan Supreme Court disagrees with it. They denied leave for appeal, and the two judges who were sitting with you disagreed with it. So what I am looking for is some plausible explanation, if you have one, as to how you came to that conclusion.

Judge WHITE. I will again state that the requirement of Michigan law is that the defendant either has the intent to commit the principal offense, which here was the murder, or that there is evidence to show that he aided with the knowledge that that was the intent of the perpetrator.

Senator SPECTER. That is what the court found, that he aided with the knowledge that the gunman intended to rob and murder.

Judge WHITE. Yes, and—

Senator SPECTER. Let me ask you this, Judge White, because we have got quite a bit to cover. Are you standing by this decision? Do you think the two judges who formed the majority disagreed with your dissent and the Supreme Court which denied appeal were wrong?
Judge White. Sir, I can only assume that if I read the briefs again and read the record from cover to cover, as I do, that I would have come to the same conclusion, that I had a reasonable legal basis for doing so and that based on my best assessment of applying the law to the facts that I read in that transcript, that there was a problem with the conviction. Yes, sir.

Senator Specter. Well, my time expired in the middle of your answer, so I am going to yield. I thank so many of my colleagues for being here, and I think it is important to observe the 5-minute rule to give others a chance to question, although there are—we will return for a later round.

Chairman Leahy. Senator Cardin?

Senator Cardin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank all three of our nominees for their public service and thank their families, and we very much appreciate your willingness to continue to serve in the public life. It is not easy to serve as a Federal judge, and we thank all three of you for being willing to do that.

I want to ask about an area that is a particular concern today, and that is, the relationship between the judicial branch of Government and the President, the executive branch, and the legislative branch. It is very likely that particularly at the appellate levels you are going to have to deal with Article II powers of the President. And as a result of the attack on our country on September the 11th, the administration has sought to use Article II powers in order, as they see it, to protect the safety of the people of this country. At times they have said that the urgency of the matter required extraordinary powers of the President. And I just want to get at least some indication from you as to how you will go about evaluating the requests that come in on Executive power under Article II and the restraints that are imposed either by statute passed by Congress or the Constitution. Mr. Kethledge, I would be glad to let you start.

Mr. Kethledge. I would be happy to, Senator. Thank you.

Clearly, there are limits on the Executive power. There are limits on the Commander-in-Chief power. Youngstown Sheet and Tube tells us that. That was a case where the President issued an Executive Order to seize steel mills, cited exigent circumstances related to the Korean War. The Supreme Court stepped forward and said no, you can’t do that. That is a clear example of courts doing, I think, what the Senator described.

How does a court go about that? I think that certainly as a court of appeals judge, you start with the Constitution itself. You go to Supreme Court precedent, which is obviously binding on any court of appeals. You look to the prior precedents of one’s own circuit, which would be binding as well. The decisionmaking can also be informed by precedents from other circuits.

I think you look at those things, and you try to reach a lawful result, which is precisely that and which is not a result which is driven by passion or considerations of the moment. That is why judges have life tenure.

Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Kethledge. Let me just point out that the circumstances of 9/11 were unprecedented in America, and the war against terror is not a traditional war, as we have
known it over the history of this Nation. And there were really some challenging moments, I think, between the judicial branch and the executive branch. And obviously we now have court decisions that will help us guide future determinations.

But we are in unprecedented times, and you may not have a clear case and precedent to rely on. And I would like you to expand a little bit more as to the respect between the three branches of Government. At times there have been some heated moments in this Committee between the executive and legislative branches as to whether the Congress can limit Article II powers. Ultimately, that is going to be determined by the courts. This is an area that really does require the independence of the judiciary, but in giving a fair ruling as to what our Constitution requires, mindful of the responsibilities of each branch of Government.

Mr. KETHLEDGE. Thank you, Senator. The branches are co-equal, and I think what an Article II judge has to do if presented with the kind of question that you described is go through the process and the materials that I described. An answer may or may not emerge from those materials. There may be answers that are implicit in those which haven't been explicitly rendered in a court decision. But, clearly, Senator, I would say that no one is above the law, and that goes in wartime as well as in peacetime.

Senator CARDIN. Judge White.

Judge WHITE. I would join in many of the answers of my colleague, and I would just add that obviously the separation of powers is at the bedrock of our constitutional system. And from time to time we do have these conflicts. I think it is one of the most precious trusts of the Federal judiciary to rule in those cases, to address the delicate balance between the executive and legislative branch. The answers are of importance not just to members of those branches, but to the American citizens. And if I were confirmed and such a case would come before me, I would very carefully consider the very reasoned, legitimate arguments on both sides, the compelling arguments, apply the precedents, and with due regard for the seriousness of the question, come to the decision that seems to be appropriate under the applicable rules.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Cardin.

I have a list from Senator Specter of the order of appearance on his side. Normally in the order I would follow, I would call first on Senator Brownback. But apparently he is not here. Senator Grassley is apparently not here. Senator Coburn had to step out. So, Senator Kyl, you are up.

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, let me just first briefly associate myself with the remarks of Senator Specter regarding the need for the Committee to apply a consistent standard for consideration of nominees, the time that we consider the questionnaires, the timing of the hearings, the ABA investigation and so on. And as part of the leadership, we would just note that the leadership agreement to use the best efforts to confirm three nominations by Memorial Day would not have required a violation of that standard if other pending nominees whose nominations have been pending for a lot longer had been moved forward rather than trying to move someone just
nominated. Senator Specter mentioned who these other nominees were, the fact that they could be moved forward, and I would just say that there is no reason not to move those nominees forward. They are qualified. The ABA has deemed them qualified, and we have a constitutional obligation to do so. And I would note that from my perspective, anyway, it would be unacceptable for the Committee to not have any additional hearings, especially, I would note, since there is at least one nominee from Arizona pending and ready to be considered by the Committee.

I generally ask questions that are general in nature about respect for the law, precedent, and so on, so let me ask each of the witnesses—and there are basically five questions here, and hopefully we can get through them fairly quickly. They deal with the concept that respect for the law is critical for any judge, somebody who is going to be judging others, and judgment with respect to judging others. So let me just ask each of you in turn, and we can start, Judge White, with you and then Mr. Kethledge and then Mr. Murphy.

First of all, is there anything in your background that you believe might disqualify you from serving in the position to which you have been nominated?

Judge WHITE. No, sir, there isn’t.

Mr. KETHLIDGE. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. No, Senator.

Senator KYL. Second, is there any public litigation that you have been involved in personally that might bear upon your responsibilities to serve as a judge?

Judge WHITE. No, Senator, there isn’t.

Mr. KETHLIDGE. No, Senator.

Mr. MURPHY. No, Senator.

Senator KYL. Have you had any bad debts, late payments, for example, credit cards, student loans, taxes, tickets, that kind of thing?

Judge WHITE. I take my obligations very seriously. There have been no bad debts in the sense of judgments or bankruptcy, anything like that, no liens. I have on occasion gotten notices regarding that the amount of tax that was paid was insufficient. I paid those. All my taxes are paid. The same thing with any debts. I may have—from time to time there may have been a payment that was after a date, but immediately I satisfied that. I have no bad debts. I have no liens. I have none of the things that you have asked—oh, and you also, I think, said—what was the last one? Tickets?

Senator KYL. Well, I just said bad debts, late payments, for example, credit cards, student loans, taxes, tickets, and I said any similar—

Chairman LEAHY. If the Senator would yield just for a moment, and I obviously will give him more time to respond to this. Any of the financial backgrounds of all three of the nominees have been thoroughly vetted in the background checks by the White House, which is available to every Senator.

Senator KYL. I appreciate that.

Chairman LEAHY. Under the Memorandum of Understanding that we have between the White House and the Senate—and Senators do not, of course, go into anything that is in the FBI back-
ground. Not only is it a violation of our rules, but that memo-
randum—and I am not suggesting the Senator from Arizona has,
but I would hope that if we are going into things that are in the
backgrounds of any of these three nominees' financial backgrounds
or anything else, if it is in the background reports given by the
White House, that we maintain ourselves to that. The Republican
and Democratic counsel have been available to all Senators to go
through any part that—

Senator KYL. I assure the Chairman I have not read the FBI re-
port. I haven't talked to the White House about anything. I am not
interested in financial records. I am mostly interested in, again,
matters that would demonstrate a lack of respect for the law by not
complying with the law oneself. And that is all I am getting at
here.

Judge WHITE. I just want to—

Senator KYL. Anything else that you wanted to say?

Judge WHITE. [continuing.]—finish the answer. And, yes, sir, I
also take my obligations as a member of the motoring public seri-
ously, and I try to abide by the rules of the road at all times, and
at times I have had lapses and have received tickets, yes. I am not
proud of them, but I have.

Senator KYL. Okay.

Mr. KETHLEDGE. Senator, I am not aware of any issues except I
did have a few speeding tickets a long time ago. I can't remember
the last one, though.

Senator KYL. For the record, I will say I have two. Okay?

[Laughter.]

Senator KYL. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I will, too, Senator. I have definitely sped and paid
my tickets. And once the IRS told me after April 15th I owed more
money, and I paid it immediately. So other than that, I have done
nothing to show disrespect for the law.

Senator KYL. Okay. Finally, in this regard, respect for the law
is also illustrated by past conduct, and this question goes to things
of a public record, whether there has been any matter of public
record that others may learn that would cast doubt on your respect
for the law, either State or Federal law.

Judge White.

Judge WHITE. No, Senator.

Senator KYL. Mr. Kethledge.

Mr. KETHLEDGE. I am not aware of anything, Senator.

Senator KYL. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No, sir.

Senator KYL. Might I, with the Chairman's indulgence, since we
had our little conversation, just ask one-and-a-half other question.
Could you just in a quick percentage, each of you tell me what your
extent of experience with the Federal as opposed to State law has
been in your career, since you are nominated to a Federal law posi-
tion here?

Judge WHITE. I have had—as a State judge for 27 years, we do
have issues that come before us that are issues that might come
before the Federal courts, first of all, with respect to the—well, the
diversity jurisdiction would be not Federal issues, but I have dealt
with preemption issues since 1983.
Senator Kyl. If I could just—I am just trying to do this real quickly, just sort of a general percentage—
Chairman Leahy. I am indulging the Senator from Arizona.
Senator Kyl. And I indulged the Chairman with his intercession a moment ago in my time, too. Just all I am looking for is a general percentage.
Judge White. Oh, a percentage?
Senator Kyl. Yes.
Judge White. I would say maybe—Okay. I would say probably maybe about—including issues of general Federal constitutional law, I would say maybe about 10 to 15 percent of the cases that have come before me have raised Federal issues in that sense.
Senator Kyl. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Kethledge.
Mr. Kethledge. Senator, I would say about 70 percent of my private practice has been State law. I would say, obviously, the 2 years I was clerking was all Federal, almost all.
Senator Kyl. And Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Ninety-five to 99 percent of my work has been Federal, Senator Kyl.
Senator Kyl. Okay. And, Judge White, you did not practice law, right? You have been on the bench your entire judicial career. Is that right?
Judge White. That is correct. I spent 27 years on the bench.
Chairman Leahy. Senator Kyl, I would note—
Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. [Continuing.]—Two things for the record. One, we had the hearing on your Arizona judge, I think last week. I think Senator Cardin—
Senator Kyl. I am appreciative of that.
Chairman Leahy. I did not want the impression to be that somehow he was not getting the hearing.
Senator Kyl. No, no.
Chairman Leahy. He did.
Senator Kyl. The hearing was held. I appreciate it.
Chairman Leahy. And, second, also for the record, I never had a speeding ticket. Had a couple of overtime parking tickets. Some overtime parking tickets, but never had a speeding ticket.
Senator Sessions, and I am not asking members to say whether they have had speeding tickets or not. Senator Sessions, you are next.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. According to the list I received from Senator Specter.
Senator Sessions. I did arrive after Senator Hatch, but—
Chairman Leahy. I am sorry. I just realized that there is a crossout. It is Senator Hatch who is next. I apologize.
Senator Sessions. I think that is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hatch. I had no problem with that, but, Mr. Chairman, I see for the first time we have two appeals court nominees in the hearing. This is a step that I took at least ten times when I chaired the Committee during President Clinton’s tenure. I would also say that for the first time one of these appeals court nominees is before us before the American Bar Association has completed its review.
As my colleagues know, I have not been the ABA’s biggest fan over the years, so I do not mention this because I think the ABA’s evaluation and rating are necessarily the gold standard for judicial nominees. And I am pleased with the way the ABA has done its job over the last number of years. But others have said that it is the gold standard, and you have indicated that before this comes to the floor, you will certainly have the ABA report.

I also see the ABA has expressed its own serious concern about setting this precedent, and I recall this is inconsistent with what many of my Democratic colleagues have said it is the way they want to handle judicial nominees, at least when I was Chairman.

Now, other appeals court nominees have completed all the normal procedural steps, and their consideration would set an unusual or inconsistent precedent. But here we are, so let me just ask a few questions of these nominees.

Mr. Kethledge, I want to welcome you back to the Judiciary Committee. You served on this side of the dais as counsel to Senator Spence Abraham when I chaired the Committee, so you are no stranger to this room. And I am pleased with what you have done since leaving the Judiciary Committee, including your clerking for Justice Anthony Kennedy on the Supreme Court. That is a singular experience that deserves a lot of credit.

And I see Judge Ralph Guy, whom you served as a law clerk, remains on the Sixth Circuit as a senior judge. It must be exciting to consider serving with him. I note, however, that he took his senior status at the end of your clerkship for him in 1994. I am not sure what caused that.

Mr. KETHLEDGE. I tried to talk him out of it, Senator.

Senator HATCH. Okay. Now, let me ask you to comment on what you believe to be the role of the Federal appellate courts in our overall system of Government within the judicial branch, and how carefully should the U.S. Court of Appeals tread giving deference to the trial courts below and respecting the rulings of the Supreme Court above?

Mr. KETHLEDGE. Well, Senator, obviously courts of appeals are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. They are for the most part bound by prior decisions of their own circuit court.

I think that the best judges are the ones that seek to apply precedent in good faith. I think most judges do that. But that is something that has to be done in good faith without skewing the precedent one way or the other. At the same time, there has to be a respect for the work of the district courts and not take an ivory tower approach to the review of what happens there. Those judges are the ones that see the people before them. They see the witnesses. The court of appeals just has a cold paper record. I think there has to be a reasonable level of deference given to the judgments of the Article III judge who has the trial before him.

And with respect to all of one’s colleagues in the judicial system, I think it is very important for a judge to have almost an irrebuttable presumption that every other judge who has looked at a particular issue was doing his or her best to discharge his or her oath just as well as I might be if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed.

Senator HATCH. Thank you, sir.
Judge White, you have served on the State appeals court for more than a dozen years, and I am sure that with all of that experience, you already have a perspective or at least a view about how a collegial body such as the appeals court should operate.

Now, in reviewing your opinions, I see that you have written numerous separate opinions, both dissents and concurrences, and these include dissents in quite a few criminal cases, criminal law cases, and dissents taking positions that the Michigan Supreme Court has rejected.

Now, would you please describe for us your view of whether an appellate court should strive for unanimity in its opinions and the purpose and effects of your frequent separate opinions?

Judge White. Thank you, Senator Hatch. I want to preface my answer by saying again that in the 15 years that I have been on the Michigan Court of Appeals, I believe there were over 4,000 cases in which I participated with my colleagues, and I would venture to say that probably in 95 percent of those, there was unanimity, and that is the context for this. And in the vast majority of those, the trial judge was affirmed.

Collegiality is very important. One can disagree without being disagreeable. In the cases where I have written separately, I tried to decide cases narrowly. And there are times when I feel that a colleague says too much, and that may be a reason why I concur.

Regarding dissents, there are sometimes differences of opinion, but as I said, in 95 percent of those cases, there was unanimity. I have been on the intermediate court for 15 years. It is a role with which I am very comfortable. I understand that the trial court is accorded deference, and I understand that it is the Supreme Court that makes the law. And that has been my job, and that would be—if I were to be confirmed, it would be a similar role in terms of deference to the trial judge and taking direction from the Supreme Court and, of course, from the legislative body.

Senator Hatch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Leahy. Thank you.

Senator Brownback.

Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, nominees, for being in front of us. I appreciate that very much. Judge White, I want to really, if I could, focus in on your nomination. I hope you can understand some of the grave concerns that many of us have on the rush nature of your nomination here and lack of information that we have. On looking at this, I would like to have had the information and hold the hearing and being able to question in depth about it. We don’t have the ABA rating, but I understand you have been rated by the ABA when you were nominated by President Clinton. Is that correct?

Judge White. Yes, sir.

Senator Brownback. Do you recall what that rating was?

Judge White. My understanding is that it was a substantial majority qualified and a minority not qualified.
Senator BROWNBACK. You have not conducted a private law practice. Is that correct?
Judge WHITE. That is correct.
Senator BROWNBACK. But you have worked in the judiciary all of your professional career.
Judge WHITE. That is correct.
Senator BROWNBACK. You started out clerking not at the Federal but you clerked at the State court. Is that correct?
Judge WHITE. That is correct.
Senator BROWNBACK. Who did you clerk for?
Judge WHITE. Justice Charles Levin.
Senator BROWNBACK. How long did you clerk for Judge Levin?
Judge WHITE. Almost 2 years.
Senator BROWNBACK. And then you went from that to the bench.
Judge WHITE. Yes, sir.
Senator BROWNBACK. Is that correct?
Judge WHITE. Yes.
Senator BROWNBACK. And you were appointed to the bench or elected to the bench?
Judge WHITE. I was elected.
Senator BROWNBACK. To which bench were you elected?
Judge WHITE. It was the Common Pleas Court for the city of Detroit. It no longer exists. There was court reorganization, and it became the 36th District Court.
Senator BROWNBACK. Okay. What did you do after that position?
Judge WHITE. I was elected to the Wayne Circuit Court, which is the general trial jurisdiction court.
Senator BROWNBACK. And how long did you serve in that position?
Judge WHITE. For 10 years, Senator.
Senator BROWNBACK. And what have you done after that position?
Judge WHITE. Then I was elected to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Senator BROWNBACK. And that is where you serve today?
Judge WHITE. Yes, sir.
Senator BROWNBACK. And how long have you served on that court of appeals?
Judge WHITE. For 15 years.
Senator BROWNBACK. You were nominated by President Clinton. When were you nominated by President Clinton?
Judge WHITE. I believe it was January of 1997.
Senator BROWNBACK. Okay. And so you have just recently been nominated by President Bush. Is that correct?
Judge WHITE. Yes, sir.
Senator BROWNBACK. I think you answered with Senator Kyl your experience in handling Federal cases. You have not handled direct Federal cases in any private practice?
Judge WHITE. No, sir.
Senator BROWNBACK. You have not handled any Federal cases as a judge?
Judge WHITE. No, sir.
Senator BROWNBACK. I am curious then. I should give you this as open because we haven't had a chance to meet privately, either,
which normally would be the process. But what do you believe makes you qualified for this position? This is the Sixth Circuit. The circuit court of appeals is next to the Supreme Court. It is a phenomenal position of importance. I would like to hear your thoughts on your qualifications as you look having not handled Federal cases before for this position.

Judge WHITE. Let me start by saying that I agree with you, it is a position of enormous importance. My professional path has been in the judiciary, and this is what I would bring to the position. I was in a limited jurisdiction court for 2 years. After that, I moved to the general jurisdiction court. I brought with me the experience of that position. What I brought to the court of appeals was the experience of being a trial judge for 10 years.

There is something in the process of judging that—judges are generalists. It has been a long time since I have been in law school. We learn skills on the bench. We learn how to approach the task of judging, which is to decide individual cases. I brought that experience of being a trial court judge, which I think is very valuable for an appellate judge, to the appellate court.

If I am confirmed, what I would bring to this is 27 years of judicial experience in terms of the process. I bring the experience of reading briefs, reading briefs in an area of law with which I may not yet be familiar, because that is the nature of litigation. The lawyers are far more expert at the time that the case begins than the judge. The experience of studying those briefs, the experience and the ability to understand difficult legal issues, to thoughtfully consider them, to understand the arguments of both sides, to respect the importance of the position, to distill the legal arguments, address the issue in written manner, to carefully decide the case, going through the process of deference to the precedents, understanding how to treat legislation, and basically how one comes to a decision in a particular case that is presented to the judge.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you.

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I would offer for the record a letter of May 6th from the Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, Mr. Timothy Hopkins, Chair, to you and Senator Specter, although it is pretty clear Senator Specter agrees with it. Mr. Hopkins says, “On behalf of the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, I write to express our concern that you have decided to proceed with the confirmation hearings of Helene White to be United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit and Stephen Joseph Murphy III before completion of the evaluations. Under our normal timetable, it would be reasonable for you to expect to receive our evaluations by the close of this month. It is unfortunate that during confirmation hearings your Committee members will not have the benefit of the answers.”

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection, that letter will be included in the record. Also without objection, my response would be included in the record. And without objection, the similar letter written by the ABA to then-Chairman Specter objecting to the five hearings without the ABA being completed will be included in the record so that we can have it all before us. And I thank the Senator
for raising the issue. It gave me a chance to put the other letters in.

Senator Sessions. I would just observe that that letter is indicative of the fact that this is an extraordinarily fast-moving nomination. Of that I think there is little doubt. And there are questions that we have, and I for one do not believe this hearing, with just a day or two notice, basically, to me, allows us to be properly prepared to ask the kind of questions that ought to be asked of a position one step below the U.S. Supreme Court.

I would note that we could have had hearings on Judge Conrad of North Carolina who has been unanimously rated well qualified by the ABA, the chief judge of the Western District of North Carolina, a Federal prosecutor under both Republican and Democratic administrations, and it is a judicial emergency circuit. And Mr. Steve Matthews of South Carolina, nomination to the Fourth Circuit, graduate of Yale, distinguished private practice career, managing director of a South Carolina law firm, strongly supported by both his State Senators and rated highly qualified by the ABA also. So this is troubling to me, I have just got to tell you.

No. 2, Judge White, I presume you misspoke, but let me ask you. You said a moment ago the Supreme Court makes the laws. What would you say about that?

Judge White. The Congress makes the laws in the Federal system, and the legislature passes the laws. If I said that, I misspoke, and I was referring to the common law. And if I said “laws,” I would have misspoke and would not have meant to refer to legislative laws.

Senator Sessions. Well, I think that is very important because one of the things that is causing the delays and tension in the confirmation process at its most fundamental level is more than politics and more than numbers. It is really about what kind of judges we want on the courts.

President Bush has a philosophy of judging that I share. I think it was ably articulated by Chief Justice John Roberts in his confirmation hearings. And there are others in this Congress that have different views. They prefer to have judges in rulings that affect their political agenda that cannot be won at the ballot box, in my view. So I just want to tell you that is a concern to me.

Judge White, your entire legal career of almost 30 years has been in the Michigan State system. I think I am correct that you have never spent a single day of your legal career in private practice, except maybe a summer internship. And you have never represented a client, never litigated a case, and never appeared in Federal court at all. Is that correct?

Judge White. That is correct.

Senator Sessions. Now, I believe that that is not an automatically disqualifying thing, but I think it is a lack that is worthy of concern on the confirming body to analyze what other strengths you have to justify the appointment without the kind of experience we would normally expect in this high appointment, which is, as I said, one step below the U.S. Supreme Court.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I would share with you, Ms. White, my concern about this aiding and abetting case that Senator Specter asked you about in the sense that to me that is funda-
ment law that if you drive the car to assist the people in a crime, you are chargeable for that offense. And in your own opinion, you concluded that the defendant knew what was about to occur and aided in the action by delivering them to the scene of the crime.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Judge White—

Senator Sessions. She was prepared to answer, but that is Okay. She has answered it previously.

Chairman LEAHY. Earlier—

Senator Sessions. It is a concern to me as a prosecutor.

Chairman LEAHY. Earlier you had said something about the percentage of cases, the rough percentage of cases where you have been in concurrence with the rest of the court. Approximately what percentage are you in concurrence with them?

Judge White. Well, I would say that probably 95 percent of the cases are decided unanimously, would be my guess.

Chairman LEAHY. And, Mr. Kethledge, you don't have any experience—I mean, we speak about experience. You have no experience managing a docket as a judge. You have not worked in a prosecutor's office or a defender's office where you would have had to manage a very high volume of cases. What do you say about being able to successfully manage the docket of a United States circuit judge? You have not had judicial experience like Judge White has in managing dockets, but what would you say about that?

Mr. Kethledge. That is true, Mr. Chairman. What I would say in response to that is two things:

First, hard work. A court of appeals judge from my observation and clerking has some latitude as far as when things are due. You do not have briefing deadlines the way you do in private practice. And it is the conscientiousness of the judge, I believe first and foremost, which is responsible for moving the cases along and clearing the docket at the court of appeals.

The other thing I would say is just the example I have had of the judge that I worked for, and I was part of his system. I got a sense of how things work, and I think I could make use of that experience as well.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

The question I was going to ask you before, Mr. Murphy, I served on this Committee for decades with former Senator Strom Thurmond. And there is a question I heard him ask, whether it was nominees of Democratic administrations or Republican administrations, that was always the same about judicial temperament. And it was basically something like this: When you go into a Federal court, a Federal judge is very powerful. It is a lifetime position. The only way he is going to be out of there is if he is impeached or resigns. And very few are ever impeached. And if he shows bias one way or the other toward plaintiffs or defendants or based on the nature of the case, it is devastating to the person who may—this may be the only time in their life they will be before the Federal court. We all have a responsibility to keep the Federal courts independent, but also to have the respect of them. Courts do not command armies. They do not command great forces. They exist and command respect only if they show respect.
How do you feel about that? There are times when you have some people who attack Federal courts as being out of touch for whatever political purpose. You have people running for office and so on. What would you do so people would look and say, you know, “One thing about Judge Murphy, I may agree or disagree with his opinions, but, boy, I sure agree that he is a good judge”?

Mr. Murphy. I would first of all thank the Senator for that comment, endorse the sentiments of both the Chair and Senator Thurmond. I would hope that however many years from now, should I be confirmed, that that sort of evaluation was made, that that would be exactly what they would say about me. I have striven to have that reputation as a Federal prosecutor, and I think that neutrality, detachment, fairness, and moderation are the hallmarks of a Federal judge. And should I be confirmed by this Committee, those are the traits that I would demonstrate in my daily work.

Chairman Leahy. Thank you. Let me ask this question of both Judge White and Mr. Kethledge. We are at the sort of pivotal moment in American history of trying to keep that careful balance between the branches of Government. The President has made unprecedented claims of nearly unchecked Executive powers. Congress and the courts have traditionally acted as curbs on any President who might do that, whether it is cases like Iran-contra or warrantless spying on American citizens. But we should also have a self-check on abuse of the congressional power, looking at ethical violations or corruption, for example, Jack Abramoff’s influence of a Member of Congress.

Do you believe that congressional oversight, not just judicial but congressional oversight, is an important means of creating accountability in all branches of Government? We will start with you, Mr. Kethledge. You have been here. You understand the question.

Mr. Kethledge. I do understand the question, Senator. I don’t think I am knowledgeable to answer it, frankly, in a specific way. What I would say is that each branch is co-equal. Congress clearly has powers of oversight. Those powers are important ones, just like other powers that Congress has. Some of those oversight powers are derived from the power of the purse that Congress has ultimately.

Certainly, Senator, I would agree that those are important powers, safeguards on Congress’ other core powers.

Chairman Leahy. Judge White.

Judge White. I would agree. The powers of each branch of Government are important and must be respected by the other branches.

Chairman Leahy. I would agree, I think all of us would agree, there have to be these checks and balances. Our Nation is powerful. It is awesome in its power and its potential as the United States.

Senator Specter.

Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Judge White, I now turn to a case captioned People v. Hansford, decided in 1997. You served on a three-judge panel which decided that a 40- to 60-year term was inappropriate and remanded for resentencing. And my question goes to your judgment in disagreeing
with that sentence for the defendant who has a record that I am about to specify.

On October 11, 1976, he was convicted of attempted larceny from a building and sentenced to 2 years’ probation.

June 14, 1977, convicted of attempted receiving and concealing $100 and sentenced to 1 to 5, did 2½ years in prison.

Two months later, August 22, 1977, convicted of attempted larceny from a motor vehicle, sentenced 1½ to 2½.

September 4, 1980, convicted of fleeing and eluding, sentenced to a fine of $185 or 19 days.

Convicted of receiving and concealing stolen property and sentenced to 6 months, March 26, 1981.

August 3, 1982, convicted of two counts of receiving and concealing stolen property, over $100, sentenced to 3 years’ probation on April 15, 1985.

November 5, 1985, convicted of a violation of probation, sentenced to 90 days in jail.

July 17, 1988, convicted of larceny, 3 to 7 years.


Now, the procedural history of this case is that on initial review, the court of appeals determined that the sentence of 40 to 60 years for a fourth offender was disproportionate. On remand, the Supreme Court ordered reconsideration in light of a recently decided case. The court of appeals on which you sat, another judge determined the sentence constituted an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed saying there was not an abuse of discretion, two Justices dissenting, concluding that because the defendant had demonstrated his inability to conform his conduct to the laws of society, the court’s sentence was not an abuse of discretion.

Now, the first opinion, which was unanimous, by your court that it was an abuse of discretion was unpublished. I am advised by staff that there was an opinion. What are the standards for publishing an opinion? It seems to me pretty important for the public to know why that sentence was vacated, and the public only knows it if there is a published opinion. What are the standards of that court for not publishing an opinion so the public knows what is happening?

Judge WHITE. Senator Specter, we are an intermediate appellate court with a very, very heavy volume. The vast majority, more than the majority of our cases are unpublished. The criteria for publication is that it—

Senator SPECTER. The vast majority unpublished, even a matter of this severity, this kind of a record, to send somebody back for resentencing?

Judge WHITE. Senator, every single case is important. I don’t intend to minimize any type of case, but—

Senator SPECTER. Well, Judge White, some cases are—

Chairman LEAHY. I think you should at least let her answer the question.

Senator SPECTER. Well, I think you should let me question. Chairman LEAHY. Let her answer the question.
Senator Specter. We have considerable latitude, at least when I was Chairman—

Chairman Leahy. And you always used to remind us to let the witness answer the question.

Judge White. Given the volume of the cases—

Senator Specter. If you are going to answer, try to be responsive.

Judge White. I am sorry, sir. I have been trying—

Senator Specter. My question to you was: Aren’t some cases more important than others?

Judge White. Yes, some cases are more significant jurisprudentially than others, and our directive is that those are the cases that should be published. We have many, many, many sentence appeals. We have judicial—we have guidelines. At one point they were legislative—they were judicial sentencing guidelines. Now there are legislative guidelines. We have many sentence appeals, and it would be the most, most rare circumstance that a case, even one reversed, would ever be published under these circumstances. That is not the practice of the court.

Senator Specter. Okay, Judge White. Now down to the merits. I read you this record in detail. The habitual offender statutes are designed, as I am sure you know, to take habitual offenders off the streets for life. There are customarily three offenses. Seventy percent of the crimes are committed by habitual offenders.

What was your reasoning and thinking that a man with the record I just enumerated did not deserve to be off the streets for life?

Judge White. Senator Specter, crime is a terrible problem in this society, and everybody should recognize that. And sentencing is a solemn obligation.

I don’t have the facts specifically in front of me. I don’t even know what year it is. But I can tell you that the case was either decided under the judicial guidelines or the legislative guidelines. And there is a guideline within which a judge must sentence. If the judge doesn’t sentence within that guideline, then that sentence is subject to review.

Chairman Leahy. Thank you.

Senator Cardin.

Senator Specter. One more. One more minute, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Leahy. I will give you as a matter of courtesy one more minute. You are now over your time.

Senator Specter. I told you what the year was. It was 1997. And I told you what the facts were. Two-part question. Are you saying that it was outside—you weren’t saying it was outside the sentencing guidelines because the State Supreme Court said 40 to 60 was fine.

Now, as you listened to the recitation of these facts, which come from the Supreme Court’s opinion, are you standing by the judgment you made twice that a 40- to 60-year sentence was inappropriate for this career criminal?

Judge White. I want to say first that I don’t know from the facts that you gave me whether it was within the guidelines or not. It may have been outside of the guidelines and, nevertheless, affirmed. I accept the Supreme Court’s decision, and that is the final
decision in the matter. And I accept that the sentence was appropriate, and it was appropriate because the Supreme Court has said it is appropriate. And I said that.

Senator Specter. The pending question is whether you today say that you were right, listening to this record, in saying the sentence was inappropriate.

Judge White. What I would say is that I read the case, applied the law as I understood it, and the sentence was appropriate. The Supreme Court said it was appropriate, and the panel and I were wrong.

Senator Specter. Let me ask you one more time if you think sitting here today, listening to this record, that you were right in saying that 40 to 60 years was an inappropriate sentence.

Judge White. At the time I decided the case, the—I have to have been wrong, sir. The Supreme Court reversed. I was wrong. The Supreme Court reversed. There are times when an appellate judge is reversed. There are times when a circuit judge is reversed. And once you are reversed, there is no question whether you were right or wrong. The higher court said you were wrong.

Senator Specter. I think the record is clear you have not answered the question.

Chairman Leahy. Well, I disagree, and I gave the Senator a great deal of extra time so she could. Any one of us who practice law or who have been prosecutors have been reversed. We know what that is like.

Senator Cardin.

Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me first make an observation. I am a new member of this Committee, and I was looking forward to getting involved particularly in one of the most important responsibilities of the U.S. Senate, and that is the confirmation of judges to lifetime appointments. And I take the confirmation hearings very seriously, which is part of a total process on confirmation, including your records that we have and the reports that have been made available to us. And my observation is that I want to compliment all three of you for the manner in which you have responded to our Committee's questions. I am impressed by all of your—the way that you have answered the questions.

Judge White, I just can't imagine what is going through your mind as you hear us talk about rushing your nomination through when you waited 4 years since your last appointment. You have shown tremendous restraint, which I think bodes well for your judicial temperament.

Mr. Kethledge, I want to follow up on Senator Brownback's point on qualifications, because I think it is a very important point, and I think he raises a very valid point about Federal experience. I don't disagree. I think that is a very important point for us to evaluate.

The difficulty I have had with some of the more recent appointments from President Bush is that he has selected individuals who don't have a judicial background, so, therefore, you don't have the traditional cases in which we can question as to how you ruled on a particular case, which is very interesting to see how you went about making decisions. Or we don't have a lot of writings in which
we can look at the way that you evaluated a particular legal issue because of your background. Instead, you come to this appointment with a relatively short background in law, and if I have read your background correctly, it has been mostly as a private attorney handling product liability issues for companies such as auto manufacturers, drug manufacturers, and in at least one case a tobacco company.

And I guess my question to you is, you know, we all come to this with life experiences to whatever we do in our future in life. And I want to give you a chance to express your views as to how you would rule on these types of matters that may come before you, including product liability and consumer rights. You have represented the company point of view. There is obviously another point of view, the consumer point of view, as represented in some of these cases. And I just want the record to be clear as to how you will approach matters that may be brought by individuals looking at rights for non-smokers, looking for rights for consumers, recognizing that product liability issues are important ways of defending those types of interests.

Mr. KETHLEDGE. Thank you, Senator. I understand really two questions to be part of what you are asking, the first being what kind of approach would I take, because I agree, you don’t have the kind of written record to review that Judge White has provided. I don’t have that kind of judicial experience, and I admit that. So the question of what approach would you take is an important one.

First and foremost, Senator, I think the approach I would take recognizes the fact that, in my opinion, the fact that judges are unelected I think is really the defining characteristic of Article III judges and the characteristic that circumscribes their power. We are a democracy. Nobody elects Article III judges. I think that means that Article III judges don’t get to impose their policy views, their opinions on the people of this country because that is not democracy. The folks in this body do, and it is the job of Article III judges to enforce your will, not the will of the judges themselves. I feel very passionate about that, and I tell you that, to the extent of my ability, that is what I would do if I were a judge.

Regarding experience, I have been out of school 15 years, and I recognize that is a relatively brief time. I am over 40 now, and I actually celebrated that birthday anticipating this question perhaps. I would hope that I have tried to pack an awful lot of relevant experience into my 15 years:

Clerking for Judge Guy on the court to which I am nominated. He is someone whom I revere, whose example I think would be of indescribable benefit to me if I were to be a judge.

Clerking for Anthony Kennedy, a man who comes to his job with extraordinary dedication and conscientiousness, and who is also a kind and decent man. Those examples would be very helpful to me.

I had the privilege of working in this institution, oftentimes in this room—

Senator CARDIN. That worries us a little bit.
[Laughter.]

Mr. KETHLEDGE. I really better not say anything about that, Senator.
But I think that that experience gives me the perspective of the legislative branch and being inside the legislative branch. A number of the Senators today have talked about separation of powers issues. I think that experience, that perspective, would be extremely valuable.

And then I have been a lawyer in private practice. I have seen the impact that these cases can have on the parties and individuals that are involved. Yes, I have had corporate clients, but not all of my clients have been corporate clients. I understand that these are not abstractions that are behind these cases. These are people. And I respect that, and I would have a sensitivity to that.

The other thing I would point out is that I have had the experience of starting my own law firm with two partners and, shortly thereafter, three. There were 15 people that chose to come with us. We were responsible in a large sense for their economic well-being. That was a responsibility I took very seriously, and, frankly, I think that was an experience that makes one grow up.

So I would hope that those things that I would draw on would allow me to be a judge that would do the job in the way the Committee would hope.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much.

Senator Brownback, did you have any other questions?

Senator BROWNBACK. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. And thank you for allowing us to go another round. There are individuals here who get a chance to question the first time.

Ms. White, I want to go back—Judge White—and ask you a few other things, if I could, and this is, I think, uncomfortable for everybody, just the way this has come forward, so I apologize for that. But they are things we really need to know.

Just without the Federal work, I would just like to know your view of the Constitution, just to—I know you cannot tell us how you decide individual cases, but do you see generally the Constitution as a more organic document, or do you see it more as a strict constructionist, or do you put yourself somewhere in between?

Judge WHITE. Senator Brownback, I have never placed labels on my judicial philosophy. I have never thought of it in those terms. I decide individual cases, and when the Constitution is implicated, I look to the precedent, and I find my way within the precedent that has been given. And I don't take a particular role. My role as a judge—my role is to be a judge in that case, and that is the way I approach it.

Senator BROWNBACK. Then what do you understand this current state of the law to be on Establishment Clause cases?

Judge WHITE. Senator Brownback, in my 27 years I have not had Establishment Clause cases—well, I must have had some. I haven't had it recently.

Senator BROWNBACK. I understand that, but you are going onto the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. This is a big area of the law. I am just asking you your understanding of the current status of the law in Establishment Clause cases.

Judge WHITE. I am—I haven't read the cases recently enough to be comfortable giving you an answer, and if a case came before me,
then I—if I were confirmed and a case came before me, then I would be an expert in all of the Supreme Court decisions to date.

Senator BROWNBACK. Judge White, the Chairman brought up—and I thought this was appropriate to ask about—case management, saying that another nominee had not been a judge so does not know about case management. But you have been on the bench, and you have dealt with case management. The Sixth Circuit is one of the busiest per judges’ cases, caseloads, so this will be very important. Have you ever thought you have had problems managing your cases or issuing your opinions in a timely fashion?

Judge WHITE. When I first became a court of appeals judge, I had a period of adjustment in the sense that it is an extremely heavy docket, and I had to learn that although I gave each case careful consideration, I couldn’t write the way one would normally want to write in each case. And that was a process where I came to understand that. It took a while, and the 15 years have been very valuable.

I think that if one thinks about the important traits in an appellate court judge, timeliness is certainly one of them, and I try to balance timeliness with considered judgment, with scholarship, giving each case attention. I try to put all of that together, and that is the way that I manage my docket.

Senator BROWNBACK. So I take it from what you are telling me, you have had a problem in this, but you feel like you have grown over the years in this area?

Judge WHITE. Yes, I would say when I first went on the bench, I did have a problem with that. It is something that one learns in the 15 years.

Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Kethledge, just in a short period of time, I would be curious about your view of the Constitution, whether you see it as—a living document or as a strict constructionist. Do you have a view on that?

Mr. KETHLEDGE. Senator, I don’t really have a label that I can put on myself. What I would say is that, obviously, first and foremost I would follow Supreme Court precedent.

The other thing I would say is that, again, I would make sure that the values that I would be enforcing if I were a judge are not just my values, that I am not striking something down simply because I don’t like it. That is a countermajoritarian aspect of our system of Government. I would start with the text. I would say that, sir.

Senator BROWNBACK. And I would just, with that answer, because we are apparently not going to be able to understand further—although clerking for the people that you did gives us some opinion on your idea. But what do you understand the current state of the law to be on Establishment Clause cases?

Mr. KETHLEDGE. Senator, I would have to give pretty much the answer Judge White did. That is not an area that I have recent experience in in my practice. If I were presented with an issue along those lines, obviously I would carefully study Supreme Court and other applicable precedent. I believe that is where the Lemon v. Kurtzman case comes in, but I could be getting the wrong clause, and that is why I shy away from being too definitive in this regard.
Senator Brownback. Have you handled any Establishment Clause cases? If I could on this, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Leahy. Yes, take one more minute. The reason is we were going to end this round, but Senator Specter has asked to be able to go until about 12:20, 12:25. And I want to make an exception to the time so that he can. He is a highly respected, knowledgeable person here. We will do it. But if you could finish with whatever this question is, Senator Brownback.

Senator Brownback. Have you handled any Establishment Clause cases in any of your clerkships or any of the work that you have done?

Mr. Kethledge. Senator, I cannot remember offhand whether the courts that I worked on had any Establishment Clause cases while I was there. There isn’t one that comes to mind. I have not handled that issue in my private practice. It is simply not possible to handle every issue that might arise under the Constitution in one’s practice.

I will say that that is obviously a very important issue where some of the most deeply held views of our citizens come into play, and I would take that very seriously.

Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much. And, of course, the record will be kept open for followup questions.

Senator Brownback. I appreciate that. I am going to, as the appropriate time, move that we go into closed session, Mr. Chairman. I would like us to be able to do that.

Chairman Leahy. If you move that, then we will have to come back later today to do that so we can accommodate Senator Specter now.

Senator Brownback. I just wanted to put you on notice of that, Chairman.

Senator Specter. Judge White, we have a very limited time. I am trying to accommodate to the Chairman’s schedule. So if you could answer my questions briefly and directly, I would appreciate it.

In a case captioned People v. Ryan, which there is a Supreme Court opinion in 1996, you were one of a three-person panel where you affirmed the dismissal of a drug dealer’s conviction. The Supreme Court reversed you. Your description of the case is as follows:

Defendant was arrested with a kilogram of cocaine by Federal agents, but was charged and convicted in State court after DEA agents turned over their file to the State. Defendant argued the decision to pursue a State prosecution was vindictive. A panel of the court of appeals where you were not a member concluded that the case was vindictive and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. In an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found vindictive conduct. On appeal, you were a member, finding that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and affirmed.

The State Supreme Court said that, “The mere threat to refer the case for State prosecution does not amount to objective evidence of hostile motive.”

Do you think that you were correct in deciding that the evidence was sufficient for a finding of vindictiveness when all that happened was for the Federal DEA authorities to do was to turn the
matter over to State prosecutors, which is a very commonplace practice?

Judge WHITE. Again, Senator, my familiarity, my recollection is refreshed by what you have said, by only by what you have said. I cannot say that those were the only facts involved. I can say that the prior panel found that there might be vindictiveness, that there was, sent it back. We had a hearing. I applied the law in terms of review, deference to be made to a trial court, concluded that it wasn’t an abuse of discretion for the trial court to so find, and that was the extent of my participation.

Again, the Supreme Court reversed, and because the Supreme Court reversed, it meant that I, among others, got it wrong.

Senator SPECTER. Do you stand by your judgment today that you rendered at the time? That is my question, again.

Judge WHITE. The Supreme Court said I was wrong. I stand by the Supreme Court.

Senator SPECTER. Well, let the record show again you haven’t answered the question.

In a 1996 case captioned People v. Thomas, the panel issued the decision—you were a member the panel—reversing a conviction of a gang member who was charged with second-degree murder and found guilty by a jury of voluntary manslaughter, carrying a concealed weapon, and felony firearm. The panel opinion reversed the conviction saying that the gang member’s assertion was correct, being denied a fair trial because the prosecution called a witness knowing the witness would refuse to testify. Your panel based its opinion on the violation of the defendant’s confrontation right. But, of course, when the witness didn’t testify, there was no opportunity for confrontation.

The Supreme Court of the State reversed your panel’s opinion saying that there was no constitutional error, found evidentiary error but harmless error.

Judge WHITE. Can you repeat that? I am sorry. I didn’t hear the last sentence.

Senator SPECTER. The Supreme Court found there was evidentiary error, but the error was harmless because the State had “proved that it was highly probable that the errors did not contribute to the verdict.”

Question: Do you stand by the judgment you made at that time?

Judge WHITE. Well, apparently the decision on the evidentiary and constitutional issue was determined to be correct, but the harmless error analysis was determined to be erroneous. So, again, I would stand with the Supreme Court and conclude that my analysis on the constitutional and evidentiary issue was correct, and the panel, of which I was one, our conclusion regarding the harmless error was erroneous.

Senator SPECTER. The Supreme Court concluded your panel was wrong. They reversed you, for the reason I stated, on harmless error. Now, my question to you is: Do you stand by the judgment that you made at that time?

Judge WHITE. No, sir. Again, I stand by the judgment of the Supreme Court.

Senator SPECTER. You think the Supreme Court was right? I am still trying to get an answer.
Judge WHITE. The issue—
Senator SPECTER. I know the Supreme Court has the final word. 
Judge WHITE. They do, sir.
Senator SPECTER. They are not necessary correct. I am just asking you for your judgment. I am trying to evaluate your judgment. Do you think you were right in the judgment—you were part of the panel—or that the Supreme Court was right in reversing for the reasons I have gone into?
Judge WHITE. Sir, I thought I was right at the time I made the decision, and I accept the conclusion of the Supreme Court.
Senator SPECTER. Okay. Same answer, same conclusion. The question hasn’t been answered.
Judge White, would you care to amplify in any way your record in handling criminal appeals? Because on the basis of the cases that I have cited—and we are under very tight time constraints—I would like to go into a lot more of your cases, very frankly. But I haven’t had time to read all your cases, and I am a fast reader, but there have only been a few days. So I want to give you an opportunity to comment or explain your attitude toward appellate work on criminal cases. Are these cases that I cited characteristic of your work on the bench?
Judge WHITE. Thank you for the opportunity to address my record on criminal cases. As I said, there are over 4,300 cases. I would say that over—probably about 60 percent of them are criminal. I would have affirmed in maybe 98 percent of the cases.

There is an appellate system applying both to criminal and civil cases. When a case comes before me, I apply the law as stated by the Supreme Court. In each of those cases, I endeavor to do so.

I am also confident in saying that both prosecutors and defense lawyers regard me as being fair and impartial. I think that lawyers on both sides are pleased to come into the courtroom when I am on the panel, and that in each of these cases, even the prosecutor would have thought that there was a reasonable basis. And as in some of these cases, my colleagues shared my opinion.

The bottom line is in most cases, 98 percent of the cases, convictions are affirmed. Part of my duty as an intermediate appellate judge is to be open to the possibility that there was error below. And I take criminal cases very seriously. I take the rights of citizens to be free of crime very seriously. I also take the rights of defendants seriously, and I have decided each one of those cases to the best of my ability.

Senator SPECTER. Now, Judge White, Senator Brownback asked you about the Establishment Clause, and you said you hadn’t had any experience with it. Have you had any experience with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, freedom of religion?
Judge WHITE. Let me say I recognize that the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are parts of the First Amendment. I understand that in many respects they are two sides of the same coin and that from time to time cases come to the court—

Senator SPECTER. Have you had any cases on these issues or any experience as a lawyer?
Judge WHITE. Okay. I don’t recall specific cases on either of those clauses. That doesn’t mean I haven’t had them. I just don’t recall them.
Senator SPECTER. Have you had any experience on the issues of freedom of speech, assembly, freedom of the press?
Judge WHITE. I have had some cases implicating the press, mostly under our State FOIA statute, Freedom of Information statute. Maybe in terms of the press in the courtroom, it has come up in that context.
Senator SPECTER. Have you had any experience on holding reporters in contempt, a contentious issue?
Judge WHITE. I have not had them directly, no.
Senator SPECTER. Have you had any experience on the attorney-client privilege, now a contentious issue, where the Federal Government is extracting waivers or tougher sentences and tougher charges?
Judge WHITE. We—
Senator SPECTER. Have you had experience in that field?
Judge WHITE. I amsorry to interrupt. I have had cases dealing with the attorney-client privilege, not in that context, but certainly attorney-client privilege issues have come before me.
Senator SPECTER. Have you had any experience in the issue of Executive power? The Sixth Circuit had the appeal coming out of the Detroit United States District Court for the Terrorist Surveillance Program which constituted an analysis of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Are you familiar with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act?
Judge WHITE. Only to the extent that any citizen would be. I haven’t had any Federal Executive power cases. I have had State Executive power cases. I understand the importance of these issues and would address them accordingly.
Senator SPECTER. Have you had any experience with the cases now pending in the Federal court seeking to grant retroactive immunity to the telephone companies? Any experience with issues like that?
Judge WHITE. I don’t recall cases that would be directly on point with immunity for telephone companies. No, sir.
Senator SPECTER. Have you had any experience with the state secrets doctrine?
Judge WHITE. It wouldn’t be something that would come to the State court system, no.
Senator SPECTER. Well, let me ask you—let me give you an opportunity to respond, pretty much the same question Senator Brownback asked. With no experience in these areas, on these front-line issues—the Sixth Circuit just had the Terrorist Surveillance Program—what are your qualifications to sit on the court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit, finality of decision short of the Supreme Court?
Judge WHITE. At the risk of being redundant, there are elements that go into being a judge. One is knowledge of the subject matter. The other is the process of deciding cases. I venture to say—and I could be wrong—that there are judges on the Sixth Circuit now who have not had cases dealing with some of the issues that—
Senator SPECTER. Do you think that ought to be considered by the Senate in whether to confirm you or not? These other judges you allude—these other unnamed, unspecified judges you allude to,
do you think we ought to consider that in evaluating your qualifications?

Judge White. I didn't mean to be speaking—I would say that they are qualified in the same way that I am qualified because you are in the job of addressing these issues every day as Members of the Congress. As judges, whether it is in the State or the Federal system, judges decide cases, individual cases, and they become expert in the subject matter through the case. As one has been on a particular court for a length of time, one becomes more familiar with certain types of cases. But there is always a first time with any subject matter, and the question is how the judge approaches it and whether the judge thoroughly familiarizes him- or herself with the law and whether the judge is familiar with the general principles of judging.

Senator Specter. Judge White, I am going to finish up with you in the next 2 minutes, by 12:25, as the Chairman has requested. And I am going to reserve some questions for the closed sessions, which Senator Brownback has already mentioned, which I think we do need. But I want to pick up on two things you testified to. You said in your earlier testimony, I quoted you, that sometimes your taxes were “insufficient.” Could you amplify that, please?

Judge White. When I pay my taxes, which is something that I am proud to do, I do not compute my taxes. I give all of my information to an accountant. That happened—

Senator Specter. Judge White, you testified that you “abide by the rules of the road, but sometimes you have not.” Could you expand upon whether you—when and under what circumstances you have not?

Judge White. I have tried to abide by the speed limit. There are times when I—

Senator Specter. Have you on occasion not abided by the speed limit? You mentioned that.

Judge White. Yes, sir, there are times when I have exceeded the speed limit.

Senator Specter. Anything else related to the rules of the road?

Chairman Leahy. You know, if you want to ask further questions, we can wait until that closed session. I hope we do not set a standard that nobody can be a Federal judge if they have ever driven over the speed limit or that nobody can be a United States Senator if they have ever driven over the speed limit, because it is going to be a pretty darn empty chamber around here if that is a standard.

Mr. Kethledge, we were talking about—have you had any experience with the Terrorist Surveillance Act?

Mr. Kethledge. No, sir, I have not.
Chairman Leahy. Or with the Federal Rules on attorney-client privilege that is under debate now, the—

Mr. Kethledge. Not the Federal. I have only experienced that to the extent I have been subject to it.

Chairman Leahy. And how about the reporter's shield law? Have you done a lot in that regard?

Mr. Kethledge. No, sir.

Chairman Leahy. So you are so like Judge White in that regard. Mr. Kethledge. That would be correct, Chairman.

Chairman Leahy. I know that I agree with what President Bush has on his website, Judge White, that you are experienced and highly qualified. I was thinking that you—about 98 percent of these district attorneys see their sentences upheld. Anybody who has ever been a district attorney would be delighted to have 98 percent of their cases upheld. And I also, even though you have been an appellate judge longer than Mr. Kethledge has been a lawyer, I think you are both highly qualified.

We will—

Senator Brownback. Mr. Chairman, I do want to move that we go into closed session.

Chairman Leahy. We will set a time so we can have other members here at a time when that can be done. The record will stay open in the meantime, and I can assure the Senator from Kansas he will have his opportunity to make that request.

Senator Brownback. Thank you.

Chairman Leahy. We stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene at 5 p.m., and went into closed session.]

[Questions and answers and submissions follow.]
May 19, 2008

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Attached are my responses to written questions from Senator Specter and Senator Grassley.

Sincerely,

Raymond Kethledge

cc: The Honorable Arlen Specter
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
1. In your response to question 17(c)(2) of the Committee questionnaire, you state that 50 percent of your practice has been in federal courts and 50 percent has been in state courts. Please describe the types of federal issues on which you have worked, including issues that you handled during your clerkship on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and your clerkship with Justice Kennedy on the U.S. Supreme Court.

The proportion and composition of federal issues in my practice has fluctuated over time. The federal issues on which I have worked as a practicing attorney include the scope of various federal jurisdictional statutes, the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement, the elements of standing, the scope of "[t]he judicial power" under Article III, federal constitutional limitations on punitive damages, various other limitations and guarantees arising from the federal Due Process Clauses, the admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the admissibility of hearsay under Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804, a wide range of issues under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the interpretation of Treasury Regulations and federal tax statutes, the scope of federal preemption of state-law claims, various aspects of patent law, and the prerequisites for class certification in federal courts, among other issues.

I worked on many of these same issues as a law clerk. I also worked extensively on issues of federal criminal law, including the constitutional guarantees afforded criminal defendants, the elements of various statutory crimes and the proof required to establish them, the application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and issues related to the writ of habeas corpus, among other issues.

2. If confirmed as a judge on the Sixth Circuit, you will frequently be called upon to construe statutes. Can you please describe your views on statutory construction and to what would look to for guidance in interpreting statutes?

I would follow Supreme Court precedent regarding the manner in which statutes should be interpreted. To that end, I would begin with the text of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is clear from its text, the inquiry would end there. I would also consider the structure of the statute as necessary to determine the meaning or scope of its text. In most cases, I believe, a court can determine the meaning of a statute by close and careful examination of its text and structure.
Responses of Raymond M. Kethledge
Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
to the Written Questions of Senator Charles E. Grassley

1. Can you please tell us your views on statutory construction? What do you look to for guidance in interpreting statutes?

   I would follow Supreme Court precedent regarding the manner in which statutes should be interpreted. To that end, I would begin with the text of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is clear from its text, the inquiry would end there. I would also consider the structure of the statute as necessary to determine the meaning or scope of its text. In most cases, I believe, a court can determine the meaning of a statute by close and careful examination of its text and structure.

2. In the confirmation hearings for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, there was extensive discussion about the amount to which judges are bound by *stare decisis*. What is your opinion as to how strongly judges should be guided by the doctrine of *stare decisis*?

   *Stare decisis* is a foundational principle of the law. Legal reasoning simply could not go on if all of a court’s prior precedents could be freely revisited in each case. Moreover, citizens may act in reliance, and Congress and state legislatures may make decisions, based in part on the extant law as declared by the courts. In addition, the courts themselves may have derived other doctrines from the precedent under consideration. Any decision whether to overrule precedent, therefore, must take into account not only the extent to which the court believes the precedent is wrong, but also the disruption that would result in the law and society generally. Finally, a court of appeals cannot overrule Supreme Court precedent in any event, and the prior published decisions of one panel are binding on future panels in the Sixth Circuit. Thus, a decision to overrule prior precedent should very much be the exception rather than the rule.

3. Judges in both federal and state courts have come under criticism for engaging in “judicial activism.” How would you define “judicial activism?” What assurances can you give the Committee that, if confirmed, you will not engage in judicial activism?

   I believe that judicial activism is the act of a judge imposing his own policy views on society for no better reason than that he holds them. In my view, a judge must always be mindful that he is an unelected official among a self-governing people. It may be tempting for a judge to construe a statute to mean what she wants it to mean, or to reach a result she prefers in a particular case. A judge must be ever vigilant against these temptations. The judge who succeeds in this task—and who subordinates her own will to that reflected in a democratically adopted text—thereby acts in the highest tradition of the judiciary. The judge who fails, and who imposes his own will on society, detracts to that extent from the reality of self-government in our Nation. If confirmed, I would not decide cases on the basis of my own policy views.
May 20, 2008

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Attached are my responses to written questions from Senator Grassley.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

STEPHEN J. MURPHY

cc:
The Honorable Arlen Specter
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Responses of Stephen Joseph Murphy III
Nominee to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
to the Written Questions of Senator Charles E. Grassley

1. Can you please tell us your views on statutory construction? What do you look to for guidance in interpreting statutes?

Response: As a judge, if confirmed, I would look to the words of a statute to determine its meaning. I would be hesitant to find lack of clarity in a statute passed by Congress unless some actually and logically existed. Then, and only then, would I go outside the words and language of the statute to other references in an effort to resolve the lack of clarity and to construe Congress’ meaning in the statute it passed.

2. In the confirmation hearings for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, there was extensive discussion about the amount to which judges are bound by stare decisis. What is your opinion as to how strongly judges should be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis?

Response: I note my respect for the role of precedent and stare decisis in the development of American law. Judges on the lower federal courts must abide by and are not able to overrule the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Federal judges should respect the precedents of the courts on which they sit and not be quick to overturn the decisions of their fellow judges who have previously ruled on certain matters.

3. Judges in both federal and state courts have come under criticism for engaging in “judicial activism.” How would you define “judicial activism?” What assurances can you give the Committee that, if confirmed, you will not engage in judicial activism?

Response: The U.S. Constitution vests executive authority in the President and legislative Authority in the Congress.

Article III of the Constitution provides the source of the federal courts' powers, and it also mandates a limited role for the judicial branch. Specifically, Article III restricts the jurisdiction of the federal courts to “cases and controversies.” Accordingly, federal courts are not to exert executive power and those courts are likewise not to act in any legislative capacity.

My core belief is that a judge has an unwavering obligation to act fairly at all times and in conformance with the requirements of the Constitution – nothing less. A judge may not, through his or her issuance of orders and delivery of opinions, enact new law or exercise powers reserved for the various agencies of the executive branch. But I also believe that a federal judge has a grave and momentous obligation to decide cases independently and with firm decisiveness. Just as a judge may not cross over into the authority of the other branches of government, a judge also may never evade his or her obligation to assess what is in controversy, to say what the law is that applies to it and to use the dictates of law to decide the issues at hand.
Responses of Helene N. White
Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
to the Written Questions of Senator Sam Brownback

1. Do you believe there is a right to privacy in the U.S. Constitution? Where is it located? From what does it derive?

Response: Although not explicitly mentioned in the United States Constitution, various cases of the Supreme Court of the United States have recognized a right to privacy in the U.S. Constitution. Opinions have pointed to the Ninth, First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as foundations for this right. If confirmed, I would follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in any case involving the assertion of a constitutional right to privacy.

2. What philosophical approach would you bring to bear on a case of first impression – in which there are no relevant precedents?

Response: If presented with a case of first impression, in which there are no relevant precedents, I would look to precedent that might be informative, although not directly on point. I would also look to see whether courts in other jurisdictions have considered the issue. If the issue concerns a statute, I would look to the plain language of the statute to determine the Legislature’s intent. If no legislation is involved, and there are different possible resolutions to the case, I would seek to determine which resolution is most consistent with existing case law.

3. Please name the current Supreme Court Justice whose approach to judging you believe is most similar to your own, and explain in detail the reasons for your answer.

Response: Two years ago, I would have found this question an easy one and identified Justice Sandra Day O’Connor as the justice whose approach to judging appeared most similar to my own, given her fact-specific and narrow approach to decision-making. I am certain that were a law professor to describe each current Supreme Court Justice and his or her approach to judging, I would say that aspects of each Justice’s approach are most similar to my own, and that aspects of each Justice’s approach differ from my own. With this caveat, I would say that Justice Kennedy’s approach is most similar to mine in that he places great importance on stare decisis. Further, he often sees the merits of both sides of an issue, and has described himself as engaging in extensive study, reflection and deliberation before actually deciding a case.

4. Judges in both federal and state courts have come under increasing criticism in recent years for overstepping their role as interpreters of the law, and for instead engaging in judicial activism. How would you define “judicial activism”? What assurances can you give the Committee that, if confirmed, you will not engage in improper “activist” judging?
Response: Judicial activism can take a number of forms. The gravamen of the criticism is that the practice usurps the powers of other branches of government. The role of the judiciary is to decide individual cases representing concrete disputes between litigants. Judges should not view individual cases as opportunities or vehicles for solving perceived societal problems, for making sweeping declarations regarding a body of law, for imposing new duties or declaring new rights, for fixing perceived deficiencies in other branches of government, or for expanding the scope of statutes beyond their terms. Each of the foregoing activities is an example of judicial activism.

I have always been most comfortable deciding cases narrowly, focusing on the dispute presented by the case before me. If confirmed, I would continue to approach my role as a judge in this manner. I would be mindful of the separation of powers and the proper authority of the states and state courts. Because the judiciary is essentially self-regulating in the exercise of judicial power and the enforcement of constitutional limitations on that power, the Supreme Court has developed justiciability doctrines to safeguard the separation of powers and assure that the judiciary exercises, appropriately, only the jurisdiction granted to it. Federal judges at every level have an obligation to apply and enforce these doctrines. Similarly, the Constitution contemplates a division of power and authority between the federal government and the states. Furthermore, the states have a role in honoring and enforcing the Constitution. Thus, abstention doctrines play a crucial role in the decision of cases involving state issues or proceedings.

When a federal court does entertain the merits of a case involving another branch of government, the court must be mindful that it has no authority to substitute its own notion of good policy. If confirmed, I would steadfastly observe all doctrines intended to curb judicial activism, and be ever mindful of my proper role as judge.
Responses of Helene N. White
Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
to the Written Questions of Senator Tom Coburn

1. You were nominated by President Clinton on January 7, 1997. While your nomination was pending, you gave $2,000 to Senator Levin’s brother, Sander Levin, for his congressional campaign ($1000 on 5/5/98 and $1000 on 8/27/98). You also gave $1000 to Al Gore for his presidential campaign on June 30, 1999. Your then-husband, Charles Levin, gave $300 to Senator Levin on 7/9/99 and $500 to Senator Levin on 6/8/00. You were renominated on January 3, 2001, by President Clinton, but the Senate failed to act on your nomination.

Canon 7 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges states “A judge should not: “make a contribution to a political organization or candidate, attend political gatherings, or purchase tickets for political party dinners, or other functions.” And, Canon 2A of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges states: “Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny.”

As a state appellate court judge, these federal rules did not apply to you; however, do you feel these contributions by you and your husband were appropriate once your nomination was pending before the Senate?

a) Why or why not?

Response: Michigan’s Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit these contributions. Because of the restrictions on a judge’s public political activities, I have availed myself, over the years, of this permissible, private avenue of participation in our country’s election process, as has my ex-husband. Congressman Sander Levin faced a particularly difficult race in 1998, hence the size of my contribution to his campaign. I did not believe that my contributions to Congressman Levin’s or Al Gore’s campaigns, or my then-husband’s contributions to Senator Levin’s campaign, would have any impact on my nomination. Because the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit these contributions, and the contributions were consistent with our past practices, I did not think they were inappropriate.

b) Do you believe there was at least an appearance of impropriety?

Response: Respectfully, I do not. However, if confirmed, I will steadfastly adhere to all provisions the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.

c) On June 26, 2007, you contributed $2,300 – the maximum amount an individual may give to a candidate – to Senator Hillary Clinton. Four days later, on June 30, 2007, you gave the same amount to Barak Obama. Has anyone discussed with you the possibility of you being nominated to a federal
judicial position under a subsequent administration, if your nomination is not confirmed during the 110th Congress?

Response: No one has discussed with me the possibility of my being nominated to a federal judicial position under a subsequent administration.
Responses of Helene N. White
Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
to the Written Questions of Senator Charles E. Grassley

1. As a judge on a state court, you are often called on to construe statutes. Can you please tell us your views on statutory construction? What do you look to for guidance in interpreting statutes?

Response: I first look to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their plain and ordinary meanings. If the language of the specific statutory provision is not clear, I look to the statute as a whole to see if the Legislature’s intent is manifested in the remainder of the statute. If it is still not clear, I look to statutes in pari materia. I apply established rules of statutory construction, such as the presumption that every word has some meaning, and avoid any construction that would render a part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. The paramount task in construing statutes is to discern the Legislature’s intent. The rules of statutory construction are simply aids to determine that intent. If necessary, I look to legislative history, but I am mindful of the limits of legislative history as a tool to discern legislative intent.

2. In the confirmation hearings for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, there was extensive discussion about the amount to which judges are bound by stare decisis. What is your opinion as to how strongly judges should be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis?

Response: Stare decisis, the rule that prior court decisions are recognized as precedent to be followed and not disturbed, is at the bedrock of our judicial system. When applied to decisions of a higher court, the rule is absolute. When applied to decisions of the same court, the doctrine, while not absolute, is presumptive. Where the doctrine is presumptive, courts should follow the doctrine, except where the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Apotex v. Feltco, 521 US 203 (1997), and other cases, leads to the conclusion that the prior decision should be overruled.

3. Judges in both federal and state courts have come under criticism for engaging in “judicial activism.” How would you define “judicial activism?” What assurances can you give the Committee that, if confirmed, you will not engage in judicial activism?

Response: Judicial activism can take a number of forms. The gravamen of the criticism is that the practice usurps the powers of other branches of government. The role of the judiciary is to decide individual cases representing concrete disputes between litigants. Judges should not view individual cases as opportunities or vehicles for solving perceived societal problems, for making sweeping declarations regarding a body of law, for imposing new duties or declaring new rights, for fixing perceived deficiencies in other branches of government, or for expanding the scope of statutes beyond their terms. Each of the foregoing activities is an example of judicial activism.
I have always been most comfortable deciding cases narrowly, focusing on the dispute presented by the case before me. If confirmed, I would continue to approach my role as a judge in this manner. I would be mindful of the separation of powers and the proper authority of the states and state courts. Because the judiciary is essentially self-regulating in the exercise of judicial power and the enforcement of constitutional limitations on that power, the Supreme Court has developed justiciability doctrines to safeguard the separation of powers and assure that the judiciary exercises, appropriately, only the jurisdiction granted to it. Federal judges at every level have an obligation to apply and enforce these doctrines. Similarly, the Constitution contemplates a division of power and authority between the federal government and the states. Furthermore, the states have a role in honoring and enforcing the Constitution. Thus, abstention doctrines play a crucial role in the decision of cases involving state issues or proceedings.

When a federal court does entertain the merits of a case involving another branch of government, the court must be mindful that it has no authority to substitute its own notion of good policy. If confirmed, I would steadfastly observe all doctrines intended to curb judicial activism, and be ever mindful of my proper role as judge.

4. Given your service on the bench, you no doubt have some insights about the role judges play in society. Will you please share your thoughts with us about the role of the judiciary?

Response: The Legislature makes the laws and the Executive branch enforces the laws. When individuals or entities, or individuals and entities and the government, have disagreements concerning the application of the laws, they turn to the Judiciary. The primacy of the rule of law as a system of rules governing society, and the willingness of citizens to be bound by the rule of law, rests on the Judiciary’s ability to fairly, promptly and transparently adjudicate these disputes. Citizens expect members of the other branches of government to have particular views and take particular positions, and they vote for them accordingly. However, they expect, rightly, that judges will be blind to all considerations other than those legally relevant to the issues before the court, will treat every litigant the same, and will decide each individual case on the facts presented, without regard to generalities. They also expect that judges will confine themselves to deciding individual cases, and will not usurp the role of other branches of government. Over the years, I have observed that the Michigan judiciary has been its strongest, and has been held in the highest esteem by citizens, during those periods in which it has been most removed from political considerations and controversies.
Responses of Helene N. White
Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
to the Written Questions of Senator Orrin G. Hatch

1. In your answer to question 15e on your Senate questionnaire you state that you “wrote a significant number of concurrences and dissents,” yet at your hearing you stated that in 95% of your cases, there was unanimity. Can you explain this apparent inconsistency?

Response: I do believe that there is unanimity in 95% of our cases. The number of separate opinions I have written over the years is significant in numbers, as reflecting additional work, but not in percentages, as compared to the total number of cases in which I have sat (upwards of 4500).

a. Do you believe that courts should strive to achieve unanimity in their opinions?

Response: I believe unanimity is desirable, and I am always willing to make and accept suggestions toward that end. I tend to write narrowly in part to achieve consensus. When I concur it is generally because I find the lead opinion too broad, or because I cannot agree with the reasoning.

b. Isn’t it true that divided opinions, especially concurrences, fail to promote clarity in the law?

Response: I believe this is especially true of opinions of the state supreme courts and the Supreme Court of the United States, or en banc opinions of the courts of appeal, where multiple opinions can lead to no majority opinion and an inability to discern a clear rule of law. It is less true in cases where there is a three-judge panel and a majority decision. As a trial judge, I often lamented the lack of clarity resulting from divided opinions, but I also lamented the breadth of other decisions, in which the panel clearly had not contemplated the implications of their broad statements. There is tension between the need for clarity in the law and the need to apply the law on a case-by-case basis, with the benefit of advocacy. I have tried to be mindful of both.

2. What is your view on the proper balance of power and separation of powers in our federal system under the Constitution?

Response: The concepts of separation and balance of powers are at the bedrock of our federal system under the Constitution. Each of the three branches of government, Congress, the Executive and the Judiciary, must recognize the limits of its own power, and respect the authority of the other co-equal branches. At the same time, however, each must recognize its constitutional responsibility to check abuse of power by another branch. Similarly, in our federal system under the Constitution, certain matters are left to the states. These limits must be observed as well.
3. Judge White, today you are bound as a state appeals court judge to follow the precedents of the Michigan Supreme Court. If confirmed to the Sixth Circuit, you will similarly be bound by the precedents of the United States Supreme Court. You have been active in organizations that take public and strong positions on political and legal issues which regularly come before the federal courts. You have been, for example, a life member of the NAACP for many years. The NAACP recently condemned in very strong language the Supreme Court’s 6-3 decision upholding Indiana’s voter identification requirement. The NAACP called the Supreme Court’s decision “akin to voter suppression.” Do you agree with this characterization of the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board? How will you maintain your impartiality and fairly apply precedents such as this one with such strong positions taken on these issues and decisions coming from organizations to which you are also sincerely committed?

Response: I became a life member of the NAACP long ago because the organization represents a commitment to racial justice. Over the years, various organizations to which I have belonged or have contributed have taken positions on individual issues with which I may not agree, or regarding which I have no opinion. I have never regarded their positions on legal issues, if any, as being at all relevant to my decision-making process. If confirmed to the Sixth Circuit, I would adhere to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges regarding membership in organizations that take positions on issues that might come before the court. I have not read the full text of the Crawford opinions, but, if confirmed to the Sixth Circuit, I would apply the Crawford decision. I believe that my record demonstrates my ability to fairly and impartially apply precedent on any issue.

4. Judge White, you served as a trial court judge before joining the Michigan Court of Appeals. The role of a trial court is very different than the role of an appellate court. Could you please describe what you see as the difference in their respective roles and how what we call the standard of review limits what appellate judges do?

Response: Trial judges sit on the front lines and may make hundreds of decisions in a single case. Some of these are discretionary calls, and some involve issues of fact or law. Appellate judges have the luxury of being presented with clearly defined legal issues and having the time for reflection. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirms discretionary decisions of the trial court unless the decision amounts to an abuse of discretion. Legal decisions are reviewed de novo, but even if there is error, the court will not reverse unless the error was outcome determinative and substantial rights were affected. Lastly, all findings of fact are affirmed unless clearly erroneous. For these reasons, most cases before the court result in affirmation of the trial court’s ultimate orders, and rightly so.

5. Judge White, it is critical to the credibility and legitimacy of our judicial system that the American people believe judges make decisions based on the law. And by the law, I mean the law as enacted by the people and their elected representatives. If the rule of law means anything, it means that judges must follow the law even if they personally disagree with it, the result the law requires in individual cases, or the
political cause or agenda furthered by a particular outcome. Otherwise, it is the rule of judges. Do you agree with that? Please explain your agreement or disagreement.

Response: I agree with these statements wholeheartedly. Judges must apply the law as the Legislature enacts it, without tailoring it to the judge’s personal views of good policy and without regard to whether the judge likes the result. Judges should be prepared to have no constituency except the law. I have always put my personal views and reactions aside and focused only on the law as it is. I have also been prepared to be criticized by either side of any issue.

a. Do you believe that judges, especially appellate judges, may decide cases based on their personal views, their personal sense of justice, their personal empathy, or their personal experience?

Response: No, I do not. I believe that judges, especially appellate judges, must decide cases based on the law.

6. In my years in the Senate and on this committee, I have seen many state court judges nominated and appointed to the federal bench. These are sometimes judges who come from a common law system, in which judges develop the law, and they therefore have a common law perspective. In your hearing, you acknowledged that in a common law system such as where you currently serve, the Michigan supreme court “makes the law.” But you have been nominated to be a judge in a written law system in which the people make or amend the Constitution or their elected representatives enact statutes. In this system, judges must have a different kind of focus and be more restrained. I think it is inappropriate for judges to approach interpretation and application of written law from a common law perspective.

What do you think of this difference and how will you make the transition in perspective and approach should you move from the state appellate bench to the federal appellate bench?

Response: I agree that it is inappropriate for federal judges to approach interpretation and application of written law from the perspective of making the law, rather than interpreting it. If confirmed to the Sixth Circuit, I would be bound not only by precedent concerning substantive law, but also by precedent guiding lower courts as to their proper role in deciding cases.

7. In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Constitution is “a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.” The judicial branch is as much a part of the government subject to the Constitution as is the legislative or the executive branch. The Constitution, however, cannot control government, including the judiciary, if government controls the Constitution. Since the operative substance of the Constitution – what the Constitution actually is – lies in the meaning of its words, the Constitution cannot control judges if judges can change its meaning. If they can change the Constitution by changing its meaning, their oath to support and defend the Constitution becomes an oath to support and
defend themselves. The nature of the Constitution as a written document that belongs to the people and its function as a limitation on government necessarily means that judges must be bound not only by the Constitution’s words but, more importantly, the meaning of those words as established by the people. Please explain your agreement or disagreement with these principles and how you believe they relate to the proper role of a federal appellate judge in our system of government.

Response: The Constitution both grants, and sets limits on, the powers of government. The legitimacy of our institutions of government rests on their adherence to the rules set forth in the Constitution. Although it is bound by the Constitution, the federal judiciary has the power to declare the meaning of that document. Because of the possibility of abuse by altering the meaning of the Constitution to remove or dilute the inherent limits on the power of the federal courts, federal appellate judges must be ever-mindful of their obligation to be true to the Constitution.
Responses of Helene N. White
Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
to the Written Questions of Senator John Kyl

1. You are a member of the NAACP. In fact, you have been a life member for over 20 years. The NAACP recently released a press statement calling the Supreme Court’s decision on voter ID in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board “akin to voter suppression.” Do you agree with that statement?

Response: I became a life member of the NAACP long ago because the organization represents a commitment to racial justice. Over the years, various organizations to which I have belonged or have contributed have taken positions on individual issues with which I may not agree, or regarding which I have no opinion. I have never regarded their positions on legal issues, if any, as being at all relevant to my decision-making process. I have not read the full text of the Crawford opinions, but, if confirmed to the Sixth Circuit, I would apply the Crawford decision.

a. If you are confirmed, you will be required to apply that precedent to cases that come before you. What assurances can you give us that you will fairly apply the Crawford decision?

Response: If confirmed, my oath of office, my life-long commitment to the judiciary, and my understanding of the role of a Sixth Circuit judge, would assure that I will apply the Crawford decision, and all decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, fully and without reservation.

2. The NAACP has filed amicus briefs supporting school districts that use race as a factor in admissions. Last term, the U.S. Supreme Court heard two cases involving the use of race as a factor in assigning students to public schools. The NAACP filed amicus briefs in these cases, supporting the use of race in school assignments. The Supreme Court, however, in a joint opinion Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, ruled that these programs violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Following these decisions, the NAACP called the opinions disappointing. Do you agree with the Supreme Court’s holding in this case?

Response: I do not follow the NAACP’s amicus participation, nor do I follow its comments on the Supreme Court’s decisions. I have not carefully studied the Supreme Court’s opinion, but it appears to be based on the application of precedent to the specific facts of the case. Moreover, if confirmed to the Sixth Circuit, I would apply the Supreme Court’s decision.

a. Do you believe a racial classification is always and intrinsically bad, or is a racial classification only harmful when used to subordinate or stigmatize a group?
Response: Under the precedents of the Supreme Court of the United States on racial classification, racial classifications, regardless of the motivation in employing them, are subject to “strict scrutiny.” They must be directed toward a “compelling government interest” and must be “narrowly tailored” to that interest.

b. If you were confirmed, would you be able to fairly apply the Supreme Court’s rulings on affirmative action, including its opinion in *Gratz v. Bollinger*, despite your membership in the NAACP?

Response: If confirmed, I would fairly apply all of the Supreme Court’s rulings on affirmative action, including its opinion in *Gratz v. Bollinger*, in any case presenting an affirmative action issue.

3. Last year, the NAACP actively opposed the nomination of Judge Leslie Southwick to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In an “action alert” the NAACP called Judge Southwick an “extremist judicial nominee” and called his record as a judge “abysmal” on civil rights. This characterization, however, was based on just one case, a case that Judge Southwick did not even author.

   a. Do you agree with this characterization of Judge Southwick?

   Response: I am unfamiliar with Judge Southwick’s record, but tend to be skeptical of any group’s characterization of a judge.

4. The NAACP also opposed the nomination of Judge Michael Mukasey as attorney general. Did you agree with the NAACP’s opposition to Judge Mukasey’s confirmation?

Response: I did not follow the NAACP’s position on Judge Mukasey, was unaware that it opposed his confirmation, and have no knowledge regarding why it took that position.
Responses of Helene N. White
Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
to the Written Questions of Senator Jeff Sessions

1. The Sixth Circuit has one of the highest adjusted weighted filings per judgeship – 665. If confirmed, what would you do to lower this number?

Response: The high number of filings per judgeship is determined by factors that are not within the control of the court or the judges. Nevertheless, because it is a reality that affects the court, the judges, and the litigants, judges must be prepared to deal with it. I presently sit on a court with a high number of filings per judgeship. We strive to achieve a clearance rate (the ratio of total dispositions to new cases filed during a given time period) of 100% or greater, so that a backlog of pending cases does not accumulate. We also strive to achieve high disposition rates (the percentage of the cases decided that were decided within a set period of time), so that cases are decided within an acceptable period of time. If confirmed, I would work with the other members of the Sixth Circuit to achieve high clearance and disposition rates.

a. How would you manage your cases if confirmed?

Response: If confirmed, I would expect to bring to the Sixth Circuit many of the docket management skills and approaches I have developed over the last fifteen years on the Michigan Court of Appeals. These include an immediate evaluation of all cases assigned to me upon receipt of the docket sheet for the month. Through this initial evaluation, I am able to determine which cases will require a substantial amount of legal research, which will require a painstaking review of a voluminous lower court record, which may involve both, which are appropriate for assignment to a law clerk, and which may require no law clerk involvement. After this “triage,” I generally spend several days attacking the cases that appear more straightforward. In this way, I am able to do 90% of the work that will be required on these cases before the cases are argued. These cases can then be decided promptly after argument. While I would anticipate that the percentage of cases falling into this category would be lower on the Sixth Circuit than in the Michigan Court of Appeals, I would expect to manage these cases in a similar fashion. I would also conduct a preliminary review of the more difficult cases and assign them to law clerks, with a view to my being completely familiar with the difficult legal issues at argument so that I can clarify issues with counsel, and discuss the cases with my colleagues on the panel. I would constantly be balancing the need to complete work on cases that have already been submitted with the need to be ready to hear, and promptly decide, new cases.

b. How will you handle the transition from the state to the federal system?

Response: If confirmed, I would expect to first identify the differences between docket management in the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Sixth Circuit. I would also speak with sitting Sixth Circuit judges to determine the various approaches employed by the different judges. I would synthesize this information, and also draw on my own
experience, and develop procedures and approaches that fit with the Sixth Circuit’s practices and objectives.

c. If confirmed, what do you believe would be your biggest challenge in transitioning to the federal bench?

Response: If confirmed, I anticipate that the biggest challenges in making the transition would be in getting adjusted to the unique culture of the Sixth Circuit, which I expect exists just as it is present in any institution, and in becoming familiar with subject matter I have not previously encountered.

d. How will you address the challenge?

Response: I would ask colleagues who recently made the transition what they found particularly helpful. I would ask questions regarding internal practices, and be attentive to the need to adjust my practices as a judge to the new environment of the Sixth Circuit. I would work especially hard in cases presenting new subject matter.

2. Judge White, you have been a state court judge since 1981, serving on both the trial and appellate bench.

a. Can you please tell us about your case management system?

Response: As a Common Pleas/36th District Court judge, I received a daily assignment of cases depending upon what division I was sitting in. I handled those cases promptly, and if a case had to return for further proceedings, I worked it into a future day’s docket, while still handling a full day’s docket on the return date.

In the Wayne Circuit Court, I helped manage the court’s transition from a central docket system to an individual docket system, and assisted other judges in making the transition and managing their dockets. I developed forms that made it easier to keep track of my cases, and made it possible for attorneys to obtain a scheduling order without having to wait in court for long periods of time. I reviewed the monthly printout of my cases to confirm that an event was scheduled in each case, and that no case lingered. I scheduled cases for trial and conferences with an eye to always having enough cases to provide for a full day’s work, but without unduly imposing on lawyers and litigants by excessive overscheduling.

In the Michigan Court of Appeals, I review each month’s cases as soon as I receive them to determine how much and what type of work they will require. I then take a few days to do the bulk of the work in whatever cases appear to be straightforward. I then return to my work on the more difficult cases from prior months, giving priority to my review of, and any responses to, opinions circulated by colleagues. I use MAPPS (Michigan Appellate Information System) to keep track of the undecided cases assigned to me, and the cases assigned to others in which an opinion has been circulated.
b. Have you ever thought that you had problems managing your cases or issuing your opinions in a timely fashion?

Response: In my early years on the Michigan Court of Appeals, I came to realize that I needed to review my pending cases regularly, (this was before we had MAPPIS), respond to colleagues' opinions more quickly, and spend less time writing and editing my opinions in routine, fact-specific cases.

c. Has anyone ever told you that you had problems managing your cases or issuing your opinions in a timely fashion?

Response: In my early years on the Michigan Court of Appeals, the chief judge told me that it was the court's practice to respond to colleagues' opinions within a short time period, and that I needed to spend less time on each case.

d. Can you provide the Committee with your caseload statistics as compared to other judges with whom you have served (for example median time intervals between case filing and date of disposition, etc)?

Response: I am not aware that the Michigan Court of Appeals keeps statistics regarding the median time intervals between case filing and date of disposition for individual judges. The opinion status summary sheet for May 12, 2008 shows that I have 4 cases pending before me that were circulated by other judges. The status summary sheet shows that the other judges on the court have between 0 and 13 cases in this category. The report also shows that I have 5 pending cases assigned to me to author in which I have not yet circulated an opinion. The other judges on the court have between 0 and 19 cases in this category.

3. What is the proper role, in your view, of foreign law in U.S. Supreme Court and Circuit Court decisions, and when, if ever, is citation to or reliance on these foreign laws appropriate?

Response: Foreign law is appropriately considered in interpreting international law or treaties.
Responses of Helene N. White  
Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
to the Written Questions of Senator Arlen Specter

1. Question 13a of the Senate Questionnaire asked you to “supply four (4) copies of all published materials to the Committee.” You list two published pieces; however, you did not provide the Committee with either. Please explain why these materials were not provided.

Response: The first piece, “Towards Excellence in Case Flow Management,” is out of print and I do not have any more copies. The second piece, Torts, Michigan Law and Practice, is a two-volume treatise on tort law in Michigan, published by the Michigan Institute for Continuing Legal Education. It was my understanding that because of my role as an editor, rather than an author, and because of the size of the work and the cost of purchasing the volumes, I could list that work rather than provide multiple copies with my responses to the Senate Questionnaire.

2. Question 13d of the Senate questionnaire asked you to “supply four (4) copies, transcripts, or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. ... If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter.” In response to this question on your questionnaire, you state that “over the years, I have participated as a member of various panel discussions at bench-bar, or state or local bar associations, conferences and meetings. None of these have been recorded or transcribed to my knowledge, and I have not retained any notes or outlines.”

   a. Please submit for the record a list of the names and addresses of the groups involved in these panel discussions, conferences, and meetings, the dates of these events, and a summary of the subject matters.

Response: While a circuit court judge, I participated in a program of the Detroit Metropolitan Bar Association, 645 Griswold St., Ste 1356, Detroit, Michigan 48226, on the Michigan Court Rules. I do not remember the year. To the best of my recollection, the focus was on the rules regarding pre-trial practice.

I recall participating in a panel regarding effective criminal advocacy. I do not recall the year, or the sponsoring organization. It was held in the Veterans Building in Detroit, Michigan.

Several years ago, I participated in a panel at the Michigan State University College of Law, 368 Law College Building, East Lansing, Michigan 48824-1300, regarding judicial clerkships.
I have participated in panel discussions at meetings of the State Bar of Michigan, 306 Townsend St., Lansing, Michigan, 48933. I recall one was at the invitation of the Labor and Employment Law section. To the best of my recollection, the subject matter concerned handling employment cases on appeal, and it took place in the fall of 2006. I do not recall the subject matter of the other panels, or the years involved.

I have participated in panels at the various Michigan Appellate Bench/Bar conferences. In 2004, I participated in plenary panels on “Delay Reduction,” and “Advocacy: A View From the Bench – What Works and What Doesn’t,” and in several smaller panels on motion practice, internal operating procedures of the court, civil practice, criminal practice, and family law. I participated in similar panels in other years in which the conference was held.

b. Also, please explain why these materials were not provided previously in response to this question.

Response: My answer to the question reflected my good-faith effort to provide the Committee with accurate information. I was concerned about providing information to the Committee that I could not verify through records where my recollection of the particulars is limited.

3. Question 15d on the Senate Questionnaire asks for “a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings.” In response to question 15d, you provided copies of 23 opinions. However, in response to 15c, you list 9 opinions that were unpublished and reversed, but you did not provide copies of these opinions. Why did you not provide copies of these cases to the Committee? Please provide copies of these and any other unpublished opinions in which you participated that were reversed.

Response: I did not include copies of the cases listed in response to question 15c because, unlike question 15d, the question did not ask for copies of the opinions referenced therein. However, the unpublished cases listed in the answer to question 15c should have been listed again in the answer to 15d. Five of these cases were included, and copies were provided. In reviewing my answers to questions 15c and 15d in order to prepare my responses to these supplemental questions, I discovered that eight of the unpublished opinions included in my response to 15c were not listed again in 15d. This was an oversight. I believe this occurred because the answers to question 15c and 15d were compiled separately. In answering 15c, I began with my answers to a prior Judiciary Committee Questionnaire that included the same question, and, with my law clerk’s assistance, updated the list with cases decided after 1998, the last time the questionnaire was updated. In preparing the answer to question 15d, which did not have a parallel question in a prior questionnaire, I started from scratch, again with my law clerk’s assistance, assembling a list of cases from the MAPPIS system, which does not include cases before July 1, 1996, and older cases in which we had retained hard copies.
of the decisions. I should also have referred to my answer to question 15c and included all unpublished cases listed in that answer.

I have now been able to secure copies of the opinions in these additional cases by asking the Court Clerks office to obtain the files from the central archive and make copies of the opinions.

In response to this supplemental question, I have also attempted to compile a list, and provide copies, of cases in which I participated, but did not write the opinion, that were reversed. However, this effort is hampered by the same limitations described elsewhere. The MAPPSIS system does not include cases decided before July 1, 1996, and, more significantly, cannot list cases according to the assigned judge or whether subsequent action was taken by the Supreme Court. Hence, I cannot obtain a list of cases in which I participated that were reversed by the Supreme Court.

Even without the ability to use the case management software, my law clerk has compiled a partial list of cases in which I participated, but did not write the opinion, which were reversed. Copies of these opinions are attached. These are:


I have not included in this list cases in which I dissented and in which the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision for the reasons stated in my dissent.

a. At your hearing, you said that the Michigan Court of Appeals rarely publishes opinions. Given that publication is rare, why did you not think it was important to provide the Committee with all of your unpublished opinions cases that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings?

Response: I made my best efforts to provide the committee with the information it requested. To respond to the questions, my staff printed cases off the court’s computer system. Because older cases were not available on this system, my staff and I also searched our files for copies of the older cases, and located several, which were included with my answers to the Senate Questionnaire. In responding to these supplemental questions, I determined that additional opinions could be obtained through the Court’s central archive. I requested that this be done and include additional opinions we have located that are responsive.

4. Question 15e of the Senate questionnaire asks for “a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored.” Your answer on your questionnaire was nonresponsive. How many unpublished decisions have you participated in as a panel member and what percentage of the cases in which you have participated are unpublished.

Response: Because of the limitations of MAPPIS, I do not have the information necessary to answer this question precisely. I estimate that I have participated in upwards of 4500 cases, and that approximately 94% of the decisions in these cases are unpublished.

5. At you hearing you said that you were not familiar with and did not recall the factual scenario and your reasoning in the four cases I asked you about, *People v. Santiago*, *People v. Ryan*, *People v. Thomas*, and *People v. Hansford*. All of these cases were listed by you in your Senate Questionnaire, and a short summary of *People v. Ryan*, *People v. Thomas*, and *People v. Hansford*, written by you, appears in your answer to question 15(c) on the Senate Questionnaire. The Committee received your questionnaire less than two weeks before your hearing on April 25. Can you explain why you were not familiar with these cases when you provided summaries of them and apparently reviewed them so recently?
Response: Because of the age of these cases, their fact-specific nature, and the fact that I have decided thousands of cases over the years, I was hesitant to opine on my reasoning in deciding these specific cases without having the cases in front of me.

6. During your hearing, in response to the question of how much experience you have with federal as opposed to state law, you stated that you have dealt with preemption issues since 1983.

a. How much of your federal experience consists of preemption issues as opposed to other matters?

Response: Over the years, I have had cases dealing with ERISA preemption, Labor Management Relations Act preemption, National Labor Relations Act preemption, Federal Railway Safety Act preemption, Single State Registration System preemption, Federal Aviation Act preemption, Fair Credit Reporting Act preemption, Copyright Act preemption, Hazardous Materials Transportation Act preemption and other issues of federal preemption. However, because of the volume of cases I handle, and the fact that so many criminal cases present constitutional issues, I estimate that preemption issues have constituted only about 15% of my federal experience.

b. What percentage of the total number of cases you have handled over your career would you estimate have dealt with issues of preemption?

Response: Because of the large volume of cases I have handled over the years, I estimate that about 1% of my caseload over my career involved preemption issues.

7. What philosophical approach would you bring to bear on a case of first impression - in which there are no relevant precedents?

Response: If presented with a case of first impression, in which there are no relevant precedents, I would look to precedent that might be informative, although not directly on point. I would also look to see whether courts in other jurisdictions have considered the issue. If the issue concerns a statute, I would look to the plain language of the statute to determine the Legislature’s intent. If no legislation is involved, and there are different possible resolutions to the case, I would seek to determine which resolution is most consistent with existing case law.

a. If two different lines of precedent appear equally applicable to the case before you, but would lead to different results, how would you choose which line of precedent to follow?

Response: While two lines of reasoning may appear equally applicable to the case, usually application of one line, rather than the other, will appear more consistent with existing precedent or the direction of existing precedent.
8. What do you understand to be the proper role of a judge in a democratic society?

a. What do you think about judges allowing their own political and philosophical views to impact on any jurisprudence?

Response: Judges should not allow their own political and philosophical view to impact on any jurisprudence.

b. Do you believe that there is any room for a judge’s own values or personal beliefs when he or she interprets the Constitution?

Response: I do not believe a judge’s own values or personal beliefs should be considered in interpreting the Constitution.

c. Do you believe that judges should consider political dimensions of controversial cases?

Response: I believe that judges should not be influenced by the political dimensions of controversial cases.

d. What is the proper role of a court in deciding highly-charged or politically charged cases?

Response: The role of a court is to decide the case presented. If a highly-charged or politically charged case comes before the court, the court should decide the case on the facts and the law. However, to the extent the court explains its decision in a clear and reasoned fashion that recognizes the issues and addresses them thoroughly and fairly, the court can help to defuse the situation.

e. If a judge was so inclined, he or she could expand on the interpretation, use, and effect of many provisions of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Do you agree with the school of thought that, when Congress and the executive branch are slow or do not act in a particular manner, then federal judges would have a license to create solutions based on some of the broad wording contained in the Constitution?

Response: Federal courts are granted the power and authority to decide individual cases; they are not granted the power or authority to act in place of Congress or the executive branch simply because neither has taken the action the judge may deem appropriate.

i. Do you think that this is a proper role for federal judges?

Response: Federal judges should be most reluctant to assume the roles of problem-solver and solution-crafter. Federal judges should be deciding individual cases.
9. In your response to the Committee questionnaire you state that 100 percent of your practice has been in state courts, but at your hearing you mentioned that some of your cases involve questions of federal law. Please explain in detail whether and to what extent you have handled cases during your legal career involving each of the following issues:

a. Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;

Response: I have handled cases involving interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as necessary to evaluate challenges to state statutes as being violative of the Clause.

b. Interpretation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;

Response: Many state criminal cases raise constitutional issues under the Fifth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment. I have handled many cases, on the trial and appellate levels, dealing with Miranda warnings, voluntariness of confessions, constitutionality of line-ups, and double jeopardy issues, ineffective assistance of counsel claims and others. Additionally, I have handled many cases involving Fourth Amendment claims as applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment. I have also handled civil cases involving procedural due process claims and Fifth Amendment takings claims.

c. Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment;

Response: Often a criminal defendant will couch a sentencing issue in constitutional terms, purporting to rely on the Eighth Amendment. I have handled many such cases.

d. Interpretation of federal criminal statutes;

Response: I do not recall handling any cases dealing with the interpretation of federal criminal statutes.

e. Interpretation of federal civil rights or antidiscrimination statutes, including Title VI, Title VII, and Title IX;

Response: I do not recall ever having cases involving Title VI or Title IX issues. Regarding Title VII, the Michigan state courts have often looked to Title VII cases for guidance in interpreting our own civil rights acts.

f. Interpretation of federal environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act;
Response: I have not handled cases involving the interpretation of the Clean Water Act or the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. I have, however, handled cases involving the interpretation of the Michigan Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, which is patterned after the CERCLA, and the Michigan Wetland Protection Act, which is Michigan’s counterpart to the Clean Water Act.

g. Interpretation of the First Amendment freedom of speech;

Response: I have handled zoning cases involving challenges to local ordinances as unconstitutionally impinging on the First Amendment freedom of speech. I have also handled labor and employment cases involving public employees claiming the protection of the First Amendment in response to adverse employment decisions of their employers.

h. Interpretation of the First Amendment freedom of press; and

Response: I have handled defamation cases involving interpretation of the First Amendment as it applies to the press.

i. Interpretation of the First Amendment freedom of religion or free exercise clause.

Response: I have handled cases involving interpretation of the free exercise clause as relevant to the issue whether the court could properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction in disputes between church factions or a church and its members. I have also handled cases that required interpretation of the free exercise clause as tangentially involved in divorce disputes where religious observance is an issue.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

ALLEN M. HARTMAN, Personal Representative
of the Estate of MARY LOU HARTMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

PORT HURON HOSPITAL, FORREST BRYAN
FERNANDEZ, M.D., and JALAL UD-DIN
AKBAR, M.D.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: Bandstra, P.J., and White and Fort Hood, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff Allen M. Hartman, acting as personal representative of the estate of his wife Mary Lou Hartman, appeals as of right the trial court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(7). We affirm.

Plaintiff brought this action on February 19, 2002, alleging that defendants breached the required standard of care in treating his wife following her admission to Port Huron Hospital on January 25, 1999. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that if the defendant physicians had properly interpreted certain diagnostic tests performed at defendant hospital and taken other appropriate diagnostic measures in light of his wife’s prior history, a proper diagnosis would have been made at an earlier date and his wife would not have suffered a subsequent stroke that lead to her death.

Generally, malpractice actions must be brought within two years of the date of accrual to be timely. MCL 600.5805(6); Omelenchuk v Warren, 461 Mich 567, 569; 609 NW2d 177

Allen Hartman died during the pendency of this action in the trial court. As will be discussed further herein, a substitution of plaintiffs was sought, but the trial court denied that motion.

MCL 600.5805 was amended by 2002 PA 715, which redesignated subsection (5) as subsection (6).
(2000), overruled on other grounds by Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642, 655; 677 NW2d 813 (2004). Notwithstanding that limitation, for wrongful death actions such as this one, MCL 600.5852 allows a personal representative two years from the issuance of letters of authority to file a medical malpractice claim, so long as the claim is not filed more than three years after the statute of limitations has run. Further, the running of the controlling statute of limitations or repose will be tolled for 182 days if the plaintiff serves a notice of intent to file suit on the prospective defendants within 182 days of the time that the statute of limitations or repose would otherwise expire. MCL 600.2912b(1); MCL 600.5856(c); Omelenchuk, supra at 575.

In this case, plaintiff’s claim accrued no later than February 16, 1999, when his wife was transferred from defendant hospital to Henry Ford Hospital. See MCL 600.5838a(1). Accordingly, under the basic statute of limitations, plaintiff’s claim had to be filed by February 16, 2001. MCL 600.5805(6). However, because the decedent died on July 13, 1999, before the basic period of limitations had run, her personal representative had two years from the date letters of authority were issued to him on August 31, 1999 to file suit on behalf of the estate. MCL 600.5852. While plaintiff served defendants with a notice of intent within two years, on August 21, 2001, plaintiff did not file a complaint until February 19, 2002.

Defendants moved for summary disposition asserting that plaintiff’s claims were time-barred under our Supreme Court’s holding in Waltz that because the notice tolling provision “tolls only the applicable ‘statute of limitations or repose,’” it did not serve to toll the running of the wrongful death saving provision. Waltz, supra at 650-651, quoting MCL 600.5856(d) (now subsection [c]). The trial court agreed that the claim was time-barred under Waltz and accordingly granted summary disposition in favor of defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(7).


Plaintiff also attempts to distinguish Waltz on the basis that, in Waltz, more than five years had elapsed from the accrual of the plaintiffs’ claims before suit was filed. Plaintiff’s argument is predicated on a misconception of how the two- and three-year periods mentioned in the wrongful death saving provision operate.

If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action which survives by law may be commenced by the personal representative of the deceased person at any time within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run. But an action shall not be brought under this provision unless the personal representative commences it within 3 years after the period of limitations has run. [MCL 600.5852.]

\[1\] MCL 600.5856 was amended by 2004 PA 87, which redesignated subsection (d) as subsection (c).
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Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the periods referred to in this statute are not aggregated to create a five-year period. As this Court has explained, the wrongful death saving provision does not establish an independent period during which a personal representative may bring suit. Specifically, it does not authorize a personal representative to file suit at any time within three years after the period of limitations has run. Rather, the three-year ceiling limits the two-year saving period to those cases brought within three years of when the malpractice limitations period expired. As a result, while the three-year ceiling can shorten the two-year window during which a personal representative may file suit, it cannot lengthen it. Farley v Advanced Cardiovascular Health Specialists, PC, 266 Mich App 566, 573 n 16; 703 NW2d 115 (2005).

Here, plaintiff’s claim accrued no later than February 16, 1999. The decedent’s husband was appointed personal representative on August 31, 1999. The two-year saving period of the wrongful death saving provision expired on August 31, 2001. The three-year ceiling does not change that result. Accordingly, because the complaint was filed on February 19, 2002, it was time-barred.

Plaintiff also cites Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Centre, Inc, 471 Mich 411, 419; 684 NW2d 864 (2004) for the proposition that this Court should consider the equities of this case and use its power under MCR 7.216(A)(7) to allow this case to proceed. Again, we disagree; this argument has been squarely rejected in Ward v Stano, 272 Mich App 715, 719-720; 730 NW2d 1 (2006), lv pending (2007).

Plaintiff next asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for substitution of plaintiffs following Allen Hartman’s death on February 15, 2004, about two years after the untimely complaint was filed. He asserts that had the trial court properly granted this motion and appointed a successor personal representative, the complaint would have been timely under Eggleston v Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29; 658 NW2d 139 (2003).¹

However, at the time the motion was made, the previously filed complaint was properly subject to summary disposition, as discussed above. Even had the trial court allowed plaintiff to substitute into the untimely action, such substitution could not transform the previous personal representative’s untimely complaint into a timely one. Mullins v St Joseph Hosp, 269 Mich App 586, 591; 711 NW2d 448, aff’d in part 271 Mich App 593 (2006); McMiddleton v Boiling, 267 Mich App 667, 671-674; 705 NW2d 720 (2005). The trial court’s order granting defendants summary disposition constitutes an adjudication on the merits of plaintiff’s claims, and res judicata barred any further action on behalf of the estate against defendants. Washington v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit, 478 Mich 412; 733 NW2d 755 (2007). Thus, plaintiff would have received no benefit from any substitution of a successor personal representative into the case and suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s denial of the motion.

We affirm.

¹To the extent that this argument is predicated on the asserted five-year window in which to file, plaintiff’s argument fails for the reasons set out in Farley, supra at 273 n 16.

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

CURTIS ANTHONY GOODMAN,

Defendant-Appellant

August 28, 2007

No. 269620
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-010643-01

Before: Owens, P.J., and White and Murray, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (“CSC”), MCL 750.520(1)(a) (sexual penetration of a person under 13 years of age), and one count of second-degree CSC, MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (sexual contact with a person under 13 years of age). Defendant received concurrent sentences of 225 to 600 months' imprisonment for each first-degree CSC conviction and 84 to 180 months' imprisonment for the second-degree CSC conviction. We affirm.

I. Facts

In May 2005, the victim, a 10-year-old boy, reported to his school's social worker that defendant, a close friend of the victim's mother, had been "bothering" him. The victim told the social worker that he had been living with defendant since January 2005 and reported that defendant frequently forced him to engage in oral and anal sex. School officials called the Detroit Police Department. Soon thereafter, an officer with the department took the victim to the Sixth Precinct in Detroit for further questioning, and the victim again described the instances of sexual abuse committed by defendant.

At trial, the victim described the most recent instance of sexual abuse that had occurred. According to the victim, defendant picked him up from his father's house but did not take him to school. Instead, defendant and the victim went to the victim's mother's house. The victim's mother was not home. Defendant and the victim were watching television and started wrestling. Then, defendant began touching the victim's genital area. Although the victim told him to stop, defendant put his genitals near the victim's mouth and "talk[ed] about sucking it." The victim declined. Soon thereafter, defendant came up behind the victim and "started humping on [him]." Defendant pulled down the victim's shorts. The victim felt something "inside [his] butt" that was painful. Defendant ejaculated.
The victim testified that defendant had performed similar actions approximately 14 or 15 times before, admitted that "sometimes" defendant inserted his penis inside the victim's anus and described another instance in which anal sex occurred. The victim also testified that defendant had forced him to perform oral sex at least three times.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge opinion testimony by two witnesses concerning the victim's veracity and several instances of inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.

"Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. A judge first must find the facts, and then must decide whether those facts constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel." People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). In general, we review a trial court's findings of fact for clear error and review questions of constitutional law de novo. Id. Because defendant "failed to move for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing with regard to his claim, review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record." People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).

The right to effective assistance of counsel is substantive and focuses on the actual assistance received. People v Pobrat, 451 Mich 589, 596; 548 NW2d 595 (1996). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant "must show that his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this was so prejudicial to him that he was denied a fair trial." People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). To establish prejudice, "a defendant must demonstrate 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different....'" Id. at 302-303, quoting People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 167; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). Defendant must also overcome the presumption that the challenged action constitutes sound trial strategy. People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995). "Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise." People v Salmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004).

Where, however, the defendant is denied counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings, the proceedings are presumed to have been unfair. United States v Cronic, 466 US 649, 662; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984). In that case, the conviction is constitutional error and no showing of prejudice is required. Id. at 659 n 25.

As an initial matter, counsel's performance in this case does not rise to the level of denial of counsel as contemplated by the Cronic Court. Counsel was neither "totally absent" during a critical stage of the proceeding, nor did she "entirely fail[] to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Id. at 659 & n 25. Counsel cross-examined each prosecutorial witness during the trial and presented two defense witnesses in addition to defendant. She presented a competent opening statement, closing argument, and theory of the case. Therefore, defendant was required to show both that counsel's performance was unreasonable and that he was prejudiced by her deficient performance.
With respect to defendant's argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the opinion testimony of two witnesses concerning the victim's veracity, we note that "[i]t is generally improper for a witness to comment or provide an opinion on the credibility of another witness because credibility matters are to be determined by the jury." People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 71; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). However, defendant fails to identify the witnesses and statements to which he refers. We speculate that he is referring to a statement by the school social worker, who testified that when the victim told her about the alleged abuse, she "looked in his eyes" and saw "sincerity." In this instance, however, defense counsel objected. The trial court overruled the objection, reasoning that the social worker could "testify as to what she did and what she perceived. It's personal knowledge." Counsel's performance in that instance was not deficient because she raised an objection. It is not clear to what other instance of opinion testimony defendant refers.

We agree that the failure of defendant's trial counsel to challenge the admission of inadmissible hearsay was unreasonable and constituted deficient performance. Three of the prosecution's witnesses testified regarding the victim's statements concerning the alleged sexual abuse. The school social worker testified:

And so then I asked him to clarify what he was—what he meant by hurting him and he said, 'Well, he does sexual things to me, um, in the home at night.' There are other people that live in the home but he would wait until these people were in bed and then he would come into the room where he was and he said that, um, he did oral sex and that he does it—quote, 'He does it to me in my butt.'

The victim's mother testified:

He looked me in my face and he said, 'Ma, I never ever would try to destroy your friendship with your brother but your brother touched me and I need for you to believe me.' With tears running down his eyes he said, 'I'm your child and I need you to believe that your brother has been hurting me.'

In addition, a police officer testified, "[the victim] said that his uncle had been sexually abusing him."

These and other statements made during trial constituted hearsay not falling within any exception. In particular, the statements do not fall within the exception in MRE 803A. 1 This hearsay exception only applies when the declarant was under 10 years of age when the statement was made. MRE 803A(1). The victim in this case was 10 years old when he first reported the alleged abuse.

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1 MRE 803A allows, under certain circumstances, the admission of a child-declarant's statement regarding sexual abuse to the extent it corroborates the declarant's testimony during the same proceeding.
The statements may fall under the rationale of the “catch-all” hearsay exception, MRE 803(24), and the prosecution properly notes our Supreme Court’s observation in People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 295-296; 662 NW2d 12 (2003), that a child’s earlier statement is more probative than one repeated at trial. However, MRE 803(24) also provides:

[A] statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. [MRE 803(24)].

Under this circumstance, admission of hearsay testimony under MRE 803(24) is not allowed. There is no indication that the prosecution provided any notice to defense counsel.

Finally, the statements do not fall under the hearsay exception for excited utterances, MRE 803(2). There was no indication that when the victim reported the alleged abuse he was “under the ‘way of excitement precipitated by an external startling event’” and did not “‘have the reflective capacity essential for fabrication . . . .” People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998), quoting 5 Weinstein, Evidence (2d ed), § 803.04(1), p 803-819. The social worker’s testimony did not suggest that the victim lacked the capacity for fabrication at the time he spoke with her. She did not, for example, testify that he was scared, crying or shaking. See People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 660; 672 NW2d 860 (2003) (finding an excited utterance where the declarant was “frantic” and having trouble breathing and speaking when she made the statement); People v Kowalak (On Remand), 215 Mich App 554, 557-560; 546 NW2d 681 (1996) (finding an excited utterance where the statement was made 30 to 45 minutes after the startling event and where the declarant was “petrified” and “scared to death” at the time she made the statement). Therefore, defense counsel should have challenged the hearsay statements made by the social worker, the victim’s mother, and a police officer. Also, she should not have stipulated that, had a second police officer testified, he would have testified that the victim told him he had been sexually abused by defendant. There was no conceivable trial strategy for allowing the jury to hear these damaging allegations against defendant repeated by multiple witnesses.

However, defendant has not established that counsel’s failure to raise these objections was prejudicial in that, absent the admission of this hearsay evidence, the result of the trial would likely have been different. Even if the trial court ruled the evidence inadmissible, the social worker, the victim’s mother, and a police officer would likely have testified that they took certain actions as a result of what they learned from the victim. This would tend to show that the victim told them about the alleged sexual abuse and that they believed him. Moreover, the victim testified at trial and there is reason to believe that the jury was persuaded by his testimony. The victim was 10 years old when he reported the abuse and 11 years old when he testified at trial. He was old enough to have had a clear understanding of what was happening to him and his testimony was competent and consistent. Accordingly, there is no indication that the absence of the hearsay statements in question would have tipped the scales in defendant’s favor.

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III. Sentencing

A. Constitutionality

Defendant argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to trial by jury, as articulated in Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), when it considered facts not admitted by defendant or established by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt when determining his minimum sentence. We disagree. In People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 143; 715 NW2d 778 (2006), cert den Drohan v Michigan, ___ US ___, 127 S Ct 592; 166 L Ed 2d 440 (2006), our Supreme Court concluded that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely does not apply to Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme. Accordingly, defendant’s constitutional right was not violated.2

B. OV 11

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in scoring him 50 points for offense variable (“OV”) 11, because none of the alleged sexual penetrations used to score OV 11 arose from the sentencing offense. We disagree. We review a trial court’s scoring decision for an abuse of discretion. People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 453-454; 709 NW2d 152 (2005). “A sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points to be scored, provided that evidence of record adequately supports a particular score.” People v Endres, 269 Mich App 414, 417; 711 NW2d 398 (2006). “Scoring decisions for which there is any evidence in support will be upheld.” Id.

The sentencing court may score 50 points under OV 11 where two or more criminal sexual penetrations occurred. MCL 777.41(1)(a). OV 11 directs the sentencing court to “[s]core all sexual penetrations of the victim by the offender arising out of the sentencing offense.” MCL 777.41(2)(a). However, “the 1 penetration that forms the basis of a first- or third- degree criminal sexual conduct offense” cannot be scored. MCL 777.41(2)(c). A criminal sexual penetration that forms the basis of an additional criminal sexual conduct conviction may be scored under OV 11. Cox, supra at 455-456; People v Muchie, 251 Mich App 273, 280-281; 650 NW2d 733 (2002), aff’d 468 Mich 50 (2003). In this case, defendant was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Therefore, the statute operates to exclude the use of one of these sexual penetrations as the sentencing offense, Muchie, supra at 280-281, but the remaining three criminal sexual penetrations for which defendant was convicted may be used to score OV 11, as long as these penetrations “arise out of” the sentencing offense.

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2 In addition, a sentencing court may consider all record evidence before it when calculating the guidelines, including admissions by the defendant, trial evidence or testimony, and the contents of the presentence investigation report. People v Dewald, 267 Mich App 365, 380, 705 NW2d 167 (2005); People v Raizov (After Remand), 201 Mich App 123, 125; 505 NW2d 886 (1993), remanded 447 Mich 984 (1994).
The trial court in this case noted the "arising out of" requirement, but did not articulate its reasoning with respect to that requirement. We uphold scoring decisions for which there is any evidence in support, Endres, supra at 417, and there is some support for the proposition that the subsequent penetrations "arose out of" the first. Defendant’s sexual penetrations of the victim could be considered part of a pattern of defendant’s abuse of his close relationship with the victim’s mother. There is causal connection between the first penetration and subsequent penetrations; the subsequent penetrations occurred because defendant influenced the victim to not tell his mother by convincing him that she would not believe his allegations. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in scoring defendant 50 points for OV 11.

C. OV 13

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in scoring him 50 points for OV 13 because it scored points for the same conduct under OV 11 and OV 13. We disagree.

The sentencing court may score 50 points under OV 13 where “[t]he offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving 3 or more sexual penetrations against a person or persons less than 13 years of age.” MCL 777.43(1)(a). Conduct scored in OV 11 or OV 12 may not be scored under OV 13. MCL 777.43(2)(c). The trial court scored defendant 50 points for OV 13. This was not an abuse of discretion because there was evidence of at least three instances beyond those scored in OV 11 in which defendant penetrated the victim.

Again, judicially ascertained facts may be used to increase a defendant’s sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict. Drohan, supra at 163. Even where a factfinder declines to find a fact proven beyond a reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction, the same fact may be found by a preponderance of the evidence for purposes of sentencing. People v Perez, 255 Mich App 703, 713; 622 NW2d 446 (2003), vacated in part on other grounds 469 Mich 415 (2003). At trial, the victim testified that defendant performed anal sex on him 14 or 15 times. The trial court’s finding that the victim’s testimony was credible in that additional uncharged sexual penetrations occurred is sufficient to sustain its scoring of OV 13 at 50 points. See id. (“[T]he victim testified that there were multiple penetrations. The trial court obviously found the victim’s testimony to be credible. Therefore, there existed evidence to support the score and we shall affirm the scoring.”)

Affirmed.

/ls/ Donald S. Owens
/ls/ Helene N. White
/ls/ Christopher M. Murray

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

JAMES TAYLOR, Personal Representative of the Estate of AFRADITA TAYLOR, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

RAMALINGESWARA YALAMANCHI, M.D.,
R.R. YALAMANCHI, M.D., P.C., and PANKAJ K. VIJ, M.D.,

Defendants,

and

GRAHAM W. LONG, M.D., WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL, DAVID M. MONTGOMERY, M.D., and MITUL K. PATEL, M.D.,

Defendants-Appellants.

JAMES TAYLOR, Personal Representative of the Estate of AFRADITA TAYLOR, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

RAMALINGESWARA YALAMANCHI, M.D.,
and R.R. YALAMANCHI, M.D., P.C.,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

-1-
GRAHAM W. LONG, M.D., WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL, DAVID M. MONTGOMERY, M.D., MITUL K. PATEL, M.D., and PANKAJ VIJ, M.D.,

Defendants.

JAMES TAYLOR, Personal Representative of the Estate of AFRADITA TAYLOR, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

RAMALINGESWARA YALAMANCHI, M.D., R.R. YALAMANCHI, M.D., P.C., GRAHAM W. LONG, M.D., WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL, DAVID M. MONTGOMERY, M.D., and MITUL K. PATEL, M.D.,

Defendants,

and

PANKAJ VIJ, M.D.,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 262777
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 03-053470-NH

Before: White, P.J., Whitbeck, C.J. and Davis, J.

PER CURIAM.

In this consolidated appeal, defendants appeal by leave granted an opinion and order denying their respective motions for summary disposition based on the statute of limitations. This is a medical malpractice case, and the relevant facts are undisputed. We reverse.

Plaintiff’s decedent, Afradita Taylor (decedent), received treatment from defendants in April and May 2000. She died on May 24, 2000. On April 18, 2001, plaintiff obtained letters of authority as personal representative of decedent’s estate. Two years later on April 18, 2003, plaintiff mailed a notice of intent to file a claim. On October 17, 2003, plaintiff filed the complaint.

Appellate courts review de novo rulings on summary disposition motions. Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642, 647; 677 NW2d 813 (2004). This Court also reviews de novo whether a statute
of limitations bars a claim. *Farley v Advanced Cardiovascular*, 266 Mich App 566, 570-571; 703 NW2d 115 (2005). Questions of law and interpretations of statutes are also reviewed de novo. *Office Planning Group, Inc v Baraga-Houghton-Keweenaw Child Dev Bd*, 472 Mich 479, 488; 697 NW2d 871 (2005). MCL 600.5805 provides a two-year limitations period for a medical malpractice claim or action. A medical malpractice claimant must give defendants notice of his intent to sue at least 182 days before filing a complaint. MCL 600.2912b(1). Doing so tolls the statute of limitations. MCL 600.5856(d); *Waltz, supra*, p 644 n 1. The two-year limitations period is tolled only if that period would expire during the 182-day notice period. MCL 600.5856(d).

The wrongful death savings statute provides an independent two-year period within which a wrongful death claimant may commence an action: “If a person dies before the period of limitations has run . . . an action . . . may be commenced . . . at any time within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run.” MCL 600.5852.

“Thus, § 5852 provides an exception to the otherwise-applicable limitation periods by permitting the personal representative of a decedent’s estate to file a wrongful death action up to two years after letters of authority are issued, subject to a three-year ceiling.” *Waltz, supra*, p 645 n 5. However, our Supreme Court has held that the saving period is not tolled by filing of a notice of intent, and this Court has held that our Supreme Court’s decision in that regard applies retroactively. *Mullins v St Joseph Hosp*, 271 Mich App 503, 509; 722 NW2d 666 (2006). This Court has further held that “plaintiffs who filed before Waltz, but incorrectly and detrimentally relied on their affidavit of merit to toll the running of the saving statute” may not use equitable tolling to avoid the inequitable results of that retroactive application. *Ward v Stano*, Mich App 703 NW2d 116 (2006). Therefore, we are bound to conclude that plaintiff’s notice of intent, sent on April 18, 2003, could not have prevented the expiration, on that same date, of the two-year wrongful death savings provision.

Reversed.

/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Alton T. Davis

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1 This section is now designated MCL 600.5856(c), pursuant to 2004 PA 87; see also *Mullins v St Joseph Hosp*, 271 Mich App 503, 509; 722 NW2d 666 (2006). The designation used in this opinion is the designation in place at the dates relevant to the actions below.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

TIMMY ALLEN ROSENBERG,

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O'Connell, P.J., and White and Markey, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On remand, defendant was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 92 to 240 months' imprisonment for delivery of a controlled substance less than 50 grams, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). Defendant appeals by right. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

After a jury convicted defendant, the trial court, relying on defendant's 31 prior misdemeanor convictions, his two acquittals and a pending charge for criminal sexual conduct, and the threat his continuous criminal behavior posed to the community, sentenced defendant to 180 to 360 months' imprisonment. Defendant's sentence was a departure of more than double the recommended minimum sentence range under the legislative guidelines. On appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence of 180 to 360 months' imprisonment and remanded for resentencing. People v Rosenberg, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 25, 2005 (Docket No. 251930). In addition to finding that the trial court incorrectly scored two offense variables, the panel concluded that while the factors the trial court relied on to depart from the minimum recommended sentence range were objective and verifiable, the factors did not justify the extent of the trial court's departure from the minimum sentence range. Id. On remand, the trial court sentenced defendant to 92 to 240 months' imprisonment, a departure double the recommended minimum sentence range of 10 to 46 months under the recalculated legislative guidelines.

Defendant first claims that his sentence was disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and his criminal record. Defendant asserts that because he delivered less than five percent of the amount punishable by MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and because he already faced a significant guidelines augmentation due to his status as an habitual offender, a more proportionate sentence would have fallen within or just over the maximum of the recommended minimum sentence range. We review a departure from the recommended sentence range under the legislative guidelines to determine if the sentence imposed is proportionate to the seriousness
of the crime and the defendant's criminal history. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 262, 264; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). A trial court abuses its discretion when it imposes a sentence that falls outside the principled range of outcomes. Id. at 269.

The principle of proportionality requires that the sentence the trial court imposes be proportional to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). For almost 20 years, from 1983 until his arrest in 2002, defendant continuously engaged in assaultive, violent, intimidating, and destructive behavior. He was convicted of 31 misdemeanors, and he was charged three times with criminal sexual conduct. In addition, there was evidence in the record of at least thirteen other instances where defendant engaged in criminal behavior. Defendant's behavior during those 20 years indicates that he harbored no respect for the law or any willingness to follow the law. The trial court recognized that defendant's unwillingness to alter his behavior reflected on his ability to be rehabilitated and that he posed an ongoing danger to his community. Even though the sentence the trial court imposed was double the recommended maximum/minimum under the legislative guidelines, it was proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and offender and was within the principled range of outcomes. Babcock, supra at 269. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Defendant next claims on appeal that the $25,000 fine imposed by the trial court was excessive and violated the principle of proportionality. Specifically, defendant asserts that the fine was excessive and disproportionate because he was fined the maximum amount allowed by MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv) for delivering one of the least amounts necessary to violate the statute. Defendant did not appeal the amount of this fine in his prior appeal and reconsideration of the amount of the fine was outside the scope of remand. Thus, defendant has waived this issue. People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436; 231 NW2d 649 (1975). Accordingly, there is no error for us to review. If we were to reach the issue we would find no error. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). We affirm the $25,000 fine.

Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $500 in court costs. Defendant failed to object to the imposition of court costs. Appellee agrees. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's order requiring defendant to pay $500 in court costs.

Defendant finally claims on appeal that, pursuant to Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), Michigan's sentencing scheme violates his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury make factual findings. Our Supreme Court has definitively ruled to the contrary, holding that Blakely does not affect Michigan's indeterminate sentencing scheme. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006); People v Claypool, 470 Mich 715, 730-731 n 14; 684 NW2d 278 (2004).

We affirm in part and vacate in part.

/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Jane E. Markey

-2-
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

KEITH GREENE, Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O'Connell, P.J., and White and Markey, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and resisting or obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1). He was sentenced as an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10, to a prison term of 126 months to 25 years for the armed robbery conviction, and 198 days served for the resisting or obstructing conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.

On October 30, 2004, the victim was working as an adult entertainer for a group of males in an apartment. As she danced, the men gave her tips ranging from $1 to $20. At one point, defendant entered the apartment with two other males. This small group looked around for a few minutes and then left after the victim indicated she did not know where the weed was. Defendant later confronted the victim in the parking lot as she was entering a car that had three other individuals in it. Defendant pointed what appeared to be a handgun at the victim's side and repeatedly demanded the money the victim had just earned. When the victim did not immediately comply, defendant got into the car, rummaged through the victim's purse, and reached under the victim's leg where she had hidden some of her earnings. At one point, defendant's gun discharged, and it sounded like a cap pistol. Defendant ran, and the police were called. When police arrived, they encountered defendant near the scene. A police officer repeatedly ordered defendant to stop, but defendant continued to run. Eventually, the police captured defendant and retrieved $30, consisting of one ten-dollar bill, and 20 one-dollar bills. They did not recover a gun or the other $270 the victim estimated had been stolen. At trial, defendant explained that he ran from the police because he "had warrants out on him and did not want to go to jail."

Defendant first argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and argue an insanity defense and for failing to produce several alibi witnesses. We disagree. Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving
otherwise. Id. at 639. At trial, defendant consistently maintained his innocence, and there is no evidence that he made a good-faith effort to avail himself of the right to present an insanity defense. See People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). Likewise, defendant has not provided any affidavits of qualified medical personnel or other documentation indicating that he had any medical or psychological condition at the time of the offenses to support that exploration of insanity might have been reasonable. Therefore, defendant fails to demonstrate that the insanity defense could have made a difference at trial, and we will not reverse his conviction solely on the basis of his speculation. Id.

Defendant relies on references in the presentence investigation report and the Michigan Department of Corrections reception center psychological report to support his contention that he "suffers from a number of mental health issues" and substance abuse problems, but there is nothing in either report that provides a basis for a diagnosis of criminal insanity. In fact, the MDOC psychological report concluded that "[t]here was no behavioral evidence of a major mood disorder or formal disorder of thought. At this time, [defendant] appears stable and not in the need of further mental health treatment." Although defendant may have certain mental health issues, mental illness alone does not constitute a defense of legal insanity, and there was no evidence that defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law. MCL 768.21a(1). With regard to substance abuse, voluntary intoxication cannot form the basis for an insanity defense, MCL 768.21a(2), and although defendant mentions involuntary intoxication, he has not proffered any evidence that he suffered from involuntary intoxication at the time of the offenses. "Defendant may not leave it to this Court to search for a factual basis to sustain or reject his position." People v Norman, 184 Mich App 255, 256; 457 NW2d 136 (1990). Because there is no basis for concluding that an insanity defense was a substantial defense and no basis for concluding that defendant tried to assert it, defendant cannot establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Kelly, supra.

Likewise, defendant has not provided any witness affidavits or identified any evidence in the record establishing that the proposed witnesses’ testimony would have yielded valuable evidence that would have affected the outcome of trial. Moreover, defendant’s argument relies on information that, according to his trial counsel, came to light on the first morning of trial. The information arrived too late to file a notice of alibi, which defendant admits was the only relevant purpose of the evidence, so we reject defendant’s argument that he made good-faith efforts to assert the defense. Kelly, supra.

Defendant next argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court improperly scored 20 points for offense variable (OV) 1 (aggravated use of a weapon) and ten points for OV 9 (number of victims). We decline to review defendant’s challenge to the scoring of OV 1 and OV 9 because the record reflects defense counsel’s on-the-record expression of satisfaction with those scores. See People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).

Next, defendant argues that he must be resentenced because the trial court’s factual findings supporting his sentence were not determined by a jury, contrary to Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). However, Blakely does not apply to Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006).
We also reject defendant’s claim that he is entitled to resentence because his sentence for armed robbery is disproportionate and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant’s sentence of 126 months to 25 years is at the lower end of the sentencing guidelines range of 126 to 262 months. Under the circumstances, we find nothing disproportionate or cruel about defendant’s punishment. Moreover, we generally affirm a sentence within the guidelines’ range unless there was an error in the guidelines’ scoring or the court relied on inaccurate information. MCL 769.34(10). Here, defendant has not demonstrated either type of error, so we defer to the Legislature’s determination of sentence proportionality as delineated by the guidelines. See id.; People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 261-262, 666 NW2d 231 (2003).

In a supplemental brief filed in propria persona, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of armed robbery because the witnesses’ identification of him was tainted by a suggestive lineup. We disagree. “When determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Under this deferential standard, “a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Two witnesses, the victim and a passenger in the car, identified defendant as the perpetrator at pretrial lineups and in court. The victim testified that, during the robbery, she got “a good look at [defendant’s] face,” that his face was “not even a foot away from [hers],” and that defendant “was in [her] face.” She also noted that defendant was the same person whom she had seen earlier in the “well-lit” apartment. The victim indicated that, when identifying defendant in a pretrial lineup, she “pretty much knew off the bat who it was.” She explained that she had indicated that she was 90 percent certain that defendant was the person who robbed her, “because there’s still that little chance that it could have been somebody that looked identical to him.” The passenger testified that he got a “good look” at defendant’s face, and was 100 percent certain that defendant was the person who committed the robbery. Levin explained that he could clearly see defendant’s face under the car’s dome light, that defendant was “approximately two feet” from him, and that the majority of defendant’s body was inside the car. Police testimony was presented that the parking lot “was fairly well-lit.” Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was the robber. The credibility of the identification testimony was for the trier of fact. id.

Defendant also claims that he was denied his right to due process because the pretrial lineup procedure was unduly suggestive. Defendant argues that the other lineup participants had a darker complexion, so he was the only individual fitting the description that the victim provided to police. “An identification procedure that is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification constitutes a denial of due process.” People v Williams, 244 Mich App 333, 542; 624 NW2d 575 (2001). However, “to sustain a due process challenge, a defendant must show that the pretrial identification procedure was so suggestive in light of the totality of the circumstances that it led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.” People v Kurylczuk, 443 Mich 289, 302; 505 NW2d 528 (1993). In this case, the only evidence of suggestion was that defendant was the only “light-skinned” African-American in the lineup, which matched the victim’s original description. However, the victim also indicated to police
that defendant was "not real light-skinned," so without more, we are not persuaded that defendant's complexion invalidated the lineup. See People v Gunter, 76 Mich App 483, 490; 257 NW2d 133 (1977). Police are not required to exert extraordinary effort to arrange a lineup of participants whose physical characteristics exactly match those of the defendant. See People v Davis, 146 Mich App 537, 547; 381 NW2d 759 (1985). Even if it were possible to present a lineup in which the participants looked identical, the purpose of the lineup would be thwarted and misidentification would be almost unavoidable. Likewise, a lineup in which the defendant represents the median of all physical features is likely as suspect as one in which some of the defendant's features set him apart. "Physical differences between defendant and the other lineup participants goes to the weight of the identification and not its admissibility." People v Sawyer, 222 Mich App 1, 3; 564 NW2d 62 (1997). Defendant fails to persuade us that the lineup fostered irreparable misidentification. Kurylczuk, supra. Accordingly, we also reject defendant's alternative argument that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to move to suppress the identification testimony. Sabin, supra at 660.

Affirmed.

/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Jane E. Markey
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

STACEY HELFNER, Next Friend of AMBER
SEILICKI, Minor,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

CENTER LINE PUBLIC SCHOOLS and
DEANNA LYNN MULRENNIN,

Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-
Appellants,

and

MICHELLE SLOAT,

Defendant/Third-Party Defendant.¹

UNPUBLISHED
June 20, 2006

No. 265757
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-003161-NI

Before: White, P.J., Whitbeck, C.J., and Davis, J.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants appeal as of right an order that, in relevant part, denied their motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10) on the grounds that there existed
genuine issues of material fact whether the motor vehicle and governmental employee exceptions
to governmental immunity existed. We affirm.

This case arose when defendant Deanna Lynn Mulrenin, the driver of a school bus for
defendant Center Line Public Schools, ordered eighth-grader Amber Seilicki to disembark from
the bus. Mulrenin was Amber's regular bus driver. To reach the bus, Amber was required to
cross the street. On the day of the accident, Mulrenin apparently understood Amber to be
suspended from school, although there is some debate whether Amber had actually received
permission to ride the bus that day notwithstanding her suspension. Amber boarded the bus as

¹Michelle Sloat is not a party to this appeal. We use the term “defendants” in this opinion only
in reference to Center Line Public Schools and DeAnna Lynn Mulrenin.
usual, whereupon Mulrenin ordered Amber to get off. The two of them debated the matter for some unspecified period of time, during which Amber became upset, embarrassed, and emotional. She eventually disembarked, and Mulrenin ordered her to cross the street and go home. Apparently, Amber did not do so immediately. At some point, Mulrenin deactivated the school bus' red flashing warning lights. Michelle Sloat had been stopped in her car alongside the school bus, and when the lights were deactivated, Sloat attempted to pass the bus. At the same time, Amber attempted to cross the street in front of the bus, where she collided with Sloat’s vehicle.

A grant or denial of summary disposition is reviewed de novo on the basis of the entire record to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Maider v. Rozwood*, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). When reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), which tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint, all evidence submitted by the parties must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and summary disposition is granted only where the evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact. *Id.*, 120. Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), where the claim is allegedly barred, the trial court must accept as true the contents of the complaint, unless they are contradicted by documentary evidence submitted by the moving party. *Id.*, 119.


The motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, excepts injuries “resulting from the negligent operation . . . of a motor vehicle.” Our Supreme Court has explained that “operation,” in this context, is limited to “the ordinary use of the vehicle as a motor vehicle, namely, driving the vehicle.” *Chandler, supra* at 321-322 (emphasis in original). Therefore, a vehicle that is undergoing cleaning while parked inside a maintenance facility is not in "operation." *Id.*, 316, 322. Similarly, a city-owned water truck that was parked at the side of the road, with its warning lights activated, while the driver exited the vehicle to inspect a fire hydrant was no longer in "operation." *Poppen v. Toney*, 256 Mich App 351, 355-356; 664 NW2d 265 (2003). As this Court noted, “[o]nce stopped for this purpose, [the truck’s] presence on the road was no longer ‘directly associated with the driving’ of that vehicle.” *Id.*, quoting *Chandler, supra* at 321.

However, *Chandler* and *Poppen* are significantly distinguishable. Simple, everyday experience demonstrates that the act of driving does not entail constant movement. A vehicle does not cease to be “driven” while temporarily halted for a stop sign or a traffic light. Under some circumstances, temporary cessation of movement is “directly associated with the driving” of a vehicle. Temporary stops are an integral part of the driving of a school bus, whether coming to a halt before proceeding over railroad tracks or stopping to take on or discharge passengers. The fact that a school bus is temporarily at rest does not take it outside the motor vehicle
exception under these circumstances. Although halted, the school bus is still being driven, and is therefore still being operated as a motor vehicle within the definition provided by Chandler.

Our Supreme Court has also explained that “resulting from” cannot be satisfied by a proximate cause analysis. Instead it requires, in the context of a police pursuit of a fleeing vehicle, that the government vehicle “hit the fleeing car or otherwise physically forced it off the road or onto another vehicle or object.” Robinson, supra at 456-457, 457 n 14. This Court then held that the motor vehicle exception requires the government-owned vehicle to physically and directly cause the incident that results in injury. Curtis v City of Flint, 253 Mich App 555, 561-562; 655 NW2d 791 (2002). Again, however, Robinson and Curtis are not directly applicable to the facts here.

Both of those cases involved purely vehicular collisions where the plaintiff was inside a vehicle, and the government-owned vehicle had no physical involvement in the injury-causing collisions. In Robinson, the police made arguably questionable decisions to pursue fleeing criminals, who crashed the vehicles they were driving. In Curtis, a driver, Kells, pulled over to permit passage of an emergency vehicle that may not have been following proper emergency protocol, whereupon the plaintiff crashed into the rear of Kells’ vehicle. The plaintiff then sued the driver and owner of the emergency vehicle. In both cases, the plaintiffs were dismissed because the government-owned vehicle must “be physically involved in the collision that caused [the] plaintiff’s injuries, either by hitting [the] plaintiff’s vehicle or by physically forcing that vehicle off the road or onto another vehicle or object.” Curtis, supra at 562 (emphasis added).

This rule is not directly applicable where the plaintiff is not, in fact, in a vehicle at all. Instead, the entirely consistent and more general rule is that the government vehicle must directly compel the injury-causing accident.

There is no dispute that there was no physical contact between Amber and the school bus here. However, even under Robinson and Curtis, there would not necessarily be physical contact between the government vehicle and a plaintiff. For example, in Robinson, our Supreme Court suggested that the motor vehicle exception would apply if, for example, a police vehicle had rammed a car off the road and into an innocent pedestrian. See Robinson, supra at 445 n 2. In other words, it is sufficient for the government vehicle to cause an injury by placing some object in motion, and that object then injures the plaintiff. This Court has found the motor vehicle exception applicable where a government-owned vehicle drove over a piece of tire tread on the road, thereby flinging the tire tread into the plaintiff’s windshield. Regan v Washtenaw Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs, 249 Mich App 153, 161; 641 NW2d 285 (2002).

The dissent notes that these cases still involve the government vehicle physically contacting and physically forcing into motion the injury-causing object. Under the circumstances of this case, where the driver prematurely turned off safety devices and violated protocols mandated by law and unique to a school bus, the dissent’s observation is a distinction without a difference. Because this case involves a school bus, it is viewed in light of the strong public policy mandated by our Legislature’s enactment of the Pupil Transportation Act, MCL 257.1801 et seq., among other statutory provisions. See Nolan v Bronson, 185 Mich App 163, 171-173; 460 NW2d 284 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by Chandler, supra (mostly discussing predecessor statutes). Among other purposes, a school bus is designed to control the motion of other vehicles on the highway, to promote one of the most important public policies imaginable – the safety of our children. Our Supreme Court has explained how special school
busses are, noting in the context of no-fault insurance that the “use” of a school bus – as distinguished from any other ordinary public transit – includes both transporting students and properly disembarking them. Pacific Employers Ins Co v Michigan Mut Ins Co, 452 Mich 218, 225-227; 549 NW2d 872 (1996). By operation of statute, the deactivation of a school bus’ warning lights “is the signal for stopped traffic to proceed.” MCL 257.1855(2)(b). That is precisely what occurred here.

A significant fact here, then, is that the defendant driver did physically place an object in motion – by prematurely deactivating the warning lights on the bus, which constituted an affirmative signal to waiting vehicles on the road to proceed. Defendant’s operation of the school bus may be found to have directly caused the accident because it exercised control over the physical movement of another vehicle. The motor vehicle exception could be found to apply even though the bus was temporarily paused and did not itself physically strike Amber or physically contact the car that struck Amber. Under the unique circumstances of a school bus deactivating its warning lights, there is no principled reason to take this issue from the trier of fact simply because there was no physical contact between the bus and the vehicle that struck Amber.

The governmental employee exception to governmental immunity provides that the employee of an agency exercising a governmental function “may be liable for grossly negligent conduct” performed while acting within the scope of her authority “if that conduct is ‘the proximate cause of the injury or damage.’” Curtis, supra at 562-563, quoting MCL 691.1407(2). There is no dispute that this school bus did not have its flashing red warning lights activated at the time of the accident, contrary to MCL 257.1855. At the time of the accident, MCL 257.1855 provided in relevant part as follows:

1. A school bus driver shall actuate alternately flashing lights only when the school bus is stopped or stopping on a highway or private road for the purpose of receiving or discharging pupils in the manner provided in this act. . . .

2. The driver of a school bus while operating upon the public highways or private roadways open to the public shall receive or discharge pupils from the bus in the following manner:

   * * *

(b) If the pupils are required to cross the roadway, the driver of a school bus equipped with red and amber alternately flashing overhead lights in accordance with section 197 shall activate the alternately flashing overhead amber lights not less than 200 feet before the stop, stop the bus as far to the right side of the roadway or private road as is possible to provide for the safety of the pupils being boarded or discharged, deactivate the alternately flashing overhead amber lights, and activate the alternately flashing overhead red lights while receiving or discharging pupils. Before resuming motion, the driver shall deactivate these

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2 This bus’ compliance with MCL 257.1819 is not disputed.
lights and allow congested traffic to disperse where practicable. The deactivation of these lights is the signal for stopped traffic to proceed.

Amber always crossed the street after exiting the bus. The driver was Amber’s regular driver, so she knew that Amber would need to cross the street immediately after exiting the bus and that she would need to activate the red flashing lights while Amber did so.

On the day of the accident, the driver understood Amber to be suspended from school and therefore not permitted to ride the bus. There is some dispute whether Amber had nevertheless been granted permission to ride the bus. The driver ordered Amber to leave the bus and debated the issue with Amber to the point where Amber was crying and pleading to remain. The driver nevertheless told Amber to leave, knowing that Amber was angry, embarrassed, and upset. The driver then directed Amber to cross the street and deactivated the warning lights. Given the summary disposition posture of this case, there is no doubt that plaintiff has at least presented a genuine issue of material fact whether the school bus driver’s conduct was “so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether” Amber would be injured. See MCL 691.1407(7)(a), defining “gross negligence” as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.”

In the context of the governmental employee exception to governmental immunity, the dissent correctly notes that “the proximate cause” means that the driver’s conduct must be “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury.” Curtis, supra at 563, quoting Robinson, supra at 458-459. The dissent then goes on to conclude that it was not the driver’s conduct, but rather plaintiff’s inattentiveness to traffic that meets that requirement. It seems to us that this is a question properly determined by the trier of fact. We do not now hold that the driver’s conduct was that sole cause. This case is before us on summary disposition. Our inquiry is into the existence of a genuine factual question whether the driver’s conduct was the “one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause.” We agree with the dissent that there is no reason why the voluntary act of a child cannot be the proximate cause. We merely decline to hold, on the basis of the record and procedural posture of the case before us, that it necessarily was. Again, the driver ordered Amber to disembark, leaving Amber with no options other than crossing the street. There is no dispute that the only reason the other vehicle drove forward and was in a position to strike Amber was the driver’s deactivation of the warning lights on the bus. There is testimony that the driver ordered Amber to cross the street, although Amber apparently did not do so immediately. The driver was aware of Amber’s upset emotional state.

Affording every legitimate inference to the plaintiff, the driver had discharged an upset 13-year-old child by the side of the road. To go home, she would need to cross the road. Students are required to cross in front of the bus, MCL 257.1855(3), where oncoming traffic is difficult to see. Finally, the driver had deactivated the warning lights, directing traffic to proceed. MCL 257.1855(2)(b). There is at least a genuine question of material fact whether anything other than the bus driver’s conduct caused Amber and the other vehicle to come to be in the same place at the same time. The trial court therefore appropriately denied summary disposition on the issue of the governmental employee exception to governmental immunity.
Affirmed.

/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Alton T. Davis
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

STACEY HELFER, Next Friend of AMBER
SEILICKI, Minor,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

CENTER LINE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and
DEANNA LYNN MULRENNIN,

Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-
Appellants,

and

MICHELLE SLOAT,

Defendant/Third-Party Defendant.

Before: White, P.J., Whitbeck, C.J., and Davis, J.

WHITBECK, C.J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. Because I conclude that the government vehicle in this case did not
directly place the injury-causing object into motion and that none of Mulreinin’s actions, albeit
arguably grossly negligent, were the proximate cause of Amber Seilicki’s injury, I would
reverse.

1. The Motor Vehicle Exception

The majority interprets the language, “resulting from the negligent operation . . . of a
motor vehicle” to hold that “the government vehicle must directly compel the injury-causing
accident.” According to the majority, “it is sufficient for the government vehicle to cause an

1 MCL 691.1405.
2 Anie at ___.
injury by placing some object in motion, and that object then injures the plaintiff." The majority then provides, for example, the situation where a police car rams another vehicle off the road and into a pedestrian, or the situation where a government vehicle drives over debris, causing the debris to fling into the air and strike another vehicle. According to the majority, Muhrenin therefore placed into motion the vehicle that hit Seilicki by deactivating the bus’s warning lights. However, in my opinion, this conclusion contradicts the majority’s own examples. In both situations the majority cites, the government vehicle came into direct physical contact with the injury-causing object and, in each example, that direct physical contact forced the injury-causing object into motion. In this case, however, there was no direct physical contact between the bus and the vehicle that hit Seilicki, nor was there direct contact between Seilicki and the bus. Therefore, I would conclude that Seilicki’s injury did not result from the negligent operation of the bus.

II. Governmental Employee Immunity

MCL 691.1407(2) provides in relevant part that a government employee is immune from tort liability for injuries to a person caused by the employee while in the course of employment if the following are met:

(a) The . . . employee . . . is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.

(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.

(c) The . . . employee’s . . conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage.

Thus, if (a) and (b) have been met, as they plainly are in this case, “a governmental employee may be liable for grossly negligent conduct if that conduct is ‘the proximate cause of the injury or damage.’”

“Gross negligence’ means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” “[E]vidence of ordinary negligence does not create a material question of fact concerning gross negligence. . . . To hold otherwise would create a jury question premised on something less than the statutory standard.”

The phrase “the proximate cause,” as used in MCL 691.1407(2)(c), is not synonymous with “a proximate cause,” and . . . to impose liability on a

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3 Id.
5 MCL 691.1407(7)(a).
governmental employee for gross negligence, the employee’s conduct must be “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury.”\(^{7}\)

While plaintiff arguably presented evidence that Mulrenin was grossly negligent, this was plainly not the proximate cause of Seilik’s injuries.

I agree with that majority that, pursuant to MCL 257.1855(b), Mulrenin was required to activate the red flashing lights while Seilik exited and crossed the street. Here, there is undisputed evidence whether Mulrenin had activated any of the bus’s flashing lights at the time of the accident. Nevertheless, Mulrenin admitted that the red flashing lights were not activated when Seilik exited the bus. In addition, there was testimony that (1) Seilik was crying and pleading with Mulrenin to let her ride the bus and become angry and embarrassed after being told to exit the bus and that (2) Mulrenin was Seilik’s everyday bus driver at the time of the incident and was therefore likely aware that Seilik was about to cross the street because Seilik stated that she did every time she exited the bus. Viewing the testimony in a light most favorable to plaintiff, she has arguably presented evidence that Mulrenin was grossly negligent, that is, that Mulrenin’s conduct was reckless and demonstrated a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury to Seilik would result.

However, it is manifest that none of Mulrenin’s actions or inactions were “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding”\(^{8}\) Seilik’s injury. As Seilik acknowledged, she attempted to run across the street without looking for cars. Seilik’s crossing of the street in this manner was plainly a more immediate, efficient, and direct cause of her injury than Mulrenin having instructed her to leave the bus. Further, although there was deposition testimony indicating that Mulrenin may have also told Seilik to cross the street, that same testimony indicates that Seilik failed to immediately heed this instruction. Thus, again, Seilik’s decision to cross the street at the moment when she did was the immediate, efficient, and direct cause of her injury. While plaintiff invokes the potential for children to act impulsively, nothing in the language of MCL 691.1407(2) or the controlling case law suggests that the voluntary act of a child cannot constitute “the proximate cause” of injury. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant summary disposition in favor of Mulrenin with regard to governmental employee immunity.

I would reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of defendants.

/s/ William C. Whitbeck

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\(^8\) Curtis, supra at 563.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN M. ELLS, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE of MAYNARD B. ELLS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

V

EATON COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 264635
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 05-000128-N1

Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and White, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right the circuit court’s denial of its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) in this negligence action. We affirm.

We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Wilson v. Alpena Co Rd Comm, 263 Mich App 141, 144; 687 NW2d 380 (2004). MCR 2.116(C)(7) tests whether a claim is barred because of governmental immunity, and requires consideration of all documentary evidence filed or submitted by the parties. Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 162; 483 NW2d 26 (1992). In determining whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court must accept as true the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, affidavits, or other documentary evidence and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. Wilson, supra at 145. Additionally, we review de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Shinkolster v Annapolis Hosp, 471 Mich 540, 548; 685 NW2d 275 (2004).

To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, the defendant breached that duty, causation and damages. Halsi v Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297, 309-310; 627 NW2d 581 (2001). Further, where the defendant is a governmental agency, the plaintiff must plead a cause of action in avoidance of governmental immunity. Id. at 302-304.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that plaintiff’s decedent died in a motor vehicle accident that was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence when it “permitted, authorized or consented to the placement of a Type-3 barricade with various other signage” at the intersection where the accident occurred. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant “owed a statutory duty to [p]laintiff’s decedent, outside government immunity, to keep their highway in reasonable repair and to insure [sic] that it was reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.” Plaintiff alleged
that the barricade "was placed on the traveled portion of the highway," and that it "created an obstruction and defect in the traveled portion of the highway in that it obscured vision of vehicular traffic . . . including the decedent . . . ." Stated another way, the decedent's "view of oncoming traffic . . . was obscured . . . so that he could not readily observe traffic approaching the intersection," and "[i]n that as a proximate result of [d]efendant[s]' negligence and breach of duty, the decedent was struck at the intersection and died of his injuries."

Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), on the basis that plaintiff's cause of action did not fall within the highway exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402(1). Defendant also argued that it was entitled to summary disposition because plaintiff failed to provide proper notice as required by MCL 691.1404, and because it could not be held liable for failing to anticipate plaintiff's decedent's negligence in entering an intersection before making reasonable and proper observations of cross traffic.

The governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., provides that a governmental agency is immune from tort liability while engaging in a governmental function unless a specific exception applies. The highway exception to governmental immunity requires a "governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway" to "maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel." MCL 691.1402(1). "The duty of the . . . county road commission to repair and maintain highways, and the liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel . . . ." Id. Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 162; 615 NW2d 702 (2000).

The circuit court denied defendant's motion, finding that the highway exception to governmental immunity was applicable because the "barricade was located in the roadway," therefore constituting a "defect . . . in the active roadbed designed for vehicular travel." We agree.

Here, two large signs had been placed on the actual roadbed, the taller of the two signs was placed immediately behind the shorter one. The taller one stated "Road closed to thru traffic," and the shorter one was an arrow stating "Detour" super imposed on a barricade, to alert passersby that the road was closed to thru traffic and that a detour existed, but that the road was open to a local golf course. The barricade was placed on the actual roadbed designed for vehicular travel. Under Nawrocki, supra, plaintiff thus pleaded in avoidance of governmental immunity. Although the Nawrocki Court's holding included that "the state or county road

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1 Defendant does not dispute that it had jurisdiction over the roadway where the accident occurred.

2 The circuit court relied on Page v Bidwell, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 4, 2005 (Docket No. 249224), which affirmed a trial court's decision that "[a] tree limb lying in the roadway and blocking a lane of traffic" fell within the highway exception to governmental immunity because it was "akin to any other type of debris that causes a dangerous condition in the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel," and therefore "clearly [constituted] a defect in the actual roadbed." We are not bound by unpublished decisions of this Court, MCR 7.215(C)(1).
commissions have no duty, under the highway exception, to install, maintain, repair, or improve traffic control devices, including traffic signs," id., at 184, its holding is clearly limited to signage not located in the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. Id. at 183 ("A plaintiff making a claim of inadequate signage, like a plaintiff making a claim of inadequate street lighting or vegetation obstruction, fails to plead in avoidance of governmental immunity because signs are not within the paved or unpaved portion of the roadbed designed for vehicular travel. Traffic device claims, such as inadequacy of traffic signs, simply do not involve a dangerous or defective condition in the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel."). In contrast, the signage involved here was located within the actual roadbed designed for vehicular traffic.

Defendant alternatively argues that the circuit court erred in failing to address its claims that plaintiff failed to provide it proper notice under MCL 691.1404. We disagree.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that and the record supports that the Road Commission had actual notice of the incident. A manager (civil engineer) for the Eaton County Road Commission testified on deposition that he went to the scene of the crash on the afternoon of the incident and took extensive photographs of the crash scene. He testified that two other personnel from the Road Commission were present in the vicinity of the crash scene as well. On appeal, defendant asserts that it was prejudiced by the lack of notice because it was unable to “quickly preserve evidence necessary for its defense.” The documentary evidence submitted below, including photographs of the crash scene and the Road Commission manager’s deposition testimony, belies this contention. Defendant has not shown actual prejudice, thus its claim fails under Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm’n, 452 Mich 354, 366-368; 550 NW2d 215 (1996).

Defendant’s final argument is that the circuit court erred in ignoring defendant’s argument below that the road commission did not have a duty to anticipate decedent’s negligence in failing to properly stop at the intersection as required by Michigan law. We disagree. First, we observe that defendant moved for summary disposition while discovery remained open. Further, defendant’s duty is defined by statute and plaintiff establish a genuine issue regarding whether that duty was violated.

Affirmed.

/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Helene N. White
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN M. ELLS, Personal Representative of the ESTATE of MAYNARD B. ELLS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

No. 264635
EATON COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,

Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 05-000128-NI

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and White, JJ.

BANDSTRA, P.J. (dissenting).

To successfully plead a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, the defendant breached that duty, the plaintiff suffered harm, and the plaintiff's harm was caused by the defendant's negligence. Halow v Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 291, 309-310; 627 NW2d 581 (2001). Further, where the defendant is a governmental entity, the plaintiff must allege facts that place the claim within an exception to governmental immunity. Id. at 302-304.

The highway exception, upon which plaintiff relies, requires a "governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway" to "maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel." MCL 691.1402(1). "The duty of the . . . county road commission to repair and maintain highways, and the liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, . . . ." Id. Stated another way, "if the [dangerous or defective] condition is not located in the actual roadway intended for vehicular travel, the narrowly drawn highway exception is inapplicable and liability does not attach." Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 162; 615 NW2d 702 (2000).

Here, the signs and barricades had been placed on the roadway to alert passersby that the road was closed to thru traffic and that a detour existed, but that the road was open to a local golf

1 Defendant does not dispute that it had jurisdiction over the roadway where the accident occurred.
course. Our Supreme Court has noted that, under the highway exception, the government’s duty is only implicated upon its failure to repair or maintain "the actual physical structure of the roadbed surface, paved or unpaved, designed for vehicular travel, which in turn proximately causes injury or damage," and that "[t]his does not include signage." *Id.* at 185. Thus, while the signs and barricade were placed on the actual roadbed (i.e., between the two edges of the roadbed), I conclude that the accident here was not caused by defendant’s failure to repair or maintain the actual physical structure of the roadbed surface. Stated another way, the barricade and signs did not constitute a "dangerous or defective condition[] in the actual roadbed itself." *Id.* at 177 (i.e., a part of the actual physical structure of the roadbed surface).

Additionally, this Court has held that liability for the failure to maintain a highway exists only if the defect complained of is "actually and specifically included" in the statutory definition of the term "highway." *Ridley v Detroit (On Second Remand)*, 258 Mich App 511, 516; 673 NW2d 448 (2003). Because barricades and signs are not part of the definition of "highway" as set out in MCL 691.1401(e), they do "not represent a defect in the highway itself because [they are] not part of the highway." *Ridley, supra* at 515.

Consistent with our Supreme Court’s mandate to narrowly construe the statutory exceptions to the broad grant of governmental immunity, *Nawrocki, supra* at 158, I conclude that plaintiff failed to plead in avoidance of governmental immunity, and the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Given that conclusion, I would not consider defendant’s alternative arguments that the trial court erred in failing to address its claims that plaintiff failed to provide it proper notice under MCL 691.1404, and that it could not be held liable for failing to anticipate the negligence of plaintiff’s decedent.

I would reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant.

/signed/ Richard A. Bandstra
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellant.

Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and White, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right an order denying its motion for summary disposition on the ground of governmental immunity. We affirm.

Plaintiff sustained injuries while riding his bicycle on a bridge on M-68. Plaintiff alleged that he was struck by an automobile when he had to swerve into its path to avoid a 1 3/8 to 3 inch deep drain hole on the bridge in an area between the fog line and the curb.

We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Wilson v Alpena Co Rd Comm, 263 Mich App 141, 144, 687 NW2d 380 (2004). MCR 2.116(C)(7) tests whether a claim is barred because of governmental immunity, and requires consideration of all documentary evidence filed or submitted by the parties. Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 162; 483 NW2d 26 (1992). In determining whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court must accept as true the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, affidavits, or other documentary evidence and construe them in plaintiff’s favor. Wilson, supra at 145. Additionally, we review de novo as a question of law the trial court’s decision regarding the applicability of the highway exception to governmental immunity, Stevenson v Detroit, 264 Mich App 37, 40-41; 689 NW2d 239 (2004).

Under the highway exception to governmental immunity, “[t]he duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. . . .” MCL 691.1402(1). Stated another way, the duty “is limited exclusively to dangerous or defective conditions within the actual roadway, paved or unpaved, designed for vehicular travel.” Nowrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 184; 615 NW2d 702 (2000).

Defendant first argues that the area where the drain hole was located was the shoulder of the road and that the shoulder is not “designed for vehicular travel.” MCL 691.1402(1).
However, even assuming that the area where the drain hole was located was considered the shoulder area of the road, our Supreme Court in Gregg v State Hwy Dep't, 435 Mich 307, 315-316; 458 NW2d 619 (1990), held that the shoulder was included in the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. See also Meek v Dep't of Transportation, 240 Mich App 105, 114; 610 NW2d 250 (2000) and Soule v Macomb Co Bd of Rd Comm'rs, 196 Mich App 235, 237; 492 NW2d 783 (1992). Defendant argues that Gregg was wrongly decided and is no longer valid in light of Nawrocki. However, Nawrocki did not overrule Gregg and we are bound by Gregg. See Boyd v WG Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515, 523; 505 NW2d 544 (1993) ("[I]t is the Supreme Court's obligation to overrule or modify case law if it becomes obsolete, and until [the] Court takes such action, the Court of Appeals and all lower courts are bound by that authority.").

Defendant next argues that although plaintiff's complaint used the words "repair and maintain," plaintiff was actually alleging a claim based on a design defect. We disagree. The plain language of the statute makes it clear that there is "no duty, under the highway exception to governmental immunity, to correct [] design defects." McIntosh v Dep't of Transportation (On Remand) 244 Mich App 705, 710; 625 NW2d 123 (2001). "Nowhere in the statutory language is there a duty to install, to construct or to correct what may be perceived as a dangerous or defective 'design.'" Hanson v Mecosta Co Rd Comm'rs, 465 Mich 492, 501; 638 NW2d 396 (2002).

However, we conclude that plaintiff did not allege a design defect in his complaint. Plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to repair and maintain the bridge surface when it repaved the surface. The drain grates were originally designed to be flush with the roadway but, as a result of defendant repaving the bridge, the grates were not flush with the surface and allegedly caused plaintiff to swerve into danger. It was the act of improperly resurfacing the bridge that allegedly led to plaintiff's injuries. Because plaintiff alleged that defendant's failure to properly repair and maintain the bridge caused the dangerous or defective condition in the roadway, Nawrocki, supra at 184, the highway exception to governmental immunity applies to plaintiff's claim.

We affirm.

/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Helene N. White

1 We note that this Court has previously rejected defendant's argument in Grimes v Dep't of Transportation, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 16, 2004 (Docket No. 249558) and Powell v Dep't of Transportation, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 16, 2005 (Docket No. 261541), that application for leave to appeal has been granted by our Supreme Court in Grimes (order of the Supreme Court, issued October 6, 2005 (Docket No. 127901)), and that application for leave to appeal is pending before our Supreme Court in Powell (Docket No. 129043).
STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

EDWARD MORGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

JAMES LAROY and LUANN LAROY,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 253789
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. D03-000201 NO

UNPUBLISHED
April 14, 2005

Before: Judges Neff, P.J., and White and Talbot, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals the court’s grant of summary disposition dismissing his premises liability action brought as a result of the injuries he sustained when he slipped and fell on snow-covered ice on defendants’ walkway. The court found that defendants owed plaintiff no duty because the hazard was open and obvious and not effectively unavoidable. We find that the condition was not open and obvious and, therefore, do not reach the question of avoidability. We reverse the court’s order.

Summary disposition of all or part of a claim or defense may be granted when “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” MCR 2.116(C)(10). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) challenges the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). This Court must consider all pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

Plaintiff visited defendants’ home for an appointment for the purpose of selling insurance. When he arrived, he parked in the driveway, entered the open garage, and knocked on the interior door. He did not encounter any snow or ice during the few steps from his car to the garage. Defendants welcomed him and he entered through the interior door.

Defendants’ home had two other entry points. There was a front door that guests rarely used. There was a side door in close proximity to the interior garage door and both were connected to opposite ends of a breezeway. Guests typically used the side door, which opened to an outdoor walkway paved with patio blocks.
After the meeting, plaintiff exited through the side door. He stated that Mrs. LaRoy indicated to him that he could exit through the side door and directed him that way. Her husband in his deposition stated that she was upset that plaintiff entered through the interior garage door, where there is no doorbell. At no point were her feelings communicated to plaintiff, however.

The weather was cold and during the preceding week there had been significant snow accumulation. The snow outside the side door was fresh in the sense that one could leave a footprint in it or scrape a snowball out of it. Plaintiff took eight to ten steps through the snow and past the one or two steps down onto the walkway and then slipped and fell. His right foot twisted behind him. Plaintiff described his speed as a normal walking gait. He did not see any ice, but he felt with his hands cold, hard ice that was not wet when he was getting up. Plaintiff did not see the ice. He only saw snow. He walked very cautiously without incident over more snow-covered ice to his car. He noticed swelling when he returned home and sought medical attention, which revealed two bone fractures in his foot.

Principles of invitee law determine whether defendants owed plaintiff a duty of care. Plaintiff was an invitee because he was on defendants' premises for the commercial purpose of selling insurance. See e.g., Kosmalski v. St. John's Lutheran Church, 261 Mich App 56, 60; 680 NW2d 50 (2004). Generally, a premises possessor owes invitees a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees from unreasonable risks of harm caused by dangerous conditions on the land. Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc., 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001). This duty does not extend to dangers that are open and obvious, unless there exist special aspects of an open and obvious condition that create an unreasonable risk of harm, in which case the premises possessor has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect invitees from the risk. Id. at 516-517. "[W]here the dangers are known to the invitee or are so obvious that the invitee might reasonably be expected to discover them, an invitor owes no duty to protect or warn the invitee" unless the risk of harm is unreasonable despite being obvious or known to the invitee. Bertrand v. Alan Ford, Inc., 449 Mich 606, 613; 537 NW2d 185 (1995) (quoting Riddle v. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp., 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992)). "The test to determine if a danger is open and obvious is whether "an average user with ordinary intelligence [would] have been able to discover the danger and the risk presented upon casual inspection." Joyce v. Rubin, 249 Mich App 231, 238; 642 NW2d 360 (2002) (quoting Noycey v. Burger King Corp. (On Remand), 198 Mich App 470, 475; 499 NW2d 379 (1993)).

The role of judge and jury with respect to the open and obvious analysis in cases involving ice and snow has been developed in a long line of case law. According to the Supreme Court in Quintilvan v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 395 Mich 244; 235 NW2d 732 (1975):

[W]e reject the prominently cited notion that ice and snow hazards are obvious to all and therefore may not give rise to liability. While the invitor is not an absolute insurer of the safety of the invitee, the invitor has a duty to exercise reasonable care to diminish the hazards of ice and snow accumulation. . . . As such duty pertains to ice and snow accumulations, it will require that reasonable measures be taken within a reasonable time after an accumulation of ice and snow to diminish the hazard of injury to the invitee. [Quintilvan, supra at 261.]

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The Court recently by implication affirmed that accumulation of snow and ice is not open and obvious as a matter of law. In *Mann v Shuster Enterprises, Inc.*, 470 Mich 320, 332; 683 NW2d 573 (2004), the Court stated the following:

> [I]n the context of an accumulation of snow and ice, *Lugo* means that, when such an accumulation is ‘open and obvious,’ a premises possessor must ‘take reasonable measures within a reasonable period of time after the accumulation of snow and ice to diminish the hazard of injury to [plaintiff]’ only if there is some ‘special aspect’ that makes such accumulation ‘unreasonably dangerous.’ [Emphasis added.]

The emphasized language indicates that not all accumulation of snow and ice is open and obvious. See also *Kenny v Kaatz Funeral Home, Inc.*, 264 Mich App 99, 106, 108; 689 NW2d 737 (2004) (holding that summary disposition was improper because reasonable minds could disagree as to whether black ice under a coating of snow was open and obvious). Indeed, in *Mann* the Court refrained from deeming open and obvious the “icy and snow-covered parking lot” upon which the intoxicated plaintiff fell and remanded the case to the trial court. *Mann, supra* at 327, 334. The Court explicitly acknowledged the role of the jury. “[I]n determining whether defendant breached its duty, the fact-finder must decide only whether a reasonably prudent person would have slipped and fallen on the ice and snow in defendant’s parking lot, or whether that reasonably prudent person should have been warned by defendant of the dangerous condition” *Id.* at 330. The Court also held that liability hinges on the condition of the premises, not the particular plaintiff. *Id.* at 329. It relied on the objective standard of care of the reasonably prudent person and rejected as irrelevant the intoxication of the plaintiff and the dramshop’s knowledge of the intoxication. *Id.* at 329-330.

This Court must therefore ask if a reasonably prudent person in plaintiff’s position would have, upon casual inspection, discovered the danger and the risk that defendants’ snow-covered walkway presented. We answer this question in the negative. All plaintiff saw was snow. He did not see ice and had no reason to believe that slippery ice was underneath the snow. The trial court’s pronouncements on temperature fluctuations and a general knowledge in Michigan that “where there is snow, there is ice” typify the general conclusion rejected in *Quinlivan* and *Mann*. Were it otherwise, then all accumulations of snow and ice would be open and obvious per se, which is not the law in Michigan. Furthermore, one walks more cautiously on visible or otherwise known ice than on snow alone. See *Kenny, supra*, 264 Mich App at 108-109. This phenomenon is apparent in the fact that, after falling, plaintiff gained an awareness of the ice and walked cautiously without incident over the remaining snow-covered ice.

The trial court also erred when it emphasized in its ruling that plaintiff felt the ice as he got back to his feet. The relevant point of time is before falling, not after. This distinction is crucial because it also sets apart other cases in which this Court held that accumulations of snow and ice were open and obvious. In each case, the plaintiff had or should have had advance knowledge of the slippery condition, unlike plaintiff in the present case. In *Perkovic v Delcor Homes–Lakeshore Pointe, Ltd.*, 466 Mich 11, 16; 643 NW2d 212 (2002), there “was nothing hidden about the frost or ice on the roof” off of which the plaintiff slipped and fell. In *Corey v Davenport College of Business*, 251 Mich App 1, 5; 649 NW2d 392 (2002), this Court found that the plaintiff was “a reasonable person who recognized the snowy and icy condition of the [dormitory] steps and the danger the condition presented.” Finally, in *Joyce, supra* at 239, the
plaintiff was aware of the slippery sidewalk, repeatedly told the defendant about it, and had slipped on it twice prior to falling.

Defendants cite several unpublished opinions in support of their position. These cases have no precedential effect and, therefore, do not merit comment. MCR 7.215(C)(1). To the extent that they are persuasive authority, many, like the cases distinguished above, relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiff had or should have had advance knowledge of the hazard.

Accordingly, snow-covered ice is not open and obvious as a matter of law. Reasonable minds can disagree on the nature of the hazard that a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would encounter and, concomitantly, on the extent of defendants’ duty to that person. A fact-finder and not a court of law must decide those questions. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition.

Because consideration of special aspects of the hazard, such as whether it was effectively unavoidable, is conditioned on a finding that the hazard is open and obvious, we need not reach the question. See Lugo, supra at 516-517.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do no retain jurisdiction.

/§/ Janet T. Neff
/§/ Helene N. White
/§/ Michael J. Talbot
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STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLOTTE JACKSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Alvin Cook,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

UNPUBLISHED
October 5, 2004

No. 246388
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-116994-NF

Before: Murphy, P.J., and Griffin and White, JJ.

GRiffin, J. (dissenting).

Plaintiff sues defendant for breach of contract over defendant’s refusal to pay uninsured
motorist benefits arising out of a hit-and-run accident in which plaintiff’s decedent was killed.
The issue on appeal is whether the provision in the parties’ insurance contract requiring the
person making a claim to report a hit-and-run accident to defendant within 30 days is
enforceable. I would hold that the contractual notice provision is enforceable and, therefore,
affirm the lower court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant. MCR 2.116(C)(10).

Plaintiff frames her first issue as follows: “Whether under Michigan law State Farm’s
insurance contract’s 30 day notice provision is ambiguous as to the estate, and/or unenforceable as unconscionable?”

In regard to the alleged ambiguity of the notice provision, plaintiff argues that because
plaintiff’s decedent was killed instantly at the scene, “Mr. Cook did not live 30 days so as to live
long enough to notify the defendant of his uninsured motorist claim.” Further, plaintiff asserts
“Certainly, if the defendant wanted the ‘estate’ or ‘personal representative’ to notify the
defendant within 30 days, it would have used the proper language.” In essence, plaintiff argues
that the notice provision contained in the policy does not contemplate the death of an insured in a
hit-and-run accident. I disagree and would hold that the notice provision is not ambiguous.

Morley v Auto Club of Michigan, 458 Mich 459; 581 NW2d 237 (1998); Hellebuyck v Farm
In dispute is the following section of the parties’ insurance contract:

“REPORTING A CLAIM – INSURED’S DUTIES.” “The person making claim ... under the uninsured motor vehicle coverage” [shall] “report a ‘hit-and-run’ accident ... to us within 30 days.”

The insurance contract at issue specifically defines “person” as: “person means a human being.” Plaintiff’s argument that, until a personal representative is appointed, a “person” cannot give notice of the claim, was rejected by our Court in an analogous context in Halton v Fawcett, 259 Mich App 699, 704; 675 NW 2d 880 (2003). In construing the substantially similar medical malpractice statutory notice provision, we held in Halton as follows:

In sum, the word “person” refers to a human being, whether in their individual or representative capacity. Plaintiff is the same human being who is responsible for the notice of intent and the filing of the lawsuit. Therefore, the statutory requirement that the person who files the suit must have previously given notice of intent is satisfied. To impose a requirement that the appointment to the position of personal representative be made before the serving of the notice of intent would create a statutory requirement that simply does not exist and for which the courts have no authority to impose.”

Although Halton, supra, involved the notice requirement by a “person” for medical malpractice, its reasoning is applicable to the present case involving a contractual notice provision.

Unlike the majority, I view the 30-day notice provision as plain and unambiguous. As a condition precedent, “the person making claim” under the insurance policy must report the hit-and-run accident to defendant within thirty days. Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff is “the person making claim,” and that she failed to comply with the notice provision. The majority finds ambiguity in the notice provision on the basis that the class of allowable claimants is unclear: “The policy is thus ambiguous regarding who may be the ‘person making claim’ and therefore who has the obligation to provide notice.” Contrary to the majority’s position, the questions of (1) notice, and (2) the universe of allowable claimants, are two separate issues. Irrespective of whether “the person making claim” under the policy is a proper claimant, that person must give notice of the accident to defendant for that person’s claim to proceed. The notice provision, itself, as a condition precedent, is not ambiguous.

Next, plaintiff raises the related argument that it was impossible for the estate to comply with the 30-day notice requirement because the personal representative was not appointed within the 30-day period. Again, for the reason stated in Halton, supra, plaintiff, Charlotte Jackson, is a “person” (irrespective of her appointment as personal representative), and the same human being who ultimately filed a claim under the contract. Therefore, she was required to give notice pursuant to the contractual notice provisions.

Last, plaintiff argues that the contractual notice provision is unenforceable because it is unconscionable. In this regard, plaintiff argues a disparity in relative bargaining power of the parties, and contends that the notice provision is substantially unreasonable. As to the relative bargaining strength of the parties, I note that because uninsured motorist benefits are not required by statute, Rokihman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co, 442 Mich 520, 525; 502 NW 2d 310 (1993), the
parties are free to contract for the terms, if any, of uninsured motorist benefits. Plaintiff has not alleged that the numerous auto insurance companies that do business in the state of Michigan fail to offer a choice of the terms of uninsured motorist benefits. Similarly, plaintiff has not cited authority for her argument that the 30-day notice provision for hit-and-run accidents is unreasonable.\footnote{At oral argument, defense counsel argued that the 30-day notice provision was reasonable for hit-and-run accidents in view of the inherent difficulties of investigating such accidents after the fact.} On the contrary, in \textit{Reynolds v Allstate Ins Co}, 123 Mich App 488; 332 NW2d 583 (1983), we held that a 60-day notice provision contained in a statute for claims made under the standard homeowners insurance policy was reasonable. Plaintiff has failed to bring to our attention any authority from Michigan or other jurisdictions in support of her position. In this regard, it is well settled that issues which are insufficiently briefed are deemed abandoned on appeal. \textit{People v Van Tubbergen}, 249 Mich App 354, 365; 642 NW2d 368 (2002). \textquote{“A party may not leave it to this Court to search for authority to sustain or reject its position.”} \textit{Consumers Power Co v Public Service Com’r}, 181 Mich App 261, 268; 460 NW2d 806 (1989).

II

Plaintiff’s second issue is \textquote{“Whether the notice provision of State Farm’s policy which in effect acted as limitations period was tolled until the estate was formed?”}

On this issue, plaintiff confuses the contractual notice provision (which is a condition precedent for bringing suit) with statutory tolling provisions for the bringing of a wrongful death action. In the present case, defendant did not argue, and the lower court did not rule, that the statute of limitations had run. Compare \textit{Rory v Continental Ins Co}, 419 Mich 310; 355 NW2d 31 (1985) (Docket No. 242847, released July 6, 2004), with \textit{Alldal v Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London}, 174 Mich App 395; 435 NW2d 498 (1989). Rather, summary disposition was granted on the basis that a condition precedent to bringing suit – the 30-day notice provision following a hit-and-run accident – was not satisfied by plaintiff. See \textit{Continental Studios v American Auto Ins Co}, 340 Mich 6; 64 NW2d 615 (1954). For this reason, the authorities cited by plaintiff are not applicable.

III

Finally, plaintiff argues that the 30-day notice provision contained in the policy can be enforced only if defendant can prove actual prejudice. Plaintiff cites \textit{Wendel v Swanberg}, 384 Mich 468; 185 NW2d 348 (1971), for her argument that \textquote{“prejudice to [the] liability insurer is a material element in determining whether notice of accident or suit is reasonably given, and [the] burden is on insurer to demonstrate such prejudice.”} However, \textit{Wendel, supra}, involved a statutory homeowners insurance policy which provided that, following the filing of a lawsuit, the summons and complaint shall be \textquote{“immediately forwarded”} to the insurer. The Supreme Court interpreted this specific provision to require the insured to deliver the summons and complaint within a “reasonable” time to his insurance carrier and that prejudice to the insurer is a material element in determining whether notice was given within a reasonable time.
Fendel is distinguishable on the basis that it does not involve a condition precedent to the filing of an action against an insurer, but, rather, when reasonable notice of a pending lawsuit is given to the insurance carrier. Furthermore, the present case does not involve any statutory obligations; instead, it entails a matter of contractual interpretation. In this regard, we stated the following in Mate v Wolverine Mutual Ins Co, 233 Mich App 14, 19-20; 592 NW2d 379 (1998):

Underinsuranc automobile insurance protection is not required by law and therefore is optional insurance offered by some, but not all, Michigan automobile insurance companies. Because such insurance is not mandated by statute, the scope, coverage, and limitations of underinsurance protection are governed by the insurance contract and the law pertaining to contracts. Auto-Owners Ins Co v Leefer, 203 Mich App 5, 10-11; 512 NW2d 324 (1993). As the Supreme Court stated in Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co, 442 Mich 520, 524-525; 502 NW2d 310 (1993), regarding substantially similar uninsured motorist benefits:

PIP [personal protection insurance] benefits are mandated by statute under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3105; MSA 24.13105, and, therefore, the statute is the "rule book" for deciding the issues involved in questions regarding awarding those benefits. On the other hand, the insurance policy itself, which is the contract between the insurer and the insured, controls the interpretation of its own provisions providing benefits not required by statute. Therefore, because uninsured motorist benefits are not required by statute, interpretation of the policy dictates what circumstances those benefits will be awarded.
[Emphasis added.]

Because we are dealing solely with an issue of contractual interpretation, we construe and enforce the plain and unambiguous terms of the contract. Because a condition precedent of the contract was not satisfied, the optional contractual coverage of uninsured motorist benefits is not available to the plaintiff, and her remedies are limited to statutory no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. See, generally, Bradley v Mid-Century Ins Co, 409 Mich 1, 53; 294 NW2d 141 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 56-63; 664 NW2d 776 (2003).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm.

/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

PHYLLIS L. GRIFFITH, Legal Guardian for
DOUGLAS W. GRIFFITH, a Legally
Incapacitated Adult,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: White, P.J., and Neff and Jansen, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right the trial court’s order ruling that room and board expenses for Douglas W. Griffith (hereinafter “Griffith”), a legally incapacitated adult, are an allowable expense under the no-fault act. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

On April 28, 1994, Griffith sustained a severe brain injury in a motor vehicle accident. The accident left him totally disabled. He requires constant monitoring, care and assistance with every aspect of life. For fifteen months after the accident Griffith received in-patient treatment in hospitals and rehabilitation facilities. From August 1995 through August 1997 Griffith resided in a modified apartment and received continuous care. On August 6, 1997, Griffith returned to his home. Plaintiff, his wife, and other attendants provide the care that he requires.

At the time of the accident Griffith was covered under a no-fault automobile insurance policy issued by defendant. During the period that Griffith was hospitalized and while he resided in the apartment, defendant paid his expenses, including those incurred for food. After Griffith returned home a dispute arose regarding defendant’s obligation to pay for various modifications to his home and for certain other expenses, including his food. Plaintiff filed suit seeking reimbursement of certain expenses, including those incurred for Griffith’s food. The trial court ruled that the cost of Griffith’s food was an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). That ruling is the only aspect of the trial court’s decision challenged on appeal.

Defendant argues the trial court erred by holding that the cost of Griffith’s food was an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), and asserts that a causal link must exist between
injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident and an incurred expense. Defendant reasons that a person must consume food regardless of whether he is disabled and regardless of where he resides, and maintains that once Griffith returned home, his food expenses were no longer incurred as a result of his injuries. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

Under the no-fault insurance act, an insurer must pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. Payable benefits include allowable expenses. Allowable expenses consist of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services, and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. MCL 500.3105(1); MCL 500.3107(1)(a). To be entitled to reimbursement for an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the expense was reasonable; (2) the expense was reasonably necessary; and (3) the expense was incurred. See *Spectrum Imaging, Inc v Allstate Ins Co*, 246 Mich App 568, 574; 633 NW2d 461 (2001).

The issue raised in this appeal is controlled by *Reed v Citizens Ins Co*, 198 Mich App 443, 453; 499 NW2d 22 (1993). In *Reed*, this Court held that where a person injured in a motor vehicle accident is unable to care for himself or herself and would be institutionalized if a family member were unwilling to provide home care, a no-fault carrier liable for the cost of maintenance in an institution is liable for the cost of maintenance, including room and board, in the home. The *Reed* Court expressed agreement with Justice Boyle’s statement in *Manley v DAIIE*, 425 Mich 140, 152-153; 388 NW2d 216 (1986), that if a person who would require institutionalized care can be cared for at home due to the devotion of family members, the test for allowable expenses should not differ from that set out in MCL 500.3107(1)(a). *Manley, supra*, 169 (Boyle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).1

Defendant’s assertion that the no-fault act requires that an expense, to be allowable, must have been incurred only as a result of an injured insured being cared for in an institutionalized setting was rejected in *Reed, supra* at 453. Defendant does not dispute that if Griffith’s wife were unwilling or unable to care for him at home, he would require institutionalized care. Under the rule announced in *Reed, supra*, the cost of Griffith’s food is an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).

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1 In *Manley v DAIIE*, 127 Mich App 444; 339 NW2d 205 (1983), a jury found the defendant insurer liable for payment of food expenses for the injured insured, who was cared for at home by family members. On appeal, this Court stated that food obtained at an institution is an allowable expense because an institutionalized person must obtain food from the institution, and the expense represented an extraordinary cost not analogous to an expense incurred at home. This Court reversed the award of room and board on the ground that it did not distinguish between food expenses and the other services provided by an institution. *Id.*, 454. In *Manley v DAIIE*, 425 Mich 140, 152-153; 388 NW2d 216 (1986), our Supreme Court declared that portion of this Court’s opinion to be without precedential effect on the ground that the issue whether food and other maintenance expenses are allowable expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) was not presented in the trial court or argued in this Court.
Defendant's efforts to distinguish Reed are unavailing where the Reed Court held that if an injured insured would otherwise require institutionalized care were a family member not willing to provide home care, room and board in the home constitutes an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Reed, supra.

Affirmed.

/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
Opinions listed in 15c, but not 15d
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals as of right, and we reverse and remand for new trial.

This case stems from a homicide that occurred more than fifteen years ago. On the evening of September 12, 1988, Charles Miller disappeared after visiting defendant’s Bangor home. On July 10, 2000, Charles Dean Lamp, a co-defendant, led police to a site one-half mile from his home, where the buried remains of a body matching Miller’s description were found. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged in connection with Miller’s death.

A jury trial was held in April 2001, and defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder. However, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for new trial based on the trial court’s misinforming the jury regarding the prosecution’s grant of immunity to prosecution witness Guy Carl Simpson in exchange for his testimony. A second jury trial took place in October 2002.

At this second trial, Simpson appeared in court, but resisted giving testimony. He was found to be unavailable, and the court admitted his testimony from the first trial together with an instruction clarifying the prosecutor’s grant of immunity. A written statement Simpson had given after the first trial, in which he recanted his testimony, explained why he had testified as he had, and stated that only he and Lamp were with Miller when he was killed, was not admitted.

According to Simpson’s testimony at the first trial, which was read to the jury at the second trial, on the evening of September 12, 1988 Simpson was dropped off at the home of defendant and defendant’s then girlfriend, Darlene (Rhodes) Zantello, for an unannounced visit sometime between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. When Simpson arrived, defendant and his one-year-old
daughter were at home, and Zantello may have been there at that time as well. Miller also was at defendant’s house when Simpson arrived. Between one-half hour and one hour after Simpson arrived, Lamp, who was also a friend of defendant’s, and whom Simpson did not like, arrived at defendant’s home. Lamp announced that he wanted to steal some marijuana from a field he knew about. Miller was known to have a knack for finding marijuana plants, and Simpson assumed that it had been planned in advance that Miller would go with Lamp and defendant to get the marijuana. Defendant originally stated that he could not go because he had to stay with his daughter, since Zantello had left by then, and suggested that Simpson accompany Lamp and Miller in his stead. Eventually, however, all four men, together with defendant’s daughter, left the home to go steal the marijuana.

Lamp drove into the woods, driving around for approximately forty-five minutes before turning off onto an unpaved “two-track” road and stopping. All four men got out, while the child was left sleeping in the car, and Lamp took a rifle out of the trunk of his car and handed it to defendant. Lamp walked off some distance ahead of the others, allegedly to look for the field, while defendant, Miller, and Simpson followed behind. Shortly thereafter, Lamp called out that he had found the field, and at that point defendant turned and shot Miller one time, and Miller fell to the ground, apparently dead. Lamp then rejoined Simpson and defendant, and Simpson and Lamp moved Miller’s body to a nearby, pre-dug grave and placed Miller in the grave. Defendant then jumped down into the grave and returned a moment later with something in his hand, which Simpson believed to be one of Miller’s ears. Lamp then filled in and disguised the grave, and the three men returned in Lamp’s car, along with defendant’s daughter, to defendant’s home. Approximately one half-hour later Lamp left to go home, while Simpson remained at defendant’s home for the remainder of the night.

Simpson testified that several days after the murder Lamp told him that they had killed Miller because Miller had “gotten in over his head with the wrong people.” Simpson testified that defendant told him that he needed to show Miller’s ear to Benny Williams. Several days after the murder, Simpson was with defendant when he took a bag, which Simpson believed contained Miller’s ear, and threw it in a nearby river.

Simpson admitted that in the past he had told several different versions of the events surrounding Miller’s disappearance, including that only he (Simpson) and Lamp, and not defendant, were involved in Miller’s death; that an entirely different person, Charles Pippin, committed the crime; and that Miller was not really dead, but rather was simply working in another state. Simpson admitted that he had made his statements with an eye to his own personal gain, and further admitted that if he testified to a different set of events at defendant’s trial, he would probably lose his grant of immunity and would risk perjury charges. Simpson also confirmed that Lamp had, in the past, threatened to kill him if he gave any information regarding Miller’s murder to the police or if he endangered Lamp’s own plea-agreement in any way.

Simpson’s testimony as to the events surrounding Miller’s death was largely corroborated by Lamp. Lamp, who was testifying pursuant to a plea-bargain under which he was permitted to plead guilty of manslaughter and receive a ten to fifteen year sentence in exchange for his testimony, testified that defendant was angry with Miller because he believed Miller was planning to rob Benny Williams, a local drug dealer who supplied defendant with cocaine. As a result, Lamp and defendant had discussed killing Miller three or four times, and ultimately they decided to take Miller out to a pre-selected, isolated area on the pretext of stealing marijuana,
and to shoot him and bury his body in a pre-dug grave. The two men located an appropriate area not far from where Lamp then lived, off an unpaved two-track road, and several nights before Miller’s murder they prepared a grave at this location, with both Lamp and defendant taking turns digging.

Lamp testified that on the night of Miller’s murder, he drove to defendant’s house, and when he arrived he found that not only was defendant there, but Simpson was present as well. Lamp was not happy that Simpson was there, because they did not like each other, but defendant took him aside and informed him that Simpson was going to assist in the murder. Approximately a half-hour after Lamp arrived, Miller was dropped off at defendant’s house, and then the four men, together with defendant’s daughter, got into Lamp’s car and drove to the pre-selected site. As previously planned by Lamp and defendant, when they arrived at the site, Lamp handed defendant a rifle, which he took from the trunk of the car, and then Lamp walked alone ahead of the others to find the pre-dug grave. When he found the grave, he shouted back to the others and then he heard a single gunshot. He then went back to the others, where he found Miller lying on the ground with blood seeping from the back of his head and defendant holding the rifle in his hands. Lamp, Simpson, and defendant carried Miller’s body to the awaiting grave, defendant jumped in and cut off Miller’s ear, and then the three men filled in the grave and disguised it so that it would not be discovered. Lamp stated that he subsequently sold the rifle.

Lamp confirmed that he had once threatened to kill Simpson when he found out Simpson was wearing a hidden wire in an attempt to incriminate Lamp and defendant, but insisted it was merely an idle threat and that he had no intention of ever following through on it.

Rebecca (Krause) Mock, Miller’s girlfriend at the time of his death, and her sister Roxanne (Krause) Barr, who lived with Miller and Mock at the time Miller was killed, both testified that defendant admitted being present at Miller’s murder, although their testimony differed with regard to whether defendant admitted shooting Miller.

Darlene Zantello, formerly Darlene Rhodes, who was defendant’s girlfriend at the time of Miller’s death, was called to the stand by the prosecution, but denied having any memory of the events of the night Miller died, her prior statements to police, her prior testimony, or an affidavit she signed after the first trial. The court established through questioning that Zantello had been an alcoholic for many years, and had suffered head injuries. The court found Zantello to be unavailable as a witness, pursuant to MRE 804, and permitted the prosecution to read Zantello’s testimony from defendant’s first trial into the record.

At the first trial, Zantello testified that she lived with defendant in September 1988, that she was pregnant at that time, that on the night of Miller’s death she had experienced severe stomach pains and had gone to the hospital. Zantello testified that she spent three or four hours at the hospital before returning home to find the house empty. After unsuccessfully trying to locate her daughter at a friend’s, she laid down and fell asleep. She was awakened some time later when defendant and Simpson returned to the house. Zantello testified that she heard Simpson say something to defendant like “that was like a movie with all that blood,” and that she very vaguely recalled someone saying something regarding someone’s ear being cut off. She also had a vague recollection of Simpson saying something about almost blowing someone’s whole head off and about a pre-dug hole. Zantello testified that when Miller’s girlfriend, Mock,
came to the house looking for him, defendant denied any knowledge of his whereabouts. A year or two later, however, after Zantello and defendant had broken up, defendant came over to Zantello’s house where Mock was then living. He became weepy and said he was sorry that “they did what they did,” but he did not say that he himself had done anything.

Following the reading of her testimony into the record, Zantello was recalled to the stand. On cross-examination she denied any recollection of telling police in 1988 and 1990 that defendant was at home when she returned from the hospital. When defense counsel began to question her regarding the affidavit executed after the first trial in which she stated that her first statement to the police was true and her testimony at trial was not, the trial court stopped the questioning on the basis that the affidavit was executed after the first trial, and therefore was not a prior inconsistent statement.

Three of defendant’s sisters, Shirley Gargus, Sheila Blackston, and Linda Johnson, each testified as to defendant’s whereabouts on the night of Miller’s murder and confirmed Zantello’s assertion that she went to the hospital that night. Gargus testified that on September 12, 1988 around 11:00 p.m. Sheila Blackston stopped by to leave her children for Gargus to baby-sit. Blackston had Zantello with her, and told Gargus that she was taking Zantello to the hospital for stomach pain. Around midnight, Blackston called her from the hospital and asked her to go check on defendant, since he had been left alone with his and Zantello’s one-year-old baby. When she arrived at defendant’s house a few minutes later defendant and the baby were at home.

Blackston confirmed Gargus’ testimony, stating that on September 12, 1988 she took Zantello to the hospital around 11:00 p.m. for stomach pain, and dropped her own children off with Gargus on the way to the hospital. When she returned Zantello to Zantello’s and defendant’s home after leaving the hospital, defendant was at home.

Johnson testified that on September 12, 1988 she got into a fight with her husband and went over to defendant’s house around 11:30 p.m. to calm down. She stated that when she arrived, defendant and the baby were at the house alone, asserted that the only visitor during the time she was at defendant’s house was defendant’s friend Lonnie Johnson, who visited for approximately twenty minutes around midnight, and told the court that when she left defendant’s home at around 12:45 a.m. defendant was still at home.

Defendant also called Benny Williams. Williams asserted that he had not known Miller, that he had never asked anyone to kill Miller, that he did not know anything about Miller’s death, and that no one had ever brought him a human ear. Williams did admit, however, that in 1988 he was a cocaine dealer in Bangor. A police officer had earlier testified that the police concluded that Williams was not involved in the murder.

The prosecution’s experts expressed the opinion that Miller died from a gunshot wound to the neck. Defendant’s experts expressed the opinion that Miller’s injuries were caused by blunt force trauma.

II

Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial, which was based on the claim that the court had erred in barring defendant from
impeaching the prior recorded testimony of two witnesses with inconsistent statements made after the two had testified in defendant's first trial but before defendant's second trial. The court agreed that the statements were, in fact, admissible under MRE 806, but determined that they were nonetheless properly excluded because the statements were more prejudicial than probative and, thus, were inadmissible under 403. We agree with defendant that the court erred in denying him the right to impeach the witnesses with these statements.

Whether to grant a new trial is in the trial court’s discretion, and its decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. People v. Jones, 236 Mich. App. 396, 404; 600 NW2d 652 (1999). The decision whether to admit evidence also is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. People v. Starr, 457 Mich. 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). An abuse of discretion is found only if an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made, People v. Snider, 239 Mich. App. 393, 419; 608 NW2d 502 (2000), or the result is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias, People v. Hine, 467 Mich. 242, 250; 650 NW2d 659 (2002). Furthermore, an evidentiary error does not merit reversal in a criminal case unless, after an examination of the entire cause, it affirmatively appears that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative. People v. Smith, 243 Mich. App. 657, 680; 625 NW2d 46 (2000), remanded on other grounds 465 Mich. 931 (2001).

First, as the trial court recognized, and the prosecution does not contest, MRE 806, rather than MRE 613, governs the use of Simpson’s and Zanlelo’s statements for impeachment purposes. MRE 806 provides:

ATTACKING AND SUPPORTING CREDIBILITY OF DECLARANT

When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C)(D) or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant’s hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination.

Defendant should have been permitted to impeach the witnesses with their statements under MRE 806, which permits the credibility of a declarant of an admitted hearsay statement to be attacked with any inconsistent statement made at any time, and without regard to whether the witness is afforded an opportunity to deny or explain.

MRE 403 provides that evidence that is otherwise relevant may nonetheless be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. "Unfair prejudice" means more than merely that the evidence is damaging to the challenging party. People v. Mills, 450 Mich. 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909, mod. on other grounds 450 Mich. 1212 (1995).
Rather, what is meant by the phrase “unfair prejudice” in MRE 403, is “an undue tendency to move the tribunal to decide on an improper basis, commonly, though not always, an emotional one.” People v Fisher, 449 Mich 494, 501; 537 NW2d 168 (1995).

In other words, evidence is said to be “unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 306; 642 NW2d 417 (2001), quoting People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).

Federal courts have held that Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy, the major function of which is to exclude matters “of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of their prejudicial effect,” and have stated that FRE 403 carries a strong presumption in favor of admissibility. United States v Grant, 256 F3d 1146, 1155 (CA 11, 2001), quoting United States v Utter, 97 F3d 509, 514-515 (CA 11, 1996), United States v Cross, 928 F2d 1030, 1048 (CA 11, 1991), and United States v Church, 955 F2d 688, 703 (CA 11, 1992). At the same time, however, federal courts have also noted that a reviewing court must remember that the trial court, and not the appellate court, is in the best position to assess the extent of the prejudice caused to a party by a piece of evidence, and have further stated that when a trial court has given careful attention to a balancing of prejudice and probative value, appellate courts should be particularly mindful of their duty not to reverse absent a clear abuse of discretion. Vaughn v Willis, 853 F2d 1372, 1380 (CA 7, 1988), quoting United States v Long, 574 F2d 761, 767 (CA 3 1978), and United States v Garner, 837 F2d 1404, 1416 (CA 7, 1987).

The general principle that witness credibility is for the jury to determine is not disturbed by FRE 403. Therefore, evidence should not be excluded under FRE 403 because the trial court considers a witness unworthy of belief. Instead, “balancing probative worth against unfair prejudice involves the trial court giving full credit to the [evidence] and then considering probative worth against unfair prejudice.” I Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence (2d ed), § 94. See United States v Thompson, 615 F2d 329, 332 (CA 5, 1980) (reversing trial court because FRE 403 does not authorize judge to “protect” jury from contradictory testimony, nor exclude evidence because judge “does not find it credible”); Bowden v McKenna, 600 F2d 282, 284 (CA 1, 1979) (weighting probative value against unfair prejudice under FRE 403 means probative value “if the evidence is believed, not the degree the court finds it believable”).

Defendant and the prosecution both discuss Vaughn, supra, and Grant, supra, as the relevant cases. The trial court relied on Vaughn, supra, in concluding that it would have properly barred use of the statements for impeachment under MRE 403. We find Vaughn distinguishable and Grant on point.

Vaughn involved a civil suit by a prisoner against a guard, alleging that the guard had deliberately or recklessly exposed him to sexual assaults. Another prisoner had given a pretrial

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1 Where a Michigan Rule of Evidence is modeled after its Federal Evidentiary Rule counterpart, this Court can look to federal precedent for guidance. People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 267; 547 NW2d 280 (1996).
deposition in which he corroborated that the plaintiff had been sexually assaulted, and testified that the defendant guard had told him to keep silent about the assaults and to say that he saw nothing. Before trial, the prisoner witness wrote defense counsel a letter stating that he would not testify at trial and that he would not attest to the accuracy of his deposition. At trial, the witness refused to testify, stating that he feared for his life and the lives of his family members. The court admitted the deposition transcript but did not allow the use of the letter for impeachment. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the admission of the deposition transcript and the trial court’s rulings, concluding that the use of the letter for impeachment would have been more prejudicial than probative.

The court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the letter “could mean anything,” and found the letter “very ambiguous.” The court stated that read in isolation, it could not determine the letter’s significance. The court also observed that parts of the letter apparently dealt with mistakes the witness had made in his deposition and had been permitted to correct after mailing the letter, so that the comments in the letter could be interpreted by the jury in a manner highly prejudicial to the plaintiff. Further, the court noted the trial court’s dilemma arising from the fact that the witness refused to testify because “he was scared to death of the people he is going to testify about.” The court observed that if the trial court had permitted the jury to consider the letter, it also would have had to permit disclosure that the letter and the refusal to testify were a product of the witness’ fear for his safety and that of his family, and that the defendant had made it clear that he did not want such disclosure made. None of these factors were present in the instant case. The statements here were not ambiguous, there was no danger of misinterpreting their meaning, and there was no impediment to full disclosure of the circumstances of their being made.

In contrast, the facts of Grant, supra, are analogous. In Grant, the prosecution used as evidence against Grant statements made by a co-conspirator in the course of the conspiracy. These statements were admitted under FRE 801(d)(2)(E). Grant attempted to impeach the co-conspirator’s statements with an affidavit that his attorney had obtained from the co-conspirator after the co-conspirator was deported to Jamaica. The court did not allow the impeachment, finding that the statements were not inconsistent. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the affidavit’s statements were admissible for impeachment purposes under FRE 806. The court then addressed the prosecution’s argument that the affidavit was inadmissible under FRE 403 because if believed, it would provide a complete defense rather than merely impeaching the co-conspirator’s hearsay statements. The court rejected that argument, observing that rule 403 is an “extraordinary remedy” that carries “a strong presumption in favor of admissibility,” and that the affidavit could do no more than impeach and could not provide a complete defense if the

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\(^2\) The letter read:

I am not going assign this transcript against V. Willis and V. Terry. Two wrong don’t make a right.

I am not going to testify in this case I made a lots of mistakes

I would like to see you person. Let me say this V. Terry don’t have anything coming by law.
prosecution requested the limiting instruction to which it would have been entitled. Grant, supra at 1155. The court also rejected the prosecution’s argument that the affidavit statements were properly excluded because they were unreliable:

Rule 806 made the statements admissible for impeachment purposes, and the point of admitting inconsistent statements to impeach is not to show that they are true, but to aid the jury in deciding whether the witness is credible; the usual argument of the party doing the impeaching is that the inconsistent statements make the witness too unreliable to be believed on important matters. See United States v Graham, 858 F2d 986, 990 n 5 ([CA5,] 1988) [stating the same proposition]. [Grant, supra at 1156.]

In the instant case, recognizing the appropriate standard of review, we nevertheless are persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial on the basis that barring the use of the statements to impeach the witnesses was supported by MRE 403. The court concluded that use of the statements would have been unfairly prejudicial because the statements went beyond mere statements and were arguments for acquittal, and the court believed that the witnesses had deliberately made themselves unavailable and given the statements “to have [their] cake and it too.” However, the statements were not offered to prove the truth of what was in them, but to attack the witnesses’ credibility. As in Grant, the very reason the court excluded the statements, because it questioned the veracity and credibility of the witnesses, made the statements all the more probative on the credibility issue. Defendant should have been free to show the jury that the witnesses were unworthy of belief. Credibility is always a question for the jury, and the court erred in concluding that it would have been proper to insulate the jury from the witnesses’ contradictory statements. Further, the court was free to redact any portions of the statements that did not amount to a statement inconsistent with the witness’ hearsay statement.

In a supplemental brief filed in propria persona, defendant raises a similar argument with respect to other witnesses who would have testified to prior inconsistent statements of Simpson in which he stated that only he and Lamp were involved in Miller’s murder. Anticipating defendant’s calling such witnesses, as was done in the first trial, the prosecutor asked the court to exclude the testimony of any witness who would testify to a prior statement that was not brought to the witness’ attention under MRE 613(b). Defense counsel agreed that she intended to call a number of such witnesses, and had affidavits from such witnesses, including some who were not known at the time of the first trial. The court ruled the testimony inadmissible. For the reasons discussed above, this testimony was admissible under MRE 806, and the court erred in excluding it.

We reject the argument that the court’s error was harmless because Simpson and Zantello had already been effectively impeached with inconsistent statements at the first trial. The jury heard evidence that Zantello’s first statements to police were that defendant was home when she returned from the hospital, and that she knew nothing about Miller’s disappearance except that defendant was not involved. However, these statements were given shortly after Miller’s disappearance, and when Zantello was living with defendant. The jury could have easily decided that the earlier inconsistent statements did not undermine the trial testimony, reasoning that Zantello had given a statement in March, 1990 that incriminated defendant, and that at the time of trial, Zantello was no longer involved with defendant, and was therefore no longer willing to
lie in his behalf. The fact that Zantello reaffirmed her earlier position shortly before the second trial would have undermined her trial testimony in a way that the earlier statements could not.

Regarding Simpson, although he was impeached with having given prior inconsistent versions of what happened to Miller, as set forth above, and he admitted at the first trial that he had told Jody Harrington shortly after the shooting that only he and Lamp were involved, he also admitted telling police that he never made such a statement to Harrington. Further, Detective Sergeant Averill testified that Simpson had remained consistent in the version of events he claimed to have witnessed, and stated that Simpson’s testimony at defendant’s first trial had been consistent with this version of events. Had Simpson’s inconsistent written statement and the testimony of other witnesses regarding other inconsistent statements been admitted under MRE 806, the jury would have had a very different view of Simpson’s credibility. We conclude that defendant has shown the requisite prejudice - - that upon a review of the entire record, it is more probable than not that the error in denying the admission of substantial impeachment evidence was outcome determinative.3

In light of this conclusion, we do not reach defendant’s additional claims of error, except to note that if Simpson is again declared to be unavailable, his refusal to testify should be clearly developed on the record.

Reversed and remanded for new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens

3 Defendant asserts that the error denied him his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. The prosecution concedes

In reviewing the parallel federal rule of evidence, FRE 806, the federal courts have found that the improper exclusion of impeachment evidence implicates a defendant’s right of confrontation where the trial court admitted the testimony of an unavailable hearsay declarant. See United States v Burton, 937 F2d 324, 328 (CA 7, 1991); United States v Moody, 903 F2d 321, 329 (CA 5, 1990); and Smith v Fairman, 862 F2d 630, 638 (CA 7, 1988).

Under standard of review, the prosecution states, “As a preserved claim of constitutional error, this Court must determine whether the people have established beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).” The prosecution argues that there was no error because the impeachment evidence was more prejudicial than probative, and that even if there was error, the error is harmless in light of the other impeachment evidence. We have rejected these arguments above. Although conceded by the prosecution, we do not decide whether the error is of constitutional magnitude, and instead have analyzed the case under the more stringent standard applied to non-constitutional error.
Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

ORDER

People of the State of Michigan v. Clarence C. Hansford, Jr.
Docket # 188370
L.C. # 92 012590

Helene N. White
Presiding Judge
Roman S. Gribbs
David H. Sawyer
Judges

As directed by the Supreme Court, this Court has reconsidered the matter in light of People v. Cervantes, 440 Mich. 620 (1995). The Court concludes that the 40 to 60 year sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion and ORDERS that the case be remanded for resentencing.

Remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Sawyer, J., would dissent for the reason that he does not feel that the sentence imposed by the trial court constitutes an abuse of discretion.

A true copy entered and certified by Ella Williams, Chief Clerk, on

[Signature]

Date
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

GERALD GRONCKI and CHERYL GRONCKI,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and WHITE and M.J. TALBOT, * JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order of the Oakland Circuit Court granting defendant's motion for summary disposition. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff (hereafter plaintiff will refer solely to plaintiff Charles Groncki), a maintenance worker, was working on a condominium unit near the outer perimeter of a condominium complex on April 24, 1989, in Novi. Plaintiff was moving a fully extended twenty-four-foot aluminum ladder when he lost control of the ladder and it touched one of defendant's power lines. Plaintiff was electrocuted and he suffered cardiac arrest and burns to his left foot. Fortunately, he was not killed, but his small left toe had to be amputated as a result of the accident.

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant Detroit Edison Company, alleging that defendant was negligent in locating the power lines too close to the ground and too near the building. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendant was negligent in failing to warn plaintiff and others of the locations and dangerousness of the power lines. Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). The trial court granted the motion, ruling that defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiff as a matter of law.


In Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445, 452; 506 NW2d 175 (1993), our Supreme Court held that in cases involving electrical wires, the "test to determine whether a duty was owed is whether the company should have anticipated the particular act from which the injury resulted, but whether it should have foreseen the probability that injury might result from any foreseeable activity done on the premises for business, work, or pleasure." Further, electric companies are bound to anticipate ordinary use of the area surrounding the lines and to appropriately safeguard the attendant risks. Id.

The facts, taken in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993), show that the power lines were installed in 1972. The condominium complex was completed in 1978. Plaintiff worked for the construction company that built the complex. It is

* Circuit judge sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
undisputed that plaintiff knew of the location of the power lines and the dangers of those lines. The power lines were twenty-one feet high and were located 14.5 feet away from the building. The Michigan Public Safety Commission regulations require power lines to be fifteen feet high and eight feet away from buildings of this type.

Plaintiff was the maintenance supervisor for the condominium complex. On the day of the accident, plaintiff and another worker were fixing the flashing and shingles of a roof. Plaintiff moved a twenty-four foot aluminum extension ladder which came into contact with electrical wires running parallel to the building. Plaintiff suffered the injuries as described.

We believe that the trial court erred in holding that defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiff with regard to the claim that the wires were too close to the ground and too near the building. To the extent that plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in failing to properly insulate the lines, failed to erect barriers to prevent contact with the lines, failed to continuously make proper and reasonable inspection of the lines, and was negligent in the selection of the route of the lines, we believe those allegations are part of plaintiff’s general negligence claim that the lines were too close to the ground and too near the building. Therefore, we find that plaintiff will be able to present these allegations to the jury as well.

In Schultz, supra, p 454, the Supreme Court held that utility companies must reasonably inspect and repair their electric lines. More importantly, the Supreme Court noted that a company that maintains and employs energized power lines must exercise reasonable care to reduce potential hazards as far as practicable. Id., p 451. Thus, like the utility company and decedent in Schultz, the relationship between defendant and plaintiff in the instant case is sufficient to impose a duty under the circumstances. Electrical energy possesses inherently dangerous properties, and electric utility companies possess expertise in dealing with those properties and delivering electricity. Id., pp 450-451.

Further, it is foreseeable that defendant’s conduct may create a risk of harm to the victim. Here, a reasonable person could anticipate that a maintenance worker, doing work on the roof and gutters, could be electrocuted if his aluminum ladder touched an electrical wire carrying approximately 13,200 volts. The Supreme Court has noted that an electric company should realize that homeowners generally maintain their homes, which includes washing windows, repairing the roof, cleaning gutters, cleaning trenches, painting. Id., pp 452-453. Thus, as the Court in Schultz noted that the lines were twenty-four feet high and fifteen horizontal feet away from the house, we find that considering the proximity of the wire to the condominium unit of twenty-one feet high and 14.5 feet away, it is foreseeable that someone making repairs to the roof could be injured if the aluminum ladder on which he was working came too close to or touched an electrical wire carrying such high voltage electricity. Id., p 453.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding that defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiff as a matter of law with regard to the claim that the electrical wires were too near the ground and too near the building.

However, we find that the failure to warn claim was properly dismissed by the trial court. In Koehler v Detroit Edison Co, 383 Mich 224, 231; 174 NW2d 827 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the fact that Edison knew a building was under construction near its power line and that cranes were being used in that construction would not, standing alone, create a duty upon Edison to remove the electrical charge, insulate the line, or notify the parties of the dangerous condition. There was further evidence that the workers fully understood the dangers of the electrical wires and the importance of staying away from them.

-2-
In the instant case, it is undisputed that plaintiff knew where the power lines were located and knew of the dangers of those lines. This is not a case where plaintiff did not know of the dangers of the lines. See Wilhelm v Detroit Edison Co, 56 Mich App 116, 130; 224 NW2d 289 (1974). Thus, defendant did not owe a duty to warn plaintiff of the dangerousness of the power lines where defendant was not informed of the maintenance work being done near the lines where plaintiff was admittedly aware of the locations and dangers of the power lines. Carr v Detroit Edison Co, 49 Mich App 332, 340; 212 NW2d 70 (1973).

Finally, the fact that the placement of the power lines complied with the Michigan Public Safety Commission regulations does not preclude plaintiff's claim. As the Supreme Court has held, compliance with industry-wide standards is not an absolute defense to a claim of negligence. Schultz, supra, p 456. Rather, compliance with industry standards or other regulations is evidence of due care and goes to the question of whether a defendant breached its duty of care, not whether a duty existed. Id. Ultimately, whether defendant in this case breached its duty, or acted negligently, is for the trier of fact to determine. Id., p 457; Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992).

Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary disposition regarding the general negligence claim that the power lines were placed too near the building and too near the ground and we remand for further proceedings on that claim only. The grant of summary disposition with regard to the failure to warn claim is affirmed.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is not retained.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

GERALD GRONCKI and CHERYL GRONCKI
Plaintiff-Appellants,

v

DETOUR EDISON COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Before: Janis, P.J., and White and M.J. Talbot,* JJ.

WHITE, J. (concurring)

I join in the majority opinion and observe that to the extent plaintiff's claims regarding the failure to mark the lines are determined by the trial court to be properly presented, these claims are part of the negligence claims as to which summary disposition is reversed.

/s/ Helene N. White

* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

v

THOMAS J. RYAN,

Defendant–Appellee.

February 24, 1994
No. 144652
LC No. 87–03365

Before: Jansen, P.J., and White and Hansen,* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The people appeal by right from the trial court's August 20, 1991 opinion and order setting aside defendant's conviction for possession with intent to deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine, MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401) on the grounds of governmental vindictiveness. The people challenge the trial court's decision asserting clear error. We affirm.

On March 21, 1987, defendant Thomas Ryan was arrested in Livonia by federal police agents, in the act of transferring one kilogram of cocaine to an undercover Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent. Defendant was charged in state court with possession with intent to deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine, and was convicted by a jury as charged on June 2, 1988. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.

Defendant appealed his conviction. This Court affirmed, but held that his assertions concerning the manner in which the DEA had chosen to bring charges in Michigan set forth a prima facie case of governmental vindictiveness, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on that question, without retaining jurisdiction. People v Ryan, No. 113547 (unpublished per curiam opinion, ref'd May 9, 1991).

After an evidentiary hearing on June 19 and 27, 1991, the trial court found that

surrendering the defendant to State prosecution under the circumstances was vindictive governmental action which not only denied defendant his right to counsel but violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution as well.*

The court then set aside defendant's conviction and ordered him discharged. The prosecutor appealed. This Court granted the prosecutor's motion for a stay of proceedings and for immediate consideration. We note that the prosecutor's brief on appeal misstates the issue as "Did the trial court clearly err in dismissing the instant case on the ground that the prosecution should have been brought in federal court?". The trial court did not dismiss the case on the ground that the prosecution should have been brought in federal court, but, rather, on the ground that the decision to bring it in state court was a vindictive governmental response to defendant's request to consult with counsel.

As with any finding of fact by the trial court, we review a finding of governmental vindictiveness for clear error. MCR 2.613(C); see also United States v Schookraft, 879 F2d 64, 67 (CA3 1989); United States v Meyers, 258 US App DC 263; 810 F2d 1242, 1244 (1987). In so doing, we give regard to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appear before it. MCR 2.613(C).

* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

-1-
Our review of the evidence persuades us that the facts found by the trial court are not clearly erroneous. While the evidence lends itself to different interpretations, we are not prepared to say that the trial court clearly erred in finding governmental vindictiveness. The trial court carefully considered all the evidence and set forth sound reasons for crediting defendant's account of the conversations and events. Moreover, the evidence established that this was a federal investigation and that there was no state involvement until the Livonia Police Department was called in to provide back up for the arrest. A DEA agent testified that she could recall no case involving over 650 grams, in her six years as an agent, that had been turned over for state prosecution. The court's findings that after defendant requested an opportunity to consult with counsel and his initial attempt to obtain the advice of counsel failed, the federal authorities referred the case to the state without providing defendant "any additional and reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel," and that they did so out of vindictiveness, were not clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kurt N. Hansen

1 The court stated "The court does not wish to be understood as saying that the mere fact that (sic) state prosecution under a harsher statute simply because the defendant would not cooperate would necessarily amount to vindictiveness. The agents did not merely choose to go to the State court. Had they done that merely to see that defendant, if convicted, would have received a harsher sentence even to punish the defendant, that would not have been a denial of due process."
People v. Waino

M.C.L. § 333.7401(2)(a)(ii); MSA
14.15(7401)(2)(a)(ii). He was sentenced to two to
twenty years on the count involving less than fifty
grams, and to ten to twenty years on each count of
over fifty grams, consecutively.

Defendant was charged and bound over with a
fourth count, conspiracy to deliver over 225, but
less than 650, grams of cocaine, M.C.L. §
333.7401(2)(a)(ii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(ii),
M.C.L. § 750.157a; MSA 28.354. This count was
voluntarily dismissed by the prosecutor.

II
Defendant first argued that he was denied the ef-
fective assistance of counsel by counsel’s (1) failure
to file a motion to quash, (2) failure to conduct dis-
coveuy, (3) failure to pursue an entrapment defense,
(4) ineffective cross-examination on the search
warrant affidavit, (5) failure to argue a defense the-
ory in closing, and (6) failure to request instructions
on the credibility of police witnesses and identifica-
tion.

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s per-
formance fell below an objective standard of rea-
sionsableness, and that the representation so prej-
diced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial.
People v. Pickens, 446 Mich. 298, 303-521 NW2d
797 (1994). We conclude that defendant was not
denied the effective assistance of counsel.

Defendant first asserts that defense counsel was in-
effective in failing to file a motion to quash. How-
over, defendant has not explained why the mo-
tion would have argues, to which charges it would
have pertained, and why it would have been suc-
scessful. Further, to the extent the motion would
have addressed the conspiracy charge, defendant
was not prejudiced, as that charge was dismissed.

Defendant further contends that counsel was inf-
fective in failing to conduct discovery and in failing
to raise an entrapment defense. Defendant offers no
support for either contention and simply requests a
Ginther* hearing. However, the record does not
support defendant's contention regarding
discovery. FN2 and defendant has made no offer of
proof indicating that he had a visible entrapment de-
Fence or that a Ginther hearing is appropriate.

FN1 People v. Ginther, 390 Mich. 456, 212
NW2d 922 (1973).

FN2 During the September 4 hearing, de-
fense counsel stated:

I've probably spent between 30 and 40
hours on this case, with [defendant], vis-
ing him two times, once with her [de-
Fendant's mother's] husband, who
would be the stepfather of [defendant]. I
gave her all pleadings, all the informa-
tion, the transcripts. She read it over,
didn't understand it, came back again.
[Defendant's sister] came to the office
with all the pleadings, again. We dis-
cussed this matter...

On the morning of trial, defense counsel
explained to the court that he had all the
necessary discovery in this matter:

... I've talked to [the prosecution] about
all this evidence. I've had all this evi-
dence.

Additionally, defense counsel stated:

... I spent 7 hours yesterday, I docu-
mented it, going from top to bottom,
made copies [sic] of search warrant,
tapes, affidavits of search warrants, pre-
liminary exam transcripts, and I will do
the best I can...

*2 Defendant also contends that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel when defense coun-
sel elicited damaging testimony and opened the
doors to other testimony during cross-examination of
Officer Grant. Counsel sought to impeach Of-
ficer Grant's testimony by cross-examining him re-
garding statements made in his affidavit in support
of a search warrant. On redirect, the prosecution
was permitted to read the selected paragraphs in
their entirety over the objection of defense counsel.
As evidenced by cross-examination, counsel was
trying to undermine Officer Grant's credibility by
demonstrating an inconsistency between his trial
testimony and the affidavit. To establish ineffectual assistance, a defendant must overcome the pre-
sumption that the challenged action might be con-
sidered sound trial strategy. People v. Lawrance, 448
has not done so.

Defendant next asserts, without elaboration, that tria-

tal counsel failed to argue a defense theory in clos-
ing. During closing argument, counsel sought to un-
dermine Officer Grant's credibility by reminding
the jury of the inconsistencies between his testi-
mony and the search warrant affidavit. Addition-
ally, counsel argued that if defendant actually knew
Officer Grant, an Officer Grant contended, defendant
would not have involved himself in a drug
transaction with him. Further, counsel asserted that
defendant was merely present at the apartment but
was not involved in the transaction. It is clear that
trial counsel argued the defense of mere presence
during closing.

Lastly, defendant argues that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel by counsel's failure to re-
quest instructions on identification and the credibil-
ity of police witnesses. However, defense counsel
specifically stated that identification was not an is-
sue in the case. Moreover, counsel was not arguing
that someone else was at the apartment rather than
defendant, but that defendant was merely present
when the transaction occurred. As for the instruc-
tion on credibility, the trial court explained to the
jury the factors to be used in determining whether a
witness should be believed or not. Defendant has
shown no prejudice.

We conclude defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

III

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his request for substitution of counsel. We disagree.\footnote{FNS. We observe that the trial court did not technically deny defendant's motion for substitution of counsel, and would have allowed substitute counsel, who was present, to enter an appearance and proceed with trial. The court, however, stated that the trial would go forward that day.}

After carefully reviewing the record, including defendant's letter to the Chief Judge, the transcript of the aborted plea-taking proceeding, and the colloquy before the trial court on the day of trial, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to adjourn the trial to allow defendant to proceed with substitute counsel. We observe that substitute retained counsel was present, but never indicated an intent to appear and never requested an adjournment. Further, the trial court gave defendant ample opportunity to explain his differences with counsel and his desire for substitute counsel, and fully explored defendant's expressed dissatisfaction. The trial court's implicit conclusion that defendant's disagreement with counsel lacked foundation was not unreasonable. Applying People v. Williams, 386 Mich. 565,194 NW2d 337 (1972), we conclude defendant has failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in denying a continuance so that defendant could proceed with substitute counsel.

IV

Defendant next asserts he was denied a fair trial by the admission of hearsay testimony. During direct examination of Officer Grant, the prosecution questioned him regarding his conversations with Curtis Van, the main participant in the drug sale.

Defendants counsel objected on the ground that the testimony would constitute hearsay not subject to a valid exception. The prosecution indicated it would fall under the present sense impression and/or declaration against interest exceptions. The trial court allowed the testimony under the declaration against interest exception.

A statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in hearsay: MRE 801(c). We first observe that many of the objected to statements were not hearsay because not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Van's statements regarding the weight and quality of the cocaine fall into this category. Further, we reject defendant's argument that the testimony was not relevant.

Defendant challenges an additional colloquy wherein Officer Grant testified:

Q (by the Prosecutor, continuing): Did you make arrangements on that occasion to purchase a quantity of cocaine?
A I did.

Q And what quantity of pur-what quantity of cocaine did you agree to buy?
A Curt Van indicated that he and John [defendant] had three ounces of cocaine -

Q Okay.
A In their possession, right now, that they would give me for $1,200.00 apiece.
Q Okay. He said, he being Curt Van and John, had three ounces?
A Clearly is what he stated to me, that he and John had three ounces, respectively.

Defendant did not specifically object to the introduction of this testimony, and never responded to the argument that the earlier statements were ad-
Not Reported in N.W.2d
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 1996 WL 33347652 (Mich.App.)
(Cite as: Not Reported in N.W.2d, 1996 WL 33347652)

possible under MRE 804(b)(3) as declarations against interest. Hearsay by an unavailable declarant is admissible if the statement, at the time it was made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, that a reasonable person in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. MRE 804(b)(3); People v. Petrius, 198 Mich.App. 401,499 NW2d 784 (1993); People v. Pooler, 444 Mich. 151, 159-506 NW2d 593 (1993). Where the declarant's inculpation of an accomplice is made in the context of a narrative of events, at the declarant's initiative without any prompting or inquiry, that as a whole is clearly against the declarant's penal interest and as such is reliable, the whole statement including portions that incriminate another, is admissible pursuant to MRE 804(b)(3).Pooler, supra at 161. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Van's statement to Officer Grant falls within this exception.

V

Defendant next asserts he was denied a fair trial by the trial court's allowance of the inadmissible bolstering of Officer Grant's testimony by the reading into the record of large portions of the search warrant affidavit. We disagree.

*4 On cross-examination of Officer Grant, defense counsel sought to impeach him by inquiring why he testified defendant was named in a certain portion of the search warrant when in fact he was not named. On redirect, the prosecutor sought to read the two paragraphs of the search warrant affidavit to show that the remainder of the material was consistent with Officer Grant's testimony. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing portions of the affidavit to be read. As a general rule, neither a prosecutor nor anyone else is permitted to bolster a witness' testimony by referring to prior consistent statements of the witness. People v. Rosales, 160 Mich.App. 304, 308; 408 NW2d 140 (1987). However, a prior consistent statement is admissible if the declarant testifies at trial, the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, the statement is consistent with the witness' testimony and the statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. MRE 801(d)(3)(B).

Here, defense counsel sought to impeach Officer Grant with his sworn search warrant affidavit by demonstrating inconsistencies between Officer Grant's testimony and the affidavit, specifically focusing on the omission of defendant's name in particular sentences of certain paragraphs in the affidavit. In doing so, defense counsel attempted to demonstrate fabrication by implicitly arguing that defendant was actually involved in the drug transactions, Officer Grant would have included his name in the search warrant affidavit, and his testimony at trial is therefore not true.

To rebut defense counsel's charge of recent fabrication, i.e., to show that Officer Grant's testimony was consistent with the prior statements contained in the search warrant affidavit in that defendant's name was within the affidavit, the prosecution sought to read to the jury prior consistent statements contained within the two paragraphs of the same document that defense counsel used on cross-examination. Pursuant to MRE 801(d)(3)(B), the trial court allowed the prosecution to read to the jury the prior consistent statements to show that Officer Grant was not testifying differently than his sworn affidavit. Under MRE 801(d)(3)(B), the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

VI

Defendant next asserts he was prejudiced by Officer Grant's references to past contacts with defendant and that his motion for a mistrial should have been granted. We disagree.


Defendant contends that he was prejudiced on two separate occasions when Officer Grant stated that he knew defendant from previous contacts. Officer Grant testified that when he first went to Van's apartment and defendant opened the door he recognized defendant because he had had face-to-face contact with him on numerous occasions. Officer Grant also testified that he recognized defendant's voice on the phone because of his numerous contacts with him. After the jury was excused, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the logical inference to be drawn from the statements is that Officer Grant had contact with defendant in his official capacity. The prosecution argued that those statements could also mean that since defendant had several meetings with Officer Grant, Officer Grant was referring to those meetings as previous contacts with defendant. The trial court concluded that the previous contacts could have taken place anywhere, and not necessarily in Officer Grant's official capacity, and found the statements more probative than prejudicial. Therefore, during recess examination, defense counsel reopened the issue by asking Officer Grant if he was in police uniform when he had these previous contacts with defendant, and Officer Grant replied "yes." Defense counsel then attempted to use the previous contacts to his advantage by arguing in closing argument that if defendant actually knew Officer Grant, he would not have then engaged in a drug transaction with a police officer.

"* * * We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony and in declining to grant a mistrial. People v. McIlvain, 203 Mich.App 495, 503; 513 NW2d 431 (1994).

VII

Defendant next asserts that prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair and impartial trial. Defendant asserts the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant to prove his innocence.

Appeal review of prosecutorial misconduct is foreclosed where the defendant fails to object or request a corrective instruction, unless the misconduct was so egregious that no corrective instruction could have remedied the prejudice to the defendant or if manifest injustice would result from this Court's failure to review the alleged misconduct. People v. Allen, 201 Mich.App 98, 104; 403 NW2d 869 (1993). Here, defendant failed to object or request a corrective instruction. Therefore, this Court's review is for egregious misconduct resulting in prejudice which could not have been cured by a corrective instruction or would result in manifest injustice. Id.

We have reviewed the arguments challenged on appeal in the context in which they were made, and conclude that the arguments were not improper and that defendant was not denied a fair trial.

VIII

Defendant next asserts that he was denied a fair trial by the inclusion on the jury of a juror who was equivocal about her ability to exercise independent judgment in rendering a verdict.

A party who has not exhausted all peremptory challenges, and has expressed satisfaction with the jury, waives issues regarding jury selection on appeal. People v. Taylor, 195 Mich.App 57, 59; 490 NW2d 889 (1992). Defendant exercised two out of the five peremptory challenges and twice stated his satisfaction with the jury. Thus, defendant has waived this issue on appeal.

Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to excuse the juror. The unidentified juror stated that she might have a conflict because a person sitting on the jury was considered "family." The juror said they might have "too much of the same mind set." The trial court did an extensive voir dire of the juror regarding her ability to be fair and impartial. Ultimately, the juror did state that she could be fair and render an independent judgment. A potential juror's self-analysis as to whether she
has formed an opinion need not necessarily control the determination of the potential juror's impartial-
ity; rather, that determination is reserved for the tri-
al judge after sufficient inquiry. People v. Tyburski,

IX

We next address whether defendant was denied a fair trial by the trial court's failure to instruct the jury, sua sponte, regarding the credibility of police witnesses and identification. Defendant did not specifically object to the lack of jury instructions on these issues. Therefore, this Court's review is for manifest injustice.

*S Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole rather than extracted piecemeal to establish error. Even if somewhat imperfect, there is no error if the instruc-
tions fairly presented the issues to be tried and suf-
ficiently protected the defendant's rights. We con-
clude the trial court did not deny defendant a fair trial when it failed to sua sponte instruct the jury on identification and the credibility of police wit-
esses. The general instruction on credibility was sufficient to preserve defendant's rights.

X

Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that a tape recording made by the police of conversations during the negotiations of the narcot-
ics transactions was inadmissible. The decision to admit evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal ab-
sent an abuse of discretion. People v. Davis, 199

Defendant was originally charged with four counts, the last count being conspiracy to deliver over 225 grams, but less than 650 grams, of cocaine. Prior to trial, the prosecutor dismissed the conspiracy count and indicated he was not planning to introduce the tape, as it pertained to the conspiracy count and was irrelevant to the remaining counts. Defense counsel was of the opinion that the tape was more prejudi-
cial than probative, and tried to convince defendant that it should not be introduced. Defendant, however, wanted portions of the tape introduced to impeach Officer Grant. The court undertook to re-
view the tape. The following day, after reviewing the tape, the trial court concluded that the tape had no probative value as it was useful for limited im-
peachment purposes regarding the dismissed con-
pairacy count, and ruled it inadmissible. The court expressed its willingness to reevaluate its ruling should defendant take the stand.

Defendant identified only one area of impeachment. At the preliminary examination, Officer Grant testi-

Q. Okay. Did he did Mr. Watera ever tell you he didn't want to sell 12 ounces of cocaine to you?

A. No, he did not.

A. He just said, stated they were a little worried about selling the 12 ounces and be went into the charges for deliveries of 50 and over 25[sic] and over 625.

Defendant contended that the tape would establish that he did state he did not want to participate in the transaction.

Based on the record presented, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error in ruling the tape inadmissible. Defendant never established that the tape was relevant to the charges being tried, or that the tape had more than marginal impeachment value.

XI

Defendant next argues that the trial court's erro-
neous admission of a "narcotics ledger" denied him a fair trial.

We find no reversible error in the admission of this

evidence. To the extent the ledger, which included Officer Grant’s address and pager number, tended
to show that the transactions occurred, they were
relevant. To the extent that the prosecutor failed to
connect the ledger to defendant, the failure was
evident and the admission of the evidence did not
prejudice defendant’s mere presence defense.

XII

Lastly, defendant asserts he was denied due pro-
cess by the trial court’s failure to require a unani-
mos verdict. He asserts that the trial court erred in
not requiring the jury to unaniously find him
guilty as either an aider and abettor, or a principal.
We find no error.

A jury verdict must be unanimous. MCR 6.410(B);
NW2d 119 (1992). If a case involves a single of-
fense that could be committed by alternative means,
a unanimous verdict as to the means is not required.
Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 187 Mich.App 621,
629-630, 486 NW2d 307 (1991)). However, if the
case involves two distinct offenses and each could
have been committed by an alternative method,
then a unanimous verdict is required as to the meth-
od. Tanger, supra.

Here, the distinction between an accessory and a
principal has been abolished. One who aids or abets
the commission of an offense may be prosecuted,
indicted, tried, and on conviction shall be punished,
as if he had directly committed the offense. MCL
767.39; MSA 28.979; People v. Flowers, 191
al court’s instruction was not erroneous. People v.
(1979), rev’d on other grounds 412 Mich. 318
(1982). The court required unanimity on the ul-
timate issue of guilt.

Affirmed.

People v. Waroba


Master v. City of Detroit

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.
Charles MASTER, Jr. and Alfred Pan', for themselves and on behalf of all retirees or beneficiaries of the Police and Firemen Retirement System of the City of Detroit, Plaintiff-Appellees,
v.
CITY OF DETROIT, Defendant-Appellant,
Charles MASTER, Jr. and Alfred Pan', for themselves and on behalf of all retirees or beneficiaries of the Police and Firemen Retirement System of the City of Detroit, Plaintiff-Appellees,
v.
CITY OF DETROIT, Defendant-Appellant,
No. 91-1421; 91-1422.

Oct. 11, 1996.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and WHITE and SAAD, JJ.

UNPUBLISHED
ON REMAND

PER CURIAM.

* * This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court for consideration of a single issue: whether the circuit court's decision that the Act 312 FNL arbitrator's award was a recognition by the arbitrator of a prior improper practice in computing benefits, by which pension benefits were improperly reduced to pre-1990 trimmings, was erroneous. In our first opinion we concluded that this issue was unpreserved. Master et al. v. City of Detroit, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 23, 1995 (Docket Nos. 154681, 154984), p. 3. On cross appeals for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that defendants sufficiently preserved the issue and, by order dated November 17, 1995, remanded the matter to this Court for reconsideration on the merits, denying the applications for leave to appeal and cross appeal in all other respects. Because the record on this issue is sparse and the circuit court's reasoning is not clear, we remand for development of the record on this issue prior to our consideration of the merits.

FNL. MCL 423.231 et seq.; MSA 17.453(31) et seq.

Plaintiff argues that

[the contract of November 20, 1974, does not provide for the reduction of pensions on the interest accumulated on the contributions. It only provides for a reduction of annuity on the accumulated contributions. There is no mention of the word “interest” in the 1974 provision. On July 1, 1990, the arbitrator recognized this discrepancy and clarified the issue.

Plaintiff-Appellees maintain that the ordinance of November, 1974, states that the annuity shall be based upon the accumulated contributions. Defendants-Appellants freely acknowledge that the term “accumulated contributions” means the sum of all the amounts deducted from the compensation of a member and does not include interest. See Trial Court transcript p. 22, lines 3-6 attached hereto as Exhibit 1.) The City has taken the employees’ funds and invested them and used the interest on those funds to reduce their portion of the total pension. Since the 1974 pension provision calls only for the reduction of pensions by the contributions and does...


http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&prft=HTML&mt=Westlaw&v...
S/13/2008
not mention any deduction on the interest, the City has been illegally reducing the pension benefits for retirees.

The portion of the trial transcript that plaintiff attached to his appellate brief in support of this argument states:

MR. BOVE: [counsel for defendant Trustees]: The Charter specifically says accumulated contributions shall mean the sum of all amounts deducted from the compensation of a member. Interest is not deducted.

THE COURT: I hear you.

MR. BOVE: Shall be credited to his individual account in the annuity savings fund.

THE COURT: You don’t need to make that argument again. I understand your argument the first time...

However, that transcript of defendants’ motion for summary disposition hearing also contains the following argument by defendant Trustees’ counsel: ... Now, accumulated contributions aren’t outlined in the pension provision in the collective bargaining provision and that collective bargaining agreement also incorporates by reference the Charter of the City of Detroit, specifically Title 9, Chapter 7, Article 2, Section 26. And Section 13 of that section of the Charter reads:

“Accumulated contributions shall mean the sum of all amounts deducted from the compensation of a member and credited to his individual account in the Annuity Savings Fund, together with regular interest.”

Now, it would appear that counsel’s argument is certainly misplaced, because “accumulated contributions” is in fact defined. It’s defined as the employer’s contributions in his annuity fund with regular interest. Thus, the entire package that was in the 1974 Optional Annuity Withdrawal, accumulated contributions including interest. In 1990 accumulated contributions including interest, except the arbitrator in 1990 said we will not consider the interest credit for your reduction. Now, I think the argument has got to fail.

THE COURT: Or did he say just that it has been improperly computed?

MR. BOVE: No, no he never said that. Your Honor, never said there was anything improper or that it was improperly computed.

Counsel also argued that the pension provision had been applied in the same manner for over twenty years without objection by the union or retirees. Later, plaintiff’s counsel responded: ... As to the merits (sic) it, he mentioned accumulated contribution. Accumulated contribution in the sections in question here are not the same as accumulated contributions in the pension chart provision, and he specifically pointed that out by saying that these contributions were into a pension fund, deferred pension fund. He named two types, and it was not the same thing. This deals with the contributions that had been accumulated that are contributed by the members while they are in active services. That’s all that meant to say. Now, what we are doing is confusing interest and principal here and there should be no confusion here...

The Charter of the City of Detroit is not before us, except a copy of the page on which the term accumulated contributions is defined.

The Act 312 Arbitration “Opinion and Award of Panel” is before us and states in pertinent part:

Union Issue # 10

OPTIONAL ANNUITY WITHDRAWAL

UNION PROPOSAL:

The Union has proposed that employees who retire on or after July 1, 1990 and have elected to receive their total or partial refund of accumulated contributions to the Defined Contribution Plan suffer no
actuarial reduction in their Defined Benefit Plan benefits with respect to withdrawn interest earnings, but only with respect to actual contributions which the employee withdraws.

The following is the language proposed by the Union as adding to Article 48 of the collective bargaining agreement entitled OPTIONAL ANNUITY WITHDRAWAL, a new Section H.

New Section:

H. For employees who retire on or after July 1, 1990, and who have made or make an election to receive a total or partial refund of his or her accumulated contributions to the Defined Contribution Plan, there shall be no reduction of retirement allowances due to the portion of withdrawal representing interest credits.

CITY RESPONSE:

*3 The present language of the collective bargaining agreement requires that an employee who exercises his/her option to withdraw all or part of his/her accumulated contributions to the defined contribution plan shall be subject to an actuarial reduction in the benefits provided or to be provided by the Defined Benefit Plan to the extent of the amounts withdrawn whether such amounts consist of principal or interest or both.

DISCUSSION:

1. It is the position of the City that the historically collectively bargained for provision with respect to all such amounts withdrawn, i.e. both the original amount of employee contributions together with interest earned thereon in the Defined Contribution Plan should cause an actuarial reduction in the benefits to be received by the employee from the Defined Benefit Plan notwithstanding that additional earnings in excess of the actuarially assumed interest rate are sufficient to fund the proposed benefit. The City further argues that the current funding features of the retirement system are in excess of that required by the State Constitution, any applicable law and the Retirement System provisions.

2. It is the position of the Union that only the actual contributions made to the Defined Contribution Plan and withdrawn and not the interest earned thereon should be the basis for the actuarial reduction in the benefits to be received from the Defined Benefit Plan.

The Union argues that such amounts as are contributed by or for the benefit of employees to the Defined Contribution Plan are mandatory contributions and that the interest earnings on such amounts should not be part of the basis for the reduction in the benefits paid from the Defined Benefit Plan as the result of the partial or total withdrawal of such interest earnings and that the retirement system has the ability to provide such benefit with no increase in employer percent of payroll contribution rates.

The City further argues that in the event this Panel awards the benefit to the Lieutenants and Sergeants Association, historically, because of parity, the benefit will be extended to all firefighter and police officers and there is no safeguard that such benefit extensions will not result in increased cost. The City appears to argue that if it is determined that the retirement system can provide the proposed benefit without increased cost to the employee, that the Retirement System can further provide for reduced employer contributions without violating the established constitutional and other legal funding requirements.

AWARD:

The Panel is persuaded by the Union's arguments in favor of adopting the proposal. However, the Panel also recognizes the validity of the City's concerns. Therefore, this Panel orders the adoption of the Union's proposal with the following provisions to become a part of the collective bargaining agree-


ment.

Provisions indicated in the following paragraphs which will be added to Section II and which along with Said Section II will be made part of the retirement system provisions as applicable to employees affected by this award. The above paragraph is expressly subject to the following requirements:

"4 I. That this award will not result in an increase in the Employer contribution percentage [sic] of payroll as determined in the June 30, 1989 actuarial valuation.

2. That the board of Trustees of the Policemen and Firemen Retirement System of the City of Detroit determines after assurance from the retirement system's actuary that the cost associated with the implementation of this award can be borne by the retirement system earnings without violation of the constitutional requirements of Article 9, Section 4 of the Michigan Constitution or the funding provisions of the retirement system.

3. That the board of Trustees of the Policemen and Firemen Retirement System, and its actuary review the actuarial valuation of June 30, 1989 in light of the new updated financial information and adopt the appropriate resolutions consistent with the above provisions.

4. This award with respect to Issue 10 will not be operative unless the Board of Trustees of the Policemen and Firemen Retirement System receives written concurrence from the City with the resolutions of the Board of Trustees as referred to in the preceding paragraph.

Finally, defendant Board of Trustees attached to its appellate brief a document entitled "ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTION CHANGES" which states that the 1990 Board of Trustees forwarded the provisions of the Act 312 arbitration award to the Board's actuary; received the actuary's recommendation that "certain economic assumptions be revised to 7.0% with respect to investment return and 5.0% with respect to wage inflation;" that the Board's actuary submitted to the Board of Trustees those amendments of the June 30, 1989 valuation report resulting from the alternative economic assumptions recommended by the Board's actuary; and that the actuary has assured the Board of Trustees that the adoption of the alternative economic assumptions are consistent with the requirements of Article 9, Section 24 of the Michigan Constitution and the funding requirement provisions of the Policemen and Firemen Retirement System. The following resolutions are then set forth that the Board of Trustees adopts the arbitrator's award as part of the provisions of the Retirement System, Defined Contribution Plan and Defined Benefit Plan; and that the Board of Trustees adopts and certifies to the City of Detroit that the employee contribution as recommended and determined by the Board's actuary pursuant to the June 30, 1989 actuarial valuation for the fiscal year July 1, 1990 through June 30, 1991 is 36.52% of payroll of those members of the Policemen and Firemen Retirement System of the City of Detroit.

In addressing the issue, the circuit court stated only:

Defendant seek summary disposition on three grounds:

1. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any contractual improvements in pensions received by active employees after plaintiffs retired.

Defendants cite persuasive case law for this proposition and plaintiffs do not argue with it.

*5 However, plaintiffs argue that defendant had been reducing pensions, not only by the amount of employee contributions withdrawn, but, improperly, by the amount of interest thereon since November 20, 1974.

It is plaintiffs' argument that the July, 1990 arbitration award is not merely a newly-bargained-for-benefit awarded to active employees. Rather, plaintiffs suggest that it was also a recogni-

tion by the arbitrator that defendants had improperly reduced pension benefits to pre-1990 retirees by the amount of the interest credits.

This Court will HOLD that plaintiff's interpretation of the 1990 arbitration award is the correct one. Plaintiffs cite Grand Rapids Schools v. City of Grand Rapids, 146 Mich.App. 652 for the proposition that, "interest on public funds designated for a specific purpose follows those funds... In general, interest is merely an incident of the principal making it the property of the party owning the principal." Even if one views the arbitration award as a new form of compensation bargained for and awarded to 1990 active employees... and thus not available to pre-1990 retirees by operation of law... it then CLEARLY becomes available to those retirees pursuant to the terms of the TANK/O'GENTILE consent judgment which required that retirees receive a proportionate share of any new form of compensation granted to active employees.

We conclude that the record before us contains insufficient information from which we can address this issue on the merits. The arbitration opinion and order does not state on its face that it is rectifying a prior improper practice, and the circuit court's opinion and order does not make clear its reasons for concluding that plaintiff's position to that effect is a proper interpretation of the arbitration award. We therefore remand for further development of this issue. The court shall consider the matter anew, entertaining whatever additional testimony, proofs or argument it deems appropriate, and shall clearly set forth its findings and the reasons for its decision. The amplified record and the court's decision shall be transmitted to this court within ninety-one days of the release of this opinion. We retain jurisdiction.

FN2. We do not find the circuit court's reliance on Grand Rapids Schools v. City of Grand Rapids, 146 Mich.App. 652 (1983), and the proposition quoted therefrom illuminating without further explication.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

IRIS E. WEISGERBER, personal
representative of the estate of
CAROLYN SUE WEISGERBER, deceased,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

v

ANN ARBOR CENTER FOR THE FAMILY,
a/k/a ANN ARBOR CENTER FOR THE
FAMILY, INC., a Michigan
Corporation, and KENNETH R. SILK, M.D.,
Jointly and severally.

Defendants–Appellees.

Before: Neff, P.J., and Marilyn Kelly and White, J.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order of the Washtenaw Circuit Court denying her motion for
new trial. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in refusing to investigate allegations of juror
misconduct. She asserts, also, that the court erred in failing to grant a new trial. We reverse and remand for
an evidentiary hearing.

I

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against defendants, after decedent committed suicide while
under defendant Silk's care. The jury returned a verdict in defendants' favor. It indicated on the verdict form
that defendant Silk had met the applicable standard of care. Shortly thereafter, the court received a telephone
call from juror Clara Debreceny. She alleged that two of the jurors acted improperly during jury
deliberations. The court instructed Debreceny to write a letter, documenting the alleged misconduct.

Debreceny claimed that she and juror Gordon Macomber initially voted "no" to the question
whether defendant Silk had met his standard of care. The four other jurors on the panel voted yes. Then,
juror Marie Coan stated that she could never award money for death, and Macomber agreed. During the
second vote, Macomber changed his initial vote and concluded that Silk had met his standard of care.
Debreceny eventually changed her vote. During voir dire, plaintiff's attorney had asked whether any juror
would be uncomfortable with the idea of awarding money damages for loss of life; none of the jurors
responded.

The trial judge instructed the attorneys to present him with law and arguments as to whether the
matters set forth in Debreceny's letter warranted an investigation or a new trial. He also instructed the
attorneys not to contact any of the jurors until he ruled. In finding that neither an investigation nor a new
trial was warranted, the court concluded:

This is not a situation where a juror lied during voir dire as to knowing a witness, or
having been in an accident previously, etc. The statements of the two jurors can well be
interpreted as meaning that they would not vote for a verdict for damages for death in the
case before them. It doesn't appear that they were necessarily talking about what they would
do in other cases. They were stating that they could not find the damages for death in the
case before them . . . When the jury was asked by the Jury Clerk, after they read their verdict, that they solemnly swore "that the verdict as read by the foreperson was a verdict of each of you, so help you God," they answered in the affirmative. Ms. Debreczeny at no time objected to the reading of the verdict or stated that she had a different verdict. If, as claimed by the plaintiff's attorney, the two jurors who had an opinion that no one should get money for the death of a person, they could well have answered Question No. 1 of the verdict form that Defendant Silk did not meet his standard of care and could have answered Question No. 2 that his failure to meet the standard of care was a proximate cause of the injury and to the total amount of plaintiff's damages in Question No. 3, could have answered zero. They did not do this. The jurors found that Defendant Silk met the standard of care.

II

Initially, plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an investigation into the allegations raised by juror Debreczeny. Once a jury has been polled and discharged, its members may not challenge mistakes or misconduct inherent in the verdict. *Hoffman v. Spartan Stores Inc.* 197 Mich App 280, 293; 494 NW2d 811 (1992), citing *Hoffman v. Monroe Public Schools.* 96 Mich App 255; 260-261; 292 NW2d 542 (1980). However, affidavits or testimony impeaching the verdict are proper if they concern an overt act which is accessible to the knowledge of all the jurors. It must not involve matters inherent in the verdict. *People v. Vettens.* 195 Mich App 235, 244; 499 NW2d 514 (1992), citing *People v. Graham.* 84 Mich App 663; 270 NW2d 673 (1978). Moreover, a new trial must be granted when it appears that a juror gave untruthful answers during voir dire, whereas truthful answers would have allowed a successful challenge for cause. *Collier v. Westland Arena Inc.* 183 Mich App 251, 254; 454 NW2d 138 (1990).

The allegations raised by juror Debreczeny do not involve matters inherent in the verdict. Instead, they challenge the truthfulness of certain jurors' answers on voir dire. See *People v. Kapp.* 193 Mich App 49, 53; 483 NW2d 424 (1992), vacated on other grounds 439 Mich 1022 (1992). Therefore, affidavits or testimony impeaching the verdict were appropriate to determine if the two jurors could have ever awarded damages for death. MCR 2.611(A)(2).

The trial court abused its discretion by speculating that the jurors refused to award money in the case before them but might award money damages for death in other cases. The judge’s assumption is not supported by anything in the record. He should have conducted an investigation into the allegations.

On remand, we instruct the judge to conduct a hearing to investigate the allegations contained in juror Debreczeny’s letter. MCR 2.611(A)(2); *People v. Kapp.* 439 Mich 1022; 486 NW2d 657 (1992). He must determine whether the jurors gave untruthful answers during voir dire and whether truthful answers would have revealed grounds for a successful challenge for cause. *Collier.* 254. If so, a new trial must be granted. *Guzman v. Morrison.* 57 Mich App 655, 664; 226 NW2d 681 (1975).

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/\ Janet T. Neff
/\ Marilyn Kelly
/\ Helen N. White

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

RONNY SUGGS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Hood and White, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court as on rehearing granted. Defendant was convicted by jury in 1985 of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2), and sentenced to 30 to 50 years. This Court reversed the conviction for prosecutorial error. Prior to his retrial, defendant dismissed his appointed counsel because he was dissatisfied and apparently indicated he wanted to represent himself. The trial court permitted trial counsel to withdraw on March 17, 1989. At the start of trial on June 19, 1989, in the course of being advised by the trial court of the pitfalls of self-representation, defendant said

"Your Honor, you recall when I dismissed the attorney . . . . I sent a letter to the Court besides the letter I sent to [him] explaining to the Court why I was dismissing [him]. It’s not that I don’t want an attorney to represent me, it’s just that [appointed counsel] never spoke to me. I had a trial date and never had a chance to talk to my attorney.

The trial court accepted the waiver and defendant proceeded in pro per with advisory counsel. During trial, defendant conducted his own voir dire and cross-examinations, and made his own closing argument. Defendant’s advisory counsel was permitted to object as necessary. Defendant took the stand and was examined by advisory counsel. Defendant’s request to permit advisory counsel to cross-examine the complainant was denied.

Defendant was again convicted, and again sentenced to 30 to 50 years. On his second appeal, defendant raised three issues, one of which was that the trial court acted arbitrarily and denied him a fair trial by refusing to permit his advisory counsel to cross-examine complainant. This Court identified a further issue after hearing oral argument, and directed the parties to provide supplemental briefs addressing the question whether defendant’s waiver of counsel was adequate under MCR 6.005(E) and case law. In response to this Court’s order, defendant, through counsel, stated he did not wish to pursue that issue and wished to stand on the brief as filed. Plaintiff filed a supplemental brief arguing defendant had abandoned the issue and that defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was effective.

This Court therefore addressed only the three issues raised in defendant’s appellate brief and affirmed defendant’s convictions in an unpublished per curiam opinion, People v Suggs, No. 122775, dated January 27, 1994.

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Defendant's appellate counsel then filed a motion for rehearing on February 7, 1994, realizing he had overlooked matters of self-representation which became apparent on his reviewing this Court's opinion. This Court denied defendant's motion for rehearing on March 23, 1994, the panel splitting two to one. Defendant appealed this Court's denial to the Supreme Court which, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration as on rehearing granted. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion and denied defendant's right to counsel when it granted defendant's equivocal, involuntary and unintelligent waiver of counsel without adequate warning of the hazards of self-representation. We agree.

Although a criminal defendant has a right, guaranteed by both federal and state constitution and state statute, to decline representation by a lawyer and conduct his own defense, it is a right contingent upon the accused voluntarily and intelligently electing to do so. Ferretta v California, 422 US 806, 835; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975); US Const, Am VI, Const 1965, art 1, sec 13, MCL 763.1; MSA 28.854. To be effective, a defendant's waiver of the constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel must be voluntary, and must constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of that right. Ferretta, 422 US at 835, People v Holcomb, 395 Mich 326, 335; 235 NW2d 343 (1975).

The Michigan Supreme Court in People v Anderson, 308 Mich 361; 247 NW2d 857 (1976), set forth three stringent requirements to be met before a trial court may grant a defendant's request to dismiss counsel and proceed in propria persona: first, the defendant's request must be unequivocal; second, once the defendant has unequivocally declared his desire to proceed pro se, the trial court must determine whether defendant is asserting his right knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Id. at 367, 368. As part of the second requirement, the trial court must make the pro se defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. [Anderson at 368, quoting Holcomb, supra at 335.]

Third, the trial court must determine that the defendant's acting as his own counsel will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience and burden the court and the administration of the court's business. Anderson at 368.

Here, the pertinent exchanges between the trial court and defendant are:

THE COURT [In the context of a discussion regarding defendant's request for discovery]: Let me say there are some rules to play by when you, the same as yourself or anyone acting as a lawyer.

First of all, you are not allowed anymore than what the lawyer is allowed. You don't get any kind of special privileges when you represent yourself. Part of that, you don't interrupt the Court when the Court is speaking. I will give you a chance to make your statement and what you have to say. When I respond to them, you sit and be quiet and don't interrupt me.

More than that, I hope you discuss the issues regarding the rules of evidence and matters of procedure with Mr. Moore [advisory counsel] to get some guidelines on how to present these and I think we all can save some time on this.

* * *

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THE COURT: Now, you do have the U.S. Supreme Court by way of the Sixth Amendment that says in the case of *Florida v. California* (per) here, found at 411, 806; a 1975 decision, there is an explicit guarantee for one to represent oneself. It is also found in the Michigan Constitution.

Now there is, and I think there should be some things you should understand, okay.

Do you fully understand you have a right to have a lawyer represent you throughout the proceedings and if you cannot afford to retain counsel, that the Court will appoint counsel for you?

THE DEFENDANT: You asked did I understand?

THE COURT: Yes.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Now, do you further understand that I must make a determination throughout what would disrupt and inconvenience and unduly burden the Court and the Court's business, I realize it is that of judgment call and it depends on your conducting yourself in the proper manner. I realize you are not trained in the law and won't be able to represent yourself the same as a lawyer would represent you. There are some procedure [sic] rules and you have to follow the rules.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Do you further understand there is an inherent danger in you representing yourself. Those include not asking proper questions. It may include not being able to make a proper statement or misstatement about the manner in which you represent yourself or cross-examine a witness. There may be a lot of inherent possibilities there in representing yourself. Do you understand that those things do exist and that you will not be able to raise issues, you know, later on that were matters that might have been better handled by an attorney representing you, do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand that.

THE COURT: You still wish to represent yourself?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Your Honor, you recall when I dismissed the attorney, Mr. Craig Daily, I sent a letter to the Court besides the letter I sent to Craig Daily explaining to the Court why I was dismissing Craig Daily. It is not that I don't want an attorney to represent me, it's just that Craig Daily never spoke to me. I had a trial date and never had a chance to talk to my attorney. I couldn't understand it, it's unprofessional.

THE COURT: Look, I am telling you I do not have a problem with you representing yourself and recognizing the fact that there is case law that says you can. I am also obligated to tell you the problems and pitfalls of that and have you unequivocally indicate on the record you understand those and you do wish to represent yourself.

THE DEFENDANT: I understand -- I understand what you said, yes.

THE COURT: Okay, fine.

Do you have any other preliminary issue that you want to bring up?

That defendant's waiver was not unequivocal is evidenced in his statement to the trial court that "it's not that I don't want an attorney to represent me, it's just that [appointed trial counsel] never spoke to me. I had a trial date and never had a chance to talk to an attorney." The first requirement of *Anderson* was thus not met.

Defendant also asserts that the trial court failed to adequately make defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The trial court stated defendant would not be able to represent himself the same as a lawyer would, that there were some procedural rules he would have to follow, and that there was an inherent danger in defendant representing himself which included not
asking proper questions or making misstatements, and asked defendant if he understood that he would not be able to later raise as issues matters that might have been better handled by an attorney. The trial court did not, however, inform defendant that he would be opposed by an experienced prosecutor and that he would get no help from the court. Nor did the trial court make clear that defendant must follow all the technical rules of substantive law, criminal procedure and evidence, although it did indicate in a different context that defendant would get no special privileges and that the court hoped defendant would discuss "issues regarding the rules of evidence and matters of procedure" with appointed advisory counsel. We conclude that under People v Blunt, 189 Mich App 643, 649-650; 473 NW2d 792 (1991), the trial court's compliance with the second requirement of Anderson was marginal at best.

Defendant further argues that the trial court did not meet the requirements of MCR 6.005(D) before permitting defendant to represent himself. MCR 6.005(D)° imposes requirements additional to Anderson's three-part inquiry:

(D) Appointment or Waiver of a Lawyer. If the court determines that the defendant is financially unable to retain a lawyer, it must promptly appoint a lawyer and promptly notify the lawyer of the appointment. The court may not permit the defendant to waive the right to be represented by a lawyer without first

(1) advising the defendant of the charge, the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense, any mandatory minimum sentence required by law, and the risk involved in self-representation, and

(2) offering the defendant the opportunity to consult with a retained lawyer or, if the defendant is indigent, the opportunity to consult with an appointed lawyer.

The record does not indicate that defendant was apprised of the charge or the range of permissible punishment.

As the record does not establish an affirmative showing of defendant's unequivocal or informed choice to waive his right to counsel, Holcomb, supra at 335, we must reverse and remand for a new trial. While we have observed that compliance with the second requirement of Anderson was marginal and that defendant was not apprised of the charge and penalty, the real gravamen of the case is the equivocal nature of defendant's waiver, and it is on this basis that we reverse.

In light of our disposition, we need not address defendant's overlapping second argument, that appellate counsel's failure to obtain the critical transcript of trial counsel's motion to withdraw and raise a meritorious and critical issue deprived defendant of his right to effective assistance of appellate counsel and due process.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Helene N. White

1 We were recently provided with a copy of the hearing transcript, dated March 17, 1989, where defendant's appointed trial counsel was permitted to withdraw. This transcript was not previously before us, but was before the Supreme Court when it remanded to this Court as on rehearing granted.
Appellate counsel attached to his brief letters establishing his unsuccessful earlier attempts to secure this transcript dating back to March 27, 1991.

At the hearing, trial counsel indicated defendant had written him and said he did not want counsel to represent him and that defendant wanted to represent himself. Trial counsel indicated he was not interested in representing defendant either as his attorney or second chairing a case in which defendant represented himself. The trial court excused trial counsel from further responsibility in the case. The only colloquy involving defendant was:

THE COURT:

Mr. Suggs, I'm going to—you can represent yourself if you want to. I will give you—I'm sure you are aware of the hazards of doing that—I'm going to appoint at least advisory counsel to assist you and you can, you and that counsel can discuss whatever you might want to do in representing yourself. I hope to be able to do that today.

Defendant responded: "Okay. Thank you, Your Honor." This was defendant's only statement at the hearing.

The Order stated:

It appears to the panel that it cannot adequately address the issues in this case without supplemental briefs addressing the issue whether defendant's waiver of counsel was sufficient under MCR 6.005(E) and pertinent case law.

Therefore, the Court orders that pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(3) and (9) the parties are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing this issue . . .

In retrospect, it appears that our order requesting further briefs would have been clearer had it referred to MCR 6.005(D) as well as 6.005(E). At the time the order was issued, this Court had the transcript of the court's colloquy with defendant on June 19, 1989, immediately before trial and did not have the earlier transcript. It appeared from the June 19 transcript that defendant had previously waived his right to counsel and so this Court focused on 6.005(E), referring to the need to waive counsel at any subsequent proceedings.

MCR 6.005(D) was modified effective October 1, 1989, and held to apply retroactively in People v. Blunt, supra at 648 (1991), because "the modified court rule redresses an existing right." The commentary to MCR 6.005(D) states in pertinent part that "it pertains to the defendant's initial waiver of the right to be represented by a lawyer and addresses the defendant's constitutional right to self-representation," citing Farretta, supra.
Responses of Helene N. White
Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
to the Written Questions of Senator John Cornyn

1. In the first set of written questions, Senators Hatch and Kyl separately asked if you, as a member of the NAACP, agree with its statement that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008), is “akin to voter suppression” (See Question 3 from Senator Hatch and Question 1 from Senator Kyl). You responded that you “have not read the full text of the Crawford opinion.” Please take this opportunity to read the opinion and comment on whether you agree with the NAACP’s statement concerning the Crawford decision.

Response: No, I do not agree with the NAACP’s statement concerning the Crawford decision.

2. In response to Senator Specter’s Question 8(e)(i) concerning whether it is appropriate for federal judges to cure societal ills when the other two branches have been silent, you stated that “[f]ederal judges should be most reluctant to assume the roles of problem-solver and solution-crafter.” In that response, you refrained from using definitive language that this is not the proper role for a judge, as you did when you responded to other questions (e.g., Question 8(c) from Senator Specter where you responded that “judges should not be influenced by the political dimensions of controversial cases”). When, if ever, do you think it is appropriate for a federal judge to act as a “problem-solver” or “solution-crafter”?

Response: As stated my initial response, federal judges are granted the power and authority to decide individual cases; they are not granted the power or authority to act in place of Congress or the executive branch simply because neither has taken the action the judge may deem appropriate. Federal judges should be deciding individual cases. Federal judges should not assume the roles of problem-solver and solution-crafter simply to fill a void. To do so would usurp the power of the other branches of government.

3. When Senator Brownback asked you, in Question 2, to name a Supreme Court Justice whose approach to judging is most similar to your own, you responded that you most closely identify with Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.

a. In a response to Senator Brownback’s Question 4, you stated that “[j]udges should not view individual cases as opportunities...for imposing new duties or declaring new rights.” Justice Kennedy has been heavily criticized by some for creating extra-constitutional rights. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Justice Kennedy struck down a state law by finding a new constitutional right to engage in intimate sexual activity that was previously rejected by the Supreme Court less than two

1. Do you think the Lawrence Court created a new constitutional right?

Response: The Supreme Court of the United States held that the petitioners' "right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government."

2. You also stated that one reason you admire Justice Kennedy is that his approach places a "great importance on stare decisis." Do you believe the majority opinion in Lawrence was grounded in a commitment to stare decisis?

Response: No. The dissent, rather than the majority, was grounded in a commitment to stare decisis, among other bases. The majority determined that the principle of stare decisis did not dictate that it decide the case based on Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and overruled that case.

b. In response to Senator Sessions’ Question 3, whether it is appropriate for federal courts to cite or rely on foreign law, you stated that “foreign law is appropriately considered in interpreting international law or treaties.” Is it your position that foreign law is never properly considered when interpreting American law? As you may know, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have suggested that international and foreign law are helpful resources for interpreting American law. Justice Kennedy mentioned foreign law in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), when striking down a democratically enacted state law, and in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), when striking down a state criminal sentence. Are Justices Kennedy and O’Connor correct that international and foreign law are validly considered, even if non-binding, when interpreting U.S. laws, including the Constitution?

Response: The problem with referring to international law in general is that it can never be controlling, is little more than informative, and, because it will sometimes support a justice’s opinion and sometimes be opposed to it, there seems to be no principled basis for deciding when and why it is relevant. In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy introduced his discussion of international law with the statement “To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding of Bowers have been rejected elsewhere.” This seems an innocuous statement because the relevance of international law is premised on the Bower’s Court having considered it. In Roper v Simmons, similarly, the Court relied on the fact that it had already established an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that referred to the views of other “nations that share our Anglo-American heritage,” as instructive in its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual” punishments.
4. In responding to Senator Grassley's Question 1 on statutory construction, you stated that you "first look to the plain meaning of the statute, giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning." You also stated in a response to Senator Brownback's Question 4 that "expanding the scope of statutes beyond their terms" is a form of judicial activism. Do you believe the same textual commitment should apply to interpreting the Constitution?

Response: The Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the precedents of the Supreme Court of the United States. These precedents control without regard to the approach taken by the individual justices in interpreting the text of the document.
Responses of Raymond M. Kethledge
Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
to the Written Questions of Senator Arlen Specter

1. In your response to question 17(c)(2) of the Committee questionnaire, you state that 50 percent of your practice has been in federal courts and 50 percent has been in state courts. Please describe the types of federal issues on which you have worked, including issues that you handled during your clerkship on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and your clerkship with Justice Kennedy on the U.S. Supreme Court.

The proportion and composition of federal issues in my practice has fluctuated over time. The federal issues on which I have worked as a practicing attorney include the scope of various federal jurisdictional statutes, the constitutional “case or controversy” requirement, the elements of standing, the scope of “[t]he judicial power” under Article III, federal constitutional limitations on punitive damages, various other limitations and guarantees arising from the federal Due Process Clauses, the admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the admissibility of hearsay under Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804, a wide range of issues under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the interpretation of Treasury Regulations and federal tax statutes, the scope of federal preemption of state-law claims, various aspects of patent law, and the prerequisites for class certification in federal courts, among other issues.

I worked on many of these same issues as a law clerk. I also worked extensively on issues of federal criminal law, including the constitutional guarantees afforded criminal defendants, the elements of various statutory crimes and the proof required to establish them, the application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and issues related to the writ of habeas corpus, among other issues.

2. If confirmed as a judge on the Sixth Circuit, you will frequently be called upon to construe statutes. Can you please describe your views on statutory construction and to what would look to for guidance in interpreting statutes?

I would follow Supreme Court precedent regarding the manner in which statutes should be interpreted. To that end, I would begin with the text of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is clear from its text, the inquiry would end there. I would also consider the structure of the statute as necessary to determine the meaning or scope of its text. In most cases, I believe, a court can determine the meaning of a statute by close and careful examination of its text and structure.
October 31, 2005

The Honorable Arlen Specter
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Chairman Specter and Senator Leahy:

On behalf of the American Bar Association, I write to express our disappointment that you have decided to proceed with the confirmation hearings of Gregory F. Van Tatenhove and Eric N. Vitaliano for district court judgeships in Kentucky and New York, respectively, before completion of the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary’s evaluation of these nominees. As you and your colleagues noted at the confirmation hearings of Chief Justice John Roberts, the Standing Committee’s evaluation “is important” to what you do. As Senator Sessions noted, “You talk to the judges, lawyers on both sides, against whom they litigated. You know from your own personal experience normally who will give fair and honest evaluation and place good judgment on a person’s professional skills. So I do think it provides a lot of advantages for our Committee.”

Central to every evaluation performed by the Standing Committee are the very extensive confidential interviews conducted with a wide spectrum of individuals who know the nominee and are in the best position to evaluate his or her professional qualifications. These interviews provide a window into the nominee’s professional strengths and weaknesses.

The ABA Standing Committee is the only entity that performs an extensive confidential peer review, and even in the best of circumstances, this process takes a minimum of 35 days. The Committee cannot begin the process until it receives a nominee’s personal data questionnaire (PDQ) from the Department of Justice and a waiver from the nominee that allows a review of important records. The Committee received Mr. Van Tatenhove’s PDQ on October 3 and his waiver on October 6. The Committee received Mr. Vitaliano’s PDQ on October 24 and has not yet received his waiver.
Chairman Specter and Senator Leahy
October 31, 2005
Page Two

The Committee's investigations of these two nominees are under way. It is unfortunate that for the first time in more than half a century, your committee members and the public will not have the benefit of the only non-partisan, non-ideological, comprehensive review of the professional qualifications of judicial nominees that is performed to assist your committee in its deliberations. We regret that the short additional time required for the Standing Committee to complete its reviews was not provided in light of the fact that the nominees, if confirmed, will have lifetime appointments to the federal bench. Nonetheless, I assure you that the Committee will continue its work evaluating both nominees, and will provide its evaluation of each nominee to your committee and to the Administration as soon as possible.

It is our belief that by evaluating the professional competence, judicial temperament and integrity of each nominee, the ABA helps to ensure the confirmation of the best qualified individuals to a lifetime appointment to the federal bench. The ABA Standing Committee looks forward to working with you in the future in pursuit of that goal.

Sincerely,

Michael S. Greco

cc: Stephen L. Tober, Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary
May 6, 2008

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Arlen Specter
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter:

On behalf of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, I write to express our concern that you have decided to proceed with the confirmation hearings of Helene N. White to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit and Stephen Joseph Murphy III to be U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, currently scheduled for May 7, before completion of the Standing Committee's evaluation of these nominees. Our evaluations provide a unique window into the nominee's professional strengths and weaknesses, and offer members of the Judiciary Committee and the Senate a unique perspective on the nominees that otherwise would not be available. You and your colleagues have noted at numerous confirmation hearings that the Standing Committee's evaluation is important to what you do.

As you know, barring unusual circumstances, the expectation is that the Standing Committee will complete its evaluation and submit its rating within 35 days of receiving a nominee's personal data questionnaire from the Department of Justice and a waiver from the nominee that allows a review of important records. A supplemental evaluation of a nominee whose nomination has been withdrawn or returned and then subsequently resubmitted by the President may require less time to complete.
The Standing Committee’s investigations of these two nominees are underway. Under our normal timetable, it would be reasonable for you to expect to receive our evaluations by the close of this month. It is unfortunate that, during the confirmation hearing, your committee members will not have the benefit of the Standing Committee’s comprehensive review.

Despite these developments, I assure you that the Standing Committee will continue its work evaluating both nominees and will make every effort to expedite the process without compromising the thoroughness or quality of its evaluation. This is consistent with our previous practice when, on rare occasions, we have been confronted with a similar situation. Our evaluation of each nominee will be submitted to your committee and to the Administration as soon as reasonably possible. We sincerely hope that the Judiciary Committee will defer further consideration of, and that the Senate will take no action on, these two nominees until our evaluations are submitted and can help inform your critical deliberations.

It is our belief that by evaluating the integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament of each nominee, the ABA helps to ensure confirmation of the best qualified individuals for lifetime appointments to the federal bench. The ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary looks forward to continuing to work with you in pursuit of that goal.

Sincerely,

C. Timothy Hopkins
Chair

CTH:cs
May 12, 2008

C. Timothy Hopkins, Esq.
Chair, ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary
Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes PLLC
428 Park Ave., P.O. Box 51219
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219

Dear Mr. Hopkins:

Thank you for your letter of May 6. I know that the ABA Standing Committee has worked diligently to provide reviews on the recent nomination of Justice Steven Agee to the Fourth Circuit and many other nominations. Your work has been very helpful, and I appreciate your efforts now, as I have over many years.

Given the colloquy between Senators Reid and McConnell, the importance of the Sixth Circuit nominations, and the fact that the Committee had received ABA ratings in connection with the prior nominations of Judge Helene White and Steven Murphy, I hope that you understand the exceptional circumstances that led to the scheduling of the hearing in advance of receiving your updated ratings on their current nominations. Nevertheless, I appreciate your concerns about preserving the important role that the ABA’s reviews play in our process.

I was more surprised that Republican members of the Judiciary Committee appeared to raise concerns about our holding a hearing in advance of receiving the ABA reviews since recent Republican Chairmen of the Committee had often engaged in that practice.

As I said at the hearing, it is not my intention to proceed with a Committee vote without the benefit of the ABA’s new ratings on these new nominations, despite that practice by Republican Chairmen. I look forward to our receiving your reviews at your earliest opportunity so that Senators on the Committee will have the opportunity to consider the Standing Committee’s ratings before being called upon to vote.

It is also my hope that we can return to a process in which the ABA completes its reviews before nominations are made. That was the practice instituted by President Eisenhower, and it worked well for more than 50 years. Regrettably the current President upset that well-established system and ordered that the Standing Committee be excluded from prenomination screening. A return to such a system would allow us to avoid difficult situations going forward.
Thank you, the Standing Committee, again for your hard work on these and many other nominations.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

PATRICK J. FITZPATRICK
Chairman
Statement of Chairman Patrick Leahy  
Senate Judiciary Committee  
Hearing on Judicial Nominations  
May 7, 2008

I have been speaking during the last several weeks about the progress we have made and are making in repairing the terrible damage done to the confirmation process and about our progress in reducing judicial vacancies.

The American people do not want judicial nominations rooted in partisan politics. They want federal judges who understand the importance of an independent judiciary. Our independent courts are a source of America’s strength, endurance and stability. Our judicial system has been the envy of the world. The American people expect the Federal courts to be impartial forums where justice is dispensed without favor to the right or the left or to any political party or faction. The only lifetime appointments in our government, these nominations matter a great deal. The Federal judiciary is the one arm of our government that should never be political or politicized, regardless of who sits in the White House.

Today we witness a demonstration of the progress about which I have been speaking and for which I have been working. Today’s hearing moves us closer to confirming President Bush’s nominations to the last two vacancies on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. This completes the task I began when I became Chairman in the summer of 2001, when the Sixth Circuit was in turmoil and nominations had been road blocked for years. At that point there were four vacancies on the Sixth Circuit. When I scheduled a hearing and vote for Judge Julia Smith Gibbons, and then for Judge John Marshall Rogers, we were able to break an impasse that had lasted for five years. Confirmation of Judge White and Mr. Kethledge would complete the process by filling the two remaining vacancies on the Sixth Circuit.

I continue in this Congress, and I will continue with a new President in the next Congress, to work with Senators from both sides of the aisle to ensure that the Federal judiciary remains independent, and able to provide justice to all Americans, without fear or favor.

The Michigan vacancies on the Sixth Circuit have proven a great challenge. I want to commend Senator Levin and Senator Stabenow for working to end the impasse. I have urged the President to work with the Michigan Senators and, after seven years, he finally has. Last month our extensive efforts culminated in a significant development that can lead to filling the last two vacancies on the Sixth Circuit, both vacant so long they have been classified as judicial emergencies.

This accomplishment stands in sharp contrast to the actions of Senate Republicans who refused to consider any of the highly-qualified nominations to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals during the last three years of the Clinton administration. Those nominees included Judge White; Kathleen McCree Lewis, an accomplished attorney and the
daughter of former Solicitor General of the United States and former Sixth Circuit Judge Wade McCree; and Professor Kent Markus, who was supported by his home state Senators, both Republicans.

Accordingly, I am delighted to welcome Judge Helene White to the Committee. Judge White has served on the Michigan Court of Appeals during the past 15 years, having been elected by the people of Michigan in 1992. Before that she served for a dozen years on the Wayne County Circuit Court, a court of general trial jurisdiction, the Common Pleas Court for the City of Detroit and the 36th District Court of Michigan. She is described on the Bush White House website as “an experienced and highly qualified judge, who is known for her intellect, work ethic, and demeanor.” I could not agree more. In addition, she has been active as a member of the legal community and of community organizations including COTS (Coalition on Temporary Shelter), JVS (Jewish vocational services), and the Metropolitan Detroit Young Women’s Christian Association.

She was first nominated by President Clinton to a vacancy on the Sixth Circuit in January 1997, more than 11 years ago, but the Republican-led Senate refused to act on her nomination. She waited in vain for 1,454 days for a hearing, before President Bush withdrew her nomination in March 2001. Hers was one of the scores of qualified judicial nominees pocket filibustered. Last month, President Bush reconsidered, and renominated her.

Our second Sixth Circuit nominee is Raymond M. Kethledge. Mr. Kethledge is a young man who has spent eight years in legal practice in Michigan beginning as a associate in the litigation department of Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn, later as a partner at the boutique litigation firm of Feeney Kellett Weiner and Bush and, since the summer of 2003, as a founding member of his own firm, that of Bush Seyferth Kethledge and Paige. He also spent a year as an in-house counsel at Ford Motor Company in their general counsel’s office. I am glad to see that he has performed pro bono legal services, something I have always thought lawyers should do.

Our third nomination for consideration today is the President’s recent nomination of Stephen Joseph Murphy III to be a United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan. That vacancy is also classified as a judicial emergency. When on April 15 he announced the renomination of Judge White, I commended the President. Since then I have sought to expedite consideration of these Michigan nominees in recognition of the breakthrough represented by the agreement reached between the President and the Michigan Senators. The Michigan Senators have always been interested in a bipartisan solution to judicial vacancies on the Sixth Circuit and had previously proposed a bipartisan commission as a way to reach consensus in Michigan. Today, I thank and commend the Senators from Michigan and, again, thank the President for finally working with them and us.

In light of that cooperation, we have taken extraordinary steps to expedite this hearing. I thank all members of the Committee for their cooperation. I recently received a letter from Senator McConnell and Senator Specter in which they note the importance of our
receiving updated ABA peer reviews for these new nominations. I agree that those are important. The ABA Standing Committee has been working diligently to provide reviews on the recent nomination of Justice Steven Agee to the Fourth Circuit as well as other nominations. They have been very helpful, and I appreciate their efforts. Given the ABA ratings we have received in connection with the prior nominations of Judge White and Mr. Murphy, I expect the new ratings will not present a concern about qualifications. As I have assured Senators McConnell and Specter, I will seek to ensure that we proceed in an orderly fashion, that all Senators have a fair opportunity to question the nominees and that we have all the materials we need in order fairly to consider these nominations.

I am sure there are some who prefer partisan fights designed to energize a political base during an election year, but I do not. The Republican Senate majority during the last five years of the Clinton administration more than doubled vacancies on our nation’s circuit courts, as they rose from 12 to 26. Those circuit vacancies grew to 32 during the transition to the Bush administration. We have been able to reverse that trend and reduce circuit vacancies by almost two-thirds. Today there are fewer circuit court vacancies than at any time since the 1996 session. In fact, our work has led to a reduction in vacancies in nearly every circuit. We are heading toward reducing circuit court vacancies to single digits for the first time in decades. With these nominations, we are also poised to add the Sixth Circuit to the other five circuits without a single vacancy, thanks to our efforts.

I am determined to prioritize progress, not politics, and focus the Committee on those nominations on which we can make progress and, in particular, on those in which the White House has finally begun to work with the Senate. The alternative is to risk becoming embroiled in contentious debates for months and thereby foreclose the opportunity to make progress where we can. Last year a controversial Bush judicial nomination took five and one-half months of debate after a hearing before Senate action was possible. We also saw what happened during the last several months of the last Congress. There were many hearings on many controversial nominations. That resulted in a great deal of effort and conflict, but not in as many confirmations as might have been achieved. I prefer to make progress where we can and to work together to do so.

###
May 12, 2008

C. Timothy Hopkins, Esq.
Chair, ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary
Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes PLLC
428 Park Ave., P.O. Box 51219
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219

Dear Mr. Hopkins:

Thank you for your letter of May 6. I know that the ABA Standing Committee has worked diligently to provide reviews on the recent nomination of Justice Steven Agee to the Fourth Circuit and many other nominations. Your work has been very helpful, and I appreciate your efforts now, as I have over many years.

Given the colloquy between Senators Reid and McConnell, the importance of the Sixth Circuit nominations, and the fact that the Committee had received ABA ratings in connection with the prior nominations of Judge Helene White and Steven Murphy, I hope that you understand the exceptional circumstances that led to the scheduling of the hearing in advance of receiving your updated ratings on their current nominations. Nevertheless, I appreciate your concerns about preserving the important role that the ABA’s reviews play in our process.

I was more surprised that Republican members of the Judiciary Committee appeared to raise concerns about withholding a hearing in advance of receiving the ABA reviews since recent Republican Chairmen of the Committee had often engaged in that practice.

As I said at the hearing, it is not my intention to proceed with a Committee vote without the benefit of the ABA’s new ratings on these new nominations, despite that practice by Republican Chairmen. I look forward to our receiving your reviews at your earliest opportunity so that Senators on the Committee will have the opportunity to consider the Standing Committee’s ratings before being called upon to vote.

It is also my hope that we can return to a process in which the ABA completes its reviews before nominations are made. That was the practice instituted by President Eisenhower, and it worked well for more than 50 years. Regrettably the current President upset that well-established system and ordered that the Standing Committee be excluded from pre-nomination screening. A return to such a system would allow us to avoid difficult situations going forward.
Thank you, the Standing Committee, again for your hard work on these and many other nominations.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Patrick [Signature]
Chairman
JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS: PAUL G. GARDEPHE, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK; KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK; CATHY SEIBEL, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK; GLENN T. SUDDABY, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2008

U.S. Senate,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, Pursuant to notice, at 2:17 p.m., in room SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Schumer, presiding.
Present: Senator Brownback.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Senator SCHUMER. The Committee will come to order.

I want to welcome all the nominees and their families. We have an all-New York panel this afternoon, and that warms my heart. In New York, we have worked out a really wonderful system of nominating judges to the District and Circuit courts, in which the President and I have worked extremely well together to name highly qualified consensus candidates to the Federal bench.

We all know there’s often rancor when it comes to judges from other parts of the country, but there’s been virtually none in the 7-years of George Bush’s term, in the 7-years I’ve been here in the Senate when we have served together and that’s because in New York we select mainstream consensus candidates for the bench.

It’s my honor to introduce to the Committee today four such candidates to serve as judges in the District Courts across the great State of New York. All four of our nominees have unanimously been rated “Well Qualified” by the Bar Association.

And so now I would like to ask the nominees to come forward. Okay. Now, Congressman Walsh was going to be here to give an
introduction, particularly to Mr. Suddaby, but he isn’t. So if he comes we’ll let him do his introduction after the introductions.

[Laughter.]
Now, will you please raise your right hand?
[Whereupon, the nominees were duly sworn.]
Senator SCHUMER. Please be seated.
Now, before I introduce the judges, the witnesses, Senator Brownback? I can sit down, I guess. Would you like to say something, Senator Brownback.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KANSAS

Senator BROWNBACK. Yes. Thank you. I wanted to thank Chairman Leahy for holding this hearing and moving these forward. As you know, this has been a controversial issue, the slow pace of judges getting approved, both at the District and the Circuit levels. I’m pleased to see us getting this moving forward, and hopefully these will get floor time to be able to get approved on through the process. We are historic low levels on Circuit Court judges, and my hope is that we can start to get some of those to move, as well as District Court judges.

I am pleased we are getting these four in the hearing today. I have looked through some of your backgrounds; quite impressive. We have even got one here from Manhattan, Kansas. Or was it Manhattan, New York? Okay. Well, I get those mixed up.

Senator SCHUMER. Six of one, half dozen of the other.
Senator BROWNBACK. Big Apple, Little Apple. I get those confused sometimes. But glad to have you here, and glad to be a part of the hearing.

Senator SCHUMER. Well, thank you, Sam. We in New York were proud to name our center island of New York City after Manhattan, Kansas.

Anyway, let me first—I am pleased to introduce Paul Gardephe. He’s nominated to be a District Court judge for the Southern District of New York. Mr. Gardephe has an impressive and eclectic legal resume that includes work in both the public and private sectors in work on criminal prosecution, criminal defense, civil litigation, and corporate law.

After graduating magna cum laude from the University of Pennsylvania and from Columbia Law School, Mr. Gardephe served as a clerk to Judge Albert Engel on the Sixth Circuit. He then worked as an associate with Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler before working 9-years in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York.

Mr. Gardephe then left to work for the Inspector General at the Department of Justice, where he worked to review the Department’s performance in the Robert Hanson and Aldritch Ames spying cases. After the Inspector General’s Office, Mr. Gardephe returned to the private sector, first to work as an in-house counsel, and ultimately vice president and deputy general counsel to Time, Inc. Mr. Gardephe later returned to Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler, where he is now a partner and chair of the Litigation Department.
Among other things, Mr. Gardephe has represented a death row inmate pro bono who was eventually released after years of litigation. For his work, Mr. Gardephe was honored with the Thurgood Marshall Award for Pro Bono Death Penalty Representation.

Mr. Gardephe, I understand your wife and four children are here with us today. Would you like to introduce them and make any remarks to the Committee?

STATEMENT OF PAUL G. GARDEPHE, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Mr. Gardephe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you, I’d like to thank Senator Specter, Senator Brownback, and all of the members of the Committee for the privilege of appearing before you today. I’d also like to thank the President of the United States for giving me the honor of nominating me to this position.

I am fortunate to have with me today my wife of 27 years, Colleen Davis, along with our four children.

Senator Schumer. When is your anniversary, Mr. Gardephe?

Mr. Gardephe. 12/27/81, Mr. Chairman.

[Laughter.]

Senator Schumer. Because my wife and I are married—we celebrate our 28th on September 24th.

Mr. Gardephe. I have with me today, in addition to my wife, my four children: Tess, who just graduated from high school, and I have three other children. They’re triplets, 12 years old.

Senator Schumer. Ooh.

Mr. Gardephe. Emma Kate, Paul William, and Sophie Elayna. In addition, I have two friends with me today.

Senator Schumer. Why don’t we first have your family stand up so we can just acknowledge them? Mrs. Gardephe. And hi, triplets. [Laughter.]

Thank you. Welcome. Please continue.

Mr. Gardephe. I have two friends with me, Mr. Chairman. Susan Woodside, who I worked with on the Ames and Hanson investigations at Department of Justice, and also Amanda Kramer, who is an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York.

[The biographical information follows.]
UNIVERS STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).

   Paul George Gardephe

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.

   United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.

   Office: Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
           1133 Avenue of the Americas
           New York, NY 10036

   Residence: New Rochelle, New York

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.

   1957, Fitchburg, MA

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse's occupation, employer's name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.

   I am married to Colleen Mae Davis. She is employed as a writer, Family Services of Westchester, One Gateway Plaza, Port Chester, NY 10573.

   We have four dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.

7. **Employment Record:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

**Employment:**

2003 – present
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
Partner, Chair of Litigation Dept.

1996 – 2003
Time Inc. Law Department
Vice President, Deputy General Counsel (2000 – 2003)
Associate General Counsel (1996 -1998)

United States Department of Justice
Inspector General’s Office
Consultant (Special Counsel)

1987 – 1996
United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York
Senior Litigation Counsel (3/95 to 10/96)
Chief, Appeals Unit, Criminal Division (7/92 to 2/95)
Assistant United States Attorney (8/87 to 6/92)

1983 – 1987
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
Litigation Associate

1982 – 1983
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Law Clerk to the Honorable Albert J. Engel

1982
United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York
Student Assistant

1981
Hale & Dorr
Summer Associate
1981
Townley & Updike (This firm no longer exists)
Summer Associate

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
Student Law Clerk to the Honorable Mary Johnson Lowe (deceased)

1980
District Council 37
AFSCME, Legal Department
Summer Law Clerk

1979
OAO Corp.
2101 L Street
Washington, DC 20037
Summer Research Assistant

Other: Fund for Modern Courts, Board Member (approx. 2004 to present)

8. Military Service and Draft Status: Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

I have not served in the military.

9. Honors and Awards: List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

Columbia Law School Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar
Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems - Articles Editor and Staff Member
University of Pennsylvania - Magna cum laude graduate; Phi Beta Kappa; Honors in English; Dean’s List 1976-1979

Professional Honors:
2003 U.S. Department of Justice, Inspector General’s Office, Special Achievement Award
1998 Thurgood Marshall Award (for pro bono death penalty representation)
1996 Stimson Medal Recipient (awarded annually by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York to an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York who has rendered outstanding public service)
1996 U.S. Department of Justice, Inspector General’s Office, Special Achievement Award
1992 U.S. Department of Justice, Special Achievement Award
10. **Bar Associations:** List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

   *American Bar Association, Litigation Section*

   *Federal Bar Council*

   *New York State Bar Association*

   Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Criminal Advocacy (1994-96)

   Former Member, Rules Committee, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

   Member, Disciplinary Committee, New York State Supreme Court, First Department

11. **Bar and Court Admission:**

   a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

      *New York State Bar, First Department, February 6, 1984.*
      There have been no lapses in membership.

   b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

      United States District Court for the Southern District of New York: September 25, 1984

      United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York: October 18, 1984

      United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: July 7, 1988

      United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: March 4, 1999

      United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: July 31, 2000

      Supreme Court of the United States: May 15, 2006

      There have been no lapses in membership.
12. **Memberships:**

   a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

   Penn Club (Spring 2007 to present)

   Fund for Modern Courts, Board Member (approx. 2004 to present)

   Davenport Club (approx. 1998 to 2007)

   b. The American Bar Association’s Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

   None of the organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion.

13. **Published Writings and Public Statements:**

   a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

   None.

   b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

   None.
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c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

None.

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

None.

e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

During my years as an Assistant United States Attorney, and occasionally during my years in private practice, I have been contacted by the press with questions about cases that I was responsible for litigating. For example, in connection with the case I argued in the Supreme Court in October 2007 (Board of Education of the City of New York v. Tom F.), I spoke with numerous reporters working for both print and electronic media. I don't recall many of these informal contacts, and I don't consider any of them formal interviews. I do not have transcripts reflecting these contacts with the media nor have I collected clips of articles in which I may have been quoted.

14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

None

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;
c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your
decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant
criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on
appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your
substantive or procedural rulings;

e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued
an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are
filed and/or stored; and

f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not
issue an opinion.

I have not served as a judge.

16. Recusal: If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or
matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you
recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or
in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal
system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general
description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the
following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant
or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you
recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action
taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any
other ground for recusal.

I have not served as a judge.

17. Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices,
including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or
appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed
you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidates you have had for
elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.
I was appointed as a Law Clerk, by the Honorable Albert J. Engel, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit (1982-1983).


I have never held elective office.

I have had no unsuccessful candidacies for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

None.

18. Legal Career: Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

I served as a clerk to the Honorable Albert J. Engel, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, 1982-83.

ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

I have never practiced law alone.

iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

2003 – present
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
1133 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
Partner, Chair of Litigation Dept.
1996 – 2003
Time Inc. Law Department
1271 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
Vice President, Deputy General Counsel (2000 – 2003)
Associate General Counsel (1996-1998)

United States Department of Justice
Inspector General’s Office
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
Consultant (Special Counsel)

1987 – 1996
United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York
1 St. Andrew’s Plaza
New York, NY 10007
Senior Litigation Counsel (3/95 to 10/96)
Chief, Appeals Unit, Criminal Division (7/92 to 2/95)
Assistant United States Attorney (8/87 to 6/92)

1983 – 1987
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
1133 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
Litigation Associate

1982 – 1983
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
640 Federal Building
Grand Rapids, MI 49503
Law Clerk to the Honorable Albert J. Engel

b. Describe:

the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

From 1983 to 1987, as an Associate at Patterson Belknap, my practice included First Amendment and media litigation matters, false advertising, products liability and general commercial litigation. I argued motions and appeals, took and defended depositions, and second-chaired several jury trials in Federal and state courts.
From 1987 to 1996, as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, I served in the Organized Crime, Major Crimes, Narcotics and Special Narcotics Investigations units. I tried more than twenty cases to a jury verdict in cases involving mail fraud, wire fraud, RICO, kidnapping, assault, murder, and narcotics trafficking. I developed extensive experience in prosecuting money laundering cases and pioneered the use of RICO for gang prosecutions in the Southern District. I handled all aspects of criminal practice, including complex grand jury and Title III wiretap investigations, and represented the United States in numerous detention, suppression, and sentencing hearings, trials and appeals.

During the period between July 1992 and February 1995, I served as Chief of the Appeals Unit in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. In that capacity, I supervised the preparation and submission of approximately 200 briefs per year to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. I served as the chief legal advisor to the United States Attorney and to the 120 Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the Criminal Division at that time. I argued numerous cases before the Second Circuit and acquired broad experience in every area of federal criminal law.

During the period between February 1995 and April 1997, I was detailed to the DOJ Inspector General’s Office to serve as the chief investigator for a review of the FBI’s performance in connection with the Aldrich Ames espionage case. I supervised a dozen agents, analysts, and support staff, interviewed more than 100 active and retired FBI and CIA employees and other witnesses, and wrote a 400-page report for submission to the Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees with findings and recommendations concerning Ames’ espionage and how the FBI’s counterintelligence program should be improved.

After FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen was arrested in 2001, I was asked to do a similar review of the FBI’s performance in discovering and interdicting Hanssen’s espionage. Our team of ten prosecutors, agents, analysts, and support staff interviewed more than 200 active and retired FBI and CIA employees, and gathered more than 350,000 pages of relevant documents. We prepared a 600-page highly classified report setting forth findings and recommendations concerning Hanssen’s espionage and the FBI’s internal security protocol and counterintelligence program, which was submitted to the Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees for use in improving the FBI’s counterintelligence effort.

In October of 1996, I joined the in-house legal department of Time Inc., the publishing arm of Time Warner Inc. I was hired as Associate General
Counsel, was promoted to Deputy General Counsel and Assistant Secretary in 1998, and was promoted to Vice President and Deputy General Counsel in 2000. As chief litigation counsel, I was responsible for all litigation involving Time Inc. and its subsidiaries, including counseling clients, developing strategy, briefing and arguing motions, trials and appeals. Unlike most in-house law departments, we litigated many of the Company’s cases ourselves rather than using outside counsel. I litigated cases involving libel, trademark, and invasion of privacy, employment and commercial disputes, and consumer marketing issues. I also performed internal investigations and corporate audits for the Company, supervised a staff of in-house litigators and paralegals, and handled multiple trials, appeals, motions and discovery practice, and arbitrations.

In May 2003, I rejoined Patterson Belknap as a partner in charge of the firm’s White Collar Criminal Defense and Internal Investigations Practice. In 2005, I became chair of the litigation department. My practice since my return to the firm has been split between criminal defense, regulatory and internal investigation work and civil litigation involving media or entertainment companies.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

Most of my work in private practice has involved the representation of large corporations, including many leading media companies, two of the largest record companies, and large pharmaceutical companies. Reflecting my experience in the U.S. Attorney’s Office and at Time Inc., I have specialized in criminal law/regulatory/internal investigation work and in areas of civil litigation that often involve media companies, such as libel, invasion of privacy, trademark and copyright.

While at Time Inc., I represented the parent company and its subsidiaries.

While at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, I represented the United States.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 85%
   2. state courts of record: 15%
   3. other courts.

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings: 55%
   2. criminal proceedings: 45%
d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

I have tried to verdict or judgment over 26 cases. I was sole or lead counsel in over 21 cases and associate counsel in 5 cases.

i. What percentage of these trials were:
   1. jury: 92%
   2. non-jury: 8%

e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

I briefed and argued the case of Board of Education of the City of New York v. Tom F. in the Supreme Court of the United States in 2007.

19. Litigation: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

   a. the date of representation;
   b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and
   c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.


   U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: Honorable Amalya L. Kearse and Honorable Robert D. Sack, Circuit Judges, Honorable Timothy C. Stanceu, Judge of the U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by designation
As the lead attorney for Tom F. in both the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, I briefed and argued this case brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). This case was significant because the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's determination that parents of children with disabilities are not required to enroll their children in inappropriate public school placements as a prerequisite to qualify for the opportunity to apply for private school tuition reimbursement.

Opposing Counsel (Supreme Court):
Leonard J. Koerner
Chief Assistant, New York City Law Department
100 Church Street, Room 6-140
New York, NY 10007-2601
(212) 788-0303

Opposing Counsel (Court of Appeals):
Drake Coley
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York
New York City Law Department
100 Church Street, Room 6-140
New York, NY 10007-2601
(212) 788-0303


In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a $54 million judgment against my client, Island Def Jam Music Group, a division of Universal Music Group, following a jury trial. The Court found that Island Def Jam Music Group was not liable for tortious interference, fraudulent concealment, and copyright infringement. The Court also reversed the punitive damages award on those claims and on a breach of contract claim. As the lead appellate lawyer in this case, I drafted the brief and argued the appeal. This case was significant because the jury verdict the Court reversed was one of the ten largest jury verdicts rendered in the United States that year.

Opposing Counsel:
Edward P. Lazarus
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
2029 Century Park East
Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA 90067-3012
(310) 552-6449
Co-Counsel:
Andrew L. Frey
Mayer Brown LLP
1675 Broadway
New York, NY 10019-5820
(212) 506-2635

3. Atari, Inc. v. Games, Inc., 164 F. App’x 183 (2d Cir. 2006); Atari, Inc. v. Games, Inc.,
No. 04 Civ. 3723 (JSR), 2005 WL 612711 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2005). U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit: Honorable Jose A. Cabranes and Honorable Barrington
D. Parker, Jr., Circuit Judges, and Honorable Loretta A. Preska, U.S. District Judge,
sitting by designation. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York:
Honorable Jed S. Rakoff

As the lead attorney in this licensing dispute involving online games, I obtained summary
judgment on behalf of Atari, Inc. following briefing and argument. I drafted the brief and
argued the case before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the District Court’s
judgment. This case was significant because it involved novel analysis of online rights to
MONOPOLY and other well-known board games.

Opposing Counsel:
Elliot Louis Pess
Price, Meese, Shulman & D’Arminio, P.C.
50 Tice Boulevard
Woodcliff Lake, NJ 07677
(201) 391-3737

John Henry Doyle, III
Anderson Kill & Olick, P.C.
1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
(212) 205-6029

the Third Circuit: Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Jr. (then-Circuit Judge), Honorable
Richard Lowell Nygaard, Honorable Max Rosein (deceased). U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter

In this libel case, an anti-rap advocate and her husband alleged that writers at TIME and
NEWSWEEK magazines committed libel by writing stories about one of the plaintiff’s
prior lawsuits against a deceased rapper’s estate. I represented Time Inc. The District
Court granted our motion for summary judgment, holding that the statements in question
were not capable of a defamatory meaning and that the plaintiffs—who had conceded
that they were public figures—could not prove actual malice. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Time Inc. As Time Inc.’s lead

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counsel in the trial and appellate courts, I briefed and argued all motions and appeals on
Time's behalf.

Opposing Counsel:
Richard C. Angino
Angino & Rowner, P.C.
4503 North Front Street
Harrisburg, PA 17110
(717) 238-8971

Co-Counsel:
Milton L. Williams, Jr.
Time Inc.
1271 Avenue Of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
(212) 522-1212

Kevin T. Baine
Kathleen L. Jennings
Williams & Connolly LLP
725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 434-5010

Stephen J. Kastenberg
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP
1735 Market Street, 51st Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599
(215) 864-8122

Donald N. David
Akerman Senterfitt
335 Madison Avenue, Suite 2600
New York, NY 10017-4636
(212) 880-3800

Beth W. Fischbein
Fischbein Badillo Wagner Harding, LLP
909 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 486-3000

Alan J. Davis (deceased)
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP
1735 Market Street, 51st Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599
Laura E. Knabill  
Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, LLP  
1650 Arch Street, 22nd Floor  
Philadelphia, PA 19103  
(215) 496-7023

Kenneth G. Schwarz  
Cozen O’Connor  
909 Third Avenue  
New York, NY 10022  
(212) 453-3878

Norman M. Goldberger  
Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, LLP  
1650 Arch Street, 22nd Floor  
Philadelphia, PA 19103  
(215) 977-2532

Daniel Segal  
Hargley Aronchick Segal & Pudlak, P.C.  
One Logan Square, 27th Floor  
18th & Cherry Streets  
Philadelphia, PA 19103-6933  
(215) 496-7003

Kumiki Gibson  
Commissioner  
New York State Division of Human Rights  
One Fordham Plaza, 4th Floor  
Bronx, NY 10458  
(718) 741-8400

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia: Honorable Norma H. Johnson

I was the lead lawyer for Time Inc. in this libel litigation that resulted in summary judgment in favor of Time Inc. The plaintiff, chief photographer for Reuters in Moscow, claimed that Time Inc. defamed him when it published a response to his accusations that certain photographs published in TIME magazine were staged. The plaintiff urged the Court to apply English libel law because of TIME’s publication of the allegedly defamatory statements in Britain. This case was significant because the Court held that the application of English libel law would violate the First Amendment’s protection of free speech.
Opposing Counsel:
Michael Nussbaum
Brenner Kiernan Trebach & Crociata, LLP
1233 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 712-7000

Co-Counsel:
Henry S. Hoberman
Executive Vice President and General Counsel
RHI Entertainment
1325 Avenue of the Americas
21st Floor
New York, NY 10019
(212) 261-9272


The plaintiff claimed that TIME magazine libeled her by publishing her photograph with a caption identifying her as a prostitute. She had worked as a prostitute in Brazil for six years but claimed she had reformed. As the lead attorney for Time Inc., I tried this case to a jury, resulting in a verdict in favor of Time Inc.

Opposing Counsel:
Howard Gotbetter
100 Central Park South
New York, NY 10019-1558
(212) 315-0968


As co-counsel for defendant FORTUNE Magazine, I tried this breach of contract case to a jury verdict. The jury returned a verdict against our clients, but Judge Carter then immediately granted our motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Opposing Counsel:
Lee Henig-Elena
Nashel Kates Nussman Rapone & Ellis, LLP
190 Moore Street, Suite 306
Hackensack, NJ 07601-7407
(201) 488-7211
Co-Counsel:
Milton L. Williams, Jr.
Time Inc.
1271 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
(212) 522-1212


I was the lead trial and appellate lawyer in this RICO case involving charges of murder and kidnapping arising out of a conspiracy in which the defendants committed their crimes while posing as police officers. Defendants’ convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. This case was significant because of the nature of the crimes and because it involved novel and complex sentencing issues, including application of a new Sentencing Guidelines’ enhancement for brandishing a firearm.

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18
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13th Assembly District  
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Co-Counsel (Court of Appeals and District Court):
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New York State Attorney General's Office
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard this case en banc after a remand from the Supreme Court. This case was significant because the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the “similar motive” requirement for admission of testimony from a prior hearing of a currently unavailable witness was not satisfied by grand jury testimony. Consequently, the Court excluded grand jury testimony offered by the defendants and the convictions were upheld. I briefed this en banc appeal.

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Professor of Law
Columbia Law School
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The defendants in this case were charged with murder and the theft of millions of dollars in art, jewelry and furs. As co-lead counsel, I successfully tried this RICO case for three and a half months to a jury verdict in favor of the United States. This case was significant because it was one of the early successful prosecutions of a criminal gang under RICO in the Southern District of New York.

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(212) 922-1080

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Lawrence A. Porcaro  
Lawrence Anthony Porcaro, P.C.  
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Co-Counsel:
Guy Petrillo
Chief, Criminal Division
United States Attorney’s Office
Southern District of New York
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New York, NY 10007
(212) 637-2519

Lorin Reiner
Debevoise & Plimpton
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 909-6191

20. Legal Activities: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organizations(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

The two most significant non-litigation matters I have pursued are the Inspector General investigations I conducted as a Special Counsel for the Department of Justice. During the period between February 1995 and April 1997, I was detailed to the DOJ Inspector General’s Office to serve as the chief investigator for a review of the FBI’s performance in connection with the Aldrich Ames espionage case. I supervised a dozen agents, analysts, and support staff, interviewed more than 100 active and retired FBI and CIA employees and other witnesses, and wrote a 400-page report for submission to the
Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees with findings and recommendations concerning Ames’ espionage and how the FBI’s counterintelligence program should be improved.

After FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen was arrested in 2001, I was asked to do a similar review of the FBI’s performance in discovering and interdicting Hanssen’s espionage. Our team of ten prosecutors, agents, analysts, and support staff interviewed more than 200 active and retired FBI and CIA employees, and gathered more than 350,000 pages of relevant documents. We prepared a 600-page highly classified report setting forth findings and recommendations concerning Hanssen’s espionage and the FBI’s internal security protocol and counterintelligence program, which was submitted to the Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees for use in improving the FBI’s counterintelligence effort.

In November 2006, I began representing the Associated Press and its photographer Bilal Hussein, an Iraqi who was hired by the AP to photograph events in Fallujah, Ramadi and other areas in Anbar Province in September of 2004. He was part of a group of AP photographers that won the 2005 Pulitzer Prize for their photographs of the conflict in Iraq. In April 2006, Hussein was taken into custody by U.S. forces. In March of 2007, I traveled to Iraq to conduct an investigation, the results of which are set forth in a report I submitted to the Associated Press and to the U.S. military. In November 2007, the U.S. military referred Hussein to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (“CCCI”) for investigation and possible prosecution. I traveled to Iraq in November 2007 and again in January 2008 to prepare for and appear at investigative hearings at the CCCI. Because my application for admission to the Iraqi bar pro hac vice was denied, I was not permitted to formally appear at these hearings. In March 2008, I returned to Iraq to prepare for a possible trial. On April 7 and 13, 2008, two panels of Iraqi judges serving as an amnesty committee granted Hussein amnesty for all conduct attributed to Hussein in CCCI case files. On April 16, 2008, Hussein was released from custody. During the entire period of his incarceration, Hussein was never charged with a crime.

I have also represented numerous companies in the context of regulatory investigations, including in the following matters (which are public):

1. In 2005, I was primarily responsible for a New York Attorney General’s Office investigation of Sony BMG Music Entertainment in connection with payments to radio stations and promoters that promote Sony BMG’s music to radio stations. I represented the Company’s senior executives at depositions, conducted an internal investigation, and negotiated with prosecutors and then-New York Attorney General Spitzer. In July 2005, the Company entered into an Assurance of Discontinuance that resolved the investigation. The Sony BMG Assurance of Discontinuance has become a template for the industry.

3. Since December 2003, I have been primarily responsible for representing Ortho McNeil, a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary, in connection with an ongoing investigation by the United States Attorney’s Office in Boston, MA into the alleged off-label promotion of Topamax (an anti-epilepsy drug). In connection with this representation, I have conducted internal investigations, made several written submissions and made presentations to Department of Justice prosecutors. Much of my work over the past five years has involved advising companies on compliance matters. Two assignments have involved serving as an independent compliance consultant pursuant to SEC decree:

1. In 2004, I was appointed as the independent compliance consultant for Aim Mutual Funds pursuant to an SEC consent decree. The SEC investigation arose from allegations of market timing activity in mutual funds managed by Aim. I conducted a thorough investigation of Aim’s compliance policies and procedures and issued a final report to the SEC in 2005.

2. In 2003, our firm was hired by Putnam Mutual Funds to serve as an independent compliance consultant pursuant to an SEC consent decree. The SEC investigation arose from allegations of market timing activity in mutual funds managed by Putnam. I conducted a full review of Putnam’s compliance policies and procedures and issued a final report to the SEC in 2005.

I have not engaged in any lobbying activities.

21. **Teaching**: What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

For the past 15 years, I have taught Trial Advocacy at New York Law School as an Adjunct Professor. This course has two components: a large lecture class that is taught by a staff professor, and small sections taught by adjunct professors in which the focus is on developing practical skills in conducting openings, summations, and direct and cross-examination. I have taught the practical skills portion of the class.

22. **Deferred Income/Future Benefits**: List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.
I receive annual payments from Time Inc. of deferred compensation. The total amount of deferred compensation still outstanding is approximately $27,400. It will be paid out in installments this year and the next two years (I believe).

Pursuant to my partnership agreement with Patterson Belknap, were I to leave the firm, I would receive payment for my capital account ($334,596 as of 12/31/07) and shares of undistributed firm net income attributable to the period when I served as a partner.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

No.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)

See attached Financial Disclosure Report

25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

   a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

   The parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during my initial service in the position to which I have been nominated would include cases involving my present law firm or clients I previously represented.

   b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

   Throughout, I will be guided by the appearance of impropriety doctrine and by the rules governing recusal and conflict of interest. In all cases, I will follow the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges and applicable statutes, policies, and procedures.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility calls for "every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged." Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

Throughout my career, I have engaged in significant pro bono activities. While at Patterson Belknap as an Associate, I was part of a team that represented an inmate incarcerated in Florida's maximum security prison under a death sentence. I helped conduct a hearing in state court challenging his conviction. Ultimately, after years of litigation, significant Brady violations came to light and the inmate was released.

More recently, over the past year, I devoted hundreds of hours of time pro bono to litigating the case of *Board of Education of the City of New York v. Tom P.* This case presented an important issue under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"): whether the parents of disabled children are required, under the statute, to place their child in an inappropriate public school placement in order to qualify for a chance at obtaining private school tuition reimbursement. I represented the parent in the Second Circuit and prevailed. The Board of Education successfully petitioned for certiorari, and I argued the case on October 1, 2007. Justice Kennedy recused himself, and a short time later the Court, evenly divided, affirmed.

28. **Selection Process:**

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

I was approached by Attorney General Mukasey in December 2007 and asked whether I would be interested in being considered for a judgeship in the Southern District of New York. I was interviewed by White House and Justice Department personnel on February 5, 2008. Thereafter, I completed all the pre-nomination paperwork, and had conversations with staff from the Department of Justice regarding that paperwork. My nomination was submitted to the United States Senate on April 29, 2008.
b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

Absolutely not.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Person Reporting (Last name, first, middle initial)</th>
<th>3. Court or Organization</th>
<th>5. Date of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gardepé, Paul O.</td>
<td>U.S. District Court, EDNY</td>
<td>04/25/08</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Title (Short Title)</th>
<th>5. Report Type (Identify appropriate type)</th>
<th>6. Reporting Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Judge - Nomine</td>
<td>Investigation, Date 01/01/2007</td>
<td>01/01/2007 to 05/15/08</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Chambers or Office Address</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1123 Avenue of the Americas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, New York 10016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II. AGREEMENTS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 9-13 of instructions.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARTIES AND TERMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Agreement 1</th>
<th>2. Agreement 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME. (Reporting individual and spouse; see pp. 17-24 of instructions.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Year</th>
<th>Source and Type</th>
<th>Gross Income</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Patterson Belknap Webb &amp; Tyler, partnership income</td>
<td>$258,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Time Warner Inc., deferred compensation payment</td>
<td>$8548.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Patterson Belknap Webb &amp; Tyler, partnership income</td>
<td>$1,330,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Time Warner Inc., deferred compensation payment</td>
<td>$9613.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>New York Law School, teaching fee</td>
<td>$4500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Patterson Belknap Webb &amp; Tyler, partnership income</td>
<td>$1,119,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Time Warner Inc., deferred compensation payment</td>
<td>$26,951.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>New York Law School, teaching fee</td>
<td>$4500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Spouse's Non-Investment Income - If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, please complete this section. (Dollar amount not required except for honoraria)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Family Services of Westchester, Salem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Family Services of Westchester, Salem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Financial Disclosure Report

**Name of Person Reporting:** Gardeng, Paul O.

**Date of Report:** 04/30/08

## IV. Reimbursements

- Transportation, lodging, food, entertainment.
- (Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 25-27 of Instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exempt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## V. Gifts

- (Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 28-31 of Instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exempt</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## VI. Liabilities

- (Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 32-33 of Instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creditor</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Value Codes:**

- 0=0.00 or less
- 1=0.01-50.00
- 2=50.01-100.00
- 3=100.01-250.00
- 4=250.01-500.00
- 5=500.01-1,000.00
- 6=1,000.01-2,000.00
- 7=2,000.01-3,000.00
- 8=3,000.01-5,000.00
- 9=5,000.01-10,000.00
- 10=10,000.01 or more
### VII. Page 1 INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS - income, value, transactions (Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 14-37 of Instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investment Description</th>
<th>Dividend</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th><code>Income/Expense</code></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date/Change</td>
<td>Date/Change</td>
<td>Date/Change</td>
<td>Date/Change</td>
<td>Date/Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dayton Mutual Fund</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>James Research Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Apple Bank cert of deposit</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Neuberger Berman International Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jeeves Enterprises Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>James Research Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>James Growth and Income Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>James Worldwide Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Fidelity Magellan Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Neuberger Berman Partners Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Time Warner Savings Plan</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Time Warner Defined Compensation Plan</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>New York College Savings Plan</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Patton Money Purchase Plan and 401k</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Vanguard Tax Managed Cap Appreciation</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Vanguard Tax Managed Growth &amp; Income</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Vanguard Tax Managed Int'l Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Note:** (No reportable income, etc.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Person Reporting</th>
<th>Date of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carolelynn, Paul G.</td>
<td>04/30/08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VII. Page 2 INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — income, value, transactions** (includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-37 of Instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Investment or Trust</th>
<th>Income/Value/Transaction</th>
<th>Income/Value/Transaction Amount</th>
<th>Income/Value/Transaction Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard Tax Managed Small Cap Fund</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>T</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS (Indicate part of Report.)

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it was not applicable or statutory provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that earned income from outside employment and bonuses and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. apps. § 901 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 7353 and Judicial Conference regulations.

Signature  
Date

NOTE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FALSIFIES OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (5 U.S.C. App. § 104.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash in bank</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts receivable</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid interest and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable-add schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-add schedule</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable-add schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td>Other debts-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto and other personal property</td>
<td>Other debts-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash value-life insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets intangible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(see attached)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total liabilities</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total assets</td>
<td>4 130 769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Worth</td>
<td>4 130 769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total liabilities and net worth</td>
<td>4 130 769</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FINANCIAL STATEMENT**

**NET WORTH**

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

**CONTINGENT LIABILITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As executor, curator or guardian</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On lease or contract</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Claim</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for Federal Income Tax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other special debt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FINANCIAL STATEMENT

NET WORTH SCHEDULES

Real Estate Owned
Personal residence $ 1,200,000
Vermont Condominium 140,000
Total Real Estate Owned $ 1,340,000

Other Assets
Money Market Funds $ 426,950
TSP Plan 340,093
Miscellaneous IRA Accounts 74,212
Janus Growth & Income Fund 84,886
Janus Worldwide Fund 22,075
Fidelity Magellan Fund 12,677
Time Warner 401(k) Plan 162,374
Time Warner Deferred Compensation Plan 26,577
Patterson Belknap 401(k) Plan 222,406
Vanguard Accounts 298,309
Patterson Belknap Capital Account 334,596
Patterson Belknap Cash Balance 46,000
New York College Savings Plan 510,174
Total Other Assets $ 2,561,330
AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul G. Garabelli, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

May 8, 2008
(DATE)

Paul G. Garabelli
(NAME)

Carmen Maria Accosta
(NOTARY)
Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Gardephe.

Now let's move on. Next, I am particularly proud to introduce Judge Kiyo A. Matusumoto because she was my recommendation to fill the seat on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which covers all of Long Island, which includes Brooklyn and Queens, where I live. Before becoming a well-respected U.S. magistrate judge in the Eastern District, Judge Matusumoto's impressive career included work in the private sector, in academia, and in public service.

After graduating with high honors from the University of California at Berkeley and receiving her J.D. from Georgetown, Judge Matusumoto worked as an associate at McDonald, Hogue & Bayliss from 1981 to 1983. She then worked as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District, and has also taught as an Adjunct Professor of Law at NYU.

As a magistrate judge since 2004, Judge Matusumoto has earned an unimpeachable reputation, and only on one occasion has a reviewing District Court declined to adopt her report and recommendations. I am not only pleased with Judge Matusumoto's nomination because of her integrity and qualifications, but I also believe Judge Matusumoto will contribute to a diversity of perspectives to the Federal bench. Outside the Ninth Circuit, Judge Matusumoto will be only the third Asian American appointee to the Federal courts, and only the second in 14 years.

Judge Matusumoto's father is here with us today. He and Judge Matusumoto's mother spent time in an internment camp during World War II, and I've always been hopeful that by ensuring that the Federal bench is filled with men and women of principle from a diverse range of backgrounds and experiences, we can avoid repeating such tragic mistakes of the past.

Judge Matusumoto and her husband have three beautiful children. So, Judge, why don't you introduce your family and make any brief remarks you wish to make?

STATEMENT OF KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Judge MATSUMOTO. Senator Schumer, I would like to thank you and the Committee for hearing us today, and thank Senator Brownback for being here. I would also like to thank the President for his nomination to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District.

I'm very pleased to introduce my family. I have here my father, George Matusumoto, and my brother Ken Matusumoto, both from California. And I have my husband of 23 years, Colin Lee, along with our three children, Kimi Lee, Liam Lee, and Miya Lee.

In addition, I am pleased to note that seven of my present and former law clerks are present here.

Senator SCHUMER. Why don't we first have your family stand so we can acknowledge them? It's always nice to see the proud families. Welcome. And particularly for you, Mr. Matusumoto. I'm sure you're very proud of your daughter today.

Judge MATSUMOTO. Thank you, sir.

Senator SCHUMER. Please continue.
Judge MATSUMOTO. I do have, as I said, seven present and former law clerks here today: Ameet Kabrawla, Tomoko Onozawa, Kristin Mattiske, Alvin Lin, Ellen Blain, Jenny Kim, and Joseph Loy, as well as representatives of the Asian American Bar Association of New York and the National Asian-Pacific American Bar Association.

Thank you, sir.

[The biographical information follows.]
1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used):
   
   Kiyo Ann Matsumoto

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.

   United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.

   Office: United States Courthouse, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, NY 11201
   
   Residence: New York, New York

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.

   1955; Raleigh, North Carolina

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.

   I am married to Colin Loy Lee. He is an artist and Art teacher in Brooklyn, NY. We have three dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.

   New York University, School of Continuing and Professional Studies, Fall 1989; No degree
   
   
   University of California at Berkeley, 1972-1976; B.A. with high honors, 1976

7. **Employment Record:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other
enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

**Employment:**

July 2004 – present
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
United States Magistrate Judge

July 1983 – June 2004
U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Assistant United States Attorney

MacDonald Hoague & Bayless
1500 Hoge Building, 705 Second Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104-1745
Associate
Summer associate, 1980 & 1981

Summer 1979 – May 1981
Covington & Burling
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Full time law clerk, Summer 1979
Part time law clerk, Fall 1979-Spring 1980, Fall 1980-Spring 1981

August 1980 – May 1981
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Part time Law Fellow, Legal Research and Writing Instructor

1976 – 1978
Morrison & Foerster
425 Market Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
Litigation Paralegal
August 1998 – May 2004  
New York University School of Law  
40 Washington Square South  
New York, NY 10012  
Adjunct Professor of Law: Government Civil Litigation Clinic

August 1985 – May 1986  
Brooklyn Law School:  
250 Joralemon Street  
Brooklyn, NY 11201  
Legal Research and Writing Instructor

Other Affiliations:  
2000 – present  
Federal Bar Council  
Board of Trustees since approx. 2000  
Vice Chair of the Board of Trustees approx. 2004-2006  
Not compensated

2003 – 2004  
Vice Chair, New York City Mayor’s Committee on City Marshals  
Not compensated

1990 – present  
Residential coop board member  
Not compensated

8. Military Service and Draft Status: Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

I have not served in the U.S. Military

9. Honors and Awards: List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

Legal Research and Writing Fellow: Georgetown University Law Center, 1980-1981  

U.S. Attorney’s Office: Periodic awards for outstanding performance as an Assistant U.S. Attorney

New York County Lawyers’ Association: Outstanding Public Service Award

3
10. **Bar Associations:** List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.


Federal Bar Council: Member since approximately 1995
  - Member of Committee on Second Circuit Courts since approximately 1995
  - Member of Awards Committee since 2006
  - Member of the Board of Trustees and on since approximately 2000
  - Vice Chair of the Board of Trustees approximately 2004 – 2007

Association of the Bar of the City of New York:
  - Member of the Committee on the Judiciary: approx. 2002 – 2004
  - Member of the Federal Courts Committee: approx. 2004 – 2007

E.D.N.Y. and S.D.N.Y. Joint Committee on Local Federal Rules: Member, approximately March 2001-June 2004

Committee on Civil Litigation (E.D.N.Y.): Member, approximately March 2001- June 2004

New York State Bar Association, Executive Committee of the Commercial and Federal Litigation Section: Member, 2006

National Asian Pacific American Bar Association: Member since approximately 1990

Asian American Bar Association of New York: Member, approximately 1990
  - Women’s Committee 2005
  - Nominating Committee 2007

Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund: Member, approximately 1990-2005

11. **Bar and Court Admission:**

   a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.


   District of Columbia Bar; 2/11/91; no lapse in membership

   State of New York, Appellate Division, First Department; 7/12/94; I went into retired status upon becoming a Magistrate Judge in 2004.
b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

Washington State Supreme Court; October 1981 (inactive)

District of Columbia Court of Appeals: February 1991

State of New York, Appellate Division, First Department: July 1994 (retired status upon becoming a Magistrate Judge in 2004)

U. S. District Court for the Western District of Washington; December 1981

U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; November 2000

U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; November 2000

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; May 1982

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, February 1984

12. Membership:

a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

United States Department of Justice, Civil Chiefs’ Working Group member: 2001-2003

b. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

None of the organizations to which I belong invidiously discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or religion.
13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

None.

b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.


c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

None.

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

I delivered a speech at my induction ceremony as a United States Magistrate Judge, June 8, 2004.

I introduced former Secretary of Commerce and Transportation Norman Mineta, who was a keynote speaker, at the 2007 annual dinner of the Asian American Bar Association of New York.
I participated as a panel member at the following events sponsored by bar associations or other legal groups for attorneys seeking continuing legal education (CLE) credit:

1/11/08: Practising Law Institute: Bridge the Gap I Program at Brooklyn Law School: Panel on “The Deadly Dozen: 12 of the Most Common Mistakes Lawyers Make When Dealing With Clients.”

12/10/07: Justice Resource Center National Mentor Program: Metropolitan mentor Moot Court Competition.

9/25/07: Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Bridge the Gap Program
Panel member on “Lawyers’ Conduct in the Courtroom from the perspective of a State and Magistrate Judge”:

9/19/07: Asian American Bar Association of New York, Women’s Committee panel member on “Women’s Leadership Forum: Successes and Challenges of Women Leaders”

6/20/07: Event sponsored by Stroock & Stroock LLP Diversity Committee and Women of Color Affinity Group, panel member on “Voices of Color from the Bench”


1/12/07: Practising Law Institute: Bridge the Gap Program at Brooklyn Law School: Panel on “The Deadly Dozen: 12 of the Most Common Mistakes Lawyers Make When Dealing With Clients”

6/6/06: Federal Bar Council First Decade Committee Judicial Luncheon Series: informal brown bag lunch with lawyers admitted to practice less than ten years


Association of the Bar of the City of New York
December 5, 2005: Practical Trial Skills: panelist
February 8, 2005: Taking and Defending Depositions: panelist
December 4, 2004: How to Become a Judge: panelist
e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

None.

14. **Judicial Office:** State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

On July 12, 2004 I was appointed United States Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of New York

15. **Citations:** If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

   a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

      Please see attached list of decisions.

   b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

      None

   c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

      None

   d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

      My Report and Recommendation in Maggio v. City University of New York, 05-cv-4211 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y.), granted plaintiff’s motion to amend her Title VII discrimination complaint to add, *inter alia*, a Title IX claim on the basis that neither the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court had decided whether Title IX claims are preempted by Title VII. Although I do not believe he did so with “significant criticism,” Judge Cogan declined to adopt that portion of my Report and Recommendation, finding that Title IX does not provide a private right of action.

   e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and
354

Because my decisions are subject to review by a district judge, I generally do not send my decisions to legal publishing services for publication. However, those services may publish my decisions, irrespective of whether I have designated the decision as "for publication" or "unpublished." Of the 157 decisions listed in response to question 15 (a) above, approximately 50% were published, and are available on the court's website through PACER, by utilizing the docket number.

f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

None.

16. Recusal: If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

Upon my appointment to the bench in July 2004, I recused myself from all cases in which I served a supervisory role, was the assigned Assistant U.S. Attorney, or was involved in any way in the case. In addition, the clerk of the court utilizes a system whereby judges list entities in which they have a financial interest so that judges are not assigned cases in which that entity is a party.


a. After counsel for defendant Euro Brokers moved for sanctions, plaintiff's counsel questioned whether I could be impartial in considering the defendant's sanctions motion, because plaintiff's counsel and I had been adversary counsel before my appointment as a United States Magistrate Judge, over one year before. I noted that my impartiality could not be
reasonably questioned, based upon the record, but that the matter could be considered further. I thereafter attempted to obtain plaintiff’s compliance with court orders in the hope that defendant would withdraw its motion for sanctions. While the defendant’s motion for sanctions was pending, plaintiff’s counsel filed an “emergency motion” to reassign the case and for a conference with the district judge, claiming that I had engaged in an ex parte communication initiated by defense counsel, apparently because of a recently issued order. Both defendants opposed the motion and denied that any ex parte communication had occurred, pointing out that a recently issued order had been made in response to submissions by the parties, and not an ex parte communication. The district judge denied plaintiff’s application “without prejudice to its renewal by motion returnable initially before the Mag. Judge on notice to all parties and the Mag. Judge.” Plaintiff’s counsel then filed a motion to recuse me and the district judge, after the district judge conducted a conflict hearing, in which I did not participate.

b. The plaintiff initially questioned my impartiality in considering the defendant’s sanctions motion, because plaintiff’s counsel and I had been adversary counsel before my appointment as a United States Magistrate Judge, over one year before. The subsequent motions were based on an erroneous allegation of an ex parte communication.

c. In considering plaintiff’s motion to recuse, I considered the record before the court, 28 U.S.C. Sections 144 and 455, as well as controlling Second Circuit case law. Title 28 U.S.C. Section 455 provides, "(a) Any... magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice. . . . (2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it; (3) Where he has... participated... [in] the case in controversy; (4) He knows that he or [his family members] have a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding; (5) He or his spouse or a person within the third degree of relationship" is in any way related to the proceeding. I denied the plaintiff’s motion to recuse.

d. Plaintiff’s counsel did not set forth any clear legal or factual basis for the Court’s recusal. She did not allege bias or prejudice, or any “facts and reasons” suggesting bias or prejudice against plaintiff or in favor of defendants pursuant to Section 144. Neither did she allege any of the circumstances enumerated in Section 455. Instead, plaintiff’s counsel apparently based her motion on the fact that I was "new" to the bench, and
was an adversary before becoming a Magistrate Judge, and on the erroneous statement in her affirmation that I was present at the conflict hearing before Judge Sifton on February 1, 2007. Those statements failed to suggest any reasonable question regarding, or appearance of, partiality, the existence of a personal bias or prejudice, or personal (as opposed to judicial) knowledge of or investment in the case.

17. **Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:**

   a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

   In 2003, I was appointed by New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg as Vice Chair of the New York City Mayor's Committee on City Marshals, and resigned in 2004, upon my selection as a United States Magistrate Judge.

   b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

      None.

18. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

   a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

      i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk:

         I did not serve as a clerk to a judge.

      ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates:

         I have not practiced alone.

      iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.
July 2004 – present
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
United States Magistrate Judge

July 1983 – June 2004
U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Assistant United States Attorney
  Deputy Chief, Civil Division: 12/86-6/98
  Chief, Financial Litigation: 1/92-3/01
  Civil Health Care Fraud Coordinator: 1994-3/01
  First Deputy Chief, Civil Division: 6/98-3/01
  Chief, Civil Division: 3/01-9/03
  Senior Trial Counsel: 10/03-6/04

MacDonald Hoague & Bayless
1500 Hoge Building, 705 Second Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104-1745
Associate

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

Following graduation from law school in 1981, I worked for approximately two years as an associate in a small civil litigation firm in Seattle, Washington, under the supervision of various partners. I handled litigation and arbitrations, negotiated actions involving fishing rights; handled estate and domestic matters (adoptions and divorces), and a constitutional challenge to the state of Washington's motor vehicle towing practices. I conducted discovery, argued several motions in state and federal court and handled an arbitration.

Starting in July 1983, as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of New York, I was responsible for a demanding caseload that, at times, exceeded one hundred cases. I conducted all aspects of litigation, including investigations, drafting pleadings, discovery, settlement negotiations, motion practice, trials and appeals in a broad range of cases on behalf of federal agencies and officials. I also briefed and argued ten appeals before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Although most of my litigation experience was in civil practice, I had significant experience with criminal investigations and proceedings. Under the supervision of the office’s Criminal Division, I co-investigated and prosecuted a criminal case arising out of what was then the largest failure of a federally insured credit union. (United States v. Angelo D’Acunto, CR-89-191 (Glasser, J.).) The investigation involved the use of pen registers, wire taps, surveillance and search warrants. Following the indictment of an individual defendant and his guilty plea, the government recovered approximately $9 million from criminal restitution and from related civil actions that I litigated. I also handled litigation arising from the enforcement of criminal monetary judgments for fines and restitution, and violations of probation and supervised release.

As a supervisor in the Civil Division since 1986 (as a Deputy Chief of the Civil Division, Chief of Financial Litigation, First Deputy Chief of the Civil Division, and Chief of the Civil Division), in addition to case work, I was responsible for hiring, training and supervising Assistant U.S. Attorneys; reviewing their written work; supervising the development of investigations and the implementation of litigation, settlement and trial strategy; preparing attorneys for arguments before the district and appellate courts; training Assistant U.S. Attorneys; acting as liaison with the Department of Justice, client agencies and the courts; developing new investigations and cases; establishing task forces with local, state and federal agencies; and handling a broad range of administrative and personnel matters.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

In private practice my clients were members of unions representing public school teachers, television and radio artists, aerospace engineers, of Native American tribes.

As an Assistant United States Attorney, my client was the United States of America. Affirmative practice areas included investigations and litigation of common law fraud, and *qui tam* actions involving federal programs and federal contractors pursuant to the False Claims Act, enforcement of federal environmental laws, civil RICO, federally insured financial institution recovery actions, and civil forfeiture. Defensive practice areas included tort (medical malpractice, accidents on federal property, vehicular accidents, constitutional tort/ *Bivens* actions) and employment discrimination cases. I also defended suits raising constitutional, statutory and regulatory challenges to actions by federal agencies and officials, and represented the interests of the United States in Bankruptcy Court.
c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

One hundred per cent of my legal practice has been as a litigator. As an Assistant U.S. Attorney, I appeared in federal district court frequently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals occasionally, and never in state court during the first fifteen years. During the last five years as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, I appeared in federal district court and the Second Circuit occasionally.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 100%
   2. state courts of record:
   3. other courts:

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings: 80%
   2. criminal proceedings: 20%

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

As an attorney, I conducted trials or evidentiary hearings in approximately fifteen to twenty cases during the course of my career. I was co-counsel in approximately ten of the cases and sole counsel in the others.

i. What percentage of these trials were:
   1. Jury: 5%
   2. non-jury: 95%

e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

I have not practiced before the Supreme Court of the United States.

19. Litigation: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

a. the date of representation;
b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and

c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

I represented the United States, as an AUSA, in each of the following cases:

1) **United States v. United States Currency in the amount of $181,590, 873 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1989)** (Doc. No. 88-6137); U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Honorable Thomas C. Platt.

The United States Customs Service and Drug Enforcement Administration seized $181,590.00 in United States currency at JFK International Airport, from an individual departing on an international flight. The individual then filed a claim for the currency, but disclaimed ownership of the currency and refused to provide information regarding the circumstances under which he came to be in possession of the currency. Representing the United States, I litigated the forfeiture action in district court and drafted and argued the appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit upheld the forfeiture, finding that the claimant did not establish standing as a claimant and that the Government did not engage in unconstitutional delays in commencing the forfeiture action during the time it was negotiating with plaintiff and investigating whether criminal violations had occurred.

**Opposing Counsel:**
Edward S. Rudofsky, Esq.
601 W. 26th St.
New York, NY 10001
(212) 245-2222

2) **United States v. Lucchese Organized Crime Family, et al., CV-89-1848 (Glasser, J.); U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Honorable I. Leo Glasser.**

Together with co-counsel, I conducted an investigation of the Long Island carting industry which had long been dominated by the Lucchese and Gambino organized crime families. The investigation culminated in the filing of what was then the largest civil action pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, naming over one hundred carting companies and their individual owners, the private sanitation industry association and two organized crime families (Lucchese and Gambino). I was active in the investigation and litigating initial dispositive and discovery motions, and conducting and responding to discovery. Judge Glasser ultimately appointed a monitor over the industry, but I was not handling the case at that time.
Co-counsel:
Joseph D. McCann, Esq.
Murray & McCann
100 Merrick Road
Rockville Centre, NY 11570
(516) 766-3131

David Nocenti, Esq.
Counsel to the Governor of the State of New York
New York State Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(518) 474-8343

Opposing Counsel: While many counsel represented over 100 defendants, among the counsel who represented multiple defendants are the following:

Judd Burstein, Esq.
1790 Broadway - Suite 1501
New York, NY 10019
(212) 974-2400

Ronald G. Russo, Esq.
Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C.
40 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005
(212) 471-8462

Paul A. Batista, Esq.
26 Broadway
New York, NY 10007
(212) 980-0070

3) United States v. Angelo D'Acunto, CR-89-191 (Glasser, J.); U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Honorable I. Leo Glasser.

This criminal investigation and prosecution arose from the collapse of the Hyfin Credit Union. The defendant had participated in a fraudulent loan scheme in which loan proceeds were utilized in his taxi medallion business. With my co-counsel, I conducted the investigation, presented the case to the grand jury, and negotiated the plea and payment of restitution. The defendant pleaded guilty to mail fraud and paid over $2 million in restitution and additional amounts in a civil settlement.

Co-counsel:
M. Lawrence Noyer, Jr. (deceased)
Opposing Counsel:
Gary Greenwald, Esq.
252 Main Street - P.O. Box 299
Goshen, NY 10924
(914) 294-6670 (Last known)


This case sought penalties pursuant to the Clean Air Act against gasoline sellers who sold as "unleaded" gasoline that contained lead. I conducted the investigation prior to the commencement of the action, and thereafter conducted discovery and successfully moved for summary judgment. Counsel for the Environmental Protection Agency provided litigation support with the investigation and documents.

Opposing Counsel:
Kenneth L. Robinson, Esq.
Robinson & Associates
35 Roosevelt Avenue
Syosset, NY 11791
(516) 496-9044

Paul Sibener, Esq.
Tananbaum & Sibener
350 Conmanack Road
Connemack, NY 11725
(516) 499-3400


In a post-judgment enforcement proceeding commenced in 1994, pursuant to writs of assistance and writs of garnishment, the government seized gemstones and currency (both foreign and domestic) from a safe deposit box held in the name of defendant’s alias. The defendant had escaped from a federal prison camp and was apprehended and subsequently identified by the Drug Enforcement Administration. I conducted discovery and depositions of defendant’s family members, who claimed an interest in the seized property. Eventually, the defendant and his family agreed to relinquish any claim to the assets and allowed the proceeds to be applied to his multi-million dollar criminal judgment.
Opposing Counsel:
David G. Cotton, Esq.
1817 College Point Blvd.
College Point, NY 11356
(718) 939-6454


This civil action was commenced on behalf of the National Credit Union Administration, to recover fraudulent loan proceeds following the collapse of the Hyfin Credit Union, which was then the largest failure of a federally insured credit union. The suit named nearly twenty real estate corporations, former officers of the credit union and individuals who had received fraudulent loan proceeds, and resulted in recoveries of approximately $20 million. I conducted discovery, drafted and argued motions and negotiated settlements with many of the defendants.

Co-counsel:
M. Lawrence Noyer, Jr. (deceased)

Opposing Counsel: Counsel representing multiple defendants or the more prominent defendants include the following.

John N. Cuomo, Esq.
260-41 73rd Avenue
Floral Park, NY 11004
(718) 962-6858

Judd Burstein, Esq.
1790 Broadway - Suite 1501
New York, NY 10019
(212) 974-2400

Robert F. Katzberg, Esq.
Kaplan & Katzberg
767 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017
(212) 750-3100


I conducted this evidentiary hearing on remand by the Second Circuit to the district court in March 2000, after the district court refused to grant the
defendant, who was on supervised release, personal travel abroad because defendant had the financial means to pay restitution but refused to do so. Representing the United States, I conducted the cross-examination of the defendant, and direct examinations of his probation officer and the government’s expert neurologist. The defendant then appealed both the enforcement of the restitution judgment by garnishment and the denial of his travel request. I briefed and argued the expedited, consolidated appeals (Second Circuit Docket Nos. 99-1489, 99-1752). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision. I was sole counsel.

Opposing Counsel:
Mark O. Wasserman, Esq.
6800 Jericho Turnpike, Suite 120W
Syosset, NY 11791
(516) 393-5936


With the assistance of the Environmental Protection Agency, I investigated, commenced and settled a cost recovery action pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). After the Environmental Protection Agency discovered a plume of contaminated groundwater that originated from the defendants’ manufacturing site in Sag Harbor, Long Island, the United States installed a new water system for the residents of Sag Harbor. Settlement negotiations failed and an action was commenced to recover the cost of installing the water system. After the complaint was filed, I conducted discovery and negotiated a settlement which resulted in the execution of a consent judgment and the recovery of the costs of the water system.

Opposing Counsel:
Burton Brody, Esq. (deceased)
Counsel for Nabisco, Inc.

Frank L. Amoroso, Esq.
Nixon Peabody
990 Stewart Avenue
Garden City, NY 11530
(516) 832-7575
Counsel for Sag Harbor Industries (later disqualified as counsel on Nabisco’s motion)

9) In addition to the above cases, as an Assistant U.S. Attorney and the Office’s Civil Health Care Fraud Coordinator, I handled a number of health care fraud
investigations, pursuant to the False Claims Act, against hospitals, home health agencies, ambulance companies and blood testing laboratories, which resulted in monetary settlements, either prior to a complaint being filed, or in the context of a qui tam action.

One health care fraud case that co-counsel and I extensively investigated with the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services and prepared for litigation, but settled prior to the commencement of a False Claims Act action, involved Olsten Corporation, then among the country’s largest home health care agencies. The government’s investigation revealed that Olsten Corporation improperly billed executive benefits to the Medicare program through its cost reports. Expenses for executive sales trips to resorts, tickets to sports events, luxury automobiles and parties were among the items improperly claimed for Medicare reimbursement in Olsten’s cost reports. The defendant paid a multi-million dollar settlement to the United States and the Medicare Trust Fund.

Co-counsel:
AUSA Richard Hayes, Esq.
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
(718) 254-6050

Opposing Counsel:
Mark H. Tuohy, Esq.
Vinson & Elkins
1455 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 639-6660

10) Another health care fraud case that I investigated with the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services, prepared for litigation and settled prior to filing suit under the False Claims Act, involved an entity known as Metropolitan Ambulance and its owner. The investigation revealed that Medicare was improperly billed for ambulance transportation that was not medically necessary. The defendants paid a settlement to the United States and the Medicare Trust Fund.

Opposing Counsel:
Nathan Lewin, Esq.
Lewin & Lewin
1828 L Street, N.W., Suite 901
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 828-1000
20. **Legal Activities:** Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organization(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

I have not engaged in any lobbying activities.

As an Assistant U.S. Attorney, I participated in a number of matters that did not proceed to trial. As a supervisory Assistant U.S. Attorney, I participated in developing and implementing several affirmative civil enforcement initiatives. For example, with an attorney from what was then the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), I created and participated in a program to address a large INS backlog of cases involving employers who had employed undocumented aliens. Working with INS agents, we investigated and initiated successful enforcement actions to collect civil monetary sanctions against employers who had employed and often exploited undocumented workers.

In addition, as a Civil Health Care Fraud Coordinator at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, I helped form a health care fraud task force comprised of federal and state agencies. Our mission was to identify and enforce anti-fraud, waste and abuse initiatives against health care providers who participated in the Medicaid and Medicare programs.

Through various bar organizations, I have participated in programs for underprivileged and minority high school and law students, public service lawyers and lawyers newly admitted to practice. With the Second Circuit Courts Committee of the Federal Bar Council, I helped organize Fall Bench and Bar Conferences and Continuing Legal Education (CLE) programs, targeting lawyers employed by small firms and the public sector who generally lack the financial resources to participate in the Federal Bar Council’s more established and expensive Winter Bench and Bar Conference. I have also participated in court mentoring programs for underprivileged high school students and moot court programs for high school and law students. With the Asian American Bar Association, I have participated in workshops that provide law students with advice and mentoring regarding resumes and interviewing skills, moot court programs as well as CLE programs for attorneys.
21. **Teaching:** What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

- Georgetown University Law Center
  - Legal Research and Writing

- Brooklyn Law School
  - August 1983 - May 1986
  - Legal Research and Writing Instructor

- New York University School of Law
  - August 1998 - May 2004
  - Government Civil Litigation Clinic

- United States Department of Justice
  - I have been an instructor in civil trial advocacy course for new Department of Justice Attorneys, including Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and in financial litigation for experienced attorneys at the Attorney General’s Advocacy Institute, Washington, D.C. and National Advocacy Center, Columbia, SC.

22. **Deferred Income/Future Benefits:** List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

None, other than my Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), and Judicial Retirement System/Judicial Survivors’ Annuities System (JRS/JSAS) Plans.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

I have no such plans, commitments, or agreements.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other
items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)

See attached Financial Disclosure Report

25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

   a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

   The parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during my initial service in the position to which I have been nominated include any case in which, as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, I had a supervisory role, litigation responsibility or any other involvement, and any case where the party is an entity in which I or an immediate family member has an interest. A list of such entities has been provided to the clerk of the court to avoid assignment of such cases. At present, I recuse myself from any in which I had a role as an Assistant U.S. Attorney.

   b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

   I will continue to comply with the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Administrative Office policies, the judicial canons and the law regarding conflicts of interest. The actions I have taken and will continue to take regarding "the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal," will be to decide all issues in each case fairly and impartially, and without bias or prejudice against any party or counsel, based on the record, judicial canons and the law.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

   After graduating from law school and passing the bar, I worked with a community group in Seattle, Washington, that provided assistance and shelter for abused women and their children. I also volunteered pro bono legal services with the Northwest Women’s Law
Center, which provided pro bono legal services, and ANEW (Apprenticeships for Nontraditional Employment for Women). Assistant U.S. Attorneys are quite restricted from providing legal services beyond official duties. As part of the Department of Justice’s “Weed and Seed” program, I have volunteered as a mentor at a day camp for disadvantaged, “at risk” youth, who were taught leadership and confidence-building skills in order to enhance their abilities to resist gang participation and drug use. I have also mentored high school students and law students from minority communities and volunteered to participate in court programs for public high school students. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, I assisted with outreach to and interviews of relatives of victims lost in the attacks. My family participates in annual holiday toy drives for disadvantaged children through the Postal Service, the court and/or New York Cares. This past summer, my family visited two schools in Africa and donated school supplies. Each of the foregoing activities involved between several hours to one day.

28. Selection Process:

   a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

   In May 2006, I submitted an application to the Chair of Senator Charles Schumer’s Judicial Selection Panel. I was granted an interview with the panel in May 2007, and interviewed with Senator Schumer in August 2007, who thereafter recommended that President George W. Bush nominate me for a position as a United States District Judge. On October 9, 2007, I interviewed at the White House with the White House Counsel’s Office and a representative from the Department of Justice. On November 7, 2007, I received a telephone call from the Office of White House Counsel, advising me that I had been approved for further consideration and was contacted by the Department of Justice regarding the nomination paperwork. Thereafter, I conferred periodically with the Department of Justice with questions regarding completion and return of the forms. I was formally nominated on March 11, 2008.

   b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

      No.
### I. POSITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Board member and Vice Chair: Federal Bar Council

2. Board member: Residential coop

### II. AGREEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTIES AND TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. NONE (No reportable agreements.)

### III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>GROSS INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A. Filers Non-Investment Income

1. NONE (No reportable non-investment income.)

B. Spouses Non-Investment Income - If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, please complete this section. (Dollar amounts are required for bonuses)

1. 2008: Art teacher, salary

2. 2007: Art teacher, salary
### FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

**Name of Person Reporting:** Matsumoto, Kiyo A.  
**Date of Report:** 3/12/08

#### IV. REIMBURSEMENTS

(Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 32-34 of Instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>(No such reportable reimbursements.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### V. GIFTS

(Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 38-39 of Instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>(No such reportable gifts.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### VI. LIABILITIES

(Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 33-34 of Instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREATOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>(No reportable liabilities.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VII. Page 2 INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 24-27 of Instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name of Account/Trust/Security</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Exempt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Citibank Smith Barney (IRA)</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>Exempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>HSBC Accounts</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>New England Variable Life</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Int/Div</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Charit. Rent. Trust (North's. Trust Soc.)</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Int/Div</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Memorial Partnership</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Rest</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sercia EE Savings Bond</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Charles Schwab IRA/Accounts</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Int/Div</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Time/Warner (part of IRA)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Int/Div</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Colgate Palmolive (common)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Int/Div</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Proctor &amp; Gamble (common)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Int/Div</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Hewlett Packard (common)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Int/Div</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Diversified Investment Trust Plan</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Int/Div</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>NY State Education Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS (Indicate part of Report.)

ART IIIA. FILER’S NON-INVESTMENT INCOME

No investment income was received during the reporting period as salary for duties as a United States Magistrate Judge.

ART VII. INVESTMENTS AND TRUSTS

JL is now Time Warner.

Jetie In prior reports is now listed as Proctor & Gamble (the value of which is less than $5000).

variable Remainder Trust

variable Remainder Trust is in Northern Trust Securities (Value as of 2/28/08: $565,730.45).

Dodge & Cox Income: $152,843.10

Vanguard GMAA: $76,805.83

Vanguard Longterm Inv. Grade: $73,595.49

Cash: $85,82

CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is true and correct to my knowledge and belief. I further certify that, if any information not reported was withhold because it met applicable legal provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that counsel perceiving from outside employment and business and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. App. § 3061 at 3060, 5 U.S.C. § 7353 and Federal Conflict of Interest regulations.

Date 3/12/08

FILING INSTRUCTIONS:

Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:

Committee on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 5-301
One Columbus Cir., N.E.
Washington, D.C., 20544
## FINANCIAL STATEMENT
### NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in bank</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities—add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed securities—add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities—add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable—add schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned—add schedule</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable—add schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td>Other debts—receivable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autos and other personal property</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash value-life insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets intangible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial Partnership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSERS / TSP (approximate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total liabilities</td>
<td>Total liabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Worth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 119 711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets</td>
<td>Total liabilities and net worth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 509 721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERAL INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As evidence, commece or guarantee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On lease or contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for Federal Income Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other special debt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FINANCIAL STATEMENT

NET WORTH SCHEDULES

U.S. Government Securities
Series EE Bonds $4,850

Listed Securities
Colgate Palmolive $5,924
Hewlett Packard 3,331
Proctor & Gamble 4,722
Time Warner 990
Northern Trust Securities (Charitable Remainder Trust) 303,330
(Dodge & Cox Income)
(Vanguard GNMA)
(Vanguard Long Term Invmt. Grade)
Total Listed Securities $318,297

Unlisted Securities
Diversified Investment Thrift Plan $148,886
Citibank/Smith Barney IRA 21,498
New York State College Savings Plan 1,890
Total Unlisted Securities $172,274

Real Estate Owned
Personal residence $2,500,000
1/5 Family Property 100,000
Total Real Estate Owned $2,600,000

Real Estate Mortgages Payable
Personal residence $378,410
AFFIDAVIT

1. Kiyo A. Matsumoto, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

3/12/08 (DATE)  

(NAME)

Sworn before me this 12th day of March, 2008.

(NOTARY)

[Signature]

[Seal]
Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Judge Matsumoto.

Next, we’re going to move on to another nominee who I enthusiastically recommended to the President, and that is Ms. Cathy Seibel. She is nominated for the District Court of the Southern District of New York. She spent 21 years as a Federal prosecutor, mostly in New York. She developed a reputation for fairness and effectiveness. Currently, she’s the First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District, and she’s also served as Deputy U.S. Attorney and Assistant U.S. Attorney in Charge during her tenure.

She has prosecuted a number of high-profile tax fraud cases, including the Leona Helmsley case, as well as the very first case when the Violence Against Women Act was used for a murder charge. I was the author in the House of that law, so it is good to see it going into effect in a good way.

Despite the demands on her time as a prosecutor, Ms. Seibel also finds time to teach a course on trial practice at Columbia Law School and has previously taught courses at Fordham. And, I would add that while at the Southern District she has trained several generations of lawyers, and not the least of whom is my own chief counsel, the well-known and outstanding Preet Barara, who is sitting behind me making sure I make no mistakes.

Ms. Seibel graduated magna cum laude from Princeton, received her J.D. from Fordham University where she was editor-in-chief of the Fordham Law Review. She clerked for Judge Joseph McLaughlin in the Eastern District after graduation, and so she has truly been working to protect the rule of law in New York since the beginning of her career as a lawyer.

Ms. Seibel, I know you are, too, joined by your family today. Would you like to introduce them to the Committee and make any brief statement?

STATEMENT OF CATHY SEIBEL, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Ms. SEIBEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to thank you and Senator Brownback for convening this hearing today, and particularly, Senator Schumer, thank you for recommending me to the White House. I’d like to thank President Bush for accepting that recommendation. It is an honor to be here.

I have with me today my mother, Ellen Seibel, my husband of almost 18 years, Barron Lerner, our two children, Ben, who is 15, and Nina, who is 13.

Senator SCHUMER. Will you please rise, Seibel family? Welcome. Glad you’re here. I can see how proud your mother is by the smile on her face.

Ms. SEIBEL. And also some friends from DC are here: Eric Biel, Michael Bosworth, and Christine Parker.

[The biographical information follows.]
1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).

   Cathy Seibel

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.

   United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.

   Office: U.S. Attorney’s Office, 1 St. Andrew’s Plaza, New York, NY 10007

   Residence: Hastings-on-Hudson, NY

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.

   1960; West Islip, NY.

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.

   I am married to Barron H. Lerner. He is a physician/historian employed as a Professor, Columbia College of Physicians & Surgeons and Mailman School of Public Health; Columbia University; 722 West 168th St., 9th Floor; New York, NY 10032.

   We have two dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.

   Fordham University School of Law, August 1982 – May 1985; J.D. *cum laude*, May 1985

7. **Employment Record**: List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

**Employment:**

August 1993 – present
United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
1 St. Andrew’s Plaza
New York, NY 10007
First Assistant United States Attorney, January 2008 – present
Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)/Senior Trial Counsel, March 1999 – Sep. 2005
Assistant United States Attorney/AUSA-in-Charge, June 1997 - March 1999
Assistant United States Attorney, September 1995 - May 1997
Assistant United States Attorney/Chief, General Crimes Unit, August 1993 - May 1995

January 2008 – present
Lecturer-in-Law, Trial Practice
Columbia University School of Law
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10027

June 1994 – April 1995
Adjunct Associate Professor
Criminal Law Externship Program
Fordham University School of Law
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023

July 1991 - June 1993
United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington
3600 Seafirst Fifth Avenue Plaza
Seattle, WA 98104
Special Assistant United States Attorney

September 1987 - June 1991
United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
1 St. Andrew’s Plaza
New York, NY 10007
Assistant United States Attorney
September 1985 - September 1987
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Law Clerk to the Honorable Joseph M. McLaughlin, United States District Judge

May – August 1984
Cravath Swaine & Moore
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, NY 10081
Summer Associate

May – August 1983
Austrian Lance & Stewart
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10112.
Summer Clerk

Other affiliations:
Board member, Fordham Law Alumni Association, 140 West 62nd Street, New York, NY 10023; approximately September 2005 – present.

Board member, Hastings-on-Hudson PTSA, c/o Jodie Meyer, 15 Forest Avenue, Hastings-on-Hudson, NY 10706; approximately September 2003 – present.

8. Military Service and Draft Status: Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

I have not served in the military.

9. Honors and Awards: List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

Henry L. Stimson Medal; Association of the Bar of the City of New York; 2004

Teamwork Award for Outstanding Achievement in the Service of the U.S. Government; New York Federal Executive Board; 2003

Chief’s Award; Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation Division; 2001

Federal Prosecutor of the Year; Federal Law Enforcement Foundation; 2000
Director's Award for Superior Performance; Department of Justice, Executive Office for United States Attorneys; 1991, 2000, 2003

Editor-in-chief, Fordham Law Review, 1984-85

10. Bar Associations: List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

Member, Federal Bar Council, approximately 1997 to present

11. Bar and Court Admission:

a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

June 2, 1986, admitted to New York State Bar, 1st Department.
There has been no lapse in membership.

b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

United States District Court for Eastern District of New York, admitted September 12, 1986

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, admitted March 26, 1987

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, admitted December 22, 1988

United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, admitted July 1, 1991

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, admitted January 22, 1992

12. Memberships:

a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or
participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

Alumni Schools Committee, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; approximately 1997 – present; member

Fordham Law Alumni Association; approximately September 2005 – present; board member

Hastings-on-Hudson PTSA; approximately September 2003 – present; board member

b. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

None of the organizations to which I belong or have belonged practice any such discrimination.

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.


b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

None
c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

None

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

Cleveland Bar Association; December 2006, "Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime."

I have appeared on numerous panels at Continuing Legal Education courses or the like. These tend to be unscripted, and I do not have transcripts or an outline of my comments. The panels in which I have participated over the last ten years are set forth below:

Fordham University School of Law, Fordham Law Women; March 2008, "Women in the Law: Shattering the Glass Ceiling."


New York County Lawyers’ Association/Federal Bar Council
Federal Criminal Practice Institute
"Pre-Trial Issues: Plea Bargaining"
May 2006, October 2007

Association of the Bar of the City of New York
"The ABCs of Federal Criminal Practice: A Practice Primer;" April 2006
"Lawyers in the Dock: When Does Good Lawyering Become Criminal Conduct? Ethical and Practical Considerations;" February 2006
"Representing Clients in Federal and State Tax Fraud Investigations;" January 2001, June 2007
American Bar Association White Collar Crime Conference; San Francisco, CA
"Plea Bargaining for Individuals";
March 2006

New York University School of Law, NYU Law Women
"Crafting a Career: Finding Professional and Personal Fulfillment as a Woman Lawyer"
October 2005

Princeton University, American Whig-Cliosophic Society
"Can a Lawyer Have a Life?"
October 2005

Federal Bar Council Winter Bench and Bar Conference; St. John, USVI
"Closing Arguments"
February 2001

Association of the Bar of the City of New York
American Bar Association, Section of Litigation
Annual Meeting, New York, NY
"You’ve Come A Long Way, Baby and Where Do We Go From Here?"
July 2000

Second Annual International Conference on Money Laundering in Banking and
Financial Systems; Rome, Italy
"International Organized Crime"
November 1997

c. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other
publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these
interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where
they are available to you.

*Seattle Times*, May 26, 1992, "Helmsley-Prosecution Team Member To Zero In
on Bankruptcy Fraud Here"


*New York Times*, July 19, 2000, "Life’s Work: Just Another Task in Paradise"

I also was interviewed for an A&E Biography program about Leona Helmsley.
14. **Judicial Office:** State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

I have not held a judicial office.

15. **Citations:** If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

   a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

   b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

   c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

   d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

   e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

   f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

     I have not served as a judge.

16. **Recusal:** If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

   a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

   b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;
c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

I have not served as a judge.

17. **Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:**

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

I have held no public office other than my positions with the United States Attorney’s Office. I have had no unsuccessful candidacies for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

None.

18. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

   From September 1985 – September 1987, I served as a clerk to the Honorable Joseph M. McLaughlin, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York

ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

   I have not practiced alone.
iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
1 St. Andrew’s Plaza
New York, NY 10007.
First Assistant United States Attorney, January 2008 – present
AUSA / Senior Trial Counsel, March 1999 – September 2005
AUSA / AUSA-in-Charge, June 1997 - March 1999
Assistant United States Attorney, September 1995 - May 1997
AUSA / Chief, General Crimes Unit, August 1993 - May 1995

July 1991 - June 1993
United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington
3600 Seafirst Fifth Avenue Plaza
Seattle, WA 98104
Special Assistant United States Attorney

September 1987 - June 1991
United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
1 St. Andrew’s Plaza
New York, NY 10007.
Assistant United States Attorney

September 1985 - September 1987
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Law Clerk to the Honorable Joseph M. McLaughlin, United States District Judge

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

Upon graduation from law school I spent two years (September 1985 – September 1987) clerking in the United States District Court for Judge McLaughlin. I became an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) in the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York in September 1987. I served in the General Crimes, Narcotics and Organized Crime Units. From 1991 to 1993, I was a Special AUSA in the Western District of Washington, where I was assigned to the Economic Crime
Unit. I returned to New York and the United States Attorney’s Office in 1993, and became Chief of the General Crimes Unit. I trained all new AUSAs and supervised their work. In 1995 I transferred to the Office’s White Plains branch, where I served as an AUSA in the criminal division for about two years, until I became AUSA in-Charge of the White Plains branch. In 1999 I returned to trial work, becoming Senior Trial Counsel for more than six years. In September 2005 I returned to the Manhattan office, serving as Deputy United States Attorney. In January 2008 I became First Assistant United States Attorney.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

After my clerkship (1985-1987), during which I assisted Judge McLaughlin with both civil and criminal matters, I spent the next 18 years (1987-2005) as a federal prosecutor, handling or supervising criminal cases on behalf of the United States. My responsibilities included conducting or supervising investigations, prosecutions, trials and appeals. In September 2005, I became Deputy United States Attorney. In that capacity, and in my current capacity as First Assistant U.S. Attorney, in addition to various management responsibilities, I supervise both criminal prosecutions and civil cases brought and defended by the federal government.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

My entire practice has been in litigation. During my stints as a non-supervisory AUSA (1987-1993, 1995-1997, 1999-2005), I appeared in court frequently. During my stints as a supervisor (1993-1995, 1997-1999, 2005-present), I appeared in court only occasionally. My practice has been exclusively in federal court, and the cases I have handled personally have all been criminal. In my current position I have some supervisory responsibility over civil matters.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 100%
   2. state courts of record;
   3. other courts.

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings;
   2. criminal proceedings: 100%
d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

I have tried 18 cases to verdict in U.S. District Court. In my first trial, I was the junior prosecutor. In two other cases at the start of my career, I tried the case, but a more senior prosecutor was present to supervise. In six cases, I was sole counsel. In nine cases, I tried the case with a partner or partners as co-counsel. Seventeen of the 18 trials were jury trials.

i. What percentage of these trials were:
   1. jury: 94%
   2. non-jury: 6%

e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

I have not practiced before the Supreme Court of the United States.

19. Litigation: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

   a. the date of representation;

   b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and

   c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

1. United States v. Avedis Khavaloujian, et al., 69 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1995); 970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1992).

I was a government prosecutor in this investigation of a narcotics money-laundering operation run out of Manhattan’s jewelry district. Another AUSA and I, along with Drug Enforcement Administration agents, conducted months of wiretaps, bugs and video surveillance at a Manhattan jewelry-district business that served as a front for the laundering of millions of dollars in proceeds of the sales of illegal narcotics. The investigation was also coordinated with U.S. Attorney’s Offices, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other investigating agencies.
throughout the country. My colleague and I coordinated the New York end of the nationwide takedown, which involved arrest warrants and (I believe) search warrants and seizure warrants. The investigation revealed that the New York operation was part of a Los Angeles-based network, and it was determined that prosecutions in that city were in the best interests of law enforcement. Accordingly, the defendants were charged in the Central District of California and convicted.

Co-Counsel:
AUSA Jonathan Liebman
Brillstein Entertainment Partners
9150 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 350
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
(310) 205-5132.


This case was a tax fraud prosecution of hotel and real estate executives. The nine-week trial ran from June through August 1989 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York before the Honorable John M. Walker, Jr. I represented the Government, along with my co-counsel. All three defendants were convicted and Helmsley appealed. I drafted most of the Government’s 110-page appellate brief, which was filed on June 29, 1990. I argued the appeal. The convictions were affirmed. Defendant Helmsley also filed a motion for a new trial. I assisted with the District Court litigation, although I was living in Seattle at the time. I cannot recall my precise role, but believe I drafted papers and attended at least one District Court hearing. The District Court (the Honorable Thomas P. Griesa) denied the motion. I drafted the Government’s 50-page appellate brief which, after editing, was filed on June 25, 1992. I argued the appeal. The denial of the motion was affirmed.

Co-Counsel:
AUSA James DeVita
Bryan Cave
245 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10167
(212) 541-1241

Special AUSA Diane Peress
Nassau County District Attorney’s Office
262 Old Country Road
Mineola, NY 11501
(516) 571-5065
Special AUSA Alfredo Mendez
Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Greenbert, Fornato & Einegér LLP
630 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017
(212) 279-0700

Opposing Counsel:
Gerald Feffer
Williams & Connolly
725 Twelfth Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 434-5007
Lead trial counsel for defendant Helmsley

Joseph Bentive
225 Broadway
New York, NY 10007
(212) 227-4700
Lead trial counsel for defendant Joseph Licari

William Brodsky
Fox Horan & Camerini
825 Third Avenue, 11th floor
New York, NY 10022
(212) 480-4800
Lead trial counsel for defendant Frank Turco

Alan Dershowitz
Harvard Law School
1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02130
(617) 495-4617
Lead appellate counsel for defendant Helmsley

Robert Bork
Hudson Institute
1015 15th Street N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 974-2400
Lead appellate counsel for defendant Helmsley on motion for new trial

This case was an interstate domestic violence murder prosecution of woman who, with an accomplice, ax-murdered and dismembered her estranged husband. It was the first murder prosecution under the Violence Against Women Act. The three-and-a-half week trial took place in January 1997 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Judge was the Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr. I tried the case, along with co-counsel. The defendant was convicted of conspiracy, murder and illegal wiretapping, and acquitted of extortion. The Government’s 90-page appellate brief was filed on November 20, 1997. I drafted the brief and argued the appeal. The conviction was affirmed. Also, I represented the United States in Gluzman’s petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 for a new trial, which was denied.

Co-Counsel:
AUSA Deirdre Daly
Daly & Pavlis
107 John Street
Southport, CT 06490
(203) 255-6700

Special AUSA Louis Valvo
Callan, Koster, Brady & Brennan
One Whitehall Street, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10004
(212) 248-8800

Opposing Counsel:
Lawrence Hochheiser
Hochheiser & Hochheiser
270 Madison Avenue, Suite 1203
New York, NY 10016
(212) 689-4343
Trial counsel for defendant Gluzman

Judd Burstein
1790 Broadway, Suite 1501
New York, NY 10019
(212) 974-2400
Appellate counsel for defendant Gluzman

Alan Untereiner
Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP
1801 K Street N.W., Suite 411
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 775-4505
Gluzman’s counsel for Section 2255 petition.

This case was a tax fraud prosecution of an attorney and an accountant. Prior to trial, the Government took an interlocutory appeal of the District Court’s dismissal of a portion of a count in the Indictment. The Government’s 45-page opening brief was filed on January 28, 2000, and its 26-page reply brief was filed on March 7, 2000. I assisted in preparing the briefs, along with co-counsel and other Assistant United States Attorneys. USA Jacobson argued the appeal. The District Court was affirmed. The five-and-a-half week trial took place in May and June 2000. I tried the case, along with USA’s Jacobson and Weddle. Albert Pirro was found guilty of all 34 counts with which he was charged. Anthony Pirro was convicted on 23 counts and acquitted on 10 counts. The Judge was the Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr. Anthony Pirro appealed his conviction. The Government’s 72-page brief was filed on February 12, 2001. I wrote the brief and argued the appeal. The conviction was affirmed.

Co-Counsel:
USA Elliott Jacobson
300 Quarropas Street
White Plains, NY 10601
(914) 993-1940

USA Justin Weddle
Department of Justice
1331 F. St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 514-1323

Opposing Counsel:
Gustave Newman
Newman & Greenberg
950 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 308-7900
Albert Pirro’s lead trial counsel

Roger Stavis
Gallet, Dreyer & Berkey
845 Third Avenue, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10022
(212) 935-3131
Anthony Pirro’s trial and appellate counsel

This case involved the investigation and a series of prosecutions of public officials of the Town of Poughkeepsie in Dutchess County. Four public officials -- William Paroli (County Election Commissioner), Fred Andros (Town Water Commissioner), James Pickles (Town Building Inspector), and Robert Kortright (Town Deputy Building Inspector) -- were convicted, and three others were charged and had their prosecutions deferred. I handled the investigation myself from April 1997 through February 1999, when AUSA Mark Godsey joined the case. In September 1999, I began working full-time on the Piro case and was replaced on the Poughkeepsie cases by AUSA Cari Robinson. I believe the charges against Paroli were the only ones brought after my departure from the case. Paroli, Pickles and Andros pleaded guilty. Kortright, who was charged with bribe-receiving and extortion under color of official right, went to trial in October 1998. I tried the one-week case myself. The Judge was the Honorable Richard Conway Casey (deceased). Kortright was convicted on both counts. He appealed his conviction. The Government's 32-page appellate brief was filed on September 17, 1999. I wrote the brief and argued the appeal. The conviction was affirmed.

**Co-Counsel:**
AUSA Mark Godsey
University of Cincinnati
Clifton Avenue & Calhoun Street
Cincinnati, OH 45221
(513) 556-0107

AUSA Cari Robinson
IBM
1133 Westchester Avenue
White Plains, NY 10604
(914) 642-4375

**Opposing Counsel:**
Solomon Abrahams
Trial counsel for defendant Kortright (Since convicted of criminal contempt in an unrelated matter; whereabouts unknown)

Ronald Cohen
Whereabouts unknown
Appellate counsel for defendant Kortright
6. **United States v. Mordechai Samet & Chaim Hollender**, S7 01 Cr. 216 (CM); 466 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2006); 2006 WL 2597869 (2d Cir. September 11, 2006); 2008 WL 162848 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2008).

This case was a prosecution for racketeering, money laundering and various substantive offenses arising from massive insurance, mass mailing, pyramid scheme, false tax return, bank and leasing frauds. The seven-week trial took place from October to December 2004. The Judge was the Honorable Colleen McMahon. I represented the Government, along with co-counsel. Both defendants were convicted and appealed. The Government’s 202-page appellate brief was filed in August 2004. I wrote portions of the brief. AUSA Barton argued the appeal. The convictions were affirmed. Both defendants also appealed from the District Court’s denial of their motions for resentencing. AUSA Margery Feinizg wrote the Government’s brief in opposition, and I argued the appeal on December 21, 2007. The Government argued as to Samet that resentencing was properly denied, and as to Hollender conceded that the case should be remanded but opposed Hollender’s request for remand to a different judge. The Government prevailed.

**Co-Counsel:**
AUSA Maria Barton
35 Maple Hill Drive
Larchmont, NY 10538
(914) 834-5046

AUSA Sean Eskovitz
Munger Tolles & Olson
355 South Grand Avenue, 35th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 683-9178

**Opposing Counsel:**
Samuel I. Bursten
(since convicted of obstruction of justice in unrelated matter)
Lead trial counsel for defendant Samet

Vincent Briccetti
Briccetti Calhoun & Lawrence
81 Main Street, Suite 450
White Plains, NY 10601
(914) 946-5900
Lead trial counsel for defendant Hollender
Diarmuid White
White & White
148 East 78th Street
New York, NY 10021
(212) 861-9850
Samet’s appellate counsel

Andrew Citron
67 Wall Street
New York, NY 10271
(212) 804-5759
Hollender’s appellate counsel

Randy Mastro
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher
200 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10166
(212) 351-3825
Appellate counsel for Samet on resentencing appeal

Arthur S. Friedman
275 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10016
(212) 986-1144
Appellate counsel for Hollender on resentencing appeal


This case was a related matter to the previous case, United States v. Mordechai Samet & Chaim Hollender. Wiesel was a tax return preparer convicted for conspiring to commit and committing mail fraud, and conspiring to present and presenting false claims to the United States, arising from a scheme to file hundreds of false tax returns fraudulently claiming refunds arising from the earned income credit. The Government’s 62-page brief was filed on August 6, 2003. I drafted the brief and argued the appeal. The conviction and sentence were affirmed.

Opposing Counsel:
Nathan Dershowitz
Dershowitz Eiger & Adelson
220 Fifth Avenue, Suite 300
New York, NY 10001
(212) 889-4009

This was the trial of a private investigator who impersonated a federal agent in connection with a custody dispute. The three-day trial took place in January 1994 before the Honorable John S. Martin, Jr. I tried the case myself. The defendant was convicted. Another prosecutor handled the appeal, and I handled the defendant's petition for post-conviction relief. The conviction was upheld.

Opposing Counsel:
John Kerrigan, Jr.
174 Middletown Blvd.
Langhorne, PA 19042
(215) 741-7144


This was a perjury and obstruction of justice prosecution arising out of shootout, on a sidewalk outside a radio station, between entourages of two rap performers. The three-week trial took place in March 2005. I represented the Government at trial along with co-counsel. Both defendants were convicted of conspiracy and multiple counts of perjury, and acquitted of obstruction of justice. Neither defendant appealed. The Judge was the Honorable Gerard Lynch.

Co-Counsel:
AUSA Daniel Gitner
Lanier, Siffert & Wohl
500 Fifth Avenue, 33rd floor
New York, NY 10110
(212) 921-8399

Opposing Counsel:
Mel Sachs, (deceased)
Trial counsel for Jones

Paul Shechtman
Stillman Friedman & Shechtman
425 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 223-0200
Sentencing counsel for Jones
Brian Kaplan
Goldberg & Kaplan
55 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004
(212) 269-2363
Counsel for Dopwell


In this case I represented the government, along with co-counsel, in the trial of a former United Nations ("UN") procurement officer for accepting corrupt payments from representatives of companies doing business with UN and for mail and wire fraud arising from a scheme to deprive the UN of his honest services. The three-week trial began in May 2007 and concluded in June 2007. The Judge was the Honorable Thomas P. Griesa. The defendant was convicted on all counts.

**Co-Counsel:**
AUSA Alexander Willscher
1 St. Andrew’s Plaza
New York, NY 10007
(212) 637-2736

**Opposing Counsel:**
Richard Herman
300 Park Avenue, Suite 1700
New York, NY 10022
(212) 759-6300

20.  **Legal Activities:** Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organizations(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

I have not performed any lobbying activities.

My service in the U.S. Attorney’s Office has included more than just litigation. For example, I have also been very involved in training in the office, giving lectures on substantive areas of criminal law or on trial practice, critiquing participants in our in-house trial training program, doing demonstrations for that program, and supervising junior Assistant U.S. Attorneys in their early trials or suppression hearings. I have also frequently participated in panels and programs on criminal law, criminal practice or
ethics for Continuing Legal Education sessions presented by various bar associations or educational groups. I have also spoken at programs on women in the legal profession.

My positions as Deputy U.S. Attorney and now First Assistant have also involved coordination with state and local law enforcement, as well as the various federal law enforcement agencies. Communicating with those entities on sensitive issues and keeping those relationships healthy has been an important part of my job.

Finally, it is my responsibility to supervise our Public Information Office, an often tricky task, as the public’s interest in knowing about the activities of a prosecutor’s office can often conflict with the needs of law enforcement or the statutes and rules that limit what a prosecutor can say about an investigation or prosecution. The U.S. Attorney and I have taken several measures to improve our relationship with the press that covers our office, including providing daily press guidance about upcoming events, establishing 24/7 availability of press officers, placing more public documents on our web site, issuing fact sheets about various areas of our practice, and doing more to explain the constraints under which we must work, rather than simply saying “no” to press requests.

A significant legal activity I pursued, which did not proceed to trial, was the case of *In re Tommy Hilfiger USA Inc*. This was an investigation of a garment manufacturer for possible tax crimes. The investigation began in 2004 and ended in August 2005 with the announcement of non-prosecution agreement under which the corporation agreed to amend its tax returns, pay approximately $18 million in back taxes and interest, self-report to Hong Kong taxing authorities, and adopt corporate reforms.

21. **Teaching:** What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

I am currently co-teaching a trial practice class at Columbia Law School. There is a small lecture and demonstration component to the class, but most of it consists of our critiques of student performances. The class culminates in a mock trial. For a brief period (June 1994 - April 1995) I served as an Adjunct Associate Professor, running the discussion component of the Criminal Law externship program for Fordham Law students serving as externs in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. I met with the externs in group each week. During these meetings, we discussed events in the Office that week and matters on which the externs were working. I endeavored to place those matters in context for the students, raise issues presented by the cases, and answer questions.

22. **Deferred Income/Future Benefits:** List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or
customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

None.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

None. My teaching commitment at Columbia Law School is only for January – April 2008.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.) See attached Financial Disclosure Report.

25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

   a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

Aside from the ordinary conflicts that would be occasioned if a party in which I held a financial interest were a litigant in a case before me, I believe I would have a conflict in cases that were open matters in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York during the time I was Deputy U.S. Attorney or First Assistant U.S. Attorney. This is so because in that position, I have nominal supervisory authority over all matters (civil or criminal) in the Office. I believe that that would present an appearance of conflict even if I had no actual knowledge of the case. If I am confirmed, I would have to review the cases assigned to me for which the U.S. Attorney’s Office represents a party and undertake the appropriate inquiries to make sure that it was not an open matter during my tenure as Deputy U.S. Attorney or First Assistant U.S. Attorney. In the
past, when similarly situated former prosecutors have become District Judges, the Office has added a section to the form it files with each new case. That section states the date the matter was opened, so that cases presenting a conflict can be readily identified.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedures you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

In all cases of any actual or potential conflict of interest, I will follow the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, applicable statutes, as well as policies and procedures established by the District Court, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the Judicial Conference.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility calls for "every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged." Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

My entire legal career has been in public service and I have done no pro bono legal work per se. While I have not devoted as much time as I would like to serving the disadvantaged, I have done and continue to do community service, some of which assists the disadvantaged. I am officer of my local Parent-Teacher-Student Association, an important function of which is to raise funds to provide to students who cannot afford field trips, longer study trips, instrument rentals, SAT preparation classes, Advanced Placement examinations, and the like. I devote anywhere from 3 to 12 hours a month to the PTSA during the school year. Through my synagogue, I occasionally assist at The Children's Village, a local residential facility for boys for whom foster care has been unsuccessful. The synagogue has "adopted" one of the cottages in which the boys live, and members visit for a few hours to read, celebrate holidays or play pick-up sports. Finally, each Christmas I volunteer, with my family, at the holiday dinner and party at a nearby soup kitchen.

28. **Selection Process:**

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.
In June 2007, I submitted a screening questionnaire to Senator Charles Schumer’s Judicial Screening Panel. I interviewed with that panel on July 12, 2007. On July 31, 2007, I met again with panel chair Mark O’Donoghue, panel member David Barrett, and Senator Schumer’s chief Judiciary counsel, Preet Bharara. On August 3, 2007, I met with Senator Schumer and Mr. Bharara. After Senator Schumer recommended me to the White House for nomination, I interviewed on September 19, 2007 with staff from the White House Counsel’s Office and the Department of Justice. On or about November 6, 2007, I was informed that a preliminary decision had been reached to go forward with my name. Since then, I have communicated with staff at the Department of Justice regarding nomination paperwork and the process in general. My nomination was submitted to the United States Senate on March 11, 2008.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
NOMINATION FILING

1. Person Reporting (Last name, first, middle initial)
   Cathy, Schul

2. Title (If applicant, title or position held; if judge, title or name)
   District Judge — elected

3. Court or Organization
   U.S. District Court — S.D. N.Y.

4. Date of Report
   03/12/2008

5. Reporting Period
   04/01/2007
   to
   03/31/2008

6. Report Type (check appropriate type)
   Amended Report

7. Chambers or Office Address
   1 St. Andrew's Plaza
   New York, NY 10017

I. POSITIONS
   ☐ NONE (See reportable positions)

   POSITION
   NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY

   1. Vice-President (middle school)
      Hastings on Hudson PTSA

   2. Board member
      Fordham Law Alumni Association

   3. Lecturer in Law (part-time trial practice instructor)
      Columbia University School of Law

   4.

   5.

II. AGREEMENTS
   ☐ NONE (See reportable agreements)

   DATE
   PARTIES AND TERMS

   1. 2008
      $2500 compensation for instructing Trial Practice course at Columbia University School of Law January - April 2008

   2.

   3.
### III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME

#### A. Filer's Non-Investment Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME (years, not spousal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2008</td>
<td>Columbia University – payment for teaching</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B. Spouse's Non-Investment Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2008</td>
<td>Columbia University; salary as faculty member and physician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2008</td>
<td>University of Vermont, biennialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2007</td>
<td>Columbia University; salary as faculty member and physician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 2007</td>
<td>Washington Post, payment for writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 2007</td>
<td>American Association of Medical Colleges, biennialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 2007</td>
<td>Duke University, biennialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 2007</td>
<td>New England Journal of Medicine, payment for writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 2007</td>
<td>New York Times, payment for writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 2007</td>
<td>Wake Forest University, biennialism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. REIMBURSEMENTS

(Include those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 25-27 of instructions.)

#### A. Filer's Reimbursements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>exempt</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### V. GIFTS
(Include those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 28-31 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- NONE (No reportable gifts.)

### VI. LIABILITIES
(Include those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 32-33 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- NONE (No reportable liabilities.)
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-36 of filing instructions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of assets (including real estate)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Amount (Code 1 in parentheses)</td>
<td>(2) Type (Code 2 in parentheses)</td>
<td>(3) Value (Code 3 in parentheses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place &quot;X&quot; after each entry except prior disclosure</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. American Century Vista Fund</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. AT&amp;T common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. AT&amp;T common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bank of America</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chase Manhattan checking account</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Comcast common stock</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Comcast common stock</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Dreyfus Global Total Return Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Dreyfus NY Tax Exempt Bond Fund</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Enbridge Energy Partners LP common stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Fidelity Magellan Fund (IRA)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Fidelity Capital Appreciation Fund (IRA)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Fidelity NY Multi Income Fund</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. IBM common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Janus Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. John Hancock Patience Div Fund I common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Metropolitan Transportation Authority NY</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(In thousands)</td>
<td>A = $1,000 or less</td>
<td>B = $1,001 - $10,000</td>
<td>C = $10,001 - $50,000</td>
<td>D = $50,001 - $100,000</td>
<td>E = $100,001 - $1,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In thousands)</td>
<td>F = $1,000,001 - $10,000,000</td>
<td>G = $10,000,001 - $50,000,000</td>
<td>H = $50,000,001 - $100,000,000</td>
<td>I = $100,000,001 - $1,000,000,000</td>
<td>J = $1,000,000,001 - $10,000,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In thousands)</td>
<td>K = Over $10,000,000,000</td>
<td>L = No report $0,000</td>
<td>M = Over $1,000,000,000,000</td>
<td>N = Over $1,000,000,000,000,000</td>
<td>O = Over $1,000,000,000,000,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In shares)</td>
<td>P = Over 10,000,000</td>
<td>Q = Over 1,000,000,000</td>
<td>R = Over 10,000,000,000,000</td>
<td>S = Over 100,000,000,000,000,000</td>
<td>T = Over 1,000,000,000,000,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Other)</td>
<td>U = Over 100,000,000,000,000</td>
<td>V = Over 10,000,000,000,000,000</td>
<td>W = Over 100,000,000,000,000,000,000</td>
<td>X = Over 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000</td>
<td>Y = Over 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00414 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS – income, value, transactions (Includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 36-40 of filing instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description of Assets (Including trust assets)</th>
<th>B. Interest during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Type (e.g., div., nat., etc.)</td>
<td>(5) Date (M, D, or N/A)</td>
<td>(6) Date (M, D, or N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6) Value Code-2 (I-P)</td>
<td>(7) Date (M, D, or N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8) Gain Code-1 (A-D)</td>
<td>(9) Identifying information (if any transactions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Municipal Bonds**
  - 18. Morgan Stanley Active Asset Money Trust
  - 19. NY State 529 College Savings Plan
  - 20. NY State 529 College Savings Plan
  - 21. RS Growth Fund
  - 22. TIAA/CREF stock fund (retirement annuity)
  - 23. TIAA/CREF global equity fund (retirement annuity)
  - 24. T Rowe Price Blue Chip Growth Fund IRA
  - 25. T Rowe Price Blue Chip Growth Fund IRA
  - 26. T Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund
  - 27. T Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund
  - 28. T Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund
  - 29. Vanguard 500 Index Fund (retirement annuity)
  - 30. Vanguard International Growth Fund (retirement annuity)
  - 31. Ziegert Total Return Fund Inc.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Gain</th>
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<td>0-15,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>15,001-35,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>35,001-50,000</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>D</td>
<td>50,001-75,000</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>75,001-100,000</td>
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<td>$5,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>100,001-350,000</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>350,001-500,000</td>
<td>$7,000</td>
<td>$7,000</td>
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</tr>
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<td>H</td>
<td>500,001-750,000</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>750,001-1,000,000</td>
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<td>$9,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>1,000,001-4,000,000</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
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<td>K</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<td>20,000,001-35,000,000</td>
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<td>P</td>
<td>35,000,001-75,000,000</td>
<td>$16,000</td>
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<td>Q</td>
<td>75,000,001-100,000,000</td>
<td>$17,000</td>
<td>$17,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>R</td>
<td>100,000,001-200,000,000</td>
<td>$18,000</td>
<td>$18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>200,000,001-400,000,000</td>
<td>$19,000</td>
<td>$19,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>400,000,001-700,000,000</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>700,000,001-1,000,000,000</td>
<td>$21,000</td>
<td>$21,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS

Non-investment income received during the reporting period included compensation for employment by the United States.

Training payment in Part III.A is not reportable.

---

### IX. CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it is not applicable statutory provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that unrealized income from outside employment and holdings and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 7353, and Judicial Conference regulations.

Signature: [Signature]
Date: 3/12/01

---

NOTICE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FALSIFIES OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (5 U.S.C. app. § 18a)

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**FILING INSTRUCTIONS**

Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:

Committee on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 2-301
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544
FINANCIAL STATEMENT as of 12/31/07

NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed securities-add schedule</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities-add schedule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-add schedule</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto and other personal property</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash value-life insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets intangible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See attached schedule</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTINGENT LIABILITIES</th>
<th>GENERAL INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As-endorser, co-maker or guarantor</td>
<td>Are any assets pledged? (Add schedule)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On leases or contracts</td>
<td>Are you defenestrated in any suit or legal action?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Claims</td>
<td>Have you ever taken bankruptcy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for Federal Income Tax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other special debt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Assets | 3 | 269 | 000 |
Total liabilities | 175 | 200 |
Net Worth | 3 | 093 | 900 |
Total liabilities and net worth | 3 | 269 | 100 |
## FINANCIAL STATEMENT as of 12/31/07

### NET WORTH SCHEDULES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Listed Securities</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T</td>
<td>$2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comcast</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enbridge Energy Partners</td>
<td>25,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hancock Patriot Premium Dividend Fund</td>
<td>11,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zweig Total Return Fund</td>
<td>13,500</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Listed Securities</strong></td>
<td><strong>$69,100</strong></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real Estate Owned</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>$800,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Assets</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Century Vista Fund</td>
<td>$72,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandywine Fund</td>
<td>110,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dreyfus New York Tax-Exempt Bond Fund</td>
<td>29,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dryden Global Total Return Fund</td>
<td>5,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fidelity Capital Appreciation Fund IRA</td>
<td>17,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fidelity Magellan Fund IRA</td>
<td>35,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fidelity New York Municipal Income Fund</td>
<td>60,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Janus Fund</td>
<td>125,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTA New York municipal bonds</td>
<td>10,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York 529 College Savings Plans</td>
<td>49,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS Growth Fund</td>
<td>62,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thrift Savings Plan</td>
<td>437,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIAA/CREF Stock Fund retirement annuity</td>
<td>182,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIAA/CREF Global Equities Fund retirement annuity</td>
<td>38,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Rowe Price Blue Chip Growth Fund IRA 1</td>
<td>15,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>T. Rowe Price Blue Chip Growth Fund IRA 2</td>
<td>16,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanguard 500 Index Fund retirement annuity</td>
<td>221,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard International Growth Fund retirement annuity</td>
<td>65,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Other Assets</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,557,300</strong></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real Estate Mortgages Payable</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>$163,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AFFIDAVIT

I, Cathy Seikel, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

5/12/08
(DATE)

Cathy Seikel
(NAME)

(Jurat)

JEANETTE ANN GRAVIEB
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 01GR495793
Qualified in Kings County
Commission Expires Nov 30, 2009
Senator SCHUMER. Great. Okay. Thank you.

And finally, last but not least, I’d like to introduce the current distinguished U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York and the President’s nominee to the bench for that same District, Mr. Glenn T. Suddaby.

Mr. Suddaby has been a U.S. Attorney since 2002, but his ties to the Northern District go much further than that. He received his B.A. from Suny at Plattsburg, then received his law degree from Syracuse University, and then began his career as a prosecutor in Onondaga County, which is the county that the city of Syracuse is in.

After a short stint in the private sector at the Syracuse law firm of Mentor, Ruben, and Trivelpiece, Mr. Suddaby returned to the Onondaga County District Attorney’s Office as the First Chief Assistant District Attorney, and he served in that position for 10 years. Between college and law school, he served for several years as a legislative aide in the New York State legislature.

Mr. Suddaby has earned his reputation as a hard-working prosecutor who has, in particular, targeted corruption throughout his District. Mr. Suddaby’s impressive career in law enforcement and his commitment to placing the rule of law ahead of ideology make him a fine choice for New York and for the Northern District.

Mr. Suddaby and his wife Jane have two children.

Mr. Suddaby, please make any remarks you wish to make, and introduce your family.

STATEMENT OF GLENN T. SUDDABY, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Mr. SUDDABY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I want to thank Senator Leahy and the Committee for the opportunity to be here. Senator Brownback, I want to thank you, sir, for being here as well.

I want to particularly thank you, Senator Schumer, for your support now for the second time. I would like to thank the President for the nomination for the ability to sit here today. Thank you.

My family is here. My wife Jane, of almost 19 years on August 25th, and my oldest son, Conor, and my younger son, Ryan.

Senator SCHUMER. Please stand so we may say hello. Welcome. Thank you all for being here.

Okay. Well, great. Now let’s begin some questions.

Here is my first question to all four nominees. There’s been an age-old debate about how exactly a free society should balance security and liberty. I’ve always been a strong believer we can have both, that we can continue to exercise the liberty guaranteed by our Constitution without hampering the ability of government to protect us from those who would do us harm. We know there are plenty of people like that, particularly these days.

I believe that our constitutional system requires checks and balances. The most important check on over-reaching executive power is the Federal judiciary. As a judge you will be on the front lines of the debate of how to balance liberty and security. How should a judge approach this question? How will you go about balancing these interests on the bench? We’ll start with Mr. Gardephe and work our way to my right.
Mr. GARDEPHE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The place I would begin, of course, is with our Constitution and laws that govern our country, and have governed it for the last 200 years. I would be guided by the fact that we have been able to maintain our principles through war and peace for the last 200 years, and most recently by the experience of the prosecutions in the Southern District of New York regarding the first attack on the World Trade Center, as well as the seditious conspiracy involving Sheik Rahman.

I believe in both of those cases the judges involved were able to balance those important—indeed, vital—considerations that you just mentioned, and that we can be confident in the future that those critical values can be balanced.

[The biographical information follows.]
1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).
   
   Glenn Thomas Suddaby

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.

   United States District Judge for the Northern District of New York

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.

   U.S. Attorney’s Office-Northern District of New York
   100 South Clinton Street
   Syracuse, New York 13261

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.

   1956; Glens Falls, New York

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.

   I am married to Jane E. Fahey-Suddaby.
   She is employed as Assistant Superintendent, Oswego County Board of Cooperative Educational Services; 179 County Route 64; Oswego, New York 13114.
   We have two dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.

   Syracuse University College of Law, 8/82 through 5/85; Juris Doctorate, May 1985
   State University of New York at Plattsburgh, 1/76 through 5/80; B.A., May 1980

7. **Employment Record:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other
enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with
which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee
since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services.
Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where
appropriate.

10/02 to Present
U.S. Attorney’s Office-Northern District of New York
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, New York 13261
United States Attorney

1/92 to 10/02
Onondaga County District Attorney
505 S. State Street - 4th Floor
Syracuse, NY 13202
First Chief Assistant District Attorney

1/89 to 1/92
Menter, Rudin & Trivelpiece, P.C.
500 South Salina St.
Syracuse, NY 13202
Associate Attorney

9/83 to 1/89
Onondaga County District Attorney
505 S. State Street - 4th Floor
Syracuse, NY 13202
Law clerk, 9/83 to 5/85; Assistant District Attorney, 5/85 to 1/89

6/80 to 7/84
New York State Assembly
Legislative Office Building
Albany, NY 12247
Legislative Assistant

7/80 to 8/82
New York State Senate (Honorable Robert B. Stafford)
Albany, NY 12247
Legislative Assistant

Empire Housing & Development Corporation
643 Park Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13204
Board Member (1995 to 2002)
8. **Military Service and Draft Status:** Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

   I have not served in the military.

9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

   Southside American Little League Award Recognizing Service to Youth; April 2007

   City of Syracuse, Department of Police Recognition for Commitment to Gang Prosecution; February 2007

   American Bar Association, Division for Public Education Recognition for Commitment to Youth Court Programs; April 2006

   City of Schenectady-Recognition for Weed & Seed Commitment; July 2004

   U.S. Department of Justice Award for Public Service Northern District of New York; April 2001

   New York State Fire Investigators Associations Arson Prosecutor of the Year; 2001

   Order of the Barristers; 1985

   Syracuse College of Law National Trial Team; 1984 - 1985

   Grossman Trial Competition First Place; 1983 – 1984
   Most Outstanding Advocate - Second Year (1983); Best Brief Award - Second Year (1983)

   National Leadership Honor Society Omicron Delta Kappa; 1978

10. **Bar Associations:** List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

   Federal Court Bar Association-Northern District of New York - Current Member
   American Bar Association
   New York State Bar Association
   New York State Trial Lawyers Association
   Onondaga County Bar Association - Current Member
   National District Attorney's Association
New York State District Attorneys Association - Associate Member - Current Association of Government Attorneys in Capitol Litigation

11. **Bar and Court Admission:**

   a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

   New York State; January 25, 1986
   Commonwealth of Massachusetts; December 18, 1985
   *I am in good standing but in “retired” status with the Massachusetts bar, as I am not practicing in Massachusetts.*

   b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

   New York State, 1986
   Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1986
   United States District Court, Northern District of New York, 1986

12. **Memberships:**

   a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

   (Steering Committee Member)

   Police Services in Onondaga County Beyond 2000 Committee-1997-2002
   (Chairman of Records and Evidence)

   Empire Housing and Development Corporation- 1995-2002
   (Board of Directors)

   Catholic Charities - 1995-2002
   (Fundraising Committee)

   Catholic Youth Organization - 1986-2002
   (Coach)
Moot Court Advisor - Syracuse University College of Law - 1986-2002

Southside American Little League - 1999-2002
(Board of Directors and Coach)

YMCA - 1985-1994
(Member)

Town of Onondaga Century Club - 1996-2002


b. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion—either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

None.

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

I have written three Opinion editorials which were published as follows:

September 29, 2003; DOJ Prosecution Guidelines and the Patriot Act
July 20, 2005; Reauthorization of the Patriot Act
May 1, 2007; Law Enforcement Use of Sting Operations

b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

None.

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

2/26/03; Dafir Indictment
9/16/03; Youth Court Future Leaders
10/03; New York State Magistrates Dinner
3/9/04; New York State Police Academy - Patriot Act
5/13/04; Henniger High School - Violence Intervention
1/7/05; Awards Ceremony
1/05; Forfeiture Presentation
2/14/05; Cortland County Legislature Community Outreach - Patriot Act
4/14/05; Corcoran High School; Boot Camp Moms
4/16/05; Crime Victims Memorial
5/2/05; Red Mass Speech
5/9/05; Civic Center; Boot Camp Moms
5/16/05; Fowler High School; Boot Camp Moms
5/20/05; Henniger High School; Boot Camp Moms
5/27/05; Nottingham High School; Boot Camp Moms
7/27/05; Corcoran High School; Boot Camp Moms
8/05; Gang Speech Law Enforcement
9/14/05; Albany United Jewish Group - Patriot Act
10/5/05; Plattsburgh Money Laundering Seminar - Patriot Act
10/05; Schenectady Rotary Club - Patriot Act
12/6/05; Albany Citizens Academy Alumni - Patriot Act
12/8/05; Nottingham High School; Gang Violence
1/20/06; Levy Middle School; Boot Camp Moms
1/25/06; Shea Middle School; Boot Camp Moms
2/16/06; Grant Middle School; Boot Camp Moms
2/21/06; Syracuse Jewish Federation, Inc. - Patriot Act
3/7/06; Albany-DCJS - Patriot Act
3/23/06; Roberts Middle School; Boot Camp Moms
4/4/06; Skaneateles High School; U.S. Atty’s Position
420

4/14/06; Skaneatles High School; The U.S. Attorney’s Role
4/24/06; Danforth Middle School; Boot Camp Moms
5/16/06; Blodgett Middle School; Boot Camp Moms
6/2/06; Beard Middle School; Boot Camp Moms
11/6/06; Christian Brothers Academy; Introduction to Law
12/14/06; Gang Prevention Symposium

e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

As United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, I have commented on numerous occasions or responded to media inquiries concerning cases and law enforcement programs. The majority of these are unavailable to me. I have made the following media appearances:

1/21/03; Channel 9-WIXT (Christy Casciano)
9/10/03; Paul Vandenberg; Patriot Act
9/16/03; Colonie Youth Court; Capital District Media; Our Future Leaders
9/17/03; WIXT (Cristy Casciano)
3/14/05; WAER Radio (Scott Willis)
6/7/05; WSYR Radio-Jim Reith Show
6/28/05; WSYR Channel 9 (Cristy Casciano); Boot Camp Moms
7/14/05; WSYR Radio-Jim Reith Show; Gang Violence
9/6/05; WCNY TV Channel 24; Gang Intervention
9/29/05; WSYR Radio (Erin Covey); Gang Violence
6/15/07; Paul Vandenberg Show; Aref & Hussain Convictions and Project Safe Childhood
7/23/07; Steve on Sunday Show; A Look At the U.S. Attorney’s Office-NDNY

14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

I have not served as a judge.

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

7
c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your
decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant
criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on
appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your
substantive or procedural rulings;

e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued
an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are
filed and/or stored; and

f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not
issue an opinion.

I have not served as a judge.

16. Recusal: If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or
matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you
recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or
in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal
system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general
description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the
following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant
or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you
recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action
taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any
other ground for recusal.

I have not served as a judge.

17. Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices,
including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or
appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed
you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for
elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.
1980 to 1984 (appointed) Legislative Assistant
New York State Assembly
Assemblyman Hyman Miller
Assemblyman Andrew Ryan

1980 to 1982 (appointed) Legislative Assistant
New York State Senate
Senator Ronald B. Stafford

1985 to 1989 (appointed) Assistant District Attorney - Onondaga County
District Attorney Richard Hennesey
District Attorney Robert Wildridge

1992 to 1997 (appointed) Chief Assistant District Attorney - Homicide Bureau
Onondaga County-District Attorney William J. Fitzpatrick

1997 to 10/2002 (appointed) First Chief Assistant District Attorney
Onondaga County-District Attorney William J. Fitzpatrick

Sept 2000 (appointed) Special Assistant District Attorney - Franklin County
District Attorney Andrew Schrader

Oct 2002 President Bush appointed me United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, following confirmation by the United States Senate.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

I served on the "Fitzpatrick for the People" Committee to elect District Attorney William J. Fitzpatrick. I was Treasurer, 1990 – 1991.

18. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

I did not serve as a clerk to a judge.
ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

I have not practiced alone.

iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

U.S. Attorney's Office-Northern District of New York
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, New York 13261
United States Attorney, 10/02 to Present

Onondaga County District Attorney
505 S. State Street - 4th Floor
Syracuse, NY 13202
First Chief Assistant District Attorney, 1/92 to 10/02
Assistant District Attorney, 5/85 to 1/89

Menter, Rudin & Trivelpiece, P.C.
500 South Salina St.
Syracuse, NY 13202
Associate Attorney, 1/89 to 1/92

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

My practice has been primarily as a career prosecutor, except for 3 years (1989-1992) when my practice was focused on civil litigation.

From 1985 – 1986 I served as a Criminal Law Associate with the Onondaga County District Attorney's Office. I was assigned to handle cases in Justice Court and Traffic Court.

From 1986 – 1989 I served as an Assistant District Attorney. I prosecuted cases in the following areas: Crime Victims Assistant, DWI, White Collar, Sex Crimes, and violent felonies.

In 1989, until 1992 I was in private practice with Menter, Rudin, Trivelpiece, P.C. as an Associate Attorney. I served in the Litigation Department as a Trial Attorney focusing on corporate, civil, personal injury, and criminal matters.
In 1992 I returned to the Onondaga County District Attorney's Office. I served as Chief Assistant District Attorney where I was supervisor Homicide Bureau. I personally prosecuted over 80 homicide cases. In 1997 I became First Chief Assistant District Attorney where I was responsible for the daily administration of the District Attorney's office. I supervised 45 Assistant District Attorneys, 14 Investigators and 40 support staff personnel. In September 2000 I was appointed as Special Assistant District Attorney to Franklin County for prosecution of Murder in the First Degree case. I was the District Attorney's representative for U.S. Attorney/District Attorney joint prosecution of gun cases ("S.A.F.E." - Strategically Applied Firearms Enforcement.)

Since October 2002 I have served as United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York. In addition to my duties as United States Attorney, I am chairman of Attorney General's Advisory Counsel Border and Immigration Sub Committee; a member of Attorney General's Advisory Counsel Environmental Issues Sub-Committee; a member of the Attorney General's Advisory Counsel Native American Issues Sub Committee; a member of the Attorney General's Advisory Counsel Regional Law Enforcement Information Sharing Working Group; and a Justice Department representative for the International Joint Management Team for the United States and Canada's Integrated Border Enforcement Teams.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

As a prosecutor, I have represented the government in criminal prosecutions. In private practice I was involved in Civil Litigation and Criminal Defense. My clients were corporations, financial institutions, and small business.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

My entire practice has been in litigation as a prosecutor and civil litigator. The frequency of court appearances has diminished significantly since becoming U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York in 2002. As an Assistant District Attorney, I had daily court appearances - calendar, motion hearings, and trials. In my civil practice, I had weekly appearances for motions, hearings and trials. As U.S. Attorney, I appear infrequently in court.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 15%
   2. state courts of record: 80%
   3. other courts: 5%
ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
1. civil proceedings: 20%
2. criminal proceedings: 80%

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

I have tried to verdict or judgment over 70 cases as sole or chief counsel.

i. What percentage of these trials were:
1. jury: 85%
2. non-jury: 15%

e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

I have not practiced before the Supreme Court of the United States.

19. **Litigation:** Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

a. the date of representation;

b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and

c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

1. **People v. Phillip Whalen,** 255 AD2d 980, lv denied 93 NY2d 981; Onondaga County Court, Hon. William J. Burke; June 1995 - September 1996

I prosecuted the defendant, who murdered two women on separate occasions. These cases went unsolved for several years because the victims' bodies were never found. I directed the police and grand jury investigations which led to an indictment based on circumstantial evidence. These were the only murder cases in the history of Onondaga County to be prosecuted where the victims' bodies were never recovered, and one of only a few in New York State. After trial, the defendant was found Guilty of Murder Second Degree (2 counts).
2. **People v. Lawrence Tutt**, Indictment No. 2000-0025-1, Index No. 9910719.
Supreme Court Onondaga County, Hon. John J. Brunetti; December 1998-September 2000.

I prosecuted this defendant who used the victim's identity to smuggle drugs across the U.S. Border into New Mexico. When caught, arrested and charged with Federal crimes he was released on bail under the name of the victim William Freitag. While out on bail the defendant traveled to New York and killed the victim by setting fire to his home while he slept. The defendant's motive was to deceive authorities into believing the man arrested for drug trafficking had died in an accidental house fire, thereby eliminating any chance of being held accountable for impersonation and drug trafficking. The case, originally classified as an accident, went unsolved for a year and one-half. I conducted the Grand Jury investigation which resulted in the indictment and thereafter the prosecution at trial which ended in the conviction of the defendant for murder, arson and criminal impersonation.

Opposing Counsel:
Thomas J. Miller, Esq.
314 E. Fayette St.
Syracuse, NY 13202
Telephone (315) 448-0126

3. **People v. Angel Carrasquillo**, Indict. No. 2000-0637-, 1, Index No. 0010645;
Onondaga County Court, Hon. Anthony F. Aloi; February 2000 - May 2001

I prosecuted Angel Carrasquillo for multiple crimes including two murders. This was a Capital Murder case that resulted from the defendant having a domestic dispute with his pregnant girlfriend during which he held her and seven members of her family at gunpoint for over ten hours. Defendant's girlfriend survived multiple stab wounds, however her younger 17 year old brother was stabbed to death and her Aunt was shot and killed by the defendant. During the 10 hours, the defendant also committed a knife point rape of his girlfriend’s sister-in-law and the kidnapping of young children family members. I was the prosecutor from the inception of the police investigation through Grand Jury, motion practice, hearings and had prepared the case for trial when the defendant pled guilty to all charges including two counts of First Degree Murder. He was sentenced to life without parole.
Opposing Counsel:
Sonya Zoghlin, Esq. and William T. Easton, Esq.
New York State Capital Defender Office
277 Alexander St., Suite 600
Rochester, NY 14607
Telephone (716) 232-5480

4. **People v. Sun Chin**, 111,234 AD2d 1014; Onondaga County Court, Hon. J. Kevin Mulroy; November 1995 - July 1997

This was a capital murder case and the first potential death penalty case in Onondaga County after the re-enactment of New York's Death Penalty Statute in 1995. The defendant killed two women. He strangled his first victim during an argument over money for sexual acts and then stabbed to death a neighbor who had seen him with the first victim. I was the prosecutor from the start of the police investigation through grand jury, motion practice, hearings and was prepared for trial when the defendant pled guilty to First Degree Murder. He was sentenced to life without parole.

Opposing Counsel:
William T. Easton, Esq.
New York State Capital Defender Office
277 Alexander St., Suite 600
Rochester, NY 14607
Telephone (716)232-5480

5. **People v. Thomas Stewart**, 89 NY2d 496, af'd after remand for trial, 256 AD2d 1147, lv- denied, 93NY2d 879; Supreme Court Onondaga County, Hon. John J. Brunetti; December 1993 - May 1997

This murder case involved protracted pretrial litigation over the admissibility of statements made by the defendant while using an alias during police questioning. The defendant Stewart beat the victim to death and remained at large for months. I was the prosecutor on the case which resulted in a guilty verdict for Murder Second Degree after a jury trial.

Opposing Counsel:
Emil M. Rossi, Esq.
307 S. Townsend St.
Syracuse, NY 13202
Telephone (315) 471-0126

6. **People v. Cornell Flowers**, 245 AD2d 1088, lv denied, 97NY2d 972; Onondaga County Court, Hon. J. Kevin Mulroy; March 1995 - February 1996
This was a domestic violence case which ended in the murder of the victim. The defendant stalked and repeatedly assaulted his estranged wife over a year's time resulting in numerous calls to police. The defendant stabbed the victim to death with a butter knife on a city street while she was trying to catch a bus. I was the prosecutor on the case from the start of the police murder investigation. The defendant was found guilty of Murder Second Degree after a jury trial.

Opposing Counsel:
Steven A. Paquette, Esq.
One Lincoln Center
Syracuse, NY 13202
Telephone (315) 422-1391

7. People v. Carlton Cotton, 237 AD2d 943, lv denied 90 NY2d 857; Onondaga County Court, Hon. William J. Burke; April 1992-March 1993

I prosecuted this murder case starting with the police investigation. The defendant and his co-defendants were trying to take over inner-city drug trafficking in Syracuse by intimidation and violence. They surrounded a local drug dealer’s car and opened fire with several semi-automatic weapons killing an innocent passenger and wounding their intended target. The case was complicated by the refusal of the targeted drug dealer to cooperate with the investigation and prosecution. A jury trial resulted in the conviction of the defendant for Murder Second Degree.

Opposing Counsel:
Donald A. Greenwood, Esq.
201 E. Jefferson St.
Syracuse, NY 13202
Telephone: (315) 475-8750


The defendant shot his wife in the neck with a shotgun during a domestic dispute. He then left his apartment and went to confront his wife’s friend. Unable to force his way into the neighbor’s apartment, he shot her to death through the door. The defendant claimed at trial that he was not responsible for his actions by virtue of cocaine intoxication. I began the prosecution of the case at the start of the police investigation, performing all litigation which resulted in the conviction of the defendant for Murder Second Degree after a jury trial.

Opposing Counsel:
Edward W. Klein, Esq.
217 Montgomery St.
Syracuse, NY 13202
Telephone: (315) 424-3854
9. *People v. Michael Pierce*, Indict. #94- 1073- 1, Index #94-2956; Onondaga County Court, Hon. Patrick Cunningham; October 1994 through May 1995

The prosecution of this arson and murder case began with my work on the police and fire investigation. It was established that the defendant set a fire in the apartment of a casual acquaintance after an argument over money for sex. The fire burned down the entire apartment building killing an elderly couple who lived in a third floor apartment. The defendant offered expert testimony that the cause of the fire was not arson. I had completed putting in the people's case at a jury trial when the defendant entered guilty pleas to two counts of Murder Second Degree and Arson.

Opposing Counsel:
Paul G. Carey, Esq.
333 E. Onondaga St.
Syracuse, NY 13202
Telephone: (315) 474-0077


The defendant and co-defendants came to Syracuse from New York City in 1993 to sell illegal drugs. In order to intimidate local drug dealers that they were in competition with, the defendant shot and killed a Syracuse drug dealer in January 1994. I began as the prosecutor on a multi-agency police investigation which covered Central New York to New York City. I conducted grand jury and all litigation through and including a jury trial which resulted in a guilty verdict for Murder Second Degree.

Opposing Counsel:
Randi Juda Bianco, Esq.
247 W. Fayette St.
Syracuse, NY 13202
Telephone: (315) 424-0744

20. **Legal Activities:** Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organizations(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

While in practice with the Menter Law Firm, 1989-1992, I represented some national corporations including a corporate executive who was being investigated by Department of Justice in an anti-trust price-fixing case which I was ultimately able to resolve to benefit of the client without criminal charges or litigation.
During my tenure as United States Attorney I have pursued very significant criminal prosecutions in terrorism cases, RICO gang prosecutions, environmental crimes to name just a few. Most significant in my view in areas other than litigation has been my work with the various U.S. and Canadian Law Enforcement officials on “Border Security Issues” and cooperative enforcement programs between our two countries. As a Department of Justice representative on the International Joint Management Team for the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams working cooperatively with U.S. and Canadian Law Enforcement has enabled me to play an important and active role in setting policy and procedures which help to ensure the safety and security of our shared Border with Canada thereby helping to deter criminal and national security threats to our respective countries.

21. **Teaching:** What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

    None.

22. **Deferred Income/ Future Benefits:** List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

    I will receive payments, upon retirement, from the New York State Employees Retirement System.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

    None.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)


25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

    See attached Net Worth Statement.
26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

Parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during my initial service in the position to which I have been nominated would include any criminal or civil matter that was pending in the U.S. Attorney’s Office during my time of service as U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

I will follow the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and all other relevant statutes, policies and procedures.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

While an Assistant District Attorney I was a regular volunteer to Dispute Resolution Center - volunteer 1 to 2 hours per month. (Hours varied different years depending on job responsibility)

While in private practice, 1989-1992, I volunteered in Syracuse Housing Court representing indigent clients 2 to 3 hours every 3 to 4 months.

28. **Selection Process:**

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

I was recommended to the President by Hon. James T. Walsh, United States Representative, 25th Congressional District, New York. I was contacted by the White House Counsel Office for purposes of an Interview in July 2007. I was interviewed on July 30, 2007 by members of White House Counsel’s Office and
Department of Justice. I was subsequently contacted by staff from the
Department of Justice regarding nomination paperwork and have periodic
conversations with them regarding that paperwork and the process. My
nomination was submitted to the United States Senate on December 11, 2007.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee
discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question
in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or
implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If
so, please explain fully.

No.
### Financial Disclosure Report

**Nomination Filing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Position Reporting (last name, first, middle initial)</th>
<th>2. Court or Organization</th>
<th>3. Date of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Natus Judge - Nominee**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. This (whether full-time, part-time, etc.; employee, judge, or other)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Judge - Nominee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Reporting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/27/2007</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Amended Report**

### Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
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</table>

### Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTIES AND TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1979</td>
<td>New York State Employee Retirement System, Pension Plan Retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Important Notes:** The instructions accompanying this form must be followed. Complete all parts, checking the "None" box for each part where you have no reportable information. Sign on last page.
III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME. (Reporting individual and spouse see pp. 17-21 of instructions.)

A. Filer's Non-Investment Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME (years, not quarter(s))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

B. Spouse's Non-Investment Income - If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, complete this section.

- NONE (No reportable non-investment income.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME (years, not quarter(s))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Onagte County Board of Cooperative Educational Services: Salary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Onagte County Board of Cooperative Educational Services: Salary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. REIMBURSEMENTS - Transportation, lodging, food, entertainment.

- INCLUDE SPOUSE AND DEPENDENT CHILDREN. See pp. 23-27 of Instructions.

- NONE (No reportable reimbursements.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
### V. GIFTS

Excludes gifts to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 20-21 of Instructions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Exempt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### VI. LIABILITIES

Excludes debts owed to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 15-16 of Instructions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. KeyBank</td>
<td>Preferred Line of Credit</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. KeyBank</td>
<td>Credit Card</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Federal Credit Union</td>
<td>Credit Card</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

**NONE (No reportable Income, Assets, or Transactions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets (Including Real Estate)</th>
<th>Income During Reporting Period</th>
<th>Gross Value at End of Reporting Period</th>
<th>Transactions During Reporting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan &quot;CQP&quot; after 1980 exempt from prior disincentives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Hartford Life</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. American Funds</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Oppenheimer Funds</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nationwide</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pacific Irrigation</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
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<td>6. Pacific Irrigation</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
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<td>7. N.Y.S. Retirement</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. N.Y.S. Teachers Retirement</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K</td>
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<td>9. N.Y.S. Savings College Plus</td>
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<td>J</td>
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<td>10. Phoenix Companies</td>
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<td>J</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Northwestern Mutual Life</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
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**Income Code Dates**
- B: 1990-1991
- C: 1992-1993
- D: 1994-1995

**Value Codes**
- A: <1,000
- B: 1,000-4,999
- C: 5,000-9,999
- D: 10,000-49,999
- E: 50,000-149,999
- F: 150,000-249,999
- G: 250,000-499,999
- H: 500,000-999,999
- I: 1,000,000-2,499,999
- J: 2,500,000-4,999,999
- K: 5,000,000-9,999,999
- L: 10,000,000-19,999,999
- M: 20,000,000-49,999,999
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- O: 100,000,000-499,999,999
- P: 500,000,000-999,999,999
- Q: 1,000,000,000 or more

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FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Page 5 of 6

VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS.

Name of Person Reporting: Glenn Y.

Date of Report: 06/29/09.

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it is not applicable pursuant to the definitions of relevant term(s).

I further certify that all income from outside employment and honoraria and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app. I §§ 782, 111, 112, and Judicial Conduct regulations.

Signature: [Signature]

Date: 12-12-07.


FILING INSTRUCTIONS
Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:
Committee on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 2-301
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544.
## FINANCIAL STATEMENT

### NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

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<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>4 100 Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities—add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
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<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due 21 340</td>
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<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
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<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dued balloon</td>
<td>Real estate mortgage payable-add schedule 221 491</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-add schedule</td>
<td>Chattel mortgages and other lien payable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgage receivable</td>
<td>Other debt items:</td>
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<td>Autos and other personal property</td>
<td>65 500 Line of credit 160 665</td>
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<td>Cash-value-life insurance</td>
<td>26 452 Auto loan</td>
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<td>Other assets items:</td>
<td>33 678</td>
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<tr>
<td>See attached schedule</td>
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<td>Total Assets</td>
<td>436 566 Total liabilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>372 363 Net Worth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total liabilities and net worth</td>
<td>808 929 Total liabilities and net worth</td>
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### CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

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<tr>
<th>GENERAL INFORMATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are any assets pledged? (Add schedule)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are you defendant to any civil or legal actions?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have you ever taken bankruptcy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for Federal Income Tax</td>
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<td>Other special debt</td>
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## FINANCIAL STATEMENT

### NET WORTH SCHEDULES

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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Real Estate Owned</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal residence 1</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal residence 2</td>
<td>185,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florida timeshare</td>
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<td><strong>Total Real Estate Owned</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Real Estate Mortgages Payable</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal residence 1</td>
<td>$221,491</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Assets</strong></td>
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<td>Hartford Life</td>
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<td>American Funds - 403(B)</td>
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<td>Oppenheimer Funds-403(B)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Best of America IV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Putnam Investments (College Adv. Plan) #1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Putnam Investments (College Adv. Plan) #2</td>
<td>11,535</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NY State Teacher’s Retirement</td>
<td>49,312</td>
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<td>NY Savings 529 College Plan (Acct #1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NY Savings 529 College Plan (Acct #2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phoenix Companies</td>
<td>592</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Other Assets</strong></td>
<td><strong>$272,877</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AFFIDAVIT

I, Glenn T. Suddaby, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

Jan. 14, 2008
(DATE)

NAME

Deborah M. Filosi
(NOTARY)

DEBORAH M. FILOSI
Notary Public in the State of New York
Qualified in Cheektowaga County
No. 467676
My Commission Expires November 10, 2010
Senator SCHUMER. Judge Matsumoto.
Judge MATSUMOTO. I agree with my colleague, Mr. Gardephe. I also would start with the Constitution that has governed all of the courts' considerations of issues where one must balance the interests of liberty and due process against the vital national interest of national security, particularly in times as we have experienced recently.
I do believe that a judge, when making those delicate balances, must pay due deference to the executive and understand that in certain circumstances the executive does have certain prerogatives. However, when individual liberties are affected, I do believe that the court must look at the due process considerations to ensure that an individual is given fair notice of the charges and adequate protection of his constitutional rights.
Senator SCHUMER. Thank you.
Ms. Seibel.
Ms. SEIBEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The question you raise is probably the pressing issue of the day. Government has no higher function than to protect its citizens. At the same time, the rights in the Constitution are of utmost importance, and have been, as Mr. Gardephe said, for 200-plus years. If issues involving the conflict between those two principles came before me, I would look to what the higher courts have said on the subject and attempt to achieve, as you said a moment ago, the maximum security with the minimal abridgement of individual liberties based on that body of law.
Senator SCHUMER. Mr. Suddaby.
Mr. SUDDABY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think it is, without question, a critical area that we really have to continue to show the world that we will continue to do it the right way and that individual rights will be protected. The judiciary has its role. We have a responsibility to make sure that we follow the law of the Constitution and that those rights are protected, at the same time assuring the public that justice will be done in our country for those who would threaten our liberties and safety.
Senator SCHUMER. Thank you.
Now, for each of you, a second question. Can you name a judge or a justice whom you admire, and tell us why?
Mr. GARDEPHE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SCHUMER. Mr. Gardephe.
Mr. GARDEPHE. There is a judge in the Southern District of New York when I first began as a lawyer named Edward Weinfeld, a District Court judge. Judge Weinfeld was admired greatly by lawyers practicing at the time for his legal scholarship, his work ethic, and his commitment to justice. He, in particular, when citing his opinions, it was the common practice after the citation to list in a parenthetical “Weinfeld, J.” because of the imprimatur that came along with any decision he had written. He is someone I admire greatly and would hope to emulate.
Senator SCHUMER. Judge Matsumoto.
Judge MATSUMOTO. Thank you, Senator. I would have to say that I have always had a great deal of respect and admiration for Circuit Judge Rena Radja of the Second Circuit. She served briefly as the U.S. Attorney before her appointment to the U.S. District Court
in the Eastern District, and throughout her career as a jurist has demonstrated a high level of scholarship, clear writing, very strong awareness of protecting the rights of the accused, and ensuring that he or she receives a fair trial. She is also, I think, as a Circuit judge, continued her tradition of writing clear, scholarly decisions and providing guidance for judges to follow.

Senator SCHUMER. Ms. Seibel.

Ms. SIEBEL. I had the good fortune after law school to clerk for Judge Joseph McLaughlin, who was then a District Court judge in Judge Matsumoto's court in Brooklyn. He, to me, is a wonderful example of a judge who is scholarly and yet practical, who runs a tight ship but never loses his humanity, and his recognition that the parties before him are there on what is, in their lives, an incredibly important matter, and I would try to emulate him.

Senator SCHUMER. Mr. Suddaby.

Mr. SUDDABY. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I met the Chief Judge in the Northern District of New York when I was in law school, Judge Munson, who was revered as a very clear-thinking, hard-working, hard-charging, practical judge. He works—you know, took the time to work with law students. He reached out to the community and he was really very well-known for his recall. In the middle of the trial he would quote testimony back to people from a week before. He was just what a District Court should be. He just retired last month after, I think it was, 30-some plus years on the bench. It was a great honor to know him and to have him as a role model.

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you.

I have two more brief questions. My time is up, but with Senator Brownback's indulgence, first, for Judge Matsumoto, you have spent most of your career representing the government, defending it from civil litigation. All citizens have the opportunity to seek redress from their government when it has violated their rights. What can you tell the committee to assure us that, if confirmed, you'll be able to fairly consider the claims and rights of plaintiffs against the government?

Judge MATSUMOTO. Thank you, Senator. In my capacity as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, I also had occasion to bring suits on behalf of the Federal Government. As a magistrate judge, I certainly do have many cases before me where I must carefully weigh the arguments, both factual and legal arguments, of both parties. I believe that I have attempted, and have in fact achieved, the ability to come to every case with an open mind, read the papers submitted by the parties, research the law, and follow the law to the best of my ability.

I do believe that in my capacity as a magistrate judge, when I've had to select jurors, I try very hard to probe the jurors and ensure that they come to the jury box with an open mind with no pre-conceived prejudices or notions about the outcome of a case or that may affect their ability to be fair and impartial in considering the facts before them.

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you.

And now for both Ms. Seibel and Mr. Suddaby, you both spent the bulk of your legal career as prosecutors, Federal prosecutors.
By all accounts you've been both fair and tough, but you have spent little or no time representing the other side in the criminal justice system. What can you tell the Committee to assure us that, if confirmed, you will be able to fairly consider the claims and rights of criminal defendants who come into your courtroom?

Ms. Seibel. Thank you, Senator. I regarded as part of my job as a prosecutor to look at the case from both sides, to make sure that the process is fair, to make sure that the defense has the rights—in fact receives the process to which it's entitled under our laws, and I would like to think, if you spoke to opposing counsel on the cases I've handled, they would tell you that I have succeeded in what I hope I'm achieving, to be open-minded and fair, and I would certainly do my best to continue that if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed.

Senator Schumer. Mr. Suddaby.

Mr. Suddaby. Thank you, Senator.

As in my supervisory capacity, both in the District Attorney's Office of Onondaga County as a U.S. Attorney, I often spoke to our young prosecutors about the fact that they have a high responsibility as prosecutors to do justice, and that means they should be just as happy and satisfied with the dismissal of a case if that warrants—if that accounts for justice as a jury verdict. I think I can say that people who know me understand that that's the way that I look at it, and that if I am fortunate enough to take this next step and be confirmed as a Federal District Court judge, that every person that walks into that courtroom will be treated fairly and just the same as anyone else.

Senator Schumer. Thank you. I'm finished with my questions.

Senator Brownback.

Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, all of you. I'm delighted to have you here. I was sitting up here feeling a little bit left out, so I wanted to tell you all, I have been married 25 years to a wonderful wife.

[Laughter.]

I have five children, and August 7th is my anniversary date.

[Laughter.]

So I'm delighted to have all of you here. You've got great records. I've just got one specific question for each of you I'd like to go through, if we could.

Mr. Gardephe, you worked for the Justice Department as Chief Investigator of the FBI's performance in connection with the Ames and Hanson espionage cases. I just wondered, and this is just for personal consumption more than anything, what did we learn as a country through your investigation in coming out of that on the other side?

Mr. Gardephe. Thank you, Senator. We learned, I think in part, from both the Ames and the Hanson experiences that it is important to have deterrents in place to make people who are contemplating espionage think about the risks. And I think what we learned from the Ames and the Hanson affairs is that we did not have adequate deterrents in place, we did not have financial disclosure requirements, we did not impose polygraph examinations with the frequency perhaps they should have been. We did not have adequate deterrents in place to prevent people like Ames and Hanson...
who attempted to betray their country to think about the consequences and the risks if they went forward with that betrayal.

Senator BROWNBACK. This doesn’t have anything to do with your appointment, but have we put those safeguards in place since then?

Mr. GARDEPHE. There have been great improvements in the security regimes at both the CIA and the FBI since Ames and Hanson. While we cannot be certain that there are no moles in these organizations today, there are certainly far more deterrents in place now than there was back when Ames was a CIA officer and Hanson was an FBI agent.

Senator BROWNBACK. Judge Matsumoto, you have an impressive background and impressive family history. I jog or walk around Capitol Hill and will go by the memorial where we recognize the internment, and it’s always, I guess, great to see people succeed through difficulty. You and your family, and your father, certainly have a lot to be proud of.

You’ve done pro bono work for several women’s organizations, I noted, including for a community group who provides assistance and shelter for abused women and their children. What have you learned through that work that we should know about here in dealing with that type of situation of abused women and children?

Judge MATSUMOTO. I think the overriding concern, Senator, in that situation was to provide a safe shelter for women who were trying to remove themselves from the abusive situation so that she and her family could seek adequate support, whether it’s legal or from the social services agencies, and to give her a place where she could decompress and have some distance from an abusive relationship, which oftentimes would be highly charged. My work there was primarily to assist organizations that would try to set up shelters for these women so that they could receive safe shelter from a situation until those support services were put into place.

Senator BROWNBACK. Are we adequately addressing that situation now? This has no bearing on your appointment, but I just was noting it in your résumé and I just was curious.

Judge MATSUMOTO. This was an organization in Seattle in my first 2 years of practice that I worked with. I haven’t ever been back to practice in Seattle, but I do believe that certainly the public awareness of this problem has increased and I do believe that, at least in New York City and other metropolitan areas, there is more attention being focused on the problem of domestic violence and the need to provide shelter for families who may wish to extricate themselves from a difficult situation.

Senator BROWNBACK. Ms. Seibel, you’ve worked—there was an article on you while you were serving as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney on bankruptcy and tax fraud crime cases. I think you said in one article, if they quoted you right, said this “made your blood boil”. I like it when people get their blood boiling; we do that a lot around here.

[Laughter.]

In your view has the Federal law enforcement been paying enough attention in recent years to bankruptcy fraud cases? Do law enforcement officers and prosecutors have sufficient tools to effectively attack bankruptcy fraud?
Ms. S EIBEL. Thank you, Senator. I think that quote sounds like me. I think I probably was correctly quoted. There have been improvements since I was doing that work back in the early 1990s. I believe it’s Section 152, which is the main criminal bankruptcy fraud statute, that has been amended and rationalized. I think, like anything else, it is a matter of resources. Many bankruptcy frauds are not huge frauds.

It is always difficult in allocating resources: Do you focus on a few huge frauds? Do you try to look at a bunch of little frauds? I think, as in most areas of law enforcement, you can’t possibly prosecute everybody who’s doing it. You have to try to bring enough cases that it will deter other people who might be thinking of that. But to me, since bankruptcy is a privilege created by government, it does make my blood boil when people abuse it.

Senator BROWNBACK. That undermines the system, as you note, that privilege, if it is abused.

Mr. Suddaby, you mentioned in your written answers to the Committee’s question, you personally prosecuted over 80 homicide cases. That’s a lot of cases to prosecute. You’ve represented Department of Justice on a border enforcement team on setting policy at the border with Canada. We generally focus on the southern border a lot more than the northern border here. What do you see as the greatest security threats we have on that northern border, and are they being addressed?

Mr. Suddaby. Thank you, Senator. Yes. I’ve had the great opportunity to serve as the Attorney General’s chair on the Border and Immigration Subcommittee, and it’s mainly because I was up there on the northern border yelling about all the resources going to the southern border, and that we had another border up north and there was a different type of threat, but I thought, and still believe, a very real threat that we have to be aware of.

I’m happy to tell you, I think we’ve made a lot of progress in our work with the Canadian Government and Canadian law enforcement. Our CMP has worked with our border law enforcement agencies terrifically. One of the committees I sit on is the International Joint Management Team for IBETs, which means Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, where provincial in Canada, Federal in the U.S., State and local, all the way through work together on the border, come together as a task force and share intelligence and do what they can to secure that border.

Now, we still have a lot of work to do and there is a threat there that we need to realize is real and pay attention to, but I think we’re doing a good job and we’re making great progress.

Senator BROWNBACK. I would ask all of you a narrow question on your background because I guess we tend to look at judges as going into a cloistered life now, and it’s okay, now you remove yourself from living and you just sit on a bench and you dispense justice from there. I don’t think it’s fair to you. I don’t think that’s good for the system. You each bring different experiences. They may be fairly far back in your background, it may be fairly recent, but those are useful things.

I just want to encourage each of you to continue to do those to the degree you can and maintain your independence on the bench. If it’s spending the night at a homeless shelter or checking yourself
into jail sometime—not for breaking the law but for experience basis—I just find, for me, it really changes your outlook when you get a sense, and a smell, and a feel and you can really see the system rather than hear about it through somebody else.

I spent a couple nights in jail of my own volition, not having committed any crime or being held there against my will. Fabulous experience. Just the smell and the feel, it just makes all the difference in the world. So I just urge you to follow some of your instincts on some of those when you get a chance to, because it just will really broaden that background of experiences you have.

Too often when we put people up in your positions, it's okay, that's it, now you've just got to sit here and be a judge and stop experiencing these things, when we really need you to experience a lot more things because you're going to have odd cases come in front of you. You don't know what case is going to come in front of you, but we expect you to be able to make a good judgment once that case comes in front of you. I've you've had a background of experiences to be able to mesh with it, that's just all that much more helpful to be able to do.

My final thought and admonition is just that, in government positions, I think we need a lot of humility, that we just don't know everything. Certainly in my position you can't say that sort of stuff because people expect you to know things, but we don't. I think we just need a good, good dose of humility, of listening to what people have to say, realizing we need wisdom. We've been put in these great positions to be able to do what's right, and the people trust the system. If they ever lose trust in the system we are in real trouble, and you are a big part of that trust in the system.

God bless you. I appreciate all of you, and I appreciate your families, too, for being a part of this because these are key jobs and it requires the whole family to do it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SCHUMER. Well, thank you, Senator Brownback.

I want to thank all our witnesses. Before ending, I'd like to put into the record the statements of Chairman Leahy, who couldn't be here today—he's got many responsibilities, as you can imagine—and Senator Clinton. So, without objection, their statements will be entered into the record.

[The prepared statements of Senator Leahy and Senator Clinton appear as a submissions for the record.]

Senator SCHUMER. We'll keep the record open for one week for written questions.

With that, our hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:53 p.m. the Committee was adjourned.]

[Submissions follows.]
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
STATEMENT OF SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON ON THE
NOMINATIONS OF KIYO MATSUMOTO, CATHY SEIBEL, PAUL
GARDEPHE, AND GLENN SUDDABY TO THE FEDERAL BENCH

June 11, 2008

I am honored today to recognize four New Yorkers – Kiyo Matsumoto, Cathy Seibel, Paul Gardephe, and Glenn Suddaby – each of whom has been nominated to the federal bench. Each of their careers has been marked by achievement, distinction, and most important, an abiding commitment to public service. If confirmed, I am certain that each will continue to exhibit the character and qualities that have defined their respective careers: a devotion to justice and fairness and a respect for the rule of law.

Kiyo Matsumoto has served as a Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of New York since 2004. Prior to her appointment, Judge Matsumoto served in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York for more than two decades, and held the position of Deputy Chief of the Civil Division. Judge Matsumoto has taught as an adjunct law professor at the New York University School of Law as well as a legal Research and Writing Instructor at the Brooklyn Law School. Judge Matsumoto has also served as a member of the Federal Court Committee of the City of New York Bar. And if confirmed, Judge Matsumoto would be the eighth active Asian-Pacific American judge on the Federal bench.

Since January of this year, Cathy Seibel has served as the First Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. She has held several other positions in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York since joining the office in 1993. Prior to joining the office, Ms. Seibel was a Special Assistant United States Attorney for the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington. She currently co-teaches a course on trial practice at Columbia Law School, and previously in her career she was an Adjunct Associate Professor at Fordham Law School.

Paul Gardephe is a Partner and Chair of the Litigation Department at the New York law firm of Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP. Previously, Mr. Gardephe was a Special Counsel for the U.S Department of Justice Inspector General’s Office. He has also worked for the Law Department of Time Inc., where he held the positions of Vice President, Litigation Deputy General Counsel, and Associate General Counsel. Prior to this work, Mr. Gardephe served in the U.S. Attorney Office for the Southern District of New York for nearly ten years. For
the past 15 years, Mr. Gardephe has taught Trial Advocacy at New York Law School as an Adjunct Professor.

Glenn Suddaby is the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York, a position he has held since 2002. Prior to this service, Mr. Suddaby worked as First Chief Assistant District Attorney for the Onondaga County District Attorney's Office in Syracuse, and an associate with the Syracuse law firm of Menter, Rudin & Trivelpiece, P.C.

Our nation is fortunate that citizens as qualified as these are willing to serve their country as jurists. I am proud to support their nominations, and I commend Senator Schumer and the Judiciary Committee for their hard work, ensuring that our federal judiciary is served by men and women of such distinction.
Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee,
On Judicial Nominations Hearing
June 11, 2008

Today, the Committee holds its sixth hearing this year to consider President Bush’s nominations for lifetime appointments to the Federal bench. It is the eighth nominations hearing this year, and the 20th nominations hearing this Congress. We will hear from four more judicial nominees—Paul Gardephe and Cathy Seibel for the Southern District of New York, Kiyo Matsumoto for the Eastern District of New York and Glenn Suddaby for the Northern District of New York.

All four of these nominees have the support of the New York Senators, who worked with the White House to identify a slate of consensus nominees. I thank Senators Schumer and Clinton for their consideration of these nominees. I also thank Senator Schumer for chairing today’s hearing.

I noted the sudden concern of the Minority Leader last week over district court nominations. Perhaps he did not have a chance to see my statement from earlier in the week in which I said that with Republican cooperation, we have the opportunity this work period to confirm five nominees already reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee. Of course, we continue to make progress. Just yesterday, the Senate confirmed three of this President’s district court nominees to the Federal bench.

Sadly, we have not seen much in the way of Republican cooperation. Instead, anonymous Republicans are stomping their feet, objecting to hearing after hearing and objecting to Senate passage of measure after measure intended to help the American people. Yesterday, Republicans objected to Senator Feinstein completing a hearing on coercive interrogation techniques and the recent Inspector General report on the role of the FBI. It was a good hearing and an important hearing. It was conducted fairly and led to important testimony and helpful analysis. It would have been cut short had not the Majority Leader taken action and extended the lunch recess of the Senate briefly so that we could complete it. As he did, the Senate Majority Leader observed:

“By refusing to allow the Judiciary Committee to hold a hearing on interrogation techniques, Bush-McCain Republicans have today found yet another way to cover for this Administration’s disregard for the rule of law. This marks the second time in less than one week that Republicans have needlessly wasted the Senate’s time, and is the latest in a disturbing trend of Republicans looking the other way from the Administration’s use of intolerable interrogation techniques. I call on Senator McCain to condemn his colleagues’ efforts to stop the Senate from investigating torture.”

His reference last week was to the childish prank by which the Republican leader refused to allow the global climate change bill to be considered without first forcing the Senate clerks to read it aloud, word for word for hours and hours and thereby effectively shut
down the Senate from action on it. Then, when it came time to vote whether to move to consideration of the bill, the Republican caucus voted to prevent progress on it.

This morning the now all too familiar pattern was repeated. The Judiciary Committee was holding a hearing on the impact on real people – on all Americans – of Supreme Court decisions that have stripped protections for American consumers and workers. The hearing began with the Ranking Republican Member noting how important it is that we discuss these issues, and he was right. In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has misconstrued our laws, ignored the intent of Congress, and ultimately prevented state court juries from providing redress for misconduct that has harmed ordinary Americans.

Then an anonymous Republican, without warning, objected to the hearing being completed and prematurely shut it down in the middle of Senator Whitehouse’s questions. As Senator Whitehouse properly observed, it was a shame given that the women who had traveled to Washington to testify had already been victimized by insurers, medical device manufacturers and the courts and were then today cut short by an anonymous Senate Republican. Republicans in the Senate earlier this year blocked Senate action on a bill to remedy one of these egregious Supreme Court decisions, that involving Lilly Ledbetter, and now they will not even listen to ordinary Americans who have been hurt.

These “objections” are selective in that Republicans are shutting down hearings on topics on which they apparently do not want the facts to become known. Republicans were apparently perhaps concerned this morning that Americans will understand that “activist judges” include those conservative Supreme Court Justices who are misconstruing laws intended to protect American consumers. The Chamber of Commerce witness had finished when our Republican colleague preemptively insisted that the microphones be turned off the microphones while ordinary Americans were trying to tell us about the injustice they have endured.

It is sad and ironic that Republicans are acting as they are since we are poised to make more progress of filling judicial vacancies. There are three more nominations on the Committee’s agenda for our business meeting tomorrow, including the nominations of Judge Helene White and Ray Kethledge to the Sixth Circuit, and the nomination of Stephen Murphy to the Eastern District of Michigan. This hearing includes four more of President Bush’s judicial nominees to the vacancies in New York.

As I said last week, with cooperation from across the aisle, the Senate is prepared to confirm four circuit court judges and 11 district court judges before the July 4 recess, bringing the total confirmed this year to 15 lifetime appointments. That compares most favorably to the 17 district court judges confirmed during the entire 1996 session, a session in which the Republican Senate majority refused to confirm a single one of President Clinton’s circuit court nominations.

I recall Senator Specter’s frustration when he was Chairman with a Republican Majority at the end of the last Congress, and Republican holds prevented the confirmation of 14 district court nominations. Democrats on the Judiciary Committee had worked hard to expedite the nominations at the end of the last Congress. At the time, Senator Specter
noted the serious impact that judicial vacancies can have on the Federal judiciary. That is why, in stark contrast to Republicans who increased vacancies during President Clinton's tenure in anticipation of a Republican president, the Democratic Senate majority has worked steadily and steadfastly to lower vacancies and make progress.

Last year, the Senate confirmed 40 judicial nominees. That topped the total achieved in any of the three preceding years under Republican leadership. It was also more judges than were confirmed in 1996, 1997, 1999, or 2000, when a Republican-led Senate was considering President Clinton's nominations. Indeed, in the almost three years that I have chaired the Committee, the Senate has confirmed 149 of President Bush's lifetime appointments to our Federal courts. That compares favorably to the total of 158 confirmations during the more than four years that Republicans led the Committee during this Republican presidency.

Although Senate Republicans suggest otherwise, we continue to make progress on judicial nominations. On June 1, 2000, when a Republican Senate majority was considering the judicial nominees of a Democratic President in a presidential election year, there were 66 judicial vacancies. Twenty were circuit court vacancies, and 46 were district court vacancies. Those vacancies were the result of years of Republican pocket filibusters of judicial nominations. Today, there are just 44 total vacancies. If we can continue to make progress this month, the current vacancies could be reduced to fewer than 40, with only nine circuit court vacancies.

When Republicans were busy pocket filibustering Clinton nominees, Federal judicial vacancies grew to more than 100, with more than 30 circuit vacancies, and it has been the Democratic Senate majority that worked hard to reduce these vacancies, first when I became Chairman in the summer of 2001, and again in this Congress. We have gone from more than 110 vacancies to less than 45. With respect to Federal circuit court vacancies, we have reversed course from the days during which the Republican Senate majority more than doubled circuit vacancies. Circuit vacancies have not been this low since 1996, when the Republican tactics to slow judicial confirmations began in earnest.

Disputes over a handful of controversial judicial nominations have wasted valuable time that could be spent on the real priorities of every American. I have sought, instead, to make progress where we can. The result is the significant reduction in judicial vacancies.

Despite this progress, the heated partisan rhetoric and petulance from the other side of the aisle might lead one to believe that judicial nominations are the most pressing problem facing the country. It is not. With Americans now facing increasing burdens from the soaring price of gas, high food prices, rising unemployment and a home mortgage foreclosure and credit crisis, with the challenges of global climate change, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and terrorism, the Republican efforts to create an issue over judicial nominees is misplaced. In fact, I have worked hard to make progress and have treated this President's nominees more fairly than Republicans treated those of President Clinton. We have worked hard to reduce vacancies to the lowest levels in decades.
I would rather see us work with the President and make progress where we can than waste precious time fighting about controversial nominations. I would also rather see the Senate focus on addressing the real priorities of the country rather than trying to create partisan advantage. Today’s hearing for four more judicial nominations represents the progress we can make when we work together.

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NOMINATION OF CLARK WADDOUPS, OF UTAH, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH; MICHAEL M. ANELLO, OF CALIFORNIA, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA; MARY STENSON SCRIVEN, OF FLORIDA, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA; CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO, OF COLORADO, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO; PHILIP A. BRIMMER, OF COLORADO, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO; AND GREGORY G. GARRE, NOMINEE TO BE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2008

U.S. Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SD–562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Leahy, Whitehouse, Specter, and Hatch.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

Chairman Leahy. The hearing will come to order. Senator Hatch is a former Chairman of this Committee, and he knows that many times these little colloquies between the members is where half the work gets done.

I have been concerned—and I am not saying anything here that I have not said before—about the number of filibusters, Republican filibusters, we faced this year and the refusal to give consent to proceed even on important bills. We had a number of bills out of this Committee that went out with virtually every Republican and every Democrat supporting them, and yet they still get blocked. We do have the Republican Thurmond rule which says no judges
after—certainly after the 1st of July. But I have gone the extra mile by proceeding with another confirmation hearing, and I hope that I will not get the objections from our Republican colleagues on breaking the Republican Thurmond rule by still having judges this late in the game.

The hearing will include the President’s nominee to be Solicitor General. This will almost complete our efforts to expedite consideration of replacements—the entire leadership of the Justice Department resigned in the wake of the scandals of the Attorney General Gonzales era, and so this will bring about almost the replacement of the entire leadership team at the Department of Justice.

We are going to include five additional judicial appointments. Their tenure, of course, is for a lifetime and will not expire in 5 months when the President leaves office. I mentioned the Thurmond rule. That dates back to 1980, Senator Strom Thurmond, the Republicans were in the minority, he was Ranking Minority Member, and he called for shutting down the judicial confirmation process. There was a Democratic President. Republicans were in the minority, and Democrats conceded to the Thurmond rule, which I know everybody on this panel strongly supports.

Then the Republicans used it in another recent Presidential election year, 1996, when the Republican Senate majority did not confirm a single judge after the August recess and no circuit judges during the whole 1996 session. I mention that because I saw something in the press recently that suggested otherwise, and it is unfortunate when reality gets in the way of the rhetoric.

We have confirmed more judges already in this Congress than during the entire 109th Congress, when a Republican Senate majority and Republican Chairman of the Committee did not have to worry about the Thurmond rule and an abbreviated session due to a Presidential election. In the 37 months I have served as Judiciary Chairman, the Senate has confirmed 158 of President Bush’s judicial nominees. That is the same number confirmed by the Senate Republican majority in the more than 4 years it controlled for the Republican administration.

But I will work with everybody. It is possible that you know at this time there had been over the year rare exceptions to the Thurmond rule, but it has required the consent of both the Democratic and Republican Leader and the Democratic and Republican leaders of this Committee to do that. And I want to thank Senator Specter who agreed to these judges: Clark Waddoups—am I pronouncing that correctly, Senator Hatch—of Utah; Michael Anello of California; Mary Stenson Scriven of Florida; and two nominees from Colorado: Christine Arguello and Philip Brimmer. They have the support of their home-State Senators, Republicans and Democrats.

Senator Salazar called me so many times at my home last week in Vermont, I think he had me on speed dial. Both my wife and I are friends of the Salazars, and she was always happy to hear from you, and I was always happy to hear from you. At least on one occasion when the phone rang, I said, “Look, I have got a pile of work I have got to do. I do not care who that is. Tell them I am not here.” And she answers and she said, “Oh, this is different. Patrick, it is Ken Salazar. You take that call,” which I did. And I want to commend you, Senator Salazar, on working it out with
Senator Allard so we could have these judges before us. As you know, they were not originally on the list, and at your request we asked consent to do it. I want to thank Senator Specter, too, because even though the time was not the normal time given for notice, the Republicans did not object, and we were able to put them on.

Ms. Arguello had been nominated before by President Clinton to the Tenth Circuit, but was pocket-filibustered in 2000. So we are trying to get through these, so Ms. Arguello, like Judge Helene White, has now been nominated by Presidents of both parties. We have reduced Federal judicial vacancies from the 10-percent level they hit after the pocket filibusters before, during President Clinton’s time, to less than half that number, and have done even better with the circuit vacancies. We have reduced those by more than two-thirds. And so we have actually improved—one of the areas we have improved.

I will put the rest of my statement in the record.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Leahy appears as a submission for the record.]

Chairman LEAHY. I will yield, of course, to Senator Specter, and again I thank Senator Specter for making it possible for us to add the two from Colorado at the request of Senator Salazar and Senator Allard.

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Senator SPECTER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was pleased to consent to the additions, notwithstanding the technical rule requirements, and we thank you for listing these judges for the confirmation hearing today.

I think that the agreement between Senator Allard and Senator Salazar is a good barometer of moving ahead with the appointment of their judges, and it is my hope that the example which they have set will provide the basis for some additional confirmation hearings. Certainly when two Senators, one a Republican and one a Democrat, come to an agreement, that takes the issue of ideology out of the picture and provides a principled basis for moving ahead, notwithstanding the fact that it is September.

There are some other situations which I have been discussing with the Chairman where the same thing has happened, where Senators of different parties in other States have come together, and it is my hope that it will provide a basis for moving ahead with some additional confirmation hearings.

When the Chairman cites the practices of the past, I agree that there has been certain actions taken by the Republican Caucus which I think were unfortunate and said so at the time. I think the same thing has happened with the Democrats. The Chairman and I have engaged in a very extensive discussion on statistics, which I will not do here today. We have also engaged in discussions about the application of the so-called Thurmond rule, and I would just put in the record a CRS study which raises questions about the Thurmond rule, citing examples where confirmations were held. Perhaps the most notable was now Supreme Court Justice Breyer confirmed to the First Circuit after the 1980 election when Presi-
dent Reagan was elected and the Committee acted and the Senate confirmed First Circuit Court Judge Breyer at that time.

But I think that it is fair to say that the Judiciary Committee of late has acted in a bipartisan, collegial manner, and I think that has been to the benefit of the country. And that is illustrated today by the Chairman setting these hearings, and even though it is September. So I hope we can proceed, and I hope we will one day reach a point where the ideology will be put behind us and we will try to move ahead on qualification only.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Leahy. I thank you.

Of course, as Senator Specter knows, we try to work together of every one of these things and try to have them together. So I will go by seniority in calling on the Senators: first, from Utah, Senator Hatch, one of the most senior members of the Senate.

PRESENTATION OF CLARK WADDOUPS, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, BY HON. ORRIN G. HATCH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH

Senator Hatch. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Leahy. I knew him when he had dark hair. He knew me when I had hair.

[Laughter.]

Senator Hatch. And I like you better without hair. As long as your wife likes you, I am going to love you, I tell you that.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this hearing. It is very important to us in Utah, as well as the other States involved here today. Let me just take a few moments to introduce to the Committee Clark Waddoups, who is nominated to the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. And I will just take a few minutes because my colleague Senator Bennett is also here to speak about this exceptional nominee.

When Judge Paul Cassell stepped down from the U.S. District Court last year, Senator Bennett and I set out to find a replacement with legal experience that is both wide and deep. Clark Waddoups truly stood out. It became obvious to us why the Utah Chapter of the Federal Bar Association recognized Clark in 1999 as Utah’s Outstanding Lawyer, because that is exactly what he is. Clark has been practicing law for nearly 35 years, the last 27 years as head of his own firm in Salt Lake City. Before that, he was a partner in the law firm of O’Melveny & Myers, but he did come home to Utah.

He has been involved in virtually every aspect of law in our State, including serving on the Board of Visitors of the Law School of Brigham Young University, and for 17 years on the Advisory Committee to the Utah Supreme Court on the Rules of Evidence. He has been involved in legal practice at the Federal as well as State level, having clerked for the distinguished Ninth Circuit Judge Jay Clifford Wallace and twice chairing the Merit Selection Panel for the U.S. Magistrate Judges.

I might mention Judge Wallace was always in contention to be placed on the Supreme Court. That is how well thought of he was by both parties. And Clark Waddoups is the type of person any appellate judge would love to have work.
The majority of Clark's extensive litigation experience has been in Federal court, and I am confident that his confirmation will be a smooth transition from before to behind the Federal bench.

Mr. Chairman, I know this is a somewhat chaotic time of the year in Congress, and we have just a few weeks to get a lot done. Utah has only five U.S. district court seats, and our population has increased by more than 50 percent since the last one was created in 1990. That kind of population growth, among the fastest in America, means more cases and more pressures on the court.

Since Judge Cassell resigned to go back to teaching, he is not available to pitch in the way senior judges do. So it is very important that this seat be filled, and I am so pleased with the excellent nominee the President has sent to the Senate.

Mr. Chairman, I know Clark Waddoups very well. We looked at the whole Utah Bar, and there are a number of very, very fine judges and lawyers there from whom we could have picked this seat. And I have to say that none is finer than Clark Waddoups. Clark Waddoups is truly a lawyer's lawyer. He is somebody that I think everybody on this Committee would respect and will respect. He is a person who I expect to be nonpartisan in every way. He is a person I expect to be one of the pillars of the district court bench in not only Utah but throughout the country. And I believe that he will add a great deal to our Federal courts.

He is here with his wife and son, and I hope that you will get him to introduce them to you. I am very proud of this family, very proud of the services given, very proud of the legal capacity that he has. He is one of the great lawyers in this country, and I know that.

So once again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your scheduling this hearing and hope that each of these nominees will be confirmed before our work is finished this year, and I am grateful to you.

Chairman LEAHY. Well, thank you very much, and he should know that the nice things you have said about him here you said to me privately several times, and you have been a very active backer of his and talked to me quite a bit. And, of course, with your support and Senator Bennett's support, two Senators I respect greatly, this has helped a lot.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you.

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Bennett.

PRESENTATION OF CLARK WADDOUPS, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, BY HON. ROBERT F. BENNETT, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to join with Orrin in recommending Clark Waddoups, and we did conduct a search together. I had some names, Orrin had some names. We sat down and went through them. And Clark Waddoups' name rather quickly rose to the top of the list, and he became ultimately our only choice as the one to recommend to the President. And I am honored, as is Orrin, that the President has chosen to respect our recommendation and make the nomination to the Senate.
He is a named partner at one of Utah’s leading law firms. I am not a lawyer, but I have paid a lot of legal bills in my life.

[Laughter.]

Senator BENNETT. And this is a law firm that the company with which I was associated used in its legal activities, and they were searching for the best, and this is where they went.

He is ranked 26th in this year’s list of Best Lawyers in America. Orrin talked about best lawyers in Utah, but he has a reputation that is national. He is an active member of the Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, and his educational background shows how ecumenical he is in the primary collegiate competition within Utah. He graduated cum laude from Brigham Young University in 1970 and then graduated Order of the Coif from the University of Utah Law School in 1973. So he has covered both of those bases that demonstrates, I think, a very wise kind of political balance for this man. While in law school, he served as President of the Utah Law Review, and Orrin has mentioned that he clerked for Judge Wallace on the Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit.

He has earned the praise of a lot of his colleagues. Let me dip into a few publications and share with you some of the comments that have been made.

In the ABA Journal, it says in an article that he possesses “that rare ability to teach and inspire.”

Another colleague said, “He is intellectually strong and doesn’t allow himself to be pushed around or walked over. But at the same time, I have never seen him be belligerent with opposing counsel or an opponent or belittle them.”

And finally, this quote: His style of legal practice reflects “an unflinching commitment to honesty and professionalism.”

These are the comments of those who have worked with him, and I am proud to support his nomination and hope that the Committee will report it out in a judicious and rapid fashion.

Thank you.

Chairman LEAHY. Well, thank you very much, and I know, Senator Bennett, both you and Senator Hatch have other committees that are meeting and going on. You are welcome to stay, of course, but also with the understanding if you have to leave at this point.

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Allard and Senator Salazar, first I might say that my wife and I spent several days in Denver, Colorado, this past month. Senator Allard, understandably you were not there, but—

Senator ALLARD. I was fishing, Mr. Chairman.

[Laughter.]

Chairman LEAHY. Well, there was part of the time I wish I could have been there fishing, and part of the time I wish I was there fishing with you. But I must say that anytime I have ever been in Colorado, I feel so much at home—the friendliness of the people. I live on the side of a mountain in Vermont, nowhere near the height of the Rockies, of course, but just being there I feel very much at home. So I thank all Coloradans, Republican and Democratic alike, for the hospitality they showed us at our convention. Senator Allard, please go ahead, sir.
PRESENTATION OF CHRISTINE ARGUELLO, NOMINEE TO BE
DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO, AND
PHILIP A. BRIMMER, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO, BY HON. WAYNE ALLARD, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH

Senator Allard. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your very
graceful remarks on Colorado, and I am glad that you had a good
time while you were there. I thought it was a well-run convention
and was proud to have you in the State of Colorado.

Also, Ranking Member Specter, thank you for being willing to
move forward with these two nominees. Distinguished members of
the Committee, I am joined today by my colleague and friend Sen-
tator Salazar to speak on behalf of Christine Arguello and Philip
Brimmer, two individuals nominated by President Bush to fill judi-
cial vacancies in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. Again, I just want to state how profoundly thankful I
am for both of you being willing to move with both of these nomi-
nees.

Christine Arguello, rated as qualified by the American Bar Asso-
ciation, and Phil Brimmer, rated as well qualified by the ABA,
would capably and honorably serve the citizens of Colorado and the
United States if confirmed.

I would like to begin by thanking Chairman Leahy for holding
this hearing. I look forward to the Committee continuing the tone
of expediency set by the Chairman by swiftly reporting the nomina-
tion to the floor for an up-or-down vote. It is critical to the adminis-
tration of justice that the vacancies on Colorado’s Federal district
bench, with a total of three vacancies—two have existed since last
year—be filled immediately. And then one was added this spring
with the untimely death of Phil Figa on the Colorado district court.

I am pleased that we are joined today by Senator Salazar in
what I hope is an early indicator of broad bipartisan support for
these nominees.

I would like to welcome to the United States Senate Mr.
Brimmer’s and Ms. Arguello’s family who are here today. All of you
no doubt played an important role in Christine’s and Phil’s being
here today. Speaking from my own experience in public service, you
are all embarking on this journey together, and your love and sup-
port will continue to be instrumental to your spouse’s ability to per-
form his or her public duties.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Brimmer is an outstanding attorney. He is a
graduate of Harvard and Yale Law School, institutions that pro-
vided him with tremendous analytical tools and an arsenal of
knowledge which has served him well in his career. Upon gradua-
tion from law school, Mr. Brimmer spent 2 years clerking with the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Thereafter, he
joined a Denver law firm where he spent 7 years in private practice
before making a decision to devote his career to public service. This
decision led Mr. Brimmer to the Denver District Attorney’s Office,
serving first as Deputy District Attorney and later promoted to
Chief Deputy District Attorney.

Former District Attorney and current Governor of Colorado, Gov-
ernor Bill Ritter, wrote, “Throughout Mr. Brimmer’s service at the
Denver District Attorney’s Office, he upheld the highest standards
of integrity, fairness, honesty, hard work, and a dedication to public service.” Governor Ritter felt he could trust Phil Brimmer with the most challenging cases that came before the office, and Phil Brimmer did not disappoint.

Current Denver District Attorney Mitch Morrissey recently wrote about his former colleague in a similar fashion: “Phil Brimmer never failed to impress me both with his work ethic and his knowledge of the law. He was one of our most valued attorneys.”

The sentiments of Governor Ritter and District Attorney Morrissey are reflected in numerous other letters sent to my office from people who worked with Mr. Brimmer throughout the years. Similar to his experience as Deputy District Attorney, Mr. Brimmer has been exceptionally successful as a Federal prosecutor. Almost 7 years ago, he joined the U.S. Attorney’s Office as Assistant U.S. Attorney and has worked on an assortment of criminal cases as chief of the Major Crimes Section and now as chief of the Special Prosecutions Section. As chief of Special Prosecutions in the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Mr. Brimmer handled very challenging and procedurally complex cases, dealing with an assortment of crimes including child exploitation, cyber crimes, capital crimes, and prison crimes. Attorney General of Colorado John Suthers hired Phil Brimmer in the fall of 2001, recognizing his excellent work ethic and his tremendous intellectual capability. It seems Mr. Brimmer continues to impress everyone he works beside as he continues to serve Colorado’s legal community with great distinction.

Anyone familiar with Phil Brimmer’s professional credentials can attest to his intelligence and his talent. Anyone familiar with Phil Brimmer as an individual would certainly observe that he is respectful, loyal, and good humored. His integrity, honesty, and professional dedication to public service also contribute to making Phil Brimmer a rare find.

From my conversations with Mr. Brimmer, it is clear that he recognizes the proper role of the judiciary. His personal qualities and character, coupled with his professional experience and an ABA rating of well qualified and outstanding bipartisan recommendations from within Colorado’s legal, make Phil Brimmer ideally suited to service on the Federal district court.

I would also like to welcome Ms. Christine Arguello to the United States Senate. This is not my first endorsement of Ms. Arguello. In 1999, I made a recommendation to then-President Clinton to nominate Ms. Arguello for a seat on the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. This past January, I again offered her name to President Bush and urged he consider nominating Christine Arguello to fill a vacant judgeship on Colorado’s Federal district court.

I speak before this Committee today in support of the nomination of this fine lawyer for service on the Federal bench. In her more than 25 years of legal experience, she has worn many different hats. She is experienced as a trial lawyer, in-house counsel, law professor, and public servant. She is a skilled attorney with impressive credentials and a diverse professional background.

Ms. Arguello earned her undergraduate degree from the University of Colorado and her law degree from Harvard. She began her distinguished professional career working as an associate for a law
firm. She moved to a public service career after 19 years of private practice when she joined the Colorado Attorney General’s Office, where she served as Chief Deputy Attorney General under former Attorney General and now my current Senate colleague Ken Salazar. In 2003, she returned to private practice as a civil litigation attorney. In 2006, she assumed her current job as managing senior associate counsel for the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Described by many as a trailblazer, Ms. Arguello and the wide-ranging experiences and accomplishments she brings with her would make her a great asset to the Federal bench. In addition to being the first Hispanic from Colorado to be admitted to Harvard Law School and the first Hispanic to be promoted to partner at one of the “Big Four” law firms in Colorado, Ms. Arguello has added law professor to a long list of accomplishments. She became a tenured professor at the University of Kansas Law School and joined the faculty at the University of Colorado School of Law and the University of Denver College of Law as an adjunct professor and a visiting professor, respectively.

Christine Arguello is a top-flight nominee whom I am proud to introduce to the distinguished members of the Committee.

I look forward to a fair and dignified confirmation process, the outcome of which I am confident will reveal two highly qualified nominees deserving of confirmation.

I would like to congratulate Phil and Christine, and on behalf of the citizens of Colorado, thank each of you for your willingness to serve this great country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator Specter.

Chairman Leahy. Thank you, Senator Allard.

Senator Salazar.

PRESENTATION OF CHRISTINE ARGUELLO, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO, AND PHILIP A. BRIMMER, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO, BY HON. KEN SALAZAR, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH

Senator Salazar. Thank you very much, Chairman Leahy, for holding this hearing this morning, and thank you for your leadership and your example as a statesman in your position as Chairman of this Committee. Thank you for the numerous telephone conversations that we engaged in over the weekend, and I appreciate Marcelle’s patience in always answering the telephone. Thank you for your example.

Senator Specter, you as well, as Ranking Member of this Committee, I very much have enjoyed my 3½ years here in the U.S. Senate, in part because I have had the honor of working with Senator Leahy and you, Senator Specter.

Senator Hatch, thank you for your service on this Committee, and, Senator Whitehouse, thank you as well. I appreciate working with all of you, my colleagues.

To Senator Allard, I want to thank you for what has been a journey that has taken us to where we are today. Some people said that it could not be done, but at the end of the day, I think our working together and recognizing the inherent qualities of the two nominees from Colorado resulted in both of us being able to stand
before this Committee this morning saying that we both unequivocally endorse both of these nominees.

Let me make a comment very briefly about each of the nominees, and I will submit the formal statement that I have written for the record.

First, with respect to Christine Arguello, her life story really is the personification of the American dream. She was born in southern Colorado in a place called Thatcher, far away from where anybody ever expected her to graduate from high school. Her father worked on the railroad, and for a part of her life, she actually grew up in a boxcar on the railroad as they moved from town to town. She became the first Latina, first Hispanic, ever admitted to Harvard Law School, went on to graduate from Harvard Law School and work with some of the most prestigious law firms in the Rocky Mountain West, including Holland & Hart, and later on becoming a partner at Davis, Graham & Stubbs.

But that was not enough in terms of achievement for her because she also wanted to do some other things in terms of teaching and public service. She went on to the University of Kansas, where she became a tenured law professor, and while there also wrote one of the books that is most often used now in courses on evidence in law schools around the country.

When I became Attorney General for Colorado, I looked for the best and the brightest to come to work for me in that Office of Attorney General. Christine Arguello joined me and served as the Chief Deputy Attorney General for the State of Colorado, working on cases that involved both Federal courts as well as the Colorado courts, arguing a number of cases before the Colorado Supreme Court, and the district court and the Tenth Circuit as well. She is a lawyer's lawyer and always tries to make sure that it is the rule of law which she upholds as she does her work in all the various capacities that she has held.

She has most recently been serving as senior counsel for the University of Colorado in Boulder and has done a tremendous job. She also happens to be a wonderful mother of four, including the two youngest of her children which she adopted about 6 or 7 years ago, and I am very proud of what she does within the community beyond her work as a great lawyer.

The story of Phil Brimmer likewise is a remarkable story. Coming from a place in Wyoming named Rawlins, Wyoming, this young man found his way to Harvard and then Yale Law School, and from Yale Law School moving to work for a great judge known to all of us who practiced law in Denver, Zita Weinshienk, and clerked for her for a period of 2 years. She told me just last week she thought Philip Brimmer was one of the very best law clerks who had ever worked with her while she served in that position of U.S. district court judge.

He went on to work with a national law firm, Kirkland & Ellis, and then left Kirkland & Ellis because he reached a point in his own life where he decided that the road that he wanted to take was one of public service. He went on to distinguish himself in the positions in the Denver District Attorney's Office that Senator Allard has mentioned. His bosses there, both current Democratic Governor Ritter for the State of Colorado as well as the Democratic District
Attorney for Denver Mitch Morrissey, have given him their absolutely highest ratings. He is a star in the work that he did on behalf of the people that he represented in the Denver District Attorney’s Office.

Then moving to the United States Attorney’s Office, he worked on a number of very important and different cases, but it led to the point where he became the chief of the Special Prosecutions Unit and distinguished himself there as well. He is joined today by his wife and his brother in the audience.

I would say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, two things.

First, I think the common theme among both Phil Brimmer and Christine Arguello is they are the kinds of people that we should be supporting for positions in our Federal judiciary system. They are lawyer’s lawyers. They understand the importance of fairness and judicial temperament and the rest of the qualities that make great judges. I appreciate their willingness to sacrifice the other route that they could have taken, which is to make a lot more money in the private sector, to come and be servants of the public.

Second, Mr. Chairman, once again to you especially for holding this hearing at this point in time in our political season to address what is a judicial emergency in the State of Colorado, I am very, very personally appreciative of your efforts in doing so, and I appreciate the cooperation of Senator Specter in getting this done.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Senator Specter.

Senator SPECTER. I have the pleasure of introducing Gregory—

Chairman LEAHY. Just before we do this, I also know that both Senator Allard and Senator Salazar have other committees meeting, and if you want to leave, I am sure it will not be seen as any snub of the two fine nominees, who I suspect are not going to have that difficult a time before the Committee today.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEAHY. I thank you both very much for being here.

Senator SALAZAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEAHY. Go ahead.

PRESENTATION OF GREGORY G. GARRE, NOMINEE TO BE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, BY HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have the pleasure to introduce Gregory G. Garre to the position of Solicitor General of the United States Department of Justice. Mr. Garre comes to this position with a very distinguished academic record, distinguished professional record, and very extensive service already in the Solicitor General’s Office.

Academically, he graduated cum laude from Dartmouth in 1987; his law degree with high honors from George Washington University Law School; Order of the Coif; editor-in-chief of the Law Review there. After graduation, he clerked for the chief judge of the Third Circuit, Anthony Scirica, and then for Chief Justice Rehnquist. He has worked with the prestigious law firm of Hogan & Hartson where he became a partner and served there for 5 years.
in that capacity. He has been with the Solicitor General’s Office as Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and most recently Acting Solicitor General. He has had 23 cases before the United States Supreme Court, which is quite a record and background for coming to this position.

So I am pleased to introduce him, also to note that he has Pennsylvania connections, was born in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, and his grandparents live there.

Chairman LEAHY. Where is that? Where is Bryn Mawr—oh, Bryn Mawr. I know where Bryn Mawr is. Sorry.

Senator SPECTER. It is a little hard to understand Bryn Mawr with either a Kansas or a Vermont accent.

When I first came to Philadelphia years ago and met somebody from Bryn Mawr, I spelled it B-r-i-n-m-a-r, and I soon found out how to spell Eastern style.

[Laughter.]

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, before excusing myself, I want to ask consent to enter into the record a statement by Senator Martinez for the nomination of Mary Scriven.

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection. Senator Martinez had asked me, too, on that, and that will be part of the record. Thank you.

Well, then, if nobody else has anything to say, I would ask Mr. Waddoups, Mr. Anello, Ms. Scriven, Ms. Arguello, Mr. Brimmer, and Mr. Garre to come forward. Before we start, if you would all stand and raise your right hand and repeat after me. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give in the matter before us will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WADDOUPS. I do.
Judge ANELLO. I do.
Judge SCRIVEN. I do.
Ms. ARGUELLO. I do.
Mr. BRIMMER. I do.
Mr. GARRE. I do.
Chairman LEAHY. Let the record show that all responded in the affirmative. Please sit down.

As has been noted, Mr. Waddoups is a partner at the Salt Lake City, Utah, law firm of Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless; prior to that at O’Melveny & Myers. We have had over the years a number of judicial nominees who worked at O’Melveny & Myers who have come before us.

I also had the pleasure a few years ago at the opening of the new Air and Space Museum meeting General Myers, who was the original partner, just recently passed away. He was at that time about 90 years old. He had flown his own airplane in for the event, and he was ramrod straight. That has absolutely nothing to do with your hearing, but an interesting bit of esotericism.

Mr. WADDOUPS, please go ahead.

STATEMENT OF CLARK WADDOUPS, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

Mr. WADDOUPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be here, and I look forward, if confirmed, to serving in this position.
I would like to introduce my wife, Vickie Waddoups, and my son, Doug Waddoups, who are here with me.

Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, and I should have asked you to do that to begin with. I will, when each one comes, I will ask for their names, because someday when somebody goes to the Waddoups archives, they will note in our official record that you were there.

Incidentally, on introducing everybody, you will be given a chance to see the transcript and to add names or correct spellings or anything else, because it is not a bad thing to have in the record.

Please go ahead, Mr. Waddoups. Did you want to add anything further?

Mr. WADDOUPS. No; just that I am honored to be here, am thankful for the Committee to consider this hearing at this time, and I look forward to being able to respond to any questions you may have.

[The biographical information follows.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name**: Full name (include any former names used).
   
   Clark Waddoups

2. **Position**: State the position for which you have been nominated.
   
   United States District Judge for the District of Utah

3. **Address**: List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.
   
   Office: 185 South State Street, Suite 1300
           Salt Lake City, UT 84111
   
   Residence: Sandy, Utah

4. **Birthplace**: State year and place of birth.
   
   1946; Arco, Idaho.

5. **Marital Status**: (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse's occupation, employer's name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.
   
   I am married to Vickie Lee Waddoups, who is a homemaker. Her maiden name is Vickie Lee Tibbitts. We have no dependent children.

6. **Education**: List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.
   
   S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, 1970 to 1973; J.D., 1973
   
   Brigham Young University, 1967 to 1970; B.A., 1970
   
   Ricks College, 1964 to 1965; I did not receive a degree.
7. **Employment Record:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

**Employment:**

12/1981 to present
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
185 So. State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Shareholder

9/1974 to 12/1981
O'Melveny & Myers
400 South Hope Street
Los Angeles, California 90071
Associate

9/1973 to 9/1974
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
95 Seventh Street
San Francisco, California 94103
Law clerk to Judge J. Clifford Wallace
(Judge Wallace's Chambers were then located in San Diego, California)

7/1973 to 9/1973
O'Melveny & Myers
400 South Hope Street
Los Angeles, California 20071
Law clerk

6/1972 to 9/1972
Strong Poelman & Fox/Fox Edwards & Gardiner (Dissolved)
57 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Summer clerk

6/1971 to 9/1971
University Village, University of Utah
1945 E. Sunnyside Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Maintenance crew member
3/1971 to 9/1971
William Cayias, Attorney at Law
15 W. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Summer clerk

Craters of the Moon National Monument
P.O. Box 29
Arco, Idaho 83213
Maintenance crew member

Other affiliations:
2/2001 to present
1365 Roosevelt, LLC
c/o Douglas Waddoups
Sandy, Utah 84092
Limited partner – 33% interest—eligible to receive a share of profits earned from rental
income collected on property owned by the LLC and would receive a share of any equity
upon sale of the property.

2/2001 to present
1876 Wyoming, LLC
c/o James Waddoups
215 So. State Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Limited partner – 20% interest—eligible to receive a share of profits earned from rental
income collected on property owned by the LLC and would receive a share of any equity
upon sale of the property.

The Family Support Center of Utah
Board member, 1990 to 1998; Board President, 1994 to 1995

8. Military Service and Draft Status: Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including
dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social
security number) and type of discharge received.

I did not serve in the military.

9. Honors and Awards: List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or
professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other
special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

Recognized in “Chambers USA Guide to America's Leading Business Lawyers 2007” for
commercial litigation.
Recognized in "The Best Lawyers in America 2007" for antitrust law and commercial litigation.

Recognized in "Utah's Business 2007 Legal Elite" for civil litigation and trial.

Recognized in "2007 Mountain States Super Lawyers" for general litigation.

Recognized in "The Best Lawyers in America 2006" for commercial litigation.

Recognized in "Utah's Business 2006 Legal Elite" for litigation and trial.


Recognized in "Utah's Business 2005 Legal Elite" for antitrust, commercial litigation, construction, environmental, and intellectual property.


Recognized in "Utah Business 2004 Legal Elite" for antitrust, commercial litigation, construction, environmental and intellectual property.


Awarded "Utah Outstanding Lawyer" in 1999 by the Utah Chapter of the Federal Bar Association.


10. **Bar Associations**: List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

   California Bar Association

   American Bar Association

   Utah State Bar

   Chair of Merit Selection Panel for U.S. Magistrate Judge, April, 1999.
Chair of Merit Selection Panel for U.S. Magistrate Judge, January 2002.

Member of the Advisory Committee to the Utah Supreme Court on the Rules of Evidence (1991 to present).

Member of the Ad hoc Committee to the Supreme Court on Rules Governing Committees (2007 to present).

11. **Bar and Court Admission:**

   a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

   Bar of the State of Utah; August 15, 1983

   Bar of the State of California; December 18, 1973

   There have been no lapses in membership.

   b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

   U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California (5/9/1997 to present)

   Supreme Court of the United States of America (10/15/1984 to present)

   U.S. District Court for the District of Utah (8/19/1983 to present)

   Supreme Court of the State of Utah (8/15/1983 to present)

   U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (1/19/1983 to present)

   U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (4/24/1980 to present)

   U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (1/31/1975 to present)

   All California State Courts (12/1973 to present)

   All Utah State Courts (1983 to present)

   I have been admitted pro hac vice on various occasions to appear for a particular case in the State Courts of Wyoming, Montana, Nevada, and in the U.S. District Courts in Nevada, Wyoming and Florida.
12. Memberships:

   a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

      A. Sherman Christensen American Inn of Court. I have been a Master of the Bench from 1990 to the present. I served as President of the Inn between 1997 and 1998.

      The Family Support Center of Utah. I served as a board member from 1990 to 1998 and Board President from 1994 to 1995.

      The Board of Visitors, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I was a member from 2001 to 2003.

      The Historical Society of the Tenth Judicial Circuit. I was a founding member of the board from its inception in 2003 to 2006.

      I am a member of the Pepperwood Homeowners’ Association, 2500 Pepperwood Drive, Sandy, Utah 84092-4841.

   b. The American Bar Association’s Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

      None.
13. **Published Writings and Public Statements:**

   a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.


   b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

   My work on the Advisory Committee to the Utah Supreme Court on the Utah Rules of Evidence has resulted in committee recommendations to adopt or modify the rules of evidence, but no reports or policy statements.

   c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

   None.

   d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.


   "Mentoring" Panel Presentation at Fall Forum on 11/16/2007 for the Utah State Bar.


Speech in honor of Judge Carolyn McHugh at Ceremonial Swearing-in as a member of the Utah Court of Appeals in August, 2005.


“Stipulations and Agreements.” Participated in presentation on 11/18/2003 for the American Inn of Court.


“Judge Conducted Jury Voir Dire.” Participated in presentation on 10/23/2001 for the American Inn of Court.

“Pitfalls of Trial.” Participated in presentation on 2/27/2001 for the American Inn of Court.


Acceptance speech upon receipt of the Award as Utah Outstanding Lawyer by the Utah Chapter of the Federal Bar Association in 1999.

Speech in honor of Judge Dale A. Kimball at Ceremonial Swearing-in as a U.S. District Court judge.

e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.
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The Salt Lake Tribune, 1/11/2006, portion of Supreme Court oral argument quoted in newspaper article entitled “State: Workers must Retire to have Rights to Benefits.”

The Salt Lake Tribune, 1/10/2006, excerpt from brief quoted in newspaper article entitled “Retirees Fight Legislation.”


14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

I have not held a judicial office.

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

I have not served as a judge.

16. Recusal: If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general
description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

I have not served as a judge.

17. **Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:**

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

None

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

None

18. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

I have never been a sole practitioner.

iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
185 So. State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Shareholder, 12/1981 to present

O’Melveny & Myers
400 South Hope Street
Los Angeles, California 90071

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
95 Seventh Street
San Francisco, California 94103 (Judge Wallace’s Chambers were located in San Diego at the time of my clerkship)

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

Following my clerkship, I joined the Los Angeles office of O’Melveny & Myers. There I worked as a litigation associate, working on mostly antitrust cases. I was a part of the trial team representing IBM in a series of major antitrust actions brought against it, and representing the NFL in an antitrust action against it arising from the relocation of the Oakland Raiders from Oakland to Los Angeles. I had experience in all aspects of litigation, including legal research, drafting motions and complaints, document production, depositions and in the court room at trial.

In 1981, I joined my current firm, Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. My practice primarily involves complex commercial transactions, contract disputes, intellectual property, construction, antitrust, securities laws, and claims of discrimination or sexual misconduct. Because of the broad nature of the firm’s practice, I have had experience in a number of areas. This experience has included one of the longest civil trials before the U.S. District Court for Utah, antitrust cases involving novel and precedent setting issues, patent and intellectual property disputes, and contractual disputes. Many of
the disputes have been successfully resolved prior to trial, often through mediation or by arbitration. Most of my cases have involved a team of lawyers who worked under my supervision for all aspects of civil litigation.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

My clients have been predominantly corporations or other commercial legal entities. I have represented clients in industries such as heavy manufacturing, broadcasting, banking and finance, automotive, oil, and real estate. I have, on a number of occasions, represented individuals in suits against corporations or other legal entities.

I have specialized in complex commercial litigation, involving antitrust, securities, labor and employment, banking, construction, environmental, and insurance claims.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates. 100% of my practice has been in litigation in federal court, state court (Utah and California), and in private arbitration proceedings. I appear in court frequently and have consistently throughout my career.

   i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
      1. federal courts: 60%
      2. state courts of record: 40%
      3. other courts.

   ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
      1. civil proceedings: 100%
      2. criminal proceedings.

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

I have tried approximately 17 cases to verdict or judgment. I was chief counsel in twelve cases and associate counsel in five cases.

   i. What percentage of these trials were:
      1. jury: 53%
      2. non-jury: 47%

c. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if
applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

I have never appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court. I have petitioned for certiorari twice: *Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PLLC*, 444 U.S. 920 (1979) and *Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n*, 479 U.S. 980 (1986). Certiorari was denied on both petitions. I have been unable to locate copies of the petitions.

19. **Litigation**: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

   a. the date of representation;
   
   b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and
   
   c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.


   I acted as lead counsel for plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued for defamation and interference with prospective economic advantage. I represented the plaintiffs. The case was tried to a jury, which awarded a verdict of $2,145,000 in favor of the plaintiffs.

   **Co-Counsel:**
   Jonathan Hafen
   Bentley Tolk
   Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
   Phone: (801) 532-7840

   **Opposing Counsel:**
   Dennis R. James
   Joseph E. Minnock
   Morgan Minnock Rice & James
   136 So. Main Street, 8th Floor
   Salt Lake City, UT 84101
   Phone: (801) 531-7888
Stephen B. Goldberg
Spiroor Woodward Corbalis & Goldberg
707 Torrance Blvd, 2nd Floor
Redondo Beach, CA 90277


I acted as lead counsel for the petitioners and intervenors who were members of the Utah State Legislature, Senator Curtis Bramble, Representative Stephen H. Urquhart, Parents for Choice in Education, Inc., and several parents of children who would have been eligible for educational vouchers. This was an original action in the Utah Supreme Court involving a dispute over whether a petition for a referendum to void a law creating educational vouchers met legal requirements under constitutional and statutory law. The petitioners argued that the referendum did not meet the legal requirements. The Court upheld the referendum.

Co-Counsel:
David C. Reymann
Cheylynn Hayman
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
Phone: (801) 532-7840

Opposing Counsel:
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Robert H. Rees, Esq.
Legislative Research & General Counsel
Utah State Capitol Complex
W210 House Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5210
Phone: (801) 538-1032

Thom D. Roberts, Esq.
Assistant Utah Attorney General
166 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Phone: (801) 366-0353


I acted as lead counsel for the defendant, Haworth. Plaintiffs sued for wrongful termination of an office furniture distributorship. The case was tried to a jury for
approximately six weeks. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but awarded damages significantly below the amount requested. On appeal, the court affirmed on liability, but reversed further reducing the amount of damages awarded.

**Co-Counsel:**
Jill N. Parrish  
Terry E. Welch  
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless  
Phone: (801) 532-7840

**Opposing Counsel:**
Jeffrey R. Oitt  
Cohne Rappaport & Segal  
257 East 200 South, Suite 700  
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111  
Phone: (801) 532-2666


I acted as lead counsel for the defendant, Bausch & Lomb. Plaintiffs brought an action seeking a preliminary injunction and other relief against the defendant arising from a dispute over ownership and rights to eye mapping technology. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction and ultimately granted summary judgment for the defendant.

**Co-Counsel:**
David C. Reymann  
Kara M. Houck  
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless  
Phone: (801) 532-7840

**Opposing Counsel:**
Richard B. Ferrari (deceased)  
P.O. Box 182072  
Coronado, CA 92178

Dwight B. Williams  
Mackey Price & Thompson  
350 American Plaza II  
57 West 200 South  
Salt Lake City, UT 84101  
Phone: (801) 438-1033

I acted as lead counsel for plaintiff, Ballard Medical, in the district court. Ballard Medical sued the defendant for infringement of its patent for ventilating and aspirating tracheobronchial catheters. The Court held an extended pretrial conference at which it heard argument on claim construction and summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding non-infringement. I did not handle the appeal. The decision was affirmed.

**Co-Counsel:**

Robert B. Lochhead
Robert S. Clark
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
Phone: (801) 532-7840

M. Wayne Western
Thorpe, North & Western
8180 South 700 East
Sandy, Utah, 84070
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Randall B. Bateman
Bateman IP Law Group
8 E. Broadway, Suite 550
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 533-0320

**Opposing Counsel:**

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Now at Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy
36 South State Street, Suite 1900
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Phone: (801) 237-0272

David V. Trask, Esq.
Trask Britt & Rossa
230 South 500 East, Ste 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Phone: (801) 532-1922

I took over from another firm as lead counsel for Non-Invasive Medical Technologies. This case involved a patent dispute over a medical device that measured the rate of blood flow through a dialysis shunt. After extensive discovery and hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Non-Invasive Medical Technologies. On appeal, the case was reversed in part, vacated, and remanded.

Co-Counsel:
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Parz Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
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Opposing Counsel:
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Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
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Phone: (801) 521-3200

Karen Vogel Weil
Benjamin A. Katzenellenbogen
Knobbe Martens Olsen & Bear, LLP
1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1500
Los Angeles, California 90067
Phone: (310) 551-3450


I acted as associate counsel and part of a trial team that represented VISA. The plaintiff, which issued the Discover Card, sued VISA for antitrust violations. The case presented novel issues of how antitrust law applied to an entity such as VISA that required the cooperative action of competitors in order for there to be a product. The jury entered a verdict against VISA which was reversed on appeal.

Co-Counsel:
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Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
Phone: (801) 532-7840

M. Laurence Popofsky
Renata M. Sos
Stephen V. Bomse
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William H. Pratt
James D. Sonda
Kirkland & Ellis LLP
Citigroup Center
153 East 53rd Street
New York, New York 10022
Phone: (212) 446-4862


I acted as lead counsel for defendant, Bankers Trust. Plaintiff sued for failing to close on a loan commitment. After extensive discovery and hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Bankers Trust.

Co-Counsel:
Robert S. Clark
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
Phone: (801) 532-7840

Mark F. James
Now at Hatch James & Dodge
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Phone: (801) 363-6666
Opposing Counsel:
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VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy
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Phone: (801) 237-0470

Perrin R. Love
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 322-2516

Richard D. Burbidge
Stephen B. Mitchell
Burbidge Mitchell & Gross
215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 355-6677

9. Utah Public Employees Ass'n v. State of Utah, 2006 UT 9 (Utah 2006), trial court,
Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah (Judge William W. Barrett) Case

I acted as lead counsel for the defendant, State of Utah. The plaintiffs sued
challenging the constitutionality of recently passed legislation that modified the
employees' unused sick leave benefits. The plaintiffs claimed that the legislation
devalued their vested rights, making it an unconstitutional taking. The trial court
denied a preliminary injunction and granted the State’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. On an expedited appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed.

Co-Counsel:
Heidi E. Leithead
David C. Reyman
Cheylynn Hayman
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
Phone: (801) 532-7840

Opposing Counsel:
Benson L. Hathaway
Alexander Dushku
Matthew K. Richards
Stephen W. Geary
Kirton & McConkie
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 328-3600


I acted as associate counsel at trial and lead counsel on appeal for plaintiff, U.S. Industries, who sued numerous defendants for violations of securities laws and fraud. The claims arose from a series of transactions relating to the sale of health club memberships and the accounting for those transactions. The trial to the jury lasted approximately six months. The jury returned a verdict in favor of U.S. Industries against five defendants, but a verdict in favor of Touche Ross. The five defendants and Touche Ross appealed. On the appeal, the court affirmed the judgment.

**Co-Counsel:**
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Now at Rooker Rawlins, LLP
170 South Main Street, Suite 850
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Phone: (801) 524-6100

Robert S. Clark
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Phone: (801) 532-7840

Michael M. Later
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Henderson, Nevada 89052
Phone: (702) 456-1328

**Opposing Counsel:**
Paul A. Renne
Cooley Godward Kronish LLP
101 California Street, 5th Floor
San Francisco, California 94111
Phone: (415) 693-2222
20. Legal Activities: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organization(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

My legal practice has been devoted almost entirely to litigation. In recent years, many cases have been resolved either through settlement after mediation or in arbitration. The following is representative of the types of cases I have handled throughout my career. In most of the cases I have worked on, I have worked with a team of lawyers. The results have been due to the work of the entire team. To reflect the team effort, I have used the pronoun "we" to describe these efforts.

In Pro-Fit Worldwide Fitness, Inc. v. Flanders Corp., we tried a case in arbitration involving a dispute between a distributor in Israel and a local supplier of exercise equipment. In Aero Tech Manufacturing v. Vortec, we resolved by settlement a dispute over ownership of intellectual property for steam cleaning carpets. In Jacobsen Construction Co. Inc. v. FS Jackson Hole Development, we resolved through settlement the principal claims of our client, Jacobsen Construction, over a contract under which it built a luxury hotel in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. In Oquirrh Artificial Kidney Center v. Interstate Insurance Group, we resolved by settlement a dispute over the opening and
operation of kidney dialysis centers in Utah. In Associated Diving & Marine Contractors v. Granite Construction Co., we settled a dispute between Union Pacific Railroad Co. and Granite, our client, over construction work on the causeway across the Great Salt Lake. In Imagraph v. Scardino, we resolved the claims of our client, Scardino, over the ownership of software for a complicated computer function that he had developed. In ZARS, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., we resolved by settlement a dispute over the claimed ownership of medical technology developed by our client, ZARS, to administer drugs through a patient’s skin. In Smith-Larsen v. Lyman Bros., we resolved claims of sexual harassment against our client, Lyman Brothers. In Geneva Steel Co. v. C&I, we resolved the claims of our client, Geneva Steel, against its insurer to recover for damages suffered from an electrical outage and fire at its steel mill. The claim involved damage to property; as well as damage to the business.

In most of these cases, settlements were reached only after substantial discovery, involving both documents and depositions, had taken place and pretrial motions had been briefed and argued. Many of them involved mediation in which the claims were capsulated and presented to a mediator.

During the operation of the Geneva Steel Works in Provo, Utah, I regularly represented the company in a number of matters including the development and negotiation of the State Implementation Plan for air releases, and in a number of arbitrations of grievances filed by members of the United Steel Workers Union.

I have been registered as a Utah Lobbyist, but have not been actively involved in lobbying activities. My meetings with legislators have been in my role as counsel, representing the legislators in connection with pending litigation over whether a petition for a referendum to void a law creating educational vouchers met legal requirements.

From 1991 to present, I have served on the Advisory Committee to the Utah Supreme Court on the Rules of Evidence. The Committee meets monthly, more or less, to review and recommend proposed changes to the Utah Rules of Evidence. During my tenure on the Committee, it has recommended and the Supreme Court has approved, for example, revisions to the rules governing privileges and the use of expert testimony, new rules governing a shield law and reporters privilege, proposals for the rule governing the admissibility of evidence of prior acts of sexual abuse of a child, as well as a number of other rules.

From 2001 to 2003, I served on the Board of Visitors for the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University. The Board reviewed scholastic programs, made suggestions and offered comments on approaches to legal education. The Board met once a year for a day-long session with members of the law school faculty and administration.

From 1990 to present, I have been a Master of the Bench in the A. Sherman Christensen American Inn of Court. The Inn meets typically once a month during the school year to discuss legal issues, lawyering skills, ethics and civility. The format involves the presentation of the topic selected for discussion, which often includes presentations by
experienced lawyers to demonstrate different skills, such as cross-examination, opening statements, closing arguments, depositions and other discovery practices. I served as president from 1997 to 1998 and served on the executive committee to plan the year’s program for several additional years.

21. **Teaching**: What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

I taught one semester of freshman English as a graduate student at Brigham Young University in 1969. I do not have a copy of the syllabus used.

22. **Deferred Income/ Future Benefits**: List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

None.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service**: Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

No.

24. **Sources of Income**: List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)


25. **Statement of Net Worth**: Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for)

See attached Net Worth Statement

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest**:

a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the
position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

Current clients of the firm Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless would present potential conflicts of interest during my initial service. Clients that I have personally represented during the last five years would also present such a potential conflict of interest. I do not believe that there are any categories of litigation or financial arrangements that would present such a potential conflict, other than my ownership in the two limited partnerships I hold with my sons. I would not hear cases involving those entities under any circumstances.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

I would resolve any such conflicts of interest (including cases in which current lawyers from the firm of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless appear, in cases involving current clients of the firm, and in cases involving any former clients, parties or attorneys with whom I have, in the last five years, had a close relationship, either as counsel or on a personal level) by following the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and applicable statutes, policies and procedures.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

I have been active in the Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee and American Inn of Court. In addition, I served as a member of the Board of Directors for eight years for the Family Support Center, which is dedicated to preventing child abuse, providing counseling and supporting parents. Board service involved almost monthly meetings, numerous day-long sessions for planning and funding, training related to work of the Family Support Center and regularly fielding legal questions that arose.

28. **Selection Process:**

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.
This jurisdiction does not have a selection commission.

When the vacancy for the federal district judge position opened, I heard indirectly that Senator Hatch and Senator Bennett were considering my name as a recommendation. I understand that Senator Hatch and his staff talked to a number of members of the legal community about my qualifications, some of whom were friends who called on my behalf. In mid-October 2007, I was interviewed by Senator Hatch and Senator Bennett, who told me that they had determined to recommend me to the President for nomination. On December 20, 2007, I was invited to an interview at the White House with counsel from the Department of Justice and White House Counsel’s Office. On March 3, 2008, I was advised that the President had made a decision to proceed with my nomination. I have had subsequent conversations with Department of Justice counsel regarding the nomination paperwork and the process. My nomination was submitted to the United States Senate on April 29, 2008.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No.
### FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
### NOMINATION FILING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Position Reporting (Last name, first, middle initial)</th>
<th>2. Court or Organization</th>
<th>3. Date of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waugh, Clerk</td>
<td>U.S. District Court, Utah</td>
<td>05/30/2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Title (if Title III judges indicate active or senior status, magistrate judges indicate full or part-time)</th>
<th>5. Report Type (check appropriate type)</th>
<th>6. Reporting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Judge—Nomination</td>
<td></td>
<td>8/1/2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Chambers or Office Address</th>
<th>8. On the basis of the information contained in this Report and any modifications pertaining thereto, it is, in my opinion, in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>155 South State St. # 1300</td>
<td>Reviewing Officer: ___________________ Date: ________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt Lake City, Utah 84111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IMPORTANT NOTES:** The instructions accompanying this form must be followed. Complete all parts, checking the NONE box for each part where you have no reportable information. Sign on last page.

---

### I. POSITIONS.
(Reporting individual only; see pp. 9-11 of instructions.)

- **X** NONE (No reportable positions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### II. AGREEMENTS.
(Reporting individual only; see pp. 18-14 of instructions.)

- **X** NONE (No reportable agreements.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTIES AND TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00499 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
### III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME

**A. Filer's Non-Investment Income**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2006</td>
<td>Past Wadlings Brown Inc &amp; Leonardo—salary</td>
<td>$237,605.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2007</td>
<td>Past Wadlings Brown Inc &amp; Leonardo—salary</td>
<td>$344,234.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B. Spouse's Non-Investment Income**

(Dollar amount not required except for honors.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### IV. REIMBURSEMENTS

- Transportation, lodging, food, entertainment

**A. Filer's Reimbursements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. EXEMPT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### V. GIFTS

- **NONE** (No reportable gifts.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>EXEMPT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### VI. LIABILITIES

- **NONE** (No reportable liabilities.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Key Bank</td>
<td>Credit card</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Living Scriptures</td>
<td>Installment purchase</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. MPPC Financial Corp.</td>
<td>Extensive warranty on automobiles</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. R.C. Wiley</td>
<td>Credit card appliances for remodel</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- **Income, value, transactions** (Includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-41 of filing instructions.)

- **NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)**

#### A. Description of Assets (including trust assets)
- **None of the assets are held in trust except from prior disclosers**

#### B. Income during reporting period
- **Value**
- **Type**
- **Date**

#### C. Gross value at end of reporting period
- **Value**
- **Method**
- **Date**

#### D. Transactions during reporting period
- **Value**
- **Type**
- **Date**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (including trust assets)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None of the assets are held in trust except from prior disclosers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Chase National Bank account
- Severe
- J
- Y
- EXEMPT

2. Rej Bank Checking
- Interest
- J
- T

3. Mass Mutual universal policy
- None
- J
- T

4. Mass Mutual whole life
- None
- J
- T

5. Mass Mutual whole life
- None
- J
- T

6. NACLMAN whole life
- None
- J
- T

7. 1355 Reserve LLC
- None
- K
- W

8. 1876 Wyoming LLC
- None
- K
- W

9. Eastern Airlines common stock
- None
- K
- U

10. ZARS common stock
- None
- K
- U

11. St. Louis Trust Co.
- None
- J
- T

12. St. Louis Trust Co.
- None
- K
- T

13. The MMO Company—401(k) account
- None
- P1
- T

14.

15.

16.

17.

#### Footnotes:
- A = $1,000 or less
- B = $1,000 to $15,000
- C = $15,001 to $25,000
- D = $25,001 to $25,000
- E = $25,001 to $25,000
- F = $25,001 to $25,000
- G = $25,001 to $25,000
- H = $25,001 to $25,000
- I = $25,001 to $25,000
- J = $25,001 to $25,000
- K = $25,001 to $25,000
- L = $25,001 to $25,000
- M = $25,001 to $25,000
- N = $25,001 to $25,000
- O = $25,001 to $25,000
- P = $25,001 to $25,000
- Q = $25,001 to $25,000
- R = $25,001 to $25,000
- S = $25,001 to $25,000
- T = $25,001 to $25,000
- U = $25,001 to $25,000
- V = $25,001 to $25,000
- W = $25,001 to $25,000
- X = $25,001 to $25,000
- Y = $25,001 to $25,000
- Z = $25,001 to $25,000

**VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00502 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC**
### VII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS

**FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT**  
**Page 5 of 6**  
**Date of Report:** 05/29/2008

#### IX. CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that no information not reported was withheld because it was not applicable statutory provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that earned income from outside employment and bonuses and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 7353, and Judicial Conference regulations.

**Signature:** [Signature]  
**Date:** May 1, 2008

**NOTE:** ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FALSIFIES OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (5 U.S.C. app. § 744)

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**FILING INSTRUCTIONS**

Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:

Committee on Financial Disclosure  
Administrative Office of the United States Courts  
Suite 2-391  
One Columbus Circe, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20544
## FINANCIAL STATEMENT

### NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in bank</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-assured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable-add schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-add schedule</td>
<td>Chateau mortgages and other loans payable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td>Other debts-in-nure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autos and other personal property</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash value-life insurance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other assets itemized</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRA Accounts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>401(k) account</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Assets</td>
<td>Total liabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net Worth</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets</td>
<td>Total liability and net worth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CONTINGENT LIABILITIES</td>
<td>GENERAL INFORMATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As enfuee, custodian or guarantor</td>
<td>Are any assets pledged? (Add schedule)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On lease or contracts</td>
<td>Are you defead in any suits or legal actions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Claims</td>
<td>Have you ever taken bankruptcy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for Federal Income Tax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other special debt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FINANCIAL STATEMENT

NET WORTH SCHEDULES

Listed Securities
Batteries & Bands $ 50,000
ZARS 10,585
Total Listed Securities $ 60,585

Unlisted Securities
1365 Roosevelt LLC $ 44,633
1876 Wyoming LLC 32,200
Total Unlisted Securities $ 76,833

Real Estate Owned
Personal residence $ 736,900

Real Estate Mortgages Payable
Personal residence $ 231,423

Assets pledged
Bank note (for home remodeling) is secured by
Personal residence $ 310,683
AFFIDAVIT

I, Clark Waddoups, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

May 13, 2008

NAME

NOTARY
Chairman Leahy. Let me ask you this: The courts, the Federal courts, is the only undemocratic branch in our system, and it was intended to be that way. They are not elected. They are appointed, given lifetime appointments—entirely different from the other two branches of our Federal system. If you go all the way back to reading the Federalist Papers on there, it is to give them the independence without fear or favor of either political party.

I have always looked, when I am going to vote on a judge—I spent a number of years in a courtroom, as many of us did. I ask myself, this person, if they are Federal judge, would I feel comfortable coming into their court, whether I was plaintiff or defendant, whether I represented somebody rich or poor, no matter what my political background or my race or my gender or my religion, would I feel that that judge will hear the case without any preconceived notion about either the attorney or the litigant? Could you give those assurances, that you would look at a case and say whether this person is a plaintiff or defendant, criminal, government, or whatever, you would look at that case and say, “You are going to get the fairest trial you could ever have before me”?

Mr. Waddoup. Without any qualification at all, I can give you that representation. I can tell you that as a litigant, when I appear in courts with clients, that is what they are looking for. They want a court that will hear their case without bias and without prejudice. That is a principle on which I am firmly committed and would assure you that that is exactly what I would attempt to do to the best of my ability.

Chairman Leahy. And do you have any background that can show that kind of equal respect to people no matter what their gender, no matter what their background?

Mr. Waddoup. I would hope—I think Senator Hatch referred to the work I have done with my colleagues. I believe I enjoy a reputation among the lawyers in our community as having treated everyone with respect. Part of my service has been to serve on the Board of the Family Support Center in Salt Lake City, in which our principal mission was to look out for mothers who are in abusive situations or who are abusive with their children. I found that to be meaningful and important service. I think that kind of service needs to continue over and be carried on the bench.

Chairman Leahy. Also, the courts serve as a check on either a runaway executive or a runaway legislature. We had a memo for a while, a secret memo, that once it came to light, it was withdrawn by the White House, which said basically the President could put people outside the law on questions of torture. He could say that the law would not apply to him or anybody he said it does not apply to.

Do I have your assurances that you feel the laws of this country apply to everybody, whether it is a Federal judge, a U.S. Senator, or a President or anybody else?

Mr. Waddoup. Without any question at all.

Chairman Leahy. And you know Federal judges have great abilities that they—on questions of conflicts of interest, basically they have to make this decision, whether they recuse themselves. What would be the kind of thing, do you believe, would require a recusal?
What kind of case do you think that might come before you that would require you to just say, look, I should not sit on this case?

Mr. WADDOUPS. I would be guided by the Rules of Judicial Conduct, but let me give you some illustrations that would seem clear to me.

Any kind of case that came before me from members of my existing law firm, I would be required, at least for a number of years, to recuse myself. I would also feel that I would recuse myself if there were cases in which adversaries, lawyers who have been advocates of mine in the recent past—that would be a shorter period of time, but I would not want anyone to feel that because we had been opposite each other they somehow were mistreated. And the same with recent clients.

Beyond those kinds of clear conflicts, as guided by the Rules of Judicial Conduct, I think a judge has a responsibility to hear the cases that come before him, whether they are hard or easy. And I do not think recusing yourself simply because of the nature of the case would be appropriate. But if there is an appearance that someone feels that they may not be treated fairly because of a past relationship, I would recuse myself.

Chairman LEAHY. Emphasize that last one just a little bit. You feel if the appearance would be that because of a Judge Waddoups, this plaintiff or this defendant might not be treated fairly, you feel that that is cause for recusal?

Mr. WADDOUPS. If there was a factual basis in terms of facts, somebody that was an adversary, somebody that was on the opposite side of me in a case before, somebody whose client was opposed to a client of mine, those kinds of situations. Simply an unsupported factual assertion would not be sufficient.

Chairman LEAHY. I understand. But what you are saying—and I do not want to put words in your mouth, but what you are saying is that your use of recusal would be also to support the integrity, the impression of the Federal court as being independent and open-minded to the American public. Is that correct?

Mr. WADDOUPS. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEAHY. I must say that I find this so important, because, I mean, a court cannot—a court does not have an army or anything else. It has to rely and the whole system breaks down if it cannot rely on the respect the American people have. I have tried an awful lot of cases. I am sure my colleagues here have. But sometimes you win and sometimes you lose, but you have to be able to say to your clients, you have to be able to say to the public, “But it was a fair trial.” And I think that is very important.

Senator Hatch.

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your courtesy and your kindness and your effort to bring these folks before the Committee, get them through the Committee, and, of course, to the floor. And I am going to help you every step of the way.

This is an impressive group of nominees, and I want to commend each and every one of you for being here today. It means a lot to me to have good people on the bench, and, Mr. Garre, you are terrific. You have the support of Democrats and Republicans in this
town and across the country who have watched you in action and know how good you are.

Having said that, I just want to say that we are very proud to have Clark Waddoups here. We know he is one of the great lawyers in this country. We know that he has an impeccable reputation. He is a leader in one of the great law firms in Utah, and I personally have a great deal of fondness and admiration for him. And I expect him to become one of the great district court judges in this country.

With regard to Mr. Garre, I hope we can confirm Mr. Garre to the position of Solicitor General by the time the Supreme Court begins its hearings when it comes in on October 6th. The 4 months that would remain in this administration would actually be more than half of the time the Supreme Court devotes to oral arguments, which conclude in May. Mr. Garre is eminently qualified, highly respected, and I see no reason why he could not begin the Supreme Court's term with the public backing of the executive and legislative branches.

I ask consent that a letter by a bipartisan group of former Solicitors General on behalf of Mr. Garre's nomination be entered into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection.

Senator HATCH. Let me quote small portion of that letter. “We have worked with Mr. Garre in the Office of Solicitor General or as co-counsel in cases before the Court. We have observed at close range his vast legal talents, and we are unanimous in our conclusion that by any measure he has been an extraordinarily effective advocate on behalf of the United States. Mr. Garre's nomination is in keeping with the finest traditions of the Office of Solicitor General.”

I certainly agree with that assessment, and I commend you for the reputation that you have been able to develop over these years, and it is a well-earned reputation.

Let me turn to the judicial nominees. By my count, the district court nominees before us today have more than 90 combined years of private practice experience. That is pretty impressive. As somebody who has been on this Committee for 32 years and has held an awful lot of these hearings, this is an impressive group of people. That does not count experience as prosecutors and judges, and that means that each of you has seen many State and Federal judges do what they do.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions because I have looked at the resumes and the information about these terrific people who are before us today. I am going to support every one of you, and I hope that we can do this quickly and get you through and confirmed quickly. And, above all, Mr. Garre, I hope you can continue doing the excellent job you have been doing, only as Solicitor General, at least during the 4 months that remain in this administration, and hopefully even after, regardless of who wins the election come this November.

Mr. Chairman, I personally want to thank you. It is tough being Chairman of this Committee. It is a very partisan Committee in many respects. When I was Chairman, I had a very difficult time from time to time, and I understand how difficult it is, and I am
very grateful that you would hold this hearing today and be willing to push these people.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much.

Senator Whitehouse, did you have anything?

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Yes, if I may. I have some questions that I would like to ask of Mr. Garre, and let me preface them by assuring my colleagues that I do not intend to object to Mr. Garre’s nomination. But as the Chairman indicated earlier, we have had a very unfortunate episode in the history of this country and in the history of the Department of Justice that has largely come to its conclusion with the replacement of the entire leadership of the Department of Justice, to which the Chairman referred.

My concern is that the cleanup is not complete. As I have indicated in many other forums, my concern is that the Office of Legal Counsel in particular remains what I have called the “George Bush Little Shop of Legal Horrors.” And while I applaud Attorney General Mukasey for many of the steps that he has undertaken to set the Department of Justice right, I do believe—and I am not, of course, Mr. Garre, asking you to accept this belief. I am just stating it to you. I do believe that the OLC remains a very troubled part of the Department of Justice into which the broom that has cleaned up so much else of the Department of Justice still needs to sweep.

You and I probably disagree on a great number of legal issues, and we would probably have a good academic and intellectual combat were we arguing cases against each other. But I think we also agree that there is a basic level of legal competence and scholarship that, irrespective of what the position you choose to take in a case is, is a baseline. And you should never go below that, and you should certainly never go below that if you are the Department of Justice of the United States of America. And I think that after the unfortunate episode that we have been through, you will probably also agree that every officer of the Department of Justice, no matter what their station, has an interest in seeing to the integrity of the entire Department of Justice. And it is off those two principles, to which I see you nodding, that my concern about OLC—it is on those two that the concern stands.

I have recently had an exchange with a member of the Department in the Intelligence Committee on which I serve. Regrettably, that transcript is classified. My efforts to have it be declassified have been resisted by the administration, are unsuccessful. We are still asking for an explanation of what it is about this exchange that contains anything that would reveal any sources or methods of intelligence gathering. I think that the denial of it is, frankly, just a desire to keep the issue out of the public and stands on no legitimate national security footing. But, in any event, we are still engaged in that, and as a result, I cannot in this forum even tell you the name of the person who I had the exchange with. But if you ask within the Department, it will be easy—it is perhaps even obvious.

I would like to ask you—I know how busy you are going to be. I know what it is like to be an appellate attorney with a vast amount of reading to do. I would ask you to take a look at that transcript—I am sure you can get clearance to do it—and to take
a look at the torture memoranda that the OLC wrote, specifically focusing on its failure to treat with a case named *United States v. Lee*, which is a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in which the court, in a prosecution brought by the Department of Justice, on the conviction of a Texas sheriff and his deputies for waterboarding prisoners to get convictions, found over and over in the opinion that this technique was torture—referred to it as “water torture.” The word “torture” I think appears eight times, sometimes quoting the Government’s own indictment, sometimes using the court’s own language.

For the life of me, I cannot understand how in the lengthy opinions that support the administration’s position on torture which went so far afield legally as to quote standards out of health care reimbursement statutes, they were unable to find or unwilling to discuss a case bang on point, discussing the procedure at issue, calling it “torture,” by a circuit court of appeals of the United States of America, a court in which the Department of Justice itself was the prosecutor and the proponent of the theory that this was torture. To me, that shows that something went seriously, seriously awry.

In the context of that, I would like you to also take a look at the treatment of a decision called *United States v. Hilldow*, which involved a course of abuse at the hands of the Marcos regime of an American citizen. The course of treatment included waterboarding. The course of treatment was referred to as torture, and the distinction that was drawn was that it was a course of treatment that included other forms of abuse than waterboarding. And, therefore, the case could not stand for the proposition that waterboarding alone was torture.

Well, there stands Lee. I do not see how from a pure point of craftsmanship you could ever write an opinion on that subject without addressing Lee. I submit to you that if you wrote that opinion to the United States Supreme Court as a brief and left out a case that on point, it would make the recent episode with respect to the omission of the statute on the death penalty look like child’s play.

I am not going to ask you any more than that. Have a look at it. Don’t tell me—don’t talk publicly, but let ye Deputy Attorney General, let your Attorney General know what your opinion on that subject is. If you agree with me that there is no legitimate standard of advocacy and scholarship that would allow that case to be omitted, then I think that is a sign we need to take a second look at OLC. And I frankly do not see how reasonable lawyers who are well trained and professional frankly could see this any other way. So that is my request to you.

**STATEMENT OF GREGORY G. GARRE, NOMINEE TO BE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES**

Mr. GARRE. Thank you, Senator, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for including this in this hearing. I feel very privileged and honored to be here.

Senator, I will absolutely look at the items that you asked me to look at and follow through in the manner that you requested. Senator WHITEHOUSE. I appreciate that.
Mr. GARRE. I also agree with you wholeheartedly that the integrity of the Department of Justice and the integrity of the lawyers who work in the Department of Justice is critical for the American people and for the duty that we have for those of us privileged enough to work there.

A former Solicitor General, Solicitor General Soboloff, said that the duty of the Solicitor General’s Office and the lawyers in that office is not simply to advocate on behalf of a client but to do justice. And I certainly agree with that. And if I were privileged enough to be confirmed, that is something that I would have foremost in my mind in carrying out my responsibilities with respect to all matters, including the matters that you referred to.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I appreciate and accept that. I thank you. Mr. GARRE. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEAHY. If I actually could follow up on that just a little bit, because the Solicitor General’s Office is very unique. It has the capacity as friend of the court. It is sometimes referred to as the “tenth Justice,” and it has to speak and lay out what is best.

Can you assure us that a Solicitor General, whether you had a Democrat or Republican in the White House, you would not serve a partisan interest but, rather, a judicial interest or a judicious interest in your work as Solicitor General?

Mr. G ARRE. Absolutely, Senator. I have been privileged to work in the office under two different administrations, and in both administrations, it was made clear to the lawyers of that office that our duty is to represent the best interests of the United States, irrespective of the political administration of that time. And I think that is critical for the Solicitor General to perform his obligations to the Court and to the country to provide the best representation that he can, and to have the courts accept the candor and arguments of the Solicitor General as a representation of what is in the best interests of the United States as opposed to the political interests of any particular time.

Chairman LEAHY. I think we would all agree with that answer, but let us just go to a specific. As Principal Deputy Solicitor General, you signed the amicus brief in Ledbetter v. Goodyear. And for those who are not aware of that, that was a case where Lilly Ledbetter for nearly two decades was paid a lot less than her male counterparts. As a supervisor, she was paid less and did not realize it until after she had left employment. But in the brief you signed, you contended she was not eligible for Title VII protection against discriminatory pay because she did not file her claim within 180 days of their repeated discriminatory pay decisions, even though, of course, she was not aware of the pay decisions. And that view contradicted the position of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the EEOC. And some have called your position even more draconian than the Eleventh Circuit.

Did you decide to file an amicus brief as a result of a request of the EEOC, which obviously disagreed with that position?

Mr. GARRE. Senator, the determination to file an amicus brief in that case was made in the same manner it is in any case, and it is a very collaborative process where we, the Solicitor General—

Chairman LEAHY. Was the EEOC involved in that collaborative process?
Mr. GARRE. It was, Senator.
Chairman LEAHY. And did the EEOC agree with your brief?
Mr. GARRE. I believe, as was indicated in the brief, and certainly as made clear through the briefings, that the EEOC had by regulation or policy statement taken a contrary position. The position that we laid out in the brief we believed was consistent with prior positions that the Supreme Court had taken in a number of decisions.

Chairman LEAHY. Who made the final decision to file an amicus brief?
Mr. GARRE. The final—
Chairman LEAHY. I mean, this was Ledbetter v. Goodyear. It was not Ledbetter v. the United States. Why was the decision made to file an amicus brief?
Mr. GARRE. Senator, the Solicitor General makes that determination. He looks to the interests of the United States in a particular question pending before the Court if the United States is not a party, and he looks to whether or not reasonable arguments can be made in support of that position.
The Federal Government has both the responsibility to enforce the civil rights laws, including Title VII, and is also an employer who is subject to suit under Title VII.

Chairman LEAHY. As you know, there has been some very strong criticism—in fact, we came, I think, within about one vote of overcoming a Republican filibuster to restore rights for subsequent people in a situation like this. But what I cannot seem to understand is you have a company that hides the fact that they are paying a woman less. The matter is up in litigation, and somebody in the U.S. Government steps in to say we have got to protect that company, not the woman who was being paid less all those years. You write the brief. I still do not fully understand why this administration, why your office, why it was so necessary to weigh in on behalf of Goodyear and not this woman who was given such a bum deal.

Mr. GARRE. Certainly, Senator, no one—and certainly no one in the Department of Justice—condoned discriminatory practices that were alleged in that case. The legal principle that we were focused on was when does the statute of limitations begin to run when someone has suffered a discrete act of discrimination.

Chairman LEAHY. But having taken the position the EEOC had taken, and you taking a contrary position, I mean, you could just as well have just stayed out of the case. Is that not correct?
Mr. GARRE. That is always an option, Senator, that the Solicitor General has. The Solicitor General of the United States had participated in a number of prior cases involving the same—

Chairman LEAHY. Who made the final decision?
Mr. GARRE. The Solicitor General did, Senator. The Solicitor General at that time was Paul Clement.

Chairman LEAHY. Was there any influence from the White House or from the Attorney General in making that final decision?
Mr. GARRE. Senator, in every case there is input from all interested components.

Chairman LEAHY. Was there in this case from the White House and the Attorney General?
Mr. GARRE. I am not personally aware of that. The Solicitor General would make a final determination in that case, listening to all interested parties, because we are interested in representing the views of the United States to the best we can, taking into account all different interests of the interested agencies and components.

Chairman LEAHY. Even though in this case the views were contrary to the views at EEOC, which is the part of the Government that would normally be involved in this.

Mr. GARRE. That is correct, Senator. And certainly it is not uncommon that different components within the Department of Justice or even different agencies may have different perspectives, regulatory perspectives or enforcement perspectives or policy perspectives.

Chairman LEAHY. Some of us were concerned that this may have been political, including to the point when Ms. Ledbetter came here to testify, and her testimony was cut off by a Republican objection. But I just throw that out for what it is worth.

[The biographical information follows.]
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UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NON-JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).
   
   Gregory George Garre

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.
   
   Solicitor General of the United States

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.
   
   Office: United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530
   
   Residence: Bethesda, Maryland

4. **Birthplace:** State date and place of birth.
   
   November 1, 1964
   
   Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.
   
   Married to Lorane Frances Hebert, attorney and partner at the law firm of Hogan & Hartson LLP, 555 13th Street, NW, Washington DC 20004.
   
   Two dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.
   
Harvard University Extension School (February 1988-April 1988); extension program, no degree.


University of London, Birkbeck College (January 1987-March 1987); Hansard Scholar Program, no degree.

7. **Employment Record**: List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530; Acting Solicitor General (June 2008-present), Principal Deputy Solicitor General (October 2005-present).

Hogan & Hartson LLP, 555 13th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20004; Partner and Head of Firm’s Supreme Court and Appellate Practice (July 2004-October 2005).


United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530; Assistant to the Solicitor General (September 2000-July 2004).


Hogan & Hartson LLP, 555 13th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20004; Associate (October 1993-December 2000); Partner (January 2000-October 2000).

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, United States Supreme Court, One First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20543; Law Clerk (1992-1993).


Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Quaker Tower, 321 N. Clark Street, Chicago, IL; Summer Associate (July 1990-August 1990).

Gardner, Carton & Douglas, 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20004, and Quaker Tower, 321 N. Clark Street, Chicago, IL; Summer Associate (May 1989-August 1989).

Testa Hurwitz & Thibeault, Exchange Place, 53 State Street, Boston MA 02109; Paralegal (October 1987- August 1988).

8. **Military Service and Draft Status:** Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

None.

9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

Special Commendation Award for National Security Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division (December 2007).

Award for Dedication in Teaching, George Washington University Law School (May 2006).

Award for Excellence, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense (October 2005).

Distinguished Graduate Award, Barrington High School (June 2004).

Certificate of Commendation, United States Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division (October 2003).

Attorney General’s Award for Excellence in Furthering the Interests of U.S. National Security, United States Department of Justice (June 2003).


10. **Bar Associations**: List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.


Edward Coke Appellate Inn of Court (2003-present); Associate (2003-2005); Barrister (2005-present).

National Chamber Litigation Center Constitutional and Administrative Law Advisory Committee (2005).

National Legal Center for the Public Interest (2004-2005); Legal Adviser.

11. **Bar and Court Admission**:

   a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.


   Illinois; December 20, 1991. My membership status is "inactive" because I do not currently live or practice law in Illinois.

   b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

   United States Supreme Court (admitted January 6, 1997).

   Supreme Court of Illinois (admitted December 20, 1991 (inactive)).

   District of Columbia Court of Appeals (admitted February 4, 1994).

   United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (admitted February 10, 1997).

   United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (admitted October 26, 2004).

   United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (admitted January 7, 2000).

   United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (admitted February 25, 2005).
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (admitted July 25, 2005).


United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (admitted April 21, 2005).


United States District Court for the District of Columbia (admitted December 12, 2005).

United States District Court for the Western District of Washington (admitted June 2004).

12. **Memberships:**

   a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

   Chevy Chase Presbyterian Church (1993-present); Deacon (2000-2006).


   b. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12(a) above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

   No.

13. **Published Writings and Public Statements:**

   a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

   *Our Chief: William H. Rehnquist Served the Nation with Vision and Grace*, Legal Times (Sept. 12, 2005).


Copyright Bandits at Large: Supreme Court Should Grant Cert in Grokster Case to Address Important Business Concerns, Legal Times (Dec. 6, 2004).

Coded Message: Lower Courts Must Decipher Supreme Court Ruling on Resurrected Alien Tort Statute, Legal Times (Sept. 6, 2004).

Fourth Amendment Update, 15 Criminal Justice 42 (Summer 2000) (with David G. Leitch).


Court Ruling on Auto Recall Confirms Due Process Protections, Washington Legal Foundation, Legal Opinion Letter (Feb. 5, 1999).

The Constitution Forces Senate to Try the President, Wall Street Journal (Jan. 5, 1999).


b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

I have not prepared or contributed to any such reports, memoranda, or policy statements.

c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal
interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

Please see attached transcript of the Teleconference with Senior Officials of the United States Department of Justice Regarding Supreme Court's Ruling in the Hamdan case (June 30, 2006).

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.


Sizing Up the 2005-2006 Supreme Court Term: A Practitioner’s View, Legal Times, July 12, 2006 (panel) (published excerpts attached).


Briefing on Arthur Andersen v. United States, National Legal Center for the Public Interest, April 2005.


Previewing the 2004 U.S. Supreme Court Term, Washington Legal Foundation, Sept. 15, 2004 (panel).
I have not maintained a list of speeches or panel presentations that I have given. The foregoing list was prepared based on my best recollection. In addition, I have spoken to law enforcement officials about pending cases and orientation matters in my current position. I generally do not speak from a prepared text, but have attached an outline for one of the speeches listed above as well as published copies of my remarks where they are available, as indicated above.

e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

I do not keep a list of interviews I have given, but outside of my time in public service I have from time to time been asked to comment publicly on various legal matters. Listed below are the articles or media in which I was quoted, which I have prepared based on an electronic search.


Jan Crawford Greenburg, *Philosophy Likely to Evoke Rehnquist; Nominee Expected to Run Top Court with Eye Toward Clarity and Judicial Restraint*, Washington Post (Sept. 6, 2005) (quoted).


John Roberts Nomination, Corporate Legal Times (Sept. 2005) (quoted).


MSNBC’s Countdown with Keith Olbermann (July 20 2005) (interviewed).


Tony Mauro, *High Court Overturns Andersen Conviction*, Legal Times (June 1, 2005) (quoted).


CNN Burden of Proof (March 10, 1999) (interviewed).

CNN (Feb. 8, 1999) (interviewed).


I was also interviewed briefly about various legal matters by other cable networks in 1998-1999. I do not have records of the particular dates of the interviews and was unable to obtain transcripts of the interviews.

14. **Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:**
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a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

United States Department of Justice, Acting Solicitor General (June 2008-present), appointed by the President; Principal Deputy Solicitor General (October 2005-present), appointed by the Attorney General.

Supreme Court Fellows Commission, Commissioner (2005); appointed by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist (I resigned this position shortly after my appointment when I became Principal Deputy Solicitor General in October 2005).

United States Department of Justice, Assistant to the Solicitor General (September 2000-July 2004); appointed by Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman.

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, United States Supreme Court, Law Clerk (1992-1993); appointed by the Chief Justice.


United States House of Representatives, Committee on Budget, Intern (March 1986-June 1986); appointed by Martha Phillips (supervisor).

I have had no unsuccessful candidacies or nominations.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.


15. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;


ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

No.

iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530; Acting Solicitor General (June 2008-present), Principal Deputy Solicitor General (October 2005-present).

Hogan & Hartson LLP, 555 13th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20004; Partner and Head of Firm’s Supreme Court and Appellate Practice (July 2004-October 2005).


United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530; Assistant to the Solicitor General (September 2000-July 2004).

Hogan & Hartson LLP, 555 13th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20004; Associate (October 1993-January 2000); Partner (January 2000-October 2000).

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, United States Supreme Court, One First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20543; Law Clerk (1992-1993).


Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Quaker Tower, 321 N. Clark Street, Chicago, IL; Summer Associate (July 1990-August 1990).


Testa Hurwitz & Thibault, Exchange Place, 53 State Street, Boston MA 02109; Paralegal (October 1987-August 1988)

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

My practice has focused on Supreme Court and federal appellate matters. On occasion, I have also briefed and argued dispositive legal motions in the trial courts. During the past eight years, I have argued 23 cases in the Supreme Court and numerous additional matters in the federal courts of appeals; before then, I briefed numerous cases in the Supreme Court and argued several matters in federal courts of appeals and the D.C. Court of Appeals. In my current position, and when I worked in the Office of the Solicitor General as an Assistant to the Solicitor General (2000-2004), I have represented the United States and federal agencies and officials on a wide variety of Supreme Court and appellate matters. In private practice, I handled a wide variety of Supreme Court and appellate matters for public and private clients. During my time in private practice, I also worked on a variety of pro bono matters, which are discussed in more detail in response to question 24 below.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

In my current position, and when I worked in the Office of the Solicitor General as an Assistant to the Solicitor General (2000-2004), my clients have been the United States and various government agencies and officials. For example, I have represented the Equal Opportunity Commission, Department of the Defense, Federal Election Commission, and United States Postal Service. I have also represented the President, Attorney General, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Bureau of Land Management Officials in litigation against them.
In private practice, I represented corporate entities, such as John Hopkins Health Systems; state and local entities, such as the States of Alaska and Hawaii and the Montgomery County Public School System; trade associations, such as the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association; and individuals, such as the plaintiff in a successful action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Equal Pay Act, and Title VII (Weber v. Infinity Broadcasting Corporation, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, No. 2:02-cv-74602-GCS-WC, 2005), who retained me to brief and argue post-trial motions and defend an appeal.

My practice on behalf of the United States in the Office of the Solicitor General and on behalf of various clients in private practice has cut across numerous different areas of law. As a lawyer in the Office of the Solicitor General, I have frequently been involved in defending the constitutionality of Acts of Congress as well as other federal actions. I have not specialized in any particular substantive area of law, but instead in Supreme Court and appellate litigation more generally.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

My practice has always focused on litigation. I have appeared in court frequently, primarily in the context of Supreme Court and appellate arguments and less frequently with respect to dispositive legal motions at the trial court level. Since 2001, I have presented 23 oral arguments in the Supreme Court and have argued numerous additional matters in the federal courts of appeals during the same period. Before 2001, I argued several matters in the federal courts of appeals and the D.C. Court of Appeals, and briefed numerous matters in the Supreme Court.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:

1. federal courts;

100% of my appearances in my current job have been in federal court. Previously, 95% of my legal work was in federal court.

2. state courts of record;

Previously, about 5% of my legal work.

3. other courts.

I have participated in administrative proceedings before the Department of Transportation.
ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:

1. civil proceedings;
   90%.

2. criminal proceedings.
   10%. I have undertaken the bulk of my criminal work as a lawyer in the Office of the Solicitor General.


d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

My practice has focused on Supreme Court and appellate matters. Since 2001, I have presented 23 oral arguments in the Supreme Court and have argued numerous additional matters in the federal courts of appeals during the same period. Before 2001, I argued several matters in the federal courts of appeals and the D.C. Court of Appeals, and briefed numerous additional matters in the Supreme Court.

While the focus of my practice has been on appellate matters, I have on occasion participated as both chief counsel and associate counsel in briefing and arguing dispositive pre-trial and post-trial legal motions in trial court. For example, in 2005, I briefed and argued the post-trial motions on behalf of the civil rights plaintiff in defending a jury verdict and damages award secured under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Equal Pay Act, and Title VII (Weber v. Infinity Broadcasting Corporation, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, No. 2:02-cv-74602-GCS-WC, 2005). In addition, as an associate counsel, I participated (including by cross-examining an expert witness) in a case that was tried to judgment before the D.C. Superior Court.

i. What percentage of these trials were:

1. jury;
   N/A

2. non-jury.

   The D.C. Superior Court case mentioned above was a bench trial.


e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if
applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection
with your practice.

I have appeared on numerous occasions before the Supreme Court as an oral
advocate and co-counsel on briefs. My current practice in the Office of the
Solicitor General focuses on all facets of Supreme Court litigation, including at
both the certiorari and merits stages. In addition, my prior practice at Hogan &
Hartson, where I headed the firm’s Supreme Court and appellate practice
from 2004 to 2005 and worked in the firm’s Supreme Court and appellate practice
from 1994 to 2000 while it was headed by the Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr.,
likewise involved many Supreme Court matters. Since 2001, I have presented
oral argument in 23 cases before the Supreme Court (20 while serving in the
Office of the Solicitor General as a Deputy and Assistant to the Solicitor General,
and three while in private practice) and have prepared scores of merits briefs filed
in the Supreme Court on behalf of both parties and amici, including the United
States and various federal agencies and officers. Please see attached briefs.

16. **Litigation**: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally
handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date
if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party
or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the
litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

   a. the date of representation;

   b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case
      was litigated; and

   c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of
      principal counsel for each of the other parties.

In reverse chronological order:


These cases involved habeas challenges to the detention of dual American citizens held
in Iraq by the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) for criminal offenses allegedly
committed in Iraq and to the transfer of such individuals to the Government of Iraq to
face trial and punishment for those offenses. I, along with other lawyers in the
Department of Justice, represented the Secretary of the Army in the cases. I presented
argument on the Secretary’s behalf in the Supreme Court. The Court, in a unanimous
decision, held that there was habeas jurisdiction over the petitions, but agreed with the
government’s position that the habeas petitions should be dismissed on the merits. In so
holding, the Court agreed with the government’s position that Iraq, like all foreign
nations, has a sovereign right to prosecute individuals (like the habeas petitioners in these
cases) who voluntarily travel to Iraq and commit criminal offenses within its borders, and that habeas jurisdiction may not be asserted to interfere with that sovereign right.


b. Name of the Court: United States Supreme Court.

c. Co-counsel and principal counsel for opposing parties:

Co-counsel with me on the briefs were Paul D. Clement, then Solicitor General, Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Daryl Joseffer, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Douglas Letter, Jonathan H. Levy, Lewis S. Yelin, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217.

Arguing counsel for opposing parties was Joseph Margulies, Northwestern University Law School, 357 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611, (312) 503-0890.


This case concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of the method of execution by lethal injection. 1, along with other lawyers in the Department of Justice, represented the United States, which participated in the case as amicus curiae in support of the state defendant. I presented argument on behalf of the United States in the Supreme Court. The Court, in a plurality opinion, adopted the position of the United States and held that the State's method of execution by lethal injection — the same basic method adopted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons — is constitutional. In addition, the plurality agreed with the standard proposed by the United States for evaluating Eighth Amendment claims based on the risk of harm, and held that to establish an Eighth Amendment violation a plaintiff must show a "substantial risk of serious harm" and proffer a feasible and readily available alternative method of execution.


b. Name of the Court: United States Supreme Court.

c. Co-counsel and principal counsel for opposing parties:

Co-counsel with me on the brief were Paul D. Clement, then Solicitor General, Alice S. Fisher, then Assistant Attorney General, Kannon K. Shanmugam, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Robert J. Erickson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2217.

Arguing counsel for respondents was Roy T. Engler Jr., Robbins, Russell, Engler, Orsick & Untereiner LLP, 1801 K Street, NW, Suite 411-L, Washington, DC 20006, (202) 775-4500.
Arguing counsel for petitioner was Donald B. Verrilli Jr., Jenner & Block LLP, 1099 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC 20001-4412, (202) 639-6000.


This case concerned the admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence of “other supervisor” evidence – *i.e.*, evidence that a supervisor other than the plaintiff’s own supervisor discriminated against other employees – in an action brought by an employee under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). I, along with other lawyers in the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, represented the United States, which participated in the case as amicus curiae. I presented argument on behalf of the United States in the Supreme Court. The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that such evidence is always inadmissible in an individual ADEA case and, instead, adopted the position of the United States that “other supervisor” evidence may be admissible based on the facts and circumstances of the case and that the admissibility of such evidence is within the province of the trial court in the first instance.


b. Name of the Court: United States Supreme Court.

c. Co-counsel and principal counsel for opposing parties:

Co-counsel with me on the brief were Paul D. Clement, then Solicitor General, Irving L. Gornstein, then Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, (202) 514-2217; Ronald S. Cooper, General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D.C. 20507.

Arguing counsel for petitioner was Paul W. Cane Jr., Paul Hastings, Janofsky, 55 Second Street Twenty-Fourth Floor, San Francisco, CA 94105-3441, (415) 856-7000.

Arguing counsel for respondent was Dennis E. Egan, The Popham Law Firm, P.C., 323 W. Eighth Street Suite 200, Kansas City, MO 64105, (816) 221-2288.


This case involved a challenge brought by several States and various private groups under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to the denial by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of a rulemaking petition with respect to greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. I, along with other lawyers in the Department of Justice and the EPA, represented the EPA in the Supreme Court. I presented argument on behalf of the EPA in the Supreme Court. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the States had standing under Article III to challenge the denial of their rulemaking petition; that the CAA authorizes the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicle emissions; and that the EPA had not provided a sufficient explanation under the CAA for denying
the States’ petition. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings, including to give the EPA an opportunity to explain its reasons for “action or inaction.”


b. Name of the Court: United States Supreme Court.

c. Co-counsel and principal counsel for opposing parties:

Co-counsel with me on the brief were Paul D. Clement, then Solicitor General, Sue Ellen Wooldridge, then Assistant Attorney General, Thomas G. Hungar, Deputy Solicitor General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Assistant to the Solicitor General, John M. Lipschultz, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, (202) 514-2217; Roger R. Martella, Jr., Acting General Counsel, Carol S. Holmes, Attorney, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 20460.

Arguing counsel for petitioners was James R. Milkey, One Ashburton Place, 18th Floor Boston, MA 02108, (617) 727-2200.


This case concerned whether or in what circumstances a police officer’s use of force to stop a fleeing motorist is deadly or excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. I, along with other lawyers in the Department of Justice, represented the United States, which participated in the case as amicus curiae in support of the police officer (Scott). I presented argument on behalf of the United States in the Supreme Court. The Court adopted the position of the United States and held that, regardless of whether the use of force in such circumstances constitutes “deadly force,” the determination whether it is constitutionally excessive turns on the reasonableness of the officer’s actions in the particular circumstances he confronted. In addition, the Court held that an officer may use force in such circumstances if he determines that the fleeing motorist posed a “substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others.”


b. Name of the Court: United States Supreme Court.

c. Co-counsel and principal counsel for opposing parties:

Co-counsel with me on the brief were Paul D. Clement, then Solicitor General, Peter D. Keisler, then Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan L. Marcus, then Assistant to the Solicitor General, Barbara L. Herwig, Teal Luthy Miller, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, (202) 514-2217.

Arguing counsel for petitioner was Philip W. Savrin, 100 Galleria Parkway, Suite 1600, Atlanta, GA 30339-5959, (770) 818-0000.
Arguing counsel for respondent was Andrew C. Clarke, Borod & Kramer, 80 Monroe Avenue, Suite G-1, Memphis, TN 38103, (901) 524-0200.


This case concerned whether alleged violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations may be remedied in a habeas proceeding brought by a foreign national convicted of a state criminal offense by ordering suppression of the defendant’s statements or excusal of a state procedural default rule. I, along with other lawyers in the Department of Justice and the Department of State, represented the United States as amicus curiae in support of respondents. I presented argument on behalf of the United States in the Supreme Court. The Court adopted the position of the United States and held that, even assuming that the Convention creates judicially enforceable rights, suppression is not an appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 36 and a State may apply its usual procedural default rules to Article 36 claims.


b. Name of the Court: United States Supreme Court.

c. Co-counsel and principal counsel for opposing parties:

Co-counsel on the brief were Paul D. Clement, then Solicitor General, Alice S. Fisher, then Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Robert J. Erickson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, (202) 514-2217; John B. Bellinger, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Arguing counsel for petitioners were Peter Garlan, Office of Public Defense Services, 1320 Capitol Street, NE, Suite 200, Salem, OR 97303, (503) 378-3349; Mark T. Stancel, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck & Unterreiner LLP, 1801 K Street, NW, Suite 411-L, Washington, DC 20006, (202) 775-4500.

Arguing counsel for respondents were Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, Oregon Department of Justice, 1162 Court Street, NE Salem, OR 97301-4096, (503) 378-4401; William E. Thro, Solicitor General, Office of Attorney General, 900 East Main Street Richmond, VA 23219, (804) 786-2436.


This case concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act), which, among other things, provides for an assessment on cattle sales to finance generic advertising overseen by the Department of Agriculture – including the "Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.” ad campaign – promoting beef products. I, along with another partner at Hogan & Hartson LLP, represented the private petitioners, a state cattlemen’s association and two individual cattlemen who supported the promotional program at issue. I presented argument on behalf of the private petitioners...
in the Supreme Court. The Court adopted our position and that of the United States and held that the Beef Act is constitutional because the promotional messages at issue were effectively controlled by the federal government and thus constituted government speech.


b. Name of the Court: United States Supreme Court.

c. Co-counsel and principal counsel for opposing parties:

Co-counsel with me on the brief was Lorane F. Hebert, Hogan & Hartson LLP, 555 13th Street, Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 637-6536.

Arguing counsel for the federal petitioner was Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20532, (202) 514-3261.

Arguing counsel for respondents was Laurence H. Tribe, Houser Hall 420, Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, (617) 495-4621.


This case concerned the statute of limitations for civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. I, along with other lawyers in the Department of Justice, represented the United States, which participated in the case as amicus curiae in support of the civil rights plaintiff (Jones). I presented argument on behalf of the United States in the Supreme Court. The Court adopted the position of the United States and held that the four-year statute of limitations established by 28 U.S.C. 1658, rather than a shorter state statute of limitations governing personal injury claims, applied, and that the plaintiff’s race-based discrimination claims under Section 1981 were therefore timely.


b. Name of the Court: United States Supreme Court.

c. Co-counsel and principal counsel for opposing parties:

Co-counsel with me on the brief were Theodore B. Olson, then Solicitor General, J. Michael Wiggins, then Acting Assistant Attorney General, Paul D. Clement, then Deputy Solicitor General, Dennis J. Dimsey, Linda F. Thome, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, (202) 514-2217.

Arguing counsel for petitioners was H. Candace Gorman, 220 S. Halsted, Suite 200 Chicago, IL 60661, (312) 427-2313.
Arguing counsel for respondent was Carter G. Phillips, Sidley Austin LLP, 1501 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005, (202) 736-8270.


This case concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). 1, along with other lawyers in the Department of Justice and the Federal Election Commission, represented the Federal Election Commission and the other federal parties. Along with one other Assistant to the Solicitor General, I had principal responsibility for drafting the government’s merits brief in the case in the Supreme Court, which totaled 135 pages, and assisted the Solicitor General and Principal Deputy Solicitor General in preparing for oral argument. With minor exceptions, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in its entirety by a 5-4 majority.


b. Name of the Court: United States Supreme Court.

c. Co-counsel and principal counsel for opposing parties:

Co-counsel with me on the brief were Theodore B. Olson, then Solicitor General, Peter D. Keisler, then Assistant Attorney General, Paul D. Clement, then Deputy Solicitor General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Douglas N. Letter, James J. Gilligan, Michael S. Raab, Dana J. Martin, Terry M. Henry, Rupa Bhattacharyya, Andrea Gacki, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, (202) 514-2217; Lawrence H. Norton, then General Counsel, Richard B. Bader, then Associate General Counsel, Stephen E. Hershkowitz, David Kolker, then Assistant General Counsels, Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C. 20463.

Arguing counsel for the intervenor-defendants was Seth P. Waxman, Wilmer Hale, 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20006, (202) 663-6800.

Arguing counsel for plaintiffs were Kenneth W. Starr, Pepperdine University School of Law, 24255 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, CA 90263, (310) 506-4621; Floyd Abram, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, 80 Pine Street, New York, NY 10005, (212) 701-3000; Bobby R. Burchfield, McDermott Will & Emery, 600 13th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-3096, (202) 756-8003; Laurence Gold, 815 Sixteenth Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006, (202) 637-5130; Jay Sekulow, 200 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington, D.C. 20002, (202) 337-2273.


This case concerned the ability of federal employers to consider certain prior disciplinary actions in disciplining federal employees. 1, along with other lawyers in the Department of Justice, represented the United States Postal Service. I presented argument on behalf of the Postal Service in the Supreme Court. The Court agreed with the position of the
Postal Service and held that, in determining the reasonableness of a penalty imposed on a federal employee, the Merit Systems Protection Board may consider prior disciplinary actions that are still the subject of pending grievance proceedings.


b. Name of the Court: United States Supreme Court.

c. Co-counsel and principal counsel for opposing parties:

Co-counsel with me on the brief were Barbara D. Underwood, then Acting Solicitor General, Stuart E. Schiffer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Paul D. Clement, then Deputy Solicitor General, David M. Cohen, Todd M. Hughes, David B. Stinson, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, (202) 514-2217.

Arguing counsel for respondent was Henk Brands, Paul Weiss, 1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1300 Washington, DC 20036-5694, (202) 223-7373.

In addition to these Supreme Court representations, during my time in the Office of the Solicitor General as a Deputy and an Assistant to the Solicitor General, I have participated in the briefing of other high-profile cases in the Supreme Court and argued other important matters in the courts of appeals. The Supreme Court merits briefs (including amicus briefs) for which I have served as counsel of record or co-counsel are attached in response to question 15(e).

17. Legal Activities: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of each client(s) or organization(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

In my current position, and when I worked in the Office of the Solicitor General as an Assistant to the Solicitor General (2000-2004), I have participated substantially in the work of the Department of Justice in representing the United States in civil and criminal matters. This work has involved, among other responsibilities, preparing and reviewing briefs, presenting oral argument, interacting with client agencies, advising the Solicitor General on whether to authorize appeals or amicus participation at the appellate level, and meeting with outside attorneys on cases handled by the Office. Since 2001, I have argued 23 cases in the Supreme Court and briefed many additional cases.

During my period at Hogan & Hartson from 2004-2005, I headed the firm's Supreme Court and appellate practice group and served as a Litigation Practice Group Director. In that capacity, I had numerous administrative responsibilities and participated in various training and development programs for junior attorneys. In addition, during my period at Hogan & Hartson from 1993-2000 as an associate and partner, I served for several years
530

on the firm’s recruitment committee and participated in training and development matters for junior attorneys. During my period at Hogan & Hartson, I also participated in numerous pro bono matters. As explained in response to question 24 below, I have devoted hundreds of hours to the pro bono representation of disadvantaged individuals, including the foster mother and a disadvantaged child seeking to terminate the rights of an abusive parent, a former federal employee seeking information under the Freedom of Information Act, and a disabled social security claimant.

For several years (1995-2000 and 2004-2005), I taught (or co-taught) a seminar on the Supreme Court at the George Washington University Law School, which is discussed in more detail in response to question 18 below. While in private practice, I also participated in moot court programs designed to improve the advocacy of those presenting cases before the Supreme Court, including moot courts in a variety of cases sponsored by the Georgetown University Law Center Supreme Court Institute and the National Association of Attorneys General. In addition, I participated in a program co-sponsored by Street Law Inc. and the Supreme Court Historical Society, which brings selected high school teachers from across the country to Washington, D.C. to educate them on how to teach their students about the Supreme Court and cases pending before it.

I have not performed lobbying activities.

18. **Teaching:** What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

During the spring of 2004-2005 and 1995-2000, I served as an adjunct professor (or professorial lecturer in law) at the George Washington University Law School. During those years, I taught or co-taught a seminar entitled Constitutional Law and the Supreme Court. The course focused on cases pending before the Court during each semester and considered how the Supreme Court functions as both a practical and institutional matter. Students were responsible for reading the briefs in pending cases, discussing the cases in class, and preparing draft majority and dissenting “opinions” in the cases. A copy of a syllabus from the course is attached.

19. **Deferred Income / Future Benefits:** List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

As an employee of the Department of Justice, I participate in the Thrift Savings Plan. I also continue to participate in retirement savings plans set up by my previous employer, Hogan & Hartson LLP, but no continuing contributions are made to those plans.
20. **Outside Commitments During Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service in the position to which you have been nominated? If so, explain.

No.

21. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)

Please see attached SF-278.

22. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

Please see attached Statement of Net Worth and corresponding schedules.

23. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

   a. Identify any affiliations, pending litigation, financial arrangements, or other factors that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

   Categories of litigation that may present potential conflicts of interest issues include cases involving my former law firm, Hogan & Hartson LLP, cases involving entities in which I have a financial interest, and cases involving recent former clients from private practice. If such a potential conflict were to arise, I would consult with the appropriate Department of Justice ethics officials and determine whether a recusal from the case or other action is appropriate, as I have done as a Deputy and Assistant to the Solicitor General in evaluating potential conflicts of interests.

   b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

   I will notify the Office of these potential conflicts and monitor filings (with the assistance of case management officials) to ensure that my participation conforms to the ethical rules. When potential conflicts of interest arise, I will consult with the appropriate Department of Justice ethics officials and determine whether a recusal from the case or other action is appropriate.

24. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of
professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each. If you are not an attorney, please use this opportunity to report significant charitable and volunteer work you may have done.

In my current position, I work full time for the public and my ability to work for non-government clients is severely restricted. However, in private practice I dedicated substantial amounts of time to no-fee or substantially reduced fee representations on behalf of the disadvantaged. The law firm at which I previously practiced, Hogan & Hartson, is renowned for its commitment to providing legal services to the disadvantaged – embodied by its Community Services Department – and while at Hogan & Hartson I devoted substantial efforts to the provision of such pro bono services.

For example, during my most recent period in private practice (2004-2005), I prepared a Supreme Court amicus brief on behalf of Senators Orrin G. Hatch, Edward M. Kennedy, and Dianne Feinstein in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The brief reviewed the intent of Congress in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and Congress’s effort in the 1984 Act to eliminate racial and other disparities that had plagued the federal sentencing system before 1984 by creating an integrated and cohesive sentencing system. The amicus brief was cited and quoted by the Supreme Court in its landmark decision in Booker. See 543 U.S. at 257-258, 267. I devoted more than 50 hours to the preparation of that brief.

In 2005, I also undertook the Supreme Court representation of a state prisoner, Donald M. Adkins, who alleged that state correctional officials had violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004). I was retained to file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court on behalf of Mr. Adkins. I devoted more than 40 hours to that task, which included multiple filings.

During my period in private practice from 1993 to 2000, I worked on numerous additional pro bono matters. For example, I prepared the briefs and presented oral argument in an appeal brought on behalf of a foster mother and a disadvantaged child seeking to allow the child’s adoption and terminate the rights of a parent who was a convicted child molester with a history of mental illness. In a path-marking family law decision, the court of appeals not only ruled in favor of our clients, the foster mother and foster child, but issued an unprecedented order directing the trial court to grant the petition for adoption. In re application of L.L., 653 A.2d 873 (D.C. 1995). I devoted more than 350 hours to that representation.

I also undertook the court-appointed representation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on behalf of a former federal employee seeking information from a government agency under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The District of Columbia Circuit ruled in favor of the employee whom I was appointed to support and reversed the dismissal of her FOIA claim. Croskey v. U.S. Office of Special
Counsel, 132 F.3d 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1997). I estimate that I devoted more than 100 hours to that representation.

I also prepared the merits brief and assisted in the preparation for oral argument (presented by Allen R. Snyder) on behalf of a disabled social security claimant in a court-appointed representation in the Supreme Court. Forney v. Appel, 524 U.S. 266 (1998). I estimate that I devoted more than 100 hours to that representation.

In addition to the foregoing, I participated in moot courts and advised on various pro bono matters handled by Hogan & Hartson and have participated on a pro bono basis in moot court programs sponsored by other organizations, including the Georgetown University Law Center Supreme Court Institute and the National Association of Attorneys General. I also participated in a program co-sponsored by Street Law Inc. and the Supreme Court Historical Society, which brings selected high school teachers from across the country to Washington, D.C. to educate them on how to teach their students about the Supreme Court and cases pending before it.
## FINANCIAL STATEMENT

### NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term</td>
<td>Real estate mortgage payable-add schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-add schedule</td>
<td>Cash in bank and to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td>Other debts-interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto and other personal property</td>
<td>Change mortgage and other loans payable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash value-life insurance</td>
<td>Other assets itemized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets itemized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Liabilities</td>
<td>Total Liabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Worth</td>
<td>Total Liabilities and net worth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,165</td>
<td>Total liabilities and net worth</td>
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<tr>
<td>599</td>
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### CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTINGENT LIABILITY</th>
<th>GENERAL INFORMATION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are you or your spouse or guarantor</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you the defendant in any suit or legal action?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever taken bankruptcy?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepayment for Federal income Tax</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other special debt</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Listed Securities</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alcan Inc.</td>
<td>$9,200</td>
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<td>American Funds SmallCap World Fund A</td>
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<td>Anne Arundel Co MD Water</td>
<td>$10,393</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baltimore MD Conv'n Ctr (revenue)</td>
<td>$10,275</td>
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<td>Baltimore MD Sr A (general obligation)</td>
<td>$5,312</td>
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<td>Baltimore MD Prj Rv Balt Ser A</td>
<td>$97,880</td>
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<td>Ford Motor Co.</td>
<td>$14,438</td>
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<td>GMAC LLC (corporate bond)</td>
<td>$6,600</td>
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<td>IBM</td>
<td>$24,140</td>
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<td>Ination</td>
<td>$937</td>
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<td>MD Cnty Dev Admin Dept (revenue)</td>
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<td>MD Cnty Dev Admin Dept (revenue)</td>
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<td>Montgomery Cty MD Const (general obligation)</td>
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<td>3M Co.</td>
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<td>Starwood Hotels</td>
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<td>Vodafone Group PLC</td>
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<td>Visteon Corp.</td>
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<td>Xerox Corp.</td>
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<td>XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Assets</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidelity Contrafund</td>
<td>$14,434</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fidelity Growth Company</td>
<td>$32,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidelity Low Pr Stock</td>
<td>$20,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidelity Mgd Inc Port</td>
<td>$30,068</td>
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1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investment Plan</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidelity Overseas</td>
<td>$42,496</td>
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<td>Fidelity Retire Mmkt</td>
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<td>Fidelity Short Term Bond</td>
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<td>Hogan &amp; Hartson Cash Balance Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>(defined benefit pension plan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Hancock Freedom 529</td>
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<tr>
<td>Money Market Portfolio</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hancock Freedom 529</td>
<td>$11,594</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portfolio 2017-2020</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Hancock Freedom 529</td>
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<td>Portfolio 2021-2024</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legg Mason Value Trust</td>
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<td>PIM Real Return Inst</td>
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<td>Spartan Extnl Mkt Index</td>
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<td>Spartan US Eq Index</td>
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<td>Thrift Savings Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$666,648</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Mr. Robert Cusick
Director
Office of Government Ethics
1201 New York Avenue, NW
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20005-3919

Dear Mr. Cusick:

In accordance with the provisions of Title I of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 as amended, I am forwarding the financial disclosure report of Gregory G. Garre, who has been nominated by the President to serve as the Solicitor General of the United States.

We have conducted a thorough review of the enclosed report. The financial conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S.C. 208, requires that Mr. Garre recuse himself from participating personally and substantially in any particular matter that has a direct and predictable effect on his financial interests or the financial interests of any other person whose interests are imputed to him, unless he first obtains a written waiver, pursuant to Section 208(b)(1), or qualifies for a regulatory exemption, pursuant to Section 208(b)(2). Mr. Garre understands that the interests of the following persons are imputed to him: his spouse; minor children; any general partner; any organization in which he serves as an officer, director, trustee, general partner or employee; and any person or organization with which he is negotiating or has an arrangement concerning prospective employment. Mr. Garre’s wife is a non-equity partner with Hogan & Hartson. She receives a fixed salary and is eligible for an annual bonus that may be affected by the firm’s total revenue. Mr. Garre is a former partner in Hogan & Hartson and is covered by a vested defined benefit plan (Cash Balance Plan), and a defined contribution plan (Retirement Savings Plan), through Hogan & Hartson.

Mr. Garre agrees that he will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that has a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of Hogan & Hartson, unless he first obtains a written waiver pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 208(b)(1). In addition, Mr. Garre agrees that he will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter which will have a direct and predictable effect on the ability or willingness of Hogan & Hartson to meet its obligations to him under the firm’s defined benefit Cash Balance Plan, unless he first obtains a written waiver pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 208(b)(1). In determining whether a particular matter has a direct and predictable effect on his financial interests or on those of any other person whose interests are imputed to him, Mr. Garre will consult with Department of Justice ethics officials.
Mr. Robert Cusick

We have advised Mr. Garre that because of the standard of conduct on impartiality at 5 C.F.R. 2635.502, he should seek advice before participating personally and substantially in a particular matter involving specific parties which he knows is likely to have a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of a member of his household, or in which he knows that a person with whom he has a covered relationship is or represents a party. Mr. Garre agrees that he will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties in which any client of his wife is or represents a party, unless he is authorized to do so pursuant to 5 C.F.R. 2635.502(d).

Based on the above agreements and counseling, I am satisfied that the report presents no conflicts of interest under applicable laws and regulations and that you can so certify to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Sincerely,

Michael H. Allen

Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Policy, Management, and Planning and
Alternate Designated Agency Ethics Official

Enclosure
### Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Appointee</th>
<th>Offices Held</th>
<th>Date of Service (A-06)</th>
<th>Signature of Reporting Individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fee for Late Filing:**

An individual who is required to file this report and does not file it no more than 30 days after the due date the report is required to be filed shall be subject to a $200 fine. If after more than 30 days after the due date the filing is not filed, the filing, shall be subject to a $200 fine.

**Reporting Periods:**

The following period is the preceding calendar year except Part II of Schedule C and Part II of Schedule D where you must also include the filing year up to the date you file. Part II of Schedule D is not applicable.

**Presidential Nominees Subject to Senate Confirmation:**

Yes [ ] No [x]

**Other Reviewer (If designee by agency):**

Signature of Other Reviewer

**Agency Ethics Officer’s Opinions:**

Signature of Designated Agency Ethics Officer/Revising Official

**Office of Government Ethics:**

Signature

**Office of Government Ethics:**

Signature

**Comments of Revising Officials:**

(If additional space is required, use the reverse side of this sheet)

(Check box if filing contains greater & indirect number of shares ————)

(Check box if comments are continued on the reverse side)
### SCHEDULE A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting Individual's Name</th>
<th>Page Number</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garm, Gregory G.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Assets and Income

**BLOCK A**

For you, your spouse, and dependent children, report each asset held for investment or the production of income which had a fair market value exceeding $1,000 at the close of the reporting period, or which generated more than $500 in income during the reporting period, together with each income.

For yourself, also report the source and actual amount of income exceeding $200 other than from (U.S. Government). For your spouse, report the source but not the amount of earned income in excess of $1,000; however, report the actual amount of any bonuses over $1,000 for your spouse.

**Examples**

- Central America Tours
- Doe & Smith, Investment, Inc.
- See attached...

#### Valuation of Assets at close of reporting period

**BLOCK B**

#### Income: type and amount

**BLOCK C**

- **Type**
- **Amount**
- **Other Incomes**

| Date (Mo., Day, Ye) Only if Exceptional |
|----------------------------------------|---|

* This category applies only if the asset/income is solely that of the filer's spouse or dependent children. If the asset/income is either that of the filer or jointly held by the filer and the spouse or dependent children, mark the other higher category of value, as appropriate.

Other Sections Cannot Be Used.
## Attachment for Gregory G. Garre

### SCHEDULE A – For Gregory G. Garre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets and Income</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
<th>Income Type and Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Earned Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None other than U.S. government salary.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stocks, Bonds, and Mutual Funds</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Funds SmallCap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Fund A</td>
<td>$15,000-$50,000</td>
<td>ELF/$2,501-$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcan Inc.</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Arundel Co MD Water</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>Interest/$201-$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore MD Conv’n Ctr (revenue)</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>Interest/$201-$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore MD Ser A</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>Interest/$201-$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(general obligation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore MD Pj Rv Balt Ser A</td>
<td>$50,000-$100,000</td>
<td>Interest/$2,501-$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of America</td>
<td>$15,000-$50,000</td>
<td>Dividends/$1,001-$2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford Motor Co.</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric</td>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>Capital gain/$2,501-$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMAC LLC (corporate bond)</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>Interest/$201-$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>$15,000-$50,000</td>
<td>Dividends/$201-$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel Corp.</td>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>Capital gain/$2,501-$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD Cnty Dev Admin Dept (revenue)</td>
<td>$15,000-$50,000</td>
<td>Interest/$201-$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merit Savings Bank PA</td>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>Capital gain/$1,001-$15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery Cty MD Const (general obligation)</td>
<td>$15,000-$50,000</td>
<td>Interest/$1,001-$2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pengrowth Energy Trust</td>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>Capital gain/$201-$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinnacle West Cap Corp</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>Dividends/$201-$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sirius Satellite Corp.</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>None (or less than $201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3M Co.</td>
<td>$15,000-$50,000</td>
<td>Dividends/$1,001-$2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starwood Hotels &amp; Resorts</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vodafone Group PLC</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>Dividends/$201-$1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xerox Corp.</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>Capital gain/$2,501-$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.</td>
<td>$1,000-$15,000</td>
<td>None (or less than $201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Subn San Dist</td>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>Interest/$201-$1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1
Washington Subn San Dist $1,000-$15,000 Interest/$201-$1000

**Employee Retirement Plans**

Hogan & Hartson Retirement Savings Plan (defined contribution retirement plan):
- Spartan US Eq Index $50,001-$100,000 EIP/$1,001-$2,500
- Fidelity Growth Company $15,001-$50,000 EIP/None (or less than $201)
- Fidelity Overseas $15,001-$50,000 EIP/$2,501-$5,000
- Fidelity Low Pr Stock $15,001-$50,000 EIP/$1,001-$2,500
- Fidelity Retire Mmkt $50,000-$100,000 EIP/$201-$1,000

Hogan & Hartson
- Cash Balance Plan $15,001-$50,000 Interest/$201-$1,000
  (defined benefit pension plan)

**Life Insurance**

Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Policy (Whole) $50,001-$100,000 Interest/$201-$1,000

Paragon Life Insurance Group Universal Life $1,000-$15,000 None (or less than $201)

(cash value)

(cash value)

**Bank and Money Market Accounts**

Bank of America (Checking) $1,000-$15,000 Interest/None (or less than $201)

UBS Bank USA Deposit $100,001-$250,000 Interest/$201-$1,000

**SCHEDULE A – For Lorane F. Hebert**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets and Income</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
<th>Income Type and Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Earned Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hogan &amp; Hartson LLP</td>
<td>Salary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Mutual Fund             |           |                        |
| Legg Mason Value Trust  | $15,000-$50,000 EIP/$2,501-$5,000 |
### Employee Retirement Plans & 529 Plans

**Hogan & Hartson Retirement Savings Plan (defined contribution retirement plan):**
- **Spartan US Eq Index** $1,001-$15,000 EIR/$201-$1,000
- **Fidelity Contrafund** $1,001-$15,000 EIR/$1,001-$2,500
- **Fidelity Growth Company** $1,001-$15,000 EIR/None (or less than $201)
- **Fidelity Overseas** $1,001-$15,000 EIR/$2,501-$5,000
- **Spartan Extnd Mkt Index** $15,000-$50,000 EIR/$2,501-$5,000
- **Fidelity Mgd Inc Port** $15,000-$50,000 EIR/$1,001-$2,500
- **Fidelity Short Term Bond** $15,000-$50,000 EIR/$1,001-$2,500
- **PM Real Return Inst** $1,001-$15,000 EIR/$1,001-$2,500
- **Fidelity Retire Mmkt** $15,000-$50,000 EIR/None (or less than $200)

**Hogan & Hartson Cash Balance Plan** $5,001-$15,000 Interest/None (or less than $201)
* (defined benefit pension plan)

**John Hancock 529 Plan for Dependent Child**
* (college savings plan offered by the Education Trust of Alaska):
- **John Hancock Freedom 529** $15,000-$50,000 EIR/$201-$1,000
- **Money Market Portfolio, T. Rowe Price Summit Cash Reserve Fund**
- **John Hancock Freedom 529** $1,001-$15,000 EIR/$201-$1,000
- **Portfolio 2017-2020**
- **John Hancock Freedom 529** $50,001-$100,000 EIR/$1,001-$2,500
- **Portfolio 2021-2024**

**Bank and Money Market Accounts**
- **Wachovia (Checking)** $5,001-$15,000 None
- **State Farm Insurance Bank (Money Market)** $50,001-$100,000 Interest/$1,001-$2,500
### SCHEDULE B

#### Part I: Transactions

Report any purchase, sale, or exchange by you, your spouse, or dependent children during the reporting period of any real property, stocks, bonds, commodity futures, and other securities when the amount of the transaction exceeded $1,000. Include transactions that resulted in a loss. Do not report a transaction involving property used solely as your personal residence, or a transaction solely between you, your spouse, or dependent child. Check the "Certificate of divestiture" box to indicate sales made pursuant to a certificate of divestiture from OGL.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transaction Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stock Purchase</td>
<td>ABC Corp.</td>
<td>01/01/2023</td>
<td>$500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock Sale</td>
<td>XYZ Inc.</td>
<td>06/01/2023</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate</td>
<td>House, 1234</td>
<td>03/01/2023</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This category applies only if the underlying asset is solely that of the file's spouse or dependent children. If the underlying asset is either held by the file or jointly held by the file with the spouse or dependent children, see the other higher categories of value, if appropriate.*

#### Part II: Gifts, Reimbursements, and Travel Expenses

For you, your spouse and dependent children, report the source, a brief description, and the value of (1) gifts (such as tangible items, transportation, lodging, food, or entertainment) received from one source totaling more than $250, and (2) travel-related cash reimbursements received from one source totaling more than $250. For travel-related gifts and reimbursements, include travel itineraries, dates, and the nature of expenses provided. Exclude anything given to you by the U.S. Government. Given to your agency in connection with official travel; received from relatives; received by your spouse or dependent child totally independent of their relationship to you; or provided as personal hospitality at the donor's residence. Also, for purposes of aggregating gifts to determine the total value from one source, exclude items worth $150 or less. See instructions for other exclusions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source (Name and Address)</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC Corp.</td>
<td>Gift of stock</td>
<td>$500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XYZ Inc.</td>
<td>Gift of stock</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel-related Cash</td>
<td>Reimbursement</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This file was created by CMORC.
### SCHEDULE C

#### Part I: Liabilities
Report liabilities over $10,000 owed to any creditor at any time during the reporting period by you, your spouse, or dependent children. Check the highest amount owed during the reporting period. Exclude a mortgage on your personal residence unless it is rented out, loans secured by automobiles, household furniture, or appliances; and liabilities owed to certain relatives listed in instructions. See instructions for resolving charge accounts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creditors (name and address)</th>
<th>Type of Liability</th>
<th>Date Incurred</th>
<th>Amount of debt</th>
<th>Rate of interest</th>
<th>Term of liability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: [ ]

**Category applies only if the liability is owed by the filer or joint liability of the filer with the spouse or dependent children.**

#### Part II: Agreements or Arrangements
Report your agreements or arrangements for: (1) continued participation in an employee benefit plan (e.g., pension, 401k, deferred compensation); (2) continuation of payment by a former employer (including severance payments); (3) leaves of absence; and (4) future employment. See instructions regarding the reporting of negotiations for any of these arrangements or benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status and Terms of any Agreement or Arrangement</th>
<th>Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: [ ]

**[Filer Directed Cautions]**
### SCHEDULE D

#### Part I: Positions Held Outside U.S. Government

Report any positions held during the applicable reporting period, whether compensated or not. Positions include but are not limited to those of an officer, director, trustee, general partner, proprietor, representative, employee, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise or any non-profit organization or educational institution. Exclude positions with religious, social, fraternal, or political entities and those solely of an honorary nature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name and Address</th>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Position Held</th>
<th>Status (No.)</th>
<th>Date (No. or Br)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Part II: Compensation in Excess of $5,000 Paid by One Source

Report sources of more than $5,000 compensation received by you or your business affiliation for services provided directly by you during any one year of the reporting period. This includes the names of clients and customers of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, or any other non-profit organization when you directly provided the services generating a fee or payment of more than $5,000. You need not report the U.S. Government as a source.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source (Name and Address)</th>
<th>Brief Description of Duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doe, Jane &amp; Sons, Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Law Firm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prior Edition Cannot Be Used.
Chairman LEAHY. Let us go to Mr. Anello. I want to mention to you that both Senator Feinstein and Senator Boxer told me of their strong support for you and that you have their support. I would ask you a similar question to what I asked Mr. Waddoups. You are already a superior court judge in San Diego, and you were a partner with the San Diego law firm of Wingert, Grebing, Anello & Brubaker and deputy city attorney. You were a captain on active duty in the United States Marine Corps, as the father of Lance Corporal Mark Patrick Leahy. That does not influence me a bit.

Judge ANELLO. I hope we did not meet back then. Did we?

Chairman LEAHY. No. He is now a former Marine. As you know, there are no ex-Marines, only former Marines. Special Courts Martial Military Judge, graduated from Bowdoin, graduated from Georgetown University Law Center, where I did. Do you have members of your family here today?

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL M. ANELLO, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Judge ANELLO. I do, and thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I also would like to express my personal appreciation to you and the other members of the Committee for having this hearing, especially at this late date in the session. I know the Senate is busy, obviously, these days, to put it mildly, and I most appreciate the opportunity to be here and appear before you today.

I do, with your permission, have folks here that I would like to introduce, if I might at this point.

Chairman LEAHY. Please do.

Judge ANELLO. Perhaps they could each stand as I announce them. First of all, my wonderful wife, Pam, who has put up with me for 35 years, is here—thankfully, I should add. We have with us also, thankfully, our three sons, starting with the oldest: Andy is here with his friend, Jane McCormick; and No. 2 son by age is Dan, he is here; and our youngest son, Chris, is here.

Also, I am pleased to have here today my sister, Diane Anello, who has also been a source of wonderful support to me over the years. And, in addition, we have her boss from the Aspen Institute, former Iowa Senator Dick Clark.

And last, but not least, we have a very—

Chairman LEAHY. I served with Senator Clark, and I did not see him there. I should have recognized that shock of white hair back there. Dick, it is always, always good to have you back here.

Judge ANELLO. And last, but not least, we have a very dear friend of ours, Liz Armstrong, from California, recently having moved to the area, and it is a pleasure to have her here today also.

Thank you.

[The biographical information follows.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).
   Michael Monroe Anello

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.
   United States District Judge for the Southern District of California

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.
   Office: San Diego Superior Court
   330 West Broadway
   San Diego, CA 92101

   Residence: La Jolla, CA

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.
   1943; Miami, Florida

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.
   I am married to Pamela P. Anello (formerly Pamela Wray Plummer). She has not worked outside the home during the marriage. We have no dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.
   January to May 1982, University of San Diego Law School, Master of Law in Taxation Program, no degree received.
   1965 to 1968, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., June 1968
   1961 to 1965, Bowdoin College; B.A., June 1965
7. **Employment Record:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

1998 – present
San Diego Superior Court
Superior Court Judge

1973 – 1998
Wingert, Grebing, Anello & Brubaker
Partner in the law firm now known as Wingert, Grebing, Brubaker & Goodwin LLP

1972 – 1973
San Diego City Attorney’s Office
Deputy City Attorney (Prosecutor)

1968 – 1972
U. S. Marine Corps
Captain

Library of Congress
Security Guard

Piercon, Ball & Dowd
Law Clerk

8. **Military Service and Draft Status:** Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

I served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps from November 25, 1968, to February 1, 1972, when I was honorably released from active duty as a Captain. While on active duty, I served a full tour in Vietnam from September 1969 to September 1970. After being released from active duty, I joined the U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, and ultimately retired as a Lt. Col. (USMCR) in 1990.

9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.
Dean’s List (all four years) and James Bowdoin Scholar Award (two years) at Bowdoin College

East Coast Regional Candidate from Bowdoin College in the 1965 Rhodes Scholarship competition (not successful)

Class Marshall for the 1965 graduating class at Bowdoin College (elected by vote of the Senior Class)

cum laude graduate of Bowdoin College

selection for law review (Georgetown Law Journal)

Military awards and honors include: National Defense Service Medal; Vietnam Service Medal; Vietnam Campaign Medal; various unit citations; and a special Certificate of Commendation from the Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, CA, citing me meritoriously for monitoring and supervising trial of approximately 1000 general and special courts-martial as Chief Trial Counsel (Chief Prosecutor), and presiding over approximately 60 special courts-martial as Military Judge.

10. Bar Associations: List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

San Diego County Barrister’s Club - I served as a Director of the Barrister’s Club in 1976 and 1977, as its Treasurer in 1976, and as its President in 1977.

San Diego County Bar Association - I served as a Director of the Association from 1982 to 1984, and as Vice-President of the Association in 1984. I served as a County Bar Association Delegate to the annual California State Bar Convention for approximately 10 years (approx. 1975-1985).


Enright Chapter of the American Inns of Court - I am a Master in the Enright Chapter of the American Inns of Court (presently on sabbatical), and served as the Program Chair in 1993-1994.

Association of Southern California Defense Counsel (former member)

San Diego Inn of Court - I am a former member and Work Shop Instructor of the San Diego Inn of Court.
San Diego County Bar Association Committees and Sections - I was formerly a member of, and active in, several bar association committees and study sections, including the Real Property, Appellate, Insurance, Probate, and Litigation Committees/Sections.

San Diego Superior Court Executive Committee - I am presently serving in my fourth annual term on the San Diego Superior Court Executive Committee (elected by the 128 Judges of the court). I also currently serve on the Technology and Civil Policy Committees of the San Diego Superior Court.

11. Bar and Court Admission:
   
   a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

   District of Columbia Bar - Feb. 16, 1969,

   California State Bar - June 2, 1972.

   I allowed the DC bar membership to lapse when I moved to California. I remained continuously licensed in California until I was appointed to the San Diego Superior Court in June 1998 at which time I became an “inactive” member. Under the Constitution of California, a person serving as a judge of a court of record is not considered to be a member of the State Bar while in office. See California Constitution Article 6, § 9.

   b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

   United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Feb. 16, 1968
   United States Court of Military Appeals, Oct. 7, 1971
   Supreme Court of the State of California, June 2, 1972
   United States District Court for the Southern District of California, May 31, 1974
   United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, June 9, 1986
   Supreme Court of the United States, June 23, 1986

12. Memberships:

   a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.
Greater San Diego County Arthritis Foundation; member of the Board of Directors (in the approx. mid-1980’s timeframe)

Muirlands Junior High School Foundation; founding member of the Board of Directors (in the approx. late 1980’s timeframe)

La Jolla High School Foundation; I served on the Board of Directors in the approx. early 1990’s timeframe.

La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club

Youth Sports. I served in several positions in youth sports organizations in the 1980’s and 1990’s, including coaching several youth baseball and soccer teams in the La Jolla Youth Recreation League, serving as a Division Director of La Jolla Youth’s Soccer League, and sponsoring several teams in the Mira Mesa-Scripps Ranch and Kearney “Pop” Warner Football Leagues.

b. The American Bar Association’s Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

To my knowledge, none of the organizations in which I have served, or to which I have belonged, have ever discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion.

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

None

b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

None
c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

None

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

None

c. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

I was the subject of articles published in the following:

Los Angeles Daily Journal, March 17, 1999
“Update” published by the San Diego Defense Lawyers, Spring 1999
North County Lawyer Magazine, August 2000

14. **Judicial Office:** State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

I currently serve as a Superior Court Judge on the San Diego Superior Court, having been appointed to that position by former California Governor Pete Wilson on June 24, 1998. The Superior Court is a state court of general jurisdiction hearing all levels and types of criminal and civil matters. Judges are elected every six years. My current term expires January 16, 2013.

In or about 1971 and 1972, while serving on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps, I served as a Special Courts-Martial Military Judge at Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, CA, where I presided over approximately 60 special court-martial trials (all criminal cases, involving prosecutions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
15. **Citations:** If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

As a state trial court judge, I have not written any citable appellate decisions. I have, however, authored many (approx. 75 to 100) “Tentative Decisions” or “Statements of Decision” following non-jury trials.

b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

None

c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

As a state court trial judge, I have been reversed in nine appellate decisions, two published and seven unpublished.

The two published decisions (with summaries) are:

(1) *Carlsbad Aquafarm, Inc. v. Department of Health Services* (2000) 84 Cal.App. 4th 809. (Plaintiff corporation grew and harvested mussels for commercial sale at its facilities in Carlsbad, California. Plaintiff alleged that defendant Department of Health Services violated its due process rights by refusing to provide a hearing before removing plaintiff from a list of approved interstate shellfish sellers. The jury agreed and awarded plaintiff monetary damages of $290,000. Defendant appealed, contending plaintiff was not entitled to recover money damages based upon a constitutional due process violation. The court of appeal reversed the judgment, finding that plaintiff was not entitled to recover monetary damages for a constitutional due process violation.)

(2) *Morris v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation* (2000) 84 Cal.App. 4th 1026. (In an insurance coverage dispute, plaintiff, as an assignee of certain rights under a real estate broker’s professional liability policy, sued defendant insurer for breach of contract for failure to defend and indemnify its assignor in an underlying lawsuit. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant insurer, concluding that there was no coverage based upon a policy exclusion for claims relating to property owned by the broker. The appellate court reversed, finding that the subject exclusion was ambiguous, and that the ambiguity should be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage.)

The seven unpublished decisions (with summaries) are:
(1) Noble v. Aldred, DO42196, issued June 7, 2004. (Plaintiff was injured while dancing in a “mosh pit” during a “punk rock” concert at defendant’s bar. Plaintiff claimed that defendant was negligent in managing the concert, and that its negligence was a cause of plaintiff’s injury. The jury rendered its verdict in favor of defendant. Plaintiff claimed on appeal that the trial court had erred in excluding an audio recording from evidence, and that it had improperly rushed the jury to its verdict. The appellate court agreed, and reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial.)

(2) Moore v. San Diego Cemetery Ass’n, DO42196, issued June 25, 2004. (Plaintiff sued defendant for negligence and breach of contract in connection with a written contract for funeral arrangements. The contract contained an arbitration provision, and defendant moved to compel arbitration pursuant thereto. Based upon affidavits from plaintiff and her husband that defendant’s representative agreed the arbitration provision would not be binding on them, the trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. Defendant contended on appeal that the contract was not ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence (i.e., the Moore’s affidavits) should not have been admitted to vary or alter its terms. The appellate court agreed that the Moore’s affidavits should not have been admitted, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings.)

(3) Morris v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, DO40993, issued Jan. 5, 2004. (In an insurance coverage dispute, plaintiff, as an assignee of certain rights under a real estate broker’s professional liability insurance policy, sued defendant insurer for failing to defend and indemnify the assignor in an underlying lawsuit. After a non-jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant insurer on the ground that even though there may have been an initial breach of duty under the subject policy, plaintiff could not establish an entitlement to any compensatory damages. Plaintiff contended on appeal that the trial court failed to give appropriate value to the settlement in the underlying lawsuit. The appellate court agreed and reversed and remanded for further proceedings.)

(4) Kuebler v. McCambridge, DO35812, issued May 3, 2001. (Plaintiff sued defendant for declaratory relief regarding the proper interpretation of the Mobilehome Residency Law and the City of Escondido’s rent control ordinance in connection with plaintiff’s sale of his mobilehome. Defendant then filed a cross-complaint against plaintiff seeking punitive damages for alleged violations of the Mobilehome Residency Law. Both the complaint and the cross-complaint were ultimately dismissed, and plaintiff then moved for an award of attorneys fees contending he was the “prevailing party.” The trial court awarded attorneys fees to plaintiff, and defendant appealed contending that plaintiff was not the “prevailing party.” The appellate court agreed, and reversed the attorney fee award.)

(5) Garces v. Cannon Pacific Services, DO44540, issued Oct. 5, 2005. (Plaintiffs sued defendant for violation of overtime laws, contending they were
common law "employees" and not "independent contractors." After a non-jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the evidence presented led to a reasonable inference that they were employees, and not independent contractors. The appellate court agreed, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

(6) Citizens for Better Rancho Santa Fe Schools v. Rancho Santa Fe School District Board of Trustees, DO47210, issued April 20, 2006. ( Plaintiff sued defendant to enjoin it from proceeding with plans to develop and construct a new school within the covenant area of Rancho Santa Fe. Defendant demurred to the complaint, contending that plaintiff could not establish the necessary predicate of waste of public funds or illegal expenditures of public money. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed, contending it had adequately stated a cognizable claim. The appellate court agreed, and reversed the judgment of dismissal.)

(7) Pender v. Waldenmayer, DO44781, issued August 2, 2005. ( Plaintiff sued defendant developers for alleged breach of an agreement to make certain improvements on a private road which abutted her residence. During the non-jury trial, at the conclusion of plaintiff's case in chief, the trial court granted defendants' non-suit motion and entered judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appealed, contending she had presented sufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing of the elements of her claim, and that the non-suit motion should not have been granted. The appellate court agreed, and reversed the non-suit and remanded the case for trial.)

I have been affirmed in part, and reversed in part, in eight appellate decisions, two partially published, and six unpublished.

The two partially published decisions (with summaries) are:

(1) Hogar v. Community Development Commission of the City of Escondido (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1288. ( Plaintiff sued defendant claiming the city was not paying sufficient funds into the low-income housing fund as required under the Community Development Law. After a non-jury trial, the trial court applied the "delayed discovery" rule and ordered reimbursement by the city of amounts that should have been paid into the fund from the date it was established until the date of trial. Defendant appealed, contending the "delayed discovery" rule was not applicable, and that reimbursement should be ordered only for amounts that accrued within the three-year limitations period under the applicable statute of limitations. The appellate court agreed, holding that under the unique facts of this case the "delayed discovery" rule was not available, and reversed the judgment in part and remanded for determination of how much reimbursement was required.)

(2) Gober v. Ralphs Grocery Company (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 204. ( Plaintiffs sued defendant for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent a
supervisor from sexually harassing them. After a jury awarded Plaintiffs both compensatory and punitive damages, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but conditionally granted defendants motion for new trial on the ground that the punitive damages were excessive. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the order denying defendant’s motion for JNOV, and remanded to the trial court with directions that the punitive damages be further reduced.)

The six unpublished decisions (with summaries) are:

(1) *Pinho v. Lobo*, DO42669, issued June 4, 2004. (In a third party lawsuit against Pinho and others, Pinho cross-complained against Lobo for defamation, interference with business relations, and conversion. Lobo moved to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (CCP § 425.16), which allows for early dismissal of an action determined to be a strategic lawsuit against public participation. The trial court denied the motion, and Lobo appealed, contending that the anti-SLAPP statute did apply. The appellate court agreed that it applied to certain of her claims, and affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.)

(2) *Brunfield v. Richardson*, DO36348, issued Feb. 19, 2002. (Plaintiffs sued defendant veterinarian for alleged veterinary malpractice in treating their horse. During the jury trial, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for fraud and breach of contract, but allowed the veterinary malpractice claims to go to the jury. The jury rendered its verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs appealed, contending that it was error for the trial court to dismiss their fraud and breach of contract claims. The appellate court agreed that there was some evidence of alleged fraud (i.e., alleged misrepresentation of veterinarian experience), and that the fraud claim should have been allowed to go to the jury. The appellate court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial on the fraud claim.)

(3) *Moore v. Orthodontic Centers of America, Inc.*, DO35808, issued Jan. 11, 2002. (Plaintiff sued defendant seeking to compel it to agree to his purchase of an OCA affiliated orthodontic practice, and defendant cross-complained against plaintiff alleging breach of contract and fraud. After a jury trial on the cross-complaint, a substantial monetary verdict was rendered in favor of OCA and against Moore. Moore appealed, contending that the underlying contract was unenforceable, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. The appellate court concluded that certain portions of the contract were unenforceable, but that those provisions could be severed from the subject contract, and that the balance of the agreement could be enforced upon retrial.)

(4) *Argonaut Great Central Insurance Co. v. St. Mar Enterprises*, DO34787, issued June 5, 2001. (This complicated matter involved three appeals from defense verdicts and subsequent denials of post-judgment motions in an insurance subrogation action and a cross-action, both of which arose out of a fire at an
Escondido shopping mall. After considering various claims of error at trial, the appellate court reversed the portion of the judgment in favor of St. Mar on Argonaut’s complaint and Zurich’s complaint-in-intervention, and affirmed the portion of the judgment in favor of Cole on St. Mar’s cross-complaint.

(5)  
Gandy v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., DO43307, issued Oct. 20, 2005. (Plaintiff sued defendant for cutting down and removing trees from its property without its consent. After a jury trial, a verdict was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of $475,000. Plaintiff then sought, in post-trial motions, to treble or double the award pursuant to applicable statutes. The court doubled the award, and both parties appealed. Plaintiff contended that treble damages were appropriate, whereas defendant contended that the entire verdict should be overturned due to certain alleged errors at trial. The appellate court agreed that treble damages were appropriate, and reversed that portion of the judgment, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.)

(6)  
Shuster v. Hilton, DO45249, issued Jan. 18, 2006. (Plaintiff sued defendant for fraud and breach of contract, among other things, arising out of a failed business relationship involving the manufacture and sale of helicopters. The defendant cross-complained against plaintiff for the alleged non-payment of various loans. The complaint was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict in favor of plaintiff Shuster in the amount of $312,706. The cross-complaint was then tried to the court, sitting without a jury, which resulted in a net recovery to defendant Hilton after all set-offs were applied. Both parties appealed. The appellate court found that the law of set-off was incorrectly applied, and reversed the judgment to that limited extent, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.)

d.  
a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

As a state trial judge, I have not issued any appellate opinions, published or unpublished. All appellate opinions reversing, or reversing in part and affirming in part, my trial court decisions are listed and summarized in the answer to Question 15 c above.

e.  
a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

As a trial court judge, I have not authored any appellate opinions. However, I have authored approximately 75 to 100 written “Tentative Decisions” and “Statements of Decision” following non-jury trials. Those written decisions are filed by case name and number in the court clerk’s office or are in storage. In addition, I maintain copies of those written decisions, which can be provided upon request.
f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

None

16. **Recusal:** If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

Our court does employ a form of "automatic" recusal system pursuant to which each judge provides the court clerk's office with a list of attorneys (e.g., former partners or good friends) and parties (e.g., former clients) whose cases the judge deems inappropriate to hear due to actual or potential conflicts of interest. That list is incorporated into our court's initial case assignment system, and, if it works properly, no case involving any of those persons or entities is assigned to that judge. Should such a case be assigned to me, or if I subsequently determine that there is a real or apparent conflict of interest, or some other ground to recuse myself, I voluntarily, on my own motion, recuse myself at that point.

In addition, California has a "peremptory" challenge procedure (set forth in Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 170.6) which allows, within a specified time frame, each party to exercise one "peremptory" challenge of the judge assigned to the case (exercised by signing and filing a peremptory challenge form which is then automatically granted by the judge) without stating any reason other than that "the party or attorney cannot or believes that he or she cannot have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judge." Accordingly, many cases are routinely reassigned either without the judge's knowledge or based upon a "peremptory" challenge which is automatically granted, and there is no practical way to compile a list of those cases and parties.
California also has a “for cause” challenge or disqualification procedure (set forth in Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 170.3) which permits a party to file a motion requesting disqualification for cause (which “shall be presented at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification”).

The only instance I can recall in which a party filed such a motion to disqualify me was in or about February 2002 in the case of Gober, et. al., v. Ralphs Grocery Company (San Diego Superior Court Case No. N72141). The motion to disqualify in that case was filed long after I had made several pretrial rulings with which the attorney filing the motion (Plaintiffs’ counsel) obviously disagreed. Although the stated reason for the disqualification motion was that I was allegedly “biased” or “prejudiced” against that party and/or its attorneys, it was clear that the motion was motivated simply by disagreement with prior rulings, and it was summarily denied as being without legal basis.

17. Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

None

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

None.

18. Legal Career: Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

I did not serve as a clerk to a judge.

ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

I have not practiced alone.
iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

1998 – present
San Diego Superior Court
Central Division (Hall of Justice)
330 W. Broadway
San Diego, CA 92101
Superior Court Judge

1973 – 1998
Wingert, Grebing, Anello & Brubaker
(now known as Wingert, Grebing, Brubaker & Goodwin LLP)
600 W. Broadway, 7th Floor
San Diego, CA 92101
Partner

1972 – 1973
San Diego City Attorney’s Office
1200 Third Ave., Suite 1620
San Diego, CA 92101
Deputy City Attorney (Prosecutor)

1968 – 1972; United States Marine Corps

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

Except for a brief time as a prosecutor with the San Diego City Attorney’s Office, my entire civilian career as a lawyer (1973 to 1998) was spent in a civil litigation law firm. During my first few years with the firm, I did some criminal defense work, and handled a substantial number of family law and probate matters. Later on, I was involved primarily in civil litigation matters, with an emphasis on real estate, insurance, business and professional liability matters. I also became the firm’s appellate specialist, and records from the California Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate District, should confirm that I appeared on more than 50 matters before that court.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

Typical clients were real estate brokers, mortgage brokers, small builders and developers, insurance companies and their insureds, small business
owners, and attorneys and other licensed professionals.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

As an attorney/partner in a civil litigation firm for 25 years, the great majority of my practice was in litigation. Since most of my matters dealt with real estate, business, insurance, professional liability, and appellate work, however, I did not appear in court as frequently as some of my partners who were more involved in personal injury, construction defect, and other matters which seemed to require more frequent trials and court appearances. Although it's difficult to quantify, I would still describe my court appearances as "frequent" rather than "occasional."

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 2%
   2. state courts of record: 98%
   3. other courts.

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings: 95%
   2. criminal proceedings: 5%

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

While in the U.S. Marine Corps, I tried literally hundreds of courts-martial cases, all of which were criminal cases, and approximately one-third of which were jury trials. As a Deputy City Attorney (Prosecutor), I tried approximately 20 misdemeanor criminal trials, approximately half of which were jury trials. While in private practice, I tried approximately 60 to 80 civil cases, approximately 15 of which were jury trials to verdict.

i. What percentage of these trials were:
   1. jury: approximately 33%
   2. non-jury: approximately 67%

e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

I have never practiced before the Supreme Court of the United States.
19. **Litigation:** Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

   a. the date of representation;

   b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and

   c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

1. **United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Cavanaugh (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 582128).**

   This matter resulted in a 6-day court trial before the Hon. J. A. Kilgarif (now deceased) in July 1988. It was a declaratory relief action filed by an insurance company (USAA) seeking a determination that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured (Evanna Cavanaugh) in an underlying wrongful death action brought against her by the heirs of a person she had shot and killed.

   I represented USAA, and Mrs. Cavanaugh and the decedent’s heirs were represented by Glen R. McAllister (now with the San Diego District Attorney’s Office, 250 East Main Street, El Cajon, CA, phone 619-441-4239).

   The trial was interesting and unusual in that it resembled the trial of a homicide case. To establish that the killing was not an “accident” (and/or an act of self-defense), we attempted to “reconstruct” the incident in the courtroom using a mock-up of the room where the shooting occurred, and a demonstration (using laser beams to show bullet paths) by a renowned criminalist. Sophisticated blood-spatter analysis was also used, along with voice analysis and audio tape enhancement of a portion of the recorded conversation of the victim just before the shooting. A representative of the County Coroner testified as to his autopsy findings (e.g., bullet paths, entry and exit wounds, which shot was likely to have caused death, etc.), and two psychiatrists testified as to the mental state (including intent) of the victim and the shooter.

   In a judgment entered on August 25, 1988, the Court found that there was no coverage for the subject claims, and thus no duty to defend or indemnify the insured, because the shooting was intentional (i.e., not an “accident” and not an act of self-defense). The judgment was subsequently appealed (to the California Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate District, Civil No. D009071), and, in an opinion filed January 18, 1991, the judgment was affirmed. A subsequent Petition for Review was denied by the California Supreme Court.
(2) **Devin v. United Services Automobile Ass'n** (San Diego Superior Court Case No. N38506).

This was an insurance "bad faith" action filed against USAA by its insureds for failing to defend and indemnify them in an underlying lawsuit brought against them by the disgruntled buyer of their home (who alleged misrepresentation and non-disclosure of defects).

I represented USAA, and the plaintiffs were represented by David J. Noonan, Esq., of the firm of Kirby, Noonan, Lance & Hoge LLP (600 West Broadway, Suite 1100, phone 619-231-8666).

On the fourth day of a jury trial, after the plaintiffs rested, the court granted a motion for non-suit on behalf of USAA on the ground that an alleged misrepresentation in the sale of real estate is not an "occurrence" triggering coverage under a liability policy. The judgment was subsequently appealed (Fourth District Court of Appeal No. D011407) and affirmed in a published decision on May 22, 1992, cited at 6 Cal.App.4th 1149 (another firm handled the appeal). A subsequent Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court was denied.

At the time this matter went to trial, there were no California cases directly on point, and the coverage issue was unresolved. There were several similar cases in the pipeline and both the insurance industry and the real estate industry were anxiously awaiting a resolution. Subsequent appellate opinions have followed this case, which is often cited for the proposition that a misrepresentation in a real estate transaction is not an "occurrence" for the purposes of triggering coverage under a liability policy.

(3) **Norman v. Fleener** (San Diego Superior Court Case No. N32449).

This was a 6-day jury trial before the Hon. Franklin J. Mitchell (now retired) in March 1990. It was a personal injury action filed by a bicycle rider struck from the rear by a motorist on Via de la Valle in Del Mar, CA, near the Del Mar Racetrack.

I represented the Fleener defendants (owners of property abutting the accident scene). Plaintiff was represented by Charles Kavalaris, Esq., of San Jose, CA (according to a recent attorney directory, now located at 1099 N. 4th St., San Jose, CA, phone 408-971-3226). The City of Del Mar was represented by Neal S. Meyers of the firm of Daley & Heff (462 Stevens Ave., Suite 201, Solana Beach, CA 92075, phone 858-755-5666). The motorist (Michael Engle) did not appear, and his default was taken.

The theory of liability asserted against my clients (the Fleeners) was that the alleged negligent maintenance of their property (which abutted the accident site) was a proximate cause of the accident. Specifically, it was alleged that dirt and debris eroded out onto the roadway (across the bike path) causing the plaintiff to have to swerve outside the bike path when she was struck and injured by a passing motorist. The Fleeners denied any
negligence, and presented evidence that the erosion, if it did contribute to the accident, was caused by another landowner.

The jury came back with a defense verdict in favor of the Fleeners and the City of Del Mar. Plaintiff then proved up a default judgment against the motorist. There was no appeal.

(4) Marinovich v. Cattedra (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 626513).

This was a 2-day court trial before the Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller (now sitting on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California) in October 1991. It was essentially a very heated boundary dispute between two neighbors. Among other things, the Marinoviches claimed the right to a prescriptive easement across a portion of the Cattedra’s property. The Cattedras claimed that certain improvements constructed by the Marinoviches encroached on their property.

I represented the Cattedras. The Marinoviches were represented by Donald Merkin, Esq. (now located at 4747 Morena Blvd., Suite 302, San Diego, CA 92117, phone 858-454-3244).

In a judgment entered January 23, 1992, the court denied the Marinoviches’ easement claim, and ordered them to remove certain encroaching improvements and to pay a monetary judgment, plus costs, to the Cattedras.

(5) Hambrick v. Bharadwaja (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 624794).

This was an 8-day jury trial before the Hon. G. Dennis Adams (now retired) in January 1992. It was a personal injury (product liability and premises liability) case resulting from a severe lacerating injury to the plaintiff’s arm caused by the shattering of a glass shower door.

I represented the defendant landlord (Bharadwaja and the Mauryan Condominium HOA). Co-defendant Guardian Industries, Inc. (the manufacturer of the glass shower door panel) was represented by Charles H. Dick, Jr., Esq. of the firm of Baker & McKenzie (101 West Broadway, Suite 1200, San Diego, CA 92101, phone 619-235-7790). Plaintiff was represented by David G. Ronquillo, Esq. (3033 Fifth Avenue, Suite 425, San Diego, CA 92103, phone 619-294-7474).

The jury returned a defense verdict in favor of my clients, and awarded money damages against Guardian Industries. There was no appeal.
(6) **Simms v. Love (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 627578).**

This was a 6-day jury trial before the Hon. J. Richard Haden (now retired) in January and February 1992. It was essentially a misrepresentation, non-disclosure claim brought by the buyer (Simms) against the broker (Love) and the seller (Richardson).

I represented the real estate agent (Chris Love) and her then-broker (Willis M. Allen Co.). Plaintiff was represented by Richard R. Leuthold, Esq. (now at 12625 High Bluff Drive, Suite 303, San Diego, CA, phone 858-792-7070). The seller (Richardson) was not represented, and was ultimately dismissed from the case.

Expert witnesses were called by both sides on the subject of the broker’s standard of care with respect to the non-disclosure claim. There was also an allegation that the real estate agent forged signatures on certain documents, and questioned-document examiners were called to testify on that subject.

The jury returned a defense verdict on all claims. There was no appeal.

(7) **United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Anderson (San Diego Superior Court Case No. EC003461).**

This was a 3-day jury trial before the Hon. James Malkus (now retired) in June 1992. It was essentially a declaratory relief action in which an insurance company (USAA) sought a determination that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured (Anderson) in an underlying action brought against him for assault and battery.

I represented United Services Automobile Ass’n. Defendant Anderson was represented by Elliott N. Kanter, Esq. (now at 2445 Fifth Avenue, Suite 350, San Diego, CA 92101, phone 619-2321-1883). The victim of the alleged assault (Teresa Anne Meno) was represented by William O. Dougherty, Esq. (now at 2550 Fifth Avenue, Suite 617, San Diego, CA 92103, phone 619-232-9131).

An usual aspect of this case was the submission to the jury (by a lengthy special verdict form containing 31 questions) of all possible factual issues upon which the ultimate coverage determination might be made. Based upon the jury’s answers to those questions, the court had no choice but to find that there was no coverage, and thus no duty to defend or indemnify, and judgment was entered in favor of USAA. There was no appeal.

(8) **Royston v. Nelson (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 642767).**

This was a 3-day binding arbitration (by stipulation) before the Hon. William Yale (retired) in 1993. It was essentially a misrepresentation/non-disclosure case, brought by the dissatisfied buyer (Royston) of a luxury ocean-view home in La Jolla against the
sellers (Mr. and Mrs. Douglas Allred) and the listing broker (Andrew Nelson and Willis M. Allen Co.)

I represented the broker (Nelson and Willis M. Allen Co.). The plaintiff/buyer (Royston) was represented by Brian L. Forbes, Esq. of the firm now known as DLA Piper US LLP (401 B Street, Suite 1700, San Diego, CA 92101, phone 619-699-3642). The sellers (the Allreds) were represented by Mark Smith, Esq., of the firm of Latham & Watkins LLP (600 West Broadway, Suite 1800, San Diego, CA 92101, phone 619-236-1234).

The primary claim here related to prospective view impairment, and consequent diminution in value, as a result of the plans of the neighbor across the street (to the West) to construct a second-story addition on his house, which would potentially block or eliminate Royston’s ocean view. It was alleged that the sellers and the broker knew of the impending construction, and should have disclosed that knowledge to the Roystons when they purchased their house. Royston claimed the loss of his view would diminish the value of his property by $2,000,000, or more, and he sought either damages in that amount or rescission.

Defendants denied any prior knowledge of the neighbor’s building plans, and thus denied liability. In order to address the damages claim, however, out of an abundance of caution, we retained experts (computer simulation expert, architect, surveyor, etc.) to create a computer-generated simulation (in glossy, color photo format) to show what the neighbor’s project would look like if built, and what the impact would be, if any, on Royston’s view. The simulation showed, in a persuasive and virtually undeniable manner, that the view impairment would be minimal.

In exercising his wide discretion as an arbitrator, Judge Yale awarded $25,000 to the plaintiffs, finding that the brokers could have been a little more careful with their due diligence, but agreeing that the damages were minimal. By stipulation, the arbitration was binding, and there was no appeal.

(9) Burroughs v. Heater (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 593572).

This was a malicious prosecution action brought against Henry E. Heater and his law firm (Enderman, Lincoln, Turek & Heater LLP) by former limited partners of a mobile home park who had been sued by Mr. Heater in an underlying action on behalf of tenants of the mobile home park.

I was retained by their insurance carrier (Lawyer’s Mutual) to represent Mr. Heater and his law firm. Charles W. Rees, Jr., Esq. (now retired), formerly of the firm of Higgs, Fletcher & Mack LLP (401 West A Street, Suite 2600, San Diego, CA 92101, phone 619-236-1551) was associated in as personal counsel for Mr. Heater. Plaintiffs were represented by Dennis E. Golub, Esq., of the Los Angeles firm of Gustlin, Golub & Bragin (according to a recent attorney directory, the firm of Golub Bragin & Sassoe is
now located at 1990 S. Bundy Drive, #540, Los Angeles, CA 90025, phone 310-979-0321).

In the underlying action (filed in Contra Costa County), the limited partner defendants (plaintiffs in this action) had their demurrer sustained, with leave to amend, on the ground that limited partners ordinarily have no personal liability for claims against a limited partnership. Rather than amend, however, and in return for other concessions, Mr. Heater elected to dismiss the underlying complaint against the limited partners. They then filed the instant action for malicious prosecution.

The primary issue was whether Mr. Heater’s clients had a “tenable claim” against the limited partners at the time the underlying action was filed (i.e., was there reasonable or probable cause to sue them). Mr. Heater’s investigation revealed that these limited partners had been “bought out” shortly before, and had thus received a return of some portion of their capital investment. His research indicated that limited partners could be sued to recover the amount of any capital distributions made to withdrawing limited partners. Accordingly, Mr. Heater felt that his clients did have a “tenable claim” and did have “probable cause.”

We filed a summary judgment motion on behalf of Mr. Heater and his firm on that basis. The motion was granted, and judgment was subsequently entered, by the Hon. James R. Milliken (now retired) on October 28, 1988. The judgment was subsequently appealed (California Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate District, No. D090914) and the summary judgment was reversed in an unpublished opinion issued on January 25, 1990. The case was then reset for trial, and it ultimately settled for a nominal amount.

(10) Griffin v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 642976).

This was a personal injury/products liability case brought by a construction worker (plumber) who incurred a permanently disabling injury to his right (dominant) arm and elbow while working on a construction site.

I represented the plaintiff (Franklin Griffin). Defendant Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. was represented by Robert W. Harrison, Esq. (now with the firm of Koehler, Nebeker, Carlson & Haluck, at 225 Broadway, 21st Floor, San Diego, CA 92101, phone 619-233-1600) and by Kris B. Thompson, Esq. (now with the firm of Thompson & Alessio, LLP, at 2550 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, San Diego, CA 92103, phone 619-233-9100).

Defendant J.L. Construction Co., the general contractor, was represented by Scott M. Bonesteel, Esq. (now with the firm of Summers & Shives, APC, at 8755 Aero Drive, Suite 230, San Diego, CA 92123, phone 858-874-1800). Defendant S.R. Bray, dba Temporary Utility Services, was represented by William F. Volk, Esq. (now with the firm of Campbell, Volk & Lauter, a 5049 Shoreham Place, Suite 150, San Diego, CA 92122, phone 858-546-1122).
The injury was caused by the sudden twisting action of a high-powered electric drill (Milwaukee "Hole Hawg" drill) when power to the site was interrupted and then suddenly restored. Experts retained by the plaintiff testified that the drill was unreasonably dangerous, and that the risk of injury could have been reduced or eliminated if the drill had been designed and manufactured with a "slip clutch" (or other torque-limiting safety device) similar to what is provided in other competing brands of electric drills. Defendants' experts disagreed, and contended that the tool was reasonably designed and reasonably safe if used properly.

Defendant Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. brought a motion for summary judgment just prior to the scheduled trial date, which was granted by the Hon. Lawrence Kapiloff (now retired). We then appealed that judgment (California Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate District, No. D018696), and Judge Kapiloff stayed the action against the remaining defendants pending resolution of that appeal. The summary judgment was reversed on appeal, and the matter was subsequently settled (for a relatively nominal amount) prior to trial.

20. Legal Activities: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organization(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

As a Superior Court Judge for the last 10 years, I have presided over more than 200 trials, including approximately 10 felony criminal jury trials, approximately 60 to 80 civil court trials, and well over 100 civil jury trials. I have also been involved in court administration, having been elected to four terms on the court's Executive Committee, and having served on several standing court committees (including the Technology Committee and the Civil Policy Committee).

In private practice, in addition to my trial work, I also became the appellate specialist in my former law firm, and in that capacity I handled all of our firm's appellate work for approximately fifteen (15) years. I handled approximately 50 or more matters before the Fourth Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal over that time frame.

During my 25 years in private practice, I was active in many bar related activities, including various bar committees and study sections. I served in various leadership positions in the San Diego Barrister's Club (Director and President), the San Diego County Bar Association (Director and Vice-President), the San Diego Defense Lawyers Association (Director), and the Enright Inn of Court (Master and Program Chair).

Before going into private practice, I served in various legal capacities in the U.S. Marine Corps for over three years, including legal assistance officer, defense counsel, trial
counsel, and ultimately Military Judge. At Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, shortly
after returning from my tour in Vietnam, I was appointed as Chief Trial Counsel (i.e.,
Chief Prosecutor), and in that capacity I supervised the trial of approximately 1000
general and special courts-martial. Thereafter, I was appointed as a Special Courts-
Martial Military Judge, and in that capacity I presided over approximately 60 special
court martial trials.

I have never performed any lobbying activities, whether on a pro bono basis or otherwise,
for any individuals or organizations.

21. **Teaching:** What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution
at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe
briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a
syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

Other than occasionally serving as a Workshop Instructor for programs put on by the
San Diego Inn of Court some years ago while I was in private practice, I have not taught
any courses or produced any course syllabi.

22. **Deferred Income/ Future Benefits:** List the sources, amounts and dates of all
anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted
contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business
relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or
customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the
future for any financial or business interest.

With the exception of my military reserve retirement annuity (currently approx. $1100
per month), and social security benefits for which I will become eligible at age 66, and
potential retirement benefits (depending upon when I retire) accrued in connection with
my judicial service on the San Diego Superior Court, I have no deferred income
arrangements, or any similar entitlement to income payments or other benefits as
contemplated by this question.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments,
or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your
service with the court? If so, explain.

I have no plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or
without compensation, during my service with the court, if confirmed.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the
calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all
salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other
items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)


25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

   a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

   Parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during my initial service in the position to which I have been nominated would include cases involving my former law partners; cases involving any companies based upon my and my spouse's actual or potential financial interest; any case involving the tenants of my rental property, or otherwise arising out the ownership or management of that property; and any cases involving anyone I deem to be a personal friend.

   b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

   As a state court judge for approximately ten (10) years, I have been careful to avoid actual or potential conflict-of-interest issues. With regard to the concerns referenced above, my present practice is to: (1) provide a list of all persons and entities as to which there may be a conflict of interest to the person (or case management program) charged with assignments so that no case involving those persons or entities would be assigned to me; and (2) personally review all new cases as they come in to ascertain whether there are any actual or potential conflicts. If I am confirmed as a United States District Judge, in all cases I would be guided by the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and all applicable statutes, policies and procedures.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility calls for "every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged." Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.
As part of the mission of my former Marine Corps military reserve unit, I regularly provided free legal assistance to needy service members at local military bases, particularly including Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, and Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton. As a former member of the San Diego County Bar Association’s Volunteer Lawyer Program, I provided legal assistance to indigent individuals as part of the mission of that program. I also provided representation on a pro bono basis to several juveniles in juvenile court as a result of referrals from local schools and family acquaintances. I also handled a few agency adoptions on a pro bono basis, again as a result of referrals from other attorneys and family acquaintances.

In addition, I found opportunities to provide pro bono legal services to deserving individuals and organizations from time to time during my 25 years or so in my law practice. For example, I provided legal services to the Greater San Diego Arthritis Foundation for several years, and as a founding member of the Muirlands Junior High School Foundation I organized the new entity as a non-profit corporation and obtained its tax-exempt status. As another example, although I was not a member of that church, I assisted a new church congregation (Hope United Methodist Church in Rancho Bernardo, CA) in forming its non-profit corporation and obtaining its tax-exempt status.

28. **Selection Process:**

   a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

   There is a federal judicial selection commission in California (under the direction of Gerald Parsky). Each federal judicial district in California has a bipartisan judicial selection committee composed of 6 members (3 appointed by the administration and 3 appointed collectively by Senators Feinstein and Boxer). I submitted my written application to the local Southern District selection committee, and was personally interviewed by the members of that committee. It is my understanding that the committee then recommended me unanimously for consideration by the President for nomination to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. I was invited to the White House Counsel’s Office for an interview on February 20, 2008, at which time I met with staff from the White House Counsel’s Office and from the Department of Justice. Since that time, I have had conversations with staff from the Department of Justice regarding nomination paperwork and the process in general. After completion of all the pre-nomination paperwork, my nomination was submitted to the United States Senate on April 30, 2008.
b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No one involved in the process of selecting me as a judicial nominee discussed with me any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning my position on such case, issue, or question.
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
NOMINATION FILING

1. Person Reporting (Last name, First, Middle Initial)
   Aueda, Michael M

2. Court or Organization
   California, Southern District

3. Date of Report
   5/2/2008

4. Title (If Article III judges indicate active or senior status; associate judge indicates full or part time)
   District Judge - Nominee

5a. Report Type (Check appropriate type)
   - Nomination
   - Initial
   - Annual
   - Final
   Date 4/30/2008

5b. Amended Report
   - No
   - Yes
   Date 4/30/2008

6. Chambers or Office Address
   San Diego Superior Court
   220 West Broadway
   San Diego, CA 92101

7. On the basis of the information contained in this Report and any
   modifications permitting disclosure, it is, in my opinion, in compliance
   with applicable laws and regulations.

   Reviewing Officer: ____________________________ Date: ____________

I. POSITIONS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 9-12 of instructions.)

   X NONE (No reportable positions.)

   POSITION
   NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY

   1. ____________________________________________________________________________
   2. ____________________________________________________________________________
   3. ____________________________________________________________________________
   4. ____________________________________________________________________________
   5. ____________________________________________________________________________

II. AGREEMENTS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 18-19 of instructions.)

   X NONE (No reportable agreements.)

   DATE
   PARTIES AND TERMS

   1. ____________________________________________________________________________
   2. ____________________________________________________________________________
   3. ____________________________________________________________________________
### FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

**Page 2 of 6**

**III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME.** (Reporting individual and spouse, see pp. 17-21 for instructions.)

A. **Filer’s Non-Investment Income**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME (you, not spouse)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2008</td>
<td>San Diego Superior Court, salary</td>
<td>$18,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2007</td>
<td>San Diego Superior Court, salary</td>
<td>$175,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2006</td>
<td>San Diego Superior Court, salary</td>
<td>$154,320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. **Spouse’s Non-Investment Income** – If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, complete this section. (Deadline not required except for lawsuits.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. REIMBURSEMENTS

- Transportation, lodging, food, entertainment,
- (Include those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 23-27 for instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>EXEMPT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. GIFTS. (Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 20-31 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>EXEMPT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI. LIABILITIES. (Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 32-34 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA Savings Bank</td>
<td>Credit Card</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Express</td>
<td>Credit Card</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citibank</td>
<td>Credit Card</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chase Home Finance</td>
<td>Second Mortgage</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Bank of Calif.</td>
<td>Overdraft Credit Line</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS – income, value, transactions (include those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-37 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Asset (including type and asset)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value as of end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
<th>E. Transaction from prior disclosures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Placed &quot;EI&quot; after asset name except from prior disclosures</td>
<td>(1) Code (2) Value (3) Date of (4) Code (5) Date of (6) Code (7) Value (8) Date Month Day</td>
<td>(1) Code (2) Value (3) Date of (4) Code (5) Value (6) Date Month Day</td>
<td>(1) Code (2) Value (3) Date of (4) Code (5) Value (6) Date Month Day</td>
<td>(1) Code (2) Value (3) Date of (4) Code (5) Value (6) Date Month Day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Rental Property
2. AT&T Common Stock
3. Chevron Common Stock
4. General Electric Common Stock
5. IDEARC Common Stock
6. PPG Indus Stock
7. Verizon Common Stock
8. Alford Laci Stock

---

1. Income Data Codes:
2. Value Codes:
3. Value Method Codes:

VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00585 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS.

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it was applicable statutory provisions pertaining non-disclosure.

I further certify that current income from outside employment and businesses and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 et seq., 18 U.S.C. § 1933, and Judicial Conference regulations.

[Signature]

[Date]

NOTE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FALSIFIED OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (18 U.S.C. § 1505)
FINANCIAL STATEMENT
NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trust, investments, and other financial holdings) all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable:</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dvotiefi</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable-add schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-add schedule</td>
<td>Chastel mortgages and other liens payable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td>Other debts-tenure:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autos and other personal property</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash value-life insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets itemize:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total liabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net Worth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets</td>
<td>2 448 373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total liabilities and net worth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTINGENT LIABILITIES
GENERAL INFORMATION

As endorser, cosigner or guarantor  Are any assets pledged? (Add schedule): NO
On leases or contracts             Are you defendant in any suits or legal actions? NO
Legal Claims                       Have you ever taken bankruptcy? NO
Provision for Federal Income Tax   Other special debt
**FINANCIAL STATEMENT**

**NET WORTH SCHEDULES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Listed Securities</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T</td>
<td>$ 2,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chevron</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>44,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEARC</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPG</td>
<td>48,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verizon</td>
<td>13,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcatel Lucent</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Listed Securities</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 143,373</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real Estate Owned</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>$1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental property</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Real Estate Owned</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 2,200,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real Estate Mortgages Payable</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>$344,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental property</td>
<td>283,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Real Estate Mortgages Payable</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 628,100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AFFIDAVIT

I, Michael M. Anello, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

5-12-08

(Date)

Michael Anello

(NAME)

CALIFORNIA JURAT WITH AFFIANT STATEMENT

☐ See Attached Document (Notary to cross out lines 1-6 below)
☐ See Statement Below (Lines 1-5 to be completed only by document signer[s], not Notary)

Michael Anello

Signature of Document Signer No. 1

Signature of Document Signer No. 2 if any

State of California

County of San Diego

Subscribed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me on this 12th day of May, 2008, by

Michael Anello

Notary Public

Commission No. 121262

Notary Public - California

San Diego County

My Commission Expires Oct 13, 2001

(proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person who appeared before me (1) (2)

(3)________________________

(4)________________________

(proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person who appeared before me.)

Signature

Confidentiality
Chairman LEAHY. Well, if I might ask the same question I asked before—and it is the sort of thing that I think all of us have in mind when we vote on a lifetime judgeship. This is an area where you are outside of politics. It is the undemocratic part, and rightly so, the undemocratic branch of our three branches of Government.

If you walk into a courtroom, if you have any respect for our Federal courts around the Nation, you have to walk in and think, okay, I am going to be treated the same as the person on the other side; my race, my color, my creed, plaintiff, defendant, wealth, non-wealth, it is not going to make a difference.

Can you give that assurance that when somebody comes in and sees you sitting there as the judge, they are not going to say, “We are in trouble,” but, rather, “We are going to get a fair hearing”? 

Judge ANELLO. I can certainly give you that assurance without qualification, Senator. I have endeavored to do that through the 10 years plus that I have been sitting on the State court, and should I be fortunate enough to be appointed to this position, I would hope to continue that. So I certainly agree with that and those sentiments 100 percent.

Chairman LEAHY. Have you had occasion to do things where you would show your commitment to equal treatment of people?

Judge ANELLO. Well, I have. Like, I would say, most lawyers, I have volunteered to perform legal services for indigent people as a public service. In my many years in the military—I remained in the Marine Corps Reserve after getting off active duty—one of our missions was to provide legal assistance to the young semi-indigent, unfortunately, men and women of the Marine Corps. And we would go to the local bases on Saturdays. With some notice they would show up. We would do the best we could to help them deal with their personal and legal problems. So that is one thing that we did often over the years throughout my entire military reserve career.

Chairman LEAHY. I like to think the country has reached a point where people are treated the same. I think of the stories I remember from my maternal grandparents when they emigrated to this country from Italy, and having difficulty first with the language and treated differently. And some of the things they had to put up with even as they established a business and then helped many others who were not able to get the kind of—or who were being treated much the same. I like to think in our State that is no longer the case. But I think that immigrants’ rights are extremely important. You do not think of Vermont so much as being a State with that, although we share a border with Canada. My parents-in-law emigrated from Canada, had to learn a new language, as did my grandparents and my mother.

You are in San Diego. One only needs to look at the map. Can you assure people who come into your court, the Federal district court, that they are going to be treated fairly, whether it is an immigration or a civil case?

Judge ANELLO. I can certainly give you that assurance, Senator. You are correct. Obviously, we are a border State. We have immigration issues. We have not dealt with them so much in the State court. Certainly, if I were fortunate enough to be confirmed to the Southern District Court, we would deal with those issues on a more
daily basis. But certainly you have my assurance that, if confirmed, I would agree 100 percent with those sentiments and act accordingly.

Chairman Leahy. And you heard Mr. Waddoups' comments before about the need to recuse oneself to preserve the integrity of the court. Now, you might have a case that would come to Federal court for post-conviction relief or something like from the court you now sit on. That should be fairly easy, I would assume. But do you agree with what Mr. Waddoups said about protecting the integrity of the court and the appearance of conflicts?

Judge Anello. I do absolutely, and the appearance aspect of that, of course, is most important for the citizenry to retain their respect for the courts. Obviously, the appearance is important. Again, I have faced those issues over the past 10 years, and I have not found it difficult. But as Mr. Waddoups says, if someone appears before me who is a former client, that is pretty easy; a former law partner, that is pretty easy. Where it gets a little dicey is someone who perhaps is a friend, a casual friend. So we try to draw lines there, make whatever disclosures are necessary. But as he also indicates, and as I agree, we also are duty-bound and required to try cases that come before us unless there is a real reason to recuse.

Chairman Leahy. Well, disclosure is always a very good thing. I mean, you can—certainly in my own years of practice, we would have the kind of friends or associations, a neighbor or whatever, and matters that would come up. And when the court has made the disclosure, it is not unusual to have the lawyers on both sides say we have discussed this with our clients and we have no problem. And it certainly takes care of the problem later on when somebody says, “Well, wait a minute. I lost.”

Senator Hatch, did you want to—

Senator Hatch. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Leahy. And I would assume you would say the same to the earlier question that no one is above the law, not the President, not a judge, not a U.S. Senator.

Judge Anello. Absolutely. We have a rule of law, not a rule of man. Absolutely, I agree 100 percent.

Chairman Leahy. Thank you very, very much.

Ms. Scriven, we have already put the letter of support in from Senator Martinez for you. You spent 11 years serving as a magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, taught contracts, banking law, associate professor at Stetson University College of Law; partner at the Tampa, Florida, law firm of Carlton Fields; graduate of Duke, Florida State.

Do you have members of your family here with you?

STATEMENT OF MARY STENSON SCRIVEN, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Judge Scriven. Thank you, Senator Leahy. Yes, I do. Chairman, I have with me almost my entire family. I have my parents, who are here from Georgia: Reverend Marshell Stenson and Dr. Mary Stenson, if they would stand.

I have my younger brother, Joel Stenson and his wife, Kartika Stenson.
I have my dear friend, Jaye Ann Terry; a friend of the family and a colleague, Fred McClure; and a young guy that my husband has mentored, Romeo Domdii Cliff, who is also here. He lives here in D.C.

And last, but not least, I have my immediate family. I have my daughter, 15-year-old Sarah; and Charles, who is enjoying a day out of school but getting an education nonetheless.

[Laughter.]

Chairman LEAHY. I bet you he hated to miss school today.

Judge SCRIVEN. And I have my husband of 20 years and my best friend, Lansing Scriven, who is an attorney in Tampa, Florida.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. Did you want to give any opening statement?

Judge SCRIVEN. I just want to say, as my colleagues have already said, that I am honored and humbled by the opportunity to be here. I thank the Chairman and the Committee for convening this hearing. I thank the home-State Senators, Senator Martinez and Senator Nelson, for working together across lines to bring this nomination forward. And I thank the President for nominating me for what I hope will be a confirmation to serve as United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida.

[The biographical information follows.]
585

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).

Mary Stenson Scriven
Mary Adrienne Stenson (maiden name)

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.

United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.

United States District Court
801 North Florida Avenue
Tampa, Florida 33602

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.

1962; Atlanta, Georgia

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.

I am married to Lansing Charles Scriven. He is an attorney employed in his own law firm, Lansing C. Scriven, P.A. His firm address is 442 W. Kennedy Blvd. Suite 280, Tampa, Florida 33606.

We have three dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.

1984-1987, Florida State University College of Law; J.D. with High Honors, 1987

Summer 1985, Oxford University; Certificate of Matriculation

7. Employment Record: List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

12/97 – Present
U. S. District Court, Middle District of Florida
801 North Florida Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33602
Magistrate Judge

08/96 – 12/97
Stetson University College of Law
1401 61st Street South, St. Petersburg, Florida 33707
Associate Professor

08/87 – 12/97
Carlton Fields
4221 West Boycecout Blvd., Tampa, Florida 33607
Shareholder (4/95 – 12/97)
Associate Attorney (8/87 – 4/95)

01/87 – 05/87
Huey Guilday Kursteiner Tucker
1983 Centre Pointe Blvd., #200, Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Intern

5/86 – 6/86
Carlton Fields
4221 West Boycout Blvd., Tampa, Florida 33607
Summer associate

8/85 – 5/86
Florida House Majority Office
411 East College Avenue, Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Intern

4/85 – 6/85
Florida State University College of Law
425 West Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32306
Research Assistant

12/83 – 7/84
Bibb County Board of Education
1710 Canterbury Road, Macon, Georgia 31206
Substitute teacher
8. **Military Service and Draft Status:** Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

I have not had any military service.

9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

Stetson University College of Law Honorary Doctor of Laws
Outstanding Service to the Spring of Tampa Bay, Inc., (2007)
Lifetime Public Service Award (Hillsborough Association of Women Lawyers, 2000)
"First" Award (Florida Association of Women Lawyers, 2001)
Distinguished "First" Award (Judicial Council of Florida Chapter of the NBA, 2002)
Distinguished Service Award (Tampa Bay Federal Agencies, 2002)
President's Award (for outstanding service to the George Edgecomb Bar Association)
Woman of Distinction (Suncoast Girl Scouts)
Florida Legal Services Award (The Florida Bar/Florida Bar Foundation Joint Commission on the Delivery of Legal Services to the Indigent in Florida)
Equal Opportunity Award (Tampa Urban League)
One of the Most Inspirational Professors (voted by Stetson Law School Students, Fall 1996)
Guest lecturer (five day summer segment) - Nottingham Law Institute (Nottingham, England) Masters program in Advanced Litigation (Trial and Advocacy skills)
Francisco Rodriguez Award, George Edgecomb Bar Association (lifetime achievement award in law practice)
Proclamation of Service - Hillsborough County Bar Association
Key to the City of Macon, Georgia (2000)

**FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW:**
High Honors graduate
University Fellowship (Full academic scholarship, tuition and stipend)
  - William-Blank-David Miller Scholarship
  - Book Award - Supreme Court Role Playing (highest grade in class)
  - Virgil Hawkins Fellowship
Selected first annual student graduation speaker (law school commencement)
  - Orin Sagle Oxford Fellowship
  - Order of Barristers (Excellence and High Honors, Art of Courtroom Advocacy)

**DUKE UNIVERSITY:**
  - Cum Laude graduate (Duke University)
  - President's Leadership Award (Duke University)
  - Chief Justice Judiciary Council (Duke University)
10. **Bar Associations**: List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

**NATIONAL**

- Federal Magistrate Judges Association
  - Executive Board (President-Elect 2008-2009, Treasurer 2007-2008, Secretary 2006-2007);
  - Board of Directors (11th Circuit Elected Representative 2005);
  - National Convention Committee FMJA (Chair 2005-2006)
- American Inns of Court (1994-Present)
- General Litigation Section, American Bar Association (1987-2003)
- Women's Law Division, National Bar Association (1994)
- Minority Partners in Majority Firms Section, National Bar Association (1994)

**STATE**

- Florida Bar (1987-Present)
- Florida Bar Foundation (Board of Directors; Executive Committee; Chairperson, Law Students Assistance Committee; Programs Grant Committee) (1989-1996)
- Florida Chapter of the National Bar Association (1989-2005)
- Florida Association for Women Lawyers
- The Florida Bar/Florida Bar Foundation Joint Commission on the Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor (1994)
- US District Court, Middle District of Florida (Chair, Education Committee; CM/ECF Implementation Committee; Court Rules Committee)

**LOCAL**

- Master/Former President, Cheatwood Inn of Court (formerly William Glenn Terrell Inn of Court) (1999-Present)
- Executive Board - Secretary, Hillsborough County Bar Association (1994-1995);
- Elected Board Member, Hillsborough County Bar Association (1995-1997)
- Hillsborough County Bar Foundation (1999-2007)
- President, Hillsborough Association for Women Lawyers (1994-1995)
- Vice President for Programs, Hillsborough Association for Women Lawyers (1992-1993)
- Newsletter Chairperson, Hillsborough Association for Women Lawyers (1991-1992)
- Board Member/Member, Hillsborough Association for Women Lawyers (1991-2007)
- Racial, Ethnic and Gender Bias Committee, Hillsborough County Bar Association (1993-1996)
Availability of Legal Services Committee, Hillsborough County Bar Association (1994-1996)
Hillsborough County Bar Association Long Range Planning Committee (1994-1995)

11. Bar and Court Admission:

a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapse(s) in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

Florida Bar; December 30, 1987

There has been no lapse in membership. I am presently in Judge status, not eligible to practice law.

b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

Florida Supreme Court and all Florida state courts 1987
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida 1988
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 1994
Supreme Court of the United States 2006

There has been no lapse in membership.

12. Memberships:

a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

Tampa Bay Performing Arts Center Board of Trustees (1990-1992)
Leadership Tampa Class of 1994; Alumni Board of Directors (1995)
Leadership Florida Class of 1995; Board of Regents (1996)
The Athena Society (1992-1994) (Chair of Retreat Committee 1994); Executive Vice President - Membership (1996-1997); Executive Board 2006-2008; President 2008
Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce Governmental Affairs Board of Directors (1993-1994)
Board of Directors, National Conference (1994)
Boys and Girls Club of Greater Tampa (Board Member 1987-1988)
Junior League of Tampa (1992-1994) (Provisional Project Chair -- Revitalization of the Children's Advocacy Center, a video witness facility for victims of child abuse)
Black American Law Students Association (1984-1987)
The Tampa Club Board of Directors (1995-1997)
First Baptist Church of West Tampa Education Committee, Children's Church Chair (1996-1999)
New Hope Missionary Baptist Church (1999-2007)
Grace Family Church (2007-Present)
Member, Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc. (2003-2004)
Co-Chairperson, Chair Emeritus, Board Member, Board of Directors
The Spring of Tampa Bay, Inc. (1999-present)

b. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

Neither of these organizations discriminates against anyone on the basis of race, sex or religion and have not as long as I have been a member. I am not aware of their ever having discriminated at any time in the past. The only exception is the national service sorority, Alpha Kappa Alpha, Inc., which, as a sorority, admits only women.

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

I have no such writings.

b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

I have not participated in the preparation of reports, memoranda or policy statements; and therefore, I have no documents responsive to this request.
c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

I have not given any testimony, official statements or other communications related to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, other than written orders; and therefore, I have no documents responsive to this regard.

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

I have spoken on numerous panels and given speeches to various local voluntary bar and civic associations over the past twenty-seven (27) years.

Effective Written Advocacy – date unknown
Stetson University College of Law Commencement Address – May 13, 2006
Speech to youth group on federal criminal law – date unknown
Tribute to Judge Joseph Hatchett upon his retirement – April 1999
When the Judge is both Judge and Jury: Effective Advocacy Before the Bench – several occasions 2007-2008
Unity Day Speech: Celebration of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies – date unknown
Stetson Law Intern Address - date unknown
St. Pete Times and Poynter Institute Scholarship Banquet - date unknown
Villa Madonna 8th Grade Commencement - date unknown
Speech for local youth group - date unknown
Stetson University Conclave: Role of the Bar in Promoting Professionalism – November 22, 1996

In addition, I have hosted various school groups in court and conducted mock trials with the students. I have not retained copies or transcripts of those talks. Finally, I can recall generally having given the following speeches or presentations. Although I have not retained copies or notes, I can recall generally the contents as set forth below.

MIMS Graduating Seniors: Find your Tree House and Get in it; May 2006
Holland & Knight Law Firm 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 4100 Tampa, FL 33602
This was an Inspirational talk to high school graduates about finding their own life’s purpose and striving to attain success in it.
Stetson University College of Law; May 2007
Stetson University College of Law Gulfport Campus
1401 61st Street South Gulfport, FL 33707
This was a panel discussion about balancing life with the practice law presented by myself and my husband, Lanse Scriven.

When the Judge is both Judge and Jury: Effective Advocacy Before the Bench; Various (last date – Spring 2008) presentations to local bar associations:
Hillsborough County Bar Association; Carrollwood Bar Association, Saady & Saxe, P.A. 205 Crystal Grove Boulevard Lutz, FL 33548; Cheathamwood Inns of Court c/o Wayne Thomas, 707 N. Franklin Street, Suite #10, Tampa, FL 33602;
George Edgecomb Bar Association c/o Julie Sned, Fowler White 501 E.
Kennedy Blvd., Suite 1700 Tampa, FL 33602

American Bar Association, Section of Labor and Employment Law; April 6-9, 2005; The Registry Resort, Naples, Florida
Panel discussion: View from the bench on developments in employment law and best practices.

Academy Prep Center of Tampa, Inc. (Preparatory Middle School for Minority and Disadvantaged Students - 1407 East Columbus Drive, Tampa, Florida, 33605); January 22, 2008; Panel discussion with other federal and state judges on becoming and serving as a judge.

e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

I have not given any substantive interviews to media outlets. I have been asked to comment on a colleague who was featured in a public interest piece; a copy of that profile is attached. I have been featured in articles and periodicals, and in that context have, on occasion, been quoted by the writer of the profile.

14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

I have served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the Middle District of Florida since December 1997. I was reappointed on unanimous consent of the Court in December 2004. This is an appointed position, appointed by the District Judges of the District.

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

As a magistrate judge in the Middle District of Florida, I carry a caseload of approximately 430 civil cases and well over 123 criminal cases. As a result, I
issue opinions on a constant basis. I have not maintained a list of all of those opinions. By searching both Lexis and Westlaw, I am able to provide the attached list of opinions that have been published in some manner.

b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

Petition for writ of certiorari was requested by the plaintiff in R. J. Fitzgerald & Co., Inc v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004). The petition for writ of certiorari was denied.

c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

I can only recall two instances in my 11 year career in which my decision has been reversed by an appellate court. They are cited below:


St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Sea Quest International, Inc., case no. 8:00-cv-00571-MSS. Affirmed in part and reversed in part, the 11th Circuit opinion is found at case no. 02-12248.

d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

None to my knowledge.

e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

I have not maintained any statistics or information that would allow me to determine the percentage of my decisions which are published or unpublished. However, beginning in July of 2004, the Middle District of Florida became an "electronic" court. This means that regardless of whether a decision is considered published or unpublished, it is available for review on the Court's electronic docket.

f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

None.
16. **Reculal:** if you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

I am not aware of any instance in which a litigant requested that I recuse myself from a case. Upon taking the bench in 1997, I recused myself sua sponte from all cases in which my former firm, Carlton Fields, was counsel as well as all cases in which my husband’s former firm, Trenam Kemker, was counsel. That order of recusal remained in place for five years for my former firm and until all financial ties were severed between my husband and his former law firm. Currently, I maintain an automatic recusal on all cases involving Tampa General Hospital, on whose board my husband serves, and all cases in which my husband is involved in any way.

In our court, it is a non-waivable conflict for a judge to sit on a case if he or she has a financial interest in a party or in a company that is wholly owned or operated by such party. Judges provide information concerning such interest to the clerk of the court and recusal is automatic. To the extent that a case is filed that system would automatically assign the case to another judge.

17. **Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:**

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

I was appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Florida Senate to serve a two-year term on the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council in 1993.
b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

Legislative Assistant (student intern) for the House Majority Office of the Florida House of Representatives 8/85–5/86

18. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

   i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

      I did not serve as a clerk to a judge.

   ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

      I have not practiced alone.

   iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

      12/97 – Present
      U. S. District Court, Middle District of Florida
      801 North Florida Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33602
      Magistrate Judge

      08/96 – 12/97
      Stetson University College of Law
      1401 61st Street South, St. Petersburg, Florida 33707
      Associate Professor

      08/87 – 12/97
      Carlton Fields
      4221 West Boylston Blvd., Tampa, Florida 33607
      Shareholder (4/95 – 12/97)
      Associate Attorney (8/87 – 4/95)

b. Describe:

   i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.
During my career as an attorney at Carlton Fields, my practice consisted of complex commercial litigation. The character of my practice remained consistent throughout my tenure.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

My clients consisted primarily of government entities, including the FDIC, FSLIC, RTC, and county and state agencies. Additionally, I represented corporate entities, exemplars being financial institutions, Fortune 500 companies, and the like. On occasion, I represented individuals and smaller closely-held corporations and privately owned companies. The primary focus of my practice was banking litigation and professional malpractice litigation.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 80%
   2. state courts of record: 20%
   3. other courts.

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings: 100%
   2. criminal proceedings.

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

I tried two cases to verdict or judgment, one as associate counsel and one as sole counsel.

i. What percentage of these trials were:
   1. jury: 50%
   2. non-jury: 50%

c. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

None
19. Litigation: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

a. the date of representation;

b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and

c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

1. FDIC v. Kearney—In 1995, I tried this case along with two of my former law partners. It was a six-week jury trial before Judge Ralph Nimmons. I was responsible for the preparation and examination of all government regulatory witnesses, the government’s chief banking expert and the government’s damages expert. Additionally, I was primarily responsible for oversight and/or drafting of all legal memoranda and arguing all major motions other than the FDIC’s directed verdict motion. As well, I presented the government’s closing rebuttal. As a result of this trial, the FDIC obtained a $62 million jury verdict on each of its two alternative claims, which was reduced by the comparative fault of non-present co-defendants and other substantial settlements obtained prior to trial. The case was appealed. I had primary responsibility for all negotiations and mediations on behalf of the client through the Eleventh Circuit mediation office. The malpractice case, the related insurance coverage case, and the Eleventh Circuit appeal were settled in April 1997. This case also applied for the first time in Florida the then newly established Supreme Court limits on the FDIC’s comparative liability for bank failures.

This case is also significant because it lasted approximately 10 years in litigation. It was one of a series of cases arising from a single bank failure, and though it was hotly contested on all fronts, I developed strong professional relationships with many of the opposing counsel, as well as other in-house counsel and outside counsel for the FDIC.

LAWYERS
Hendrick Milne (opposing counsel)
1244 Sorolla Avenue
Ste. 1980
Miami, Florida 33134
(305) 373-6600

James Middleton (opposing counsel)
1301 Riverplace Boulevard
Ste. 1500
Jacksonville, Florida 32207
(904) 398-3911
2. **FDIC v. Cherry Bekaert**— I was principally responsible for all pre-trial matters in this case. It was ultimately resolved through binding arbitration. This was an accountants' malpractice case which required me to be intimately familiar with bank loan loss reserves, interest rate calculations on compounding debts, loan to value ratios, complex damage calculations and the like. I worked with our banking and damages experts and our FDIC forensic accountants in developing the case theory. Several reported decisions on important discovery issues flowed from that case, and I was principally responsible for preparing the memoranda for the FDIC. See **FDIC v. Cherry Bekaert and Holland**, 742 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Fla. 1990); **FDIC v. CBH**, 131 F.R.D. 596 (M.D. Fla. 1990); **FDIC v. CBH**, 131 F.R.D. 202 (M.D. Fla. 1990); **FDIC v. CBH**, 129 F.R.D. 188 (M.D. Fla. 1989). The matter was resolved through binding arbitration presided over by John Upchurch.

**LAWYERS**
Elizabeth Sara "Sally" Gere (opposing counsel)
2001 K Street N.W.
Washington, District of Columbia 20006-1040
(202) 662-2005

Jack Gerstein (opposing counsel)
2001 K Street N.W.
Washington, District of Columbia 20006-1040
(202) 662-6000

3. **RTC v. Refco** — This was a securities litigation matter that I handled as Chief Counsel. It was litigated by Carlton Fields after the initial counsel was removed from the case. We obtained a favorable settlement after a successful summary judgment on key legal issues. I was principally responsible for preparing the legal memoranda in the case and negotiating the settlement.

**LAWYERS**
Paul Dengel
Schiff Hardin LLP
6600 Sears Tower
Chicago, Illinois 60606-6473
(312) 258-5500

In addition to the cases above, which I litigated, the following cases are significant cases over which I presided as a United States Magistrate Judge:

1. I presided over the non-jury trial of **Teamsters Local Union No. 444 v. Coca-Cola Company**. The action arose out of the consummation of an Asset Purchase Agreement between the Defendant and another company related to one of Defendant's citrus plant. Plaintiff, a union that formerly represented employees employed by Defendant at the
plant, initiated this action for damages pursuant to the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the "WARN Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq., claiming that Defendant failed to provide the employees represented by the Plaintiff sixty days advance notice of the consummation of the Asset Purchase Agreement. Prior to the trial, I issued an order on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment and found in favor of the Plaintiff on the issue of whether the Defendant was liable for failing to provide WARN notice to those employees not hired by the other company. I further found that the Defendant was not liable for failing to provide notice to the employees hired by the other company. The remaining issue for trial related to damages. After the close of the Defendant's case but prior to closing arguments, the parties requested a continuance of closing arguments until the following morning and amicably resolved the case the next day.

LAWYERS
Thomas Pilacek
Red Willow Plaza
5844 Red Bug Lake Road
Winter Springs, Florida 32708-5011
(407) 660-9595

Martin R. Raskin
2601 S. Bayshore Drive
Ste. 600
Miami, Florida 33133
(305) 444-3400

Elizabeth Finn Johnson
Coca Cola Company
P.O. Box 1734
Atlanta, Georgia 30301
(404) 676-3736

2. I presided over the trial of Messer v. GATX. Mr. Messer alleged that the Defendant denied him training and promotional opportunities because of his sex and ultimately laid him off due to his sex and age. He further claimed that Defendant suggested that another company not hire him in retaliation for his having filed an EEOC charge. At the close of the Plaintiff's case, I entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Defendant on Plaintiff's claims of age discrimination and retaliation. The parties amicably settled the matter the following morning before the start of the Defendant's case.

LAWYERS
Christie Arkovich
1520 W. Cleveland Street
Tampa, Florida 33606
(813) 258-2808

William Radford
Ford & Harrison LLP
100 SE 2nd Street
3. In April 1999, I entered a Report and Recommendation on a Joint Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to foreclose a preferred ship mortgage in an admiralty action styled Madeleine L.L.C. v. The M/V Sea. Various parties filed intervening complaints in rem seeking payment for services they provided to the M/V Sea. The issue in the motion related to the priority of liens as between two companies that provided architectural services to the M/V Sea. I found that the two companies provided necessaries to a vessel and said necessaries were provided in the United States. I therefore concluded that the architectural companies had necessaries liens pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a), and that their liens primed Madeleine's preferred mortgage liens. The parties later consented to have me conduct the non-jury trial. Several of the parties settled prior to trial. The remaining parties settled amicably at the conclusion of the first day of the trial.

LAWYERS
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Henry H. Bolz, III
Keller & Bolz LLP
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Coral Gables, Florida 33134
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Morgan L. Gaynor
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Clearwater, Florida 33763
(727) 725-7661

David F. Pope
Fowler White Boggs Banker PA
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4. In January 2005, I presided over the trial in Bogacki v. Buccaneers Limited in which the Plaintiff asserted a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act alleging failure to pay overtime and retaliation. After a week long trial, the jury found for the Defendant on the retaliation claim and awarded the Plaintiff $36.68 on her overtime claim.
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LAWYERS
Ronald Fraley
Fraley & Fraley Law Firm, P.A.
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Ste. 1200
Tampa, Florida 33602
(813) 229-8300

Thomas Gonzalez
Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez
501 E. Kennedy Blvd.
Ste. 1400
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(813) 273-0950

5. In January 2005, I presided over White v. Purdue Pharma, Inc., a two week jury trial in which Plaintiff asserted a Florida Whistle-blower/wrongful termination claim. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered an adverse employment action when she complained about the Defendant pharmaceutical company’s sales and marketing strategies used in the distribution of OxyContin. The matter involved a number of significant legal issues resulting in the entry of several substantive orders, one of which is published and has been cited favorably. (White v. Purdue Pharma, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2005)). The jury returned a defense verdict.

LAWYERS
Robert F. McKee
Kelly & McKee, P.A.
1718 E. 7th Ave.
Ste. 301
Tampa, Florida 33605
(813) 248-6400

Patricia Lowry
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, LLP
1900 Phillips Point West
777 S. Flagler Dr.
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
(561) 650-7214

David Spector
222 Lakeview Ave.
Ste. 210
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
(561) 659-1911

6. In February 2005, I presided over a jury trial in IMPORT A.N.T. Inc. v. C. Haven Imports, LLC, which was brought by a distributor of a foreign beer against another distributor Plaintiff contended was infringing on its exclusive territory. Plaintiff asserted
a claim for tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship and violations of the Florida Beer Distributors Act. Because of the relative obscurity of the Act, this case also involved novel legal issues, requiring construction of the applicable statutes. The matter was tried over a week, but settled after several trial rulings before a jury verdict could be reached.

LAWYERS
Peter C. Koch
Gardner Carton & Douglas LLC
191 N. Wacker Dr.
Ste 3700
Chicago, IL 60606-1698
(312) 569-1376

John Koda
Boone, Boone, Boone, Koda & Frook, P.A.
1001 Avenida del Circo
Venice, Florida 34285
(941) 488-6716

Jeffrey Bergman
Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd.
30 S. Wacker Dr.
Chicago, IL 60606-7484
(312) 207-1000

Niziol v. Pasco Co. District – I presided over this matter, resolving it on jurisdictional grounds after extensive briefings and hearings. The case involved an accidental shooting by a student of another student who had brought a gun to school. The suit was brought by the deceased student’s parent against school officials. Ultimately, I entered judgment on behalf of the Defendants, finding, among other grounds, that the Defendants were immune from suit under federal law.

LAWYERS
J. Meredith Wester
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Dennis J. Alfonso
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Dade City, Florida 33526
(352) 567-5636
20. **Legal Activities**: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organization(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

As a United States Magistrate Judge I have presided over approximately twenty-five Bench and Jury Trials (excluding evidentiary hearings and criminal proceedings numbering more than 300). I have served over 4000 hours in active Federal Court proceedings, including 217 Settlement Conferences.

While on the court I have served in various capacities, on the district, circuit and national levels. Those positions are described below.

In March 2008, I was appointed by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, Director Duff, to serve on the Advisory Group of Magistrate Judges, which provides assistance to the Director and to the Magistrate Judges Division in preparation for meetings of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System.

I was elected in 2005 and 2006 by the full membership of the Federal Magistrate Judges Association to serve as the Secretary and the Treasurer, respectively, on the national organization's Executive Board.

Additionally, in 2005, I was appointed by the President of the FMJA to chair the national convention committee of the Board. In this position, I was responsible for overseeing the planning, programming and budgeting for the annual convention, which was held in New York.

I was elected in 2003 by the Magistrate Judges of the Eleventh Circuit to serve as the representative for the Circuit on the Board of Directors for the Federal Magistrate Judges Association ("FMJA"). In this capacity, I presided over meetings of the Magistrate Judges during circuit conferences, and I attended the Board meetings of the FMJA to develop policy and direct the activities of the FMJA.

I was also appointed in 1999 by then Chief Judge Joseph Hatchett to serve on the planning and implementation Committee which planned and hosted the Eleventh Circuit Judicial conference in Marco Island, Florida.

Locally, I have served for the past four years as the EEO coordinator for the Middle District of Florida, overseeing the Court’s response to any complaint or request for counseling concerning allegations of discrimination in the workplace by any of the agencies of the Court or Court employees.

I served as chair of the Judicial Education Committee for three years, 2005-2007. My responsibilities included planning education programs for judicial officers and planning
our annual meetings. These meetings included substantive educational programs on
issues such as judicial ethics, sentencing guidelines, preservation of Court history
through oral and written material and management of inmates in the Bureau of Prisons.
The meetings have been held throughout the district including in St. Augustine, Orlando,
Naples, the Coleman Federal Corrections Facility, and Amelia Island.

Additionally, I serve or have served on the Court’s CM/ECF Implementation Committee,
the Magistrate Judges Advisory Committee, the Court’s Rules Committee, the Judicial
Resources Committee and the Case Management Committee.

In addition to the aforementioned matters, I consider my service to the court as a
mediator to be a significant contribution to the Administration of Justice by the Court.
As one of only two magistrate judges serving as mediators here in Tampa, I have
mediated over 200 cases, with settlements achieved in approximately 85% of those
cases. These matters range from substantial commercial disputes with multi-million
dollar demands after prior unsuccessful mediation attempts to simple single party suits
where the demands are small. In this context, I assist the parties in fashioning outcomes
to the litigation preserving judicial resources for criminal and civil matters for which no
amicable resolution can be reached.

21. **Teaching:** What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution
at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe
briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a
syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

I was a full time Associate Professor of Law at Stetson University College of Law from
Fall 1996 through Fall 1997. I taught Contracts, Legal Malpractice, Banking Law and
Remedies. I did not retain copies of the syllabi for those courses.

22. **Deferred Income/ Future Benefits:** List the sources, amounts and dates of all
anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted
contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business
relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or
customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the
future for any financial or business interest.

None other than my accrued pension and retirement benefits through the federal
retirement system.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments,
or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your
service with the court? If so, explain.

No

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the
calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all
salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)

See attached Financial Disclosure Report

25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

   See attached Net Worth Statement

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**
   
   a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

   The only conflict I foresee is a potential conflict in service on a case involving my husband or his law firm and the hospital board on which he sits.

   b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

   I will continue to follow the conflict procedures currently in place in the Middle District of Florida, automatically recusing from the cases described above and those that may arise in which I have a financial interest. In all circumstances, I will follow the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

   I serve and have served my community in many ways, both formally and informally, providing assistance to the disadvantaged in individual matters and in a more global fashion. I serve as Chair Emeritus of the Spring of Tampa Bay, providing guidance in the implementation of policy and community outreach to help end domestic violence in our community. I serve as a mentor through the Hillsborough Association for Women Lawyers and have served in this capacity for the University of South Florida’s Minority Student Union. I host area school children in the courthouse year round, conducting mock trials and civic lessons to impress upon them the impact that the judicial system has on their lives. I also support Stetson’s trial practices classes, holding pretrial and mediation conferences for their course requirements and hosting practices for the moot court teams preparing for competitions.
I served as a Board member of the Florida Bar Foundation continuously from 1990 – 1996. The Bar Foundation's primary responsibility is to allocate the $11 million IOTA fund to appropriate grantees, the largest single recipient group being legal services providers such as Bay Area Legal Services. In addition, I was instrumental in developing and implementing the Florida Bar Foundation Scholarship Program which through my tenure had awarded $1,160,937 in scholarships to students in Florida law schools. The Foundation augmented the program by instituting a companion mentoring program, pursuant to which all recipients of scholarship funds are paired with mentors from the legal community to enhance their law school experience and improve their chances of success in the practice of law. Similarly, my responsibility as chair of the Law Students Assistance Committee was to administer the Public Service Fellows program under which law schools offer public service opportunities for law students to encourage those students to make public service their career choice.

I also served while at Stetson as the interim faculty advisor to the Public Service Fellows. These students receive grants from the Florida Bar Foundation based upon their commitment to pursue a public service career or devote time in their law career to public service. As their advisor, I oversaw their work in several public service agencies and assisted them in their effort to encourage other law students to contribute public service hours during and after law school. In the Spring of 1997, we sponsored a public service career day which featured general private and public sector lawyers who have devoted their time to ensuring that all people have equal access to justice. I moderated the program which was attended by about 200 students and guests.

While practicing law I provided direct legal services to individual clients on a voluntary pro bono basis, for example, I handled adoptions, dissolutions of marriage, civil claims by elderly citizens against construction contractors and claims to recover state benefits.

28. Selection Process:

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

The state of Florida utilizes a Federal Judicial Nominating Commission to recommend candidates for nomination to the United States District Court. In November 2007, I submitted an application to the Judicial Nominating Commission indicating my interest in one of two positions as United States District Judge, Middle District of Florida. On December 3, 2007, I was notified that I had been selected for an interview by the Commission. I, along with approximately twelve other applicants, appeared for an interview before the full
Middle District of Florida Commission on December 17, 2007, a date that had been previously disclosed as the likely interview date. That evening, I was notified that I, along with five other candidates, had been selected by the Commission to be recommended for further consideration. Approximately two weeks later, on January 3, 2008, I was notified that the two Florida Senators were interviewing the six candidates in Washington on either January 20 or February 6, 2008. Consistent with this schedule, on February 6, 2008, I had the privilege of interviewing with the Senators from the state of Florida, Senator Nelson and Senator Martinez, as well as representatives from their offices. Thereafter, I was notified on February 19, 2008, that I would be interviewed by the staff from the White House Counsel’s Office and from the Department of Justice on March 5, 2008. That interview took place as scheduled. I was later informed by the White House that President Bush had selected my name to be forwarded for further consideration for the position of United States District Judge for one of the two vacancies in the Middle District of Florida. Since then, I have had conversations with staff from the Department of Justice regarding the nomination paperwork and the process. My nomination was forwarded to the Senate on July 10, 2008.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No
608

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
NOMINATION FILING

Report Required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978

1. Person Reporting (Last, first, middle initial)
   Srodes, Mary S

2. Court or Organization
   Florida, Middle District

3. Date of Report
   07/11/2008

4. Title of Position (If judicial, indicate court or senior status; magistrate judges indicate full- or part-time)
   District Judge - Nominee

5. Report Type (If applicable)
   Nomination
   01/01/2007
   Initial
   06/30/2008

6. Chambers or Office Address
   U.S. District Court
   801 N Habana Avenue
   Tampa, FL 33607

7. Receiving Officer

IMPORTANT NOTES: The instructions accompanying this form must be followed. Complete all parts, checking the NONE box for each part where you have no reportable information. Sign on last page.

I. POSITIONS

   NONE (No reportable positions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>The Spring of Tampa Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Federal Magistrate Judges Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. AGREEMENTS

   NONE (No reportable agreements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTIES AND TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME. (Reporting non-investment income, see pp. 13-21 of filing instructions.)

A. Filer's Non-investment Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME (years, tax schedule)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Spouse's Non-investment Income - If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, complete this section. (Specific amount not required except for bonuses.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. REIMBURSEMENTS - Transportation, lodging, food, entertainment. (Includes those in spouse and dependent children, see pp. 21-27 of filing instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>ITEMS PAID OR PROVIDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NONE (No reportable reimbursements.)
V. GIFTS. (Exclude those to spouse and dependent children; see pp. 28-30 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXEMPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI. LIABILITIES. (Exclude those of spouse and dependent children; see pp. 28-30 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets</th>
<th>E. Income during Operating Period</th>
<th>C. Gross Value at end of Operating Period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during Operating Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Account Code (A-BI)</td>
<td>(2) Type of Income, Less, or Incl.</td>
<td>(3) Value Code (C-P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mutual Fund - Seaside Scudder Tax Exempt Money Fund</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>EXEMPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mutual Fund - American Century Acti Growth Series</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Vanguard Growth Index Fund</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Harbor Adviser FD CL A</td>
<td>A Interest/Div</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Harbor Div &amp; Growth FD CL A</td>
<td>A Interest/Div</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Harbor Global Leaders FD A</td>
<td>A Interest/Div</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Harbor Highfly FD CL A</td>
<td>A Interest/Div</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Harbor Focus</td>
<td>A Interest/Div</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. AMCAP Fund</td>
<td>A Interest/Div</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Growth Fund of America</td>
<td>A Interest/Div</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Harbor Small Cap Growth</td>
<td>A Interest/Div</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The Investment Fund of America Intl Eq Cap</td>
<td>A Interest/Div</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. American Balanced Fund</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Capital Income Builder America Funds</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. The Growth Fund of America America Funds</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. American Funds Company of America</td>
<td>A Interest/Div</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. American Funds New Perspective Fund</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00619 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — income, value, transactions (Includes those of spouse and dependents. See pp. 16-44 of filing instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset (including resale value)</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>Proceeds from disposal during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Items</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Interests, Bonds, Corp. Shares</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Page 6 of 7

VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS.

Part III.A: Non-re报able income was received during the reporting period in compensation for current employment by the United States as a U.S. Magistrate Judge.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Page 7 of 7

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it was applicable statutory provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that earned income from outside employment and honoraria and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app. § 301 et. seq., 3 U.S.C. § 323, and Judicial Conference regulations.

Signature:

NOTE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FALSELY OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (18 U.S.C. APP. § 104)

FILING INSTRUCTIONS
Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:
Committee on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 2-301
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544
FINDANCIAL STATEMENT
NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-accrued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable:</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derivatives</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable-add schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-add schedule</td>
<td>Chattel mortgages and other liens payable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td>Other debts-insecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autos and other personal property</td>
<td>Student Loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash value-life insurance</td>
<td>Automobile Loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets item:</td>
<td>401(k) loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See attached</td>
<td>Policy Loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total liabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net Worth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets</td>
<td>Total liabilities and net worth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

GENERAL INFORMATION

As endorser, co-maker or guarantor Are any assets pledged? (Add schedule)
On leases or contracts Are you defendant in any suits or legal actions?
Legal Claims Have you ever taken bankruptcy?
Provision for Federal Income Tax
Other special debt
### FINANCIAL STATEMENT

#### NET WORTH SCHEDULES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Real Estate Owned</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>$ 575,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Real Estate Mortgages Payable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>$ 289,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Assets</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPL Financial IRA #1</td>
<td>$ 189,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPL Financial IRA #2</td>
<td>105,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPL Financial IRA #3</td>
<td>37,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Century</td>
<td>45,144</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAI 401(k)</td>
<td>39,918</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSP Federal</td>
<td>156,749</td>
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<tr>
<td>Law Practice NBV</td>
<td>48,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Other Assets</strong></td>
<td>$ 623,335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Attachment in response to Question 15.a. – citations for opinions written, Judge Mary S. Scriven

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Name</th>
<th>Southern Reporter</th>
<th>Lexis Citation</th>
<th>Westlaw Citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. v. Seither</td>
<td></td>
<td>2008 WL 4233580</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In re Burton Wiand</td>
<td></td>
<td>2008 WL 4800641</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwinn v. U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2008 WL 4841061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izraileva v. Chertoff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanfilippo v. Astrue</td>
<td>2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95641</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer Reinsurance Corp. v. Laurier Indem.</td>
<td>2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61714</td>
<td>2007 WL 1831775</td>
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<td>Access for the Disabled, Inc. v. Missouri Mart, Inc.</td>
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<td>Johnson v. Barnhart</td>
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<td>White v. Purdue Pharma, Inc.</td>
<td>389 F. Supp. 2d</td>
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<td>Burton v. Hillsborough County</td>
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<td>Knopfel v. Tech Data Corp.</td>
<td>225 F.R.D. 263</td>
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<td>Nizioł v. District School Bd. of Pasco County</td>
<td>240 F. Supp. 2d</td>
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<td>184 F. Supp. 2d</td>
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<td>Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. R.J. Fitzgerald &amp; Co., Inc.</td>
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<td>Gibbons v. Food Lion, Inc.</td>
<td>1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18505</td>
<td>1999 WL 1043861</td>
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AFFIDAVIT

1. Mary Stewart Searles, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

July 18, 2008  
(DATE)  

(NAME)  

Paula Lynn Ace  
(NOTARY)  
7/18/08
Chairman Leahy. Well, I appreciate that, and both Bill Nelson and Mel Martinez have talked to me privately in support, doing, as I said, what Senator Hatch and Senator Bennett have for Mr. Waddoups, and the Senators from California with Judge Anello.

Let me ask you the same thing. I walk into your court as a litigant. Can I look at a Judge Scriven—and you have your reputation as a magistrate judge, and I have gone through those cases. Can I look at you and say, “I am going to be treated the same no matter who I am, rich, poor, Democrat or Republican, white, black, Hispanic, whatever, male, female, plaintiff, defendant, am I going to be treated the same”?

Judge Scriven. There is no question, Senator, that you are going to be treated the same without respect of who you are, and I think there is a great deal of assurance in the context of my consideration here, because I have come to you as a candidate from a nonpartisan, bipartisan judicial nominating committee that has presented my name forward for consideration.

In addition to that, I have 11 years on the bench, and as a magistrate judge, you do not serve a lifetime term. You get terms. And I served one term, and then I had to be questioned and evaluated by the people who had come in front of me, and I had unanimous approval from the Retention Committee after an extenuous review in the community for the service that I had provided to the court. And I was humbled and challenged by the respect that people had shown as part of the process.

And so, yes, I think anyone coming before me could feel confident that they would be given fair and just treatment under the law.

Chairman Leahy. Judge, I looked at that retention, and I must admit I was impressed with it. Do you have any question on being able to recuse yourself? It would be an obvious case if your husband’s law firm—

Judge Scriven. He would be grateful that I would recuse myself.

[Laughter.]

Chairman Leahy. You do not want somebody coming forward in the court and instead of calling you “Judge,” and they call you “Honey,” or something like that.

Judge Scriven. He calls me “Your Honor” at home, too.

[Laughter.]

Chairman Leahy. I do not even want to get into that. I do not get called “Senator” at home, let me tell you right now.

Judge Scriven. No, seriously, Senator, I have faced the question of recusal throughout my tenure as a magistrate judge. I recused from my law firm of Carlton Fields that I had practiced for years, for the first 5 years of my tenure as a magistrate judge. And if my husband has cases before me, or his firm does, or if any—he serves, for example, on the board of the Tampa General Hospital. I do not handle cases that the hospital handles. And, more importantly, as I think you have indicated, it is not just the impropriety of serving on cases, but the appearance of impropriety that courts must observe, because lay people, more than lawyers, look to what is happening in the court and how judges comport themselves. And if we do not avoid the appearance of impropriety, it sort of falls on deaf ears when we occasionally recuse ourselves.
Chairman Leahy. And I think the appearance—the public has to—we went through this, and I do not mean to be picking on either Justice Scalia or Vice President Cheney. But I remember the dispute. Senator Lieberman had made the original complaint where Vice President Cheney and Justice Scalia were going hunting together at a time when a case involving Vice President Cheney was before the Supreme Court. And I think you have to—and courts get attacked, oftentimes unfairly, just because somebody disagrees with an opinion. To overcome those attacks, we have to be able to say these courts are impartial. We have had Members of Congress who have said we should impeach these judges because we disagreed with this decision. Of course, maybe somebody on the other side disagreed with other judges. And the reason that law is somebody sent out a press release but goes no further is that people respect our Federal judges and respect the impartiality of it. And I think that everybody who comes on the Federal bench has an enormous responsibility for that.

I have had the honor of being able to recommend both Democrats and Republicans to various Presidents to go on the Federal bench from our State. But the point I have made in my reviews of every one of them: Can you be, will you be impartial?

Now, we are a very small State, and if you are anything but impartial, it becomes pretty obvious very quickly. You are probably the fastest-growing State or one of the two fastest-growing States in the country, but it is still important because many people, the only time they will ever know about the Federal courts is when they come before you. And, obviously, this is directed at all of you because—and I am sure you all feel that way.

Did you have anything, Orrin?

Senator Hatch. No. I am just grateful to all these folks for being willing to serve, and I think we ought to introduce Mr. Garre's family as well, if you would.

Chairman Leahy. Mr. Garre, we questioned you, and you did not get a chance to mention your family, as Senator Hatch just pointed out. Would you, please, for the Garre archives?

Mr. Garre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be thrilled to do that.

I am very proud to say that my wife, Lorane Hebert, is here today, and—

Mr. Garre. Our two children: our little daughter, Natalie, who is going to be 3 in October; and our newest member, Sawyer, who is going to be 3 months later this week, who I think just wheeled in. They are really the reason I am here today, and my inspiration.

I am proud to say that my parents, Sam and Maryjo Garre, are not only here today, but celebrating their 47th wedding anniversary today.

Chairman Leahy. Congratulations. My wife and I celebrated our 46th when we were in Denver at the convention. It was not quite the way we normally would, but youngest son, whom I mentioned earlier is a Marine—a former Marine—is now a pilot for a large corporation, their jets—he flew a number of their executives out and joined us for dinner on our 46th. I am always delighted to see people with long marriages like that. I will not even give Senator
Hatch a point to point out that he has been married longer than all the rest of us—of course I will.

Senator Hatch. Well, let me just say that I really believe Marcelle deserves a medal for bearing this heavy cross all these years.

[Laughter.]

Senator Hatch. She is a wonderful person. Elaine and I celebrated our 51st wedding anniversary on August 28th, so this is a crusty old judiciary with a lot of us being married for a long time.

Chairman Leahy. Our wives are bearing the brunt.

Do you have anybody else?

Mr. Garre. I am very happy to say my sister flew here from Minneapolis to be here today, and I am grateful that many friends and mentors and colleagues in the Office of Solicitor General made time to be here today. And I am particularly grateful that you included me in this hearing and feel very privileged to be here.

Chairman Leahy. Thank you.

Chairman Leahy. Ms. Arguello, do you have family members here?

STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Ms. Arguello. Unfortunately, I did not get the news with enough time to—I was lucky to bring myself out. But I would like to—

Chairman Leahy. But you did not object to coming out.

Ms. Arguello. I did not object at all.

Chairman Leahy. Would you like to put their names in the record just so it can be—

Ms. Arguello. I would love to recognize them: my husband, Ron Arguello, husband of 34 years; my older son, Ronnie; my older daughter, Tiffany; my younger daughter, Jennifer; and my son, Kenny. And I would just like to thank them for their love, their support, and their patience with me.

Chairman Leahy. Good. And you should know that we talked about it here, but Senator Salazar was—as I said, I think he has my farmhouse in Vermont on speed dial. He was calling me from home. He was calling me from the road. He was calling me elsewhere to make sure you would be here, and I committed to him that we definitely would.

Ms. Arguello. Well, I definitely appreciate the fact that you and this Committee have taken the time in what I know is a very busy schedule.

I would also like to thank Senator Allard and Senator Salazar and President Bush for having confidence in my ability to serve them well.

[The biographical information follows.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).
   
   Christine Marie Arguello
   f/k/a Christine Marie Martinez
   a/k/a Christy Arguello, Chris Martinez, Marie Christine Martinez (birth certificate)

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.

   United States District Judge for the District of Colorado

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.

   Office: University of Colorado at Boulder
   924 Broadway, UCB 013
   Boulder, CO 80309

   Residence: Westminster, CO

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.

   1955; Thatcher, Colorado

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.

   I am married to Ronald Leroy Arguello. He is employed by Boulder Valley School District as an elementary school teacher.
   We have 3 dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.


   1973 – 1977, University of Colorado; B.S. with Special Honors, 1977
7. **Employment Record**: List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

2006 – Present
University of Colorado at Boulder
924 Broadway, 013 UCB
Boulder, Colorado 80309
Managing Senior Associate Counsel

2004 – 2006
Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP
1550 17th Street, Suite 500
Denver, Colorado 80202
Equity Partner

2003 – 2004
Duncan Green Brown & Langeness, P.C.
600 17th Street, Suite 2800 South
Denver, Colorado 80202
Shareholder &Managing Partner

2003
University of Denver College of Law
2255 East Evans Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80208
Visiting Professor

1999 – 2002
Colorado Attorney General’s Office
1525 Sherman Street, 5th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80203

1999 – 2002
University of Colorado School of Law
Campus Box 401
Boulder, Colorado 80309
Adjunct Professor (Spring 2002, 2001, and 2000)
Visiting Professor (Spring 1999)
1991 – 1999
The University of Kansas School of Law
Green Hall, 15th Street & Burdick
Lawrence, Kansas 66045
Full Professor (1998 – 1999)
Associate Professor (1991 – 1998)

1991 - 1997
Professional Fee Examiners, Inc.
6452 E. Bates Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80222
Vice-President of Legal (part-time) (1996 – 1997)

1985 – 1991
Holland & Hart
90 South Cascade Avenue, Suite 1000
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80903
Senior Associate (1985 – 1988)

1980 – 1985
Valdes-Fauli, Cobb & Petrey
One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3400
2 South Biscayne Blvd.
Miami, Florida 33131-1803
Associate (1980 – 1985)

Summer 1979
Smathers & Thompson (now dissolved)
Summer Clerk

Summer/Fall 1978
Greater Boston Legal Services, Domestic Relations Division
Summer Intern

Summer 1977
University of Colorado, EOP Summer Program
Boulder, Colorado
Algebra Instructor

8. **Military Service and Draft Status:** Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including
dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social
security number) and type of discharge received.

None
9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

University of Colorado:
- Graduated with **Special Honors**
- Was first in GPA rank in my class
- Selected as the Outstanding Senior of 1977 (School of Education)
- In my junior year, I was hired by the University as an undergraduate instructor to teach algebra to incoming freshman
- Elected to the University of Colorado Student Union
- Recipient, Colorado Springs Veterans Scholarship

Harvard University:
- Articles Editor, Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review, Harvard Law School

**General Honors and Awards:**
- 2007 Recipient, "Scouting... Vale La Pena!" Service Award, Denver Area Boy Scout Council
- 2007 Recipient, Distinguished Individual Award, University of Colorado Hispanic Alumni Association
- 2007 Recipient, Qwest Diversity Trailblazer: Individual of the Year Award, Rocky Mountain Legal Diversity Summit
- 2004 Recipient, Dia de la Mujer Latina Courage and Valor Award, Latino/a Research & Policy Center, University of Colorado at Denver
- 2003 Finalist, Colorado Rockies Hispanic Adult Leadership Award
- 2002 Recipient, Distinguished Alumnus Award, University of Colorado Hispanic Alumni Association
- 2001 Recipient, Hispanic Pioneer Award, Denver Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
- 2000 Recipient, Mary Lathrop Award (Woman Trailblazer), Colorado Women's Bar Association
- 1999 Recipient, Outstanding Hispanic Lawyer Award, Colorado Hispanic Bar Association
- 1998 Awarded Tenure and Promoted to Full Professor, University of Kansas School of Law
- 1996 Recipient, William T. Kemper Fellowship for Teaching Excellence, University of Kansas
- 1995 Recipient, Plaque of Recognition for Outstanding Contributions as a Minority in the Law, University of Kansas School of Law Minority Alumni Banquet
- 1993 Recipient, Frederick J. Moreau Award for Student Counseling, University of Kansas School of Law
- 1991 Recipient, Hispanic of the Year Award, Cinco de Mayo Committee, Colorado Springs, Colorado
- 1990 Recognized by the Gazette Telegraph as one of the 50 most influential women in Colorado Springs, Colorado
1989 Recipient, Recognition Award from El Paso County Bar Association for Outstanding Service in establishing the Legal Literacy School
1988 Recipient, Portia Award (Outstanding Woman Lawyer), El Paso County Bar Association, Colorado
1987 Recipient, Women's Trade Fair Recognition Award for Outstanding Performance in the area of Professional Service, Colorado Springs, Colorado
1986 Recipient, Recognition Award from El Paso County Bar Association for Outstanding Service in establishing the High School Mock Trial Competition, Colorado Springs, Colorado

10. **Bar Associations:** List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

National Association of College and University Attorneys
   Member, Board of Directors of the Journal of College and University Law, 2007 – Present

Colorado Women’s Bar Association Foundation
   Member, Board of Directors, 2006 – Present
   Member, Planning Committee for Raising the Bar Dinner, 2007 – Present

Colorado Women’s Bar Association
   At Large Representative, 2004 – 2005
   Co-chair, Judicial Committee, 2003 – 2004
   Co-chair, Publications Committee, 2001 – 2002

Colorado Hispanic Bar Association
   Director, 2007 – Present
   Treasurer, 2004 – 2006
   Chair, Nominations & Endorsements Committee, 2002 – 2003
   Co-chair, Nominations & Endorsements Committee, 2001 – 2002
   Treasurer, 2001 – 2003
   Director, 2000 – 2001

Hispanic National Bar Association

Kansas Bar Association
   Member, Kansas Bar Association Task Force on the Status of Minorities in the Profession, 1991 – 1993

El Paso County (Colorado) Bar Association
   Chairperson and Coordinator, Adult Legal Literacy Committee, 1988 – 1990
   Founder and Chairperson, High School and Ninth Grade Junior High Mock Trial Competition (Subcommittee of the Citizen's Law Committee), 1985 – 1987
Dade County (Florida) Bar Association
Chairperson, High School Mock Trial Committee of the Young Lawyers Section of the Dade County Bar Association, 1983 – 1984

Colorado Bar Association (current)
Florida Bar Association (inactive status)
American Bar Association (expired)
Dade County Bar Association (expired)
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (expired)

Judicial-related Committees or Selection Panels:

Friend of the Commission, Commission on Families in the Colorado Courts, 2001 – 2002
Member, Pattern Instructions for Kansas Criminal Advisory Committee to the Kansas Judicial Council, 1992 – 1998
Member, Pattern Instructions for Kansas Civil Advisory Committee to the Kansas Judicial Council, 1992 – 1998
Member, Colorado Supreme Court Nominating Commission (Gubernatorial appointment) 1987 – 1991

Other Law Related Activities:

Vice-chair, Board of Directors, Colorado Campaign for Inclusive Excellence, 2007 – Present
Member, Advocacy Task Force, University of Colorado School of Law, 2007 – Present
Member, Deans’ Diversity Council, Chair, Retention Working Group, 2006 – Present
Member, Sentencing Reform Project, Colorado Lawyers Committee, 2004 – 2006
Master, Minoru Yasui Inn of Court, Denver, Colorado, 2002 – Present
Mentor for First Year Law Student Mentorship Program (University of Denver and University of Colorado), 2002 – Present

11. **Bar and Court Admission:**

   a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

   Florida – October 23, 1980 (inactive status - voluntary)
   Colorado – April, 22 1985 (no lapse in membership)
   Iowa – December 19, 2003 (voluntary retired inactive – not practicing in Iowa)

   b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

   Florida State Courts, 1980
   Colorado State Courts, 1985
   United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, 1981
   United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1981
   United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 1981
   United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 1986
   United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 1986, 1999

   There have been no lapses in membership.

12. **Memberships:**

   a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

   **Organizations to which I currently belong:**
   Women’s Forum of Colorado, Inc., 2005 – Present
   Stapleton Development Corporation (Mayoral appointment); Director, 2004 – Present
   Rocky Mountain News Hispanic Community Advisory Committee; 2003 – Present
   Kroenke Sports Enterprises Latino Advisory Committee; 2003 – Present
   Circle of Latina Leadership; Mentor and Trainer, 2002 – Present

   **Organizations to which I have belonged:**
   Latina Chamber; Director, 2005 – 2007

   Arapahoe House; Director, 2003 – 2006, Secretary (2005)
Smart Government, Inc. (Advisory Board to Denver Mayor John Hickenlooper), 2003

2025 Commission; Executive Committee Member, 2002-2003

City Attorney Transition Subcommittee of Denver Mayor-elect John Hickenlooper’s Transition Committee; Co-chair, Member, Board of Advisors, 2003

Justicia, Inc., Director, 1994 – 1996

The Hispanic Network of KU; Co-founder and member, 1994 – 1998

University of Kansas Hispanic American Advisory Committee; Member, 1992 – 1993

Colorado Hispanic League; First Vice President, 1990 – 1991

National Caucus of Hispanic School Board Members; Member, 1988 – 1991; Treasurer (1989, 1990), Vice President for the Western Region (1988),


Pikes Peak United Way; 1986 – 1991, Director, Secretary (1990-91), Executive Committee (1989-91),

Pikes Peak Legal Services Board; Trustee, 1986 – 1991

Citizens’ Goals Board; Director, 1986 – 1991

League of United Latin American Citizens, Colorado Springs Chapter, Member, 1985 – 1991

Director, Advisory Board of Colorado Civics/Legal Education Program, Boulder, Colorado, 1986 – 1988

b. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical
implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

None of the organizations listed in response to 12a above discriminate on the basis of race, sex or religion. I do not currently belong, nor have I ever belonged, to any organizations that discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or religion.

13. **Published Writings and Public Statements:**

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.


Letter to the Editor, Rocky Mountain News, September 26, 2003

b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of, on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

None

c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

Attorney General Formal Opinion 2000-2, AG Alpha No. ST EL FBQSN, responding to a request from the Secretary of State requesting clarification of certain issues relating to the term limits provisions of Colo. Const. Art. XVIII, section 11 (“Amendment 17”).
Attorney General Formal Opinion 2001-3, AG Alpha No. LE HR AGBAP, responding to a request from the Speaker of the House regarding term of At-Large Member of State Board of Education.

Letter to House and Senate Judiciary Committees, March 31, 1998, signed by fifty-seven bankruptcy law professors urging Congress "to pause, to hold full hearings on the issues, and to seek out a balanced, reasoned approach" to reform of the nation's bankruptcy laws.

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

The following are the speeches or presentation I was able to identify from my records. In addition to the listed speeches and presentations, I have given numerous presentations to community groups and elementary, junior high, and high school classes on the importance of education. In my capacity as a Law Professor, I have given hundreds of hours of lectures to law students in the substantive areas of Trial Advocacy, Advanced Litigation, Bankruptcy, Creditors' and Debtors' Rights, Criminal Law and Procedure, Contracts, Legal Research & Writing and Appellate Practice.

“A Few Ideas about Ideas - First Amendment and the State University” (Panelist) – 2008 Summer Council of Presidents, American Association of State Colleges and Universities

“Effective Direct & Cross Examination” (Presenter) – 2007 University of Colorado Counsel Retreat (copy of power point attached)

Acceptance Speech for the “Scouting . . . Vale La Pena!” Service Award, Denver Area Boy Scout Council 2007 (copy attached)

“Hand in Hand: The Value of Mentoring” (Panelist) – 2007 Rocky Mountain Legal Diversity Summit

“Legal Issues in Diversity Initiatives” (Panelist) – 2007 NALP Annual Education Conference (copy attached)

“Passing the Gender Bar: A Discussion on Gender Disparity in the Legal Profession” (Moderator) – 2007 CWBA and the CU Women’s Law Caucus
"Effective Internal Investigations" (Presenter) – 2006 UCAR Measuring Up Conference (copy attached)

"Effective Internal Investigations" (Presenter) – 2005 Davis Graham & Stubbs Employment Update

"Reforming the Bankruptcy Code: Developments and Consumer Law" (Moderator) – 2005 Hispanic National Bar Association Annual Convention

"Choosing a Path to Achieve" (Commencement Speaker) - Remington College Graduation, May 6, 2005 (copy attached)

"Choosing a Path to Achieve" (Key Note Speaker) - Latina Chamber Luncheon, November 30, 2004 (copy attached)

"Diversity in the Legal Profession" (Speaker) - University of Denver College of Law Orientation, August 13, 2003

"Strength in Unity" (Key Note Speaker) – 2002 Hispanic Heritage Month, Aerospace Data Facility Diversity Program, Buckley Air Force Base

"Protecting our Seniors" (Speaker) - Los Alegres Ancianos Mexicanos, El Dia de Los Ancianos, Greeley, Colorado, August 17, 2002

"Tips on Being a Good Supervisor and the Secret of Success" (Key Note Speaker) – 2002 Annual Employee Recognition Luncheon, Crossroads Managed Health Care Systems, Inc., Pueblo, Colorado

"Success – What Is it and How Do You Achieve It?" (Key Note Speaker) – 2002 Scholarship Awards Ceremony, Coors Hispanic Employee Network

"The Privileges and Obligations of Being an Attorney" (Key Note Speaker) – 2001 Swearing In Ceremony for New Bar Admittees, Colorado Supreme Court (copy attached)

"Conquering the Obstacles: How to Succeed as a Latina in the Professional Fields" (Speaker) – U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, October 10, 2001

"Women in Law – It’s a Long Way from First to Finished" (Panel Moderator) – 2001 Colorado Women’s Bar Association Annual Convention

"Why Diversity Matters – Law School and Beyond" (Speaker) – 2001 and 2003 First Year Law Student Orientation, University of Denver College of Law
"The Critical Role Parents Play in the Development of their Children" (Key Note Speaker) – 2001 Annual Convention, Los Padres Colorado Statewide Parents Coalition

"What to Expect from Your Law School Experience" (Speaker) - University of Colorado School of Law 2001 Minority Orientation Program

"You Are Our Hope for the Future" (Key Note Speaker) – 2001 Scholarship and Awards Dinner, Brighton Hispanic Advisory Committee

"What Makes a Successful Manager and Administrator" (Speaker) - Denver City Attorneys Office, March 15, 2001

"Inclusion in Institutions of Higher Education – My Personal Experiences" (Key Note Speaker) – 2001 Annual Diversity Conference, University of Colorado

"Hopwood vs. Texas" (Panelist) – Hispanic American Law Students Association, University of Oklahoma (February 26, 2000)

"Finding Support and Challenges Outside Our Institutions" (Speaker) – 1999 AALS Workshop for Women in Legal Education (October 1, 1999)

"Women & Education" (Speaker), www.hro (Working with Women) Centennial Awards Reception, Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado, May 6, 1999

"Conquering the Obstacles: How to Succeed as a Latina in the Legal Profession" (Key Note Speaker) – Center for Latina/Latino Legal Studies, St. Mary’s Law School, November 5, 1998

"Multiculturalism and Education" (Presenter) - The University of Kansas, Latino/Latina Symposium, May 1, 1998

"The Problem of Attorneys Fees in Bankruptcy" (Presenter) - Harvard Law School, La Alianza Annual Conference, April 13, 1996

"The Use of Fee Audits in Bankruptcy as a Means of Monitoring Reasonableness of Compensation" (Presenter) - San Francisco Bay Area Forum on Compensation of Attorneys in Bankruptcy, November 6, 1995

"Latinos as Law Professors: Success in the Face of Challenge" (Panelist) - Harvard Law School, La Alianza Annual Conference, April 13, 1996

"Court Systems Panel on the Influence of the Mass Media" (Moderator) - The University of Kansas School of Law, Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy Symposium, March 9, 1995
“How Do or Should Law Schools Teach Students Professionalism” (Moderator) - University of Kansas School of Law Faculty Forum, February 16, 1995 (copy attached)

“The Added Obstacles of Being an Hispanic Woman in Today's Society” (Speaker) - University of Kansas Hispanic Heritage Week, September 22, 1994

Central Junior High (Speaker) – Lawrence, Kansas, date unknown (copy attached)

1992 – 1998 Speaker, KU Law Night, University of Kansas School of Law (copy attached)

1995, 1997; Presenter, KU Minority Law Day, University of Kansas School of Law

c. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

On air interview with KNRV La Buena Onda 1150AM; 2/26/2008 – no clip or transcript available

“Set Goals and Dream Big”: A DILP Profile of Christine Arguello, The Colorado Lawyer, Vol. 34, No. 11; 11/2005 (copy attached)

14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

I have not held a judicial office.

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

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e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

I have not served as a judge.

16. **Recusal:** If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

   a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

   b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

   c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

   d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

I have not served as a judge.

17. **Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:**

   a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

   On July 27, 2000, I was nominated by President William Clinton to be a United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit. On December 15, 2000, my nomination was returned to the President upon the adjournment of the 106th Congress.

   I was elected to the nonpartisan position of Trustee for the Board of Education for Colorado Springs School District 11, Colorado Springs, Colorado. I served a
four-year term and did not seek re-election because I moved to Kansas to begin teaching. I served in this position from 5/1987 – 5/1991.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

For a brief period of time in 2004, I was Treasurer (uncompensated) for the Don Quick for DA (17th Judicial District) campaign.

During 2002, I was an uncompensated volunteer in the Ken Salazar for Colorado (Attorney General) re-election campaign.

During 2004, I was an uncompensated volunteer in Ken Salazar’s senatorial campaign. My responsibilities included stuffing envelopes and walking door to door delivering literature, and delivering signs for both of Ken Salazar’s campaigns.

18. Legal Career: Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

I did not serve as a clerk to a judge.

ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

I have not practiced alone.

iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

2006 – Present
University of Colorado at Boulder
924 Broadway, 013 UCB
Boulder, Colorado 80309
Managing Senior Associate Counsel
2004 – 2006
Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP
1550 17th Street, Suite 500
Denver, Colorado 80202
Equity Partner

2003 – 2004
Duncan Green Brown & Langeness, P.C.
600 17th Street, Suite 2800 South
Denver, Colorado 80202
Shareholder & Managing Partner

2003
University of Denver College of Law
2255 East Evans Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80208
Visiting Professor

1999 – 2002
Colorado Attorney General’s Office
1525 Sherman Street, 5th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80203

1999 – 2002
University of Colorado School of Law
Campus Box 401
Boulder, Colorado 80309
Adjunct Professor (Spring 2002, 2001, and 2000)
Visiting Professor (Spring 1999)

1991 – 1999
The University of Kansas School of Law
Green Hall, 15th Street & Burdick
Lawrence, Kansas 66045
Full Professor (1998 – 1999)
Associate Professor (1991 – 1998)

1991 - 1997
Professional Fee Examiners, Inc.
6452 E. Bates Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80222
Vice-President of Legal (part-time) (1996 – 1997)
b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

From May of 1980 to June of 1991 and from May of 2003 to March of 2006, I was a civil litigation attorney in private practice. I successfully prosecuted and defended, in state and federal courts, a broad variety of civil litigation matters including cases involving domestic or family law, breach of contract, employment discrimination and harassment, trademark infringement, statutory liens, debt collection or foreclosure, commercial litigation, lender liability defense, personal injury, and medical malpractice. The general character of my practice remained consistent over the years I was in private practice, although from 2003 to 2006 my emphasis shifted from commercial litigation to employment related investigations and litigation.

In June of 1991, I joined the University of Kansas School of Law as an associate professor, assuming responsibility for teaching and directing the School’s Trial Advocacy Program. I also taught bankruptcy, contract law, legal research and writing, and appellate advocacy. During 1997, I supervised students in the Prosecutors’ Clinic at the law school. In 1996, I was the first law professor to be awarded one of the most prestigious teaching awards given by the University of Kansas - the William T. Kemper Fellowship for Teaching Excellence. In April of 1998, I was granted tenure and promoted to the rank of Full Professor by the University of Kansas. I am the co-author of a casebook, Evidence: The Objection Method, which is used in numerous law schools around the country. I taught bankruptcy law as a Visiting Professor at the University of Colorado School of Law in the Spring of 1999, and as an adjunct professor in the Spring of 2000, 2001 and 2002. I also taught bankruptcy
and commercial law (Articles 2 and 9) as a visiting professor at the University of Denver College of Law during the Spring of 2003.

In January of 1999, I left academia and returned home to Colorado where I joined Attorney General (now Senator) Ken Salazar's new administration in the Colorado Attorney General's office. From January of 1999 until October of 2000, I served as Deputy Attorney General for State Services, supervising a group of 35 attorneys and 20 support staff who advised and defended the State of Colorado in state and federal trial and appellate courts in matters involving challenges to the State Constitution, laws passed by the legislature, and initiatives passed by the people. In late 2000, Attorney General Salazar promoted me to Chief Deputy where, in addition to being the chief advisor to the Attorney General, I was responsible for the administration of the Office of the Attorney General, including oversight of all sections of the office (approximately 200 attorneys and 150 support personnel), budget and expenditures, crisis control, and policy.

In my current position as Managing Senior Associate Counsel at the University of Colorado in Boulder, I supervise a team of 4 lawyers, 1 legal assistant, and 1 administrative assistant who provide legal advice to and representation of the University on all its legal needs. In addition, as a member of the Chancellor's cabinet, I assist in the development and implementation of campus policies and long-term strategic plans for the University.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

As a private practitioner, my typical corporate clients included banking institutions, savings and loan lending institutions (and later, during the savings and loan crisis, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Resolution Trust Corporation), construction companies, franchise companies, and other similar businesses. My non-corporate clients included individuals for whom I handled only a single matter related to personal injury, medical malpractice, employment discrimination and harassment, breach of contract disputes, divorce, or release of trust fund monies. As a public servant in the Colorado Attorney General's Office, my clients included the Governor, all of his cabinet members and the state agencies they direct, the Judiciary, the Department of Local Affairs, the Department of Military Affairs, the Secretary of State, the State Controller, the Department of Human Services, the Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, the Department of Labor and Employment, General Support Services, and all Colorado state higher education agencies and institutions. As Managing Senior Associate Counsel my client is the University of Colorado.
In private practice, I specialized in commercial, employment, breach of contract, and medical malpractice litigation and bankruptcy matters. As a professor and scholar, my areas of specialization were trial practice, the rules of evidence, contract law and bankruptcy law. At the Attorney General’s office, I defended government employees, institutions, and agencies in a variety of trial and appellate matters. In my current position at the University of Colorado, I advise the Chancellor and other administrators, employees, and students on the Boulder campus on a wide spectrum of matters ranging from constitutional law issues such as academic freedom and first amendment rights, to compliance with statutory research restrictions, to personnel and other day to day operational matters.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

90% of my practice was litigation related. As a civil litigator, I appeared in court occasionally. Between 1990 and 1991, I appeared in bankruptcy court on contested matters and adversarial proceedings on a frequent basis.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 50%
   2. state courts of record: 50%
   3. other courts.

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings; 100%
   2. criminal proceedings.

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

To the best of my recollection, I tried approximately fifty trials or major evidentiary hearings in State and Federal courts while in private practice, 1980 - 1991. I was sole counsel in all the matters I tried, except for one jury trial in which I was chief counsel and one jury trial in which I was associate counsel. From 2003 to 2006, I was lead counsel on dozens of active litigation matters but, due to good pretrial preparation, only one had to be litigated to judgment.

i. What percentage of these trials were:
   1. jury; 20%
   2. non-jury; 80%
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c. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if
applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection
with your practice.

I have not practiced before the Supreme Court of the United States.

19. **Litigation:** Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally
handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date
if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party
or parties whom you represented, describe in detail the nature of your participation in the
litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

a. the date of representation;

b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case
was litigated; and

c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of
principal counsel for each of the other parties.

1. **In re: West Central Housing Development Organization,** United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Colorado, Case No. 04-23758-HRT. Presiding Judge: Howard R.
Tallman.

I represented the State of Colorado, Department of Local Affairs, Division of Housing,
which sought to recover notes receivable and funds valued at approximately $4,000,000
from the bankrupt debtor, a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit Community Housing Development
Organization that administered the State's affordable housing programs for cities and
counties in the western part of the State. This case was factually and legally complicated
because of the lack of precedent on the issue, lack of clarity in the contract documents
governing the relationship between the State and the debtor, and the numerous federal
regulations that governed the grant monies involved. The State's attempt to recover these
assets was adamantly opposed by two creditors because the assets at issue comprised the
bulk of the debtor's estate. In 2005, after a two day trial and full briefing of the matter,
the court accepted my argument that the debtor had held these assets in a custodial
capacity and ordered that the Trustee return the assets to the State.

**Opposing Counsel:**
William S. Silverman, Esq.,
1601 Blake St., Ste. 500
Denver, Colorado 80202
(303) 623-6966

Charles Greenhouse, Esq.
Franke Greenhouse List & Lippitt, LLP
Granite Building, 1228 Fifteenth Street, Second Floor
Denver, Colorado 80202
(303) 623-4500


   This was a gender discrimination case in which my co-counsel and I represented a female police officer who had been terminated from her position with the Englewood Police Department. We obtained a probable cause finding of discrimination from the Colorado Civil Rights Division and attempted to mediate a settlement with the City. After filing suit in Federal court, I took the depositions of two key witnesses for the City of Englewood. Shortly after taking these depositions, the City settled the case for significantly more than it had offered in the mediation.

   **Opposing Counsel:**
   Patrick Mooney, Esq.
   Semple Miller & Mooney PC
   1120 Lincoln St., Ste. 1308
   Denver, Colorado 80203
   (303) 395-0941

   **Co-counsel:**
   Joseph A. Salazar
   3842 E. 127th Lane
   Thornton, CO 80241
   (303) 452-5601


   I represented Plaintiff Thomas Wells in this medical malpractice/wrongful death case. Defendant, despite not being licensed to practice medicine in the State of Colorado, provided regular psychotherapy sessions to Plaintiff's wife in her home in Colorado via the telephone. Without appropriately monitoring and conducting personal examinations of Plaintiff's wife, Defendant prescribed anti-psychotic drugs, anti-depressant drugs, controlled substances, and other prescription drugs to Plaintiff's wife by phoning in such prescriptions to pharmacies in Colorado. Defendant prescribed these drugs in such high dosages that Plaintiff's wife became addicted and her existing psychological debilities were aggravated instead of assisted. After Defendant abandoned Plaintiff's wife by suddenly terminating his doctor/patient relationship with her, Plaintiff's wife committed suicide. I successfully opposed the Defendant's vigorous challenge to the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. After key discovery was taken, the case was settled prior to trial.
Opposing Counsel:
Craig A. Sargent
Pryor Johnson Carney Karr Nixon, P.C.
5619 DTC Parkway, Suite 1200
Greenwood Village, CO 80111
(303) 773-3500


Plaintiff asserted that our client, the First National Bank of Colorado Springs, had put him out of business by wrongfully foreclosing on his home and business property in breach of an alleged oral agreement entered into with the bank during negotiations over a Cash Collateral Agreement in the bankruptcy of the Plaintiff's company. Plaintiff sought actual and punitive damages based on breach of contract and fraud. Judge Pelican granted my motion for summary judgment on the fraud count and my motion to strike the request for punitive damages based on admissions obtained from the Plaintiff during deposition. The case was tried to a jury on the sole count of breach of contract. I was lead counsel on this case. After a weeklong trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff.

Opposing Counsel:
James W. Kin and Thomas Herd
Gaddis, Kin & Herd, P.C.
118 S Wahsatch
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80903
(719) 471-3848
(original attorneys for Plaintiff who were allowed to withdraw from case for ethical reasons).

James A. Carleo
503 North Main Street, Suite 658
Pueblo, Colorado 81003
(719) 632-5001
(counsel for plaintiff after withdrawal by Mr. Kin and Mr. Herd).

5. **Alvarado v. Herrington**, Case Number 86CV142, Division B, District Court, Pueblo County, Colorado. Presiding Judge: Judge Thomas Phelps (original trial judge); Judge Dennis Maes took over upon Judge Phelps’ retirement.

This was a medical malpractice case in which I represented the Plaintiffs. The case was originally tried to a jury with Judge Phelps as the presiding judge. Halfway through the trial, over objection of Plaintiffs, the judge granted defense counsel a mistrial because the defense’s expert witness was precluded from rendering an opinion on an issue that was critical to the defense of Plaintiffs’ malpractice claims. The judge’s granting of a mistrial
was not immediately appealable and my clients, who had mortgaged their home to pay
for the expert witnesses and court costs, could not afford a second trial. Thus, they were
forced to settle the case.

Opposing Counsel:
Lewis M. Quigg
Shaw & Quigg, P.C.
Suite 222, 501 North Main Street
Pueblo, CO 81003-3124
(719) 543-8596

Co-counsel:
Roger D. Hunt - retired

6. Resolution Trust Corporation, as Receiver for Pacific Savings Bank v. Ragan, Case
Number 90CV3087, Division 10, District Court, El Paso County, Colorado. Presiding
Judge: Judge Gilbert Martinez.

On behalf of our client, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), I obtained an order
appointing a Receiver for five apartment complexes owned by the defendants and on
which the RTC held deeds of trust. Upon conducting an accounting, the Receiver
determined that the defendants had removed a significant amount of cash and personal
property, including rents, equipment, and furniture, from the apartment complexes. On
behalf of the RTC and the Receiver, I filed a motion to compel turnover of this property.
The defendants denied that they collected the rents and asserted that the personal property
in question did not belong to TSR Properties, one of the defendants, but rather that it
belonged to another entity owned by them. As a result of my pretrial investigation, I
located documents signed by the defendants under penalty of perjury in a prior
bankruptcy in which they attested that the personal property did in fact belong to TSR.
Through discovery, I was able to track the collection of the disputed rents to deposits in
the debtors’ bank accounts. An evidentiary hearing was held on our motion on May 16,
1991. In the middle of my cross-examination of Mr. Ragan, Judge Martinez called a
short recess and instructed Mr. Gelt to take this time to advise his client regarding the
penalty for committing perjury in a court proceeding. The Court ultimately granted the
motion to compel turnover.

Opposing Counsel:
Howard B. Gelt
Shughart Thomson & Kilroy PC
1050 17th Street, Ste. 2300
Denver, CO 80265
(720) 931-8143

7. In re McClanahan Surveying, Inc., Bankruptcy No. 87-B-0161E, Chp. 11, United States
Bankruptcy Court, District of Colorado. Presiding Judge: Judge Roland Brumbaugh,
(retired).
My client, First Colorado Bank, N.A., held a perfected security interest in all accounts receivable and equipment of the debtor which had defaulted on its loan payments to the bank. The bankruptcy of the debtor was due, in part, to the lack of managerial skills and overspending by the individual owners. Because the bank held a perfected security interest in the debtor’s cash collateral, it would have been easy for me to collect what I could by liquidating the assets of the debtor even if that meant putting the debtor out of business. However, by doing so, the bank would recover less than half the debt due it. After reviewing the financial documentation and speaking with both the bank and the McClanahans (with their attorney present), it was my opinion that this company had the means to rehabilitate itself, assuming proper oversight and management. I persuaded my client not to close down the debtor and to allow them to use, under strict limitation, some of the cash collateral. I drafted a stipulation for the use of cash collateral, which was approved by the court. The debtor emerged from bankruptcy intact and the bank was paid in full.

Opposing party/counsel:
Gayle L. McClanahan
President, Charles A. McClanahan
915 South 8th St.
Colorado Springs, CO
(Debtors) (last known address).

Rodney Bradley, (not listed in Martindale or the Colorado Legal Directory)
old address: 1080 Cheyenne Road
Colorado Springs, CO 80906
(Attorney for Debtors).

8. In re David A. Weseloh, d/b/a Innovative Growth Investments, Bankruptcy No. 86-B-27093, Chp. 11, United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Colorado. Presiding Judges: Judge Charles Matheson and Judge Roland Brumbaugh, (both retired).

In this bankruptcy, I represented Stan and Nina Predmore, creditor of the debtor by virtue of a note and deed of trust he gave them to finance his purchase from them of the Royal Scotman Motel in Gunnison. In November of 1986, the debtor filed an objection to the claim of my clients and also asserted three claims against Stan Predmore for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty related to the sale of the motel. Several times I provided debtor’s counsel with evidence that the claims of the debtor were false and that there was no basis in fact to support the debtor’s allegations. On May 27, 1987, after a day of trial, Judge Brumbaugh dismissed the claims as groundless and frivolous. In a subsequent evidentiary hearing, Judge Brumbaugh sanctioned both the debtor and his counsel in an amount equal to the attorney’s fees and court costs expended by my client in defending himself in this matter. In November of 1988, I filed an adversary proceeding against the debtor for purposes of obtaining a preliminary injunction to enjoin the debtor from conducting a fire sale of all the assets of the business without court authorization. On November 15, 1988, after an evidentiary hearing on the merits, Judge Matheson issued an order granting the preliminary injunction.
Subsequently, my client obtained relief from the automatic stay and had a receiver appointed to protect against further deterioration of the motel pending foreclosure.

Opposing Counsel: Jeffrey Cohen (address unknown).

9. *In re Trainor Ranch, Inc.*, Bankruptcy No. 91-12200 SBB, Chapter 12, United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Colorado. Presiding Judge: Judge Sidney Brooks (retired).

In this Chapter 12 (Family Farmer Reorganization) case, I represented the First National Bank of Ordway which held a perfected security interest in the Trainor Ranch real property and in the cattle owned by the Trainor Ranch. After filing bankruptcy, the bank became concerned that the owners of the Trainor Ranch were diverting cattle that were subject to the bank’s security interest and transferring them to their adult son. When the bank and a veterinarian were denied access to the ranch for purposes of inventorying and checking the health of the cattle, I filed a Motion to Remove the Debtor in Possession and to Appoint a Trustee. The motion was presented to the court at an emergency hearing on April 23, 1991, at which time Judge Brooks ordered the Chapter 12 Trustee to appoint an independent evaluator to report on the number and condition of the cattle, the water and the grass on the ranch. On June 1, 1991, the Debtors and the bank entered into a stipulation resolving the dispute. The debt was extended and the debtors agreed to round up and account for all the cattle and allow them to be inspected. Shortly thereafter, the parties were successful in negotiating a plan of reorganization.

Opposing Counsel:
Joseph A. Hambright
PO Drawer 3868, 3026 Patterson (F) Rd.
Grand Junction, Colorado 81504
(970) 434-4685
(Attorney for Debtor)

William M. Bass
P.O. Box 100035
Denver, CO 80163
(no phone number available)
(Chapter 12 Trustee).


Plaintiffs filed this lender liability action in state court against the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, as Conservator for First Federal Savings and Loan of Colorado Springs. I removed the matter to federal court on behalf of the FSLIC. The matter was put on a fast track with accelerated discovery cut-off and pre-trial conference
dates. The matter was settled pursuant to a loan workout agreement and the matter was
 dismissed by stipulation.

Opposing Counsel:
J. Gregory Walta
105 East Moreno
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80903
(719)578-8888

Patrick J. Canty
no listing available.

20. **Legal Activities:** Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued,
 including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not
 involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities.
 Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities
 and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or
 organizations(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any
 information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

In addition to the fourteen years I was in private practice, I spent six and a half years
 teaching trial practice skills, bankruptcy law, and appellate advocacy at the University of
 Kansas School of Law. As the Director of the Trial Advocacy program at KU, I
 developed, coordinated and taught a program that focused on the students’ development
 of forensic technique in the basic trial practice skills of direct examination, cross
 examination, impeachment, introduction and use of exhibits, defense of examinations,
 expert witness examination, jury communication, opening statement, and closing
 argument. My program also impressed upon the students the importance of well-
 developed analytical skills, strategic evaluation of the case, case theory development,
 precise fact analysis, tactical decision making, technical and tactical application of the
 rules of evidence, professionalism, and negotiating skills. I dedicated substantial time
 and effort to researching and writing about the rules of evidence and bankruptcy law.
 My book, Evidence: The Objection Method, addresses how to teach the Federal Rules of
 Evidence to law students. The three years I devoted to researching and writing this book
 helped me gain an extensive knowledge of the intricacies of the Federal Rules of
 Evidence. Few lawyers and judges ever attain that in-depth level of familiarity and
 expertise with these operative rules.

As a law professor, I worked to expand my knowledge and understanding of criminal
 law and procedure. From 1992 - 1998, I served as the only non-judicial member of the
 Pattern Instructions for Kansas - Criminal, Advisory Committee to the Kansas Judicial
 Council. In addition, during academic year 1997-98, I supervised KU’s Criminal Justice
 (Prosecutors’) Clinic which required me to supervise and monitor student interns
 working in the offices of the U.S. Attorney, Wyandotte District Attorney, Johnson
County District Attorney, and Douglas County District Attorney, and to coordinate a two hour presentation each week on substantive topics of criminal prosecution.

As Chief Deputy and Deputy Attorney General, I served as mentor and advisor to attorneys, including the Criminal Law Section of the Attorney General’s Office, in numerous matters in the state and federal trial and appellate courts. I was also personally involved in defending the State in several high-profile litigation and appellate matters including:

*In re Submission of Interrogatories on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549 (Colo. 1999).*

Presiding Judges: Justices Mullarkey, Scott, Love Kourlis, Hobbs, Martinez, Bender, and Rice. Opposing Counsel: Edwin G. Perlmutter (now Congressman Perlmutter), 415 Cannon House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515, (202) 225-2645. Co-Counsel: Rebecca C. Lennahan, Office of Legislative Legal Services (Retired). This matter involved the submission of three interrogatories by the General Assembly and the Governor to the Colorado Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of legislation authorizing the issuance of revenue anticipation notes to fund highway construction. At the request of the Governor, I presented the oral argument on behalf of the Governor before the Colorado Supreme Court. We prevailed on two of the three interrogatories.

*Sturdevant v. Paulsen*, 218 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2000). Presiding Judges: Judges Seymour, Lucero, and Ellison. Opposing Counsel: Sharon Dreyer, Colorado Education Association, 1500 Grant Street, Denver, CO 80203-1800, (303) 837-1500. This case involved an appeal of the denial of the State Board for Community Colleges & Occupational Education’s motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The district court’s finding that the SBCCOE, the governing board of the State’s community college system, was not an arm of the state had serious negative ramifications for governing boards of other State educational institutions. Because of the import of this case to the State, I drafted the State’s appellate brief and I argued this appeal before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against entities that are arms or instrumentalities of a state and that the SBCCOE was an arm of the state.

*Giardino v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ.*, Case No. 98CV0246 (Denver County District Court). Presiding Judge: Judge Paul A. Markson. Opposing Counsel: Randolph W. Barnhart, Hillyard Barnhart Ekker & McNally LLP, 7887 E Belleview Ave., Ste. 1200, Englewood, Colorado 80111-6015, (303) 793-0700. This case was filed as a class action on behalf of minor students who attended public schools in eleven of the 186 school districts in Colorado. The Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Colorado’s school finance system as it related to capital construction for public schools. I supervised the trial strategy for this case. More importantly, I was actively involved in assisting Attorney General Salazar with the complex negotiations among Plaintiffs’ counsel, the Colorado General Assembly, and the Governor to achieve an unprecedented settlement in this case.
For the past two years, as Managing Senior Associate Counsel at the University of Colorado in Boulder, I have supervised a team of lawyers who provide for all the legal needs of the University. We advise the Chancellor and other administrators, employees, and students on a wide spectrum of matters ranging from constitutional law issues such as academic freedom and first amendment rights, to compliance with statutory research restrictions, to personnel and other day to day operational matters. As a high-level administrative member of the Chancellor’s cabinet, I also assist and advise in the development and implementation of campus policies and long-term strategic plans for the University.

21. Teaching: What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

From August of 1991 through December of 1998, I was employed as a law professor [Full Professor from 8/1991 – 1/1999; Associate Professor from 8/1991 – 5/1998] at the University of Kansas School of Law in Lawrence, Kansas. I taught the following courses at KU:

a. Trial Advocacy: focused on the students’ development of forensic technique in the basic trial practice skills of direct examination, cross examination, impeachment, introduction and use of exhibits, defense of examinations, expert witness examination, jury communication, opening statement, and closing argument. Also impressed upon the students the importance of well-developed analytical skills, strategic evaluation of the case, case theory development, precise fact analysis, tactical decision making, technical and tactical application of the rules of evidence, professionalism, and negotiating skills.

b. Advanced Litigation: Reinforcement of the skills and techniques taught in the basic Trial Advocacy course through a series of bench and jury trials

c. Bankruptcy/Creditors’ and Debtors’ Rights: State remedies, Chapters 1, 3, 5, 7, 13 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (with emphasis on Chapters 7 and 13)

d. Advanced Bankruptcy Law: Indepth review and analysis of Chapter 11 (Reorganization) of the Bankruptcy Code

e. Criminal Justice (Prosecutor’s) Clinic: Lectures and supervision of students interning with local DA and US Attorney offices in Kansas and Missouri

f. Contract Law

g. Legal Research and Writing (as a component of Contract Law)

h. Appellate Advocacy
I taught Bankruptcy Law at the University of Colorado School of Law as a Visiting Professor (Spring 1999) and as an Adjunct Professor (Spring 2000, 2001 and 2002).

I taught Bankruptcy Law and Commercial Law (Articles 2 and 9 of the UCC) at the University of Denver College of Law as a Visiting Professor during the Spring of 2003.

I am attaching representative examples of the syllabi I was able to find for most, but not all, of these courses.

22. **Deferred Income/Future Benefits:** List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

I receive annual royalty payments in the approximate amount of $4,000 from sales of my book, *Evidence: The Objection Method*.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

I have committed to teach Advanced Litigation as an adjunct professor at the University of Colorado School of Law during the Spring 2009 semester.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)

See attached Financial Disclosure Report

25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

   a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.
The potential conflicts of interest that might arise during my initial service would include litigation involving the University of Colorado or its representatives; litigation in which a lawyer of Davis Graham & Stubbs is counsel for a party; litigation involving AG Edwards which handles most of my retirement accounts; and litigation involving any of the companies in which any of my retirement funds are invested.

Potential conflicts might also arise as a result of my service on the boards of non-profit organizations, especially those that are involved in lobbying or who submit amicus briefs in litigation matters, e.g., the Colorado Hispanic Bar Association and the Colorado Women’s Bar Association Foundation.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

To identify and resolve conflicts-of-interest issues, I would follow the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 28 U.S.C. Section 455, and any other relevant guidelines. I have reviewed these materials, but hardly consider myself an expert in this area. Should I be nominated, I will take all necessary steps to understand the intricacies of these provisions and the realities of their application by conducting further research and by consulting with and seeking guidance from appropriate court officials.

27. Pro Bono Work: An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

Between 1985 and 1991, when I was in private practice in Colorado Springs, not only did I serve as a Trustee for Pikes Peak Legal Services, but I regularly accepted pro bono referrals. I was actively involved in the El Paso County (Colorado) Bar Association and established both the High School Mock Trial Program and the Adult Legal Literacy Program. In addition I served as a Trustee for the Board of Education of Colorado Springs School District #11 (elected position), as a Director and Officer of Pikes Peak United Way, and as a Director of the Citizens’ Goals Board.

Because I was not admitted to practice law in Kansas, my pro bono activities in Kansas involved state and local bar activities and community service activities. Between 1991 and 1999, I served as a member of both the Civil and Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions Advisory Committees to the Kansas Judicial Council. I served as a Master in the Judge Hugh Means Inn of Court for Douglas County, Kansas, and as a member of the KBA Task Force on the Status of Minorities in the Profession. I also spent much of my time giving presentations and inspirational talks to students and community groups, and I founded and coordinated the KU Law School/Lawrence High School Partnership.
During the time I was Chief Deputy of the Colorado Attorney General’s Office, I worked with legal services to establish a partnership for the referral of family and domestic matters to attorneys in the office. Between 2003 and 2006, while I was in private practice, I handled several pro bono matters for Spanish speaking clients who had not been paid for work performed. I also provided training and legal forms to law students at the University of Denver College of Law on how to file mechanic’s liens and otherwise protect the interests of day laborers for work performed. In addition, I serve on the Board of Directors for several non-profit organizations including the Colorado Hispanic Bar Association, the Colorado Women’s Bar Association Foundation, and the Stapleton Development Corporation. Because of my interest in working with and mentoring young people, each year I give numerous presentations and inspirational talks to elementary school, middle school, high school, and college students.

28. **Selection Process:**

   a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

   On October 31, 2007, I received a telephone call from Senator Wayne Allard who informed me that my name had been suggested as a potential nominee for one of the federal district court vacancies and he inquired as to whether I was interested in being considered. I responded affirmatively. Senator Allard was familiar with my qualifications because, based on the recommendation of his Judicial Selection Commission, in 1999 he had recommended me to President Clinton for consideration as a nominee for a federal district court vacancy. I submitted an updated Judicial Questionnaire to Senator Allard on November 5, 2007. On December 10, 2007, I was interviewed by staff from the White House Counsel’s office and the Department of Justice. In late January of 2008, Senator Ken Salazar established a Bi-Partisan Judicial Nomination Commission (“Salazar Commission”). I submitted an Application for Judgeship to the Salazar Commission. On March 13, 2008, I was interviewed by the Salazar Commission. The Salazar Commission recommended that Senator Salazar consider me further and, on March 19, 2008, Senator Salazar interviewed me. On April 3, 2008, Senator Salazar submitted my name to President George Bush for consideration as a nominee for one of the three judicial vacancies existing on the Colorado district court bench. On May 16, 2008, I received a telephone call from the White House Counsel’s office informing me that I was under consideration by the President and that the next step would be for me to undergo an FBI background check and to submit the requisite forms. I had subsequent conversations with staff...
from the Department of Justice regarding the nomination paperwork and process. My nomination was submitted to the United States Senate on July 10, 2008.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No.
## I. POSITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Managing Senior Associate University Council</td>
<td>University of Colorado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Partner</td>
<td>Davis Graham &amp; Stibbs LLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Director</td>
<td>Stapleton Development Corporation - Volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Vice Chair</td>
<td>Colorado Campaign for Inclusive Excellence - Volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Director</td>
<td>Colorado Hispanic Bar Association - Volunteer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## II. AGREEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTIES AND TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2008</td>
<td>University of Colorado - Teach 2 credit hour courses in Advanced Trial Advocacy, Spring 2009, $3500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2008</td>
<td>Davis Graham &amp; Stibbs LLP - Buy-out of equity interest, $4776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INSTRUCTIONS: The instructions accompanying this form must be followed. Complete all parts, checking the NONE box for each part where you have no reportable information. Sign on last page.
III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME. (Reporting individual and spouse; see pp. 17-20 of instructions)

A. Filer's Non-Investment Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2008</td>
<td>University of Colorado - Salary as of 6/30/2008</td>
<td>$79,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2007</td>
<td>University of Colorado - Salary</td>
<td>$143,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2006</td>
<td>University of Colorado - Salary</td>
<td>$95,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 2006</td>
<td>Davis Graham &amp; Stubbs LLP - Distributions</td>
<td>$46,077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Spouse's Non-Investment Income - If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, complete this section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2008</td>
<td>Boulder Valley School District, Salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2007</td>
<td>Boulder Valley School District, Salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2008</td>
<td>Colorado Department of Human Services, Childcare Subsidy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 2007</td>
<td>Colorado Department of Human Services, Childcare Subsidy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. REIMBURSEMENTS - transportation, lodging, food, entertainment

(Include those to spouse and dependents (children, see pp. 21-22 of instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. EXEMPT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. GIFTS. (Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 29-31 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXEMPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI. LIABILITIES. (Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 32-33 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington Mutual</td>
<td>Mortgage on mother-in-law's home, Parker, CO</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chase Visa</td>
<td>Credit Card - 0%</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevations Credit Union</td>
<td>Co-signer on auto car loan</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES Student Loan</td>
<td>Co-signer on student loan</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- **No reportable income, assets, or transactions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets (including trust assets)</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>Transaction during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan &quot;529&quot; after which most exempt from prior disclosures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Investment Property 1, Colorado Springs, CO (2003 $26,000)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>L, R</td>
<td>EXEMPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Investment Property 2, Parklo, CO (817,727)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>M, S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. MedLife Insurance Policy</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Federated Govt Obligations Fund Class SE</td>
<td>A.Inv.Inv.</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. AAIAX</td>
<td>A.Inv.Inv.</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PCVAX</td>
<td>A.Inv.Inv.</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. AHFX</td>
<td>B.Inv.Inv.</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. BFAX</td>
<td>A.Inv.Inv.</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. IFAX</td>
<td>A.Inv.Inv.</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. AAGFX</td>
<td>A.Inv.Inv.</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. QCMAX</td>
<td>A.Inv.Inv.</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. QGAX</td>
<td>A.Inv.Inv.</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. QFAFX</td>
<td>A.Inv.Inv.</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. IBFX</td>
<td>A.Inv.Inv.</td>
<td>J, U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Income Data Codes
- **A** = Income over $100,000
- **B** = Income $10,000 to $100,000
- **C** = Income $1,000 to $10,000
- **D** = Income $100 to $1,000
- **E** = Income less than $100

#### Value Codes
- **C** = Cash
- **P** = Property
- **V** = Value

#### Date Codes
- **J** = January
- **M** = May
- **S** = September
- **T** = October
- **D** = December

#### Value Location Codes
- **C** = Cash
- **P** = Property
- **V** = Value

#### Conversion Codes
- **E** = Equal to
- **G** = Greater than
- **L** = Less than
- **R** = Range of
- **T** = Total
- **U** = Unknown
VIII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS - income, value, transactions (Includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See p. 36-40 of filing instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset (Including trust asset)</th>
<th>Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flow &quot;C3&quot; above each item except from prior disclosure</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. AIOFX</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Int/Div.</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. FTFA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Int/Div.</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. TRMCX</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Int/Div.</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. SCWFX</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Int/Div.</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. WMFX</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Int/Div.</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Anthem Nat Lif Ins Co Perspective II</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Metlife Inv Ins Paula L. Share Variable Annuity</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Metlife Inv Ins Paula Variable Annuity</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Prudential Life Ins Co DIA Choice Versus</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

Page 6 of 7

Name of Person Reporting: Arguello, Christene M

Date of Report: 07/11/2008

VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS. (Indicate part of Report)

1. Positions
   6. Director - Colorado Women's Bar Association Foundation - Volunteer

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

Page 7 of 7

Name of Person Reporting: Arguello, Christene M

Date of Report: 07/11/2008

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it was not applicable, statutory provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that earned income from outside employment and bonuses, and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app. § 881 et. seq., 28 U.S.C. § 735, and Judicial Conference regulations.

Signature: Christene M. Arguello

Date: 07/11/2008

NOTE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FALSELY OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (5 U.S.C. app. § 104)

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:
Committee on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 2-363
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544
**FINANCIAL STATEMENT**

**NET WORTH**

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cash on hand and in banks</strong></td>
<td><strong>Notes payable to banks-secured</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</strong></td>
<td><strong>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Listed securities-add schedule</strong></td>
<td><strong>Notes payable to relatives</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unlisted securities-add schedule</strong></td>
<td><strong>Notes payable to others</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accounts and taxes receivable</strong></td>
<td><strong>Accounts and bills due</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Due from relatives and friends</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unpaid income tax</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Due from others</strong></td>
<td><strong>Other unpaid income and interest</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deposits</strong></td>
<td><strong>Real estate mortgages payable-add schedule</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Real estate owned-add schedule</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chattel mortgages and other liens payable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Real estate mortgages receivable</strong></td>
<td><strong>Other debts itemsize:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Auto and personal property</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cash value-life insurance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other assets itemsize:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retirement Accounts (see attached schedule)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total liabilities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>425</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Assets</strong></td>
<td><strong>Net Worth</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Liability and net worth</strong></td>
<td>1 644 097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONTINGENT LIABILITIES**

**GENERAL INFORMATION**

| As endorser, co-maker or guarantor | Are any assets pledged? (Add schedule) | Yes |
| On leases or contracts            | Are you defendant in any suits or legal actions? | NO |
| Legal Claims                      | Have you ever taken bankruptcy? | NO |
| Provision for Federal Income Tax  |                                  |
| Other special debt                |                                  |
### FINANCIAL STATEMENT
### NET WORTH SCHEDULES

**Listed Securities**
- Alcide Corporation $2,450

**Real Estate Owned**
- Personal residence #1 $550,000
- Personal residence #2 200,000
- Investment Property #1 86,000
- Investment Property #2 175,000
- Time share #1 10,000
- Time share #2 3,000
- Time share #3 6,000
- Time share #4 5,000
- **Total Real Estate Owned** $1,035,000

**Retirement Accounts**
- Fidelity Investments $44,140
- Colorado 457 Plan 1,470
- Wachovia/AG Edwards IRA #1 149,989
- Wachovia/AG Edwards IRA #2 35,161
- MLI Variable Annuity #1 67,140
- MLI Variable Annuity #2 9,926
- Jackson Nat Life Variable Annuity #1 10,728
- Jackson Nat Life Variable Annuity #2 31,100
- Best of America Venue Annuity 37,178
- PERA 38,650
- **Total Retirement Accounts** $425,482

**Real Estate Mortgages Payable**
- Personal residence #1 $427,948
- Personal residence #2 92,349
- Investment Property #2 92,609
- **Total Real Estate Mortgages Payable** $612,906

Assets pledged: Real property to secure mortgages.
AFFIDAVIT

I, Christine M. Arguello, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

7/25/08
(DATE)

Christine M. Arguello
(NAME)

ALICE R. CLARK
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF COLORADO

Alice R. Clark
(NOTARY)

Expires 4/20/2012
Chairman LEAHY. Well, thank you. You are one of those rare people that has the distinction of having been nominated by both a Democratic President and a Republican President. I am glad you are here.

Let me ask you the same questions. You are in a State, a beautiful, wonderful State, but a State of great diversity in income, races, creed, everything else. Can somebody come before a court where you preside and look at you, no matter who they are, no matter their background or religion, gender, or anything else, can they look at you and say, “Okay, if I have got a winning case, I win; if I do not, I lose; but it will be solely on what the case I have is”?

Ms. ARGUELLO. Absolutely. I believe that my reputation in the community for fairness and objectivity is very strong. I have lived my life or I have attempted to live my life by the Golden Rule, to do unto others as I would have them do unto me. And so I treat everyone with respect. And the No. 1 lesson I taught my trial lab students was treat everyone as if they were a very important person. It does not matter at what level they interact with them.

Chairman LEAHY. I mentioned my grandparents, and I still remember the details of them coming here from Italy, speaking a different language and having to overcome that, and eventually becoming one of the most respected members of the community for what they had overcome. Is it fair to say that nobody is going to have to overcome those kind of hurdles if they come before your court?

Ms. ARGUELLO. Absolutely not, and that would be very fair to say. I recall—although I was not an immigrant, my family has been in the United States for four or five hundred years. I was bilingual, but I remember being told not to speak Spanish on the playground at school and being punished for having done so. So I am very sensitive to those issues.

Chairman LEAHY. My wife's first language is not English, even though she was born here in the United States. She remembers that. Now, of course, it is a great advantage to be bilingual. I had to learn the same language when we started dating as teenagers because I wanted to know what her parents were saying about me.

[Laughter.]

Chairman LEAHY. And they still let her marry me.

On the recusal issue, do you have any different answer than what has already been given on recusal?

Ms. ARGUELLO. I would say my answer would be exactly as Judge Anello had stated.

Chairman LEAHY. You could possibly have in your career at times when a court has to step in because everything else has failed—the political process and everything else has failed. Do you have any problem with that? I am thinking back to U.S. v. Carolane Products. It is now a 60-, 70-year-old case, but the Supreme Court held that legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more exact judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the 14th Amendment than are most other types of legislation. In other words, if an un-
fair result is coming about in legislation, do you believe that the
court has a duty for stronger scrutiny of such legislation?

Ms. ARGUELLO. I believe if a case were to come before me and
I were fortunate enough to have been confirmed by the Senate, my
job would be to review the controlling precedent and attempt to
come to a decision that would be within the rule of law.

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Hatch

Senator HATCH. I have to say that I am pleased with this whole
set of nominees, and, frankly, I think you have covered the basic
questions that need to be covered.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Now, Mr. Brimmer, you have not had a chance to introduce
your family. I mentioned that he was chief of the Special Prosecu-
tions Section in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the District of Colo-
rado, and I mentioned Chief Deputy District Attorney in the Den-
ver District Attorney’s Office. Those of us who had the opportunity
to be district attorneys, or as we call them in Vermont “State’s At-
torneys,” appreciate that; Harvard and Yale, obviously a great
background. But we have not heard whether you have family mem-
bers here, and I realize you are here on short notice, but do you
have family members here?

STATEMENT OF PHILIP A. BRIMMER, NOMINEE TO BE
DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Mr. BRIMMER. I do, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to take this
opportunity to introduce them to the Committee.

Chairman LEAHY. Please.

Mr. BRIMMER. My wonderful wife, Dana Brimmer, is here. My
brother Andy Brimmer is here. And my cousin Rob Wallace is also
here.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you all for being here.

Mr. Brimmer, you have been in private practice. You have also
been a prosecutor. You could have litigants before you on criminal
matters as well as private matters. Let us go first with the crimi-
nal matters. Would you be able to fairly look at a criminal case,
even though you have been a prosecutor, would you be able to fair-
ly judge it on the merits without a bias toward either side?

Mr. BRIMMER. Yes, I absolutely could do that. As you know from
being a prosecutor, prosecutors wear different hats. One of the hats
is being not just an advocate but being a minister of justice. And
so in a role as a prosecutor, you need to look at fairness to the de-
fendants in deciding whether to charge them, whether to offer
them a plea bargain, or whether you have sufficient evidence to
proceed. So I am confident that I can do that and not simply be
in the role of an advocate on behalf the Government.

Chairman LEAHY. And you have been in private practice, and
you have been in the prosecutor’s office. Do you have any doubts
of being able to recuse yourself if a case came up that might have
involved directly matters that you had handled before?

Mr. BRIMMER. No. In fact, if I were lucky enough to be confirmed,
I would set up a procedure with the clerk’s office so that I could
be informed if there were any matter that my name is associated
with from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and also given the fact that
I am the chief of the Special Prosecutions Unit, if any case came
from one of those attorneys, I would in all likelihood recuse if it seemed to be one that arose during the time that I was there.

Chairman LEAHY. And do you agree that no one is above the law? And I am thinking back to the infamous torture memo that we can immunize—Presidents can immunize people from legal action itself. Would you agree with me that no one is above the law? You would not be as a Federal judge. Senator Hatch and I would not be as U.S. Senators. And the President would not be and nobody else would be.

Mr. BRIMMER. I strongly agree with that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEAHY. That it keeps our system of Government working.

Mr. BRIMMER. Absolutely. If it were something else, then the system would not be fair.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Senator Hatch.

Senator HATCH. Again, very happy to welcome you to the Committee. I frankly support you very strongly, and I look forward to seeing you be confirmed.

Mr. BRIMMER. Thank you.

[The biographical information follows.]

Chairman LEAHY. With this grueling part to have somebody show up here on short notice, especially Ms. Arguello and Mr. Brimmer, I appreciate you all being here. I appreciate your family coming. Sorry we had to take you out of school, young man, but—

[Laughter.]

Chairman LEAHY. If you are like my grandchildren, you probably did not mind that.

We will stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair, and we will keep the record open, and I would hope that we could get cooperation on both sides of the aisle to move quickly. I appreciate Senator Hatch, who is sitting here, I appreciate his efforts in helping move this forward, and I appreciate Senator Specter’s willingness to waive the notice on the two nominees from Colorado. I realize that meant you have to move very quickly in getting out here, but you were probably willing to do that under the circumstances.

We stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).

   Philip Andrew Brimmer

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.

   United States District Judge for the District of Colorado

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.

   **Office:** United States Attorney's Office
                1225 17th Street, Suite 700
                Denver, Colorado 80202

   **Residence:** Denver, Colorado

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.

   1959; Rawlins, Wyoming

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse's occupation, employer's name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.

   I am married to Dana Jones Brimmer (previous names: Dana Elisabeth Jones, Dana Jones Benet). She is employed as a Behavioral Scientist with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (McKing Contractor); 1600 Clifton Road NE; Atlanta, Georgia, 30333

   We have no dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.

   1982-1985, Yale Law School, J.D. (May 1985)

7. **Employment Record**: List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

**Employment:**

11/01 – present  
United States Attorney’s Office, District of Colorado  
1225 17th Street, Suite 700  
Denver, Colorado, 80202  
Chief of Special Prosecutions Section (10/06 – present)  
Chief of Major Crimes Section (6/06 – 10/06)  
Assistant United States Attorney (11/01 – 6/06)

5/94 – 11/01  
Denver District Attorney’s Office  
303 West Colfax Avenue  
Denver, Colorado, 80204  
Chief Deputy District Attorney (1/01 – 11/01)  
Deputy District Attorney (5/94 – 1/01)

3/87 – 5/94  
Kirkland & Ellis  
1999 Broadway  
Denver, Colorado, 80202  
Associate

8/85 – 3/87  
United States District Court, District of Colorado  
1929 Stout Street  
Denver, CO 80294  
Law Clerk to the Honorable Zita L. Weinshienk

6/83 – 8/83  
Kirkland & Ellis.  
1225 17th Street  
Denver, CO 80202  
Summer Associate
6/84 – 8/84
McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen
3 Embarcadero Center, San Francisco, CA 94111
Summer Associate

6/81 – 8/82
Jack Ferguson Associates
203 Maryland Ave. N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
Research Assistant

Other affiliations (Volunteer positions):
St. Barnabas Episcopal Church
1280 Vine Street
Denver, Colorado, 80206
Senior Warden (2/01 – 2/04)
Vestry Member (2/89 – 2/93; 2/00 – 2/01)

8. **Military Service and Draft Status:** Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

I have not served in the Military.

9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

Harvard College: Phi Beta Kappa.

Harvard College: Magna cum Laude.

Century III Leaders Scholarship, one of two recipients from Wyoming (two awarded from each state) (1977).


Criminal Justice Award from the Colorado Coalition against Sexual Assault for demonstration exemplary sensitivity in the field of sexual assault prosecution (June 2001).

Performance Award, Department of Justice (Dec. 2003).

Special Achievement Award, Department of Justice (April 2002).
10. **Bar Associations:** List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

Past member of the Colorado Bar Association and the American Bar Association.

11. **Bar and Court Admission:**

   a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

   Colorado, November 1, 1985

   There have been no lapses in membership.

   b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

   Colorado State courts, 1985

   United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 1986

   United States District Court, District of Colorado, 1987

12. **Memberships:**

   c. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

   Environmental Crimes Task Force (approximately 1997 to 1999).

   James Joyce Reading Society (approximately 1986 to present).

   Rocky Mountain Harvard University Club (approximately 1986 to present).

   Colorado Yale Association (approximately 1986 to present).
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St. Barnabas Episcopal Parish (1986 to present)
Chairman of the Information Sharing Committee (2000).
Member of Personnel Committee (approximately 2001 to present).
St. Barnabas representative to Richard Hooker Forum.

Denver Bonsai Society (approximately 1985 to 1987)

Denver Police Protective Association (approximately 2000 to 2007)

Internet Safety Foundation (2007 to present)

d. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct
states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization
that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please
indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above
currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or
religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical
implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken
to change these policies and practices.

No.

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor,
editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including
material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all
published material to the Committee.

None.

b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you
prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association,
committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If
you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give
the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document,
and a summary of its subject matter.

None.

c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other
communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal
interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

None.

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

February 20, 2002 – Speech at training dinner at the Denver Athletic Club, 1325 Glenarm Place, Denver CO, for Denver District Attorney’s Office on “Trial Issues Involving Co-Defendants.”

September 24, 2002 – Gave an hour-long presentation with a state assistant attorney general at the Copper Mountain ski resort, Colorado, for the annual conference of Colorado District Attorneys entitled “Trial Issues Involving Co-Defendants.”

June 29, 2004 – Brief remarks to ATF-sponsored conference of federally licensed firearms dealers at Westin Hotel, 1672 Lawrence Street, Denver CO. Subject: The ways firearms dealers can assist the prosecution of prohibited persons who attempt to purchase firearms.


September 21, 2007 – Brief introductory remarks at Internet Safety Summit in Broomfield, Colorado, regarding importance of educators taking steps to protect children from internet predators.


October 23, 2007 – Speech to FBI Citizen’s Academy at Macaroni Grill, 2500 E. 1st Avenue, Denver, CO. Subject: The FBI’s interaction with the Colorado U.S. Attorney’s Office.
November 28, 2007 – Speech to the Doyle Inn of Court at the University Club, 1673 N. Sherman Street, Denver, Colorado, on internet safety.

February 27, 2008 – Helped to lead discussion regarding federal grand juries for a class at Colorado University Law School in Boulder, Colorado taught by Judge Morris Hoffman, Denver District Court Judge.

e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

Comment to reporter for Denver Westword newspaper regarding a murder case that I prosecuted, People v. Meshel Turtle Sino; May 1997.

Comment to reporter from Rocky Mountain News regarding sentencing of a co-defendant in a murder case, People v. Thomas Holden; March 24, 2000.


14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

I have not held a judicial office.

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

   a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

   b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

   c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

   d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

   e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and
f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

I have not served as a judge.

16. Recusal: If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

I have not served as a judge.

17. Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

I have held no public offices other than my employment with the Department of Justice and with the Denver District Attorney's Office. I have no candidacies for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.
Mitch Morrissey, Denver District Attorney election. Campaigned on behalf of Mitch Morrissey in the summer of 2004 during the primary election.

Bill Ritter, Denver District Attorney election. Campaigned on behalf of Bill Ritter in 1996.

18. **Legal Career**: Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

   I served as a law clerk to the Honorable Zita L. Weinshienk
   United States District Court, District of Colorado
   August 1985 to March 1987

ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

   I have not practiced alone.

iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

   11/01 – present
   United States Attorney’s Office, District of Colorado.
   1225 17th Street, Suite 700
   Denver, Colorado, 80202
   Chief of Special Prosecutions Section (10/06 – present)
   Chief of Major Crimes Section (6/06 – 10/06)
   Assistant United States Attorney (11/01 – 6/06)

   5/94 – 11/01
   Denver District Attorney’s Office
   303 West Colfax Avenue
   Denver, Colorado, 80204
   Chief Deputy District Attorney (1/01 – 11/01)
   Deputy District Attorney (5/94 – 1/01)

   3/87 – 5/94
   Kirkland & Ellis
   1999 Broadway
   Denver, Colorado, 80202
   Associate
b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

I began my legal career as a law clerk to U.S. District Court Judge Zita L. Weinshenk. Through my clerkship with Judge Weinshenk, I learned a great deal about federal procedure and, through observation, about the qualities that make a good judge. In particular, I saw how important judicial demeanor is to litigants’ sense of whether they were treated fairly.

After my clerkship in 1987, I joined the Denver branch of Kirkland & Ellis. My practice had a great deal of variety. I worked on matters involving commercial disputes, real estate issues, labor relations, employee benefit disputes, and Superfund litigation.

My law practice changed dramatically when I joined the Denver District Attorney’s Office and began practicing criminal law. My primary reason for joining the Denver DA’s Office was to gain trial experience. I soon realized that it was also a privilege to represent the State of Colorado. As a prosecutor, I could always be on the side of justice: If the facts were egregious, I could seek punishment. If the facts were weak, I could offer a plea bargain, make an appropriate sentence recommendation, or dismiss the case. At the Denver District Attorney’s Office, I started in the County Court division, where I handled misdemeanor cases such as drunk driving and domestic violence matters, moved to the Juvenile Division where I handled charges ranging from theft to sexual assaults, and then transferred to the District Court Division, where I handled adult felony matters. In January 2001, I was promoted to a Chief Deputy, where I was the Chief of Courtroom 16 and later Courtroom 11. As a Chief Deputy, I supervised two attorneys, an investigator, a victim advocate, and a legal assistant. I also participated in office management meetings and was periodically on homicide duty, meaning that, if a murder took place, I was available for consultation or to go to the scene.

My legal practice changed again when I joined the U.S. Attorney’s Office in November 2001. The interview was memorable – it took place on the afternoon of September 11, 2001, when both the Denver DA’s Office and the U.S. Attorney’s Office were officially closed due to the terrorist attacks and were staffed only by senior management. At the U.S. Attorney’s Office, I joined a team of prosecutors in the Major Crimes Section handling gun cases being prosecuted under the Attorney General’s initiative to reduce gun violence, Project Safe Neighborhoods. The philosophy of Project Safe Neighborhoods is to aggressively prosecute felons in possession of firearms. I also handled a wide variety of other cases, including prison crimes, immigration cases involving aggravated re-
entry to the United States, and escapes. In June 2006, I was promoted to
Chief of the Major Crimes Section. There I supervised ten attorneys who
handled crimes involving firearms, immigration, bank robberies, identity
theft, prison assaults, and postal crimes. This Section accounted for
approximately half of all criminal cases filed by the U.S. Attorney’s
Office. When Troy Eid became the U.S. Attorney later that summer, he
reorganized the Criminal Division and named me the chief of the newly-
created Special Prosecutions Section, which handles child exploitation
cases, cyber crimes, capital crimes, and prison crimes.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

In private practice, with Kirkland & Ellis (1987 – 1994) my typical clients
were corporations who retained the firm for a specific case. I specialized
in toxic tort litigation and related insurance coverage disputes during the
last four years at the firm.

As a criminal prosecutor with the Denver District Attorney’s Office I
represented the State of Colorado.

As an Assistant United States Attorney, my client is the United States of
America.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether
you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of
your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

At Kirkland & Ellis, I appeared in court occasionally, usually in connection with
motions hearings. While a Denver District Attorney, I appeared in state court
almost every day during my seven years at the Denver District Attorney’s Office.
Since becoming an Assistant United States Attorney, I appear in court frequently,
usually several times a week. I am occasionally involved in post-trial proceedings
in Denver District Court regarding matters that I worked on as a Deputy District
Attorney.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 60%
   2. state courts of record: 40%
   3. other courts: 10%

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings: 35%
   2. criminal proceedings: 65%
d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

I have tried approximately 110 trials to verdict or judgment. I tried 87 of the trials by myself. I tried the remaining cases with another prosecutor.

i. What percentage of these trials were:
   1. jury: 83%
   2. non-jury: 17%

c. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

I have not practiced before the Supreme Court of the United States.

19. Litigation: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

a. the date of representation;

b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and

c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

counsel for Rudy Sablan claimed that William Sablan was mentally ill and was responsible for the homicide. The jury convicted the defendant of First Degree Murder, but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict in the penalty phase of the trial. By operation of law, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Co-counsel Brenda Taylor and I divided the trial responsibilities equally, as well as responsibilities for the numerous motions hearings. I handled the mental health experts. Various rulings of the court can be found on Westlaw. See, e.g., Order re constitutional challenges, 2006 WL 1028780 (D. Colo. April 18, 2006).

2. United States v. William Sablan, Case No. 09-cr-531-WYD. Trial to jury. January 24 to April 6, 2007. U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Judge Wiley Daniel. I represented the United States. Co-counsel: Brenda Taylor, U.S. Attorney’s Office, 1225 17th Street, Suite 700, Denver, Colorado 80202, (303) 454-0206. Defendant’s counsel: Nathan Chambers, 1601 Blake Street, Denver, Colorado 80202, (303) 825-2222. Charge: First Degree Murder. Attorney General Janet Reno authorized seeking the death penalty. Facts: See description of U.S. v. Rudy Sablan above. At trial, defense counsel claimed that William Sablan was incapable of deliberation due to mental illness. After the jury convicted the defendant of First Degree Murder, the defense primarily relied upon the defendant’s mental health history as a mitigator in the penalty phase. The jury was unable to reach a verdict in that phase of the trial. By operation of law, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Co-counsel Brenda Taylor and I divided the trial responsibilities equally, as well as responsibilities for the numerous motions hearings. I handled the mental health experts. Various rulings of the court can be found on Westlaw. See, e.g., Order re constitutional challenges, 2006 WL 1028780 (D. Colo. April 18, 2006).

3. U.S. v. Clemmeth Nevels, Case No. 04-cr-417-LTB. Trial to jury. March 6-10, 2006. U.S. District Court, District of Colorado. Judge Louis Babcock. I represented the United States. Co-counsel Joshua Stein, 5041 Pleasant Ave., Norfolk, VA 23518, (303) 847-3365. Defense counsel: Dana Casper, 600 South Cherry, Suite 305, Denver CO 80246, (303) 321-5850. Charge: Felon in Possession of a Firearm. Facts: Nevels shot and killed a fellow gang member in Nevels’ residence. The police got a call about the shooting. When they arrived, Nevels said that a guy inside his apartment pulled a gun on him and he did what he had to do. His girlfriend told the police that she was upstairs and heard the gunfire. The defendant then came upstairs and told her that the victim had pulled a gun on him. The victim was on the couch and had been shot multiple times. A pistol was near the body. At trial, a Denver Police Department detective testified that an analysis of bullet trajectories showed that the victim was shot rising up from a sitting position and then adopted a defensive posture when the other bullets hit him, which was inconsistent with the defendant possessing the firearm for self-defense. The defendant was convicted of the charge and sentenced to 300 months prison. Note: This prosecution was significant in that state murder charges had been declined due to self-defense issues. Co-counsel Joshua Stein handled the crime scene reconstruction expert; otherwise, trial duties were divided equally. Reported at 490 F.3d 800 (10th Cir. 2007).


6. **People v. Darnell Weare**, Case No. 02CR769. Trial to jury. January 5-13, 2004. Denver District Court. Judge Martin Egelhofer. I represented the People. Co-counsel: Timothy Twining and Verna Carpenter, Denver District Attorney’s Office, 201 West Colfax Avenue, Denver Colorado 80204, (720) 913-9000. Defendant’s attorney: Charles Elliott, 1801 Broadway, Suite 1100, Denver, Colorado, 80202, (303) 623-2013. Charges: First Degree Murder, Felony Murder, First Degree Kidnapping. Facts: A federal/state drug task force suspected that Darnell Weare and Andre Shoeboot were using a car lot on Colfax Avenue in Denver as a front for selling drugs. The task force tapped the phones of Weare and Shoeboot and set up surveillance on the business. When the task force saw a suspected cocaine supplier make a delivery and saw Weare put a briefcase in the trunk of a car on the lot, the task force got a search warrant for the car, broke into the trunk, and removed the drugs. The goal was to generate chatter on the tapped phones when Weare realized that the drugs were gone. When Weare and Shoeboot noticed that the drugs had been stolen, they accused an innocent man staying at a cheap motel next door of taking them. They eventually took him into a garage bay and strangled him. When the task
force officers monitoring the phones realized something was wrong, they raided the
business and found the victim’s body. Co-counsel Tim Twining, Verna Carpenter, and I
divided trial responsibilities equally. I cross-examined the defendant. Verdict: Guilty of
Reckless Manslaughter, First Degree Kidnapping, Felony Murder, and Conspiracy to
Commit First Degree Murder. Weare was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.
Reported at 155 P.3d 527 (Colo. App. 2006). Note: I tried this case while at the U.S.
Attorney’s Office. I was appointed a special prosecutor for the case at the request of
Denver DA Bill Ritter.

October 30 to November 21, 2000. Judge Joseph Meyer. I represented the People. Co-
counsel: Henry Cooper, Denver District Attorney’s Office, 201 West Colfax Avenue,
Denver, Colorado 80204, (720) 913-9000. Defendant’s counsel: James Castle, 1860
Race Street, Denver, Colorado 80206, (303) 675-0500. Charges: First Degree Murder,
Felony Murder, First Degree Sexual Assault, First Degree Burglary, and Aggravated
Robbery. Denver District Attorney Bill Ritter sought the death penalty in this case.
Facts: Donita Page was a Maryland parolee sent to a halfway house in Denver. On
February 24, 1999, before being sent back to Maryland on a bus, Page broke into a house
across the street. While he was still in the house, one of the residents, Peyton Tuthill, age
24, returned to let her dog out. Page beat Tuthill, brutally raped her, and bound her with
a cord. He demanded money from her and went to her SUV to look for her purse. When
he returned, Tuthill was getting loose, so he cut her throat to stop her screams and
stabbed her in the heart, killing her. He then took the bus back to Maryland. Denver
police located Page in a Maryland jail. The defendant made a statement implicating
himself, and DNA evidence conclusively linked him to the crime. At the liability phase,
the defense contended that he had brain damage and, as a result, could not deliberate.
The People put on evidence that his neurological tests were normal. Verdict: The jury
convicted him of all charges. The penalty phase, which at that time consisted of a trial to
a three-judge panel (Judge Meyer, Judge Brooke Jackson, and Judge Leyland Anderson),
took place between February 20 and February 27, 2001. The panel sentenced the
defendant to life imprisonment. Co-counsel Henry Cooper and I divided the trial and
motion responsibilities equally. I handled the mental health experts and contact with the
victim’s family.

8. People v. Christopher Ball, Case No. 99CR4530. Denver District Court. Trial to jury.
Benedetti, Denver District Attorney’s Office, 201 West Colfax Avenue, Denver, Colorado
80204, (720) 913-9000. Defendant’s counsel: Joseph Gavaldon, 125 S. Howes Street,
Two homeless men in their 20s, Nathan Harrison and Thomas Holden, saw an older
homeless man, Melvin Washington, at a 7-11 store in downtown Denver. Washington
asked them for spare change, which they considered a sign of disrespect. Later in the
evening, Christopher Ball, Harrison, and Holden saw Washington sleeping on a steam
grate near Skyline Park, which they considered their turf. They kicked Washington in the
ribs and stomped on his head. Washington died a week later from his injuries. Co-
counsel Bonnie Benedetti and I divided the trial responsibilities equally. Verdict: Guilty of Manslaughter. Ball was sentenced to ten years prison.

9. **People v. O’Neal, Williams, and Mingo**, Case Nos. 98CR2671, 98CR2672, and 98CR2673. Trials to jury (O’Neal and Williams on December 8, 1998; Mingo on February 8, 1999). Denver District Court. Judge Stephen Phillips. I represented the People. Co-counsel: William Robbins, Denver District Court Judge, 1437 Bannock Street, Courtroom 7, Denver CO 80202, (720) 865-8308. Defense counsel: Robert Pepin represented O’Neal, Office of the Federal Public Defender, 633 17th Street, Suite 1000, Denver, CO 80202, (303) 294-7002; Harry Holtzman represented Williams, 303 16th Street, Suite 200, Denver CO 80202, (303) 629-9700; Evans Garcia (deceased) represented Mingo. Charge: First Degree Murder. Facts: Moustapha Marouf, a taxicab driver from Morocco, was leaving an apartment building in Denver when he bumped his cab into a car in the parking lot. The car’s owner, Christopher Buchanan, saw the collision from the balcony of his apartment. Buchanan and his friends, Bruce Mingo, Demetric O’Neal, and Brett Williams, then ran down to the parking lot. O’Neal and Mingo hit Marouf in the face. Then all four started kicking Marouf on the ground. O’Neal ran up and stomped the victim in the head with both feet, followed by Mingo stomping him very hard in the face. They then put Marouf in the trunk of his cab and left in Buchanan’s car. The police responded and found the victim dead in the trunk. Buchanan pled guilty to Attempted 2nd Degree Murder and was sentenced to 10 years prison. Verdicts: The jury convicted O’Neal of Manslaughter and Williams of First Degree Assault. The court sentenced O’Neal to 12 years prison and Williams to 20 years prison. The jury convicted Mingo of First Degree Murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Co-counsel William Robbins and I divided trial responsibilities equally. The one reported decision is **People v. O’Neal**, 32 P.3d 533 (Colo. App. 2000).

10. **People v. Mesole Turtle Sirio**, Case No. 96CR304. Trial to Jury. March 18-21, 1997, Denver District Court, Colorado. Judge Larry Naves. I represented the People. Co-counsel Thomas Mulvahill, 1601 Blake Street, Denver, CO 80202, (303) 825-2222. Defense counsel: Robert Berger, 7476 E. 29th Ave., Suite 108, Denver, CO 80238, (303) 436-1596. Charges: First degree murder, felony murder, aggravated murder, second degree kidnapping. Facts: Victim Manuel Rodriguez disappeared on May 17, 1996. Accomplice Bridget Zorn contacted the police anonymously on May 19 to report that an unnamed friend had hired a man named "Roberto" into a home, struck him in the head with a hammer, tied him up, drove him to the foothills, and then dumped him into a creek. The victim's body was found two weeks later, at which time Zorn came forward and made a statement identifying the defendant. When arrested, defendant Sirio said, "I'm not taking this alone; Bridget is an accomplice." Defendant Sirio told another witness that she had hit her "abusive boyfriend" with a hammer, and that she and her girlfriend wrapped him in a carpet and dumped him into a river while still alive. Zorn testified against Sirio. Verdict: Guilty of all counts. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Co-counsel Thomas Mulvahill and I split the trial duties equally.
20. **Legal Activities**: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organization(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

Since becoming Chief of the Special Prosecutions Section at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, I have been involved in Project Safe Childhood, the Attorney General’s program to protect children from internet predators and pedophiles. Through this program, I have worked to form partnerships with state and federal law enforcement agencies and district attorneys to prosecute child exploitation and child pornography cases. I have also helped to identify ways to educate children and parents about the dangers of sexual predators on the internet. I supervise the AUSA who serves as the Project Safe Childhood coordinator, have conducted training for prosecutors at the U.S. Attorney’s Office and at the Colorado District Attorney’s Conference, and have participated in and spoken at community education events.

The most significant civil matter that I worked on that did not progress to trial took place between about 1989 and 1993 when I represented Hughes Aircraft Company concerning groundwater contamination from waste disposal near the Tucson, Arizona Airport. There were two aspects to this litigation. First, the defense of a class action toxic tort suit against Hughes and several other companies who had operations in the airport area. Second, the defense of declaratory judgment actions by Lloyd’s of London and other insurance carriers who disclaimed coverage for any potential liabilities. Another associate and I coordinated the defense of approximately 80 current or former employees’ depositions and responded to related motions filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona.

21. **Teaching**: What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

I have not taught a formal course, but I have given training speeches to Denver police officers on the proper way to interact with sex assault victims; to Denver District Attorneys and to the Colorado District Attorney’s Council’s fall conference on co-defendant issues; to police officers and district attorneys, on federal firearms laws; and to U.S. Attorneys, federal agents, and to the Colorado District Attorney’s Council’s fall conference on prosecuting child pornography cases.

22. **Deferred Income/Future Benefits**: List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted
contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

None.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

No.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)


25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement.

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

The parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during my initial service in the position to which I have been nominated would include criminal matters for which I entered an appearance as an AUSA or which were pending in the Special Prosecutions Section of the U.S. Attorney’s Office while I worked there. Although I have done no civil work in the U.S. Attorney’s Office, I would consider disclosing my past employment to civil litigants where the United States is a party to the action and the matter was pending while I was employed in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Another potential conflict would be any matter where the law firm of Holland & Hart represents a party, as my sister, Geraldine A. Brimmer, is a partner of that firm.
b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

In all circumstances I will follow the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and applicable statutes, policies and procedures. For criminal matters assigned to me, the Clerk’s Office can alert me if I entered an appearance as an AUSA. For cases being handled by members of the Special Prosecutions Section of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, I would make inquiries in open court of the assigned AUSA as to whether I was involved in any way in the investigation, charging, or supervision of the case.

27. **Pro Bono Work**: An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

As a Department of Justice employee, I am restricted from representing clients in criminal matters. See 5 C.F.R. § 3801.106. However, I regard my work as both a District Attorney and an Assistant United States Attorney as service to the community. While not performing representational “pro bono” work, I give back to the community in other ways. For example, while a Denver District Attorney, I was part of the Capitol Hill Neighborhood Association, which was a community outreach program of the DA’s Office that addressed crime concerns of residents and businesses in Capitol Hill. I was also a representative from the Denver DA’s Office to the Sexual Assault Interagency Council and the Rape Assistance Awareness Program. In addition, I participated in several “phone-a-thons” for Denver Victims Service Center, a victim assistance organization. While at the Denver DA’s Office, I taught a course for five years called “Courtrooms to Classrooms” to teach middle school children the basics about the legal system. As an AUSA in 2003, I was part of the state Restraining Order Committee that proposed revisions to Colorado domestic violence restraining orders. I have also judged a number of mock trials for various law school classes. In September 2007, I participated in the Internet Safety Summit in Louisville, Colorado, which provided information to educators and school computer technicians regarding protecting children from sexual predators on the internet, which is believed to have been the first of its kind in the country. I taped a segment for Comcast’s Metro Beat TV “Student Voices” television program in October 2007 on Internet Safety (viewable at http://www.metrobeat.tv/svFp4.aspx#14). In November 2007, I gave a speech to the Doyle Inn of Court in Denver on the subject of child exploitation through the internet.

28. **Selection Process**:

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your
jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

On January 10, 2008, Sean Conway, Senator Wayne Allard’s chief of staff, interviewed me concerning the vacancy on the District Court for the District of Colorado caused by the death of Judge Phillip Figa. On January 17, 2008, Senator Allard and his State Director interviewed me at Senator Allard’s office in Englewood, Colorado. Later that day, Senator Allard’s office informed me that Senator Allard would submit my name to the White House as one of seven persons to fill the three vacancies on the District Court for the District of Colorado.

On January 17, 2008, Senator Ken Salazar announced the formation of a bipartisan commission (“the Salazar Commission”) to recommend persons to him to fill the vacancies on the District Court. I submitted an application to the Salazar Commission on February 15, 2008. On March 14, 2008, I had an interview with the Salazar Commission, although I did not make the Commission’s short list. On April 3, 2008, Senator Salazar announced that he was nominating three persons for the three vacancies for the District of Colorado.

On April 15, 2008, the White House called me to schedule an interview. On April 29, 2008, staff from the Office of White House Counsel and the Department of Justice interviewed me at the White House. On May 16, 2008, the White House informed me of its intention move forward with my possible nomination for one of the vacancies on the District Court for the District of Colorado. Since that time, I have had conversations with staff from the Department of Justice regarding the pre-nomination paperwork and the nomination process. My nomination was submitted to the Senate on July 10, 2008.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No.
**FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT**

**NOMINATION FILING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Person Reporting (Last name, first, middle initial)</th>
<th>2. Court or Organization</th>
<th>3. Date of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Browner, Philip A</td>
<td>U.S. District Court, Colorado</td>
<td>07/11/2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Title (Check III if judge indicates active or senior status; magistrate judges indicate full or part time)</th>
<th>5. Report Type (Check appropriate type)</th>
<th>6. Reporting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Judge - Nominee</td>
<td>Initial</td>
<td>06/01/2007 to 06/05/2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Chamber or Office Address</th>
<th>8. Other information contained in this Report and any responses to prior report(s) are to the best of the person's knowledge and belief, correct and complete in all respects.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1225 17th Street, Suite 700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver, CO 80202</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IMPORTANT NOTES:** The instructions accompanying this form must be followed. Complete all parts, checking the NO box for each part where you have no reportable information. Sign on last page.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. POSITIONS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 9-12 of instructions)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X NONE (No reportable positions.)</td>
<td>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</td>
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<td>1.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II. AGREEMENTS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 13-14 of instructions)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NONE (No reportable agreements.)</td>
<td>PARTIES AND TERMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. 2001</td>
<td>Denver Employees Retirement Plan; position at age 55 (reduced) or age 65; no control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME. (Reporting individual and spouse; see pp. 17-20 of instructions.)

A. Filer’s Non-Investment Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME (yours, not spouse’s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X  NONE (No reportable non-investment income.)

B. Spouse’s Non-Investment Income — If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, complete this section.

(Other amount not required except for insurance.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Inc. — salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control &amp; Prevention — salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>McGuire Consulting Corp. — salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. REIMBURSEMENTS — Transportation, lodging, food, entertainment.

(Include those to spouse and dependents children. See pp. 15-17 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NONE (No reportable reimbursements.)
V. GIFTS. (Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 28-30 of instructions.)

- NONE (No reportable gifts.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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VI. LIABILITIES. (Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 32-35 of instructions.)

- NONE (No reportable liabilities.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Direct Loan Servicing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center – U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Education</td>
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<td></td>
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|        |             |            |
|        |             |            |
VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Person Reporting</th>
<th>Date of Report</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brienne, Philip A</td>
<td>07/11/2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets (Excluding trust assets)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan NCY, stock, mutual fund, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A. Description of Assets (Excluding trust assets)**

- **1. DWS Direct**
  - **Type of Asset:** Interest
  - **Taxable Income:** J
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T
  - **Exempt:** Exempt

- **2. DWS Newport Money Market**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** J
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **3. Van Kampen High Yield Municipal Fund A**
  - **Type of Asset:** Interest
  - **Taxable Income:** J
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **4. Van Kampen Equity & Income**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** J
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **5. Van Kampen Comstock Class A (IRA)**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** J
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **6. Van Kampen Mid Cap Growth Fund A (IRA)**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** J
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **7. Van Kampen Emerging Markets Class A (IRA)**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** J
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **8. Vanguard 500 Index**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** O
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **9. Vanguard Intermediate Term Bond**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** K
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **10. Vanguard Precious Metals**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** K
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **11. Vanguard REIT Index**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** K
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **12. Vanguard Total International Stock**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** K
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **13. Vanguard Long-Term Tax Exempt Bond**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** K
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **14. Vanguard Prime Money Market (IRA)**
  - **Type of Asset:** Interest
  - **Taxable Income:** J
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **15. Vanguard Long-Term Bond Index (IRA)**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** J
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **16. Vanguard Extended Market Index (IRA)**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** M
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

- **17. Vanguard 500 Index (Robo-IRA)**
  - **Type of Asset:** Dividend
  - **Taxable Income:** J
  - **Taxable Exempt:** T

**B. Gross Value at fair market value**

**C. Gross value at end of reporting period**

**D. Transactions during reporting period**

**E. Identity of person (other than reportee) who made dispositions**

---

**Notes:**

- **Income Code:**
  - F: Income over $20,000
  - E: Income $10,000 - $20,000
  - D: Income $5,000 - $10,000
  - C: Income $1,000 - $5,000
  - B: Income $100 - $1,000
  - A: Income less than $100

- **Value Code:**
  - Non-Filer
  - Low
  - Mid
  - High
  - Very High

- **Book Value:**
  - A: $100,000 - $500,000
  - B: $50,000 - $100,000
  - C: $10,000 - $50,000
  - D: $1,000 - $10,000
  - E: Less than $1,000

- **Place of Record:**
  - A: 1099A
  - B: 1099B
  - C: 1099C
  - D: 1099D
  - E: 1099E

VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00700 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- **NONE** (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset (including trust assets)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has &quot;YOU&quot; ever received any assets from prior disclosures</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (e.g., div., rent, cust., etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Method Code 1 (A-B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Method Code 2 (A-B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date (M, D)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Example Entries:

18. Vanguard Pacific Index (Rob RIA)
   - A: Dividend
   - B: J
   - C: T

19. Vanguard Windsor II (IRA)
   - A: Dividend
   - B: L
   - C: T

20. Vanguard Total Stock Market Index (Rob RIA)
   - A: Dividend
   - B: J
   - C: T

21. Berkshire Hathaway Class B
   - A: None
   - B: K
   - C: T

22. Principal Life Govt & Eq Bond (401k)
   - A: Dividend
   - B: J
   - C: T

23. Principal Life Large Cap Stock Index (401k)
   - A: Dividend
   - B: J
   - C: T

24. Principal Life Mid Cap Stock Index (401k)
   - A: Dividend
   - B: J
   - C: T

25. Denver Employees Retirement Plan
   - A: None
   - B: K
   - C: T

26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

#### Income Codes:

1. Item Income Code:
   - 0: Other
   - 1: Self-Employed
   - 2: Rob RIA
   - 3: IRA
   - 4: 401(k)
   - 5: Other

2. Value Code:
   - 1: Less than $10,000
   - 2: $10,000 - $20,000
   - 3: $20,000 - $40,000
   - 4: $40,000 - $60,000
   - 5: $60,000 - $80,000
   - 6: $80,000 - $100,000
   - 7: $100,000 - $200,000
   - 8: $200,000 - $500,000
   - 9: $500,000 - $1,000,000
   - 10: $1,000,000 - $5,000,000
   - 11: $5,000,000 - $10,000,000
   - 12: $10,000,000 - $20,000,000
   - 13: $20,000,000 - $50,000,000
   - 14: $50,000,000 - $100,000,000
   - 15: $100,000,000 - $250,000,000
   - 16: $250,000,000 - $500,000,000
   - 17: $500,000,000 - $1,000,000,000
   - 18: $1,000,000,000 or more

3. Value Method Code:
   - A: Market Value
   - B: Fair Market Value
   - C: Revalued
   - D: Empirical Method
   - E: Other

4. Description of Asset (including trust assets)
   - A: Name of Trustee or Custodian
   - B: Description of Asset
   - C: Value of Asset
   - D: Date of Report
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

Page 6 of 7

VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS.

Section III.A (Non-Investment Income) – I received income during the reporting period from employment by the United States.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

Page 7 of 7

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it met applicable statutory provisions prohibiting such disclosure.

I further certify that honorariums from outside employment and bonuses and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app. § 106 and 18 U.S.C. § 203(b), and Judicial Conference regulations.

Signature: ____________________________ Date: 7-11-08

NOTE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FALSIFIES OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (18 U.S.C. § 1001)

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:

Committee on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 2-300
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544
### FINANCIAL STATEMENT

#### NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-odd schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed securities-odd schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrealized gains-odd schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable-odd schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-odd schedule</td>
<td>659 900 Charte mortgages and other loans payable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td>Other debts-insecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autos and other personal property</td>
<td>American General Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash-value life insurance</td>
<td>Sears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets intangible</td>
<td>Home Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrift Savings Plan</td>
<td>Student Loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver Employees Retirement Plan</td>
<td>104 435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets</td>
<td>2 006 452 Total liabilities and net worth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

- As endorser, confirmor or guarantor
  - Are any assets pledged? (Add schedule)? **NO**
- On leases or contracts
  - Are you defendant in any suits or legal actions? **NO**
- Legal Claims
  - Have you ever taken bankruptcy? **NO**
- Provision for Federal Income Tax
- Other special debt
FINANCIAL STATEMENT

NET WORTH SCHEDULES

Listed Securities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DWS Money Mrkt Fund</td>
<td>$1,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Kampen High Yield Muni Bond Class A</td>
<td>$1,062</td>
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<tr>
<td>Van Kampen Equity/Income Class A</td>
<td>$3,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Kampen Comstock Class A (IRA)</td>
<td>$4,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Kampen Mid Cap Growth Class A (IRA)</td>
<td>$8,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Kampen Emerging Mrkts Class A (IRA)</td>
<td>$10,549</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanguard 500 Index Fund</td>
<td>$548,201</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanguard Intermediate Term Bond Index</td>
<td>$31,691</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanguard Precious Metals</td>
<td>$36,180</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanguard REIT Index Fund</td>
<td>$26,629</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanguard Total Int'l Stock Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanguard L-T Tax-Exempt Inv</td>
<td>$24,219</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanguard Prime Money Mrkt Fund (IRA)</td>
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<td>Vanguard L-T Bond Index (IRA)</td>
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<td>Vanguard Extended Mrkt Index (IRA)</td>
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<td>Vanguard 500 Index (Roth IRA)</td>
<td>$3,583</td>
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<td>Vanguard Pacific Stock Index Inv (Roth IRA)</td>
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<td>Vanguard Windsor II Fund (IRA)</td>
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<td>Vanguard Total Stock Market Index (Roth IRA)</td>
<td>$3,323</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berkshire Hathaway Class B</td>
<td>$20,060</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principal Life Gov't &amp; HQ Bond (401k)</td>
<td>$1,884</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principal Life Large Cap Stock Index</td>
<td>$1,671</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principal Life Mid Cap Stock Index</td>
<td>$1,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Listed Securities</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,065,571</strong></td>
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Real Estate Owned

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Property Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>$699,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Real Estate Mortgages Payable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>$508,934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AFFIDAVIT

I, Philip Andrew Brimmer, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

DATE
7-30-08

NAME

NOTARY

My Commission Expires 03/02/2008
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Solicitor General

Acting Solicitor General
Washington, D.C. 20530

September 17, 2008

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you again for the privilege of appearing before your Committee last Tuesday and for extending such a kind welcome to me and my family.

Attached are my responses to written questions for the record posed to me after my confirmation hearing. If I can be of further assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Gregory G. Garre
Acting Solicitor General

cc: The Honorable Arlen Specter
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on the Judiciary

Enclosures
Senator Dick Durbin  
Senate Judiciary Committee  
September 16, 2008

Written Questions for Gregory Garre  
Nominee to be Solicitor General of the United States

1. In the case *Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Mukasey*, filed in 2006, the Justice Department has been strongly defending the constitutionality and legality of the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006. In a May 2008 opinion, a three-judge panel ruled in favor of the Justice Department and upheld the constitutionality of this important law. The case is now on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and the Justice Department’s response brief is due next month.

**Will you commit to continuing the Justice Department’s strong defense of the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006?**

ANSWER: The Justice Department has successfully defended the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 before the three-judge court, and will continue to defend the Act before the Supreme Court. The Office of the Solicitor General has a long tradition of defending the constitutionality of congressional enactments whenever a reasonable legal argument can be made in their defense. As both a career and non-career lawyer in the Office of the Solicitor General, I have participated in the defense of the constitutionality of numerous Acts of Congress. As Acting Solicitor General and, if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, as Solicitor General, I will maintain that important tradition.

2. In a second important voting rights case currently pending before the Supreme Court, *Bartlett v. Strickland*, you filed an amicus brief in opposition to the interests of the civil rights community. Your brief advocates a rigid approach to the creation of majority-minority legislative districts, under which, according to a brief filed by the NAACP et al, “the state would be free under Section 2 [of the Voting Rights Act] to eliminate all these districts and thus relegate African Americans to token representation in the North Carolina General Assembly.”

**Why did you decide to advance a position in this case that would undermine the ability of African Americans to elect representatives of their choice and to achieve more political power?**

ANSWER: The position of the United States in *Bartlett v. Strickland* is that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did not require the State to draw a legislative district with an approximately 35% African American voting age population, but that a State would be free to draw such a district under Section 2. In explaining that position, the government’s amicus brief (at 8-29) pointed to, among other factors, the text of Section 2, the Supreme Court’s statement in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986), that a plaintiff must...
show as a “necessary precondition” of a Section 2 vote-dilution claim that a minority group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district,” and that a contrary interpretation raised constitutional concerns identified by the Supreme Court. In addition, the government’s brief emphasized (at 7) that “the United States certainly supports efforts to draw legislative districts in a manner that will provide equal electoral opportunities for all voters, regardless of race, including districts in which minority voters constitute less than a majority but nonetheless may carry significant political clout because of coalitions with voters from other minority groups or ‘crossover’ voting by members of the majority.”

As explained in the government’s amicus brief (at 10), the position of the United States in this case is consistent with the positions of the United States in prior cases before the Supreme Court in which the United States has argued that a Section 2 plaintiff must generally show that a minority group would constitute a majority of a proposed district in order to state a Section 2 vote-dilution claim. The government’s brief further explains (at 13-14) -- consistent with the position of the United States in prior cases before the Supreme Court -- that the general majority-minority requirement is not absolute and may be relaxed in two situations: where “intentional racial discrimination has been shown,” and where the minority group is “compact *** and substantial in size yet just short of a majority.” In this respect, the government’s brief (at 6, 13) agrees with the State that the North Carolina Supreme Court went further than necessary in this case in stating that a numerical majority is always required to state a Section 2 claim.

3. According to Senate testimony and media reports, there was nearly a mass resignation of senior officials at the Justice Department in 2004 over the issue of White House pressure to approve a secret surveillance program. These reports indicate that the Solicitor General at the time, Theodore Olson, may have shared concerns over the program and may have considered resigning over this matter.

**Mr. Garre, in 2004 you were part of the core group within the Solicitor General's office who worked on terrorism and national security matters. If you were aware of the controversy over the surveillance program, did you consider resigning from the Justice Department over it? Based on what you now know, do you believe it would have been advisable to resign had the White House refused to back down?**

**ANSWER: In 2004, I was a career attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General and one of several career attorneys in the Office who worked on the government’s defense in cases challenging the detention of enemy combatants in the wake of the September 11 attacks. I had no involvement with or knowledge of the matter described in this question and therefore had no occasion to consider resigning from the Department in connection with such matter. While I had no involvement with and thus lack personal knowledge of the matter in question, I feel strongly that the Solicitor General has an obligation to protect the integrity of the Department of Justice and the Office of the Solicitor General, as well as the rule of law. As Acting Solicitor General and, if I were fortunate enough to be confirmed, as Solicitor General, I would therefore exercise my independent judgment and make determinations that I believe to be supported by the law and in the best interests**
of the United States. In making such a determination, I would want to know and carefully consider all the pertinent facts and circumstances. I would not defend, nor would I lend either my name or that of the Office of the Solicitor General, to a legal position that I did not believe was supported by a reasonable, good faith argument and in the best interest of the United States. If I were forced to choose between doing so and resigning, I would resign my position.

4. In responding to a question from Senator Kennedy in 2005, your predecessor, Paul Clement, acknowledged that the Attorney General and the President have the power to overrule legal judgments of the Solicitor General but that “the President and the Attorney General are both best served when they have confidence in the judgments of the Solicitor General and therefore do not find occasion to overrule the Solicitor General.”

**Have there been any instances during the Bush Administration in which the Attorney General or the President has overruled the Solicitor General? If so, please identify the matter and the reasons why the Solicitor General was overruled.**

**ANSWER:** I have not worked in the Office of the Solicitor General during the entire period of the Bush Administration and can only speak to my experience in the Office. Since June 2, 2008, when I became Acting Solicitor General, there has not been any instance in which the Attorney General or the President has overruled a position that I have taken as Acting Solicitor General. Nor have I worked on any matter in the Office of the Solicitor General in any other capacity (as a career or non-career attorney) in which, to my knowledge, the Attorney General or the President has overruled the position of the Solicitor General.

5. Please provide a list of all amicus cases in which the Justice Department has participated before the U.S. Supreme Court or a federal court of appeal during your tenure as Acting Solicitor General. Please provide a capsule summary of the substance of each case, the positions and arguments advanced by the Justice Department, the status of the case, and the specific nature of your participation in the case.

**ANSWER:** Please see Attachment A. In answering this question, I have relied on the Office of the Solicitor General’s internal recordkeeping system for filings authorized by the Office of the Solicitor General. Based on that system, a list of the cases in which the government has participated before the U.S. Supreme Court or a federal court of appeals as an amicus curiae during my tenure as Acting Solicitor General, which began on June 2, 2008, has been generated and is attached as Attachment A. The list includes a summary of the substance of the case, position/argument advanced by the government, status of the case, and nature of my participation.

6. Please provide a year-by-year breakdown of the number of Supreme Court cases and federal court of appeals cases originating in the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division since January 1, 2005 in which the government has participated as an amicus curiae, along with a capsule summary of the substance of each case, the positions and
arguments advanced by the Justice Department, the status of the case, and the specific nature of your participation in the case.

ANSWER: Please see Attachment B. In answering this question, I have relied on the Office of the Solicitor General's internal recordkeeping system for filings authorized by the Office of the Solicitor General and the recordkeeping system of the Civil Rights Division. Based on those sources, a year-by-year breakdown of the number of Supreme Court cases and federal court of appeals cases originating in the Civil Rights Division since January 1, 2005 in which the government has participated as an amicus curiae has been generated and is attached as Attachment B. The list includes a summary of the substance of the case, position/argument advanced by the government, status of the case, and nature of my participation. The Office of the Solicitor General does not maintain copies of the amicus briefs filed on behalf of the government in court of appeals cases in which the Solicitor General has authorized amicus participation, but where possible I have provided a summary of the requested information based on information obtained from the litigating Division.
ATTACHMENT A

U.S. Supreme Court

Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343: This case concerns whether the Constitution forbids the imposition of capital punishment for the offense of child rape. The government’s amicus brief takes the position that it does not, and that the Court should grant rehearing in this case to reconsider its decision in light of a 2006 Act of Congress amending the Uniform Code of Military Justice to authorize the death penalty for child rape. The case is pending before the Court on the State’s petition for rehearing. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Communications, No. 07-512: This case concerns whether a price-squeeze allegation based solely on the margin between a vertically-integrated defendant’s wholesale and retail prices is insufficient to state a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The government’s amicus brief takes the position (consistent with the position stated in an amicus brief authorized at the certiorari stage in this case by the former Solicitor General) that such an allegation is insufficient to state a Section 2 claim. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

Molendes-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591: This case concerns whether a state laboratory’s certificate of analysis as to drug-testing results constitutes a testimonial statement within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. The government’s amicus brief takes the position that such a certificate is not a testimonial statement. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

Ministry of Defense v. Elahi, No. 07-615: This case concerns whether and in what circumstances a judgment is subject to attachment by a plaintiff under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. The government’s amicus brief takes the position (consistent with the position stated in an amicus brief filed at the certiorari stage in this case by the former Solicitor General) that the judgment at issue is not subject to attachment in this case. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

Pearson v. Callahan, No. 07-751: This case concerns whether a police entry into a home after an undercover informant alerted the police to criminal activity in the home violated the Fourth Amendment and whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from suit. The government’s amicus brief takes the position that the Fourth Amendment was not violated and that the officers are in any event entitled to immunity from suit. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

AT&T Corp. v. Hulstren, No. 07-543: This case concerns whether an employer violates Title VII, as amended, if it determines eligibility for certain benefits without correcting
discrimination that was not unlawful under Title VII when it occurred and whether finding such a violation would give Title VII an impermissible retroactive effect. The government’s amicus brief takes the position (consistent with the position stated in an amicus brief filed at the certiorari stage in this case by the former Solicitor General) that finding such a violation would give impermissible retroactive effect to Title VII. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

Altria Group v. Good, No. 07-562: This case concerns whether statements and orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission impliedly preempt state-law tort claims based on a cigarette manufacturer’s allegedly fraudulent use of “Light” and “Lowered Tar and Nicotine” descriptors. The government’s amicus brief takes the position that the FTC’s statements and actions do not impliedly preempt such claims. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, No. 07-562: This case concerns whether an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement, which clearly and unmistakably waives the union members’ right to a judicial forum for their statutory discrimination claims, is enforceable. The government’s amicus brief takes the position that such a clause is not enforceable. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

Pleasant Grove v. Summum, No. 07-665: This case concerns whether the First Amendment entitles a private group to insist that a city permit it to erect a permanent monument in a city park that contains a number of objects donated by other private individuals and groups and accepted by the city for display. The government’s amicus brief takes the position that the First Amendment does not entitle the private group to insist that the city erect such a display. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

Barlett v. Strickland, No. 07-689: This case concerns whether the Voting Rights Act of 1965 obligated a state to draw a legislative district in which African Americans constituted approximately 39% of the voting-age population. The government’s amicus brief takes the position that the state was not required to draw such a district. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

Morris v. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, No. 07-811: This case concerns whether the court of appeals misapplied qualified immunity principles in reversing the entry of summary judgment for law-enforcement officers on First and Fourth Amendment claims arising out of a vehicle detention. The government’s amicus brief takes the position that the court of appeals did so err. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation in response to the Court’s invitation to file a brief and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, No. 07-854: This case concerns whether supervisory prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from suits for damages alleging that they failed to develop policies to protect against violations of Gallow v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). The government’s amicus brief takes the position that supervisory prosecutors enjoy immunity from such suits. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

Arizona v. Johnson, No. 07-1122: This case concerns whether a police officer who is participating in a lawful traffic stop may frisk a passenger when the officer has reasonable suspicion that the passenger is armed and dangerous but lacks reasonable suspicion that the passenger is committing or has committed a criminal offense. The government’s amicus brief takes the position that an officer may conduct such a frisk. The case is pending before the Court. I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government’s brief.

Federal Courts of Appeals

Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, No. S155742 (Cal. S. Ct.): This case concerns whether the owner and operator of a sports stadium violated the Constitution by conducting pat-down searches of fans entering the stadium to see National Football League games. The government’s amicus participation supports the position that the pat-down searches at issue did not violate constitutional rights. The case is pending before the California Supreme Court. I authorized amicus participation.

Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, Nos. 05-6408 et al. (2d Cir.): This case concerns whether land owned and occupied by an Indian Tribe is subject to foreclosure for nonpayment of county property taxes and related issues. The government’s amicus participation supports the Tribe’s position that it is immune from such an action. The case is pending before the Second Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Castaneda v. United States, No. 08-55684 (9th Cir.): This case concerns whether, under 42 U.S.C. 233, the sole remedy available to a plaintiff suing PHS physicians and employees for alleged injuries arising out of medical treatment is a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The government’s amicus participation supports the position that Section 233 precludes a constitutional tort claim in such circumstances. The case is pending before the Ninth Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

United States ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin, No. 07-07-1295 (10th Cir.): This case concerns when a relator’s pre-filing release is generally unenforceable to bar a subsequent qui tam action under the False Claims Act and related issues. The government’s amicus participation was by invitation of the court and supports the position that such a pre-filing release is unenforceable against public policy if the government has not been made aware of the information concerning the claim. The case is pending before the Tenth Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.
Kimbro v. Hildebrand, No. 08-5871 (6th Cir.): This case concerns whether 11 U.S.C. 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) permits a debtor to count as monthly expenses a vehicle ownership expense when the debtor owns the vehicle outright and thus has no ownership expense associated with the vehicle. The government’s amicus participation supports the position that the statute does not permit the counting of such expenses. The case is pending before the Sixth Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewage, No. 08-1103 (7th Cir.): This case concerns whether or to what extent a settlement between a state and municipal sewage district bars a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act as a matter of res judicata. The government’s amicus participation was by invitation of the court and supports the position that in determining the res judicata effect of such a settlement the court should focus on the facts known to the State at the time of the stipulation. The case is pending before the Seventh Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Boin v. Holy Land Foundation, 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir.): This case concerns whether a donor to an organization that, the donor knows, practices terrorism, can be liable under 18 U.S.C. 2333(a) in the absence of proof that the donor intended to advance the violent component of the recipient’s activities. The government’s amicus participation was by invitation of the en banc court and supports the position that the defendant’s lack of intent to facilitate terrorist acts does not preclude liability under the statute. The case is pending before the Seventh Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Products, No. 08-1409 (1st Cir.): This case concerns the requirements for bringing a qui tam action under the False Claims Act. The government’s amicus participation supports the position that a qui tam suit may qualify as “based upon” a covered “public disclosure” even if the relator does not actually derive his information from publicly available materials. The case is pending before the First Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Contioli v. Local 705, No. 07-2673 (7th Cir.): This case concerns whether a pension plan’s rule that no benefits are payable for any month that precedes a formal application for benefits violates 29 U.S.C. 1053(a). The government’s amicus participation was by invitation of the court and supports the position that the plan provisions at issue violate that statute. The case is pending before the Seventh Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, Nos. 08-1055 et al. (1st Cir.): This case concerns whether the term “average wholesale price,” as used in the Medicare statute, referred to the average price at which drugs were actually sold, or the average list price for the drugs. The government’s amicus participation supports the position that the term refers to the average price at which drugs were actually sold. The case is pending before the First Circuit. I am recused from this case and thus have had no involvement in it.
Babin v. Washburn, No. 08-2023 (8th Cir.): This case concerns whether 11 U.S.C. 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) permits a debtor to count as monthly expenses a vehicle ownership expense when the debtor owns the vehicle outright and thus has no ownership expense associated with the vehicle. The government’s amicus participation supports the position that the statute does not permit the counting of such expenses. The case is pending before the Eighth Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

In re Trusted New Media Holdings, No. 07-13429 (11th Cir.): This case concerns whether the requirements set forth in 11 U.S.C. 303(b) for commencing an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding are jurisdictional. The government’s amicus participation supports the position that such requirements are not jurisdictional. The case is pending before the Eleventh Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Pugliese v. Pukka Development, No. 07-15198 (11th Cir.): This case concerns whether the two-year right to revoke a contract under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1703(d), applies to a contract for the sale of a lot that is partially exempt from other provisions of the act. The government’s amicus participation supports the position that the Act does not apply to such a contract. The case is pending before the Eleventh Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Nelson v. Miller, No. 08-2044 (7th Cir.): This case concerns whether a prison official’s refusal to approve an inmate’s request for a vegetarian diet was a “substantial burden” on his religious exercise within the meaning of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The government’s amicus participation supports the position that the inmate has shown such a burden. The case is pending before the Seventh Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

United States v. Caremark, No. 08-50354 (5th Cir.): This case concerns whether claims asserted by a False Claims Act defendant against a state and the United States are compulsory counterclaims such that the governments waived their sovereign immunity with respect to those claims by filing suit against the defendant. The government’s amicus participation supports the position that the plaintiff-governments did not waive their sovereign immunity with respect to particular claims by filing suit. The case is pending before the Fifth Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

American Atheists v. Detroit, Nos. 07-2398 et al (6th Cir.): This case concerns whether a city violated the Establishment Clause by making available community beautification grants for the renovation, repair, and improvement of certain facilities. The government’s amicus participation supports the position that the grants at issue are constitutional. The case is pending before the Sixth Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Superior Court, No. S156555 (Cal. S. Ct.): This case concerns whether insurance claims adjusters are exempt from state law requiring overtime pay. The government’s amicus participation explains the Department of
Labor's interpretation of various regulations and statements. The case is pending before the California Supreme Court. I authorized amicus participation.

Quon v. Arch Wireless, No. 07-55282 (9th Cir.): This case concerns whether a public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages on his government-issued pager, when the government had established an official policy that such messages were not confidential. The government's amicus participation supports the position that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in such messages. The case is pending before the Ninth Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

BGA, LLC v. Ulster County, No. 06-0096 (2d Cir.): This case concerns whether a district court properly declined to adjudicate a case concerning whether a group should be recognized by the federal government as an Indian tribe. The government's amicus participation supports the position that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The case is pending before the Second Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Nebraska Public Service, No. 08-1764 (8th Cir.): This case concerns whether orders of the Federal Communications Commission preempt a state requirement that providers of voice over IP service must contribute to a universal-service fund under a certain formula. The government's amicus participation supports the position that there is no preemption. The case is pending before the Eighth Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Terry v. Tyson's Farms, Inc., No. 08-5577 (6th Cir.): This case concerns whether the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921's prohibitions against certain business practices apply only to acts that adversely affect competition. The government's amicus participation supports the position that the statute prohibits specified business practices regardless of whether they have an anticompetitive effect. The case is pending before the Sixth Circuit. I am recused from this case and thus have had no involvement in it.

Young v. GM Investment Management, No. 08-1532 (2d Cir.): This case concerns whether the plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act are time-barred. The government's amicus participation supports the position that the claims are not time-barred. The case is pending before the Second Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Hayden v. Freightliner America, No. 08-1109 (3d Cir.): This case concerns whether, when an employer lays off employees in order to prevent their pension benefits from vesting, the court may order that the employees be reinstated to their jobs. The government's amicus participation supports the position that reinstatement is an appropriate remedy. The case is pending before the Third Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, No. 06-14666 (11th Cir.): This case concerns whether the operator of a sports stadium violated the Constitution by conducting pat-down searches of fans entering the stadium to see National Football League games. The government's amicus participation supports the position that the pat-down searches did
not violate constitutional rights. The case is pending before the Eleventh Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.

Azza v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir.): This case concerns whether the pilot of an aircraft had "reasonable grounds to believe" that passengers posed a threat to "good order and discipline," and was thus entitled to divert the aircraft and remove the passengers under the Tokyo Convention and whether the Warsaw Convention preempts related defamation claims. The government's amicus participation was by invitation of the court and generally supports the position that the pilot had grounds for removing the passengers and that related statements to the police were protected by the Warsaw Convention. The case is pending before the Ninth Circuit. I authorized amicus participation.
ATTACHMENT B

U.S. Supreme Court (3 cases)

1. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005): This case concerned whether, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., when parents initiate an administrative "due process" hearing to seek reimbursement for private-school tuition and challenge their child's individualized education program, the burden of proof falls on the parents or the school district. The government's amicus brief took the position that the IDEA should be read to place the burden of proof on the party initiating and seeking relief at an administrative hearing under the Act. The Court agreed with that position. At the time the government's brief was filed in June 2005, I was an attorney at Hogan & Hartson L.L.P. While at Hogan, I filed a brief and presented oral argument on behalf of the respondent in this case.

2. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corporation d/b/a The Moonlight Cafe, 546 U.S. 500 (2006): This case concerned whether Title VII's fifteen-employee requirement limits the courts' subject matter jurisdiction, or instead is relevant only to the merits of a Title VII claim. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., prohibits employment discrimination by an "employer," and defines an "employer" for that purpose to be a person who, inter alia, had fifteen or more employees for each working day during 20 or more weeks in the current or preceding year.) The government's amicus brief took the position that the fifteen-employee requirement is not jurisdictional. The Court agreed with that position. I had no involvement in the case.

3. Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 546 U.S. 1085 (2006): This case concerned whether the fee-shifting provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., authorizes a court to award "expert" fees. At the Court's invitation, the government filed an amicus brief arguing that the petition should be granted on that question. The Court agreed. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general.

Federal Courts of Appeals (8 cases)

1. Barnes-Wallace v. Boy Scouts of America, 471 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2006), withdrawn and superseded on rehearing by 530 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008): This case concerns whether a policy under which a city offers low-cost leases of city property to community organizations providing benefits to the public violates the Establishment Clause as applied to a lease of parkland to the Boy Scouts of America to operate a campground and a boating center open to the public. The government's amicus brief took the position that the Boy Scouts is not a religious organization such that its receipt of government benefits would violate the Establishment Clause; that the leases were value-for-value transactions that could not be deemed benefits to the Boy Scouts for constitutional purposes; and that the large number of other diverse community organizations that had similar leases with
the city created a context in which it could not be said that the city was endorsing or advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Ninth Circuit issued an order certifying questions to the California Supreme Court. That order remains subject to a pending petition for rehearing. I had no involvement in this case.

2. Muntagim v. Coombe, 449 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 2006): This case concerned whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA") applies to New York Election Law § 5-106(2), which prohibited incarcerated felons from voting. The government’s amicus brief took the position that Section 2 of the VRA should not be construed as applying to the New York law. The Second Circuit ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing because he was not a New York resident before his incarceration in a New York prison. I had no involvement in this case.

3. Hayden v. Patak, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006): This case concerned whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA") applies to New York Election Law § 5-106(2), which prohibited incarcerated felons from voting. The government’s amicus brief took the position that Section 2 of the VRA should not be construed as applying to the New York law. The Second Circuit agreed. I had no involvement in this case.

4. Atkinson v. Lafayette College, 460 F.3d 447 (3d Cir. 2006): This case concerned whether Section 901 of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, encompasses a prohibition on retaliation for complaining about sex discrimination. In 2003, the government filed an amicus brief taking the position that it does. The Third Circuit stayed the appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005). In 2005, the United States filed a supplemental memorandum as amicus arguing that Jackson was directly on point and supported the position we took in our original amicus brief. The Third Circuit agreed. I had no involvement in this case.

5. Baker v. The Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2006): This case concerned whether an employee seeking a reasonable accommodation of his religious practices under Title VII to refrain from work on Sundays was provided with a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law when his employer offered to give him Sunday mornings off to attend religious services. The government’s amicus brief took the position that in order for a proffered accommodation to be reasonable as a matter of law under Title VII, and thereby bypass the undue-hardship-on-the-employer inquiry, the accommodation must remove the conflict between job duties and religious practice. The Second Circuit agreed. I had no involvement in this case.

6. Fitzgerald v. Camden R-Ill School District, 439 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2006): This case concerned whether the "child find" provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(3), requires a school district to evaluate a child the school district suspects of having a disability if the child’s parents refuse consent, remove the child from public school, and waive any claim to public educational
benefits under the IDEA. The government’s amicus brief took the position that it does not. The Eighth Circuit agreed. I had no involvement in this case.

7. Faith Center Church Evangelic Ministries v. Glover, 462 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2006), revised and rehearing en banc denied by 480 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2007): This case concerned whether a community room in a public library that was open to a variety of community organizations for various events and activities could exclude a group wishing to hold a conference that would include a religious worship element. The government’s amicus brief took the position that the defendants had discriminated against religious expression in violation of the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. I had no involvement in this case.

8. Wisconsin Community Services, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 465 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2006) (en banc): This case concerned the application and validity of two regulations, 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(7) and 28 C.F.R. 41.53, promulgated by the Department of Justice to implement Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In response to an invitation from the Seventh Circuit, the government filed an amicus brief asserting that the regulations were valid and explaining how they applied in this case. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

2006

U.S. Supreme Court (7 cases)

1. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006): This case concerned a statutory and constitutional challenge to a Texas redistricting plan. The government’s amicus brief took the position that the State’s plan complied with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973. It did not address the constitutional issues presented by the case. The Court agreed with the government’s position as to one Section 2 claim but disagreed as to another. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general and argued the case before the Court.

2. Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006): This case, in which the government previously had filed a brief at the certiorari stage, see supra, concerned whether the fee-shifting provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., authorizes a court to award “expert fees.” The government’s amicus brief took the position that it does not. The Court agreed with that position. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general and assisted in the preparation for oral argument by another attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General.

that she suffered a materially adverse employment action. The government’s amicus brief took the position that a plaintiff was required to make such a showing and that the plaintiff in this case should prevail because she had done so. The Court agreed with the government’s argument that the plaintiff should prevail, but disagreed with its interpretation of Title VII. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general and argued the case before the Court.

4. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007): This case concerned whether a school district’s race-based student assignment plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The government’s amicus brief took the position that it did. The Court agreed with that position. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general and assisted in the preparation for oral argument by the Solicitor General.

5. Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007): This case concerned whether a school district’s race-based student assignment plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The government’s amicus brief took the position that it did. The Court agreed with that position. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general and assisted in the preparation for oral argument by the Solicitor General.

6. Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007): This case concerned whether a non-lawyer parent of a minor child with a disability may proceed pro se in a federal court action brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The government’s amicus brief took the position that the parents of a child with a disability may proceed pro se when they bring a civil action in federal court either to enforce procedural rights under the statute or to seek relief for a substantive violation of the right to a free appropriate public education. The Court agreed with the government’s position. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general and assisted in the preparation for oral argument by another attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General.

7. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007): This case concerned whether a plaintiff may bring an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging illegal pay discrimination when the allegedly disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations period. The government’s amicus brief took the position that the plaintiff’s Title VII claims was time-barred in those circumstances. The Court agreed with the government’s position. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general and assisted in the preparation for oral argument by another attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General.

Federal Courts of Appeals (6 cases)

1. Living Water Church of God v. Meridian Charter Township, 2007 WL 4322157 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2007): This case concerned whether a municipality’s limitation of a
church's expansion created a substantial burden on religious exercise for purposes of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). The government's amicus brief took the position that RLUIPA's substantial burden had been met. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

2. Faith Temple v. Town of Brighton, No. 06-0354 (2d Cir.): This case concerned whether a town's use of its eminent domain power to take church land in accordance with its comprehensive land-use plan would constitute application of a "land use regulation" under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). The government's amicus brief took the position that under the circumstances of this case, the taking would be a land use regulation and RLUIPA therefore would apply. The case settled after briefing but prior to argument and the appeal was withdrawn. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

3. Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 2006): The case concerned whether an individual may sue a state official in his official capacity to enjoin continuing violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The government's amicus brief took the position that private plaintiffs may enforce the requirements of Title II of the ADA through suits filed under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Eighth Circuit's opinion did not address the ADA issue. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

4. Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007): This case concerned a claim that a church was improperly excluded from a commercial district in violation of Section 2(b)(1) of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). The government's amicus brief argued that a church bringing a claim under Section 2(b)(1) need only show discrimination against churches as compared to equivalent secular assemblies, and need not additionally show a "substantial burden" on its religious exercise. The Third Circuit agreed with the government's position, but ruled against the church on the facts. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

5. Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 492 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007): This case concerns whether a school board's refusal to rent facilities to a religious group after hours on an equal basis with other community organizations on the grounds that the group intends to engage in worship violates the Constitution. The government's amicus brief took the position that the discrimination violated the First Amendment. The court remanded the case to the district court to determine if it was ripe for adjudication. The district court ruled that it was ripe, and the case is again pending before Second Circuit. See infra. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.
6. Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2007): This case concerned whether a Jewish day school that was denied zoning approval to expand to meet its needs had its religious exercise “substantially burdened” for purposes of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and whether RLUIPA was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power. The government’s amicus brief argued that the school had established facts demonstrating substantial burden, and that RLUIPA is constitutional. The Second Circuit agreed. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

2007

U.S. Supreme Court (4 cases)

1. Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York v. Tom E., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007): This case concerned whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., permits an award of private school tuition reimbursement when a child with a disability has been denied a free appropriate public education but the child has not “previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.” The government’s amicus brief took the position that IDEA authorizes such an award. The Court affirmed the decision below (which the government supported) by an equally divided vote. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general and argued the case before the Court.

2. Federal Express Corporation v. Holoweczki, 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008): This case concerned what constitutes “a charge alleging unlawful discrimination” under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The government’s amicus brief took the position that the Court should adopt Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) interpretation of that term, i.e., that a “charge” is a submission that meets the form and content requirements set forth in the EEOC’s regulations and objectively manifests a submitter’s intent to make a formal accusation that a named party has engaged in unlawful discrimination. The Court adopted the government’s position. As Acting Solicitor General, I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the brief. I also assisted in the preparation for oral argument by another attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General.

3. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board and Indiana Democratic Party v. Rekita, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008): These consolidated cases concerned whether an Indiana statute mandating that those seeking to vote in person produce a government-issued photo identification on its face violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The government’s amicus brief took the position that the statute was not unconstitutional on its face. The Court agreed with that position. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general and assisted in the preparation for oral argument by the Solicitor General.

4. Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, No. 06-1595: This case concerns whether, or to what extent, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, Section
704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), protects an employee from being dismissed because she cooperated with her employer's internal investigation of sexual harassment. The government's amicus brief takes the position that it does. The case is pending before the Court. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general.

Federal Courts of Appeals (7 cases)

1. Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2008): This case concerned a claim that renovations to two subway stops in Philadelphia violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The question presented was what events trigger the running of the statute of limitations on such a claim. The government's amicus brief took the position that the statute of limitations does not begin to run, at the earliest, until the defendant has completed the alterations that are the subject of the lawsuit. The Third Circuit agreed. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

2. Digruglietts v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2007): This case concerned whether the City of Indianapolis violated Section 2(b)(1) of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") when it barred a church from a zone in which clubs, assembly halls, community centers, and similar assembly uses were permitted. The government's amicus brief took the position that the exclusion violated Section 2(b)(1), and that the proffered reasons for the discrimination (that the exclusion was necessary to protect churches from locating near businesses selling pornography and alcohol) was not valid. The Seventh Circuit agreed. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

3. Miller v. California Speedway Corporation, 536 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2008): This case concerned whether the Department of Justice's regulations issued pursuant to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., require newly-constructed assembly areas to provide wheelchair seating locations with lines of sight over standing spectators where patrons can be expected to stand during events. The government's amicus brief took the position that they do. The Ninth Circuit agreed. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

4. John M. v. Board of Education of Evanston Township High School District 202, 502 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2007): This case concerned the issue of whether the "stay-put" provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1415(j), requires the provision of services using a methodology not specified in a student's individualized educational program. The government's amicus brief took the position that it does not. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

claims alleging race-based insurance discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. The government’s amicus brief took the position that, in light of Missouri law, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar plaintiffs’ race-based insurance discrimination claims under the Fair Housing Act. The Eighth Circuit held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act barred the particular claims at issue. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

6. Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008): This case concerned whether the State of Colorado violated the constitutional rights of students when it barred them from using state scholarship and aid programs, which may be used at public and private schools within the state, to support education at a nondenominational Christian university. The government’s amicus brief took the position that the bar discriminated against the students in violation of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit agreed. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

7. Harless v. Brunner, Nos. 07-3829 & 07-4165 (6th Cir.): This case concerns whether the head of a state agency designated as a voter registration agency under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq., is liable for NVRA violations resulting from failures by the agency’s local offices. The government’s amicus brief took the position that such a state official is liable for NVRA violations resulting from failures by the agency’s local offices. The case is pending before the Sixth Circuit. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

2008 To Date

U.S. Supreme Court (6 cases)

1. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008): This case concerned whether a claim asserting retaliation against an individual who has complained of intentional racial discrimination is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The government’s amicus brief took the position that such a claim is cognizable under Section 1981. The Court agreed with the government’s position. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general and assisted in the preparation for oral argument by the Solicitor General.

2. Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970 (2008): This case concerned whether the implementation of a change affecting voting concerning a state law that was previously precleared and enforced is exempted from Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1964 simply because it is precipitated by a state court decision declaring that the state law violates the state constitution. The government’s amicus brief took the position that such a change is not exempted from Section 5. The Court disagreed with that position. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general and assisted in the preparation for oral argument by another attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General.
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3. **AT&T v. Hulstee**, No. 07-543: This case concerns whether an employer violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., as amended, if it determines eligibility for certain benefits without correcting discrimination that was not unlawful under Title VII when it occurred and whether finding such a violation would give Title VII an impermissible retroactive effect. The government's amicus brief takes the position (consistent with the position stated in an amicus brief filed at the certiorari stage in this case by the former Solicitor General) that finding such a violation would give impermissible retroactive effect to Title VII. The case is pending before the Supreme Court. As Acting Solicitor General, I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government's brief.

4. **Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York v. Gulino**, 128 S. Ct. 2986 (2008): This case concerned whether the Court should grant certiorari on the question of whether an employer's compliance with a facially neutral state licensing requirement for teachers that allegedly has a disparate impact on members of a protected class may subject it to liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. At the Court's invitation, the government filed an amicus brief expressing the view that certiorari should be denied. The Court denied certiorari. I reviewed and commented on the brief as deputy solicitor general.

5. **14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett**, No. 07-581: This case concerns whether an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement, which clearly and unmistakably waives the union members' right to a judicial forum for their statutory discrimination claims, is enforceable. The government's amicus brief takes the position that such a clause is not enforceable. The case is pending before the Court. As Acting Solicitor General, I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government's brief.

6. **Bartlett v. Strickland**, No. 07-689: This case concerns whether the Voting Rights Act of 1965 obligated a state to draw a legislative district in which African Americans constituted approximately 39% of the voting-age population. The government's amicus brief takes the position that the state was not required to draw such a district. The case is pending before the Court. As Acting Solicitor General, I authorized amicus participation and reviewed and commented on the government's brief.

**Federal Courts of Appeals (4 cases)**

1. **Germano v. International Profit Association, Inc.**, No. 07-3914, --- F.3d --- (7th Cir. 2008): This case concerned a suit filed under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq., by a plaintiff with a severe hearing impairment who alleged that the defendant rejected him for a job because of his disability. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant employer after concluding that a statement by an agent of the defendants that was conveyed to the plaintiff through a telecommunications relay service was inadmissible hearsay and that, absent this evidence, the plaintiff failed to raise any issues of triable fact regarding the reason for his rejection. The government filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff-appellant arguing that the statement at
issue was not inadmissible hearsay. The Seventh Circuit agreed. As deputy solicitor
general, I made a recommendation concerning amicus participation to the Solicitor
General.

2. Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of the City of New York, No. 07-
5291 (2d Cir.): This case concerns whether a school board violates the Constitution by
refusing to rent facilities to a religious group after hours on an equal basis with other
community organizations on the grounds that the group intends to engage in worship. The
government previously had filed an amicus brief in this case. See supra. On appeal after
remand, the government filed another amicus brief reiterating its argument that the
exclusion of the religious group violates the Constitution. The case is pending before the
Second Circuit. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning
amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

3. B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 School District, No. 07-3099 (8th Cir.): This case
concerned whether a school district violated the First Amendment by prohibiting students
from wearing clothing displaying the Confederate flag where the school and the
community in which it was located recently had experienced numerous incidents of racial
violence and racial tension, and school officials had reason to believe that display of the
flag would cause material and substantial disruption to the school’s educational function.
The government filed an amicus brief in support of the school district, arguing that the
school officials’ actions did not violate the First Amendment. The case is pending before
the Eighth Circuit. As deputy solicitor general, I made a recommendation concerning
amicus participation to the Solicitor General.

4. Nelson v. Miller, No. 08-2044 (7th Cir.): This case concerns whether a prison
official’s refusal to approve an inmate’s request for a vegetarian diet was a “substantial
burden” on his religious exercise the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
the inmate. The case is pending before the Seventh Circuit. As Acting Solicitor General,
I authorized amicus participation.
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Statement of

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

United States Senator
California
September 9, 2008

Senator Dianne Feinstein

Statement for the Record
Judicial Nominations Hearing, Tuesday, Sept. 9, 2008
Judge Michael Anello

I would like to thank Chairman Leahy for his leadership on this Committee and for his commitment to moving well qualified judicial nominees through the confirmation process.

Today the Committee is hearing testimony from California Superior Court Judge Michael M. Anello, who has been nominated to a judgeship on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.

As many of you know, in California we have established a bipartisan Judicial Advisory Committee that is responsible for recommending nominees to fill vacancies in California's federal district courts. Judge Anello was a unanimous recommendation of that committee.

All of the Committee's members found Judge Anello extremely well-qualified to serve on the district court.

Born in 1943, Judge Anello graduated from Bowdoin College and Georgetown Law School before entering active duty in the United States Marine Corps in 1968. While serving in Vietnam, he acted as a military prosecutor, defense counsel, and Judge, until he was released in 1972 with multiple honors, a certificate of commendation, and the rank of captain.

As he told members of the California Judicial Advisory Committee, his experience applying military justice in a war zone instilled in him a lasting respect for the rules of evidence and procedure.

Following military service, Judge Anello moved to San Diego, where he worked first as a Deputy City Attorney and then for a prominent law firm known as Tood, Tothborne & Wingert when he entered, and Wingert, Shilling & Anello when he left. During his time as a litigator, he developed experience in criminal and civil litigation, as well as appellate law.

In 1998, California Governor Pete Wilson appointed him to the State Superior Court, where he has served with distinction for a decade. His colleagues on that court have elected him to the court's Executive Committee four times; and in the Southern California legal community, he is well known and well respected for his intelligence and his judicial temperament.

I am pleased that Judge Anello is here today to testify before the Committee.

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http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?renderforprint=1&id=3537&wit_id=2... 10/10/2008
The Honorable Patrick Leahy  
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary  
United States Senate  
224 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Chairman Leahy:

We are former Solicitors General of the United States and Acting Solicitors General of the United States who served in the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and William J. Clinton. We are writing to urge you to move to confirm Gregory G. Garre, Esq., to the position of Solicitor General of the United States.

As you are doubtless aware, Mr. Garre is eminently qualified for the position. Shortly after Mr. Garre was elected to the partnership of Hogan & Hartson LLP, Solicitor General Seth Waxman selected him to serve as an Assistant to the Solicitor General in 2000. (Mr. Waxman has sent for your consideration his own letter of support for Mr. Garre’s nomination.) As an Assistant to the Solicitor General, Mr. Garre argued nine cases before the Supreme Court, and briefed dozens of others. He left the Office of the Solicitor General in 2004 to become the head of Hogan & Hartson’s appellate practice, where he argued three more cases before the Court. But he was soon called back to public service in the Office of the Solicitor General—this time to serve as the Principal Deputy Solicitor General under Solicitor General Paul D. Clement. In that position, Mr. Garre argued another eleven cases before the Court, covering a wide and balanced array of substantive areas.

We have worked with Mr. Garre in the Office of the Solicitor General or as co-counsel in cases before the Court. We have observed at close range his vast legal talents, and we are unanimous in our conclusion that, by any measure, he has been an extraordinarily effective advocate on behalf of the United States. Mr. Garre’s nomination is in keeping with the finest traditions of the Office of the Solicitor General.

We have no doubt that Mr. Garre will continue his outstanding service as Acting Solicitor General even if the Senate is not afforded an opportunity to pass upon his nomination. Yet we urge you to move Mr. Garre’s nomination forward so that he may be confirmed before the Supreme Court’s Term opens in October. Historically, the Solicitor General has held a nonpartisan role in our government. When appearing before the Court, the Solicitor General does not merely as a lawyer for the Executive Branch, but rather as the lawyer for the United States. Except in limited circumstances, the Solicitor General traditionally has defended the constitutionality of Acts of Congress whenever a good faith defense could be made. For that...
reason and others, the Office of the Solicitor General has generally enjoyed autonomy within the Department of Justice, answering first and foremost to the interests of the United States.

In the first two months of the Term, the Court will hear argument in 27 cases—up from 19 during the same period last year—covering the waterfront of substantive areas. The interests of the United States in those cases will be best served by an advocate who has both the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch standing behind him.

We respectfully urge you to expeditiously advance Mr. Garre’s nomination to the full Senate and to confirm him before the opening of the Supreme Court’s Term on October 6.

Very truly yours,

Paul D. Clement
Solictor General (2005-2008)

Walter Dellinger, III

Theodore B. Olson

Barbara Underwood
Acting Solicitor General (2001)

cc: Honorable Arlen Specter
Memorandum
July 10, 2008

SUBJECT: Whether the Senate, in the Judicial Confirmation Process, Customarily Observes the “Thurmond Rule”

FROM: Denis Steven Rutkus
Specialist on the Federal Judiciary
Government and Finance Division

Kevin M. Scott
Analyst on the Federal Judiciary
Government and Finance Division

Under the Constitution of the United States, the President and the Senate share the responsibility for filling vacancies in the federal judiciary. While the President nominates persons to fill federal judgeships, the appointment of each nominee also requires Senate confirmation. Although not mentioned in the Constitution, the Senate Judiciary Committee also plays an important role midway in the process — after the President selects, but before the Senate as a whole considers, the nominee. It is the Judiciary Committee in the Senate that maintains committee jurisdiction over most federal judicial nominations — namely, those to the Supreme Court, the circuit courts of appeals, the district courts (including the territorial district courts), the U.S. Court of International Trade, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

A continuing point of contention in the 2nd session of the 110th Congress has been the pace at which the Senate should consider judicial nominations, particularly those to the courts of appeals, in a presidential election year. Some Senators, apparently along party lines, have differed as to whether, thus far in the 110th Congress, a sufficient number of court of appeals nominees have been confirmed, or are on track to be confirmed.1 Some Senators


Congressional Research Service
Washington, D.C. 20540-7000

CRS prepared this memorandum to enable distribution to more than one congressional client.
have asserted that, in a presidential election year, the Senate customarily slows down the processing of judicial nominations at an earlier point than in other years. Other Senators, however, have disputed the notion that such slowdowns are customary or appropriate, pointing to past presidential election years in which the Judiciary Committee and Senate processed relatively large numbers of judicial nominations, including some late in the year.

Thus far in 2008, much of this debate has revolved around the question whether the Senate and its Judiciary Committee customarily observe a practice referred to by some as the “Thurmond Rule,” named after the late Senator, and former Judiciary Committee chairman, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. Those who claim the existence of the Thurmond Rule contend it originated when Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts chaired the Judiciary Committee and Senator Thurmond served as the committee’s ranking member. The Thurmond Rule has been expressed in various ways, differing, for instance, as to precisely when in the year the slowdown occurs. Nevertheless, almost all Senators who have cited it have characterized it as an established practice according to which, at some point in a presidential election year, the Judiciary Committee and the Senate no longer act on judicial nominations—with exceptions sometimes made for nominees who have bipartisan support from Senate committee and party leaders.

**Debate over the Thurmond Rule in the 110th Congress.** The Senator who most frequently has asserted the existence of a Thurmond Rule has been the current chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont. In December 2006, just before assuming the chairmanship of the committee, Senator Leahy, told a law school audience:

> The Thurmond Rule, in memory of Strom Thurmond — he put this in when the Republicans were in the minority — which said in a presidential election year after Spring no judges would go through except by the consent of both the Republican and Democratic leader... I want to be bipartisan. We will institute the Thurmond Rule.2

Subsequently, in a March 3, 2008, Senate floor statement, Senator Leahy referred to the “history of the Thurmond Rule, by which Republicans, then [in 1980] in the minority, insisted that judicial vacancies in the last year of a President’s term remain vacant in order to be filled with the nominations of the next President.”3 Again, four days later, in another floor statement, Senator Leahy recalled that:

> ...when President Reagan was running for President and Senator Thurmond, then in the Republican minority as ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, instituted a policy to stall President Carter’s nominations. That policy, known as the “Thurmond Rule,” was

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1 (...continued)

*110th Congress*, by Denis Steven Rutkus, Kevin M. Scott, and Maureen Bearden.


put in when the Republicans were in the minority. It is a rule that we still follow, and it will take effect very soon here.\textsuperscript{4}

Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Senate Majority Leader, has concurred that the Thurmond Rule exists. In April 10, 2008, floor remarks, Senator Reid stated that “[i]n a Presidential election year, it is always very tough for judges. That is the way it has been for a long time, and that is why we have the Thurmond rule and other such rules.”\textsuperscript{5} In similar floor remarks five days later, Senator Reid stated, “you know, there is a Thurmond doctrine that says: After June, we will have to take a real close look at judges in a Presidential election year.”\textsuperscript{6}

Various Republican Senators, however, have disputed the assertion by some Senate Democrats that there is an established Judiciary Committee or Senate practice known as the Thurmond Rule. In an April 1, 2008 floor statement, Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, a former chairman of the Judiciary Committee (1995-2001 and 2003-05), declared, “we have already heard about the so-called Thurmond rule, supposedly justifying grinding the confirmation process to a halt in this Presidential election year. The Thurmond rule neither is a rule nor can it be attributed to the late Senator Strom Thurmond...”\textsuperscript{7} Expressing similar sentiments, Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama, in April 16, 2008, floor remarks, stated:

I would say there has been talk about invoking the so-called Thurmond Rule. The Thurmond Rule could sort of be, if you want it to be, an excuse for slow-walking nominees and not approving the nominees who ought to be approved just because there is a Presidential election on the horizon. Majority Leader Harry Reid mentioned last night that the so called rule would be invoked in June. Senator Leahy has mentioned before he would invoke it in the second half of this year. Let me say this about the Thurmond Rule. It is a myth. It does not exist. There is no reason for stopping the confirmation of judicial nominees in the second half of a year in which there is a Presidential election.\textsuperscript{8}

A similar view was expressed earlier, at the start of the 110\textsuperscript{th} Congress in January 2007, by Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, ranking Republican member on the Judiciary Committee (who served as committee chair in the 109\textsuperscript{th} Congress). In a Senate floor statement, Senator Specter alluded to “what has been called the ‘Thurmond Rule.’” Some,


\textsuperscript{5} Sen. Harry Reid, “Confirmation of Judges,” remarks in the Senate, \textit{Congressional Record}, daily edition, vol. 154 (Apr. 10, 2008), p. S2829. Senator Reid, however, indicated that it was not his intention to use his understanding of the Thurmond Rule to prevent Senate consideration of judicial nominations that had recently been approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee. He said that he had “indicated to the Republican leader that we are going to try to move these nominations along. We are trying to keep up with the average that has gone on in years past without a lot of political bickering.” Ibid.


he said, “have suggested that this so-called rule holds that the Senate should dramatically curtail confirmations after the spring of a presidential election year. Review of the historical record suggests that this rule is more myth than reality.”

**First Emergence of the Thurmond Rule as an Issue.** Although mentions by Senators of the Thurmond Rule can be traced as far back as 1997, it first emerged as a major point of contention between Senate Democrats and Republicans only in 2004. In July 2004, an analysis of the Thurmond Rule by a Capitol Hill newspaper referred to it as a “new concept [that] has crept into the back-and-forth between Republicans and Democrats — or at least a long-dormant one [that] has been dusted off ....” The article, based on contacts made with some Senators and senior Senate staff, reported that “even some of the most skillful senators aren’t quite sure whether the Thurmond Rule is really a rule at all. Some call it a ‘precedent.’ Others term it a ‘general understanding.’ Some have never even heard of it.” Sources for the article cited different points in time at which, according to their view of the rule, the Senate would stop processing judicial nominations: on July 1, or at the beginning of the first national political party convention that summer, or during the last few months of a President’s term in office.

One of the Senators interviewed for the article was Senator Kennedy, a longtime member of the Judiciary Committee and former chairman (1979-81). The article reported that Senator Kennedy said that, at the point the Thurmond Rule went into effect during a presidential election year, “‘for all intents and purposes, we’d leave it,’ meaning not confirm any more judges. ‘That having been said,’ he added, ‘there has always been sort of an effort to try and work through some sort of accommodation at different times.”

The article (without identifying any Republican Senator by name) reported that Republicans, as well Democrats, “acknowledge there is a Thurmond Rule, or at least a precedent dating back to the days when Thurmond chaired the Judiciary Committee.”

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10 One of the first public mentions of the phrase “Thurmond Rule” in reference to judicial nominations appears to have been made by Senator Leahy at a press conference on February 12, 1997. Noting the lack of progress on President Clinton’s nominations to the courts of appeals during 1996, a presidential election year, Senator Leahy suggested that the rule contemplated slowing down, but not completely stopping, the processing of judicial nominations in presidential election years. Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, News Briefing, Feb. 12, 1997, FDCH Political Transcripts. The phrase “Thurmond Rule” first appeared in the Congressional Record two months later. Senator Leahy, expressing frustration with the pace of Senate consideration of judicial nominations at the beginning of President Clinton’s second term, said that “We have followed, in the past, the so-called Thurmond rule of stalling a President’s appointments to the judiciary in about the last few months of their term in office. I have never seen the stall start in the first few hours of a President’s 4-year term.” Sen. Patrick Leahy, “The Crisis In Our Federal Judiciary,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 143 (Apr. 17, 1997), p. S3392.


12 Ibid.

13 Ibid. The article, however, singled out only one unnamed Republican staff member, and no Republican Senators, as attesting to this rule or traditional practice. Specifically, the article cited (continued...)
article indicated that, with Republican President George W. Bush in office, invocation of a Thurmond Rule to slow down processing of judicial nominations would be more to the advantage of Senate Democrats than to Senate Republicans. "By invoking the Thurmond Rule," the article said, "Democrats may be able to attach legitimacy to their ongoing campaign against some [of] President Bush's controversial nominees in a chamber that reveres history and precedent."14

On July 19, 2004, only two days before the publication date of the aforementioned article, Senator Hatch, then Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, rejected the notion that the Thurmond Rule exists. In Senate floor remarks, he stated:

We have heard from the other side about the mythical 'Thurmond rule' and all kinds of other suggestions that judges should not be confirmed from here on, this late in a Presidential election year. I remember way back when, cases where we confirmed judges, Democratic nominees, Carter nominees, even after President Reagan had won the election. In fact, one of them [Stephen Breyer] is sitting on the Supreme Court of the United States of America.15

Senator Hatch had also dismissed the Thurmond Rule a month earlier. During a Judiciary Committee business meeting, Senator Hatch referred to the "so-called Thurmond Rule," while expressing hope that the committee would report several of President Bush's circuit nominations.16

Judicial Nomination Events in 1980 Involving Senator Thurmond. The debate over whether there is, or has ever been, a Thurmond Rule appears to arise out of different meanings attached to events involving Senator Thurmond in 1980. At that year's Republican National Convention, Senator Thurmond reportedly said that, at his urging, the presidential nominee, Ronald Reagan, had agreed that the Senate should block all presidential nominations by President Jimmy Carter until after the November 4 elections.17 One account, without directly quoting Senator Thurmond, reported him as having said that by withholding their consent, Senators could "prevent appointments that would continue

13 (...continued)
"one senior Republican aide [who] said the tradition was a general understanding that there would be no floor votes on controversial nominees, rather than an understanding that there would be no action on nominees at all." Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Sen. Orrin Hatch, "The Nomination of William Gery Myers III to be a U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit," remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol.150 (July 19, 2004), pp. S8406-S8412. Senator Hatch's remarks are the first instance in the Congressional Record that any Senator other than Senator Leahy has referred to the "Thurmond Rule" by name.


17 Senator Thurmond, one account reported, "said he told Reagan that he should contact Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) and all other Republican members of the Senate in an attempt to withhold Senate confirmation of appointments [until after the Nov. 4 election]. "He said he would be glad to do that,' Thurmond said," "Reagan May Seek to Bar New Carter Nominations," The Washington Post, July 17, 1980, p. A15. See also, "GOP Senators Urged to Stall Appointments," Los Angeles Times, July 17, 1980, p. A19.
beyond Jimmy Carter’s term, should he be defeated in the general election."\(^{18}\) At this time, Senator Thurmond was the ranking Republican member on the Judiciary Committee, to which all circuit and district court nominations were referred. The blocking of appointments urged by Senator Thurmond presumably extended to those judicial nominations.

In the weeks immediately thereafter, however, the Judiciary Committee processed district and circuit court nominations, although not all referred nominations. This occurred without Senator Thurmond repeating his earlier call to block President Carter’s appointments. The Judiciary Committee continued to hold hearings and report judicial nominations during August and September (although the committee reported only one circuit court nomination during this period). The Senate in turn, in September, confirmed 12 judicial nominations (11 district, one circuit).

In mid-September 1980, the news media had reported conflict between the Democratic majority and Republican minority in the Senate Judiciary Committee over the pace at which judicial nominations were being processed. A press account of the committee’s September 10 meeting reported that Senator Thurmond’s move to block a vote on 13 judicial nominations was perceived by “some Democrats ... as a Republican plot to delay all judgeship nominations in the hopes that Ronald Reagan will be elected president and can fill the posts with good Republicans."\(^{19}\) However, a week later, on September 17, the committee approved motions, to which no objections were heard, to report 10 of the judicial nominations (all district court nominations) to the Senate. Six other judicial nominations, also on the committee’s agenda, were not reported. Following the votes to report, Senator Thurmond stated that he intended to exercise his privilege, under the committee’s rules, of “carrying over” to a later committee meeting a vote on three other judicial nominees who had “just had a hearing.” Senator Thurmond prefaced that statement with the following remarks:

Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to say at this juncture, let me make the point, that the Minority has tried to be more than fair in considering all of the nominees that have appeared before this committee. I would remind you it is just about six weeks before the election, and I want to say that for a year and a half before the last election, there was no action taken on judges when we had a Republican President. But, anyway, last week it was necessary for me to lay over all 13 judicial nominees because our investigation had not been entirely completed on some of them. Today I will again exercise the privilege and request that the three that have just had a hearing ... be held over.\(^{20}\)

**Subsequent Senate Action on Judicial Nominations in 1980.** All 10 district court nominations approved by the Judiciary Committee on September 17 were considered and confirmed en bloc by the Senate on September 29. In floor remarks preceding the Senate action, Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon noted that, a few months earlier, he was one of the three Senators appointed by the Senate Minority Leader to a committee within the Republican Conference tasked with screening the qualifications of President Carter’s


\(^{20}\) “Transcript of Proceedings, United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Executive Session No. XIV, September 17, 1980,” Miller Associates Reporting Service, p. 4. (Copy in archival records of Senate Judiciary Committee.)
nominations ("not just judicial appointments but all nominations")21). The three-member committee, he said, had "gone over all the nominations that have been sent up here for many posts besides the judiciary."22 In anticipation of the Senate confirming the 10 judicial nominations, Senator Hatfield stated:

I think today is again strong evidence that we want to try to minimize what may have been a tradition in this body in years past of holding up nominations per se in an election year because our commitment is that all the functions of Government must perform to their utmost capacity and efficiency. If there is a failure to confirm, it is going to impinge upon that ability to perform in a judicial district or in an administrative post. We are not going to try to frustrate that ability because we want to facilitate that highest performance of duties and responsibilities of government.23

The final weeks of the second session, following the November 4 election, witnessed an unusually late consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate of a circuit court nomination. The nomination was transmitted to the Senate by a "lame-duck" President, who had just lost his bid for re-election, and was the only lower court nomination made by President Carter in the second session after September. The nomination of Stephen G. Breyer of Massachusetts to the First Circuit Court of Appeals was received in the Senate on November 13, received a Judiciary Committee hearing on November 17, was reported by the committee on December 1, and was confirmed by the Senate on December 9, just one week before the Senate adjourned sine die on December 16. Although its expedited treatment generated some controversy, the nomination enjoyed the support of the committee's ranking minority member, Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, as well as of other Republican members of the committee, which approved the nomination by a 12-0 vote. The nomination ultimately was confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 80-10.24

**Interpretations of 1980 Events in More Recent Congresses.** Some of the above-narrated events of 1980 were later cited in Senate floor debates concerning the "Thurmond Rule" in the judicial confirmation process. In a Senate floor statement in July 2004, for instance, Senator Leahy, then the ranking Democratic member on the Judiciary Committee, maintained that the Republican majority in the Senate was, at that point, "intent on violating the 'Thurmond Rule' and the spirit of cooperation reached earlier this year" on processing President George W. Bush's judicial nominations. The "Thurmond Rule," Senator Leahy said:

...dates back at least to July 1980 when the Reagan campaign urged Senate Republicans to block President Carter's judicial nominees. Over time, Senator Thurmond and Republican leaders refined their use of and practices under the rule to prevent the consideration of lifetime judicial appointments in the last year of a Presidency unless [the nominees under consideration were] consensus nominees."25

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 At the time of his nomination, Stephen Breyer was the Chief Majority Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee.
25 Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, "Nomination of Henry W. Saad to be United States Circuit Judge for the (continued...)"
Two months later, in September 2004, Senator Leahy again pointed to events in 1980 as the genesis of the Thurmond Rule. In a Senate floor statement, he declared:

In July 1980 Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan asked Senate Republicans, then in the minority, to stop confirming the judicial nominees of President Carter. Senator Strom Thurmond, who was then the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee, was happy to oblige. Republicans were able to accomplish this blockade with only a few exceptions that required Republican consent. Senate Republicans have adhered to this rule with a Democratic President, whether they were in the minority, as in 1980, or the majority, as in 1996 and 2000.26

The meaning of judicial nominations events of 1980, however, have been interpreted differently by Senate Republicans. In January 4, 2007 floor remarks, Senator Specter stated that it did not appear that Senator Thurmond ever publicly asserted that nominations should be delayed due to an impending presidential election. Rather, Senator Specter said:

The only comment that could be so construed was made after the [Judiciary] Committee approved ten nominees at a September 17, 1980 markup. He stated, "Let me make the point that the Minority has tried to be more fair in considering all of the nominees that have appeared before this Committee. I would remind [the Committee] it is just about six weeks before the election, and I want to say that for a year and a half before the last election, there was no action taken on judges when we had a Republican President." However, because Senator Thurmond used this as a point of contrast, the natural implication seems to be that he considered blocking nominations in the lead up to an election unfair.27

Several months later, in a May 9, 2007 floor statement, Senator Specter again disputed the idea that the "historical record supports any kind of 'rule' calling for a "dramatic slow down in confirmations in the latter part of next year." At the same time, he said that:

...we do know that the press of a Presidential election has a tendency of slowing down work in the Senate. If nothing else, we can expect the Congress will be in recess for a substantial portion of the second half of next year.

Therefore, in order to meet the standards set by similar Congresses in recent times, it will be necessary for us to confirm approximately one circuit court judge for every month we are in session.28

25 (...continued)


Data Indicating Slowdown Trend in Senate Processing of Circuit Court Nominations. Although Senators disagree about the existence of the Thurmond Rule, data on Senate consideration of court of appeals nominees in 1980 and subsequent presidential election years may help to illuminate the degree to which the Senate has followed a pattern consistent with what one might expect if the “Rule” were in effect. The following section examines Senate processing of court of appeals nominations in presidential election years from 1980 to 2004, according to two kinds of data:

- **Number of committee and Senate actions:** On average, there were fewer hearings held, nominations reported, and nominations confirmed in the last three presidential election years of 1996, 2000, and 2004 than in 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992.

- **Last dates of committee and Senate actions:** In 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992, the data reveal that the Senate confirmed its last court of appeals nominee of the session in October or later. By contrast, in 1996, 2000, and 2004, the last confirmation of a court of appeals nominee occurred in July or earlier.

Decline in Number of Court of Appeals Nominations Confirmed by the Senate in Recent Presidential Election Years. Table 1, below, presents data on Judiciary Committee and full Senate action on nominations to U.S. court of appeals judgeships in each presidential election year from 1980 to 2004. For each of these presidential election years, the table lists the number of nominations transmitted to the Senate, hearings held, nominations reported, and nominations confirmed. The table also presents the same kind of data for 2008, but only through early July. (The 2008 data, of course, are subject to change, depending on any further judicial nominations activity that might occur during the rest of the year.)

The data indicate, among other things, a sharp decrease in the average number of court of appeals nominees confirmed by the Senate in recent presidential election years. Specifically, the average number of court of appeals nominees confirmed in the three most recent completed presidential election years (1996, 2000, and 2004) was less than half of the corresponding average for the four presidential elections before that time (1980, 1984, 1988, 1992). On average, the Senate confirmed 9.5 court of appeals nominations in the presidential election years from 1980 to 1992. In 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992, there were 65 total nominees to the courts of appeals pending, of which the Senate confirmed 38, or 58.5%. Over the next three presidential election years, the average has fallen to 4.3 confirmed court of appeals nominees: In 1996, 2000, and 2004, there were a total of 55 nominees to the courts of appeals pending, of which the Senate confirmed 13, or 23.6%. Furthermore, Table 1 shows, in each of the three most recent presidential election years, the Senate confirmed a smaller percentage of court of appeals nominations than in any of the four preceding presidential election years.

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39 Also, on average, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on 66.2% (43 of 65) and reported 63.1% (41 of 65) of pending circuit court nominations in the 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992 presidential election years. Corresponding percentages were much smaller for the presidential election years of 1996, 2000, and 2004, when the Judiciary Committee, on average, held hearings on 33.3% (24 of 72) and reported 29.2% (21 of 72) of pending circuit court nominations.
Table 1: Nominations, Hearings, Reports, and Confirmations of U.S. Court of Appeals Nominees in Presidential Election Years, 1980-2008
(through July 7, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New Nominations</th>
<th>Previously Pending Nominations</th>
<th>Total Nominations</th>
<th>Hearings Held</th>
<th>Nominations Reported</th>
<th>Nominations Confirmed</th>
<th>% Confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996a</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008a</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRS Judicial Nominations Database, based on data from the Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate, various years. In cases where a nominee was nominated more than once in a given year, more than one hearing was held on a nominee in a given year, or where a nominee was reported more than once in a given year, only the first nomination/hearing/report is included in Table 1.

Notes:
1. Includes nominations held over from the previous session of a Congress and those returned at the end of the previous session of Congress but resubmitted by the President during the session of Congress that coincided with the presidential election year.
2. The data are for the second session of the 104th Congress, which began on January 3, 1996. The Senate confirmed two nominees to the courts of appeals on January 2, 1996, at the end of the first session of the 104th Congress.

Earlier Cut-Off in Senate Action on Nominations in Recent Presidential Election Years. The data presented in Table 1 may be seen as useful in revealing one particular trend — the smaller percentage of court nominees in presidential election years from 1996 to 2004 receiving Senate confirmation than in the four previous presidential election years. The data, however, are not useful in determining how late in each of these years the Senate processed judicial nominations or at what point, if any, in these years the Senate might have begun to slow down the pace of the judicial confirmation process. To help in that determination, Table 2, below, presents data on when, in recent presidential election years, the Senate, and its Judiciary Committee, ceased their consideration of court appeals nominees. Specifically, Table 2 presents, for each presidential election year between 1980 and 2004, the last dates on which the Senate received a court of appeals nomination, the Judiciary Committee held a hearing on or voted to report such a nomination, and the Senate voted on its confirmation.

Table 2 sheds light on the Senate’s ability to move court of appeals nominations forward after July in presidential election years. Among other things, the table shows the...
cut-off dates for Senate action occurring earliest in the most recent presidential election years. The Senate confirmed court of appeals nominees after July in four consecutive presidential election years from 1980 to 1992. In 1980, Stephen G. Breyer was confirmed to the First Circuit on December 16; in 1984, 1988, and 1992, the Senate confirmed court of appeals nominees in October of each year, in each case within several days of the Senate’s adjournment sine die. In the three subsequent presidential election years, however, the Senate confirmed no court of appeals nominees after July. In 1996, the Senate confirmed no court of appeals nominees in the second session of the 104th Congress; its last confirmations were on January 2, 1996, the final day of the first session. In 2000, the last confirmation of a court of appeals judge occurred on July 21; in 2004, the last confirmation occurred on June 24. Although the Senate considered four court of appeals nominations in late July, it rejected motions to invoke cloture on them and did not subsequently vote on their confirmation.

Table 2: Last Dates of Court of Appeals Nominations, Hearings, Committee Reports, and Confirmations. Presidential Election Years 1980-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Last Nomination</th>
<th>Last Hearing</th>
<th>Last Report</th>
<th>Last Confirmation</th>
<th>Adjourn Sine Die</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


Notes:
1. The Senate confirmed two court of appeals nominees on January 2, 1996, the final day of the first session of the 104th Congress.

Concluding Observations. As noted above, recent debate over whether there is, or has ever been, a Thurmond Rule in the Senate appears to arise out of different meanings attached to events involving Senator Thurmond in 1980. The foregoing review of these events found, among other things, that Senator Thurmond did appear, in July 1980, to have asked Ronald Reagan, the Republican Party’s presidential candidate, to endorse a plan to slow Senate consideration of all judicial and executive appointments that would extend beyond President Jimmy Carter’s term. Shortly thereafter, the Senate Republican Conference apparently detailed three Senators to review pending nominations to the judiciary and executive agencies. Notwithstanding the existence of such a screening mechanism and Senator Thurmond’s request to Mr. Reagan, the Senate Judiciary Committee continued to report judicial nominees to the Senate, and the Senate confirmed district court nominees as late as September 29, 1980, and one court of appeals nominee as late as December 10, 1980.

Senate floor remarks in the 110th Congress, and in other recent Congresses, indicate a sharp disagreement between some Senators, apparently along party lines, as to whether, in...
presidential election years, the Senate and its Judiciary Committee customarily observe a practice referred to by some as the Thurmond Rule. Senate floor debate has indicated the absence of bipartisan agreement on whether a drop-off in Senate processing of lower court nominations is to be expected in presidential election years and how many judicial nominations the Senate should confirm before its final adjournment.

As noted above, quantitative analysis of Senate judicial nomination activity reveals that the Senate has, in each of the three most recent presidential election years (1996, 2000, and 2004), confirmed a smaller percentage of court of appeals nominations than in the four preceding presidential election years (1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992). Coincident with that development, the Senate, in the three most recent presidential election years, stopped confirming court of appeals nominations earlier than in the four preceding presidential election years.
Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee,
Hearing on Nominations
September 9, 2008

Despite Republican filibusters and their refusal to give consent to proceed even on important bills with broad bipartisan support, I have, nonetheless, again gone the extra mile by proceeding with yet another confirmation hearing for the President's nominees.

This hearing includes the President's nominee to be Solicitor General, which will bring to near completion our work at expediting consideration of replacements for the entire leadership of the Justice Department that resigned in the wake of the scandals of the Gonzales era.

This hearing also includes five additional judicial nominations, which, if confirmed, are lifetime appointments. Their tenure will not expire when President Bush leaves office in five months. This is extremely late in a presidential election year for such a hearing and serves as an exception under the Thurmond Rule. That rule dates back to 1980, when Republican Senator Strom Thurmond was the Ranking Minority Member of this Committee, and called for shutting down the judicial confirmation process. At the time, there was a Democratic President and Senator Thurmond wanted to wait until the next President, a Republican, was elected and had the opportunity to send his nominations to the Senate. Republicans used the Thurmond Rule in another recent presidential election year, 1996, when the Republican Senate majority did not confirm a single judge after the August recess and, in fact, refused to confirm any circuit court nominees during the entire 1996 session.

This Congress has already confirmed more judges than were confirmed during the entire 109th Congress, when a Republican Senate majority and Republican chairman of this Committee did not have to worry about the Thurmond Rule and an abbreviated session due to a presidential election. Indeed, in the 37 months I have served as Judiciary chairman, the Senate has already confirmed 158 of President Bush's judicial nominees. That is the same number of President Bush's nominees confirmed by the Senate Republican majority in the more than four years it controlled the pace of confirmations for this Republican administration.
I have long said that by this stage of the year I will be working with the Majority Leader, as well as our Republican counterparts, in order to be able to proceed. At this juncture, during a presidential election year, progress on judicial nominees requires consensus and the cooperation of all Senators.

Today the Committee is poised to hear from five more nominees for lifetime appointments to the Federal bench: Clark Waddoups of Utah, Michael Anello of California, Mary Stenson Scriver of Florida, and two nominees from Colorado, Christine Arguello and Phillip A. Brimmer. All of these nominees have the support of their home state Senators, Republicans and Democrats. I was happy to accommodate Senator Salazar's request that we add two Colorado nominees to the hearing today, after he and Senator Allard reached an agreement. Yesterday, Senator Allard finally returned the blue slip for Ms. Arguello. Of course, Ms. Arguello was nominated by President Clinton to the 10th Circuit, but a Republican pocket filibuster in 2000 stalled her nomination. Today, we are attempting to right another wrong from the Republican abuses of those years. Ms. Arguello, like Judge Helene White, who was confirmed to the 6th Circuit earlier this year, has now been nominated by Presidents of both parties. I am hopeful that we can complete the consideration of her nomination promptly. If Committee consideration of today's nominees is expedited, if the nominations are not held over, but can be reported promptly to the Senate, and if there are no delays in their floor consideration, then they can be confirmed before we recess later this month.

By hearing from the President's nominee to be Solicitor General, Greg Garre, we continue with the extensive time and attention we have devoted to rebuilding the Department of Justice. This is the ninth hearing we have held to restock and restore the leadership of the Department of Justice in the last year alone, including confirmation hearings for the new Attorney General, the new Deputy Attorney General, the new Associate Attorney General, and so many others.

At the beginning of this Congress, the Judiciary Committee began its oversight efforts. Over the next nine months, our efforts revealed a Department of Justice gone awry. The leadership crisis came more and more into view as I led a bipartisan group of concerned Senators to consider the United States Attorney firing scandal, a confrontation over the legality of the administration's
warrantless wiretapping program, the untoward political influence of the White House at the Department of Justice, and the secret legal memos excusing all manner of excess and subverting the rule of law.

What our efforts exposed was a crisis of leadership that took a heavy toll on the tradition of independence that has long guided the Justice Department and provided it with safe harbor from political interference. It shook the confidence of the American people. Through bipartisan efforts among those from both sides of the aisle who care about federal law enforcement and the Department of Justice, we joined together to press for accountability. That resulted in a change in leadership at the Department, with the resignations of the Attorney General and virtually all of its highest-ranking officials.

The two reports we have received so far from the Department's Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility have confirmed what our oversight efforts in this Congress have uncovered about the politicization of hiring practices at the Department. It confirms our findings and our fears that the same senior Department officials involved with the firing of United States Attorneys were injecting improper political motives into the process of hiring attorneys for career positions throughout the Department, from career prosecutors, to immigration judges, to young attorneys through the Department's prestigious honors program. I suspect the further reports we expect from the Inspector General will continue to shed light on the extent to which the Bush administration has allowed politics to affect — and infect — the Department's priorities, from law enforcement to the operation of the crucial Civil Rights Division.

I hope that Mr. Garre shares my view that it is vital to ensure that we have a functioning, independent Justice Department, and that we ensure that this sad era in the history of the Department is not repeated. We have seen what happens when the rule of law plays second fiddle to a President's agenda and the partisan desires of political operatives. It is a disaster for the American people. Both the President and the nation are best served by a Justice Department that provides sound advice and takes responsible action, without regard to political considerations — not one that develops legalistic loopholes and ideological litmus tests to serve the partisan ends of a particular administration.
I am holding these proceedings in spite of the legislative obstructionism from Republicans. The Judiciary Committee has worked throughout this Congress to advance the priorities of Americans. We have reported legislation to support local law enforcement to make our cities and towns safe from crime, which is on the rise after consistent declines in the 1990s. These legislative efforts include the COPS Improvements Act, S.368, and my bill to extend the Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Act, S.2511. We have reported legislation to combat fraud and corruption, like the War Profiteering Prevention Act, S.119, and the Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, S.1946. We have reported legislation to protect the civil rights and voting rights of Americans, like the Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act, S.535, and Senator Obama’s Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2007, S.453. We have reported legislation to protect Americans’ data privacy, like my Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S.495. We have reported measures to provide the Federal judiciary with increased resources both in terms of salary restoration and additional judgeships, S.1638 and S.2774. We have reported intellectual property measures like the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act, S.2913. And, of course, we have reported the bill to confront the OPEC cartel, NOPEC, S.879. I have also been seeking for months to find a way to extend the EB-5 investor visa pilot program that brings benefits not only to Vermont but to Pennsylvania and Iowa, and elsewhere. Authority for this worthwhile program that leads to investments here in the United States expires in September. My efforts to clear H.R. 5569, a bill to extend the program for five years, have been stymied by Republicans who insist on using this bill as a vehicle for other immigration-related matters. They have ensnared it in a series of competing concerns. I look forward to a time when Republicans work with us on these matters instead of obstructing us at every turn.

Legislation with broad bipartisan support that I have managed to move through the Judiciary Committee has then been stalled on the Senate floor by the obstruction of a few Republicans. Of the bills that have been reported from the Judiciary Committee this Congress, Republicans have blocked legislation to support runaway and homeless young people, S.2982; to help law enforcement cope with mentally-ill offenders, S.2304; to support the investigation and prosecution of Civil Rights Era murders left unsolved for too long, S.535; and to protect our children from the scourges of drugs, child pornography, and child exploitation, such as S.1210, S.1738 and S.2344. I joined the Majority Leader in introducing a measure that combined some of these Committee-approved and House-passed bipartisan measures into one bill, S.3297. These
should have been consent items and already been considered and passed by the Senate. Instead, they fell victim to another Republican filibuster.

Republicans have become masters of obstruction, boycotting business meetings of the Judiciary Committee and cutting short important hearings, including a hearing at which two courageous women from Pennsylvania testified about severe injuries they suffered to help us understand the plight of hardworking Americans whose legitimate grievances have been rejected by a pro-business Supreme Court. Sadly, we have seen Republican obstructionism since the beginning of this Congress, with Republicans using filibuster after filibuster to thwart the will of the majority of the Senate from doing the business of the American people.

Republican filibusters prevented Senate majorities from passing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act; the climate change bill; the Employee Free Choice Act; the DC Voting Rights Act; the Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and Energy Efficiency Act of 2007; the Renewable Energy and Job Creation Act of 2008; the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008; the Consumer-First Energy Act and the Advancing America’s Priorities Act. These are critical pieces of legislation to address urgent priorities like ensuring equal pay for equal work for women and fair wages for all working Americans, the energy crisis, the environment, voting rights, health care and law enforcement needs. All of them had the support of the majority of the Senate. And all were blocked by a minority of Republican Senators bent on preventing us from making progress. Republicans have now filibustered more than 80 pieces of legislation in this Congress and are heading for 100 before we adjourn. Imagine what we could have accomplished in this Congress with cooperation rather than obstruction.

This long list of priorities unaddressed because of the Republicans in Congress would be even longer if we were to include the many important bills President Bush has vetoed since the beginning of this Congress. This list includes legislation to fund stem cell research to fight debilitating and deadly diseases, to extend and expand the successful State Children’s Health Insurance Program that would have provided health insurance to more of the millions of American children without it, to set a timetable for bringing American troops home from the disastrous war in Iraq, and to ban waterboarding and help restore America as a beacon for the rule of law.

5
I have always said that we would treat this President's nominees more fairly than Republicans treated President Clinton's. Despite their legislative obstruction, we have. Indeed, we have matched the confirmation record that Republicans achieved for a President from their own party. We have not pocket filibustered more than 60 of this President's nominees. We are not going to return 17 circuit court nominees without action to this President as the Republican-led Senate did to President Clinton. We have not doubled the judicial vacancies and forced them above 100 nationwide, nor have we doubled the number of circuit court vacancies. To the contrary, we have cut judicial vacancies by more than half, and reduced circuit court vacancies by more than two-thirds from a high point of 32, to a low of single digits throughout all 13 Federal circuits.

The 100 nominations we confirmed in only 17 months in 2001 and 2002, while working with a most uncooperative White House, reduced the vacancies by 45 percent by the end of 2002. With 40 additional confirmations last year, and another 18 already this year, we have already exceeded the total confirmations for the last Congress, which was under Republican majority control. Nearly half of the judicial nominees the Senate has confirmed while I have served as the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee have filled vacancies classified by the Administrative Office of the Courts as judicial emergency vacancies. Eighteen of the 27 circuit court nominees confirmed while I have chaired the Committee filled judicial emergency vacancies, including nine of the 10 circuit court nominees confirmed this Congress. This is another aspect of the problem created by Republicans that we have worked hard to improve. When President Bush took office there were 28 judicial emergency vacancies. Those have been reduced by more than half.

We have reduced Federal judicial vacancies from the 10 percent level they hit after Republican pocket filibusters of President Clinton's nominees, to less than half that number. With respect to the circuit courts, we have done even better. We have moved from the 32 circuit court vacancies that arose from years of Republican pocket filibusters of President Clinton's moderate and qualified nominees and more than doubled the circuit court vacancies nationwide to less than 10 earlier this summer. Thus, we have reduced circuit court vacancies by more than two thirds.

Partisan Republican critics ignore the progress we have made on judicial vacancies. They also
ignore the crisis that they had created by not considering circuit nominees in 1996, 1997 and 1998. They ignore the fact that they refused to confirm a single circuit nominee during the entire 1996 session. They ignore the fact that they returned 17 circuit court nominees without action to the White House in 2000. They ignore the public criticism of Chief Justice Rehnquist to their actions during those years. They ignore the fact that they were responsible for more than doubling circuit court vacancies during their pocket filibusters of moderate and qualified Clinton nominees or that we have reduced those circuit court vacancies by more than two thirds.

I have yet to hear praise from a single Republican for our work in lowering vacancies. I also have yet to hear in the Republican talking points any explanation for their actions during the congressional session in the 1996 presidential election year, when the Republican Senate majority refused to allow the Senate to confirm even one circuit court judge. I have yet to hear explanations for why they did not proceed with the nominations of Bonnie Campbell, Allen Snyder and so many others.

There are currently 10 judicial vacancies without a nominee, even though the White House has in the last weeks rushed forward with a number of new nominations on which the paperwork has yet even to be completed. Eleven judicial nominations had yet to be reviewed by the ABA when we noticed the hearing on September 2nd. Currently eighteen do not have blue slips or support from both their home state Senators. No nominations received after June 6 were confirmed when the Republicans were in charge in 1996. Following that standard would eliminate 18 recent nominees, more than half of all those pending. Instead, working with Senators from both parties we are proceeding today with the nomination of Mary Sterson Scriven of Florida.

The reduction in judicial vacancies is one of the few areas in which conditions have actually improved over the last couple of year. I wish we could say the same about unemployment, the cost of gasoline, food prices, health care costs, inflation, the credit crisis, home mortgages and the national debt, but all those indicators have been moving in the wrong direction, as is consumer confidence and the percentage of Americans who see the country as on the wrong track.

Just last week unemployment was reported at 6.1 percent. It is much higher in some
communities. Americans have suffered through job losses every month this year and they now exceed 600,000. The day-to-day lives of hardworking Americans have only become more difficult during the last several years. The Treasury Secretary has been quite sobering about the financial difficulties still ahead. Thousands of Americans are in danger of losing their homes after falling behind on mortgage payments. Inflation is now on the rise, jobs are being lost, gas and food prices have skyrocketed, health care and college are less affordable, the American dream of owning a home is under assault -- and yet we can expect Republicans to pick a partisan fight about judicial confirmations, an area in which we have done better than they have, even with this Republican President, and where we have taken great strides to fix the system they broke.

Hardworking Americans trying to do the best they can for their families are more concerned about critical issues they face in their lives each day. They are concerned about affording to heat their homes this winter. They are concerned about gas prices that have skyrocketed so high they do not know how they will afford to drive to work. They are concerned about the steepest decline in home values in two decades. Americans are worried about soaring health care costs, rising health insurance costs, the rising costs of education and rising food prices. The partisan, election-year rhetoric over judicial nominations, at a time when judicial vacancies have been significantly reduced, is a reflection of misplaced Republican priorities.

I look forward to hearing from the nominees today. The Federal judiciary is the one arm of our government that should never be political or politicized, regardless of who sits in the White House. I will continue in this Congress, and with a new President in the next Congress, to work with Senators from both sides of the aisle to ensure that the Federal judiciary remains independent, and able to provide justice to all Americans, without fear or favor.

# # # # #
Testimony of
The Honorable Mel Martinez
Senator
September 9, 2008

Statement regarding Mary Scriven’s nomination to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
Presented by U.S. Senator Mel Martinez (R-FL)
Tuesday, September 9, 2008

Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to come before this Committee today in support of the President’s nomination of Magistrate Judge Mary Scriven to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Judge Scriven is an outstanding attorney and a committed public servant. She will make a fine United States District Judge.

In 1987, after earning her undergraduate degree from Duke University and her law degree from Florida State University, Judge Scriven entered private practice with the Tampa office of Carlton Fields. Judge Scriven eventually became a partner there before taking on a Magistrate Judgeship in 1997.

During her more than 10 years of private practice at Carlton Fields, Judge Scriven focused on representing corporations and governmental clients in complex, commercial litigation. She litigated and tried matters over amounts ranging from $50,000 to $122 million. She handled securities and anti-trust matters, defended corporate clients against class-actions, and pursued insurance coverage for banking clients facing losses from embezzlers.

Throughout her career, she earned the respect of a variety of people — from the lawyers at her own large, regional firm, to co-counsel, to opposing counsel, to, of course, members of the bench before whom she appeared.

In December 1997, Judge Scriven, was selected to serve an 8-year term as a Federal Magistrate Judge. She was re-appointed to another 8-year term in 2005. In her 11 years as a Magistrate, Judge Scriven has proven herself to be a committed public servant. Judge Scriven has garnered significant courtroom experience in both criminal and civil matters. She has put in the time and effort necessary to understand and fairly decide issues of often little glamour, but critical importance to the litigants and lawyers before her.

Beyond her professional accolades, Judge Scriven is married and the mother and step-mother to four children. And, despite the demands of her current position, she has remained involved in the local Tampa community through her service on various charity boards and through her church.

I believe I echo the sentiment of all those who know Judge Scriven when I say that she reflects the necessary attributes of a jurist — intelligence, honesty, and even-handedness.

The President has made a good choice in nominating Mary Scriven to the bench. I ask that you look favorably upon her nomination and see to it that she may continue her career serving the people of the Middle District of Florida.
September 15, 2008

VIA HAND DELIVERY

The Hon. Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman
The Hon. Senator Arlen Specter, Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
224 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Re: Nomination of Gregory G. Garre to be Solicitor General

Dear Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter:

I am writing to express my enthusiastic support for the nomination of Gregory G. Garre to be the Solicitor General of the United States. While I am now in private practice, I had the privilege of serving with Greg in the Solicitor General’s Office during my eleven years there as an Assistant to the Solicitor General (1996 to 2007). I worked with Greg both when he was an Assistant in the Office and when he returned to serve as Principal Deputy Solicitor General. In both roles, Greg consistently demonstrated the highest caliber of legal advocacy skills, both oral and written. He quickly developed a well-deserved reputation within the office for the exceptional vigor and persuasiveness of his oral arguments, and his smoothly written briefs. His work consistently reflected extraordinary legal acumen and litigation judgment. He is, in short, one of the best appellate and Supreme Court advocates of our time, possessing the exceptional skills needed to properly serve the people of the United States as Solicitor General.

But what lies behind those skills is even more important. In every case I worked on with Greg, he always demonstrated extraordinary and balanced judgment. While I might not personally agree with every governmental policy that Greg was tasked with defending, I have never doubted the even-handed judgment, common-litigation-sense, and devout commitment to serving the interests of the United States that he brought to bear in every case on which he worked. Most importantly, Greg is an individual of the very highest integrity and unflagging honesty – characteristics that he would bring to bear on every one of the difficult and critically important litigation decisions that he would have to make as Solicitor General. Beyond that, his easygoing demeanor, humility, fairness, and the universal esteem in which he is held will make his nomination welcome news within the Department of Justice and the Office of the Solicitor General.
Statement of Senator Ken Salazar
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Nominations
September 9, 2008

Thank you Chairman Leahy and Ranking Member Specter for holding this hearing today. I am very pleased that two of the five nominees that the Committee will consider, Christine Arguello and Phillip Brimmer, were nominated to serve as U.S. District Judges for the District of Colorado.

Senator Allard and I recognize that very few nominees are approved this late in the Congressional session, especially when they are nominated as late as July. Given this fact, we are very grateful that the process to confirm Christine Arguello and Philip Brimmer is moving forward.

I am honored to introduce Christine M. Arguello to the Committee. Ms. Arguello is a Colorado native who received her Juris Doctor
from Harvard Law School. Throughout her impressive career, she has served as a law school professor and co-authored a law school casebook on Evidence that is used at law schools across the country. Ms. Arguello is a former partner of Davis Graham & Stubbs in Denver and at Duncan, Green, Brown & Langeness in Denver. Ms. Arguello also served as Chief Deputy at the Colorado Attorney General’s office. Today, Ms. Arguello serves as Senior Associate Counsel for the University of Colorado.

In January, I formed a bipartisan Judicial Nominations Advisory Commission to help select highly qualified individuals to forward to the White House for consideration of judicial appointments. The Commission highly recommended Christine Arguello to me to consider citing her outstanding legal experience.

Philip Brimmer was born in Rawlins, Wyoming, but has been a long-time Colorado resident. He received his Juris Doctor from Yale Law School and served as a law clerk to the Honorable Zita
L. Weinshienk, a United States District Court Judge for the District of Colorado. Mr. Brimmer was an Associate at Kirkland & Ellis before joining the Denver District Attorney’s office. Today, Mr. Brimmer serves as an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Last week, the American Bar Association rated Mr. Brimmer “well qualified” to serve, its highest rating.

We can all agree that these are vitally important lifetime appointments to our federal judiciary. These judgesthips should be filled only by the most competent and highly qualified individuals. Both Christine Arguello and Philip Brimmer would serve the people of Colorado and the Nation well as District Court judges. I am hopeful that this Committee will approve these nominations and that the full Senate will confirm them as soon as possible.
JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS ANTHONY J. TRENGA, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA; C. DARNELL JONES, II, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA; MITCHELL S. GOLDBERG, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA; JOEL H. SLOMSKY, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA; ERIC F. MELGREN, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2008

U.S. Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, Pursuant to notice, at 3:09 p.m., in room SD–562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Specter.
Also present: Senators Warner, Webb, Casey, and Roberts.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

Chairman Leahy. There are rather extraordinary things going on on the Hill and we get one request after another to vote for a blank check on a “just trust us” basis involving Wall Street. Unfortunately, the form of the blank check tends to change all the time, so there’s been some skepticism raised, I think as much on the Republican side of the aisle as the Democratic side. But I’m holding this exceptional hearing this late in a Presidential election year as an accommodation to Senator Specter, who is the Ranking Republican member of our Committee and a former Chairman.

The Thurman rule, which was certainly established and followed by Republicans when there’s a Democratic President in the White House, calls for Senate consideration of judicial nominations to stop
in the last several months before a Presidential election until we see the outcome of the election.

Senator Hatch followed that practice in both 1996 and 2000 when he chaired the Judiciary Committee. In fact, in the 1996 Presidential year, no one nominated after June 6th was considered and there were no judicial confirmations after the August recess. In 2000, there were none after July 25th.

I have said throughout my chairmanship I would treat President Bush’s nominees better than Republicans treated President Clinton’s, and I’ve done so. This hearing is another example of that. This is the second hearing I’ve held for judicial nominees in September of this Presidential election year.

I’ve included the five judicial nominees from Utah, California, Florida, and Colorado, who participated in our September 9 hearing on the Committee’s agenda for consideration in our business meeting later this week.

Today we are going to hear from five additional nominees for lifetime appointments to the Federal bench in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kansas. I have consistently said this time of the year I will work with the Majority Leader and the Republican Leader in order to be able to proceed on consensus nominees.

Progress on judicial nominees requires consensus and the cooperation of all Senators, I think something that is one of those things that both Republicans and Democrats would agree on. I want to thank Majority Leader Reid, with whom I’ve consulted, for his willingness to have us proceed with this.

Now, three of the nominees are included at Senator Specter’s request: C. Darnell Jones, Mitchell Goldberg, and Joel H. Slomsky, and they all have the support of the other distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, Senator Casey.

President Bush did not nominate these men until just before the August recess. At the time I set this hearing last week we still had not received ABA ratings, but based on peer reviews of all of them. We are expediting these proceedings as a courtesy to Senator Specter, and he’s agreed with me to waive the 1-week notice required by our Senate rules.

I am also happy to accommodate the request of the senior Senator from Virginia that we include the nomination of Anthony J. Tringa to a judicial vacancy in Virginia. Senator Warner is one of our most distinguished members, and he’s retiring at the end of this Congress. In this case he’s been helped by Senator Webb, who has worked with him on the nomination and supports this nomination as well with his bipartisan support of the nominee. I compliment Senator Webb, who’s sitting right here, for that, for making it possible to go forward.

The final nominee is Eric Melgren of Kansas. I am accommodating the request of Senator Brownback by including this nomination. I must say to my friend Senator Brownback, I did so notwithstanding his rather constant criticism of my efforts in expediting other nominees, including when I worked to provide consideration of long-delayed judicial nominations for Michigan earlier this year.

I talked to him about having his delaying of Senate consideration of first one, and then as a result a dozen other, of President Bush’s
nominees at the end of the last Congress. He’s explained his reasons for doing that, and of course he was within his rights to, whether I agree with him or not.

There’s more that I could say, but I understand we’re going to have to go back on the floor very soon. I would note, we’ve cut the judicial vacancies that I encountered in the summer of 2001 by more than half. A lot of those vacancies occurred because of the pocket filibuster by Republicans of President Clinton’s nominees. Right now, we are proceeding with this hearing when we’re facing what the White House describes as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, and many of us have to get back to that.

We’ll go for opening statements by seniority of those who are here. I think the only person senior to Senator Specter is Senator Warner, and he’s not here at the moment. So I will yield to you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA**

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Warner is not here because he is still at the Republican conference. When I exited just a few moments ago, he asked me to explain his absence and his assurance that he will be along shortly.

Today is a very complicated day on Capitol Hill because of the economic crisis. I did not use the word “tumultuous”, which I used earlier today, commented on by the Chairman.

We have a Republican luncheon, as the Democrats do. It starts at about 12:30 and usually goes to 2:15. When I left a few moments before 3, it was still in process. Secretary Paulson was supposed to be there early and didn’t finish up the hearing until past 2. I left a few minutes before 3, even though I didn’t have a chance to ask a question, or questions, that I wanted to. Senator Warner remained.

I had planned to meet with three of the Pennsylvania nominees earlier today and just arrived a few moments ago here. But the schedule is very involved. We were scheduled to have a series of votes starting at 2:15, 2:30 and the photograph of the Appropriations Committee, and all of that has been deferred. The Senators may be interrupted at any time to go to the floor for votes, depending upon what happens there.

I thank Chairman Leahy especially for scheduling this hearing. It is very unusual to have judicial hearings on the week when the Senate is scheduled for termination. The reasons are very complicated and we don’t have time to discuss them now. But suffice it to say that Chairman Leahy has gone the extra mile, the extra 25,000 miles around the globe to accommodate this proceeding.

I also thank Senator Reid, the Majority Leader, for his acquiescence, for his support of this proceeding. It is my hope—really, my expectation—that we will be able to complete these nominations. That, of course, in the final analysis rests with the Majority Leader who sets the agenda for confirmation. But we do have a very distinguished panel of lawyers who are here.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will just proceed with very brief introductions of the three Pennsylvania nominees.

Chairman LEAHY. I see Senator Warner is here.
Senator Specter, Senator Warner.

Chairman Leahy. I'd like to hear from Senator Casey before we introduce people from Pennsylvania.

Senator Warner, we've already given you glowing accolades as one of the most senior members of the Senate, and praised your work, your bipartisan work, with Senator Webb. That's why we're here. With that, I'll go to you apparently we're going to have votes fairly soon. I doubt if we'll come back to this hearing once those votes start, so we're going to see how many judges we get done before the votes start. I'm not suggesting that anybody—put speeches in the record.

PRESENTATION OF ANTHONY J. TRENGA, A NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA BY HON. JOHN WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, you and I have been here together 30 years, and the man on your right, 28 of those years he's been with us.

Chairman Leahy. That's right.

Senator Warner. I think it's just important to say that I have had the privilege of introducing many, many, many individuals before the U.S. Senate, particularly this Committee. In the first place, I thank the courtesy that the Chairman and the Ranking Member extend to all members of the Senate as they deal with these situations, because each of us has nominations coming up for the judiciary.

I was a former lawyer and prosecutor myself, so I've had some modest experience. I can cut to it right away. This gentleman that I have the privilege of introducing, Anthony Trenga, is a lawyer's lawyer. He has tried and proven his skills. He has the highest ratings of our State Bar Association and of the American Bar Association. His career is what every young lawyer I think dreams about when they finally make their way through law school and pass the Bar. So I will simply put in my statement, but first I would ask that he introduce his family.

Chairman Leahy. I was thinking, because we have not heard from—

Senator Warner. Senator Webb joins me in this nomination. Whatever the pleasure of the Chair might be.

Chairman Leahy. Well, I'll tell you what. Because of the time—normally I would, but because of the time thing, why don't I go to Senator Brownback, Senator Casey, and Senator Webb for any comments they want. Then we'll introduce all the nominees.

Senator Brownback.

PRESENTATION OF ERIC F. MELGREN, A NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS BY HON. SAM BROWNBACK, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KANSAS

Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Leahy. I'm just afraid, if we run out of time, some of these people will have to wait till next year and take their chances with a new president.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I appreciate your accommodating this on the schedule and the nominee. I visited with you about policy concerns on prior nominees, but more than anything I want to thank you for holding this hearing and putting up Eric Melgren in this. I think it is an extraordinary act on your part and I deeply appreciate it, and I want you to know that.

If I could—and I will cut to the chase on this as well. Eric Melgren is somebody I've known for a number of years. He was born in Minneola, Kansas, which probably the only other person that would even know about that in this room would be the Ranking Member of where that is. It’s a very small community near Dodge City, not far from Russell, Kansas. He's been married for 30 years. He's got four kids.

But he's also a lawyer's lawyer as well: graduated Washburn University. He was student body president first at Wichita State, magna cum laude at his law school, top 5 percent. Then he went out and clerked for the very judge and on the bench on which he seeks to go now, on the Federal court bench in Wichita, where we have three senior judges that are helping us carrying our cases—I mentioned last week in the hearing, the oldest of which is 100 years old, who is still hearing cases. We're just a little concerned about his work ethic at this point in time at that age.

He joined a major law firm in Kansas, did a great job there. He's been U.S. Attorney for the last 6 years, very publicly involved. I think he's earned the highest ranking from the Bar Association of Unanimously Well Qualified. I urge his consideration.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. We'll put the full statements in the record. I apologize for rushing, but we would not have this hearing if we couldn't do it otherwise.

[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback appears as a submission for the record.]

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Casey.

PRESENTATION OF C. DARNELL JONES, II, A NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, MITCHELL S. GOLDBERG, A NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, AND JOEL H. SLOMSKY, A NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA BY HON. ROBERT CASEY, JR., A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I appreciate the time you're putting into holding this hearing and scheduling it so late in the legislative year. I want to thank Senator Specter for his work that went into today's proceeding.

I'm going to be very brief but I wanted to say, in summary fashion—I know that Senator Specter and the record will reflect more detail about the records of all of these individuals. I want to say, first of all, by way of support for all three individuals, Judge C. Darnell Jones, Mitchell Goldberg, and Joel Slomsky, all of them in one way or another have the requisite legal experience, in some cases—in two cases they are judges.
Each of them has some other kinds of experience, including experience as prosecutors. I think they’re all ready to assume the important responsibilities of being not just a judge, but a judge on the Federal District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. I am honored to stand here—to sit here, I should say—in this hearing and to be able to support them. It is an honor to work with Senator Specter to bring them forward, and we look forward to their confirmation.

Chairman Leahy. You and Senator Specter, like Senator Warner and Senator Webb, have shown the way a bipartisan effort can be done to bring about judges, and I commend both of you.

Senator Webb.

PRESENTATION OF ANTHONY J. TRENGA A NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA BY HON. JIM WEBB, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Specter. I have a longer statement I would ask be inserted in the record at this point.

Chairman Leahy. All statements will be.

[The prepared statement of Senator Webb appears as a submission for the record.]

Senator Webb. I appreciate very much the unusual step of having this hearing. Senator Warner and I, as you know, have worked hard, jointly, in a bipartisan way to come up with highly qualified candidates. I think a lot of that work would have been for naught if you had not given us the courtesy of this hearing.

Mr. Trenga enjoyed a long career. He’s earned the respect of colleagues and clients. He received a rating of Highly Qualified by the Virginia Bar. His nomination was, as I said, the result of a very rigorous process that Senator Warner and I jointly participated in. I am very proud to be supporting him, along with Senator Warner. He has a number of family members who are with him today; this is a big day for their family. We wish him the best as a judge.

Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much. We will put the full statements of everybody in the record.

Senator Roberts, did you wish to speak? I noted before, anybody who doesn’t get heard by the time we have our roll call votes probably will not get heard this year.

Go ahead.

PRESENTATION OF ERIC F. MELGREN A NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS BY HON. PAT ROBERTS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KANSAS

Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, I used to, when I was chairman of the Intelligence Committee, say that people would have 1 minute and if they exceeded that they would be taken to Dodge City and hung by the neck until they’re dead.

Chairman Leahy. You’ve used up about half of that 1 minute. Go ahead.

Senator Roberts. I’ve got it. I support the President’s nomination of Eric Melgren as Federal District Judge for the District of
Kansas. I associate myself with the remarks of my distinguished colleague and the senior Senator from Kansas, Senator Brownback. Simply put, Eric Melgren is qualified for this important responsibility. On the other side of it, we are in desperate need of active judges as opposed to senior judges and he would do a great job. Thank you.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much.

Senator Specter, do you and Senator Casey wish to note who is here? Maybe their families may want to stand up and be recognized.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That’s a good idea. If the families of the three nominees from Pennsylvania would stand, you’d be recognized.

Chairman LEAHY. It would be Mr. Jones, Mr. Goldberg, and Mr. Slomsky. Thank you. And when the individual nominee testifies, we’ll make sure we put in the names of all the families so that someday in the Jones, Goldberg, and Slomsky family archives, we’ll know exactly who was here.

Senator Warner and Senator Webb.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. As Senator Webb said so eloquently, we both worked on this and it was a pleasure to have interviewed this nominee who is right here with his family. If he’d stand with the family, and then we’ll get all the names in due course. Wonderful.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. And could I add one note? Throughout this process and others, I just want to compliment the dignity of the staff. They were always responsive, both Majority and Minority, in working on this and other nominations this year.

Chairman LEAHY. You instill that in everybody, Senator Warner, and I mean that very seriously.

Senator Brownback, Senator Roberts.

Senator BROWNBACK. Eric Melgren’s family is not here, but obviously he is here and will be testifying.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Well, I know that all Senators have about four other hearings they have to go to. If you want you’re welcome to stay, but if you want to leave, feel free also. The statements are all going to be put in the record.

All the nominees, Trenga, Judge Jones, Judges Goldberg, Slomsky, and Melgren, please come.

Would you please stand, raise your right hand, and repeat after me.

[Whereupon, the witnesses were duly sworn.]

Chairman LEAHY. The record can show they all were sworn in.

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY J. TRENGA NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Mr. Trenga, would you please just put in, for the record, those of your family and friends who are here? Later we’ll make sure we get all the spelling right for the Trenga archives.

Mr. TRENGA. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m very fortunate to have here today with me my family and some very close friends and colleagues. First and foremost is my wife, Rita. We have been married 25 years and we have two children. My daughter Elizabeth
is here with me. Unfortunately, my son Anthony was unable to be here. Also with me are my two siblings: my sister, Marilyn McClain and her husband Charles; and my brother, Larry Trenga, who came in from Philadelphia today.

I also am very fortunate to have with me my brother-in-law, Colonel Ken Dahl, who is currently here in this area.

I am also very fortunate to have with me a number of my very good colleagues and friends from my law firm: Mr. Charles McAleer, Elizabeth O'Keefe, Megan Ellis, Pat Hackman, and also very good friends, Agnes Dover and Mary Hanigan have joined us. Also, very good friends, Tom Hylden and Shelley Davis.

[The biographical information follows.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).

   Anthony John Trenga

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.

   United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.

   Office: Miller & Chevalier Chartered
           655 15th Street, NW, Suite 900
           Washington, D.C. 20005.

   Residence: Alexandria, Virginia.

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.

   1949; Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.

   I am married to Rita Marie FlorCruz Trenga (Rita Marie FlorCruz, pre-marriage), who is a homemaker and part-time accountant and sailmaker, employed by Potomac Sailmakers, 5645-K, General Washington Drive, Alexandria, Va. 22312.
   I currently have one dependent child.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.

   1985 – 1988, Georgetown University Law Center; non-degree graduate law courses
   1971 – 1974, University of Virginia Law School; J.D., 1974
7. **Employment Record**: List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

1998-present
Miller & Chevalier Chartered
655 15th Street, Suite 900, Washington, D.C
Chairman, Litigation Department, 2001-2003
Member, Executive Committee, 1999-2000, 2001-2003

1987-98
Hazel & Thomas, P.C.
510 King Street, Alexandria, Va.
Member, 1987-98
Vice-President (Managing Partner), Alexandria Office, 1992-98
Chair, Practice Committee (consisting of all practice area chairs)
Member, Budget Committee
Loss Prevention Partner with respect to all conflicts and professional responsibility issues

1975-87
Sachs, Greensbaum & Tayler, Washington, D.C.
1140 Conn. Ave., NW, Washington, D.C.
Partner (1982-1987)
Associate (1975-1982)

1974-75
Law Clerk to the Honorable Ted Dalton
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
Charlottesville, Va.

1973-74
Prof. Michael Dooley
University of Virginia Law School
Research Assistant

Summer, 1973
Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay
Pittsburgh, PA
Summer Associate
Summer, 1972  
Law Offices of A. Andrew Giangreco, Esq.  
Alexandria, VA  
Summer law clerk

Summer, 1971  
U.S. Office of Education  
Washington, D.C.  
Summer intern

8. **Military Service and Draft Status:** Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

   None

9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

   Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers

   Faculty, National Trial Advocacy College of the University of Virginia, sponsored by the Virginia CLE Committee of the Virginia Bar Foundation.

   Fellow, International Society of Barristers (induction pending)

   Martindale-Hubbell Rating AV

   Public Arbitrator, Panel of Arbitrators, Nat’l Assoc. of Securities Dealers (FINRA)

   Member, Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Committee, through appointment of the Chief Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court, 1996-2002

   Master of the Bench, George Mason Inn of Court

   Outstanding Citizen Award, Northern Virginia Urban League, 1998

   Chair, Alexandria Human Rights Committee, 1982-85

   Woodrow Wilson School Princeton University Scholar, 1970-71

   Scholarship Recipient, Class of 1905 Scholarship, Princeton University, 1967-71

Eagle Scout, 1964

10. Bar Associations: List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

Virginia State Bar Association, 1974-present:

Member, Continuing Legal Education Committee, Virginia Bar Foundation, 2002-present

VSB Disciplinary Board, 1996-2002

Eighth District Disciplinary Committee (Chairman; Secretary), 1989-1995

Trustee, VSB Client Protection Fund, 1991-1995

American College of Trial Lawyers, 2006 - present

George Mason Inns of Court (Master), 1989-present Co-Chair, Program Committee, 2005-2006

Alexandria Bar Association, 1975-present

Fairfax Bar Association, 1975-present

Federal Bar Association, Northern Virginia Chapter, 1999-present

Defense Research Institute, 1988-2006

District of Columbia Bar Association, 1975-present


American Bar Association, 1975-present

American Trial Lawyers Association, 1977-1987

11. Bar and Court Admission:

a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

Virginia State Bar, 1974
District of Columbia Bar, 1975
There have been no lapses in membership.
b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

Virginia Supreme Court, 1974
District of Columbia Court of Appeals/ D.C Superior Court, 1975
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 1976
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1978
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 1986
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1993
Supreme Court of the United States, 1997
United States District Court for:
  Eastern District of Virginia, 1974
  Western District of Virginia, 1974
  District of Maryland, 1986
  Southern District of Texas, 1992

There have been no lapses in membership.

12. Memberships:

  a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

    Board of Directors, Bethesda Center for Excellence, 2001-present
    Coach, Alexandria Youth Baseball, 1996-98
Alexandria Human Rights Committee, 1979-85
Board of Directors, Northern Virginia Urban League, 1995-1999
Alexandria Chapter of the National Conference of Christian and Jews, 1982-84
Princeton University Club of Washington, DC, 1977 to the present
Father’s Club, St. Stephens-St. Agnes School, 2005-2007
Seminary Valley Civic Association, Alexandria, Va., 1987-present

b. The American Bar Association’s Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion—either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

None

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.


Presentation to the International Litigation Consortium. Amsterdam, Netherlands, November 9-11, 2006, Overview of the American Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine

Presentation to the International Litigation Consortium, Barcelona, Spain, November 11- 12, 2005, Extraterritorial Enforcement of United States Evidence Gathering Procedures
763


Article, State-of-Mind Hearsay Evidence in Contract Interference Cases, American Bar Association’s Business Tort Journal, Fall 2004


Miller & Chevalier Focus on Employee Benefits, January 1, 2008, January 24, 2008, and February 8, 2008 (listed as practice group member)

b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

None

c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

None

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

I served as the Panel Moderator in March, 2006 with Judge Lee of the Eastern District and Judge Lambert of the District of Columbia federal court on “Judicial Perspectives on Daubert” in D.C. and Virginia federal courts,” co-sponsored by the Northern Virginia Chapter of the Federal Bar Association.
In January and February, 2006, I presided over a two part program at the George Mason Inns of Court titled "You know you have to finally decide - choosing between State and Federal Court." I have also participated in other presentations on the cross-examination of experts and other trial practice issues before the George Mason Inns of Court.

In May, 2005, I served as a panelist in an American Bar Association sponsored regional conference on Electronic Discovery.

e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

I am quoted in the following articles:


I also participated with my law partner in two press conferences held in 2005 in Kiev, Ukraine concerning the arrest and detention of Boris Kolesnikov. I did not personally make any statements at those conferences and to my knowledge, there are no transcripts available, although Ukrainian television stations that covered the conferences may have video tapes.

14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

None

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;
c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your
decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant
criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on
appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your
substantive or procedural rulings;

e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued
an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are
filed and/or stored; and

f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not
issue an opinion.

I have not served as a judge.

16. **Recusal:** If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or
matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you
recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or
in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal
system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general
description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the
following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant
or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you
recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action
taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any
other ground for recusal.

I have not served as a judge.

17. **Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:**

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices,
including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or
appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed
you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for
elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.
I served as a member of the Alexandria Human Rights Commission, appointed by
the Alexandria City Council, from 1979 to 1985.

I was an unsuccessful candidate for the Alexandria City Council in 1981.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether
compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever
held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the
particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your
title and responsibilities.

Member, Alexandria Democratic Committee, 1980-87

1968 Presidential Campaign of Hubert Humphrey. Volunteer aide at Democratic
National Convention, Chicago.

18. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation
from law school including:

   i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge,
   the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

   I served as a Law clerk to the Hon. Ted Dalton, United States District
   Judge Western District of Virginia; U.S. District Court for the Western
   District of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia; 1974-75.

   ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

   I have never practiced alone.

   iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or
governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature
of your affiliation with each.

   1998-present
   Miller & Chevalier Chartered
   655 15th Street, Suite 900, Washington, D.C.
   Chairman, Litigation Department, 2001-2003
   Member, Executive Committee, 1999-2000, 2001-2003
   Firm representative at Annual ALAS Risk Management Conferences
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1987-98
Hazel & Thomas, P.C.
510 King Street, Alexandria, Va.
Member, 1987-98
Vice-President (Managing Partner), Alexandria Office, 1992-98
Chair, Practice Committee (consisting of all practice area chairs)
Member, Budget Committee
Loss Prevention Partner with respect to all conflicts and professional
responsibility issues

1975-87
Sachs, Greenebaum & Tayler, Washington, D.C.
1140 Conn. Ave., NW, Washington, D.C.
Partner (1982-1987)
Associate (1975-1982)

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its
character has changed over the years.

Throughout my career of more than 30 years, my practice has been
primarily devoted to litigation and trial practice, the primary focus of
which has been the Eastern District of Virginia where I have served as
lead litigation/trial counsel in well over 50 cases. In addition to trial skills
and expertise in procedural and evidentiary issues, I have developed a
substantive law expertise in commercial, fraud-based and fiduciary claims,
including cases under federal statutes dealing with securities regulation
(1933 Securities Act, 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 1940 Investment
Advisors Act), economic regulation (Bankruptcy, Anti-trust), ERISA;
RICO, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, intellectual property (patent
infringement, Lanham Act), government procurement (False Claims Act);
and civil rights (Title VII, ADA, ADEA) and also state law claims
involving fraud and fiduciary duties within investment contexts, personal
liability, directors’ and officers’ liability and corporate governance,
financial institutions liability, professional liability, trade secrets,
partnership, trusts and joint venture disputes, and contracts. That
experience has also included dealing with federal and state jurisdictional
and procedural issues, including those dealing with class actions,
privileges, evidence, classified materials, expert testimony, discovery
(including electronic discovery), international treaties (Hague
Convention), injunctions and other equitable relief, jurisdictional
abstention and comity, transfer, and removal from state court. In addition,
my trial practice has provided extensive experience in the evaluation and
presentation of scientific and technical evidence.
I have served as lead litigation/trial counsel in numerous complex cases, both jury and non-jury, many with parallel criminal and regulatory proceedings. By way of example, I served as lead trial counsel in a private government procurement dispute that resulted in my client’s favor, after an eight-week jury trial, in one of the largest verdicts of 2002, as listed by the National Law Journal, obtained on behalf of a group of 122 plaintiffs a multi-million dollar recovery for securities fraud, and successfully defeated both take-over attempts of public companies and challenges to tender offers for control of public companies. In the RICO area, I obtained on behalf of a government sponsored secondary mortgage market maker a $60 million RICO judgment for systematic fraud by a seller and servicer of mortgages and successfully defeated at trial and on appeal RICO class action claims. I have obtained at trial defense verdicts in a $35 million environment clean up case and a $65 million fraud on the market class action securities claim and successfully defended at trial the award of a $4 billion military contract. Following internal, congressional, administrative and criminal investigations, I have been lead litigation counsel on claims against former officers of a company for insider trading and other breaches of fiduciary duty under ERISA and state law.

I participated for twelve years in the Virginia State Bar’s lawyer disciplinary system, including for six years as a member of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Committee, through appointment of the Chief Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court. I have also served for fourteen years as a public arbitrator in securities fraud disputes.

The nature of my litigation/trial practice has changed somewhat over my career. At Sachs, Greenebaum & Tayler (1975-87), my practice was a general civil and criminal defense practice with a wide range of cases and clients. On the civil side, my practice consisted of insurance defense, plaintiff tort, professional liability (both plaintiff and defense), domestic relations and commercial matters. At Hazel & Thomas (1987-98), my practice focused predominantly on civil matters filed in the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. The cases covered a wide range of business disputes, including a substantial number of securities fraud and intellectual property cases. At Miller & Chevalier (1998-present), my practice has been a civil litigation and trial practice, both in the Eastern District and throughout the country, that often involves matters with multiple parallel regulatory or criminal proceedings, although I have
continued to represent clients in general business and employment disputes.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

At Sachs, Greenebaum & Tayler, the clients I represented ranged from individuals of moderate means and small to medium sized businesses to wealthy individuals and major corporations, including both plaintiffs and defendants on the civil side. On the criminal side, my practice consisted of both court appointed cases and retained clients. At Hazel & Thomas, the clients I represented also included both individuals and corporations of various means, both as plaintiffs and defendants.

At Miller & Chevalier, the clients we represent are predominantly corporate or other types of business clients or associated officers or employees. Miller & Chevalier also maintains a large and active pro bono practice for which the firm employs a dedicated lawyer whose sole responsibilities are to coordinate and administer our pro bono program. Through that program, the firm handles a wide spectrum of pro bono cases including those pertaining to child custody, landlord & tenant matters, public benefit appeals for disabled people, federal immigration matters on behalf of political asylum applicants, displaced workers seeking benefits in the Court of International Trade under the Trade Adjustment Act, court appointments in both civil and criminal matters, and constitutional challenges, including a current case involving a constitutional challenge to the District of Columbia’s disability compensation program, and tax exempt charitable entities. I have been involved in this program, which is structured around more senior lawyers supervising and consulting with younger lawyers who serve as lead or primary counsel.

The substantive areas in which I have concentrated have also changed from time to time. While at Sachs, Greenebaum & Tayler, I concentrated on insurance defense, plaintiff tort, criminal defense and business disputes. At Hazel & Thomas, my practice concentrated around business disputes, employment, intellectual property, professional liability, fraud based claims, both statutory and common law, and ERISA. At Miller & Chevalier, my practice continues to be concentrated in the areas of commercial litigation, fraud based claims, ERISA, corporate governance issues and professional liability.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.
i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 70%
   2. state courts of record: 25%
   3. other courts: 5%

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings: 85%
   2. criminal proceedings: 15%

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment
   (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or
   associate counsel.

   I have tried to verdict or judgment approximately 50 cases. I was either sole or
   chief counsel in all but seven of the above cases. I was "second chair" on five of
   these cases and co-counsel on two cases.

   i. What percentage of these trials were:
      1. jury: 40%
      2. non-jury: 60%

e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States.
   Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if
   applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection
   with your practice.

   Many years ago, I filed petitions for certiorari on behalf of one or two criminal
   defendants and on one occasion, a civil litigant. I have not been able to locate
   copies of those petitions. None of the cert. petitions was granted.

19. **Litigation**: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally
    handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date
    if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party
    or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the
    litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

   a. the date of representation;

   b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case
      was litigated; and

   c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of
      principal counsel for each of the other parties.
1. *General Motors Corporation and Allison Engine Company, Inc. v. Northrop Corporation, Northrop Aircraft Division*, Cause No. 49D01-9109-CP-1029, the Honorable Gary L. Miller, presiding, filed in the Marion Superior Court Civil Division.

During the period 1998-2003, I represented the plaintiffs General Motors and Allison Engine Company in the above styled action. I served as lead trial counsel. The case asserted claims against Northrop Corporation for breach of its duty to disclose superior knowledge and to provide adequate specifications for major components of the FY-23 prototype Advanced Fighter Jet, which resulted in a $68 million judgment in favor of General Motors Corporation/Allison Engine Company after an eight week jury trial. The case was affirmed on appeal in a published opinion, at 807 N.E. 2d 70 (Ind. Ct. App.).

**Opposing Counsel:**
Joseph F. Coyne, Jr., Esq.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
Forty-Eighth Floor, 333 South Hope Street
Los Angeles, California 90071-1448
(213) 617-4200


I served as lead trial defense counsel for defendant Patten-Beers Construction Company in 1996-97 in defense of a $35 million environmental cleanup claim arising out of a 400,000 gallon pipeline rupture. The lawsuit included claims by the pipeline owner and its managers under the federal Oil Pollution Act, state environmental statutes and common law theories of recovery. The claims against my client were settled at the close of the evidence at trial.

**Opposing Counsel:**
Alan B. Croft, Esq.
Baach, Robinson & Lewis
1 Thomas Circle, N.W., Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 833-8900

Jay Range, Esq.
Hutton &Williams
1900 K Street NW
Washington, D.C.
(202) 955-1500
Counsel for co-defendant:
Thomas F. Holt, Jr., Esq.
K&L Gates
Boston, Mass
(617) 951-9061

3. In re: Elections of Directors of Allstate Financial Corporation, Chancery No. 97-790, the Honorable Benjamin Kendrick, presiding, filed in the Arlington County Circuit Court.

I served as lead trial counsel in 1997-98 for outside directors and the largest shareholder who challenged the election of directors of a publicly held company. After a trial, the court found in favor of my clients and ordered a new election of directors.

Opposing Counsel:
William Coston, Esq.
Venable Baetjer & Howard LLP
1201 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20005-3917
(202) 962-4800


Before my involvement, the trial court had entered judgment against defendant Alliant Techsystems for approximately $4 million on claims arising out of the SRAM-II Missile Systems procurement. The case was reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial. I served as lead defense trial counsel in 1998 for defendant Alliant Techsystems at the second trial. Following the second trial, the trial court entered judgment against our client in an amount less than $1 million.

Opposing Counsel:
Lawrence M. Farrell, Esq.
Ray M. Aragon, Esq.
McKenna & Cuneo, LLP
1900 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006,
(202) 496-7500.


I served as lead counsel in 1995-96 for plaintiff MPR Associates, Inc., a nuclear engineering design firm, against defendant General Electric Co., alleging that GE
misappropriated MPR's trade secrets, and infringed MPR's patented method for the repair of cracking in core shrouds of boiling water nuclear reactors. After extensive pretrial discovery, a settlement was reached shortly before trial, which included a consent order that acknowledged that the MPR patent was valid and enforceable. The case involved extensive discovery and evaluation of engineering, metallurgical and other scientific evidence.

Opposing Counsel:
Thomas Slater, Esq.
Hutton & Williams,
Richmond, VA
(804) 788-8475.


I served as lead litigation counsel in 1988-89 for plaintiff Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") against a national, affiliated group of mortgage banking companies and their principal officers and directors on RICO and state law fraud claims. Judgment was obtained against the corporate group and the principal officers and directors on RICO claims in the amount of $57 million, $19 million of which has been adjudicated as non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. Approximately $2 million was also recovered on related claims brought on behalf of Fannie Mae against certain professionals. I also worked in cooperation with the U.S. Attorney's Office in its successful criminal prosecution.

Opposing Counsel
Joe Kaestner, Esq.,
Richmond, VA
(804) 648-2801


I served as co-counsel in 1991-92 for defendants Marshall Exploration, Inc., Carlile and Howell, Inc. and Kenneth Q. Carlile (the "Marshall defendants"), a Texas group of defendant oil and gas operators/drillers, in their successful defense of a $10 million class action for federal and state securities law and RICO violations arising out of the syndication of oil and gas limited partnerships. The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants; and the case was affirmed on appeal by the Fourth Circuit, in a reported decision, No. 92-143, decided on January 11, 1993, 983 F.2d 1295. In this case, the Fourth Circuit first decided that "loss causation" was a necessary element of proof for establishing damages under RICO.

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Co-counsel:  
Kim J. Askew, Esq.,  
K&L Gates  
Dallas, Texas  
(214) 939-5579

Opposing Counsel:  
Robert N. Levin, Esq.  
Schwitzer, Bentzen & Scher  
815 Connecticut Ave., N.W.  
Washington, DC 20006-4004,  
(202) 785-1530.

Counsel for co-defendant:  
Howard V.B. Sinclair, Esq.  
Arent Fox L.L.P.  
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036  
(202) 857-8948


I served as lead counsel in 1988-89 on behalf of 122 individual plaintiff investors in a nationally marketed syndication of limited partnerships. The plaintiffs asserted securities fraud and RICO claims, which settled for over 90% of their investment.

Opposing counsel:  
W. Stuart Parsons, Esq.  
Quarles & Brady L.L.P.  
411 East Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 200  
Milwaukee, WI 53202-4497  
(414) 277-5000

9. **In Re: Tomlinson Interests, Inc.,** multiple proceedings in federal and state courts in Texas (U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Wheelless, presiding), Mississippi and Alabama.

I served as lead litigation counsel in 1992-96 for the plaintiff trustee in bankruptcy of Tomlinson Interests, Inc. ("TII"), a gas exploration and development company located in Houston, Texas, and its related corporations in multiple state and federal proceedings in Texas, Mississippi and Alabama, which concerned, among other things: (1) defending the validity of a take-or-pay gas contract having an estimated value to the TII estate in excess of $100 million; and (2) substantive consolidation of all the corporate debtors for the purposes of the bankruptcy proceedings, an issue having a potential impact on a group of bank lenders in excess of $75 million. Aspects of the representation involved technical
and scientific issues pertaining to deep high pressure sour natural gas wells. After extensive discovery and numerous hearings, the cases settled.

Opposing Counsel:
Allen Gover, Esq.
Weil, Gotshal
700 Louisiana, suite 1600
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 545-5000;

Thomas Cunningham, Esq.
Fulbright & Jaworski,
Fulbright Tower, 1301 McKinney, suite 5100
Houston, Texas 77010.
(713) 651-5151

10. Mobil Oil Corporation v. Texas Petrochemicals Corporation, Civil Action No. 92-343-A, filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, and transferred to the Southern District of Texas, the Honorable David Hittner, presiding, where it settled before trial.

I served as lead counsel in 1992-96 for the defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Texas Petrochemicals Corporation, which asserted a $200 million breach of contract and fraud claim involving the chemical Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE).

Opposing Counsel:
David Beck, Esq.
Beck, Redden & Seccrest, L.L.P.
One Houston Center
1221 McKinney St., Suite 4500
Houston, Texas, 77010
(713) 951-3700

20. Legal Activities: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organization(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

The most significant legal activities that I have pursued have been in the area of litigation and trial work, including those cases referenced above. I have not engaged in lobbying activities on behalf of any clients. In addition to the cases referenced above, I regard as most significant my Bar, teaching, mentoring and other activities that have allowed me to work with other lawyers. Those include the following:
I served for four years as a Trustee of the Virginia State Bar Client Protection Fund, which compensates clients who have been victims of unethical conduct by their lawyers. During the time I served, we were successful in requesting and obtaining increased funding by the VSB as well as higher limits on recoveries for clients.

I served for twelve years in the VSB lawyer disciplinary system, first for six years as a member and officer of a local District Committee and then for six years as a member of the VSB Disciplinary Board, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court, which reviews the most serious cases of lawyer misconduct. The Disciplinary Board was a particularly valuable experience because it provided the opportunity to work with other lawyer Board members from throughout the Commonwealth, who brought to our deliberations diverse experiences, from small town, rural sole practitioners to large firm urban practices, and also with non-lawyer lay members appointed to the Board, who brought their own distinctive insights and expectations of the legal profession.

I have participated for nearly fifteen years as a member of the George Mason Inns of Court. As a Master of the Bench (the highest designation), I have worked with law students to make presentations to the Inn on a wide range of litigation and trial topics. In the process, I have had the opportunity to see the attitudes and expectations of young lawyers and to contribute to their development. For similar reasons, I have found working with our younger associates in our law firm particularly rewarding.

I have been involved with European lawyers through the International Litigation Consortium, a private organization that I helped organize in 2004 and whose mission is focused on the exchange of information and ideas within the areas of international criminal and economic sanctions. The organization consists of prominent lawyers in The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, who annually meet and make presentations on various topics and developments from the perspective of a particular country. Those topics have included the extraterritorial enforcement of criminal laws and sanctions, money-laundering, discovery, and privacy laws.

I was involved as a member of an international defense team for a prominent Ukrainian regional elected official who had been imprisoned on criminal charges in violation of the recently adopted Ukrainian constitution, which was based in large measure on the constitutions of Western Democracies, including the United States Constitution. My involvement focused on issues of pre-trial detention and possible proceedings before the European Court for Human Rights.

I have served on the panel of public arbitrators for the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), now the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). In that capacity, I have heard claims principally by customers of broker-dealers against their brokers and brokerage companies. These claims covered the range of issues that often come up with customer accounts, including suitability issues, churning issues and market drop issues and involved small, medium and large customer accounts and loses and a range of sophistication among customers.
21. **Teaching**: What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

I have served frequently as a faculty member for CLE seminars, including for the week long National Trial Advocacy College in January, 2007 and January 2008 at the University of Virginia, sponsored by the Virginia CLE Committee of the Virginia Bar Foundation.

I served as a judge in law school moot court competitions, most recently as a judge for the 2007 Region 4 Rounds, sponsored by the American College of Trial Lawyers and hosted by George Mason University.

I have served as an instructor at several in-house courses at our firm sponsored by the National Institute for Trial Advocacy (including courses in depositions, expert witnesses and trial examinations). I have also participated in a teaching capacity in our firm’s other in-house training programs, including those involving witness preparation, internal investigations, depositions, direct and cross examination, and experts, several of which have qualified for Virginia CLE credit.

I have served as an instructor in a Legal Reasoning Program, sponsored by the D.C. Bar Association for minority students entering their first year of law school.

22. **Deferred Income/ Future Benefits**: List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

Under our firm’s by-laws, the value of a departing member’s stock in the law firm is paid out over five years, with interest. It is customary, however, for that stock value to be paid in a single lump sum payment upon leaving the firm to members who leave to pursue government service, including judgeships. The current value of my law firm stock is $142,000. In addition, I am currently covered by the Miller & Chevalier Retirement Plan that provides that at age 65 I would receive an annual annuity payment of approximately $15,000 per year.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service**: Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

No.
24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more. (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)


25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement.

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**
   
a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

   While none are likely, the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that could present potential conflicts-of-interest during my initial service in the position to which I have been nominated would include family, close friends, clients, members of my law firm, and financial interests which I may have.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

   I would review any potential conflicts issues with reference to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. More specifically, I would review the parties in each case and their disclosed affiliations in order to determine any potential or actual conflicts. I would then identify to the parties involved any matters that may reasonably raise an issue as to my impartiality and make full disclosure concerning that matter, even where I do not think my impartiality would be affected. I will follow the Code of Conduct and established policies and procedures in determining whether or not recusal is appropriate.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

   Consistent with the goals adopted by the American Bar Association, our firm has an institutional commitment to devote at least 3% of our billable hours to pro bono work.
Each year for at least the last seven years we have met that goal and in 2006, substantially exceeded it. The firm employs a dedicated lawyer whose sole responsibilities are to coordinate and administer our pro bono program; and our official policy is to encourage all the lawyers to do pro bono work, grounded in the D.C. Rules of Professional Responsibility, which call on all lawyers to devote 50 hours annually to pro bono work.

I have meet or exceeded the firm’s pro bono goals. My pro bono work has revolved around both the firm’s pro bono program, my work with the Bethesda Center for Excellence and my involvement with Bar activities and CLE programs, which is addressed elsewhere in this Questionnaire.

Miller & Chevalier has handled a wide spectrum of pro bono matters, including those pertaining to child custody, landlord & tenant matters, public benefits appeals for disabled people, federal immigration matters on behalf of political asylum applicants, displaced workers seeking benefits under the Trade Adjustment Act in the Court of International Trade, court appointments in both civil and criminal cases, tax exempt, charitable entities, and constitutional challenges, including a current case involving a constitutional challenge to the District of Columbia’s disability compensation program.

Under the structure of our pro bono program, more senior lawyers serve as supervisors and consultants with respect to cases handled by younger lawyers. Consistent with that approach, and as a former chair of our Litigation Department and one of the more senior litigation/trial lawyers in the firm, I spend most of my pro bono involvement within the firm in consulting with and mentoring younger lawyers on a wide range of cases that our younger lawyers handle as primary, lead counsel. I have also participated in the firm sponsored six-week “Introduction to Legal Reasoning” course for rising first year law students, which is designed to teach principles of law to students from traditionally disadvantaged backgrounds.

I also currently serve on a pro bono basis as General Counsel to the Bethesda Center for Excellence (BCE), which is a non-profit organization dedicated to supporting Olympic level athletes in the Olympic events of whitewater slalom and also recreational boating on the Potomac and other area rivers, including outreach to disadvantaged youths. (Two members of the 2004 and three members of the 2008 U.S. Olympic Team are BCE members). I devote approximately 100 hours per year to that activity. The website is located at www.bce-racing.com.

28. **Selection Process:**

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or
communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

I have participated in the judicial selection process endorsed by the U.S. Senators from Virginia. That has included appearing before the judicial selection committees of the various bar associations, including the Virginia State Bar Judicial Nominations Committee. Following that process, I was interviewed by Senators James Webb and John Warner and was latter selected for inclusion in a list of candidates endorsed by both Senators for the open seats in the Eastern District of Virginia, which was forwarded to the White House for consideration. I was interviewed at the White House by representatives of the White House Counsel’s office and the Justice Department on May 15, 2007 and also on March 12, 2008. On May 13, 2008, I was contacted by the White House Legal Counsel’s office concerning its interest in proceeding further with me in connection with a possible nomination and have had subsequent communications with the Justice Department. On July 17, 2008, the President delivered my nomination to the Senate.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No.
## FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
### NOMINATION FILING

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<th>2. Court or Organization</th>
<th>3. Date of Report</th>
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<td>07/21/2008</td>
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<th>5. Report Type (check appropriate type)</th>
<th>6. Reporting Period</th>
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<td>Initial</td>
<td>06/15/2007</td>
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<th>7. Address of person or office mailing address</th>
<th>8. On the basis of the information contained in this Report and any supporting documents, 5% or more, in my opinion, in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.</th>
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<td>455 7th Street, NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20005</td>
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**IMPORTANT NOTES:** The instructions accompanying this form must be followed. Complete all parts, checking the "NONE" box for each part where you have no reportable information. Sign on last page.

### I. POSITIONS

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<thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Member</td>
<td>Miller &amp; Chevalier Chartered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Entire, Secretary and General Counsel</td>
<td>Bethesda Center for Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Member</td>
<td>VA CLE Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### II. AGREEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTIES AND TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 1998</td>
<td>Miller &amp; Chevalier Retirement Plan, no control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1998</td>
<td>Miller &amp; Chevalier Employment Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME

#### A. Filer’s Non-Investment Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME (Dollars, not rounded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2006</td>
<td>Miller &amp; Chevalier, member compensation</td>
<td>$238,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2007</td>
<td>Miller &amp; Chevalier, member compensation</td>
<td>$299,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2006</td>
<td>Miller &amp; Chevalier, member compensation</td>
<td>$897,351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B. Spouse’s Non-Investment Income

If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, complete this section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2006</td>
<td>Putnam Saltmakers, salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2007</td>
<td>Putnam Saltmakers, salary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. REIMBURSEMENTS

Includes those to spouses and dependents only. See pp. 25-27 of instructions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. EXEMPT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## V. GIFTS

Excludes those to spouse and dependent children. See app. 18.11 of instructions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXEMPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## VI. LIABILITIES

Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See app. 18.14 of instructions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- **Income, value, transaction (includes those of the spouse and dependents children. See pp. 16-17 for filing instructions):**

  - *NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)*

#### A. Description of Asset (including type of asset)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Value (Method of Determining Value)</th>
<th>Description of Transaction</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Value (Method of Determining Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B. Income During Reporting Period

- **Type of Income**
  - **(A)**
  - **(B)**

- **Amounts**
  - **(C)**
  - **(D)**

#### C. Gross Value and/or End of Reporting Period

- **Type of Asset**
  - **(E)**
  - **(F)**

- **Valuation**
  - **(G)**
  - **(H)**

#### D. Transactions During Reporting Period

- **Type of Income**
  - **(I)**
  - **(J)**

- **Date**
  - **(K)**
  - **(L)**

- **Value**
  - **(M)**
  - **(N)**

#### E. Description of Asset (including type of asset)

- **Gross Value and/or End of Reporting Period**

- **Description of Transaction**

- **Type of Income**

- **Date**

- **Value**

#### F. Description of Asset (including type of asset)

- **Gross Value and/or End of Reporting Period**

- **Description of Transaction**

- **Type of Income**

- **Date**

- **Value**

---

1. **Description of Asset (including type of asset)**
2. **Gross Value and/or End of Reporting Period**
3. **Description of Transaction**
4. **Type of Income**
5. **Date**
6. **Value**

---

- **Income Gain Calc.**
- **Value Calc.**
- **Value Netted Calc.**

---

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### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

#### Income, value, transactions (includes all of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 10-11 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of asset (including interest)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Code 1</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Type of asset:**<br>
  - **[A]**: Dividend<br>
  - **[B]**: Income from other sources<br>
  - **[C]**: Gain or loss from sale or disposition<br>
  - **[D]**: Total income, value, or transactions

#### Examples of Key Terms:

1. **Income Source Codes**<br>
   - [A]: Dividend<br>
   - [B]: Income from other sources<br>
   - [C]: Gain or loss from sale or disposition<br>
   - [D]: Total income, value, or transactions

2. **Code Descriptions**<br>
   - [A]: Dividend<br>
   - [B]: Income from other sources<br>
   - [C]: Gain or loss from sale or disposition<br>
   - [D]: Total income, value, or transactions

3. **Examples of Key Terms**<br>
   - **[A]**: Dividend<br>
   - **[B]**: Income from other sources<br>
   - **[C]**: Gain or loss from sale or disposition<br>
   - **[D]**: Total income, value, or transactions

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**785**

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**FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT**

Page 5 of 24

**Date of Report**

Trenga, Anthony J. 07/21/2008

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**VerDate** Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 **Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00793 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependents (children, step, or foster, 18-25 if full-time student))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets (Including real assets)</th>
<th>A.</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>B.</th>
<th>Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>C.</th>
<th>Transaction during reporting period</th>
<th>D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Date of Dividend/Interest</td>
<td>Date of Dividend/Interest</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **35. WFSX common stock**
  - B. Dividend
  - K. T

- **36. WMS common stock**
  - B. Dividend

- **37. WRE common stock**
  - A. Dividend

- **38. WTM common stock**
  - A. Dividend

- **39. WYE common stock**
  - B. Dividend

- **40. B3154229Q tax exempt Bd. (Fairfax, VA)**
  - C. Interest

- **41. KPS1526/GDO tax exempt Bd. (Chesapeake, VA)**
  - A. Interest

- **42. K16O0039 tax exempt Bd. (Falls Church, VA)**
  - A. Interest

- **43. K0779160 tax exempt Bd. (Leesburg, VA)**
  - A. Interest

- **44. 0279860/0 tax exempt Bd. (Leesburg, VA)**
  - A. Interest

- **45. SAGA mutual fund**
  - None

- **46. BAM common stock**
  - A. Dividend

- **47. B common stock**
  - A. Dividend

- **48. BCA common stock**
  - A. Dividend

- **49. Poindexter Rock common stock**
  - A. Dividend

- **50. GCI common stock**
  - A. Dividend

- **51. CGI common stock**
  - A. Dividend

---

1. Income, Gain, Deduction, etc.
2. Long-Term Capital Gain (LTCG)
3. Short-Term Capital Gain (STCG)
4. Other (please specify)
5. Nominal Amount
6. Value
7. Date
8. Code
9. Amount
10. Value
11. Date
12. Code
13. Amount
14. Value
15. Date
16. Code
17. Amount
18. Value
19. Date
20. Code
21. Amount
22. Value
23. Date
24. Code
25. Amount
26. Value
27. Date
28. Code
29. Amount
30. Value
31. Date
32. Code
33. Amount
34. Value
35. Date
36. Code
37. Amount
38. Value
39. Date
40. Code
41. Amount
42. Value
43. Date
44. Code
45. Amount
46. Value
47. Date
48. Code
49. Amount
50. Value
51. Date
52. Code
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- **NONE** (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)

#### A. Description of Assets (Including Trust Assets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Date of Dividend Payment</th>
<th>Value Code 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32. -HD common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. -IR common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. -Kraft Foods common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. -MWAY</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. -Suffolk Va. tax-exempt bond</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. -APL common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. -MD common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. -AXF common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. -OJS common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. -CVCW common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. -CXL common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. -XIC common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. -LJK common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. -MCD common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. -MGT common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. -PM common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. -SHV common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### D. Transactions during Reporting Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Value Code 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### T. Encumbrance or Delegated Authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity of person or entity receiving authority</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. [VWAC Dividend] A $5.00 in for 1 share $40,000.00
2. [VWAC Dividend] B $5.00 in for 1 share $10,000.00
3. [VWAC Dividend] C $5.00 in for 1 share $5,000.00
4. [VWAC Dividend] D $5.00 in for 1 share $1,000.00
5. [VWAC Dividend] E $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
6. [VWAC Dividend] F $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
7. [VWAC Dividend] G $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
8. [VWAC Dividend] H $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
9. [VWAC Dividend] I $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
10. [VWAC Dividend] J $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
11. [VWAC Dividend] K $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
12. [VWAC Dividend] L $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
13. [VWAC Dividend] M $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
14. [VWAC Dividend] N $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
15. [VWAC Dividend] O $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
16. [VWAC Dividend] P $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
17. [VWAC Dividend] Q $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
18. [VWAC Dividend] R $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
19. [VWAC Dividend] S $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
20. [VWAC Dividend] T $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
21. [VWAC Dividend] U $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
22. [VWAC Dividend] V $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
23. [VWAC Dividend] W $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
24. [VWAC Dividend] X $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
25. [VWAC Dividend] Y $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
26. [VWAC Dividend] Z $5.00 in for 1 share $0.00
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- Income, value, transactions (include here of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 24-27 of filing instructions)
- NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)

#### A. Description of assets (excluding tax assets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets</th>
<th>(i) Amount Code 1 (A-D)</th>
<th>(ii) Type of Code 2 (E-P)</th>
<th>(iii) Value Code 3 (Q-W)</th>
<th>(iv) Gross value as of end of reporting period</th>
<th>(v) Transmissions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TSS common stock</td>
<td>A Dividends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFC common stock</td>
<td>A Dividends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHPA preferred stock</td>
<td>A Dividends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery Va. tax-exempt bond</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKBYL taxable bond</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokerage Account 42 (IRA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Market VMOOX</td>
<td>A Interest</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUG</td>
<td>A Dividends</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBV common stock</td>
<td>B Dividends</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CED common stock</td>
<td>B Dividends</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOD 1 stock</td>
<td>B Dividends</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIII common stock</td>
<td>B Dividends</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAD common stock</td>
<td>B Dividends</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOOD common stock</td>
<td>B Dividends</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFT common stock</td>
<td>C Dividends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOL common stock</td>
<td>B Dividends</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREC preferred stock</td>
<td>C Dividends</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Legend

1. Income Code C: Cash
2. Income Code C: Dividend
3. Income Code C: Interest
4. Value Code A: Bank
5. Value Code B: Bond
6. Value Code C: Certificate Of Deposit
7. Value Code D: Stock
8. Value Code E: Real Estate
9. Value Code F: Other
10. Value Code G: Cash in Bank
11. Value Code H: Cash in Hand
12. Value Code I: In Trust
13. Value Code J: In Economy
14. Value Code K: In Other
15. Value Code L: In Savings
17. Value Code N: In Other

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## VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS – income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 14-17 for filing instructions)

### NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset (including trust assets)</th>
<th>B. Income during the reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of the reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during the reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) V. Code (2) Amount (3) Type (4)</td>
<td>(1) V. Code (2) Amount (3) Type (4)</td>
<td>(1) V. Code (2) Amount (3) Type (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset</th>
<th>V. Code</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description of Asset</th>
<th>V. Code</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description of Asset</th>
<th>V. Code</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABW A preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>CCPF preferred stock</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td>CCPF preferred stock</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPF C preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>CPF C preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td>CPF C preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA A preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>DPA G preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td>DPA G preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA G preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>DPA G preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td>DPA G preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA G preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>DPA G preferred stock</td>
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<td>K T</td>
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<td>K T</td>
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<td>K T</td>
<td>DPA G preferred stock</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pg. 39 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (excluding nonexistent)</th>
<th>B. Income During Reporting Period</th>
<th>C. Fair Value of Assets as of End of Reporting Period</th>
<th>D. Transactions During Reporting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First &quot;3&quot; after each asset is earnings from prior-disclosures</td>
<td>(1) Amount</td>
<td>(1) Value</td>
<td>(2) Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10). Credit Suisse taxable bond 22547FD3</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(104). Citibank taxable bond 229316R1</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(105). Dominion Power taxable bond 257867A9</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(106). Ecol Dks Grp taxable bond 263501A9</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(107). Fortune Plc taxable bond 24906J</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(108). Fidelity American Co taxable bond 589778A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(109). G &amp; E Global Iss taxable bond 261574A9</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(110). General Electric Power taxable bond 27547X4A2</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(111). GTE Hutton涂料 taxable bond 6927FRA8</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(112). GEHortivolt taxable bond 6923R</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(113). General Motors saleable bond 179373A9</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(114). Morgan Compa taxable bond 217446GT</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(115). Morgan Stanley taxable bond 61984GCD</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(116). National Bar taxable bond 22931A9</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(117). National Commercial taxable bond 65327B90</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(118). Pinnacle Bank taxable bond 79047FA1</td>
<td>B</td>
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<td>K</td>
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<tr>
<td>(119). Royal Bank Bla taxable bond 78904TR2</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A - $1,000 to $50,000</td>
<td>B - $1,000 to $1,000,000</td>
<td>C - $1,000,000 to $5,000,000</td>
<td>D - $5,000,000 to $25,000,000</td>
<td>E - $25,000,000 to $50,000,000</td>
<td>F - $50,000,000 to $100,000,000</td>
<td>G - $100,000,000 to $250,000,000</td>
<td>H - $250,000,000 to $500,000,000</td>
<td>I - $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000</td>
<td>J - $1,000,000,000 to $5,000,000,000</td>
<td>K - $5,000,000,000 to $10,000,000,000</td>
<td>L - $10,000,000,000 to $25,000,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- **Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependents' children, see pp. 24-37 of filing instructions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset (including instrument)</th>
<th>B. Income during Reporting Period</th>
<th>C. Gross Value at End of Reporting Period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during Reporting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Type (e.g., div, rent, interest)</td>
<td>Value Code</td>
<td>Method Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121. &quot;3M Corp Var taxable bond&quot; 76907FED</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122. &quot;800 Million Var taxable bond&quot; 00315F27</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123. &quot;Xerox Corp taxable bond&quot; 92145NAA8</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124. &quot;BRE PPTY INC preferred B 05059640&quot;</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125. &quot;5G CMS SPFD VAR taxable bond&quot; 96228N02</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126. &quot;WASHINGTON taxable bond&quot; 02975AED</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127. &quot;AAR INC MTN taxable bond&quot; 9919BY83</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128. &quot;INTL Lease taxable bond&quot; 09F44ALC</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129. &quot;SBC common stock&quot;</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130. &quot;Roberts taxable bond&quot; 7497719M4</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131. &quot;Brinkman Account #3 (IRA)&quot;</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132. &quot;Money market CLASS A 196&quot;</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133. &quot;BGV stock&quot;</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134. &quot;BGR stock&quot;</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135. &quot;BACLX mutual fund&quot;</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136. &quot;MARCEL CUEP taxable bond&quot; 139355AA3</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- **A**: Asset
- **B**: Bond
- **C**: Cash
- **D**: Dividend
- **E**: Equal to
- **F**: Fall-in
- **G**: Gain
- **H**: Hang
- **I**: Interest
- **J**: Joint
- **K**: K
- **L**: Loss
- **M**: Market
- **N**: Other
- **O**: Option
- **P**: Price
- **Q**: Q
- **R**: Right
- **S**: Sale
- **T**: Taxable

In accordance with 528.21, amounts have been omitted from this report. See pp. 24-37 of filing instructions.
VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS – Income, value, transactions (includes state of the grantor and dependent children. See pg. 34-77 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets (including trusts)</th>
<th>A. Description of Assets (including trusts)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(10) WSTC-annual fee</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(101) Brokerage Accounts #1</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(102) Money Market</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(103) RRRB</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(104) WSTC</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(105) Brokerage Accounts #5</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(106) HMO common stock</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(107) APF common stock</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(108) SLC common stock</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(109) BAC common stock</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(110) BMY common stock</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(111) C common stock</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(112) D common stock</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(113) GE common stock</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(114) INTL common stock</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(115) S/L common stock</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
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<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
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<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(103) RRRB</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
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<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(104) WSTC</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
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<tr>
<td>(113) GE common stock</td>
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<td>J T</td>
<td>J T</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependents 16/26. See pp. 24-37 of filing instructions)

**NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Asset (Including stock series)</th>
<th>B. Income During Reporting Period</th>
<th>C. Gross Value at End of Reporting Period</th>
<th>D. Transactions During Reporting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Adjusted Value Code</td>
<td>(2) Type of Dividend Paid, etc.</td>
<td>(1) Adjusted Value Code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Notes:

1. Income Code Codes
   - (A-B) = $0.00 or less
   - (C-F) = $1,001 - $19,999
   - (G-L) = $20,000 - $49,999
   - (M-P) = $50,000 - $99,999
   - (R-X) = $100,000 - $499,999
   - (Y-Z) = $500,000 - $999,999
   - (AA-AB) = $1,000,000 - $4,999,999
   - (AC-AD) = $5,000,000 - $49,999,999
   - (AE-AF) = $50,000,000 or more

2. Disposition Method Codes
   - (A-B) = Sale
   - (C-F) = Short Sale
   - (G-L) = Exchange
   - (M-P) = Cash
   - (R-X) = Liquidation
   - (Y-Z) = Stock Split
   - (AA-AB) = Other
   - (AC-AD) = Non-Reportable
   - (AE-AF) = Dividend

3. Adjusted Value Method Codes
   - (A-B) = Fair Market Value
   - (C-F) = Cost Basis
   - (G-L) = Appreciation
   - (M-P) = Depreciation
| A | Description of asset (including term and any Code 1 | B | Income during reporting period | C | Gross value at end of reporting period | D | Transactions during reporting period | E | Fair value from Beneficiary |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 171 | Money market acct. | A | Dividend | J | T |
| 172 | Am. Funds Euro Income Bonding Fund CL A Mutual Fund | A | None | J | T |
| 174 | Putnam New Opportunity Fund CL A Mutual Fund | A | Dividend | J | T |
| 175 | Putnam Growth & Income Equity Investment Fund CL A | A | Dividend | J | T |
| 177 | UBS Account #1 (GEF) | A | Interest | J | T |
| 178 | Putnam New Opportunity Fund CL A | A | Interest | J | T |
| 180 | Blackrock Total Return Bond Fund | A | Dividend | J | T |
| 181 | Morgan Stanley US Govt. Sec TR & Mutual Fund | A | Dividend | J | T |
| 182 | TIAA Ameriprise | A | Dividend | J | T |
| 183 | IBM common stock | A | Dividend | J | T |
| 184 | Dominion Resources Inc. common stock | B | Dividend | K | T |
| 185 | American Century Growth Mutual Fund (TWKOD) | A | Dividend | J | T |
| 186 | Navy Federal Credit Union (IRA #1) (CD) | A | Dividend | J | T |
| 187 | Navy Federal Credit Union (IRA #2) (CD) | A | Dividend | J | T |

1. Income or loss on asset codes:
   - A = $10,000 or less
   - B = $10,001 - $25,000
   - C = $25,001 - $50,000
   - D = $50,001 - $100,000
   - E = $100,001 - $250,000
   - F = $250,001 - $500,000
   - G = $500,001 - $1,000,000
   - H = $1,000,001 - $5,000,000
   - I = $5,000,001 - $10,000,000
   - J = $10,000,001 - $25,000,000
   - K = $25,000,001 - $50,000,000
   - L = $50,000,001 - $100,000,000
   - M = $100,000,001 - $250,000,000
   - N = $250,000,001 - $500,000,000
   - O = $500,000,001 - $1,000,000,000
   - P = $1,000,000,001 - $2,500,000,000
   - Q = $2,500,000,001 - $5,000,000,000
   - R = $5,000,000,001 - $10,000,000,000

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VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — Income, value, transactions (include that of the spouse and dependent children, see pg. 34-37 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Description of Assets (including real estate)</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>Type of</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>Type of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stock</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>(B)</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>Method Code</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188. Navy Federal Credit Union CD</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189. Navy Federal Credit Union Accounts</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190. Virginia Commerce Bank CD</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191. Bank of the States Bank Account</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>192. Wells Fargo Bank Accounts</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>193. First Republic Bank Account</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>194. Brokerage Account #1 (VOL K)</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195. AGSTEX Mutual Fund</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>196. ANCFX Mutual Fund</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>197. AMEXIX Mutual Fund</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>T</td>
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<tr>
<td>198. JAYLX Mutual Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>199. ASHTX Mutual Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>200. EMIIX Money Market</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>201. Northwestern Mutual Life Indiv. Insurance Policy</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>T</td>
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<tr>
<td>203. Reliance Life Insurance Co.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>T</td>
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<tr>
<td>204. SFT Holdings LLC Stock</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>U</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Footnotes | | 1. Include (a) All mutual funds, (b) All stocks, (c) All bonds, (d) All real estate, (e) All business interests, (f) All other investments. |
|-----------|--------|---|---|---|---|
|           | None   | J | U | | | |

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### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (Includes those of the spouse and dependents. See pp. 36-37 of filing instructions)

- NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of assets (including real estate)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pct. &quot;CL&quot; after which amount can be assessed prior to disclosure</td>
<td>Amount Code 1 (A-B)</td>
<td>(2) Net (Inc., Dec., or ln.) Code 2</td>
<td>Value Code 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>205. Brokerage Account #9 (Closed Cty. 2007) Real Transactions</td>
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<tr>
<td>206. ANGLO AMER. ADR 03/05/07-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>207. -IMX common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>208. -STZ common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>209. -RBD common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210. First Trust V All-Equity 100 Mutual Fund</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>211. -FO common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>212. -HNE common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>213. -KMB common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>214. -MSC common stock</td>
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<td>215. -OBH common stock</td>
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<td>216. -ETM Mutual Fund</td>
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<td>217. -TYCO Int'l Ltd. New</td>
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<tr>
<td>218. -UPS common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>219. -WMT common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>220. -WYF common stock</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>221. -ATL common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
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</table>
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

income, values, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 36-37 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Asset</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of Issuer</td>
<td>Description of Asset</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAC common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>BII common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYY common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cvenon stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCI common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRM common stock</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHD common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTW common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCD common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MMTY common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF Mutual Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFE common stock</td>
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<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NMZ common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
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<tr>
<td>AXP common stock</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS**

- Income, values, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependents)(Sects. 3a, 4a, 5c, 6c)(Public disclosure)

- NONE (no reportable income, assets, or transactions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Income (Including Receipts)</th>
<th>Amount Received During Reporting Period (in A)</th>
<th>Value of Asset at End of Reporting Period (in C)</th>
<th>Transactions During Reporting Period (in D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

259. - D commerical stock

260. - GE common stock

261. - INI common stock

262. - RTF common stock

263. - MDT common stock

264. - Brokerage Account #91(FBA) (Closed Oct 2017) Paul Fronz.

265. - CBLAASS FFFY preferred stock

266. - Equity Inco Inc preferred stock

267. - A common stock

268. - JPM CAP FeC preferred stock 66623-AD-0

269. - Cleveland Electric Bond

270. - CODI Electric Stock

271. - GEX Div BLTY 21536-87-1

272. - How Pex Excel Realty TR 44925H-56-9

273. - PS Business Parts 051680-76-1

274. - Pace REIT SER PFS 50912-20-4

275. - Second BCRF CAP TR 851510-0-0-0

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Gain/Loss</th>
<th>Gain/Loss of (5)</th>
<th>Description of Income</th>
<th>Value of Asset at End of Reporting Period</th>
<th>Transactions During Reporting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

---

**FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT**

**Page 18 of 24**

**Name of Person Reporting**

**Date of Report**

Anthony J. Trompo
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets (Including Investments Except Those of the Spouse and Dependent Children)</th>
<th>B. Income During Reporting Period</th>
<th>C. Gross Value at End of Reporting Period</th>
<th>D. Transactions During Reporting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>(ii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Type of Div. or Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plots &quot;U&quot; after rent</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Div. or Inc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **256.** SURSTAD BIDLO PFPY CL A (UBA)
- **257.** Telenet DE PR R792550-Ap-5
- **258.** AREC preferred stock
- **259.** AVG common stock
- **260.** JAVY A preferred stock
- **261.** BBMRE PFPY Preferred 35586E-05-3
- **262.** JBD Mutual Fund
- **263.** CNBLC preferred stock
- **264.** CDB common stock
- **265.** CDBA preferred stock
- **266.** C.D. preferred stock
- **267.** OTC G preferred stock
- **268.** ODRC preferred stock
- **269.** GOOG common stock
- **270.** GLM common stock
- **271.** GOOGO preferred stock
- **272.** JHT common stock

---

1. **Value:** Column A contains the value.
2. **Gain:** Column B contains the gain.
3. **Type of Div. or Inc.:** Column C contains the type of dividend or income.
4. **Gain Code:** Column D contains the gain code.
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children, see pp. 19 ff. of filing instructions)

- **NONE** (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets (excluding trusts)</th>
<th>Reporting Period</th>
<th>Gross Value at End of Reporting Period</th>
<th>Transactions During Reporting Period</th>
<th>Dividends, Interest, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Value (2) Code 3 (P)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>(1) Date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Value (3) Code 3 (P)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name of Person Receiving Distributions</td>
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<td>(3) Receipt (4) Code 3 (P)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Method</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Description &amp; Amount</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Method</td>
<td></td>
<td>(5) Description &amp; Amount</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Examples

- **273.** 800 Share common stock
  - **Description:** Common stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **274.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **275.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **276.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **277.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **278.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **279.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **280.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **281.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **282.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **283.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **284.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **285.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **286.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **287.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **288.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

- **289.** 800 Shares 800% preferred stock
  - **Description:** Preferred stock
  - **Value:** $800
  - **Dividends:** $200

---

1. **Income Codes**
   - (1) Dividends
   - (2) Interest
   - (3) Other Income

2. **Value Codes**
   - (4) Market Value
   - (5) Book Value

3. **Method Codes**
   - (6) Assessed
   - (7) 12 Months
   - (8) 12 Months
   - (9) Annualized

4. **Other Codes**
   - (10) Cost
   - (11) Fair Value
   - (12) Total Value

---

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### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependents. See pg. 34-37 of filing instructions)

- **NONE:** (No reportable income, assets, or transactions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Income</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Date</td>
<td>(2) Value Code</td>
<td>(3) Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Code 1</td>
<td>Code 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **GTE INTWEST 286252-AB-6**
   - Type: Interest
   - Value: $801

2. **INTL LEASE 007725-AC-6**
   - Type: Interest
   - Value: $801

3. **Markel Corp M613-3**
   - Type: Interest
   - Value: $801

4. **Merrill Lynch VAR 00148-878-7**
   - Type: Interest
   - Value: $801

5. **Merrill Lynch VAR 00148-878-7**
   - Type: Interest
   - Value: $801

6. **Precor Refin 744417-AH-1**
   - Type: Interest
   - Value: $801

7. **Racorbank 786176-AH-1**
   - Type: Interest
   - Value: $801

8. **Royal Amex 296014-2G-2**
   - Type: Interest
   - Value: $801

9. **GLM Corp VAR 784545-G2-3**
   - Type: Interest
   - Value: $801

10. **SGX REIT**: R. (REIT 78417-XA-1**
    - Type: Interest
    - Value: $801

11. **SGX CMS Spred VAR 78422-HA-1**
    - Type: Interest
    - Value: $801

12. **Washington 59671-AB-9**
    - Type: Interest
    - Value: $801

13. **Enbridge Account #1067(RA) (Closed Oct 2001)**
    - Type: Income Dividend
    - Value: $801

14. **BBY Mutual Fund**
    - Type: Income Dividend
    - Value: $801

15. **BGI Mutual Fund**
    - Type: Income Dividend
    - Value: $801

16. **Wells Fargo**
    - Type: None
    - Value: $801

17. **Markel Corp taxable bond 170755-4E-4**
    - Type: Interest
    - Value: $801

---

1. **Income Code**
   - Date: November 30, 2008
   - Value: $801

2. **Value Code**
   - Description: Income (Code 1), Value (Code 2), Method (Code 3)

3. **Exempt Code**
   - Description: Yes/No (Code 1), Exempt From Income Tax (Code 2), Exempt From Reporting (Code 3)
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

- **NONE** (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets (including investments)</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fund &quot;TT&quot; after each asset excerpt from prior disclosure</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(A)</th>
<th>(B)</th>
<th>(C)</th>
<th>(D)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>407. USAA S&amp;P 500 Index Fund</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308. Robert W. Baird &amp; Co. checking and cash management accounts</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>309. DRYVUS money market accounts</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Team</td>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Income from Outside | A | B | C | D |
2. Value Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
3. Value Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
4. Value Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
5. Value Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
6. Income from Outside | A | B | C | D |
7. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
8. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
9. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
10. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
11. Income from Outside | A | B | C | D |
12. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
13. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
14. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
15. Income from Outside | A | B | C | D |
16. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
17. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
18. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
19. Income from Outside | A | B | C | D |
20. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
21. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
22. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
23. Income from Outside | A | B | C | D |
24. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
25. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
26. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
27. Income from Outside | A | B | C | D |
28. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
29. Valye Cod Ex | A | B | C | D |
30. Income from Outside | A | B | C | D |
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Page 23 of 24

Name of Person Reporting
Tremga, Anthony J

Date of Report
07/21/2008

VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Page 24 of 24

Name of Person Reporting
Tremga, Anthony J

Date of Report
07/21/2008

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above, including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any, is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it was applicable statutory provisions preventing non-disclosure.

I further certify that none of income from outside employment and bonuses and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 7353 et. seq., 18 U.S.C. § 208, and Judicial Conference regulations.

Signature

Date
July 21, 2008

NOTE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFIES OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (18 U.S.C. § 1001).

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:

Committee on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 2-301
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544
### FINANCIAL STATEMENT

#### NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>100 000 Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td>9 500 Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed securities-add schedule</td>
<td>3 534 167 Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities--add schedule</td>
<td>176 410 Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>40 000 Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dooitful</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable-add schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-add schedule</td>
<td>1 500 000 Chariity mortgages and other loans payable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgage receivable</td>
<td>Other debt instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto and other personal property</td>
<td>245 400 Auto lease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash value-life insurance</td>
<td>242 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets immiser</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total liabilities | 1 060 600 |
| Net Worth | 4 777 477 |
| Total Assets | 5 838 077 |
| Total liabilities and net worth | 5 838 077 |

#### CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

| As endorser, cosigner or guarantor | Are my assets pledged? (Add schedule) | Yes |
| On leases or contracts | Are you defendant in any suits or legal actions? | NO |
| Legal Claims | Have you ever taken bankruptcy? | NO |

#### GENERAL INFORMATION

Provision for Federal Income Tax

Other special debt
FINANCIAL STATEMENT

NET WORTH SCHEDULES

U.S. Government Securities
Morgan Stanley MS US Govt Sec TR B Mutual Fund $ 9,500

Listed Securities
Robert W. Baird & Co. Brokerage Account # I
-money market account $ 353,600
-AIG common stock 27,300
-BAC common stock 22,900
-BRKZB common stock 68,000
-CPB common stock 55,200
-CNI common stock 49,600
-CTAS common stock 42,600
-DEO common stock (ADRs) 53,400
-D common stock 57,400
-FO common stock 26,800
-GE common stock 50,600
-GAIN common stock 11,500
-ISCA common stock-A 26,300
-IYZ common stock (index fund) 38,500
-JNJ common stock 41,200
-MCD common stock 45,900
-MSFT common stock 53,100
-NGG stock (ADRs) 41,100
-ORCL common stock 9,800
-PFE common stock 37,600
-PBI common stock 52,200
-PGN common stock 51,600
-GLD 21,500
-TFX common stock 53,300
-UL stock (ADRs) 49,000
-UPS common stock 41,500
-UTX common stock 48,000
-VLO common stock 35,900
-WMT common stock 30,900
-WAG common stock 54,400
-WFSL common stock 51,500
-WMI common stock 59,300
-WRI common stock 49,200
-WTM common stock 26,900
-WYE common stock 43,600
-40952MAPO tax exempt Bd. Hampton, VA 10,500  
-42605MBH4 tax exempt Bd. (Henrico, VA) 10,200  
-927780YEO tax exempt Bd. (Va. St.) 15,600  
-927780UTI tax exempt Bd. (Va. St.) 10,000  
-SGENX mutual fund 37,800  

Sub-Total $1,865,300

Robert W. Baird & Co. Brokerage Account #2 (IRA)  
-Money market VMMXX 25,800  
-AIG common stock 6,800  
-BDV common stock 16,100  
-CDR common stock 15,500  
-COD I stock 19,000  
-DRH common stock 14,400  
-GLAD common stock 17,800  
-GOOD common stock 10,700  
-HPT common stock 16,900  
-IEF common stock 17,200  
-OLP common stock 17,000  
-ARE.C preferred stock 25,300  
-ABW.A preferred stock 14,600  
-CCPCN preferred stock 20,000  
-CBL.C preferred stock 13,200  
-CDR.A preferred stock 24,300  
-C.O preferred stock 21,700  
-OFG.G preferred stock 9,600  
-DDR.G preferred stock 18,700  
-GOODO preferred stock 12,000  
-NNN.C preferred stock 23,000  
-NBD preferred stock 8,800  
-PRE.C preferred stock 12,600  
-OUI preferred stock 20,200  
-BFS.A preferred stock 9,700  
-American Gen. taxable bond 02635PTB9 23,300  
-Barclays Bank taxable bond 06738CK40 28,900  
-Barcly Perform taxable bond 06738CMS5 23,500  
-Constln Brds taxable bond 21036PA0 19,600  
-Credit Suisse taxable bond 22541FDN3 20,400  
-Dayton Hudson taxable bond 239753BK1 22,000  
-Donnelley R taxable bond 257867AM3 18,500  
-Elec Data Stp taxable bond 285661AD6 20,900  
-Fortune Nt taxable bond 349631AL5 27,700  
-Fund American Co taxable bond 36077BAA5 28,700  
-GE Global Insu taxable bond 36158FAC4 10,400  
-Genwrth Fnl taxable bond 37247XAE2 24,700  
-GTE Nthwest taxable bond 36233RAF0 30,500
- GTE Nthwest taxable bond 36233RAG8 10,000
- Markel Corp taxable bond 570535AF1 30,600
- Morgan Comdis taxable bond 6174464T3 19,900
- Morgan Stanley taxable bond 6174462G3 24,400
- Nabisco Inc taxable bond 629527AU6 32,100
- Nextel Comm taxable bond 65332VBH5 25,400
- Premcor Refng taxable bond 74047PAH7 20,800
- Royal Amer Bk taxable bond 78004TBBG2 25,100
- SLM Corp Var taxable bond 78490FSZ3 16,600
- Toyota Mtg Var taxable bond 89233PV37 29,700
- Verizon Vr taxable bond 92345NAA8 19,200
- Xerox Corp taxable bond 98412BM4 20,700
  Sub-Total $ 984,500

Robert W. Baird & Co. Brokerage Account #3 (IRA)
  - money market CLASS A 196 1,600
  - BDV stock 2,100
  - BGR stock 3,600
  - BALCX mutual fund 3,700
  - GLD 8,700
  - WSHCX mutual fund 2,900
  Sub-Total $ 22,600

Robert W. Baird & Co. Brokerage Account #4
  - Money Market 2
  - BRKZB 12,700
  - WSHCX 1,000
  Sub-Total $ 13,702

Charles Schwab Brokerage Account
  - MO common stock 9
  - AXP common stock 37
  - AIG common stock 3,600
  - BAC common stock 3,300
  - BMY common stock 4
  - C common stock 2,600
  - DIS common stock 2
  - D common stock 44
  - GE common stock 3
  - INTC common stock 18
  - SJM common stock 1
  - JNJ common stock 23
  - MOT common stock 8
  - ORCL common stock 7
  - PFE common stock 6,200
-PG common stock 160
-SVNT common stock 16
-TXN common stock 15
-Money Market Acct. 2,141
Sub-Total $ 18,188

ING Pension IRA
-Oppenheimer Global Port.- I 1,900

UBS Account #1
-GE common stock 7,000
-Money Market 1,700
-Pace Large Co. Value Equity Investment Fund Class A Mutual Fund 2,900
Sub-Total $ 11,600

UBS Account #2
-Money Market 4,100
-American Funds Cap Income Builder Fund Cl A Mutual Fund 5,300
-Putnam New Opportunity Fund Cl A Mutual Fund 3,600
-Pace Large Co. Value Equity Investment Fund Class A Mutual Fund 1,400
-Eastgrowth Tsy Strpd Cpn 4,900
-Treasury Investment Growth 3,800
Sub-Total $ 23,100

UBS Account #3 (Sep)
-Pace Int'l Equity Investment Fund Class A Mutual Fund 800

Citi/Smith Barney Legg Mason Opportunity Trust Primary Class Mutual Fund 3,000

Janus Fund(Jansx) 9,500

IBM Common Stock 9,000

DOMINION RESOURCES INC Common Stock 34,700

American Century Growth Mutual Fund (TWXCGX) 2800
Wachovia Brokerage Account (401-K) (As Of 5/31/08)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGTHX Mutual Fund</td>
<td>199,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCFX Mutual Fund</td>
<td>178,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMECX Mutual Fund</td>
<td>83,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAVLX Mutual Fund</td>
<td>49,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHITX Mutual Fund</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 510,477</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAA S&amp;P 500 INDEX FUND</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Listed Securities</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 3,524,167</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Unlisted Securities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FISERV IRA-Crealde note</td>
<td>$ 31,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Firm Stock</td>
<td>142,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFT Holdings LLC stock</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Unlisted Securities</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 176,410</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Real Estate Owned**

- Personal residence          | $ 1,500,000 |

**Real Estate Mortgages Payable**

- Personal residence          | $ 1,051,000 |

**Assets Pledged – Personal Residence**
AFFIDAVIT

I, Anthony John Trenza, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

July 24, 2008

(NAME)

(DATE)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of July, 2008.

Notary Public

Chairman LEAHY. Which indicates he is—being from Virginia and nearby. I appreciate that. I’d note that we’ll put in the record your background and the fact that you’re a partner at the DC law firm of Miller & Chevalier, and so on.

STATEMENT OF C. DARNELL JONES, II, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Then if I could have Judge Jones, who is a judge on the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, the highest trial court in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. He’s been there 21 years. He was elected president judge by the judges of the Court of Common Pleas in 2006. Prior to becoming a judge, he was an Office Assistant in the Citizens Crime Commission and practiced law at the Defender Association of Philadelphia. And down through—and I will put, again, in the record his whole background, which is significant.

I would note that Judge Srika, Tony Srika, took me aside at the Supreme Court the other day and praised you—not very much—Judge Jones.

Could you please introduce any members of your family who are here?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again for the honor of being here, Senator Specter. My wife, Evelyn Jones, my daughter, Sheinelle Jones, my daughter, Dr. Keesha Elliott, my daughter, Antonia Jones, and my son-in-law, Uche Ojeh. And my close friend from law school, Judge Reggie Walton and his daughter Dannin.

[The biographical information follows.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).
   
   Cardozie Darnell Jones, Jr.
   C. Darnell Jones II

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.
   
   United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.
   
   Office: Office of the President Judge
   Room 386 City Hall
   Philadelphia, PA 19107

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.
   
   1949; Claremore, Oklahoma

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.
   
   I am married to Evelyn Antonia Jones (Pre-marriage-Evelyn Antonia Williams). She is employed with the Defender Association of Philadelphia-Federal Division, Capital Habeas Unit; 601 Walnut St., Suite 545 West Curtis Ctr; Independence Sq. West; Philadelphia, PA 19106.
   We have no dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.
   
   1968 – 1972, Southwestern College; B.A., 1972
7. **Employment Record:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

**Employment:**

1987 – present  
Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas)  
5001 Louise Drive  
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055-0719  
Judge, Court of Common Pleas, 1987 – present  
President Judge, Court of Common Pleas, 2006 – present

March 1987 – November 1987  
Citizens Crime Commission  
1518 Walnut St, Suite 902  
Philadelphia, PA 19102  
Office Assistant

1975 – 1987  
Defender Association of Philadelphia  
111 S 15th St # 111  
Philadelphia, PA 19102  
Chief, Family Court Division, 1985-1987  
Assistant Chief, Family Court Division, 1979-1985  
Special Defense Unit, 1979  
Trial attorney, 1976-1987

1974 – 1975  
Pratt, Bowers and Queen  
Washington, DC  
Part-time law clerk

1973 – 1974  
Federal Filing Service  
Chevy Chase, MD  
Part-time package delivery

1972 – 1973  
Sears  
Chevy Chase, MD  
Part-time stock clerk
Faculty Positions:

1998 – present
The National Judicial College
Judicial College Building/MS 358
Reno, NV 89557
Instructor, Curriculum developer
(All judicial faculty are volunteers)

1993 – present
The University of Pennsylvania School of Law
3400 Chestnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Adjunct Professor (Salaried)

1992 – 1996
Temple University Beasley School of Law
1719 No. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
Adjunct Professor (Salaried)

1991 – 1992
St. Joseph’s University - School of Criminal Justice Graduate Program
5600 City Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19131-1395
Adjunct Professor (Salaried)

1984 – 1985
The National Institute of Trial Advocacy
Volunteer faculty

Other Affiliations:
American College of Business Court Judges- Board of Directors -2006 to present)
Salvation Army Advisory Board
New Directions For Women Advisory Board
Zion Baptist Church-Board of Trustees

8. Military Service and Draft Status: Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

I did not serve in the military.
9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

   In my campaign for Pennsylvania Supreme Court (Spring 2007):
   Pennsylvania Bar Association rating: “Highly Recommended for Pennsylvania Supreme Court”
   Endorsed by Hon. Edward G. Rendell, Governor
   Endorsed for Pennsylvania Supreme Court by the following newspapers:

   500 leading judges in America by Lawdragon magazine

   Martin Luther King, Jr. Award for Social Justice

   Brandeis Law Society Award for Community Service

   Thurgood Marshall Award

   Hurricane Katrina Volunteer

   Public Internet Rating by Citizens—www.ratephillyjudges.com

   Inductee, Claremore Public School Foundation Hall of Fame, Claremore, OK

   Benjamin Lerner Career Achievement Award

   Outstanding Young Men in America

   Stakeholder in Juvenile Justice Award

   Southwestern College-Honor Roll, Moundbuilders

10. **Bar Associations:** List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

   American Bar Association-Judicial Section; Business Law Section
   Selected as a Business Court Representative to the Business Law Section of the ABA 2008. Selected as Business Court Liaison to the Judicial Section of the ABA effective August 11, 2008.

   American College of Business Court Judges
   Member, Board of Directors -2006 to present
Barristers Association
National Conference of State Trial Judges
National Bar Association
Pennsylvania Bar Association
Philadelphia Bar Association-Judicial Selection and Retention Committee
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania- Judicial Auditing Agency (Audits Supreme Court’s budget); Judicial Council of Pennsylvania; 02/06-Present
Chair, Administrative Governing Board First Judicial District (Philadelphia)
Judicial Education Committee
Chair, Computer and Technology Committee
Chair, Committee on General Rules

11. Bar and Court Admission:

a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

  Pennsylvania - April 26, 1976 to Present

b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

  Commonwealth of Pennsylvania courts – 1976
  United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania – 1976
  There have been no lapses in membership.

12. Memberships:

a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or
participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

Salvation Army Advisory Board; Appointed Spring 2008
The Junior Legal Club; Admitted Spring 2008
The University of Pennsylvania American Inn of Court; 1998-Present
Crime Prevention Association; 1980’s
Family Support Services; 1980’s
Fellowship Commission; 1980’s
The Citizens Crime Commission; March 1987 - November 1987
New Directions For Women Advisory Board; 2007-Present
Oak Lane Community Action Association; 1989-Present
Seigleton School; 1980’s
Zion Baptist Church, 1977-Present

b. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

None of these organizations discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion.

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

"Pretrial Matters Unique to Capital Cases" National Judicial College (Course taught yearly, 2000-Present) [Modified to teach specific states' laws at each presentation]

"Pretrial Matters Unique to Homicide Cases" Coursebook for the Kansas Judicial Conference, taught June 9, 2008

"Trial Matters Unique to Capital Cases" National Judicial College (2000 to Present) [Modified to teach specific states' laws at each presentation]

"Criminal Evidence" National Judicial College (Course taught yearly, 1998-2006) [Curriculum modified to teach state judges and US military judges.]


b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

None

c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

None

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

Presidents Day and George Washington’s Birthday - National Museum Of American Jewish History; February 18, 2008

Campaign advertisement for Supreme Court of Pennsylvania candidacy; Spring 2007

Supreme Court Campaign Announcement; January 17, 2007
“On The Occasion Of The Inaugural Swearing-In Ceremony Of President Judge
C. Darnell Jones, III; January 20, 2006

Address to the State Civil Committee, Philadelphia Bar Association; June 2, 2004

e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other
publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these
interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where
they are available to you.

I have given numerous interviews to editorial boards, however the subsequent
editorials were the statements and opinions of the editors, with references to me,
and a brief quote here and there.

“10 Questions for President Judge C. Darnell Jones II”, The Philadelphia
Lawyer, Philadelphia Bar Association Magazine Summer 2006

Pennsylvania Cable Network (PCN) broadcast an interview with me (and all
Pennsylvania appellate court candidates) in May 2007. I am unable to retrieve a
recording of the broadcast.

Case In Point (Magazine of the National Judicial College) Winter/Spring 2006
“Saved by Gumbo and Brotherly Love”
http://www.judges.org/pdf/casemagpoint_winter06.pdf

Philadelphia Inquirer, Sunday, July 6, 2008

14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether
such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such
court.

I have served as a Judge on the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas since 1987. I was
appointed by Governor Robert P. Casey in November 1987 and subsequently elected to a
ten year term in November 1987. I was retained for a ten year term in November 1997
and again in November 2007.

The Court of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania is a court of General Jurisdiction. It is the
highest trial court in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

Our state trial courts’ opinions are not published, and thus, there are no citations
except for the case caption at the trial level. However, I have authored well over
four hundred trial court opinions in the last twenty and one-half years as a trial judge.

b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

None

c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

In over twenty years as a state trial judge, having authored over 400 trial court opinions, no appellate court has ever criticized my substantive or procedural rulings. Please note that trial court opinions are not published. They are forwarded to the appellate court after an appeal from the trial court verdict has been filed.

Cases reversed on appeal:


Cargilada v. Binks Mfg. Co., April Term, 1999 No. 2981 (C.P. 1st Dist. Jan. 24, 2003), rev'd, No. 3790 EDA 2002 (Super. Ct. filed Nov. 25, 2003)(Trial Court erred in granting Motion to Strike Judgment. Case was remanded for trial court to determine if facts supported a Petition to Open. On remand, trial court found that facts did support a Petition to Open and said decision was affirmed on appeal.)

In Re Petition to Contest Nomination of Anthony Payton as Democratic Candidate in 179th Legislative District, 1781 CD 2006, reversed 10-04-06. Summary- In reversing the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, the Commonwealth Court concluded that Petitioners had not set forth specific allegations of fraud or error to warrant a re-canvass of the votes in the subject election districts


Summary - The trial court sustained the city port authority's preliminary objections and dismissed all of the corporation's claims against the authority.


Rambo v. Greene, 2126 EDA 2005, reversed/remanded 8-23-06 Summary - In relation to a medical malpractice action, an appellant sought treatment from the doctor, who prepared two expert opinions in preparation for the suit. The doctor
refused to testify at the trial despite being subpoenaed. As a result of the doctor's absence, a non-suit was entered in the malpractice action. The order sustaining the preliminary objections and dismissing Appellants' Amended Complaint, with respect to breach of an implied contract only, is reversed.


Summary- The trial court entered judgment in favor of the landlord on the trespass and conversion to chattel count of the complaint. The court found in favor of the tenant on the breach of contract count of the complaint and entered judgment for the amount of damages sought by the tenant.

Summary- Plaintiff insureds filed an action against defendant insurance companies alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and malicious prosecution. The insurance companies filed motions for summary judgment on the grounds that the breach of contract and bad faith claims were time barred and the insureds failed to demonstrate in their malicious prosecution claim that the insurance companies instituted criminal proceedings against the insureds.

d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;


In Re Petition to Contest Nomination of Anthony Payton as Democratic Candidate in 179th Legislative District, 1781 CD 2006, reversed 10-04-06.

Banacol Marketing Corp. v. Penn Warehousing, 17 CD 2006, reversed in part 8-11-06

Limbach Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 1575 CD 2005, reversed remanded 7-24-06.


Tesauro v. Quigley, 3490 EDA 2006, vacated/remanded

Thomas Jefferson v. Wapner, reversed/remanded in part, 7-24-07

Rambo v. Greene, 2126 EDA 2005, reversed/remanded 8-23-06


Margaret Auto Body v. Universal Underwriters Group, et. al., affirmed/reversed/remand, 8-10-05.

e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

I have authored well over four hundred opinions since becoming a trial judge over twenty years ago. It was not uncommon to preside over five bench trial per day for three weeks per month when I began in 1987. Whenever an appeal was filed, I wrote an opinion to support the verdict of the trial court, and forwarded the record to the appellate court. Those trial court opinions are unpublished. I have maintained the majority of trial opinions on my computer records.
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f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

None; I have not served as a panel member.

16. Recusal: If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

Fine v. Checchio, Aug. Term, 2000 No. 0315. Attorney George Szymanski represented himself in an interpleader action, seeking counsel fees. Court issued a Rule to Show Cause why Mr. Szymanski’s Fourth Amended Complaint should not be dismissed. Attorney Szymanski sought recusal via written correspondence to the Court on the basis that the Court issued the Rule to Show Cause sua sponte and because opposing counsel allegedly made a comment to Mr. Szymanski on the telephone that they and their law firm were "very friendly" with the Court. Opposing counsel also allegedly stated that as a result, Mr. Szymanski would have "little chance of prevailing in [his] claims for attorney fees." This Court heard argument from both sides on the issue and although the statements regarding the Court's familiarity with opposing counsel were wholly inaccurate, the Motion for Recusal was granted to avoid any appearance of impropriety.

Commonwealth v. John Wayne, Dec. Term, 1994, No. 0698. Subsequent to this Court issuing its decision in a protracted capital post conviction matter, counsel for Defendant sought recusal on the basis of an article appearing in the Philadelphia Daily News. Said newspaper inadequately quoted this Court regarding his alleged interest in potentially seeking the office of District Attorney. In response, this Court issued an Order which stated in part that "In view of Petitioner's sealed motion, the Court hereby vacates its Opinion and Order of January 30, 2008, to allow for the deliberate and conscientious consideration of
the issues raised therein." Subsequent to issuance of the Order, the
Commonwealth filed a brief in opposition to the recusal request and counsel for
Defendant filed a response to the Commonwealth's brief. After reviewing all
submissions and conducting a lengthy on-the-record discussion of the matter by
and between the Court and counsel, this Court concluded that absolutely no
conflict existed. As such, Defendant's Motion was denied and the Court
reinstated its original Opinion denying post-conviction relief for Defendant.

17. **Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:**

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices,
including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or
appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed
you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for
elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

I have held no public offices, other than judicial offices. I have had no
unsuccessful nominations for appointed office. In 2007 I was an unsuccessful
candidate in the Democratic primary election for the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether
compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever
held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the
particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your
title and responsibilities.

None

18. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation
from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge,
the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

I did not serve as a clerk.

ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

I have not practiced alone.

iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or
governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature
of your affiliation with each.
1987 – present
Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
5001 Louise Drive
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055-0719
Judge, Court of Common Pleas, 1987 – present
President Judge, Court of Common Pleas, 2006 – present

March 1987 – November 1987
Citizens Crime Commission
1518 Walnut St, Suite 902
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Office Assistant

1975 – 1987
Defender Association of Philadelphia
111 S 15th St # 111
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Chief, Family Court Division, 1985-1987
Assistant Chief, Family Court Division, 1979-1985
Special Defense Unit, 1979
Trial attorney, 1976-1987

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

I began my practice as an Assistant Public Defender in 1975, representing indigent defendants charged with criminal offenses. I’ve tried virtually every kind of criminal case there is. During my tenure there as a Trial Attorney, the Defender Association of Philadelphia was not allowed to represent defendants charged with murder.

In 1979, I became Deputy Chief of the Family Court Division, which represents indigent juvenile defendants charged with delinquent (criminal) offenses. In 1985 I became Chief of the Family Court Division. In 1987, I became the first Assistant Public Defender in the 50 year history of that office who was appointed directly to the bench by a Governor.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

I represented indigent criminal defendants.
c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

   i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
      1. federal courts: 100%
      2. state courts of record:
      3. other courts:

   ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
      1. civil proceedings:
      2. criminal proceedings: 100%

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

   From 1976 to 1987, I tried hundreds of non-jury cases and approximately 8 cases to juries.

   i. What percentage of these trials were:
      1. jury: 2%
      2. non-jury: 98%

e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

   I have not practiced before the Supreme Court of the United States.

19. **Litigation**: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

   a. the date of representation;

   b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and

   c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

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I was an Assistant Public Defender over 21 years ago. Many cases were complex major trials, jury and non-jury. I cannot remember the most significant ones. Therefore, in lieu of cases, I am providing a list of professional references.

Hon. Lynn Abraham, District Attorney of Philadelphia
215-686-8701

Hon. Jacqueline Allen, Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia
215-686-7038

Mr. Mitchell Bach, Esquire, American Bar Association Representative and Business Court specialist
215-851-8466

Honorable Amanda Cooperman, Judge, Court of Common Pleas; (former adversary in the Office of the District Attorney when I was an Assistant Public Defender)
215-683-7080

Honorable Kevin Dougherty, Administrative Judge, Family Division
215-686-7970

Hon. William Dressel, President, National Judicial College
775-327-8262

Dr. Stephen Feiler, Dir. Of Judicial Education, Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts
717-795-7460

Ellen Greenlee, Esquire, Chief, Defender Association of Philadelphia
267-765-6600

Hon. Chester Harhut, Immediate Past President, Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges
570-963-6306

Mr. Ronald Harper, Esquire, Chairman, Board of Trustees, Zion Baptist Church (I am a member of this church, and former Trustee.)
215-844-4848

Hon. Nazario Jimenez, Judge, Municipal Court of Philadelphia
215-683-7232

Hon. D. Webster Keogh, Administrative Judge, Trial Division
215-686-2602
Ms. Sayde Ladov, Chancellor-elect, Philadelphia Bar Association
215-587-0840

Hon. Benjamin Lerner, Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia
215-683-7077

Ms. Lynn Marks, President, Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts
215-569-1150

Hon. Michael Nutter, Mayor, City of Philadelphia
215-686-2160

Professor Edward Ohlbaum, Temple University Beasley School of Law
215-204-1856

Hon. George Overton, Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia
215-683-7103

Zygmont Pines, State Court Administrator, Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts
215-560-6337

Mr. Michael Pratt, Chancellor, Philadelphia Bar Association
215-981-4386

Mr. Eliot B. Present, Esquire (Mr. Present was an Assistant District Attorney against whom I tried cases as an Assistant Public Defender.)
215-735-9200

Hon. Lisa Rau, Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia
215-686-3768

Hon. Edward G. Rendell, Governor, Commonwealth of PA
717-787-2500

Mr. Andrew Susko, Esquire, Immediate past President, Pennsylvania Bar Association
215-864-6228

Hon. Ben Tennille, North Carolina Business Court, ABA Business Court Liaison
336-334-5260

20. Legal Activities: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities.
and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organizations(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

The most significant legal activities I have pursued in past twenty years on the bench have been centered on teaching state trial judges, military judges, lawyers and law students. I have also become very active in the area of Business Courts for the American Bar Association, and served in the Business Court (Commerce Case Management Program) in Philadelphia. I am the Business Court Representative to the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section, Appointed as the Business Court Liaison for Judicial Section and Business Law Section of the ABA (effective 8.11.08), and serve as a member of the Board of Directors of the American College of Business Court Judges.

21. **Teaching:** What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

1998 to Present
The National Judicial College
Special Problems in Criminal Evidence  NJC-Reno, NV
Handling Capital Cases (Charleston, Chicago, New Orleans, Reno, Seattle, Pennsylvania)

1993 to Present
The University of Pennsylvania School of Law
Trial Advocacy

1992 to 1996
Temple University Beasley School of Law
Trial Advocacy

1991 to 1992
St. Joseph’s University - School of Criminal Justice Graduate Program
“Court Administration”

1984 to 1985
The National Institute of Trial Advocacy
Seminars Taught:
   - Alabama Judicial Education; (scheduled Sept. 2008)
   - Kansas Judicial Education; June 2008
   - Arizona Judicial Education; 2007
   - Supreme Court of Pa Capital Litigation for Trial Judges; 2007
   - New Jersey Judicial Education; 2004
   - Pennsylvania Bar Institute-August 13, 2008 Trial of a Felony Case
22. **Deferred Income/ Future Benefits:** List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

I anticipate being able to begin collecting my state judiciary pension the day I leave office from my position as a state court judge. According to the estimate I have been provided from the State Employee Retirement System, I will be eligible to collect approximately $8,280.04 (Eight Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Dollars and four cents) per month.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

The decision on any outside employment would be made after conferring with the Chief Judge of the court. I would like to continue teaching at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)

See attached Financial Disclosure Report

25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

The parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that may present potential conflicts-of-interest during my initial service in the position to which I have been nominated would include those attorneys and or litigants who may appear before me who contributed to my Spring 2007 Campaign for a seat on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Since I made every effort not to know who...
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contribution, I have publicly stated on various occasions that the campaign finance records are public, and if any attorney or party made a motion for recusal on that basis, I would gladly grant the recusal motion to avoid any appearance of impropriety.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

In all situations, I will consult and comply with the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

While I have not practiced law for over twenty years, I have spent a great deal of my time as President Judge recruiting and publicly acknowledging the work of Pro Bono Counsel. I have created two programs in our court: 1) Fraudulent Conveyance of Real Property, and 2) Mortgage Foreclosure Diversion Pilot Program. Each is dependent upon pro bono counsel.

28. **Selection Process:**

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

In November 2007, I was interviewed by the judicial selection commission in Philadelphia. After a morning interview, I was invited back for an afternoon interview. In June, I was contacted by Sen. Robert Casey, Jr. and was informed of his desire, after consultation with Sen. Arlen Specter, to submit my name to the President for consideration for an appointment to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On June 3, 2008 I met with and was extensively interviewed by the Office of White House Counsel. On June 12, 2008 I was traveled to Washington and was met by a representative of the White House Counsel’s office who escorted me to the offices of Sen. Casey. During a large portion of the day I was interviewed Sen. Casey and members of his staff. On June 6, 2008 I traveled to Washington to meet with Sen. Arlen Specter. I was
interviewed by Sen. Specter and his staff, and accompanied him to the Capitol during the day. Subsequently, I have had conversations and communication with staff members from the Department of Justice regarding the nomination process and paperwork. My nomination was forwarded to the United States Senate on July 24, 2008.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No
**FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT**  
**NOMINATION FILING**  

**JONES, C. DARNELL**  
1. **Person Reporting** (Last name, first, middle initial)  
2. **Court or Organization**  
   Pennsylvania, Eastern District  
3. **Date of Report**  
   07/27/2008  

4. **Title** (District Judge indicates active or senior status; magistrate judge indicates full or part-time)  
   District Judge - Nominee  
5a. **Report Type** (check appropriate type)  
   [ ] Nomination,  
   Date: 07/27/2008  
5b. **Reporting Period**  
   Initial [ ] Annual [ ] Final  
   01/01/2007 to 06/30/2008  

6. **Chambers or Office Address**  
   Office of the President Judge  
   Room 708 City Hall  
   Philadelphia, PA 19107  

7. **Amended Report**  
   [ ] Amended Report  

8. **On the basis of the information contained in this report and any**  
   supplemental information submitted to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, I certify to my knowledge, in compliance  
   with applicable laws and regulations.  
   Reviewing Officer: __________________________ Date: ____________  

**IMPORTANT NOTES:** The instructions accompanying this form must be followed. Complete all parts,  
checking the “NONE” box for each part where you have no reportable information. Sign on last page.  

---  

**I. POSITIONS.** (Reporting individual only; see pp. 9-11 of instructions.)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---  

**II. AGREEMENTS.** (Reporting individual only; see pp. 14-16 of instructions.)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTIES AND TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1987</td>
<td>COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM PENSION UPON DEPARTURE FROM CURRENT STATE TRIAL JUDGE POSITION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME. (Reporting individual and spouse; see pp. 7-28 of instructions.)

A. Filer’s Non-Investment Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME (years, not spouse’s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2006</td>
<td>Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts - Judicial Salary</td>
<td>$154,471.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2006</td>
<td>Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania - Adjunct Law Professor</td>
<td>$6,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 2007</td>
<td>Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania - Adjunct Law Professor</td>
<td>$6,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 2008</td>
<td>Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts - Judicial Salary</td>
<td>$90,300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 2008</td>
<td>Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania - Adjunct Law Professor</td>
<td>$3,800.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 2008</td>
<td>Kansas Judicial Conference - Lecturer</td>
<td>$900.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Spouse’s Non-Investment Income - If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, complete this section.

(Other amount not required except for homestead)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2008</td>
<td>Defender Association of Philadelphia, Salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2008</td>
<td>Penrose Design, Inc. - sales representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2008</td>
<td>Defender Association of Philadelphia, salary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. REIMBURSEMENTS — Transportation, lodging, food, entertainment.

(Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 35-37 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXEMPT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


V. GIFTS. (Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 28-31 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI. LIABILITIES. (Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 32-33 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safeco</td>
<td>College Loan</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Motors Acceptance Corporation</td>
<td>Automobile Loan</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia Federal Credit Union</td>
<td>Personal Loan</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-44 of filling instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset (including trust assets)</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Asset Code</td>
<td>(2) Type (e.g. div., rent, expenses)</td>
<td>(3) Value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1. US Treasury Bond
- **A. Description of Asset**: Interest
- **B. Income during reporting period**: J T
- **C. Gross value at end of reporting period**: EXEMPT

### 2. CITIZENS BANK ACCOUNTS
- **A. Description of Asset**: Interest
- **B. Income during reporting period**: J T

### 3. PNC BANK ACCOUNT
- **A. Description of Asset**: Interest
- **B. Income during reporting period**: J T

### 4. ROGERS COUNTY BANK
- **A. Description of Asset**: Interest
- **B. Income during reporting period**: J T

### 5. FIRST TRUST BANK ACCOUNTS
- **A. Description of Asset**: Interest
- **B. Income during reporting period**: J T

### 6. AMERICAN HERITAGE CREDIT UNION
- **A. Description of Asset**: Interest
- **B. Income during reporting period**: J T

### 7. PHILADELPHIA FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
- **A. Description of Asset**: Interest
- **B. Income during reporting period**: J T

### 8. Comm. of Pa. State Employees’ Retirement System
- **A. Description of Asset**: None
- **B. Income during reporting period**: PJ T

### 9. Alliance Benefit Group Mid Atlantic, LLC
- **A. Description of Asset**: None
- **B. Income during reporting period**: KT T

### 10. EXXON MOBIL
- **A. Description of Asset**: Dividend
- **B. Income during reporting period**: J T

### 11. 

### 12. 

### 13. 

### 14. 

### 15. 

### 16. 

### 17. 

### Notes: Gain Codes
1. Gains over $10,000
2. Gains over $5,000 but not over $10,000
3. Gains over $1,000 but not over $5,000
4. Gains over $100 but not over $1,000
5. Gains under $100
6. Losses over $10,000
7. Losses over $5,000 but not over $10,000
8. Losses over $1,000 but not over $5,000
9. Losses over $100 but not over $1,000
10. Losses under $100

### C. Gross value at end of reporting period

### D. Transactions during reporting period

### E. Identification of buyer/seller (if partner transaction)
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

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VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

Page 7 of 7

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it is not applicable statutory provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that earned income from outside employment and honoraria and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app. § 301 et. seq., 5 U.S.C. § 735, and Judicial Conference regulations.

Signature: [Signature]

Date: 07/27/2008

NOTE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSELY OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (5 U.S.C. app. § 501)

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:

Committee on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 2-301
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544
## FINANCIAL STATEMENT

### NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and liabilities (including debts, mortgages, leases, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-accrued</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidated securities-accrued</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unliquidated securities-accrued</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable:</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable-accrued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-accrued</td>
<td>Chattel mortgages and other loans payable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td>Other debts-in-series:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets and other personal property</td>
<td>Other debts-in-series:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash-value-life insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets itemized:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement annuity:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total liabilities               | 405 000                           |
| Net Worth                       | 1 596 817                          |
| Total Assets                    | 2 003 817                          |

### CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERAL INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As endorser, co-maker or guarantor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On leases or contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for Federal Income Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other special debt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FINANCIAL STATEMENT
NET WORTH SCHEDULES

Unlisted Securities
Alliance Benefit Group Mid Atlantic, LLC $ 5,565

Real Estate Owned
Personal residence $ 380,000

Real Estate Mortgages Payable
Personal residence $ 305,000

AFFIDAVIT

I, C. Darnell Jones II, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

Aug. 15, 2001
(DATE)

C. Darnell Jones II
(NAME)

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Notary Public

Notary Public

Matter, Pennsylvania Association of Notaries
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you all for being here.
 Judge Goldberg, who’s next, is a judge in the Bucks County
Court of Common Pleas. He was appointed in February 2003, elect-
ed into office for a 10-year term in November of 2003. He was a
former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania, a senior partner at the Philadelphia law firm of Cousin
O’Connor, Assistant D.A. for the Philadelphia District Attorney’s
Office, one office that I first knew about when the distinguished
senior Senator from Pennsylvania was the District Attorney there.
 Would you like to indicate, Judge Goldberg, do you have family
members here?

STATEMENT OF MITCHEL S. GOLDBERG, NOMINEE TO BE DIS-
TRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYL-
VANIA

Mr. GOLDBERG. I do. Thank you, Chairman Leahy and Senator
Specter. My wife, Helene Goldberg, is here. My children are not.
My daughter is attending Boston University, her first year. My son
Sam, hopefully is in school right now.
 [Laughter.]
 My sister-in-law, Sandi—
 Chairman LEAHY. When he reads this record he’s going to pray
he was.
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. GOLDBERG. I’m going to show it to him. My sister-in-law,
Sandi Widlitz, who—really, sister-in-law is just a term. Sandi
Widlitz is like a sister to me. She is here. And my sister, who lives
in Bethesda, Maryland, Aileen Kantor, is also here. I hope I
haven’t missed anybody.
 I did have a brief opening statement. The lawyer in me wanted
to give it, but you’ve emphasized brevity so I’ll waive my opening
statement, Senator.
 Chairman LEAHY. That shows you’re a very good lawyer.
 [Laughter.]
 [The biographical information follows.]  
 [The prepared statement of Judge Goldberg appears as a submis-
ion for the record.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. Name: Full name (include any former names used).
   Mitchell Steven Goldberg

2. Position: State the position for which you have been nominated.
   United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

3. Address: List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.
   Office: Bucks County Courthouse
           55 E. Court Street
           Doylestown, PA 18901

   Residence: Yardley, Pennsylvania

   1959; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

5. Marital Status: (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.
   I am married to Helene Goldberg, formerly Helene Robins. She is a Financial Manager, Heartsine Inc., 105 Terry Drive, Suite 116, Newtown, Pennsylvania 18940
   We have two dependent children.

6. Education: List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.
7. **Employment Record:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

**Employment:**

2003 – Present
Bucks County Court of Common Pleas
Bucks County Courthouse
55 E. Court Street
Doylestown, Pennsylvania
Judge

2002 – 2006 (Various semesters)
Temple Law School,
719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122
Adjunct Professor, Trial Advocacy

1997 – 2003
United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania
615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
Assistant United States Attorney

1990 – 1997
Cozen O’Connor
1900 Market St.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
Senior Partner

1986 – 1990
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107
Assistant District Attorney

1984 – 1985
Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association
121 S. Broad St.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107
Law Clerk
844

1981 – 1983
United States Senate Subcommittee on Investigations
Russell Senate Office Building
Washington DC 20510
Legislative/Investigative Assistant

Other Affiliations:
Friends of the Delaware Canal – Advisory Board and Board member – 2003- present
Bucks County Opportunity Council, Board of Directors, 2003 – present

8. Military Service and Draft Status: Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including
dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social
security number) and type of discharge received.

I did not serve in the military.

9. Honors and Awards: List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or
professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special
recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

Highest Possible Attorney Performance Rating – U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania

Nominated by U.S. Attorney’s Office for Attorney General Award for Outstanding
Presentation

Winner – Temple Law School Trial Competition;

Winner – Best Appellate Brief, Samuel Polsky Moot Court Competition;

Recipient – International Academy of Trial Lawyers’ Commencement Award for
Distinguished Achievement in Trial Advocacy

Semi-Finalist – Eastern Regional Mock Trial Competition

10. Bar Associations: List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees,
selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles
and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

Bucks County Bar Association – 2000 – present; member of Pro Bono Committee.

11. Bar and Court Admission:

a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in
membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.
Pennsylvania – November 13, 1986
This membership is in inactive status due to my position as a Judge.

New Jersey – 1986
Inactive status - Not permitted to practice in New Jersey as U.S. Attorney (prior job) or as Bucks County, Pennsylvania, Judge. Membership administratively revoked in 2005 due to lapse in payment of dues for 7 years.

b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court – 1986 (currently inactive status due to my position as a Judge.)

State of New Jersey – 1986 – currently Inactive Status - Not permitted to practice in New Jersey as U.S. Attorney (prior job) or as Bucks County, Pennsylvania, Judge.

Eastern District of Pennsylvania – Federal District Court – 1986
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit – 1986

12. **Memberships:**

a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

Bucks County Opportunity Council – Board member – 2003 – present
Friends of the Delaware Canal – Advisory Board and Board member – 2003- present

b. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

These organizations do not discriminate.
13. **Published Writings and Public Statements:**

   a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

   None

   b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

   None

   c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

   None

   d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

   None

   e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

   None

14. **Judicial Office:** State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.
Judge – Bucks County Court of Common Pleas (PA)

Appointed – February, 2003; Elected to ten year term – November 2003

The Bucks County Court of Common Pleas is a trial level Court with jurisdiction over Criminal, Civil, Juvenile, Family and Orphan’s Court matters.

15. Citations: If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

I have submitted a total of 86 Opinions while sitting on the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas bench. Please note that for several cases, multiple Opinions were submitted. Cases that were published in D & C 4th Reporter are indicated with an *; along with D & C cite.

1. Donna M. Beck v. John F. Jackson, Bucks County Family Court Docket No. A06-96-62291
2. Citifinancial Services, Inc. v. Grumbkow, Ronald C. and Rushen, Bucks County Civil Docket No. 1999-06630
3. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Kenneth Lee, Bucks County Criminal Docket No. 01-06901 (2 Opinions filed)
5. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Jeffrey Friedman, Bucks County Criminal Docket No. 02-01424, (3 Opinions filed)
6. Yoder, Courtney v. Yoder, Brian, Bucks County Family Court Docket No. A06-97-61848-S
9. Herbert Elsner, Sr. v. Linda Lee Elsner, Bucks County Family Court Docket No. A06-01-61709-Q-26
10. Wendy S. Lang, formerly Wendy S. Meske v. Robert H. Meske, Bucks County Family Court Docket No. A06-00-62889-Q-19
17. **Appeal of Tenet Health Systems-Bucks County, LLC from the Bucks County Board of Assessment Appeals**, No. 1999-6488-28-6
19. **Julia P. Rakowsky v. Larry F. Rakowsky**, Bucks County Family Court Docket No. A06-00-62878-S-18
30. **Condemnation of 23.015 Acres, More or Less, Known as Tax Map Parcel No. 15-29-129, Lands N/L Condemnor/Appellee v. Robert L. and Maryanne P. Showalter, b/w, Condemnor/Appellants**, Bucks County Civil Docket No. 2000-07052
34. DCR Fund I, LLC v. Bucks County Industrial Development Authority, Randolph A. Scott and United States of America, Bucks County Civil Docket No. 2003-01550-28-1
36. Carol Hughes Grundy v. James A. Grundy, Jr., Bucks County Family Court Docket No. A06-03-60379-Q-28
40. Jessica Miklavic v. Bruce M. Miklavic, Bucks County Family Court Docket No. A06-04-63486-C-26
46. Mary E. Crawley v. James G. Wiles, Bucks County Family Court Docket No. A06-92-62646-S-20
55. Janice Paul v. Mitchell and Eileen Cohen, Bucks County Family Court Docket No. A06-06-61769-C
56. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Mark Murphy, Bucks County Criminal Docket No. 2005-4387
59. Nermin Nameli v. Daniel Bettucio, Bucks County Family Court Docket No. A06-01-60199-A
64. Robert Glosson v. Bedminster Township, Bucks County Civil Docket No. 2004-4254
71. DE & BS, Inc. v. Ericka Kirkpatrick, Bucks County Civil Docket No.2002-3166-28-5
73. In re: Appeal of George Moore From the Decision of the Upper Southampton Board of Supervisors Granting a Conditional Use Cluster Development Dated February 21, 2006, Bucks County Civil Docket No. 2006-2570-28-5; In Re:
Appeal of Charles Moore and George Moore from the Decision of the Upper Southampton Board of Supervisors Granting a Conditional Use Cluster Development Dated February 21, 2006, Bucks County Civil Docket No. 2006-3620 (2 Opinions filed)


b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

None

c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;


Kenneth T. Spector v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Bucks County Criminal Docket No. 1302 Misc. 2003; Commw. Ct. 365 C.D. 2005. Reversed 2/10/06. Return of Property case involving car stereo lost by law enforcement after the vehicle in question was seized. Issue on appeal involved whether Trial Court had authority to order damages in favor of petitioner for lost stereo.
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d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;


c. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

Most of my opinions (approximately 90%) are unpublished and listed in the response to question 15.a. My office has a copy of each opinion.

d. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

None

16. Recusal: If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;
d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

There are two matters I can recall I recused myself from:

Livsey v. Livsey, Bucks County Family Court Docket No. 1999-60175-CD. Sometime in 2003, the parties appeared before me for a custody hearing. At that time, I was sitting on the bench by appointment from the Governor and preparing to run in an election for a full ten-year term. One of the lawyers in the case was a member of a firm who had planned an up-coming fundraiser for all Republican candidates (i.e., County Commissioners, row officers and four Judicial openings) and I thought it best to disclose that information and offer to recuse myself. After doing so, the lawyer on the other side requested recusal, which I agreed to and did not hear the case; and

Stanton v. Clark, Bucks County Family Court Docket No. A06-01-61666-C. As best as I can recall, the Defendant, Clark, was the son of a former police officer who was involved in litigation regarding the Pennsylvania Police Tenure Act. While in private practice, I represented Falls Township who recommended the police officer’s (i.e., Clark’s father) removal for misconduct under the Police Tenure Act. Given this background, I agreed to recuse myself.

17. Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.


b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.


Campaign Manager – Pennsylvania State Representative Dave Steil – 1994

18. Legal Career: Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation
from law school including:

i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the
court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

I did not serve as a clerk.

ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

I have not practiced alone.

iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or
govermental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature
of your affiliation with each.

2003 – Present
Bucks County Court of Common Pleas
Bucks County Courthouse
55 E. Court Street
Doylestown, Pennsylvania
Judge

2002 – 2006
Temple Law School,
719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122
Adjunct Professor, Trial Advocacy

1997 – 2003
United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania
615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
Assistant United States Attorney

1990 – 1997
Cozen O’Connor
1900 Market St.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
Senior Partner

1986 – 1990
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107
Assistant District Attorney
b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

The general character of my legal experience has been varied between civil and criminal, but mostly focused on litigation trial work. I have served as both a State and Federal Prosecutor and practiced in civil law at a full service law firm. For the last 5 ½ years I have served as a State Court Trial Judge, hearing criminal, civil and family court matters.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

While in private practice, I represented a variety of companies in all types of commercial litigation. I also specialized in representing insurance companies in insurance fraud cases.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

Virtually all of my legal experience has been focused on litigation, trial and appellate work.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 60%
   2. state courts of record: 40%
   3. other courts.

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings: 40%
   2. criminal proceedings: 60%

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

Including bench trial and arbitrations, I estimate I have tried hundreds of cases to verdict. In excess of 25 of these cases were jury trials. In most of these cases I was lead counsel, although on a few larger cases, I served as co-counsel or associate counsel.

What percentage of these trials were:
   1. jury: 25%
   2. non-jury: 75%
c. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

I have not practiced before the Supreme Court of the United States.

19. Litigation: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

a. the date of representation;

b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and

c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

Matters listed below were litigated in Federal Court-Eastern District of Pennsylvania. For all cases except Novick v. St. Paul, I represented the U.S. Attorney’s Office, 615 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA. 19106-4476 (215) 861-8200


Judge Robert Kelly
Co-Counsel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Richard Zack (215)-861-8463
Defense Counsel, Brian McMonagle, 30 S. 15th St., Philadelphia, PA 29201 (215)-981-0999;


Judge Anita B. Brody
Defense Attorney for principal defendant – Lou Busico, 246 South State St., Newtown, PA 18940 (215)-504-2930

Judge Herbert Hutton (deceased)
Co-Counsel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Maureen Barden (215)861-8566
Defense Counsel Shane Cremer, I believe retired, could not locate.


Judge Ronald Buckwalter
Defense Counsel – Carlos Martir, 3 N. 2nd St., Philadelphia, PA (215) 731-9886;


Judge Robert Kelly
Co-Counsel – Assistant U.S. Attorney – Jeff Whitt (215) 861-8404


Judge William H. Yohn, Jr.
Defense Counsel, Gerald Ingram, 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 800, Philadelphia, PA 19107 (215) 732-9011


Judge Stewart Dalzell
Client, St. Paul Ins. Co.
Plaintiff’s Counsel, Harry Begier, Jr., 201 S. 18th St., Suite 402, Philadelphia, PA 19103-5997 (215) 994-1515


Judge Jay Waldman (deceased)
Co-Counsel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Richard Zack (215) 861-8463
Defense Counsel for defendant Phoebe Kuttab, Jeff Minehart, 1205 Criminal Justice Ctr., 1301 Filbert St., Philadelphia, PA (215) 683-7032
Defense Counsel for Samuel Kuttab, Luther E. Weaver, III, 14th Floor, 1525 Locust St., Philadelphia, PA 19102-3732 (215) 790-0600


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Judge Eduardo Robreno  
Defense Counsel, Donald Goldberg, 1735 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103  
(215) 864-8345

10. Multiple Defendant, Nationwide Telemarketing Fraud Investigation that involved prosecution of over 20 telemarketing companies. Some cases included were:

U.S. v. Lee Lerman, 2:00-cr-00261-JP, case filed 5/00, guilty plea  
Judge John R. Padova  
Co-Counsel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Jeff Whitt (215) 861-8404  
Defense Counsel, Ellen Brotman, 123 S. Broad Street, Avenue of the Arts, Philadelphia, PA 19109 (215) 772-7683

U.S. v. David Fleisher, 2:00-cr-00021-JCI, case filed 1/00, guilty plea  
Judge James Curtis Joyner  
Co-Counsel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Jeff Whitt, (215) 861-8404  
Defense Counsel, Wallace H. Bateman, Jr., 104 South 6th Street, Perkasie, PA 18944 (215) 257-6811

U.S. v. Eugene A. Marella, Jr., 2:02-cr-00213-RK, case filed 4/02, guilty plea  
Judge Robert Kelly  
Co-Counsel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Jeff Whitt (215) 861-8404  
Defense Counsel, L. Felipe Restrepo (now a Federal Magistrate), 900 Market Street, Suite 219, Philadelphia, PA 19106-4299 (267) 299-7690

Judge John Fullam  
Defense Counsel, Marc Neff, 123 South Broad Street, Suite 1812, Philadelphia, PA 19109 (215) 563-9800

20. Legal Activities: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or organizations(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

As a Trial Judge in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, I have presided over, in excess of 70 jury trials, both Civil and Criminal. I have also handled a fair amount of Family Court cases, including protracted custody matters and complex equitable distribution cases.
For most of my time on the bench, I have served as the Court's liaison to the Bucks County Bar Association's Pro Bono Committee. In this capacity, I have involved the Bucks County Court in improving pro bono services in Bucks County.

As an Assistant United States Attorney, I handled the grand jury investigation in the case of U.S. v. Clayton Lee Waagner. Waagner, who was on the FBI's top ten most wanted list, perpetrated a nationwide anthrax scheme against multiple women's clinics throughout the United States. I was assigned by the Justice Department as lead counsel for the grand jury investigation, which resulted in a multiple count indictment. Waagner proceeded to trial and was convicted of all charges. (I did not try the case as I was appointed to the Bucks County bench).

21. **Teaching:** What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.


22. **Deferred Income/Future Benefits:** List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

None

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

Spring, 2009 – Drexel Law School – Teaching Civil Litigation.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other items exceeding $500 or more. (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)


25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement
26. Potential Conflicts of Interest:

a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

The parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that may present potential conflicts-of-interest during my initial service in the position to which I have been nominated would include family and friends, or matters where I may have some yet unspecified financial interest.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

Each case is fact specific and handled accordingly, but I would first and foremost consult with, and abide by the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.

27. Pro Bono Work: An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

Bucks County Court liaison – Bucks County Bar Association
Pro Bono Committee
Bucks County Opportunity Council – Board of Directors

For most of my time on the bench, I have served as the Court’s liaison to the Bucks County Bar Association’s Pro Bono Committee. In this capacity, I have involved the Bucks County Court in improving pro bono services in Bucks County.

28. Selection Process:

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.
I have interviewed several times with the Federal Judicial Selection Committee for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania – headed by Tom Kline, Esquire. I do not know what the results of these interviews were. I interviewed with White House Counsel on March 17, 2008. After I was informed that my name would go forward in the process, I had conversations with staff from the U.S. Department of Justice regarding the process and nomination paperwork. My nomination was submitted to the United States Senate on July 24, 2008.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No.
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
NOMINATION FILING

1. Person Reporting (last name, first, middle initial)
Goldberg, Mitchell S

2. Court or Organization
Eastern Dist. Federal Court

3. Date of Report
07/26/2008

4. Title (Article II judges indicate active or senior status; magistrate judges indicate full or part-time)
District Judge - Nominee

5. Report Type (check appropriate type)
NOMINATION
Date 7/24/2008

6. Reporting Period
07/01/2007 - 07/31/2008

7. Chambers or Office Address
Becks County Courthouse
25 E. Court Street
Dundee, PA 19341

IMPORTANT NOTES: The instructions accompanying this form must be followed. Complete all parts, checking the "NONE" box for each part where you have no reportable information. Sign on last page.

I. POSITIONS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 9-21 of instructions.)

- NONE (No reportable positions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Board of Directors</td>
<td>Becks County Opportunity Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Advisory Board</td>
<td>Friends of Delaware Canal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. AGREEMENTS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 16-24 of instructions.)

- NONE (No reportable agreements.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTIES AND TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 203</td>
<td>State Employees Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1/97</td>
<td>Thrift Savings Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 608</td>
<td>Delaware University Law School</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00870 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
### III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME

**A. Filer's Non-Investment Income**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME (year, net income)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2006</td>
<td>Salary, Bucks County Court of Common Pleas</td>
<td>$133,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2006</td>
<td>Temple University Law School</td>
<td>$5,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2007</td>
<td>Salary, Bucks County Court of Common Pleas</td>
<td>$152,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 2007</td>
<td>Family Trust</td>
<td>$18,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 2008</td>
<td>Salary, Bucks County Court of Common Pleas</td>
<td>$76,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B. Spouse's Non-Investment Income**

(Please answer non-required except for huswento.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2007</td>
<td>Spouse Salary, Hewitt Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2007</td>
<td>Spouse Salary, Hewitt Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2008</td>
<td>Spouse Salary, Hewitt Technology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. REIMBURSEMENTS

(Includes those in spouse and dependent children. See pp. 23-27 of instructions.)

**SOURCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>exempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**V. GIFTS.** (Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 33-37 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>exempt</td>
<td>exempt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 3.     |             |       |
| 4.     |             |       |
| 5.     |             |       |

**VI. LIABILITIES.** (Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 33-37 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 3.       |             |            |
| 4.       |             |            |
| 5.       |             |            |
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, values, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 34-37 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description of Asset (including investment)</th>
<th>Value (000)</th>
<th>Transaction During Reporting Period</th>
<th>Transaction During Reporting Period Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Family Trust - 1/3 Interest</td>
<td>B Reit</td>
<td>M T</td>
<td>except</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Vanguard Admiral Money Market</td>
<td>B Dividend</td>
<td>K T</td>
<td>except</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Wachovia Securities</td>
<td>A Dividend</td>
<td>N T</td>
<td>except</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>- Wachovia Securities - #1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>except</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>- Wachovia Securities - #2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>except</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>- Wachovia Securities #3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>except</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>- Wachovia Securities - #4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>except</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>- American Fund - #1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>except</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>- American Fund - #2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>except</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>- American Fund - #3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>except</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>- American Fund - #4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>except</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1. Current (as of Date of Filing)

### Notes

- **VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00873 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC**
**FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT**

**Page 5 of 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Person Reporting</th>
<th>Date of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goldberg, Mitchell S</td>
<td>07/29/2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS.** (Indicate part of Report)

---

**FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT**

**Page 6 of 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Person Reporting</th>
<th>Date of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goldberg, Mitchell S</td>
<td>07/29/2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IX. CERTIFICATION.**

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it was not applicable statutory provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that earned income from outside employment and honoraria and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app. § 301 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 735, and Judicial Conference regulations.

**Signature:**

![Signature Image]

**Date:**

7/29/08

**NOTE:** ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (2 U.S.C. app. § 90)

**FILING INSTRUCTIONS**

Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:
Committee on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 2-301
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544
## FINANCIAL STATEMENT

### NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trust, investments, and other financial holdings) all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unliened securities—add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable:</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable-add schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-add schedule</td>
<td>Chattel mortgages and other items payable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td>Other debts-payable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autos and other personal property</td>
<td>Home equity loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash value-life insurance</td>
<td>Tuition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets itemize</td>
<td>Automobile loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See attached</td>
<td>844 410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Assets</th>
<th>Total liabilities</th>
<th>233 606</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>910 066</td>
<td>Net Worth</td>
<td>1 676 466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERAL INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As assignor, co assignor or guarantor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are any assets pledged? (Add schedule)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you defendant in any civil or legal actions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever taken bankruptcy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for Federal Income Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other special debt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### FINANCIAL STATEMENT

#### NET WORTH SCHEDULES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Owned</td>
<td>$ 650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Mortgages Payable</td>
<td>$ 147,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Trust</td>
<td>$ 225,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Funds</td>
<td>$ 154,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement Annuity</td>
<td>$ 120,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement account</td>
<td>$ 52,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Market</td>
<td>$ 25,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSP account</td>
<td>$ 134,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania State Employees Retirement</td>
<td>$ 91,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Other Assets Owned</td>
<td>$ 844,410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### AFFIDAVIT

I, [Name], do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

(Date) [Signature]

[Notary Stamp]

[Notary Name]
The prepared statement of Judge Goldberg appears as submission for the record.

Chairman Leahy. Joel Slomsky, for the past 38 years, has been a Federal prosecutor, a partner in a law firm, a sole practitioner, a Federal prosecutor with the Criminal Division of the Organized Crime section with the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, and down through. Again, your whole background, Mr. Slomsky, will be in the record. Of course, you know that having two former prosecutors up here, we both read that part of your background.

Do you have members of your family here?

STATEMENT OF JOEL H. SLOMSKY, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. SLOMSKY. I do. I just want to thank you also for holding the hearing and giving us this opportunity, and also thank Senator Specter, and certainly Senator Casey.

I have here today my wife, Paula. Next March, we celebrate our 40th anniversary, and I've been truly blessed. Also, my daughter Mona, who is here, who we both love dearly.

[The biographical information follows.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).
   
   Joel Harvey Slomsky

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.
   
   United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.
   
   Office: 30 South 17th Street, 12th Floor
            Philadelphia, PA 19103-4196

   Residence: Wynnewood, Pennsylvania

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.
   
   1946; Brooklyn, New York

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.
   
   I am married to Paula Beth Slomsky (maiden name-Paula Beth Gilbert). She is a clinical social worker and therapist, Northeast Community Center for Mental Health/Mental Retardation, Adams Avenue and Roosevelt Boulevard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. I have no dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.
   

   1967 - 1968, Buffalo Law School of the State University of New York; no degree

7. **Employment Record:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

**Employment:**
1990 – present
sole practitioner in the practice of law
30 South 17th Street, 12th Floor (last address)
Philadelphia, PA 19103

1982 – 1990
DiGiacomo and Slomsky, P.C
DiGiacomo and Slomsky
DiGiacomo, Slomsky and Baffa
1626 Pine Street (last address)
Philadelphia, PA
Partner and 50% shareholder

1974 – 1982
sole practitioner in the practice of law
Two Mellon Bank Plaza, Suites 2400 and 2616
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

1973 – 1974
Lipschitz and Danella
915 Robinson Building
15th and Chestnut Streets
Associate

1970 – 1973
United States Department of Justice
Criminal Division, Organized Crime Section
Special Attorney

1968 – 1970
United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York
200 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201
Law clerk
1968
New York City Department of Social Services
Brooklyn, NY
Caseworker

Other affiliations:
1974 – 1976
Gold Minds, Inc.
Partner
I incorporated with a partner a company called Gold Minds, Inc. to engage in
motivational writing and meetings. I recall attending several motivational meetings but
the company did not succeed. I do not recall being compensated for my services.

In 1993, while practicing law, I also attempted to promote music but did not receive
compensation for this service.

8. **Military Service and Draft Status:** Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including
dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social
security number) and type of discharge received.

I did not serve in the military. I was called and reported for a physical at a base in
Brooklyn, New York about 1967. I was deferred and classified 1-Y due to a medical
condition.

9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or
professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other
special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

Hired by the United States Department of Justice under the Attorney General’s Honors
Program for honor law students.

Award from the Criminal Justice Section - Philadelphia Bar Association for Dedicated
Service as Chairman of the Section (1981).

Award for contributions and leadership by the National Association of Criminal Defense

Award for Distinguished Service in Continuing Legal Education from the Federal Bar

Certificate from the Federal Bar Association, Philadelphia Chapter, for periodic review of
appellate cases for the Criminal Law Committee (1990-1991).

10. **Bar Associations**: List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

Federal Bar Association, Philadelphia Chapter  
Member of Criminal Law Committee

Philadelphia Bar Association  
Secretary - 1997 and 1998 (elected position)  
Assistant Secretary - 1995 and 1996 (elected position)  
Member of the Board of Governors (1981 and 1991 to 1993 - elected to three-year term)  
Former Editor and Former Associate Editor - The Philadelphia Lawyer Magazine  
Member of the Committee on Judicial Selection and Retention (1981)  
Chairman of the Criminal Justice Section (1981)  
Member of Fee Disputes Committee  
Member of the Criminal Justice Section  
Former Member of Long Range Planning Committee  
Member of Federal Courts Committee

Pennsylvania Bar Association - Presently a Delegate to the House of Delegates

Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers  
Former Member of the Board of Directors, November, 1978 to August, 1984  
Former Member of Continuing Legal Education Committee

Brandeis Law Society - Member - Executive Committee

Historical Society of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Former Memberships:  
American Bar Association  
Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association  
Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association

11. **Bar and Court Admission**:  

a. List the dates on which you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.

New York State, April 1977  
Pennsylvania, April 23, 1978

There have been no lapses in membership.
b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.

New York, (through the Second Appellate Department), April 1971
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, April 23, 1973
Supreme Court of the United States, June 10, 1974
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, April 3, 1973
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, May 6, 1981
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, April 13, 1992
United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, May 11, 1973
United States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania, April 30, 1986
United States District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania, July 19, 1994
United States District Court, Southern District of New York, May 26, 1992
United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, May 26, 1992
United States District Court, Northern District of New York, October 12, 2000
There have been no lapses in membership.

12. Memberships:

a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

Present Memberships
New York Law School Alumni Association
Mason’s--Brotherhood Lodge No. 126 into which Mac Sanders Brotherhood Lodge No. 773 merged.

Metropolitan Opera Guild

Opera Club of Philadelphia

The Pennsylvania Society

Republican Party - Committeeman (Montgomery County, Pennsylvania)

Member of Finance Committee of Lower Merion Township Republican Committee

Former Memberships:

Knights of Pythias - Steuben Lodge

Pennsylvania Horticultural Society

Tau Epsilon Phi College Fraternity- Inactive Alumnus

Phi Delta Phi Law School Fraternity- Inactive Alumnus

Golden Slipper Club

Opera Guild of Philadelphia-Board Member and Counsel

Beth David Reform Congregation

JCC Kaiserman Branch

Philadelphia Music Alliance

Finance Committee of Republican State Committee of Pennsylvania

I was only a dues paying member in many of these organizations. The dates of membership go back many years, especially in former memberships.

b. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex or religion--either through formal membership requirements or the practical
implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

These organizations did not and do not discriminate on the basis of race, sex or religion.

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

An Updated Civil RICO Primer (The Legal Intelligencer, January 5, 1990)

RICO: The Emerging “Pattern” Element (The Legal Intelligencer, April 3, 1990)

Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Practical Analysis (The Legal Intelligencer, September 13, 1990)

Recent Trends in Criminal Law (The Legal Intelligencer, March 4, 1991)


Commentary: An Occasion to Appreciate Our Bill of Rights (The Retainer, Bar Association Newspaper, December 11, 1991)


The United States Supreme Court Unleashes a New Era In Downward Departures (The Philadelphia Lawyer Magazine, Winter 1999, Vol 60, No 4, p 24)


While Editor of the Philadelphia Lawyer Magazine in 2000 and 2001, I wrote several articles for the Magazine entitled: “Lawyers and the Arts”, “Quotes for All Time” and “A Short Lesson for Lawyers”.


b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association, committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document, and a summary of its subject matter.

I contributed to reports or statements of the Philadelphia Bar Association while I was an active member. I cannot recall specific subject matter other than a committee I served on to evaluate the sentencing practices of a judge seeking another judicial appointment. Service on this committee was about ten years ago.

c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your behalf to public bodies or public officials.

I recall about five years ago speaking before the Board of Commissioners of Lower Merion Township, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, where I reside, in opposition to enacting an earned income tax. Because Philadelphia County, where I work, imposed a wage tax, I would have been exempt from paying the earned income tax in Lower Merion Township. I did not feel that it was fair for our first responders - police, firemen, hospital employees, ambulance service providers - who worked in Lower Merion Township to be required to pay the tax while I would have been exempt. Other reasons may have been advanced. The Commissioners did not impose the tax. I do not have a tape recording of my remarks or any notes of my remarks. My remarks were delivered in the Township Building located on Lancaster Avenue in Ardmore, Pennsylvania.

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures, panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and
readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.

I have lectured on the Federal Immunity statute and sentencing procedures in State and Federal Court at two seminars attended by lawyers. The seminars occurred in the early 1980's.

I also lectured in the late 1970's on “Recent Trends in Search and Seizure Law” at a seminar sponsored by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

I was a guest speaker at a synagogue in Northeast Philadelphia on January 6, 1985 and spoke on the subject of a police corruption trial in which I had represented a defendant.


The written material presented at these sessions was not maintained.

c. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

I have been interviewed several times after a court proceeding by reporters about a case. They were very short interviews and occurred many years ago. I cannot recall the dates and have no clips or transcripts of these interviews.

14. Judicial Office: State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

I have never held a judicial office.

15. Citations. If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

a. Citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents).

b. A list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted.
c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

I have not served as a judge.

16. **Recusal:** If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;

d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

I have not served as a judge.

17. **Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations.**

a. list chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed
you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

I am an elected Republican Committeeman in the area in which I reside in Lower Merion Township, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. It takes ten votes to get elected. I have been a Committeeman for about fifteen years. I have not been an unsuccessful candidate for elective office or an unsuccessful nominee for appointed office.

From August 1970 to November 1973, I was a Special Attorney with the United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. This was an appointed position. I was hired as part of the Honors Program of the United States Department of Justice.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

I am on the Finance Committee of the Lower Merion Township Republican Committee and contribute at the Chairman’s Club level. I also contribute at the Chairman’s Club level to the Montgomery County Republican Party.

About six years ago, I was a campaign chairman for an elected local district justice running for re-election. It was an uncontested election and I just attended a few meetings with her. The District Justice’s name was Caroline Stine.

I am a former member of the Finance Committee of Republican State Committee in Pennsylvania. I served on this Committee for about a two or three-year period in approximately the late 1990’s.

I have held or co-chaired fund raisers for candidates for political office. They were former Philadelphia Councilwoman Joan Specter (July 1995); former U.S. Congressman Jon Fox (July 1996, July 1997 and August 1998); U.S. Senator Arlen Specter (September 1998); Pennsylvania State Senator Stewart Greenleaf in his campaign to be a U.S. Congressman (June 2000); District Attorney Bruce Castor of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania running for re-election (May 2003); U.S. Congressman Jim Gerlach (October 2003); and candidates for Lower Merion Township School Board (July 1996). The dates are approximate ones.

18. Legal Career: Please answer each part separately.

a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

11
i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

I did not serve as a law clerk.

ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

From November, 1974 to August, 1982, I was a sole practitioner. My office was located at Suites 2616 and then 2400, Two Mellon Bank Plaza, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

From August, 1990 to the present, I have practiced law as a sole practitioner. From August, 1990 to August, 1997, my office was located at 1600 Market Street, Suite 1720, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. From September, 1997 to May, 2005, my office address was Two Penn Center Plaza, 1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1204, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102. From June, 2005 to April, 2007, my office address was 1601 Market Street, 16th Floor, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103. My office is presently located at 30 South 17th Street, 12th Floor, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.

iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

1982 – 1990
DiGiacomo and Slomsky, P.C
DiGiacomo and Slomsky
DiGiacomo, Slomsky and Baffa
1626 Pine Street (last address)
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Partner and 50% shareholder

1973 – 1974
Lipschitz and Danella
915 Robinson Building
15th and Chestnut Streets
Associate

1970 – 1973
United States Department of Justice
Criminal Division, Organized Crime Section
Special Attorney
b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

From August, 1970 to November, 1973, I was a federal prosecutor assigned first to the Organized Crime Section of the Criminal Division in Washington, D.C., and then to the Philadelphia Strike Force. In my position with the Department of Justice, I served as a prosecutor in the Eastern and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania. I prosecuted cases, handled appeals and supervised and conducted grand jury investigations. I prosecuted individuals for crimes involving tax, labor, counterfeiting, narcotics and other racketeering violations.

From November 12, 1973 to November, 1974, I was in private practice employed by the firm Lipschitz and Danella, 915 Robinson Building, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

From 1974 to the present, I have been primarily a criminal defense attorney representing clients mainly in Federal Court before the grand jury, at trial and on appeal. I have tried numerous cases, argued many appeals, including one case before the United States Supreme Court. The cases I have handled ranged from antitrust matters to labor, ERISA, tax, RICO (racketeering), securities fraud, healthcare and government contracting fraud and other violations contained in the United States Code. In addition, I represent clients in forfeiture matters in which the Government seeks to restrain the transfer of assets and to forfeit them.

From November, 1974 to August, 1982, I was a sole practitioner. My office was located at Suites 2616 and then 2400, Two Mellon Bank Plaza, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

From August 23, 1982 to September, 1983, I practiced law as a professional corporation, DiGiacomo and Slomsky, Ltd. My office was located on the 8th Floor, Atrium Building, 1900 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. I was a 50% shareholder and a principal of the professional corporation.

From September 1983 to January 1990, I practiced law as a partnership. The names of the practice were DiGiacomo and Slomsky and then DiGiacomo, Slomsky and Baffa. I was a partner. Our last office address was 1626 Pine Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Since then, I have been a sole practitioner.

I have also handled civil matters in state and federal courts, including among other matters RICO suits, cases under the Federal False Claims Act.
(Qui Tam Actions), a wrongful discharge case and a suit involving an insurance company. I have also had some involvement in different kinds of personal injury cases which was the primary area of practice of my former partners.

I have been involved in many criminal matters in state court, representing, for example, a major defendant in the investigation into corruption in the Philadelphia Traffic Court and a prominent doctor charged with transporting body parts. I also represented a doctor who was charged with “check-kiting.” I have tried cases and argued many appeals before the state courts in Pennsylvania.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

My typical client is a doctor, lawyer, accountant, executive, union worker or employee of a small or large business who is either under investigation or has been charged with an offense. I specialize in all phases of federal criminal law, particularly in white collar offenses. Over the years I have represented a number of defendants who would not fall within the category of white collar offender, especially in cases in which I was appointed by the Court to represent an indigent defendant in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

In civil cases, I usually represent principals of closely held companies and the companies themselves.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.

I appear in court regularly. A large percentage of my practice has been in litigation, trials (jury and non-jury), hearings on pre-trial and post-trial motions, guilty pleas, sentencing hearings and other matters. The frequency of my court appearances has not varied over the years, except the number of trials in federal court has decreased.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 85%
   2. state courts of record: 15%
   3. other courts.

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings: 5%
   2. criminal proceedings: 95%
d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

I tried to verdict or judgment 52 cases - 26 as sole counsel, 16 as chief counsel in multiple defendant cases, and 10 as associate counsel with equal responsibility as co-counsel.

i. What percentage of these trials were:
1. jury: 70%
2. non-jury: 30%

c. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

My practice before the U.S. Supreme Court is infrequent. I argued one case before the Court in 1979. United States v. Appelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980). I have no transcript of the oral argument. I participated in another case on brief that was argued by co-counsel. Three petitioners were involved in that case. United States v. Abney, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). Over the years I have filed two or three other Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari, but none were granted. One recently filed was Pajilkenko v. United States, No. 07-472, cert. denied 1/7/2008. Enclosed are four copies of the briefs in the Appelbaum and Abney cases and the last Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the Pajilkenko case.

19. Litigation: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

a. the date of representation;

b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and

c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.

Mr. Apfelbaum was charged with making false statements when he testified before the federal grand jury under a grant of immunity. I represented Mr. Apfelbaum in the trial court. Mr. Apfelbaum was charged with making two series of false statements to the grand jury knowing that they were false. The first indictment filed against Mr. Apfelbaum was dismissed by the trial judge after I filed pretrial motions showing that the offenses were not properly charged in the indictment as a matter of law. The government then reindicted Mr. Apfelbaum and the case went to trial before a jury which found him guilty. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, 584 F.2d 1264 (1978). I represented Mr. Apfelbaum in this appeal and those that followed and presented oral argument. I also researched and prepared the briefs on appeal. The Third Circuit agreed that in order for the grant of immunity to be coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination it replaces, the prosecution in a perjury case may not use truthful immunized testimony as substantive evidence against a defendant. The government may only use that testimony which is alleged to be false and is the core of the charges. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Third Circuit. 445 U.S. 115 (1980). The Supreme Court held essentially that only in a perjury prosecution may truthful immunized statements be used against a defendant without violating the Fifth Amendment privilege it replaces. The same result would not necessarily hold if a defendant were charged with a substantive offense as opposed to a false swearing offense. Therefore, the case was remanded to the Third Circuit for consideration of other issues I raised on appeal. The Third Circuit considered them and affirmed the conviction. 621 F.2d 62 (1980).

The Prosecutor was Robert E. Madden, Esquire, 1401 Walnut Street, Suite 300, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102, telephone number (215) 568-3331. Government Counsel on appeal were the Honorable William C. Bryson, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, National Courts Building, 717 Madison Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20439, telephone number (202) 633-6550 and Assistant United States Attorney Vincent Gambale (Address and telephone number of Mr. Gambale could not be located).


Mr. Feinstein was charged with mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1341. The defendant was a public adjuster who adjusted a claim for a company and its principals. A wind and rainstorm damaged a building leased by the company and destroyed inventory located in the building. Mr. Feinstein was charged with assisting the corporate principals in a scheme to inflate the insurance claim by watering down additional stock after the storm and making it appear that the inventory was damaged by the storm. The jury found Mr. Feinstein not guilty on all counts. I represented Mr. Feinstein at trial before the jury. I cross-examined the three principals of the company and convinced the jury that their credibility was suspect and their attempt to blame Mr. Feinstein was self-serving. Mr. Feinstein had no prior record and testified in his own defense.
The Prosecutor was Karl K. Lunkenheimer, Esquire. Mr. Lunkenheimer is deceased.

3. **United States v. Donald Abney:** United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Crim. No. 74-98 and 74-133); Jury Trial before the Honorable Donald W. VanArtsdalen from June 18, 1974 to July 1, 1974 and non-jury trial before Judge VanArtsdalen on October 12-13, 1977.

Mr. Abney and his co-defendants were charged with extorting money from the owner of a tavern in Philadelphia in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1951. I represented Mr. Abney as his trial counsel and in the appeals that followed. I also filed pre-trial motions, many of which formed the basis for the eventual acquittal of Mr. Abney. Mr. Abney was convicted by a jury following a ten day jury trial. On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. **United States v. Starks,** 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975). I researched and prepared the Brief for Appellant Abney and argued the case before the Court of Appeals. In addition to finding a defect in the one-count indictment, which improperly charged two offenses in one count, in violation of Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Third Circuit held that the Government failed to properly authenticate a tape-recording of conversations made by its principal witness with one of the defendants. In footnote 11, the Court set forth the necessary foundation which must be established by the proponent of tape-recorded evidence. Since tape-recordings and videotapes now play a central role in the evidence-gathering process of law enforcement, the Starks case is often relied upon as setting the standard for the admissibility of such evidence. A pre-trial Starks hearing is commonplace in the district courts in the Third Circuit. After remand for a new trial, the defense moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that a retrial would violate double jeopardy. This motion was denied and Mr. Abney took an interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit which decided the appeal on the merits and affirmed the denial by the trial judge of the motion to dismiss.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether a pre-trial order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds is a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 and thus immediately appealable. The Supreme Court held that the denial of the motion was appealable. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). I assisted in preparing the Brief filed in the United States Supreme Court.

Following a remand of the case, I represented Mr. Abney at trial. The defendant waived a trial by jury and was found not guilty by the trial judge.

The Prosecutors were Donald F. Manno, Esquire, 900 Dudley Avenue, Suite 250, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08002, telephone number (609) 665-6464, and Kenneth Bravo, Esquire, 1000 East 9th Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44114-583, telephone number (216) 621-8400. Government counsel on appeal were Mr. Manno, along with Marshall Tamor Golding, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, National Place, Room 4414N, 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530, telephone number (202) 517-4871. Then Assistant Attorney General Richard Thornburgh argued in the United States Supreme Court on behalf of the Government. Co-counsel representing other defendants...
were: 1) Jack Myers, Esquire, represented a co-defendant. Mr. Meyers is retired from the
practice of law; 2) Thomas Carroll, Esquire represented a co-defendant. Mr. Carroll is
deceased; 3) Robert B. Mozenter, Esquire, 121 South Broad Street, Suite 1720,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107, telephone number (215) 985-4280; and 4) Ralph
David Samuel, Esquire, 215 South Broad Street, Suite 10, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
19107, telephone number (215) 893-9992.

4. United States v. James S. Hill, Jr.; United States District Court, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (Crim. No. 90-353); Jury Trial before the Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter
from April 1 to April 3, 1991.

Mr. Hill was indigent and I was appointed by the Court to represent him in his federal
criminal case. He was charged with offenses involving controlled substances and
firearms. I represented Mr. Hill at his trial and the appeal that followed to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals. One of the unique issues in Mr. Hill's case concerned the
warrantless search of his business by parole officers in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Mr. Hill had a prior conviction in state court and was being supervised by
Pennsylvania parole officers. The officers received information that Mr. Hill maintained
drugs and guns at his home and this information led the parole officers to search Mr.
Hill's place of business where they seized guns and drugs. These seizures led to the
federal prosecution in which I represented Mr. Hill. A Motion to Suppress the use of this
evidence was filed in which it was contended that the warrantless search was illegal
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial judge denied
the Motion. Mr. Hill was convicted by the jury on many of the counts contained in the
indictment and he appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. In United States v.
Hill, 967 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1992), the Court held essentially that in light of the parole
systems special needs, the search of Mr. Hill's business was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The need to supervise a parolee and to investigate whether violations have
occurred provide parole agents with greater authority to conduct unannounced searches.
Extensive conditions of parole are part of the parole process and a parolee has a
diminished expectation of privacy in his home and business.

The prosecutor was Joseph LaBruno III, Esquire, Assistant United States Attorney, 615
Chestnut Street, Room 1250, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; telephone number (215) 861-
8412. Mr. LaBruno also represented the Government on appeal.

5. United States v. Timothy Kehrig, D.C.; Guilty Plea and Sentencing before the Honorable
Eduardo C. Robreno, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, on October 5, 1998 and December

Timothy Kehrig was a chiropractor. I represented him in his federal criminal case. I
began my representation after search warrants were executed by federal agents at several
locations where chiropractic offices were located. Dr. Kehrig was a relatively junior
chiropractor who was hired to work in one of the offices and to build a practice there. He
was charged in an Information, along with nine other persons, many of whom were
founders and owners of the company of which Dr. Kehrig was a part. The company was
run in a fraudulent manner and bills to insurance companies were falsified in many ways in order to generate illegal fees to the company.

Dr. Kehrig is a typical client I represent in federal court. He cooperated with the United States Attorney’s Office and the federal agents and agreed to testify against the principals who created the fraudulent scheme and pressured him into participating in it. In return for his cooperation, the Government informed the Court of the extent of his cooperation and Dr. Kehrig received a more favorable sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines than he would otherwise have been entitled to receive. He was sentenced to four months imprisonment to be served in a halfway house, to be followed by three years supervised release and ordered to pay $50,000 restitution.

The prosecutor was Thomas M. Gallagher, Esquire. Mr. Gallagher practices law at Pepper Hamilton, LLP, 3000 Two Logan Square, 18th and Arch Streets, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103, telephone number (215) 981-4068.

6. **Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fideleco, Inc.** United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Civil No. 90-1396); Motions to Dismiss an Amended Complaint before the Honorable Robert F. Kelly in 1990.

Kehr Packages, Inc., my client, brought a civil RICO action against Fideleco, Inc. under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. Sections 1961-68. There are many elements of a civil RICO action. The critical one in question in this case involved whether the facts alleged in the complaint were sufficient to establish a “pattern of racketeering activity.”

Two brothers had entered into an agreement to purchase Kehr. Fidelity Bank had agreed to provide secured financing. Fidelity had agreed to a loan package, including working capital, which was critically important to the success of the venture. The two brothers who purchased Kehr alleged that during settlement bank officers made an oral commitment to lend additional working capital and did so numerous times over an eight-month period. No additional working capital was made available and the matter continued through the summer of 1988 when the bank declared the loans in default.

The District Court Judge held that the facts alleged did not establish a pattern of racketeering activity and dismissed the complaint. I represented Kehr and the two brothers in the district court and on appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal and wrote an opinion and further defined the parameters of a “pattern of racketeering activity.” 926 F.2d 1406 (1991). The Court held essentially that the absence of any threat of continued activity beyond a short term attempt to force the corporation into bankruptcy did not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. I researched and prepared the brief on appeal and argued the case before the Third Circuit.
Counsel representing Fidelcor, Inc. was Walter Weir, Jr., Weir & Partners, LLP, The Widener Building, 1339 Chestnut Street, Suite 500, Philadelphia, PA 19107; telephone number (215) 241-7751. Mr. Weir also represented Fidelcor, Inc. on appeal.

7. Commonwealth v. David Stern, et al.; Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Nos. 9500-2665, 9500-2662 and 9500-2636; This case involved a motion to dismiss a criminal complaint for failure to state a crime and was before the Honorable Jacqueline Allen in 1996.

David Stern was a lawyer charged in a criminal complaint with a violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. Section 4117(b)(1), which prohibited compensating or giving anything of value to a non-lawyer for recommending or securing employment by a client. The Attorney General was investigating "runners" or non-lawyers who are paid a fee to obtain clients for or to make referrals to lawyers and healthcare providers. An undercover officer posed as an operator of an automobile which had been in an accident. He was introduced to David Stern as a client by a confidential source to whom Stern paid $500 for the referral.

Both the Municipal Court and the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County agreed with my argument that the criminal statute, Section 4117(b)(1), was unconstitutional because it violated Article V, Section 10(e) of the Pennsylvania Constitution which grants sole authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The statute violated the separation of powers doctrine.

The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court also agreed that there was a separation of powers violation. 701 A.2d 568 (1997), 1 researched and prepared the brief and argued the appeal before the Supreme Court. I also argued the case in the lower courts. The Supreme Court in its decision made clear that supervising the conduct of an attorney before the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was a matter exclusively for the Supreme Court.

Counsel representing the Commonwealth on appeal was Jerome T. Foerster, 560 Belmont Drive, Harrisburg, PA 17112, telephone number (717) 545-4127. Counsel representing a co-defendant was Samuel C. Stretton, Esquire, 301 South High Street, West Chester, PA 19381, telephone number (610) 696-4243.

8. United States v. Wilson; United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Criminal Nos. 78-1829, 78-1867, 79-1014 and 79-1015); Jury Trial before the Honorable John B. Hannum (deceased).

Defendant Thomas Wilson and his co-defendant John MacGregor, my client, were charged with conspiring to possess checks stolen from the mail and with preparing false income tax returns. In addition, Mr. MacGregor was charged with possessing two of the stolen checks. I represented Mr. MacGregor at the first trial in which there was an acquittal on some counts and a hung jury on other counts. Defendants were convicted in the second trial. I represented Mr. MacGregor at the second trial.
In this case, I researched, prepared and filed a motion to take the deposition of a potentially crucial witness residing in Spain. He was a fugitive, having been convicted in a state court for cigarette tax violations. The fugitive witness would have provided testimony to discredit the Government’s chief witness whom the trial judge said was “devoid of credibility.” The trial judge denied the motion because the witness was a fugitive. The defendants were not responsible for his flight.

The Third Circuit reversed the convictions and held it was permissible to take the deposition under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(a), which provides for taking depositions in exceptional circumstances. 601 F.2d 95 (1979). Given the serious credibility issues in the case, the jury should have been permitted to hear all the evidence regardless of its controversial nature. I researched and prepared the brief on appeal and argued the case before the Third Circuit. The Government decided not to try the case a third time and the charges were dismissed.

The prosecutor at trial was Robert E. Courtney, III, Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney, 615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250, Philadelphia, PA 19106, telephone number (215) 861-8668. The prosecutors on appeal were Michael J. Keane and Barry A. Friedman. They no longer work for the U.S. Department of Justice and I could not locate them. Co-counsel representing another defendant was Edward Reif, Esquire, 1760 Market Street, Suite 1100, Philadelphia, PA 19103, telephone number (215) 561-3333.


Defendant Pojilenko was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of RICO and related offenses. I did not represent him at trial. I represented him on his appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The critical issue on appeal dealt with a matter of first impression in the Third Circuit under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. In the course of this conspiracy, a minor, age 16, was used to broker a sale of controlled substances. There was no evidence at trial that Appellant Pojilenko directed, procured, counseled or solicited the minor. Despite this evidence, the district court judge enhanced Mr. Pojilenko’s sentencing guidelines under the “Role In the Offense” guidelines for use of a minor in the offense. U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.4. Another co-conspirator did use the minor in the offense and the issue before the Third Circuit was whether a co-conspirator’s reasonably foreseeable use of a minor can be attributed to other members of the conspiracy for the purposes of applying the enhancement under Section 3B1.4. The Court held that it cannot. 416 F.3d 243 (2008).

The Court vacated the sentence and Mr. Pojilenko was resentenced. I represented Mr. Pojilenko at his resentencing and on another appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. In addition, a Writ of Certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court of the United States. I prepared a sentencing memorandum in the district court, researched and prepared the briefs, argued the first appeal and researched and prepared the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

10. **United States v. Herman Bloom**: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Criminal No. 86-00451-18 and 86-00451-19); Pretrial Motion to Suppress Taped Recorded Conversations in 1988 before the Honorable Marvin Katz.

Herbert Fisher and Herman Bloom, my client, were two lawyers who visited a union headquarters to discuss various matters with officials of the union. At the time of the visit the Government had in place in the ceiling of an office a court-authorized device to intercept conversations of the union officials and others in which criminal activity was discussed. Both Defendants Bloom and Fisher were intercepted talking to a union official and members of the union. They were subsequently indicted and essentially charged with paying a kickback to a union official.

My co-counsel and I prepared and filed a motion to suppress the conversations, alleging that they were seized in violation of the attorney-client privilege. The District Court Judge reviewed each conversation in light of the factual circumstances and the requirements of the attorney-client privilege and denied the motion because the privileged nature of the communications was not established. **United States v. Fisher**, 692 F. Supp. 488 (1988). The filing of the motion helped the defense and the government focus on the pertinent portions of the conversations. Many portions were excluded by agreement of the parties. At a trial at which I represented Defendant Bloom, the jury acquitted him on some counts and convicted him on others.

Counsel representing the Government was Richard L. Scheff, Esquire, Montgomery McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, LLP, 123 South Broad Street, Philadelphia, PA 19109, telephone number 215-772-7502. Counsel representing co-defendant Herbert Fisher was William J. Winning, Esquire, Cozen & O'Connor, 1900 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103, telephone number 215-665-2093.

20. **Legal Activities**: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such clients or organizations. *Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.*

I do not perform lobbying activities on behalf of clients.
I have been a trial lawyer for a large part of my career and the cases described in answer to Question 19 typically represent my most significant litigation and legal matters whether or not the matter went to trial.

In addition, I have devoted considerable time to bar association activities. My efforts were directed not only to improving the system of justice in our courts, but also to enhancing the professionalism of the bar. To achieve these results, I served on Boards, planning committees and publications.

21. **Teaching**: What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

On one occasion, I participated as a faculty member of the National Institute of Trial Advocacy.

On one occasion, I was a guest “judge” at an advocacy class at Rutgers Law School. After the “mock trial”, I critiqued the performance of the students. On two occasions, I went to the University of Pennsylvania Law School to demonstrate to an advocacy class techniques in cross-examination and closing arguments and to critique the performance of the students.

I do not have a syllabus for the above matters.

22. **Deferred Income/ Future Benefits**: List the sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the future for any financial or business interest.

None, other than retirement accounts my wife and I have and a potential fee in a case in which I am court-appointed to represent a defendant on appeal in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service**: Do you have any plans, commitments, or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the court? If so, explain.

No.

24. **Sources of Income**: List sources and amounts of all income received during the calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, bonuses and other...
items exceeding $500 or more (If you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)

See attached Financial Disclosure Report

25. **Statement of Net Worth:** Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement.

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest:**

a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

The parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that may present potential conflicts-of-interest during my initial service in the position to which I have been nominated would include cases involving family members, close friends and former clients as well as cases which involved, in any way, my financial assets.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

If confirmed, I will follow the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and applicable policies and procedures of the court.

27. **Pro Bono Work:** An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility calls for “every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.” Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

First, knowing the vital nature of the right to counsel and the need for competent counsel to represent persons accused of crimes, I began and funded in 1996 the “Gideon Award” which is presented to a graduating senior at Temple University School of Law who excels academically and is hired by the Defender Association of Philadelphia. I intend to fund this award annually unless I am otherwise precluded from doing so.

I have also made financial contributions to legal service organizations which represent persons who cannot afford to hire counsel to ensure that everyone has equal access to courts regardless of wealth or status in life. I am a member of the Andrew Hamilton Circle of the Philadelphia Bar Foundation, the charitable arm of the Philadelphia Bar.
Association. A member of the Hamilton Circle pledges to make a minimum financial contribution to the Foundation for a ten-year period. I have fulfilled my commitment.

Finally, I have accepted court appointments in criminal cases at reduced fees so that defendants could receive adequate representation. In cases in which I was not court appointed, I have represented at reduced fees clients who could not otherwise afford a standard fee. Over the years I have served on committees whose primary functions were to make policy decisions to improve the criminal justice system. I have dedicated a large amount of time over the years to pro bono activities.

28. **Selection Process:**

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

I have been interested in a federal judgeship for many years and have appeared many times before the Federal Judicial Nominating Commission established by the U.S. Senators in Pennsylvania. I was recommended for this nomination and was interviewed at the White House on March 12, 2008. I was contacted by the White House and Department of Justice about my potential nomination moving forward the week of May 12, 2008. I have had subsequent conversations with staff from the Department of Justice. My nomination was forwarded to the Senate on July 24, 2008.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

No.
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT  
NOMINATION FILING

1. Person Reporting (first name, last name, middle initial)
   Holmes, Joel H

2. Court or Organization
   U.S.D.C. PA E

3. Date of Report
   10/3/2008

4. Title (Specify if Judge indicates sole or senior status, magistrate judges indicate full or part-time)
   District Judge-Senior

5. In. Report Type (check appropriate type)
   Initial

6. Reporting Period
   Date 7/30/2008
   To
   6/30/2008

7. Chambers or Office Address
   10 South 13th St., 12th Floor
   Philadelphia, PA 19107-4938

--- IMPORTANT NOTES: The instructions accompanying this form must be followed. Complete all parts, checking the NONE box for each part where you have no reportable information. Sign on last page. ---

I. POSITIONS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 9-13 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. sole proprietor</td>
<td>Joel Harvey Holmes, Esquire</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

II. AGREEMENTS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 14-16 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTIES AND TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/29/08</td>
<td>Joel Harvey Holmes, Esquire, #104 PPE; Central Penn. Plastics, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/29/08</td>
<td>Joel Harvey Holmes, Esquire, #104 PPE; Central Penn. Plastics, Inc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME. (Reporting individual and spouse; see pp. 15-20 of instructions.)

A. Filer's Non-Investment Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2006</td>
<td>Joel Harvey Stoneby, Esquire, Law Firm</td>
<td>$245,762</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2007</td>
<td>Joel Harvey Stoneby, Esquire, Law Firm</td>
<td>$278,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2008</td>
<td>Joel Harvey Stoneby, Esquire, Law Firm</td>
<td>$118,525</td>
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</table>

B. Spouse's Non-Investment Income - If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, complete this section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2007</td>
<td>Northeast Community Center for Mental Health/Mental Retardation/Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2008</td>
<td>Northeast Community Center for Mental Health/Mental Retardation/Safety</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

IV. REIMBURSEMENTS - (Include here gifts, food, entertainment.)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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V. GIFTS. (Includes those to spouse and dependent children. See pp. 28-31 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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</table>

VI. LIABILITIES. (Includes those of spouse and dependent children. See pp. 32-33 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEBTOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — income, value, transactions (Includes those of the spouse and dependent children, see pg. 20-40 of filing instructions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of assets (including trust accounts)</th>
<th>A. Description of assets (including trust accounts)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRA A-1</td>
<td>E. Dividend</td>
<td>M. T.</td>
<td>Exempt</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Vanguard Wellington Fund</td>
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<td>- Vanguard Star Fund</td>
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<td>IRA A-2</td>
<td>E. Interest</td>
<td>K. T.</td>
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<td>- E-Trade-Cash Account</td>
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<td>- E-Trade-CDD</td>
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<tr>
<td>401(k) Profit Sharing Plan</td>
<td>G. Int/Div.</td>
<td>P. T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- American Fund- Capital Income Builder</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ivy Asset Income Fund</td>
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<td>- Vanguard Wellington Fund</td>
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<td>- Vanguard Star Fund</td>
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<td>- U.S. Treasury Strip</td>
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<td>- Bond Index Bond</td>
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<tr>
<td>- American Bank</td>
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VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:33 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00906 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS – income, value, transactions (Includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pg. 35-36 of filing instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.</th>
<th>Description of Assets (Including Transactions)</th>
<th>B.</th>
<th>Income during Reporting Period</th>
<th>C.</th>
<th>Gross Value at End of Reporting Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Method Code 1 (A)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Type (e.g., div., int., etc.)</td>
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<td>Value Code 2 (F)</td>
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<td>D.</td>
<td>Transaction during Reporting Period</td>
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- **18.** Chase Bank (CD)
- **19.** Bank of the Ozarks (CD)
- **20.** Citizens State Bank (CD)
- **21.** Discover Bank (CD)
- **22.** Discover Bank (CD)
- **23.** East West Bank (CD)
- **24.** Farmers and Merchants Bank (CD)
- **25.** Farmers Bank (CD)
- **26.** First National Bank (CD)
- **27.** First Citizens Bank NA (CD)
- **28.** First National Bank (CD)
- **29.** First National Bank (CD)
- **30.** Select Bank (CD)
- **31.** Washington Mutual Bank (CD)
### VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

**NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Assets (including trust assets)</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>Transactions during reporting period</th>
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<tr>
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<td>(D) Asset</td>
<td>(E) Type</td>
<td>(F) Value</td>
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<td>65.</td>
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<td>67.</td>
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<td>68.</td>
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<td>69.</td>
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<td>70.</td>
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<td>---</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — Income, value, transactions (Includes those of the spouse and dependents. See pp. 56-68 of 2008 Instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Descriptions of assets (Including trust assets)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value as of end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
<th>E. Identity of beneficiary (if any, of reported transaction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Amount Code 1 (15,995)</td>
<td>(2) Description of asset</td>
<td>(1) Value Code 2 (16)</td>
<td>(2) Value Method Code 3 (G-W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place &quot;X&quot; after each trust exempt from prior disclosure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Vanguard Intermediate Bond Index Fund

53. Defined Benefit Pensions Plan

54. Country Bank (CD)

55. Comerica Bank (CD)

56. CoreStates Bank (CD)

57. Discover Bank (CD)

58. Discover Bank (CD)

59. First National Bank (CD)

60. Magnet Bank (CD)

61. Merrill Lynch Bank (CD)

62. Moody's Money Market Account

63. GMAC Automotive Bank (CD)

64. Workers Bank (CD)

65. Bank of America (CD)

66. JPMorgan Chase Bank (CD)
## VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS

Income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 36-40 of filing instructions.)

### NONE (No reportable income, assets, or transactions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Asset (including trust assets)</th>
<th>Income during reporting period</th>
<th>Gain or Loss during reporting period</th>
<th>Transaction during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>B.</td>
<td>C.</td>
<td>D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69. Bank North (CD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70. Mancari R (CD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71. Flexible Annuity Plan</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Int.Div.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72. Mutual of America Conservative Allocation Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73. Mutual of America General Account</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74. Mutual of America Conservative Allocation Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75. Mutual of America Liquid Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76. Mutual of America Money Market Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77. Total Defined Annuity</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Int.Div.</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78. Mutual of America Conservative Allocation Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79. Mutual of America Money Market Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80. Mutual of America Insure Accumulation Account</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81. Mutual of America Money Market Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82. Mutual of America Liquid Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 29, 2009 Jkt 048894 PO 00000 Frm 00000 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
VII. INVESTMENTS and TRUSTS — income, value, transactions (includes those of the spouse and dependent children. See pp. 24-44 of filing instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Description of Assets (including trust assets)</th>
<th>B. Income during reporting period</th>
<th>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</th>
<th>D. Transactions during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan &quot;X&quot; where such asset exemption was denied</td>
<td>(E) Description of Income (A, B, C, D)</td>
<td>(G) Value (L.P.)</td>
<td>(4) Date of Disposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(F) Type of Income (div, rent, or oth)</td>
<td>(G) Value (L.P.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 16. Citizens Bank Money Market Account
  | B. Interest |

- 17. PNC Bank Money Market Account
  | B. Interest |

- 18. PNC Bank Money Market (D.E.T.A. Account) See "X"
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Page 10 of 11

VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS.

Page 4-6: Many listed certificates of deposit (CDs) matured and were reinvested during the reporting period. The funds were reinvested in other listed financial assets, including certificates of deposit. Some listed bonds also matured and were reinvested during the reporting period and the funds were reinvested in other listed financial assets. Some listed money market accounts were closed during the reporting period and the funds were reinvested in other listed money market accounts. The information on mandatory transactions is not provided in Section II because of the exception.

Page 8: An NLTA (Near Legal Trust Account) is an interest-bearing trust account. Under Rule 17 of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, lawyers are required to participate in the NLTA program and all interest earned is sent by the bank directly to the NLTA Board which distributes the funds for public benefit.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Page 11 of 11

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) in this report is true, accurate, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it was not applicable statutory provisions permitting non-disclosure.

I further certify that earned income from outside employment and honoraria and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 7351, and Appraisal Conference regulations.

Signature: 

Date: 7/25/2008

NOTE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY FALSIFIES OR FALSIFIES OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (5 U.S.C. § 1304).

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:
Committee on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 2-301
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20544
### FINANCIAL STATEMENT

#### NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable and schedule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to others</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable and schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash and other personal property</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash other-life insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets-intangible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA account</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401(k) account</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined Benefit Pension Plan</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total liabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spousal IRA &amp; retirement accounts</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Worth</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total liabilities and net worth</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

- Are all debts, contracts, or guarantees (See attached schedule) Are any assets pledged? (Add schedule) NO
- Are any defendants in any suits or legal actions? YES
FINANCIAL STATEMENT

NET WORTH SCHEDULES

Real Estate Owned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>$675,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey Condominium</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Cooperative Apartment</td>
<td>670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Real Estate Owned</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,795,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contingent Liabilities:

Guarantor on month-to-month residential lease for family member - $1330 per month.

$7306 – auto leases and parking spot lease balance

**AFFIDAVIT**

I, Joel H. Slomsky, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

July 25, 2008

DATE

Joel H. Slomsky

NAME

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
County of Philadelphia

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of July, 2008.

Shelley B. Burdy

NOTARY
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much.

The last one will be Eric Melgren, who's currently the U.S. Attorney for the District of Kansas, a position he's held since 2002. He graduated magna cum laude from Wichita State University, was student body president, has a law degree from Washburn, graduating cum laude.

STATEMENT OF ERIC F. MELGREN, NOMINEE TO BE DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

Mr. Melgren, I understand that with the short notice, you do not have family here with you. Is that correct?
Mr. MELGREN. That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.
Mr. MELGREN. They're very supportive, but in absence.
Chairman LEAHY. No, I understand. We could have waited a couple of weeks to give them a chance, but I don't think you wanted to do that.
Mr. MELGREN. We're much happier with the way it is. I would join the remarks. I'm very grateful to you for scheduling this hearing, Mr. Chairman.
[The biographical information follows.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES

PUBLIC

1. **Name:** Full name (include any former names used).

   Eric Franklin Melgren
   name used is Eric F. Melgren

2. **Position:** State the position for which you have been nominated.

   United States District Judge for the District of Kansas

3. **Address:** List current office address. If city and state of residence differs from your place of employment, please list the city and state where you currently reside.

   United States Attorney’s Office
   301 N. Main, Suite 1200
   Wichita, Kansas 67202

4. **Birthplace:** State year and place of birth.

   1956; Minneola, Kansas

5. **Marital Status:** (include name of spouse, and names of spouse pre-marriage, if different). List spouse’s occupation, employer’s name and business address(es). Please, also indicate the number of dependent children.

   I am married to Denise Jo (nee Warfield) Melgren. She is employed as the Interim Worship and Music Director, West Evangelical Free Church; 1161 N. Maize Road
   Wichita, Kansas 67212

   We have four dependent children.

6. **Education:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, each college, law school, or any other institution of higher education attended and indicate for each the dates of attendance, whether a degree was received, and the date each degree was received.

   1982 – 1985, Washburn University School of Law; J.D. awarded 1985

   1974 – 1979, Wichita State University, B.A. awarded 1979
7. **Employment Record:** List in reverse chronological order, listing most recent first, all governmental agencies, business or professional corporations, companies, firms, or other enterprises, partnerships, institutions or organizations, non-profit or otherwise, with which you have been affiliated as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, or employee since graduation from college, whether or not you received payment for your services. Include the name and address of the employer and job title or job description where appropriate.

**Employment:**

2002-present  
U.S. Attorney’s Office  
301 N. Main; Suite 1200  
Wichita, Kansas  67202  
United States Attorney for the District of Kansas

1987 - 2002  
Foulston Siefkin LLP (I/k/a Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt)  
100 N. Broadway, Suite 700  
Wichita, Kansas  67202  
Currently located at:  
1551 N. Waterfront Parkway; Suite 100  
Wichita, Kansas  67206  
associate attorney 1987-1992  
partner 1992-2002

1/95 - 4/95  
Congressman Sam Brownback, 104th Congress  
1313 Longworth House Office Building  
Washington, DC  
Legislative Assistant – Employment was part time, on leave from my law firm

1985 - 1987  
Hon. Frank G. Theis  
United States District Court  
District of Kansas  
401 N. Market  
Wichita, Kansas  67202  
Law clerk

1984 - 1985  
KMG Main Hurdman CPAs  
Merchant’s National Bank Building  
8th & Jackson  
Topeka, Kansas  
Research law clerk, part time
1979-1984
Ander Corporation (f/k/a Penn State Industries)
323 E. 13th Street
Topeka, Kansas
General Manager, Hess Chemical Co. 1981-1984
401 E. 13th Street
Topeka, Kansas
Assistant to the President, Penn State Chemical Company 1980-1981
General Sales Manager, Penn State Chemical Company 1980
Sales Representative 1979-1980

Other affiliations:

Midwest HIDTA, Director 2002-2008


United Way of the Plains: Board 2000-2002; Chairman 2001

Wichita Christian Legal Aid, Inc.: Director 2001-2002

Rotary Club of West Wichita: Board and Secretary, 2000-2001

Live Free Ministries, Inc.: Board 1998-2002


Leadership Wichita: Board 1994-1997; Chairman 1996

Mental Health Association of South Central Kansas: Board 1988-1994; Chairman 1990-1991

Capitol Civitan Club (Topeka): President 1984-1985

8. **Military Service and Draft Status**: Identify any service in the U.S. Military, including dates of service, branch of service, rank or rate, serial number (if different from social security number) and type of discharge received.

I did not serve in the military.
911

9. **Honors and Awards:** List any scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, academic or professional honors, honorary society memberships, military awards, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievement.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, presentation in recognition of the outstanding leadership and significant contributions to public service by ensuring the preservation of America’s space program artifacts, January 2006

National Alliance Mentally Ill, Kansas, Prosecutor of the Year, 2006

Presented Certificate of Achievement from the Boeing Company, 1997, for achievement in a case

Martindale Hubbell “AV” rating

Graduate of the Leadership Wichita (f/k/a Leadership 2000) program

Civitan Clubs International Distinguished Presidential Award, 1985

Graduated *cum laude* from Washburn Law School, in top 5% of class
- Member of the Washburn Law Journal
- Received Kansas Bankers Association Estate Planning Award
- Recipient of Coffman Scholarship my junior and senior year (which I believe was the largest single scholarship at the time)

Graduated *magna cum laude* from Wichita State University
- Graduate of the Emory Lindquist Honors Program
- Senior Honor Man (top 5 outstanding seniors)
- Student Body President
- Omicron Delta Kappa National Leader of the Year (Province VIII)
- National Collegiate Honors Council Washington, D.C. Honors Colloquium Semester 1976

10. **Bar Associations:** List all bar associations or legal or judicial-related committees, selection panels or conferences of which you are or have been a member, and give the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in such groups.

**American Bar Association:** Member 1985-2002

**Kansas Bar Association:** Member 1985 to present
- Task Force on the State Board of Tax Appeals 1983-1994
- Legislative Committee 1996-2002
- Judicial Resources Task Force 1999-2000

**Wichita Bar Association:** Member 1986 to present
- Legislative Relations Committee 1989-2002
Chairman 1995-1996
Nominating Committee 2001
Law Day Committee/Public Relations Committee (committee renamed) 1999-2004
Chairman 2004
Hosted Cheryl Brown Henderson for 50th Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education Law Day address, with student symposium
Law in Education Committee 1988, 1993
Public Relations Committee 1987

Christian Legal Society
Kansas state membership director 1989-1994
Wichita CLS Chapter (unincorporated), Director 1992-2002
Wichita Christian Legal Aid, Inc. 2001-2002
Incorporator, Board of Directors & Volunteer

11. Bar and Court Admission:

   a. List the date(s) you were admitted to the bar of any state and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership.
      
      State of Kansas - September 20, 1985
      There have been no lapses in membership

   b. List all courts in which you have been admitted to practice, including dates of admission and any lapses in membership. Please explain the reason for any lapse in membership. Give the same information for administrative bodies that require special admission to practice.
      
      Kansas State courts, 1985
      United States District Court for District of Kansas, 1985
      United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 1987
      United States Tax Court, 1988
      Supreme Court of the United States, 1996
      There have been no lapses in membership

12. Memberships:

   a. List all professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations, other than those listed in response to Questions 10 or 11 to which you belong, or to which you have belonged, or in which you have significantly

   5
participated, since graduation from law school. Provide dates of membership or participation, and indicate any office you held. Include clubs, working groups, advisory or editorial boards, panels, committees, conferences, or publications.

Midwest HIDTA, Director 2002-2008


United Way of the Plains: Board 2000-2002; Chairman 2001

Wichita Christian Legal Aid, Inc.: Director 2001-2002

Rotary Club of West Wichita: Board and Secretary, 2000-2001

Live Free ministries, Inc.: Board 1998-2002


Leadership Wichita: Board 1994-1997; Chairman 1996

Dave Shank for School Board, Chairman 1997

Mark Vining for Judge, Campaign Steering Committee 1994

Mental Health Association of South Central Kansas: Board 1998-1994; Chairman 1990-1991


Other organizations to which I have belonged but in which I have held no office or significant position are:

Washburn University School of Law Alumni Association, c1985-2005
Wichita Area Chamber of Commerce, c1992-2002
The University Club c1988-1998 (a now defunct dining club)
The Petroleum Club c1994-2002 (a luncheon club)
Wichita Lawyers Club c1986-1988
Federalist Society, 2002-present
Big Brothers Big Sisters "Bigs in Schools" Volunteer, 2002-2003
Maize School District (USD 266) Board Committee, Co-Chair 2000
b. The American Bar Association's Commentary to its Code of Judicial Conduct states that it is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Please indicate whether any of these organizations listed in response to 12a above currently discriminate or formerly discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or religion – either through formal membership requirements or the practical implementation of membership policies. If so, describe any action you have taken to change these policies and practices.

None of the entities or organizations listed discriminate on the basis of race, sex or religion, formally or in practice, currently or in the past, save for West Evangelical Free Church, Christian Legal Society, and Wichita Lawyers Club. West Evangelical Free Church and the Christian Legal Society require an agreement with a religious statement of faith as a condition of membership. The Wichita Lawyers Club was an old and prestigious society which granted membership only by secret vote and restricted membership to only a certain percentage of Wichita lawyers. The rules of the organization denied membership to anyone who received 3 negative votes. I was voted into membership in approximately 1986. Although the organization did not formally bar females from its membership, the effect of the 3 blackball vote rule had historically been to deny membership to women. Several of us promoted some female membership (including the first female judge in the county), but all proposed female members were voted down. Therefore, I resigned from the organization in approximately 1988. I am unsure if the organization even exists today.

13. Published Writings and Public Statements:

   a. List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, letters to the editor, editorial pieces, or other published material you have written or edited, including material published only on the Internet. Please supply four (4) copies of all published material to the Committee.

   "[Drug] Legalization Would be a Mistake"
   *Wichita Eagle* (op ed) January 26, 2007

   "Preventing Children from Being Victims"
   *Kansas Prosecutor* Vol. IV, No. 1 (Winter 2007)

   "Turning the Tables on Child Predators"
   *Kansas Prosecutor* Vol. II, No. 3 (Winter 2005)

   "Sentencing Guidelines"
   Wichita Bar-o-Meter October 2005

   "Patriot Act's Tools Still Needed to Fight Terror"
   *Wichita Eagle* (op ed) July 21, 2005

    7
“Crime’s Decline Due to Tougher Laws”
_Wichita Eagle_ (op ed) November 12, 2004

“Columnist Misrepresented Patriot Act’s Powers”
_University Daily Kansan_ (letter to editor) September 30, 2004

“The U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Kansas, and the KCDAA”
_Kansas Prosecutor_ Vol.1, No. 1 (Summer 2004)

“No Mere Yeoman: Incorporating the Family Farm”
republished: _Law Review Digest_ Vol. 34, No. 6, p. 13

b. Please supply four (4) copies of any reports, memoranda or policy statements you
prepared or contributed in the preparation of on behalf of any bar association,
committee, conference, or organization of which you were or are a member. If
you do not have a copy of a report, memorandum or policy statement, please give
the name and address of the organization that issued it, the date of the document,
and a summary of its subject matter.

None

c. Please supply four (4) copies of any testimony, official statements or other
communications relating, in whole or in part, to matters of public policy or legal
interpretation, that you have issued or provided or that others presented on your
behalf to public bodies or public officials.

In 2003 I gave testimony to the Kansas legislature joint committee on homeland
security as U.S. Attorney regarding the Patriot Act. No written testimony or
statement was presented.

I gave testimony regarding state tax disputed issues on behalf of the Kansas Bar
Association in the 1990’s, for which I have no files or records.

d. Please supply four (4) copies, transcripts or tape recordings of all speeches or
talks delivered by you, including commencement speeches, remarks, lectures,
panel discussions, conferences, political speeches, and question-and-answer
sessions. Please include the date and place where they were delivered, and
readily available press reports about the speech or talk. If you do not have a copy
of the speech or a transcript or tape recording of your remarks, please give the
name and address of the group before whom the speech was given, the date of the
speech, and a summary of its subject matter. If you did not speak from a prepared
text, please furnish a copy of any outline or notes from which you spoke.
October 3, 2006; Ethics Seminar for Corporate Counsel; “Ethical Issues Involving Document Gathering and Retention, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Reporting to the Government in an Investigation” (panel)

October 7, 2004; Kansas Ethics Seminar for Corporate Counsel; Panel Discussion of Ethical Scenarios

July 15, 2004; Kansas Women’s Attorney’s Association; PATRIOT Act Debate

July 14, 2004; Church Law Seminar; “Tax Exempt Entities - Involvement in Political Elections”

May 3, 2004; Kansas City Association of Financial Professionals; “Requirements of the PATRIOT Act”

February 5, 2003; Johnson County Bar Association; “Litigating Civil Cases with the Federal Government”

June 29, 2000; “Kansas Nonprofits: Tax and Business Answers”; National Business Institute

June 22, 2000; “Kansas Property Tax”; Lorman Business Institute

May 15, 2000; “Formation and Operational Issues in Nonprofit Entities”; Kansas Society of Certified Public Accountants

June 25, 1999; “Kansas Property Tax”; Lorman Business Center


May 11, 1998; “When the Audit Goes Bad: Preparing for and Managing Tax Litigation”; Kansas Society of Certified Public Accountants

February 27, 1998; “Choice of Business Entity”; Wichita Bar Association

November 22, 1996; “Agricultural and Operational Considerations of Limited Liability Companies”; Kansas Livestock Association

November 14, 1996; “Sales & Property Taxes”; “Taxpayer Bill of Rights”; Credit Card Affinity Programs”; Kansas Tax Exempt Organizations

May 15, 1996; “Limited Liability Companies”; National Business Institute
May 13, 1996; “The 100% Penalty-How an Employer’s Unpaid Tax Becomes Your Liability”; Kansas Society of Certified Public Accountant’s

July 14, 1995; “Ad Valorem Tax Appeals”; Petroleum Appraisal Institute

May 12, 1995; “Avoiding and Defending Supplemental Tax Assessments”; Kansas Society of CPA’s

May 12, 1995; “Personal Property Tax Exemptions”; Commercial Property Owners Association of Kansas

December 9, 1994; Panel Discussion on Handling Property Tax Disputes; Commercial Property Owners Association of Kansas

November 16, 1993; “State and Local Tax Issues”; Institute of Management Accountants

January 8, 1993; “Kansas State Tax Overview”; Boeing legislative briefing

May 22, 1990; “Homeowner’s Property Rights”; Botanica Education Series

September 30, 1989; “Medical/Legal Concepts”; Sedgwick County EMT-EMICT Recertification Seminar

1989; “Kansas Property Taxes”; Wichita Claims Associates

Community Speeches

May 14, 2008; Horace Mann Magnet School; U.S. Constitution

April 22, 2008; LEC Conference Opening Remarks

April 15, 2008; USD 259; “Project Safe Childhood”

April 9, 2008; FBI Citizen’s Academy; USAO Overview

March 27, 2008; Retired Professional & Businessmen’s Club; USAO Overview

March 9, 2008; Tabernacle Baptist Church; “Project Safe Childhood”

March 4, 2008; KWCH Channel 12 Television; Wichita Citizen’s Academy

February 23, 2008; Dwight D. Eisenhower Excellence in Public Service Series; “Project Safe Childhood”
February 9, 2008; Pure & Simple Lifestyle Project/Abstinence; Project Safe Childhood-Internet Predators

February 6, 2008; Kansas Gang Investigator’s Conference; USAO Overview

January 8, 2008; KLETC Training; Opening Remarks

December 18, 2007; McIntosh Report - KNSS Radio; United States Attorney’s Office Update

October 24, 2007; FBI Citizen’s Academy; USAO Overview

October 10, 2007; Drug Endangered Children; “Protecting Our Children” (opening remarks)

September 27, 2007; Sedgwick County Young Republicans; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

September 27, 2007; Stucky Middle School; “The United States Constitution”

September 11, 2007; Wichita Area Law Enforcement; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

July 25, 2007; Wichita East Rotary; “Project Safe Childhood and Internet Predators”

June 25, 2007; Wichita Prayer Breakfast; Personal remarks

June 15, 2007; Sedgwick County Sheriff’s Training Graduation; “Cooperative Law Enforcement”

May 11, 2007; Kansas Association Legal Assistants; “Project Safe Childhood”

May 9, 2007; Money Laundering Conference; “Federal Investigations” (opening remarks)

May 7, 2007; First Responders Response To Terrorism Conference; “Importance of Preparedness” (opening remarks)

May 7, 2007; Northwest High School; Law Day - Rule of Law

April 17, 2007; Boy Scouts of America; “Obligations of U.S. Citizenship”

April 4, 2007; FBI Citizen’s Academy; USAO Overview

February 20, 2007; West Wichita Rotary; “Project Safe Childhood”
February 17, 2007; Dwight D. Eisenhower Excellence in Public Service Series; “Project Safe Childhood”

January 23, 2007; Wichita State University Political Science; Legalization of marijuana debate

October 17, 2006; Bel Plaine Lions Club; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

October 16, 2006; WSU Distinguished Alumni Breakfast Series; “The Job of the United States Attorney”

September 14, 2006; Protect our Children Regional Conference; “Protect Our Children” (opening Remarks)

August 23, 2006; Drug Endangered Children State Conference; “Protect Our Children” (opening remarks)

May 3, 2006; Maize High School; Law Day - Rule of Law

April 25, 2006; McIntosh Report - KNSS Radio; Immigration; USAO overview

March 17, 2006; Pachyderm Club; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

February 22, 2006; Federalist Society; “National Security Act Intercepts”

February 8, 2006; Newton Bar Association; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

February 7, 2006; KINT Radio-Independence; “Fighting Child Internet Porn”

December 21, 2005; McIntosh Report - KNSS Radio; USAO High Profile Cases & Upcoming Trends

October 6, 2005; Institute of Internal Auditors; “White Collar Crime”

October 1, 2005; Kansas Student Leadership Forum; “Leadership Principles from the Words of Jesus”

September 8, 2005; West Sedgwick County Sunrise Rotary; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

September 7, 2005; Wichita Claims Association; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

July 11, 2005; Dodge City Rotary Club; “The PATRIOT Act”
June 17, 2005; Retired School Personnel; USAO Overview and Social Security Fraud

June 7, 2005; West Wichita Rotary; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

April 27, 2005; Goddard High School; Law Day - Rule of Law

April 25, 2005; Great Bend, Kansas Rotary Club; “The PATRIOT Act

March 16, 2005; East Wichita Rotary Club; “The PATRIOT Act”

March 8, 2005; Wichita Bar Association; “The United States Attorney’s Office”

February 24, 2005; Sedgwick County Young Republicans; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

February 11, 2005; Derby High School; “The Job of the U.S. Attorney”

December 16, 2004; Kansas Law Enforcement Training Center; “The Function of the U. S. Attorney’s Office”

October 4, 2004; Wichita Civitan Club; “Role of the U.S. Attorney & USAO Overview”

August 19, 2004; Physical/Emotional Survivability Conference – LECC; “Protecting the Protector”

July 13, 2004; West Wichita Optimists Club; “The PATRIOT Act”

June 7, 2004; Agricultural Terrorism Conference; “Protecting our Food Supply” (opening remarks)

May 15, 2004; Minneola High School; Commencement Remarks

May 14, 2004; Pachyderm Club; “The United States Attorney’s Office”

May 11, 2004; ACLU Forum; “The PATRIOT Act”

May 6, 2004; Identity Theft Conference: Train the Trainer; Opening remarks

April 30, 2004; Butler County Law Day; “The PATRIOT Act”

April 23, 2004; Shawnee County Sheriff’s Office; Graduation Remarks

April 13, 2004; East Wichita Shepherd’s Center; “The PATRIOT Act”
April 5, 2004; Washburn Pre-Law Association; “The PATRIOT Act”

April 1, 2004; Kansas Library Association Tri-Conference; “The PATRIOT Act”

March 11, 2004; Univ. of Kansas Law School Federalist Society; “The PATRIOT Act”

March 8, 2004; North Newton City Council; Defense of the PATRIOT Act

March 4, 2004; Sam A. Crow Inns of Court; “The PATRIOT Act”

January 21, 2004; LECC Conference Awards Lunch; “The PATRIOT Act”

November 12, 2003; Wichita Downtown Lions Club; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

November 11, 2003; Butler County Community College Business Law Class; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

November 10, 2003; WSU Political Science Forum; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

November 10, 2003; WSU Distinguished Alumni Breakfast Series; “From WSU to the U. S. Attorney’s Office”

November 4, 2003; Manhattan League of Women Voters; “Defense of The PATRIOT Act”

November 4, 2003; Kansas Association of Legal Assistants; United States Attorney’s Office Overview

October 26, 2003; Interfaith Alliance-Pittsburg State University; “Defense of The PATRIOT Act”

October 25, 2003; Ks American Association of University Women; “Defense of The PATRIOT Act”

October 14, 2003; Wichita Chartered Property Casualty Underwriters; “Defense of The PATRIOT Act”

October 9, 2003; Public Broadcasting Service – Taping; “Defense of The PATRIOT Act”

September 22, 2003; Wichita Downtown Rotary; “Defense of The PATRIOT Act”
September 11, 2003; Topeka Rotary; “Defense of The PATRIOT Act”

August 12, 2003; Identify Theft Conference; “Attacking Identity Theft” (opening remarks)

July 23, 2003; Irving Show Community Based Programs-KSJM; Wichita Weed & Seed

July 22, 2003; McIntosh Report - KNSS Radio; Internet Crimes Against Children
May 23, 2003; Kansas Law Enforcement Training Center; “Law Enforcement, Ethics & Professionalism” (graduation remarks)

May 7, 2003; Drug Endangered Children Training-KHP; “Protecting our Children” (opening remarks)

April 20, 2003; Wichita North High School; Law Day - Rule of Law

April 17, 2003; DARE-Maize East Middle School; Just Say No (graduation remarks)

March 11, 2003; Earl E. O’Connor Inns of Court; Terrorism and DOJ / USA response

February 21, 2003; Testimony to Kansas Legislature; PATRIOT Act - Terrorism Issues

January 24, 2003; YMCA Men’s Club; “United States Attorney’s Office Overview”

January 16, 2003; Southern Ks./Northern Ok. Peace Officers; “Project Safe Neighborhoods Overview”

December 13, 2002; Johnson County Police Academy; Graduation Remarks

December 11, 2002; LECC Conference; “Mission of Law Enforcement (opening remarks)

November 20, 2002; Women Attorney’s Association of Topeka; “United States Attorney’s Office Overview”

October 24, 2002; Retired Business & Professional Men’s Club; “United States Attorney’s Office Overview”

October 17, 2002; Leadership Wichita 2002; “Liberty vs Security”
October 15, 2002; Johnson County Police & Sheriff’s Association; Current issues of concern (informal roundtable)

September 14, 2002; League of Women Voters; “Liberty vs Security”

August 26, 2002; Meth Investigative Workshop; “Meth: A Growing problem in Kansas (opening remarks)”

August 16, 2002; Wichita Kiwanis Club; “Project Safe Neighborhoods Overview”

May 23, 2002; Kansas Highway Patrol Academy (Salina); Graduation Remarks

April 11, 2002; FBI Academy Alumni; “USAO Overview, New U.S. Attorney Priorities”

July 21, 1995; Wichita Downtown Kiwanis Club; “The First 100 Days”

e. Please list all interviews you have given to newspapers, magazines or other publications, or radio or television stations, providing the dates of these interviews and four (4) copies of the clips or transcripts of these interviews where they are available to you.

As U.S. Attorney, I frequently hold press conferences or respond to media inquiries regarding specific cases or activities of the U.S. Attorney’s office, but those are announcements rather than interviews and so are not included in this response.

I was interviewed by the Wichita Business Journal for a profile piece which was published in its June 6, 2003 edition, at page 4.

I have given interviews to the McIntosh Report on KNSS radio which were about the activities of the U.S. Attorney’s office, but were not limited to a specific case or event. They are as follows (The dates listed are the dates I was interviewed; the interview itself may have aired on one or more different dates, but I do not have records of when that would have been. I also have no transcripts or clips of these interviews):

December 18, 2007; United States Attorney’s Office Update
April 25, 2006; Immigration; USAO Overview
December 21, 2005; USAO High Profile Cases & Upcoming Trends
July 22, 2003; Internet Crimes Against Children

On February 7, 2006 I also gave an interview to KINT Radio-Independence, Kansas on Fighting Child Internet Porn. I do not have a transcript or clip of this interview.
14. **Judicial Office:** State (chronologically) any judicial offices you have held, whether such position was elected or appointed, and a description of the jurisdiction of each such court.

I have not held a judicial office.

15. **Citations:** If you are or have been a judge, please provide:

   a. citations for all opinions you have written (including concurrences and dissents);

   b. a list of cases in which certiorari has been requested or granted;

   c. a short summary of and citations for all appellate opinions or orders where your decisions were reversed or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

   d. a list of and copies of any of your unpublished opinions that were reversed on appeal or where your judgment was affirmed with significant criticism of your substantive or procedural rulings;

   e. a description of the number and percentage of your decisions in which you issued an unpublished opinion and the manner in which those unpublished opinions are filed and/or stored; and

   f. citations to all cases in which you were a panel member in which you did not issue an opinion.

I have not served as a judge.

16. **Recusal:** If you are or have been a judge, please provide a list of any cases, motions or matters that have come before you in which a litigant or party has requested that you recuse yourself due to an asserted conflict of interest, or for any other apparent reason, or in which you recused yourself sua sponte. (If your court employs an "automatic" recusal system by which you may be recused without your knowledge, please include a general description of that system.) Please identify each such case, and for each provide the following information:

   a. whether your recusal was requested by a motion or other suggestion by a litigant or a party to the proceeding or by any other person or interested party; or if you recused yourself sua sponte;

   b. a brief description of the asserted conflict of interest or other ground for recusal;

   c. the procedure you followed in determining whether or not to recuse yourself;
d. your reason for recusing or declining to recuse yourself, including any action taken to remove the real, apparent or asserted conflict of interest or to cure any other ground for recusal.

I have not served as a judge.

17. Public Office, Political Activities and Affiliations:

a. List chronologically any public offices you have held, other than judicial offices, including the terms of service and whether such positions were elected or appointed. If appointed, please include the name of the individual who appointed you. Also, state chronologically any unsuccessful candidacies you have had for elective office or unsuccessful nominations for appointed office.

On March, 17 2002, I was appointed United States Attorney for the District of Kansas by President George W. Bush, after confirmation by the United States Senate.

b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered, whether compensated or not, to any political party or election committee. If you have ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign, please identify the particulars of the campaign, including the candidate, dates of the campaign, your title and responsibilities.

Brownback for U.S. Senate
Fourth District Chairman 1998
Sedgwick County Chairman 1996, 1998

Kansas State Republican Party
Executive Committee 1997 - 2002

Kansas Delegate – Republican National Convention 2000

Republican Fourth District Delegate 2001 - 2002

Republican Precinct Committeeman, Sedgwick County, 1998- 2002

Republican Precinct Committeeman, Shawnee County, 1982 - 1985

Chairman, Dave Shank for Maize School Board, 1997

Mark Vining for Judge Campaign Steering Committee, 1994

In 1996 and 1997 I raised money for Congressman Todd Tiahrt, 4th District, Kansas, in his campaign informally.
I assisted the unsuccessful gubernatorial campaign of Tim Shallenberger in 2002 (prior to my appointment as U.S. Attorney).

I have helped some state legislative candidates, but all in an informal role without a title or formal authority.

I have also helped with some political mailings, yard signs, parades and precinct walking for Republican party candidates generally.

18. **Legal Career:** Please answer each part separately.

   a. Describe chronologically your law practice and legal experience after graduation from law school including:

      i. whether you served as clerk to a judge, and if so, the name of the judge, the court and the dates of the period you were a clerk;

         I served as a clerk to the Honorable Frank G. Theis, United States District Court, District of Kansas, 1985-1987

      ii. whether you practiced alone, and if so, the addresses and dates;

         I have not practiced alone.

      iii. the dates, names and addresses of law firms or offices, companies or governmental agencies with which you have been affiliated, and the nature of your affiliation with each.

         2002-present
         U.S. Attorney's Office
         301 N. Main; Suite 1200
         Wichita, Kansas 67202
         United States Attorney for the District of Kansas

         1987 - 2002
         Foulston Siefkin LLP (f/k/a Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt)
         100 N. Broadway, Suite 700
         Wichita, Kansas 67202
         Currently located at:
         1551 N. Waterfront Parkway; Suite 100
         Wichita, Kansas 67206
         associate attorney 1987-1992
         partner 1992-2002
1/95 – 4/95
Congressman Sam Brownback, 104th Congress
1313 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC
Legislative Assistant – Employment was part time, on leave from my law firm

b. Describe:

i. the general character of your law practice and indicate by date when its character has changed over the years.

The United States Attorney’s office prosecutes federal crimes which primarily include fighting terrorism, prosecuting gang crimes, violent crime offenders, gun crimes, drug trafficking, crimes against our children, corporate fraud and public corruption, housing discrimination, cybercrimes and immigration offenses. Our civil division is primarily involved in bankruptcy, social security appeals, asset forfeiture, collections, prisoner litigation, affirmative fraud, medical malpractice defense, employment discrimination defense and foreclosures. My job is principal supervisor of a staff of almost 100 employees in three offices who carry out these roles.

At Foulston Siefkin LLP my practice was generally a business and tax practice, including an emphasis on litigation of contested federal, state and local tax matters in court and before administrative tribunals, and negotiating and finalizing various business transactional matters such as acquisitions, financing, and corporate governance. This practice occasionally involved litigation in connection with business interests. My practice also included an estate planning and probate component, with an emphasis on contested probate matters.

ii. your typical clients and the areas, if any, in which you have specialized.

As the United States Attorney my client is the United States of America.

At Foulston Siefkin LLP my typical clients were individuals with business related issues; various land and property owners, small to mid-sized businesses, and a few large (over 500 employees) businesses in healthcare and manufacturing. As mentioned above, my principal area of specialty was handling contested tax matters.

c. Describe the percentage of your practice that has been in litigation and whether you appeared in court frequently, occasionally, or not at all. If the frequency of your appearances in court varied, describe such variance, providing dates.
As the United States Attorney I appear in court occasionally both prosecuting cases at trial level (less than once a year) or arguing appeals to the 10th Circuit (at least once a year). As a private practice attorney I appeared in courts, and in quasi-judicial forums, frequently.

i. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. federal courts: 35%
   2. state courts of record: 15%
   3. other courts: 50%

ii. Indicate the percentage of your practice in:
   1. civil proceedings: 80%
   2. criminal proceedings: 20%

d. State the number of cases in courts of record you tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled), indicating whether you were sole counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.

I have tried 28 cases to verdict or judgment - 16 cases as sole counsel; 7 cases as chief counsel; and 5 cases as assistant counsel;

i. What percentage of these trials were:
   1. jury: 14%
   2. non-jury: 86%

e. Describe your practice, if any, before the Supreme Court of the United States. Please supply four (4) copies of any briefs, amicus or otherwise, and, if applicable, any oral argument transcripts before the Supreme Court in connection with your practice.

I have had no cases before the Supreme Court of the United States

19. Litigation: Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled. Give the citations, if the cases were reported, and the docket number and date if unreported. Give a capsule summary of the substance of each case. Identify the party or parties whom you represented; describe in detail the nature of your participation in the litigation and the final disposition of the case. Also state as to each case:

   a. the date of representation;
   b. the name of the court and the name of the judge or judges before whom the case was litigated; and
   c. the individual name, addresses, and telephone numbers of co-counsel and of principal counsel for each of the other parties.
1. United States of America v. Max Ary

Citations: United States District Court (D. Kan) Case Number: 05-10053-01-JTM; Circuit Court Case Number: 06-3383; Circuit Court opinion reported at 581 F.3d 775 (10th Cir. 2008)

Summary: Max Ary was the director of the Kansas Cosmosphere and Space Center, located in Hutchinson, Kansas. The Cosmosphere, as it is commonly called, was founded in the 1960s as a planetarium. Mr. Ary was hired as its manager and director in 1976, and under his leadership the Cosmosphere developed into a museum of space exploration with a collection of U.S. space artifacts second only to that of the Smithsonian’s Air and Space Museum in Washington D.C., and with the largest collection of Soviet space artifacts outside of Moscow, Russia. This collection was assimilated in various ways, but principally by purchase of excess governmental property by the nonprofit museum, donations of space artifacts by astronauts to the museum, and loans of numerous artifacts to it by the Smithsonian, NASA, and the U.S. Air Force. Although the Cosmosphere was not the only entity receiving such loans of government-owned space artifacts, it had the largest collection of such loaned items by far. As director and CEO, Mr. Ary had direct access and control of the museum’s collection, and was universally viewed as the individual with the most detailed knowledge of the collection. On a periodic basis, the Cosmosphere was required by the various governmental entities to certify that it still possessed the numerous artifacts on loan to it, and was otherwise complying with the requirement of the loan agreement. Mr. Ary always personally made these certifications. After Mr. Ary left the Cosmosphere in 2003, it was discovered that numerous government owned items included on those verifications, along with other property which the museum had purchased or received as donations, had been sold by him at various auctions from 1999 through 2001. Most (though not all) of those sales had been for his own financial benefit. Additionally, a search warrant executed at Mr. Ary’s new residence disclosed several boxes of Cosmosphere-owned property in his possession. The matter was investigated principally by NASA’s OIG, with assistance from the FBI. NASA devoted significant resources to the investigation in the interests of protecting the integrity of U.S. owned space artifacts. Mr. Ary went to trial in the fall of 2005 on a 19 count superseding indictment charging wire fraud, mail fraud, theft of government property, honest services fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property, money laundering, and criminal forfeiture. Three counts of honest services fraud were plead in the alternative. Following a 3 week trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts except one count of interstate transportation of stolen property and one count of money laundering. The convictions were affirmed on appeal.

Party Represented: we represented the United States of America

Participation: I played an active supervisory role during the investigation phase, which was lead by AUSA Debra Barnett with assistance by AUSA Annette Gurney. I joined the trial team as a full participant several months before trial, handling opening statement, and one-third or more of the witnesses at trial. My co-counsel would have referred to me as chief counsel, but in reality I viewed
AUSA Barnett as lead counsel. On appeal, AUSAs Barnett, Gurney, and myself each wrote portions of the brief, and I argued the appeal.

Final Disposition: found guilty in part; found not guilty in part


Name of court and judge: United States District Court; Honorable J. Thomas Marten

Appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit. I briefed and argued the appeal.

Name and address of co-counsel and defense counsel:

Co-Counsel:
AUSA Debra Barnett, 301 N. Main, Suite 1200, Wichita, Kansas
AUSA Annette Gurney, co-counsel, 301 N. Main, Suite 1200, Wichita, Kansas

Defense Counsel:
Lee Thompson, Occidental Plaza, 106 E. 2nd Street, Wichita, Kansas
Stephen Joseph, Joseph & Hollander PA, 500 North Market, Wichita, Kansas

2. United States of America v. Ayad Abo-Seba

Citations: 06-20055-01-DW-JTM

Summary: Mr. Ayad Abo-Seba appeared in federal district court for the District of Kansas for sentencing (in a different case) in December of 2005. At the conclusion of the proceeding, Mr. Abo-Seba attacked U.S. Probation Officer Michelle Caples in the courtroom, stabbing at her with an ink pen. He was indicted by a federal Grand Jury in the District of Kansas on one count of assault of a governmental employee with a deadly weapon. Federal judges in the district of Kansas recused themselves, and the matter was assigned to Judge Dean Whipple of the Western District of Missouri. Because the victim was a member of the “court family” I prosecuted this case myself, with assistance from AUSA Alan Metzger. Following a one and half day trial to a jury, a guilty verdict was returned. No appeal from the conviction was taken.

Party represented: we represented the United States of America

Participation: Lead counsel. I assigned this case to myself from the beginning, for the reasons above noted. Ultimately, AUSA Metzger was assigned to assist. We split trial duties.

Final disposition: found guilty

Date of representation: April 2006 to April 2007

Name of court and judge:
United States District Court, Western District of Missouri; Honorable Dean Whipple, sitting by designation

Name and address of co-counsel and defense counsel:

Co-Counsel:
AUSA Alan Metzger, 301 N. Main, Suite 1200, Wichita, Kansas

Defense Counsel:
Jay D. DeHardt, McQuain, DeHardt & Rosenbloom, P.C., 4505 Madison Avenue, Kansas City, Missouri
3. Litwin v. United States of America

Citations: United States District Court Case Number: 89-1072-C; Circuit Court opinion reported at 983 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1993)

Summary: The case involved the tax characterization of losses which Mr. Litwin had incurred as a result of guaranteeing loans to his corporation. Loss treatment turned upon the factual determination of whether his motive for making the loan was to protect his investment, or to protect his employment. We introduced factual testimony demonstrating his employment-related objective. The District Court held that Mr. Litwin was so motivated, and therefore that the tax refund prayed for should be paid. The Circuit Court affirmed.

Party Represented: Mr. Litwin, the taxpayer

Participation: My senior partner Mr. Sawatsky assisted and supervised the discovery and trial preparation which I principally handled. We both participated at the trial. I briefed and argued the appeal.

Final Disposition: Tax refund awarded to Mr. Litwin; affirmed by Circuit Court

Dates of representation: 1989 through 1993

Name of court and judge: United States District Court; Honorable Sam Crow;

Appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit. I briefed and argued the appeal.

Name and address of co-counsel and defense counsel:

Co-Counsel:

   Gerald Sawatsky, co-counsel, Foulston & Siefkin, 100 N. Broadway, Suite 700, Wichita, Kansas

Defense Counsel:

   Christine Grant, United States Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC

4. In re Estate of Robert Sheldon Coleman/In re Sheldon Coleman Investment Trust

Citations: United States Tax Court Case Number: 23402-91 to 23404-91

Summary: Sheldon Coleman was the patriarch of the Coleman Company. His family controlled the company, but owned less than half of the stock. They began working with investment bankers to launch a leveraged buyout of the publicly held stock. Shortly before the LBO was ready to be offered to the stockholders, Mr. Coleman died. The LBO was later launched, and as a result the company was put into play. Ultimately, an outsider’s offer was accepted, and the stock (including the stock in Mr. Coleman’s trust) was sold. The capital gains tax to be reported on the sale was dependent upon the trust’s basis in the stock which under estate tax rules was “stepped-up” to fair market value as of the date of death. The dispute over the fair market value of the stock was unusual, in that the stock was publicly traded, and in a reversal of traditional roles, the Coleman estate was arguing for a higher basis, and the United States for a lower basis. Due to the unusual facts that an LBO was nearly ready to be announced at the time of the death of Mr. Coleman, the largest single shareholder of the company, the estate argued that his block of stock had a higher fair market value than the traded price.
The issue before the United States Tax Court was, simply, a factual determination of the basis of the relevant stock.

Party Represented: the Estate of Sheldon Coleman

Participation: I worked closely with my senior partner, Mr. Robert Foulston, on discovery, expert preparation, and location and preparation of witnesses, until his death. My senior partner Mr. Mikel Stout then assumed Mr. Foulston’s role. I continued as before, and assisted Mr. Stout in the trial of the case (he was lead trial attorney). Due to an extraordinary event on the fourth day of trial (the courtroom flooded, destroying all of the exhibits, attorneys’ notes, and court reporter’s record), the Judge ordered us to settle the case, which we did.

Final Disposition: Case settled during trial

Dates of representation: 1991 through 1993

Name of court and judge: United States Tax Court; Judge Fay

Name and address of co-counsel and defense counsel:

Co-Counsel:

Robert Foulston, Senior Partner, Foulston & Siefkin, 100 N. Broadway, Suite 700, Wichita, Kansas

Mikel Stout, Senior Partner, Foulston & Siefkin, 100 N. Broadway, Suite 700, Wichita, Kansas

Defense Counsel:

Frederick J. Lockhart, Internal Revenue Service, 1244 Speer Blvd, Denver, Colorado

5. The Boeing Company v. Oaklawn Improvement District/In re Protests and Appeal of the Boeing Company

Citations: Sedgwick county District Court Case Number: 91 C 3147. Supreme Court decision reported at 255 Kan. 848, 877 P.2d 967 (1994); Board of Tax Appeals Docket Numbers: 92-3944-PR, 92-16882-PR, 93-1098-PR; Sedgwick County District Court Case Number (on appeal): 95 C 1603; Kansas Court of Appeals Case Number: 95-75702-A; Supreme Court decision reported at 261 Kan. 508, 930 P.2d 1366.

Summary: The Oaklawn Improvement District was an improvement district created under state law to provide sewer service to a small neighborhood of older homes. Several large, undeveloped tracts of adjacent land had been annexed into the improvement district, with the intent of obtaining sewer service for development. However, the tracts were instead acquired by the Boeing Company, to which they were also adjacent. The Boeing Company expanded its large industrial manufacturing plant onto the acquired tracts, and provided sewer service to them through its own system. Because the tracts remained in the improvement district, it levied ad valorem taxes against them. Due to the nature of Boeing’s improvements upon these tracts, Boeing paid 75 to 80% of all ad valorem taxes levied by the improvement district, even though it obtained no services from the improvement district. Boeing sought an injunction against the taxes, arguing that the improvement district could not tax it when it received no benefits from the improvement district. The district court granted the injunction, finding the improvement district act under which the taxes were levied unconstitutional as
applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Boeing was required to exhaust administrative remedies through the State Board of Tax Appeals. The case was tried to the Board of Tax Appeals, where Boeing again argued that the lack of any benefits from the improvement district prevented it from assessing Boeing property. The Board of Tax Appeals denied relief to Boeing, which under the state's procedural law filed an appeal to the Sedgwick County District Court. That Court reversed, and held that the taxes which had been paid by Boeing were unlawful and should be refunded. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court and affirmed the Board of Tax Appeals, holding that Boeing obtained sufficient indirect benefits to permit assessment under the improvement district act.

Party Represented: The Boeing Company

Participation: In the first round of cases (the injunction action), I joined the case a few weeks before the trial to the district court, to assist Mr. Darrell Warta. I did final pre-trial preparation, and assisted him at trial (principally handling the legal arguments). I wrote the brief on appeal, which he argued. Although Mr. Warta remained involved in the second round of cases (the tax appeal), I did all of the pre-trial work and handled the trial to the Board of Tax Appeals, as well as writing the brief for both appeals and arguing both appeals (to the District Court and the Supreme Court).

Final Disposition: Taxes assessed


Name of court and judge: Sedgwick County District Court, Judge C. Robert Bell, and the Kansas State Board of Tax Appeals. The case was appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court twice, once after an administrative appeal to the Sedgwick County District Court, Judge Keith Anderson, and an appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals.

Name and address of co-counsel and defense counsel:

Co-Counsel:
Darrell Warta, Partner, Foulston & Siefkin, 100 N. Broadway, Suite 700, Wichita, Kansas

Defense Counsel:
Counsel for Sedgwick County in the District Court case and appeal was Tom Powell and Roger Theis, Hinkle, Eberhart & Elkouri, 301 N. Main, Suite 2000, Wichita, Kansas
Counsel for Sedgwick County in the Board of Tax Appeals case and appeal was Patricia Parker, Assistant County Counselor, Sedgwick County Courthouse, 525 N. Main, Wichita, Kansas


Citations: Sedgwick County District Court Case Number: 91 C 3106; Kansas Court of Appeals Case Number 93-69398-A.

Summary: Rev. Moore, a widower, bequeathed his entire estate to three Christian publishing houses to republish specified 18th century theological works. His son and daughter, who were omitted entirely from the revocable trust and will, challenged the same alleging they were the product of an insane delusion. The evidence showed that Rev. Moore was eccentric, a devoted student of old
934

theological writers (having amassed a large collection of their works), and
estranged from his children, particularly his son (who was eccentric himself,
having changed his name from Richard Moore to Haven O'More). The case was
tried to the bench. The judge found the trust and will valid and upheld their
provisions.

Party Represented: Beneficiaries of the Estate: Kregel Publications, Baker Book
House, and the Baptist Standard Bearer.

Participation: I was aligned with counsel for the Estate, Mr. William Trebar. He
took the lead in discovery and trial, on behalf of the estate, but I actively
participated in discovery and the trial of the case, including putting on the
testimony of my own witnesses during trial. On appeal, the Trust and the
beneficiaries filed a joint brief, the preparation of which Mr. Trebar took the lead.
He also argued the case on appeal; I did not appear or make argument.

Final Disposition: Provisions of the will and trust were upheld


Name of court and judge: Sedgwick County District Court, Judge William Rustin;
Kansas Court of Appeals

Name and address of co-counsel and defense counsel:

Co-Counsel:
William Trebar, Fleeson, Gooing, Coulson & Kitch, 125 N. Market, Suite
1600, Wichita, Kansas

Defense Counsel:
Jerry Bogle, Young, Bogle, McCausland, 106 W. Douglas, Suite 923,
Wichita, Kansas

7. In re Application of American Restaurant Operations
Citations: Sedgwick County District Court Case Numbers 92 C 514 (injunction
action) and 92 C 653 (interlocutory review); Board of Tax Appeals Docket
Numbers: 91-12236-TG through 91-12261-TG, 91-11740-TG through 91-11745-
TG, 92-14113-TG, and 91-13522-PR through 91-13527-PR; Sedgwick County
District Court Case (on appeal) Case Number: 93 C 512; Supreme Court decision

Summary: American Restaurant Operations and related parties owned several
Grandy's restaurants, which were managed by Restaurant Management Company
(both names, and other entities' names, appear a various times in these
proceedings). The Sedgwick County appraiser audited the personal property tax
returns of the restaurants, and assessed substantial additional tax. Substantively,
these related cases challenged the factual accuracy of the personal property tax
audit. However, the majority of the litigation involved a variety of legal issues
involving interpretation of the relevant tax statutes and related procedural and
discovery statutes. The restaurants filed an injunction action against the additional
assessments, and also filed proceedings before the State Board of Tax Appeals.
The cases were substantively prosecuted initially before the Board of Tax
Appeals. The factual matters were settled or resolved, save a dispute regarding
the legal effect of Sedgwick County's purported interim abatement of taxes.
Principally, the case proceeded regarding the effect of legislative action.
shortening the period during which assessments for prior years could be made, the
dates from which the relevant periods for assessment were measured, the effect
and amount of penalties assigned to the value of non-reported property, and the
appropriateness of discovery sanctions imposed against the county appraiser’s
office. These matters were largely resolved in the taxpayer’s favor, at the Board
of Tax Appeals, on appeal to the District Court, and on appeal to the Supreme
Court. The courts’ decisions were noteworthy principally for their resolution of
these various legal issues relating to personal property tax audits.

Party Represented: the various restaurant entities
Participation: although I was assisted at various stages by various of my partners, I
essentially had sole responsibility for the case.
Final Disposition: Settled or resolved
Name of court and judge: Various aspects of this case were brought to the Kansas
State Board of Tax Appeals, on appeal (and, collaterally, on injunction and
interlocutory review) to the Sedgwick County District Court, Judge William
Rustin, and to the Kansas Supreme Court.
Name and address of co-counsel and defense counsel:
Defense Counsel:
Clarence Holeman, Assistant County Counselor, Sedgwick County
Courthouse, 525 N. Main, Wichita, Kansas
Thomas Docking, Morris, Laing, Evans, Brock & Kennedy, 200 W. Douglas,
4th Floor, Wichita, Kansas

8. In re Application for Exemption of Hays Medical Center
Citations: Board of Tax Appeals Docket No: 1999-1875-TX
Summary: Hays Medical Center is a tax-exempt hospital. It had built an addition to
its main medical campus, virtually doubling the size, which contained both
traditional hospital functions as well as a variety of medical offices. Ostensibly,
this case regarded the qualification of that expansion for property tax exemption.
In reality, however, the case involved the evolving role of what constitutes a
“hospital” in rural areas. To be exempt under Kansas law, the expansion must be
used exclusively for “hospital purposes.” The Medical Center contended that, in
rural areas with declining medical services, it falls upon the hospitals not only
provide traditional hospital services, but also to recruit and retain physicians and
specialists to adequately provide a broad array of medical services. The Medical
Center, various state health care agencies, and the Kansas Hospital Association
offered evidence and testimony of what a rural hospital was required to do in
order to successfully recruit and retain such physicians and specialists. The
medical offices in the expansion were proffered as being used, in this context, for
(rural) hospital purposes. In what has become a widely quoted decision, the
Board of Tax Appeals recognized the expanded scope required of rural hospitals
in these times, found the entire facility to be used exclusively for hospital
services, and granted the exemption.

Party Represented: Hays Medical Center

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Participation: My partner and co-counsel, Mr. Stanley Andeel, was the Medical Center’s principal outside counsel, but he relied on me almost entirely to prepare the case; and although he was present when it was tried, he did not participate in the presentation of our case.

Final Disposition: Exemption granted

Dates of representation: 1998 through 1999

Name of court and judge: Kansas State Board of Tax Appeals

Name and address of co-counsel and defense counsel:

Co-Counsel:
Stanley G. Andeel, Senior Partner, Foulston & Siefkin, 100 N. Broadway,
Suite 700, Wichita, Kansas 67202

Defense Counsel:
William Jeter, Counsel for Ellis County, P.O. Box 128, Hays, Kansas
H. Phillip Elwood, Counsel for amicus curiae the Kansas Hospital
Association, Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds and Palmer, 515 S. Kansas Avenue,
Topeka, Kansas


Citations: Board of Tax Appeals Docket Numbers: 94-3901-TG to 94-3909-TG; 94-7221-PR to 94-7237-PR; 94-10091 PR to 94-10099PR; Ford County District Court Case No: 96 C 14; Kansas Supreme Court Mandamus Number: 96-76643-S; Kansas Court of Appeals Decision reported at 26 Kan. App.2d 395, 985 P.2d 725 (1999); review denied (by the Kansas Supreme Court), December 21, 1999, Docket Number 1997-80114-AS.

Summary: Curtis Machine was a manufacturer which struggled with insolvency throughout much of the 1980s. Its property taxes were not paid during that period of time. It recovered, and in the early 1990s paid its past due property taxes. Under Kansas law, property taxes must be protested (as to the value) when paid, or they may not be challenged. Curtis Machine paid its delinquent property taxes under protest. Ford County, Kansas, challenged its ability to do so, arguing that earlier court orders foreclosing the delinquent property taxes, which orders had become final, precluded any further court proceedings on the subject matter of the taxes. The issue regarding whether foreclosed taxes could later, upon payment, be challenged as to amount had never been addressed clearly in Kansas law, and the litigation through the district court and the states’ appellate courts were solely regarding this jurisdictional question. The published Court of Appeals decision held that, since the foreclosure court’s order did not address the subject matter of the value of the taxed property, that order could not be a bar to subsequent valuation challenges. The cases were remanded for trial on their factual issues. In 2002 the parties settled the remaining issues.

Party Represented: Curtis Machine Company

Participation: Although I was assisted in the preparation of my appeal briefs, principally by my partner James Oliver of Foulston & Siefkin, I otherwise was sole counsel in this case.

Final Disposition: remanded for trial on factual issues; remaining issues settled

Dates of representation: 1993 through 2002
Name of court and judge: The case was tried to the Kansas State Board of Tax Appeals; appealed to the Ford County District Court, Judge Jay Don Reynolds; appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals; appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court (seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus); and remanded for retrial.

Name and address of co-counsel and defense counsel:

Co-Counsel:
James Oliver, Foulston & Siefkin, 100 N. Broadway, Suite 700, Wichita, Kansas 67202

Defense Counsel:
Terry Fuller, P.O. Box 314, Kinsley, Kansas
Glenn Kerba, P.O. Box 1473, Dodge City, Kansas


Citations: Board of Tax Appeals Docket Number: 96-6307-EQ. Sedgwick County District Court Case Number: 98 C 2178

Summary: Corporate Hills Hotel Associates owned a Marriott hotel in Wichita, Kansas. It filed this case to challenge its ad valorem real estate appraisal. The property was valued based upon the income from operations. The dispute between the parties was how that income was to be segregated between the tangible, taxable real and personal property, and the intangible (and non-taxable) business operations of the hotel. At the time of trial, this issue was receiving a great deal of national attention in the field. Corporate Hills Hotel Associates proffered a methodology of valuing a franchise which was sponsored by the Marriott International Vice President in charge of hotel development. The taxing jurisdiction relied upon a methodology then being used by tax appraisers, which alleged that the franchise value was fully accounted for by deducting franchise fees from the income. Although that approach was met with some skepticism by the triers of fact (and by the taxing authorities own witnesses), the trier of fact also determined that the hotel did not carry its burden of quantifying a franchise value separate from the property values, and so upheld the assessment.

Party Represented: Corporate Hills Hotel Associates

Participation: I essentially had sole responsibility for the case.

Final Disposition: Assessment upheld

Dates of representation: 1996 through 1999

Name of court and judge: Kansas State Board of Tax Appeals, appealed to the Sedgwick County District Court, Judge Karl Friedel

Name and address of co-counsel and defense counsel:

Defense Counsel:
Patricia Parker, Assistant County Counselor, Sedgwick County Courthouse, 525 N. Main, Wichita, Kansas

20. Legal Activities: Describe the most significant legal activities you have pursued, including significant litigation which did not progress to trial or legal matters that did not involve litigation. Describe fully the nature of your participation in these activities. Please list any client(s) or organization(s) for whom you performed lobbying activities and describe the lobbying activities you performed on behalf of such client(s) or
organizations(s). (Note: As to any facts requested in this question, please omit any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.)

As United States Attorney, the most significant legal activities I have been involved in would include the following:

Review and presentation of several “death-eligible” cases to the Attorney General’s Capital Crimes Unit, including two cases in which I personally participated in discussions with the CCU at the Department of Justice, for both of which the Attorney General directed that the death penalty be sought: *U.S. v. Scott Cheever* (defendant charged with the murder of a Kansas sheriff in connection with his operation of a meth lab – for complicated reasons the federal capital trial was declared a mistrial in the midst of jury selection and the defense motion for a several month continuance granted, and the federal case was ultimately dismissed and the case prosecuted in state court with substantial assistance from two Assistant United States Attorneys; the death sentence was imposed); and *U.S. v. Jason Tisdale* (case scheduled for trial in 2009). I also participated in the process in the case of *U.S. v. Demetrius Hargrove* for which the Attorney General also directed that the death penalty be sought (the jury convicted, but recommended life). Although not a trial attorney in these cases, my involvement in the capital consideration issues was substantial.

The most significant corporate fraud case prosecuted by this office is *U.S. v. David Wittig and Douglas Lake*. Mr. Wittig and Mr. Lake were the top officers in the Kansas utility Westar, and were ultimately charged in a multi-count indictment alleging a multi-faceted and complex scheme to loot the company of nearly $100 million. When the investigation first began, Westar fired the executives, hired the law firm of Debevoise & Plimpton to conduct an independent investigation. The independent investigators consulted with us regarding areas of inquiry, waived any privilege which might attach to their investigation, and spent a full day with my trial team and me reviewing their findings. Although not a member of the trial team, I was heavily involved in the investigation and strategic development of this case from the beginning, and on two separate occasions lead a settlement conference with defense lawyers in unsuccessful attempts to resolve the prosecution.

Mark Spencer was an army veteran who suffered from schizophrenia and had a history of alcohol and drug abuse. He resided in a medical ward at the Fort Leavenworth Veterans Administration hospital. He was arrested one day in the community for acting out, and because he had VA identification on him, the local police took him to the Emergency Room at the VA hospital. There, a doctor advised that he could be incarcerated. While in the jail, he became agitated and was pepper sprayed at least once. He then stepped up onto his bunk and leaped into the wall, rendering himself a quadriplegic. Expert testimony, including our own, opined that the VA doctor deviated from the standard of care by not admitting him for observation but by releasing him for incarceration without any follow-up. Mr. Spencer was in his 30s and would require significant life-time care. He sued (*Spencer v. U.S.*) demanding close to 11 million dollars. The case was expertly handled by two of my civil AUSAs, but we determined
that a settlement of the case for less than a million dollars would not be possible. Due to limitations on settlement authority, plaintiff’s counsel required my personal involvement, and I lead lengthy settlement negotiations involving plaintiff’s counsel, counsel for the VA, and the Department of Justice Torts branch. Ultimately, I was able to negotiate a structured settlement for far less than the demand amount, which placed much of the settlement in a reversionary medical trust. The trust protected the interests of the United States both by insuring that the plaintiff would not bankrupt himself by prematurely spending all of the money and falling back on the welfare of the United States and the VA, and by ensuring that if plaintiff died earlier than expected with money remaining in the trust the balance would revert to the United States.

AKAL Security, Inc. was awarded a series of U.S. Army contracts to provide security guards for Army posts. Three company employees who worked as AKAL guards at Ft. Riley, Kansas, filed a qui tam suit charging that AKAL defrauded the United States by failing to property train the guards as required and failing to man the security posts as represented, among other items. My office intervened and took over the suit, which grew to include eight military installations. Although all aspects of the charges were vigorously contested by AKAL, and negotiations for settlement overtook the completion of exhaustive investigations at each of the eight posts, we estimated that AKAL’s liability (including doubled damages under law) could exceed $35 million, which was in excess of AKAL’s net worth. The position of our client, the Army, was that putting AKAL out of business would create security problems for it (AKAL had largely corrected its deficiencies and was continuing to provide security at the posts). I personally lead settlement negotiations on behalf of all eight U.S. Attorney’s offices with AKAL’s senior officers and counsel. AKAL’s opening settlement offer had been a low seven figure sum. After extensive negotiations, I recommended a much higher settlement to Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Peter Keisler. He, and the Associate Attorney General William Mercer instructed that additional negotiations should occur, which were lead by the Civil Section of USDOD, with assistance from the Eastern District of Kentucky and my office (though with less involvement from me). An ultimate settlement of $18 million was agreed upon by all parties.

As a private lawyer, I specialized in business and tax related issues, both litigation and transactional. The prior question (Question 19) discusses some of my litigation. Other significant legal activities that I pursued as a private lawyer, during a time frame of 8 to 12 years ago, would include the following (because of the age and the non-public nature of these matters, my descriptions are of necessity briefer and more generalized):

I was the principal attorney for a large machine shop company with facilities in two states which supported the aviation industry prominent in Wichita. During the later years of my representation the company was struggling with its financing arrangements, and during my last years in private practice I re-negotiated a high eight figure credit restructure with its consortium of lenders.

An accounting firm with which I worked a great deal (and whom I also represented) referred an agri-businessman to me to negotiate, document and close the low eight figure
sale and purchase of a regional meat packing facility. I was the sole lawyer on the
transaction.

In connection with my legal partners, we represented a developing hotel chain. My
principal area of responsibility was monitoring and processing its financial arrangements
with its lenders for the construction of each new hotel, including issuing opinion letters
required for each such transactional financing. I was not the principal attorney for the
hotel chain, but did have primary responsibility for this particular piece of our
representation.

In the mid-1990s, I provided testimony to the Kansas legislature on one or two occasions
regarding changes to state procedural tax issues on behalf of the Kansas Bar Association.
I have no files from that, and do not even have precise dates. I testified as a tax lawyer,
and not as a lobbyist. I have never been registered as a lobbyist for anyone, have never
lobbied for anyone, and other than this issue had never performing any activities which
could be construed as similar to lobbying.

21. **Teaching:** What courses have you taught? For each course, state the title, the institution
at which you taught the course, the years in which you taught the course, and describe
briefly the subject matter of the course and the major topics taught. If you have a
syllabus of each course, please provide four (4) copies to the committee.

Other than the professional speeches regarding legal issues, listed above in question
13.d, I have not taught any courses.

22. **Deferred Income/ Future Benefits:** List the sources, amounts and dates of all
anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock, options, uncompleted
contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from previous business
relationships, professional services, firm memberships, former employers, clients or
customers. Please describe the arrangements you have made to be compensated in the
future for any financial or business interest.

I have retirement plan accounts which I own and to which (other than my TSP account) I
have been the sole contributor, but I have no rights or expectations to any deferred
income or future benefits from any third party.

23. **Outside Commitments During Court Service:** Do you have any plans, commitments,
or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your
service with the court? If so, explain.

No.

24. **Sources of Income:** List sources and amounts of all income received during the
calendar year preceding your nomination and for the current calendar year, including all
salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents, honoraria, and other
items exceeding $500 or more (if you prefer to do so, copies of the financial disclosure report, required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, may be substituted here.)


25. **Statement of Net Worth**: Please complete the attached financial net worth statement in detail (add schedules as called for).

See attached Net Worth Statement.

26. **Potential Conflicts of Interest**:

a. Identify the parties, categories of litigation, and financial arrangements that are likely to present potential conflicts-of-interest during your initial service in the position to which you have been nominated. Explain how you would address any such conflict if it were to arise.

Other than possible litigation involving close personal friends or family members (none of which is anticipated), and cases from the U.S. Attorney's office immediately after my departure I foresee no conflicts of interest.

b. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including the procedure you will follow in determining these areas of concern.

I will address all potential conflicts which are brought to my attention or which I detect *suo sponte* in accordance with established law on judicial recusal and in compliance with the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.

27. **Pro Bono Work**: An ethical consideration under Canon 2 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility calls for "every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, to find some time to participate in serving the disadvantaged." Describe what you have done to fulfill these responsibilities, listing specific instances and the amount of time devoted to each.

I was the incorporator, a director, and a volunteer of the Wichita Christian Legal Aid, Inc. from its inception until my appointment as U.S. Attorney. This organization works with local aid societies (e.g., Union Rescue Mission; World Impact Village) by providing regularly scheduled times to meet with *pro bono* clients at their facilities to provide counsel and legal advice. On one occasion I was requested by a local judge to provide *pro bono* service to an elderly, low income couple with a state tax problem. I have provided legal aid to a few low income individuals from a mission church in an impoverished area of town (this was through an informal program which grew into the Wichita Christian Legal Aid, Inc.). In connection with my volunteer work with nonprofit agencies (e.g., the Mental Health Association) or my own church, I have occasionally provided free legal service to low income individuals referred to me. I have
been asked to mediate a heated dispute between members of an African-American church, for which I only charged expenses (but not my time). The amount of time devoted to these activities has not been consistent but varies widely.

28. **Selection Process:**

a. Please describe your experience in the entire judicial selection process, from beginning to end (including the circumstances which led to your nomination and the interviews in which you participated). Is there a selection commission in your jurisdiction to recommend candidates for nomination to the federal courts? If so, please include that process in your description, as well as whether the commission recommended your nomination. List the dates of all interviews or communications you had with the White House staff or the Justice Department regarding this nomination. Please do not include any contacts with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning your nomination.

There is no selection commission in Kansas for federal judges. In January of 2008 I contacted both Kansas Senators, Sen. Sam Brownback and Sen. Pat Roberts, to express my interest in this position. They jointly recommended me to the President. On March 17, 2008 I interviewed for this position with staff from the White House Counsel’s office and the Department of Justice. I had subsequent conversations with staff from the Department of Justice regarding the nomination paperwork. My nomination was forwarded to the Senate on July 23, 2008.

b. Has anyone involved in the process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any currently pending or specific case, legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as seeking any express or implied assurances concerning your position on such case, issue, or question? If so, please explain fully.

I have had no such discussion with anyone.
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
NOMINATION FILING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Person Reporting (Last name, First, Middle Initial)</th>
<th>2. Court or Organization</th>
<th>3. Date of Report</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Melgren, Eric F.</td>
<td>U.S. District Court, D. Kansas</td>
<td>07/24/2008</td>
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<tr>
<th>4. Title (Article 11 Judge indicates active or associate status; Magistrate judges indicate full- or part-time)</th>
<th>5. Report Type (check appropriate type)</th>
<th>6. Reporting Period</th>
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<td>District Judge - Nominator</td>
<td>Initial</td>
<td>05/05/2007</td>
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<tr>
<th>7. Chambers or Office Address</th>
<th>8. Position (check appropriate type)</th>
<th>9. Addressing Officer</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Attorney Office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301 N. Main, Ste 1200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wichita, Kansas 67202</td>
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**IMPORTANT NOTES:** The instructions accompanying this form must be followed. Complete all parts, checking the NO box for each part where you have no reportable information. Signs last page.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. POSITIONS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 3-15 of instructions)</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>NONE (No reportable positions.)</th>
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<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANIZATION/ENTITY</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>II. AGREEMENTS. (Reporting individual only; see pp. 16-18 of instructions)</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>NONE (No reportable agreements.)</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PARTIES AND TERMS</th>
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</table>
III. NON-INVESTMENT INCOME. (Reporting individual and spouse; see pp. 17-24 of instructions)

A. Filer's Non-Investment Income

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<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
<th>INCOME</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1.2007</td>
<td>Family farm, sale of wheat</td>
<td>$1,454</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

B. Spouse's Non-Investment Income – If you were married during any portion of the reporting year, complete this section. (Either amount not required except for bonuses.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE AND TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1.2008</td>
<td>West Evangelical Free Church, salary</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2007</td>
<td>West Evangelical Free Church, salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. REIMBURSEMENTS – transportation, lodging, food, entertainment.

(Include those to spouse and dependent children; see pp. 25-27 of instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1.</td>
<td>EXEMPT</td>
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<td>SOURCE</td>
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**VI. LIABILITIES.** (Includes those of spouse and dependent children, see pp. 15-16 of Instructions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDITOR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE CODE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>A. Description of Assets (Including trust assets)</td>
<td>B. Income during reporting period</td>
<td>C. Gross value at end of reporting period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan &quot;VC&quot; after each asset except from prior disclosure</td>
<td>(1) Amount (Code 1)</td>
<td>(2) Type (Code 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ass Equitable Variable Life Insurance</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Investment</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Vanguard PRIMA Conservative Growth</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Vanguard Windsor II Fund</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. American Century Value Investments</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Vanguard LifeStrategy Moderate Growth</td>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Income Code: C01
2. Value Code: C02
3. Income Code: C03
4. Value Code: C04

1. Income: 0.00 or less
2. Value: 0.00 or less

VerDate Nov 24 2008   10:03 May 29, 2009   Jkt 048894   PO 00000   Frm 00954 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601   S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48894.TXT   SJUD1   PsN: CMORC

946
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Page 5 of 6

VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR EXPLANATIONS. (Indicate part of Report)

III.A. Additional Non-Investment Income was earned during the reporting period as salary from the United States Government.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT
Page 6 of 5

IX. CERTIFICATION.

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not reported was withheld because it was not applicable or necessary pursuant to prevailing law or regulation.

I further certify that no income from3 appointee employment and bonuses and the acceptance of gifts which have been reported are in compliance with the provisions of 2 U.S.C. app. § 901 et seq., 3 U.S.C. § 1729, and Judicial Conference regulations.

Signature

NOTE: Any individual who knowingly and wilfully falsifies or fails to file this report may be subject to civil and criminal sanctions (2 U.S.C. app. § 104).

FILING INSTRUCTIONS
Mail signed original and 3 additional copies to:
Committee on Financial Disclosure
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Suite 2-301
One Columbus Circle N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20544
# FINANCIAL STATEMENT

## NET WORTH

Provide a complete, current financial net worth statement which itemizes in detail all assets (including bank accounts, real estate, securities, trusts, investments, and other financial holdings) and all liabilities (including debts, mortgages, loans, and other financial obligations) of yourself, your spouse, and other immediate members of your household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>LIABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand and in banks</td>
<td>3  120 Notes payable to banks-secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to banks-unsecured 15  856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed securities-add schedule</td>
<td>Notes payable to relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted securities—add schedule</td>
<td>Note payable to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts and notes receivable:</td>
<td>Accounts and bills due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from relatives and friends</td>
<td>Unpaid income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from others</td>
<td>Other unpaid income and interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Real estate mortgages payable-add schedule 97  740</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real estate owned-add schedule</td>
<td>160 000 Charter mortgages and other loans payable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real estate mortgages receivable</td>
<td>Other debt-items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets and other personal property</td>
<td>42  000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash value-list insurance</td>
<td>6  655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets itemize:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401(k) Vanguard Group</td>
<td>145  792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSP account</td>
<td>163  278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of America IRA (spouse)</td>
<td>2  530 Total liabilities 113  596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net Worth 409  779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets</td>
<td>523  375 Total liabilities and net worth 523  375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

| As endorser, co-maker or guarantor    | Are any assets pledged? (Add schedule) YES |
| On loans or contracts                 | Are you defendant in any suits or legal actions? YES |
| Legal Claims                          | Have you ever taken bankruptcy? NO         |
| Provision for Federal Income Tax      |                                           |
| Other special debt                    |                                           |
FINANCIAL STATEMENT
NET WORTH SCHEDULES

Real Estate Owned
Personal residence $ 160,000

Real Estate Mortgages Payable
Personal residence $ 97,740

Assets pledged: My only asset pledged is my home
Lawsuits: Suits have been filed against me in my capacity as U.S. Attorney.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Eric F. Melgren, do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.

8/5/08
(DATE)

(NAME)

CINDY McKEE
Notary Public - State of Kansas
My Aptr. Expires 5/19/2009

(NOTARY)
Chairman LEAHY. Let me ask sort of a basic question of all of you. Again, both Senator Specter and I have been trial lawyers. Those who have, when you come into a courtroom, you look at the judge and you say, whether on plaintiff, defendant, government, or non-government, no matter who I'm representing, I kind of look at that judge and say, okay, I'm going to get a fair trial. Win, lose or draw, it's going to be a fair trial.

What assurances—and I'm going to ask the same question of each of you—that everybody coming into your courtroom—because we ask this question because you're the only undemocratic branch of our government. You're not elected and it's a lifetime appointment. What assurances that they'll be treated fairly regardless of race, gender, religion, political beliefs, or anything else? Can you point to anything specific in your background that would demonstrate that commitment? I'll start with you, Mr. Trenga.

Mr. TRENGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can certainly give you that assurance without any reservation or qualification. I've worked with people and have lived in a variety of circumstances that have allowed me to work with a wide diversity of people. Within the community, I have attempted to participate in activities that were dedicated to the proposition of treating people fairly and to address inequalities.

Within my own practice, I have attempted to represent all people of whatever means they may have. My practice has been broad. I've represented plaintiffs, I've represented defendants, I've represented indigent defendants, I've represented defendants of means, plaintiffs of means.

I've represented large corporations, small corporations, employees, managers, and I've not restricted my practice in any way to either plaintiffs or defendants, whether it be securities fraud cases, or employment cases, or personal injury cases. I think it is an enormous—of utmost importance that the process be perceived as credible, and in order to be credible the process has to be—the person involved in the process has to do precisely what you say, and that is treat all people fairly and without regard to station or office.

Chairman LEAHY. I wish to underscore that, because if courts—Federal courts especially—give the impression that they won't treat you fairly, the whole system breaks down. When people lose respect for the courts, it totally breaks down in this country. We are a country of the rule of law. If we can't trust our courts, they get their reputation, then we've all lost. It makes no difference what our political parties are or our position in the country.

Judge Jones, the same question to you. Can you give that assurance? Can you point to things in your own background that would demonstrate commitment to that assurance?

Mr. JONES. Without any equivocation whatsoever, I can make that commitment, Chairman Leahy. Thank you again for the opportunity to be here and participate in this process.

Two things. First, my reputation. I trusted my reputation through all of the reports that have been returned from the endorsements by the various Bar Associations, the questionnaires, the American Bar Association. All of those things combined would demonstrate my reputation for being an individual who has always
been fair and equitable in treatment of all persons who appeared before me, and all entities which appeared before me.

I also know that by reason of my experience many, many years ago as an Assistant Public Defender, I always promised myself, if I was ever able to achieve the level of being a judge, I would treat lawyers and litigants the same way I would want to be treated as a lawyer, and if I ever was a litigant, the same way. I am duty-bound to do that, sir.

Chairman Leahy. That is important. I remember one thing that Senator Thurmond would say to everybody, and it didn't care who was President. He said, remember your power as a judge. A lot of litigants will only be in a Federal courthouse once. They're not like those of us who may practice law. They're only going to be there once, and their whole view of the criminal justice or the civil justice system of our country is going to be based on that one time. That's an awesome responsibility a judge has, an awesome responsibility of the lawyers as litigants, too, but also for the judge to demonstrate clearly that he's not favoring one side or the other.

Judge Goldberg, how would you answer that question?

Mr. Goldberg. First, Senator, you have my word that I will be fair and impartial, and I'll give you an example that I'm very proud of. When I first came to the Court of Common Pleas of Buck's County in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, I had previously been an Assistant United States Attorney, a Federal prosecutor for some time, and further back in my career, a State prosecutor. So when I came to the Buck's County Courthouse, as you can imagine, the Public Defender's Office, they were a little bit wary of, what kind of sentencer was I going to be, was I going to be pro-prosecution, pro-defense.

We have proceedings in our courthouse, trials go to certain judges, and then those persons who want to plead guilty go to other judges. Initially, there was a reluctance—I think rightly, because the lawyers and the public defenders didn't know much about me. They were reluctant to plead in front of me.

But shortly after I took the bench, the head of the Public Defender's Office came to our president and judge and said, we have a great comfort level with Judge Goldberg. We know that he is going to—has put aside his prior background as a prosecutor. He's been fair. He's exhibited that fairness and we're comfortable bringing our clients in front of him for plea proceedings. Even as a former State and Federal prosecutor, that was a very high compliment to me.

The other—the second way I'd answer that question, Senator, is I've represented a wide range of litigants, not only as a State and Federal prosecutor, but I've also, in private practice, represented criminal defendants, and in civil practice, small business owners up to large corporations. So, I have the perspective of all kinds of litigants that would come into my courtroom.

Chairman Leahy. Thank you very, very much, Judge Goldberg. Mr. Slomsky.

Mr. Slomsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can assure you also that I will be very fair and very courteous to all litigants and lawyers that come into my courtroom. I have practiced law for 37 years in our Federal courts. I was a prosecutor, I've been a defense
attorney. I have represented people from practically every socio-economic level in this country, different ethnic backgrounds. I’ve interacted with so many people and I’ve learned the necessity of treating everyone fairly, and not only my clients, but also prosecutors I’ve interacted with, and fellow lawyers. I can assure you that, based upon my experience, everyone will be treated fairly in my courtroom.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Mr. Melgren, I might put extra emphasis on the question that Judge Goldberg responded to. You’re going to be going, if you’re confirmed, from a U.S. Attorney to a judge who will, the way our dockets go today, have to be handling a lot of cases from a U.S. Attorney.

Now, I assume it’s easy enough to answer the obvious questions about recusal in cases that you may have been involved with. But how do you demonstrate your impartiality, and what is there in your background that would give credibility to that?

Mr. MELGREN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for the question, because I do think the issue of both judicial impartiality and a comfort with the litigants before the jurist that he or she is impartial goes to the heart of the integrity of our process.

It has been my honor to represent the U.S. Government for the last 6 years as a U.S. Attorney, but prior to that in my days of private practice, my practice was characterized principally as a tax litigant. As was noted when I was sworn into this office, in that role I typically was adverse to the U.S. Government, so I actually have probably had more years of suing them than of defending them.

I’ve been pleased, as this process has progressed along, to have been stopped several times in our courthouse, even by our Federal public defenders, to wish me well and to tell me that they believed and had every confidence that I would be a good judge and they wished me well in the process.

I was pleased to discover in the American Bar Review that several people had made comments, and I was told one that included a longstanding, well-regarded senior attorney in our community, a member of the American College, who I have on many occasions debated various issues with in public forums, Rotary Clubs and such. He told the Bar Review that he and I may be on opposite ends of an ideological spectrum, but he would have no hesitation at all in entrusting a matter to me as a judge and believing he’d be treated fairly.

Chairman LEAHY. I read the Bar Association—you had the highest rating they can give.

Senator Specter.

Senator SPECTER. The critical questions which are customarily asked are whether you will interpret the law as opposed to making the law, and whether you will follow the statutory requirements, or if the matter is governed by appellate decisions, will you follow those without regard to your own personal opinions?

Mr. Melgren.

Mr. MELGREN. Thank you, Senator Specter. Certainly you and this Committee have my commitment that, if I am confirmed in this as a judge, my commitment is to follow the law. I have great
pride in the fact that we are a Nation of laws and that we are governed by laws, and that as a trial judge it would be our duty to interpret the law as this Congress has passed it and has been signed into law as it is written. It's my commitment that that would be my highest goal and obligation, if I were confirmed.

Senator Specter. Mr. Slomsky.

Mr. SLOMSKY. Senator Specter, I certainly concur. I think a judge’s job is to apply the law and put aside any personal feelings and to follow the language of the law, and to make sure that it’s followed. I will do that. I assure you it will be done, and I will respect the process of the law.

Senator Specter. Judge Goldberg.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Senator Specter, I have the greatest respect for the separation of powers. I understand and respect that a judge’s role is not to be a policymaker or to legislate. That is the role of the legislature. You have my commitment that I will strictly apply the statutes and the precedent.

Senator Specter. Judge Jones.

Mr. JONES. Senator Specter, I concur again with my colleagues here. I also commit that I have demonstrated that same kind of commitment for the last 21 years as a member of the bench in Philadelphia.

Senator Specter. Mr. Trenga.

Mr. TRENGA. Senator Specter, you also have my commitment. It is the role of the court to decide cases based on the law in a transparent, principled way. The statutes that we’re called upon to interpret reflect the legislative judgments that are entitled to respect and deference, and I give you my commitment that I’ll do precisely that.

Senator Specter. Judge Goldberg, there was a removal of a polling place in Buck’s County where you sat on a three-judge panel to decide the matter. There were some concerns expressed that there was an effort to deprive people of the right to vote by moving it from what I believe was a housing project to a more affluent neighborhood because of concerns that there had been a high incidence of crime at the housing project.

Would you explain what happened there, what your role was and why your decision was made as it was?

Mr. GOLDBERG. Sure. The Board of Elections in Buck’s County made a recommendation to move a polling place. I believe the distance was less than one-half a mile. Their recommendation, as I understood it, was based on the fact that there had been high incidence of crime in the one polling place. That decision has to be affirmed by the Commissioners of Buck’s County. But it was during an election year, so for obvious reasons they could not stand in and affirm that recommendation.

I believe what occurred then, is the president judge of our court asked myself and two other judges, Judge Lawlor and Judge Mellon, to hear the evidence and decide whether the Board of Elections was acting properly. We heard the evidence. I won’t go into great detail here, but it was, as I said, that there had been high incidence of crime, and also that the move was only a half-mile and that would not cause a huge inconvenience to the voters who had to move from one polling place to another.
Given that evidence, I deferred to—and I don’t believe technically I was sitting as a judge. I was sitting as a member of the Board of Elections. Given that evidence, I did what I do in all the cases that I sit: I weighed the evidence, I listened carefully, and decided that the Board of Elections was acting properly. That was my vote, and that was the vote of Judge Lawlor and Judge Mellon as well.

Senator Specter. I think we have time for one question on the substance.

Chairman Leahy. Ask all the questions you want.

Senator Specter. Well, when they ring the bells and you have 15 minutes to get to vote, there’s 5 minutes of grace period. But they haven’t rung the bell yet, so I will ask a question which we customarily reserve for Supreme Court nominees. Chairman Leahy and this Committee and I have been engaged in very heavy lifting on the question of the warrantless wire tap program which the President has instituted on his Article 2 powers as Commander in Chief, which is in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act which requires judicial approval.

When the matter came before the District Court Judge in Detroit who declared it unconstitutional, that’s a pretty big decision for a District Court judge, when the Congress and the President are battling over expansion of executive authority.

How would you tackle an issue like that, Judge Goldberg?

Mr. Goldberg. It’s a very complicated issue, obviously, Senator. I would approach it, I think, like I approached all cases, which is to study the statute first, know it backwards and forwards, and then study all of the precedent around that and try to give the truest meaning to the statute.

Senator Specter. I’ve already told you it’s a violation of the statute. Now you have to decide whether the President’s Article 2 powers are sufficient. That’s a judgment call on Al Qaeda, the atmosphere, and all the surrounding circumstances. You don’t have a whole lot to go on here. Will you have any hesitancy in declaring it unconstitutional because you’re only a District Court judge and you’re bucking the President of the United States?

Mr. Goldberg. I’d have to read and study the statute, Senator. But after doing that, if I concluded that the statute was unconstitutional, even though the ramifications would be significant, I would do my job.

Senator Specter. How about it, Mr. Trenga?

Mr. Trenga. If I were confirmed as a District Court judge, I, of course, would look for comfort in the case law as best I could find it in the Supreme Court cases, and in the cases of the Fourth Circuit.

Senator Specter. You might not find any comfort in the case law, in the Sixth Circuit, or in the Tenth Circuit. Let’s see. You’re in the Fourth Circuit?

Mr. Trenga. Fourth Circuit. If there were an absence of guidance, I would, of course, examine what the precise constitutional challenge was. I don’t think it’s ever an easy matter to invalidate a legislative judgment based on a constitutional challenge. Likewise, I would examine the actions that were being challenged as a violation of the Constitution. If, in fact, I was convinced under
the law that there was in fact a constitutional violation, I would—I would so declare.

Senator Specter. A first cousin, Judge Jones, has been the controversy over habeus corpus and the Combat Status Review Board which has been set up by Congress, which involved the abrogation of habeus corpus. When the case came to the Supreme Court, the Miller case—we don’t have time to go into great detail on it, but how would you approach an issue like that as to whether the congressional decision to have a review board was sufficient to guarantee the rights of someone in detention to have a reason stated as to why they were held in detention, contrasted with the customary habeus corpus where the Federal judge makes a determination as opposed to a review board?

Mr. Jones. Mr. Senator, I, if confirmed, would first recognize the very, very high bar of congressional legislation, that it is not something that would be taken lightly, recognizing the status of this great body. It would be, as has been discussed, something that would be taken into consideration based upon all of the requisite applications of constitutional dimension as espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court, and certainly thereafter entertaining all the arguments of all sides. Then I would address the issue.

Senator Specter. Mr. Slomsky, which one of those two questions would you prefer to answer?

[Laughter.]

Chairman Leahy. Because you’ve got to answer one or the other.

Mr. Slomsky. Senator Specter, I believe in an independent judiciary. I have been before many independent judges in my career. I think when you have a constitutional question, a judge has to act with restraint, has to study the law very carefully. I agree with Judge Jones, there is a high bar set. I would want to read the precedent, study the Supreme Court decisions on that area and listen to the arguments of counsel and read the submissions, and then make a decision on what I think is the right thing to do. It’s never easy for a District Judge, I believe, to declare a statute unconstitutional, or something the President did unconstitutional. I think that power has to be used very judiciously.

Senator Specter. Mr. Melgren, do you look forward to being a Federal judge to have an opportunity to weigh these lofty issues?

Mr. Melgren. Well, certainly, Senator Specter, both of your scenarios raise questions of greatest weight that are vested in a judiciary. I think when we’re reviewing, if I’m confirmed, when a judge—any judge—is reviewing an act of Congress, acting under the broad powers that Article 1 of the Constitution gives the Congress, great respect and deference is due to those actions. Likewise, I think the President, under Article 2, is given broad powers and respect and deference is due to those as well. But the courts, under Article 3, do have both the authority and the responsibility to uphold and enforce the Constitution. And although those would not be easy decisions nor ones taken lightly, if I were confirmed as a judge and a matter came before me either from a—from either a congressional enactment or a Presidential action, that my study of the law and listening to arguments of counsel con-
vinced me was unconstitutional, I believe it would be my responsibility to so hold.

Senator Specter. Mr. Melgren, which is your town in Kansas, your residence?

Mr. Melgren. Minneola, Senator. It’s probably 100, 120 miles south of Russell, population 700. My father farmed there and my mother was a nurse in our little 18-bed hospital.

Senator Specter. Well, I knew it was small because I didn’t know about it.

[Laughter.]

And where do you have your office?

Mr. Melgren. As U.S. Attorney?

Senator Specter. As U.S. Attorney.

Mr. Melgren. The District of Kansas is all one district, but there are three Federal courthouses: Wichita, Topeka, and Kansas City. My principal office is in Wichita—that’s the headquarters office of U.S. Attorneys—but we have Assistant U.S. Attorneys at all three courthouse locations.

Senator Specter. I will conclude by a short Senator Thurmond story. Senator Thurmond left the Senate 1 month after his 100th birthday. He still casts a long shadow over our proceedings. The Chairman has quoted him, and I will quote him as well.

On one of the early hearings that I attended on this Committee, Senator Thurmond, in his inimitable voice, said, “Do you promise to be courteous”, which is interpreted to be “do you promise to be courteous?”

[Laughter.]

And then he said, “The more power a person has, the more courteous a person should be.” The more power a person has, the more courteous the person should be.

In Senator Thurmond’s absence, I always—or whenever I can—repeat that admonition, because it’s like Chairman Leahy’s point about impartiality. Judges wear black robes. Fortunately, as Mr. Slomsky talked about, judicial independence is the hallmark of the system. Those of us who have to run for elected office are envious of those of you who enjoy lifetime appointments. Not sufficiently envious so we’d give up the Senate to become a judge.

[Laughter.]

Chairman Leahy. I was going to say, I have, three times, turned down the possibility of being a judge.

Senator Specter. But nonetheless, envious. But when you put on that black robe and you get up in the morning and things haven’t gone exactly your way, there’s a real temptation to not be courteous, a real temptation not to be courteous. Nominees have come to me years after these hearings and have said, I remember what Senator Thurmond said. Keep it in mind.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Leahy. And I appreciate you doing that. I’m going to turn to Senator Brownback in just a moment, but I feel very much the same way, the courteous—the treating everybody alike. I can’t emphasize enough the fact that the people who come in there—there’s some lawyers in there all the time. That’s fine for them. Most litigants will be in there once in their lifetime, and their
whole view of the third branch of government is going to be based on that.

When the Soviet Union broke up, a group from Duma in Russia came to visit with me. They were trying to study something about the independence of our judiciary. I remember very well, one of them said, is it true that people in your country sometimes sue the government? I said, happens all the time. They said, is it also true that sometimes the government loses? I said, yes, it happens often. And do you then replace the judge?

[Laughter.]

I'm serious. It was almost like a lightbulb went on in the room when I explained, no, we don't. I think what Senator Specter—the questions on the Constitution are very, very important because, in these particular things—and I'm not being partisan in saying it.

I have a great deal of concern. Both Senator Specter and I have made comments about this, on habeus corpus, on wire tapping, and everything else. Without going into all the cases, the fact is, in many of them the changes came about only when the judge had the willingness to stand up and say, no matter how much pressure—political pressure or anything else—is being brought, as I read this statute, as I read what is happening, what is happening is unconstitutional and it must stop.

As a practical matter, once those positions were taken, then changes came about. It's because the Federal judiciary stepped in and showed that kind of courage. Among those who have shown the courage are people who have been both Republican and Democratic judges.

Senator Brownback, did you wish to add something? Then I had one other question.

Senator BROWNBACK. Yes, if I could, just briefly. More, it's just a statement following up. First, congratulations to each of you making it this far. This is something that a number of people aspire to and dream about in law school or other iterations, so it's really quite a compliment to you and to your families as well if this moves on through.

Then just, finally, really is a comment along the lines of what Senator Specter said, just a kind of a mentality approach. When you go on to the bench, that's one of the highest positions that the government—the highest positions in the land, and just to maintain a humility about that, that while you are in one of those vaulted positions and it's a position for life, if you're able to make it all the way through the process, just that humility of what that power brings to it. I would hope you would think about it.

I think about that often in a great Nation and where we are one of 100 in this body, which is a fabulous honor. It's a great blessing, but it's a trusteeship more than anything else. I'm entrusted with a certain level of power and authority that is far beyond me as an individual, and after I'm gone will continue to be there. I need to be as good a trustee as I possibly can with that so that it maintains the dignity of the system, maintains the dignity of the human individual that's in front of me, and it maintains the wisdom of the founders of this country.

You are possibly going to be in one of those vaulted positions, and I just would urge you all to contemplate on that on a fairly
regular basis. If you don't, I would hope your family that's here would remind you about that. Mine regularly does, and it's a nice help that they do.

Thanks, Chairman.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Judge Goldberg, when your name came up here we had a lot of people raise the Buck's County voting booth place. One thing that occurred to me, would it not have worked just to keep it where it was, but just say we've got to have more law enforcement in there, more law enforcement presence? Was that an option?

Mr. GOLDBERG. I probably, Senator, shouldn't speculate, so I preface this answer with, I'm not sure that this is 100 percent correct. But I believe, under the Pennsylvania Voting Act laws, the Board of Elections cannot order law enforcement to be at the polling places. And because it was such a short distance, I again defer to the wisdom of the Board of Elections.

Chairman LEAHY. Now, every judge has to make a decision when there's a conflict of interest. Some conflicts of interest are very easy and you have to recuse yourself. Chief Justice Rehnquist said many times that the standard for recusal was not subjective, but rather objective. Your brother brings a case before your court, a member of your family is a litigant, that's very easy. You can do that. It's in the gray areas.

I know that in 2004, I remember Senator Lieberman was very critical of Justice Skalia, as was I, for not recusing himself from a case about Vice President Cheney, even though, after he refused to recuse himself, he went on a duck hunting trip with the vice president and rode in his airplane, and everything else, and then wrote a harshly worded opinion in which he said that there's no way "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." People are still scratching their heads over that.

Without going into the Scalia case, you'll be coming from either private practice or a different judgeship. Do I have the assurance of all of you that you will bend over backward, especially when you first get on the bench, to be prepared to recuse yourself if there is the appearance of conflicts of interest?

Mr. Trenga.

Mr. TRENGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an issue that goes to the integrity of the process. You do have my assurance that I would—I would seriously consider any suggestion of conflict and recuse myself in those circumstances.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much.

Judge Jones.

Mr. JONES. Absolutely, I would, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I did just that in a case in Philadelphia involving a Democratic chairman who was also a candidate for mayor not too long ago. I recused my entire bench.

Chairman LEAHY. That's a big recusal.

[Laughter.]

Judge Goldberg.

Mr. GOLDBERG. You have my assurances, Senator. I think you—you honed in on the most important words: the appearance of impropriety. I'm well aware that if I am lucky enough to be confirmed, it's not only do you have a direct conflict, but is there an
appearance of a conflict; how the public views the court and the trust in the court is very important.

Chairman LEAHY. Mr. Slomsky.

Mr. SLOMSKY. You have my assurance, Mr. Chairman. My reverence for institutions is such that any appearance will be completely avoided, and I would recuse myself whenever necessary.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Mr. Melgren.

Mr. MELGREN. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. Your opening question to this panel went to the trust of the litigants before it, and I believe these issues address not only whether a judge is impartial, but whether he may be reasonably viewed to be impartial by those before him. I take that very seriously. Certainly you and this Committee have my word that, if I am confirmed, I will take those issues seriously and do so to further the trust and integrity of the process of those who appear before us.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much.

Senator Specter.

Senator SPECTER. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling and conducting these hearings, and so efficiently as to have concluded them before the vote bell has rung.

Chairman LEAHY. And I want to thank you, of course, and Senators Warner, Brownback, Roberts, Casey and Webb. I know they all had long statements praising all of you, and I normally never cut off any Senator who wants to give a statement. But I did urge them to do that because I was afraid we might not complete these hearings. Obviously the record will stay open for any statement they want to add, or any further statement you want to add, because we also rushed you, too.

With that, we'll stand in recess subject—

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, I'd just like unanimous consent to put in resumes from each of the nominees.

Chairman LEAHY. Oh, sure. Of course. They will be put in. And if there's anything further that the staff sees has been left out, resumes or anything else, those will be added to the record.

With that, we'll stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

Thank you all.

[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m. the Committee was adjourned.]

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Eric F. Melgren
301 N. Main, Suite 1200
Wichita, Kansas 67202

September 25, 2008

Honorable Patrick Leahy
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Leahy,

Attached please find my responses to written questions from Senator Kennedy forwarded to me by your staff.

Again, allow me to express my appreciation to you for scheduling the Judiciary Committee hearing on my nomination on September 23, 2008.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Eric F. Melgren
Questions from Senator Edward M. Kennedy
to Eric Melgren
Nominee to the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas

1. According to press reports, a former Department of Justice official, Bradley Schlozman, pursued voter fraud prosecutions shortly before the November 2006 elections for political reasons. On November 1, 2006, just days before the elections, Mr. Schlozman announced indictments in connection with improper voter registrations by the Kansas City chapter of the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), a grassroots organization that supports ballot access. Mr. Schlozman also warned of an ongoing national investigation. These actions contradicted the requirements of the Department’s official manual on election fraud prosecution at the time, Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, which stated that “federal prosecutors . . . should be extremely careful not to conduct overt investigations during the preelection period” to avoid “chilling legitimate voting and campaign activities” and causing “the investigation itself to become a campaign issue.” The Department’s manual also stated that “most, if not all, investigation of alleged election crime must await the end of the election to which the allegation relates.”

   a. Did your office have any role in the investigation or prosecution of ACORN workers for election-related crimes in 2006? If so, please describe that involvement in detail, including the participants from your office and their roles.

      Neither the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Kansas nor any of our personnel had any involvement in the ACORN investigation or prosecution.

   b. Did you have any contact with Bradley Schlozman or the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Missouri regarding plans to combat voter fraud? If so, please describe that contact in detail.

      Mr. Schlozman and I had no conversations regarding federal action by our offices or by investigative agencies such as the FBI and others, nor did we have plans to take or initiate any federal action, either separately or together, to combat voter fraud.

2. As U.S. Attorney for the District of Kansas, did you approve voter fraud indictments? If so, please provide the names of any cases filed as a result, and the dates on which they were filed.

   While I have been U.S. Attorney, my office has brought only two prosecutions relating in any way to election crimes. In 2004, we indicted Leslie McIntosh on federal vote fraud charges for double voting. The details of this charge are discussed in more detail in response to question number 4 below. In August of 2005 we indicted Adam Taft for wire fraud and for violating the Federal Election Campaign Act arising from the misuse for personal benefit of his campaign funds. Mr. Taft had been the Republican candidate for Congress from the 3rd District in
Kansas in 2002, and had again sought that office in 2004 (he lost the general election in 2002 and the primary election in 2004). Investigators discovered that Mr. Taff had improperly used his election account to create the phantom appearance of $300,000 equity in a home he purchased — cycling funds from his election account through a real estate closing and then back to his election account (no equity was actually paid into the home purchase; the funds were merely used to create the appearance of such equity at closing to deceive the closing company and the lender). Mr. Taff pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 15 months. Other than these two matters my office has not brought any other indictments related to any election crime.

3. On November 1, 2006, you issued a press release on your office’s plans to monitor the November 2006 elections. Among other things, your press release stated that you “warned that there are criminal penalties under federal law for any efforts to fraudulently influence the outcome of the election . . . .” and that the Department had established an initiative to “prosecute those offenses whenever and wherever they occur.” Your press release also stated that FBI agents would be on call to respond to any potential election offenses.

   a. As many civil rights organizations have stated — and as recognized at the time by the Department’s own manual on prosecution of election offenses — threats of election-related prosecutions may serve to chill legitimate voting and campaign activities. In particular, many low income voters and minority voters may be deterred from voting if they believe that voters will be subjected to scrutiny by law enforcement officials. In retrospect, do you believe that your November 1, 2006, press release was consistent with the Department’s manual on election prosecutions? Please explain in detail the reasons for your answer.

   The Election Crimes Branch of the Public Integrity Section of the Department has requested that announcements similar to these be made in advance of each general election for the general elections held during my tenure as U.S. Attorney, and that during the election we have both Assistant United States Attorneys and FBI Agents available until after the polls have closed to respond to any complaints or allegations of attempted interference with voters’ civil rights and the exercise of their franchise. This request is in accordance with the provisions of the Election Crimes Branch’s Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses Sixth Edition, dated January 1995, which was extant during all general elections held during my tenure as U.S. Attorney (the manual was updated in 2007). The 1995 manual creates election day procedures which include such press releases (page 88).

   b. Do you agree that election-related investigations and prosecutions should not be announced immediately before an election, in order to avoid a chilling effect on voter turnout? Please explain.
The law protects the right of citizens to freely exercise their right to vote according to their choice, and to be free from improper influence, suppression, or intimidation. If such improper efforts were being directed at voters by outsiders, then the voters should know that law enforcement will be on their side to protect their free exercise of their voting rights. I agree that law enforcement must strike a careful balance between protecting the rights of voters from being intimidated by others from freely exercising their voting rights, and making sure that the enforcement itself of voters civil rights to exercise their franchise does not create an intimidation to the voters.

4. On October 22, 2004, the Kansas City Star reported that you and then-U.S. Attorney for Western Missouri Todd Graves publicly announced voter fraud charges against three Kansas City area residents. As noted above, the Department of Justice's long-standing policy at the time was to avoid election-related investigations and prosecutions shortly before an election.

   a. Why did you believe it was important to announce election fraud indictments on the eve of the 2004 elections? Was there a law enforcement reason to publicize these indictments before the election? Please explain in detail the reasons for your answer.

   Immediately prior to the 2004 elections the Kansas City Star ran an article reporting on its investigation of dual voting in the metropolitan Kansas City area. Specifically, it reported that several individuals were registered to vote in both Kansas and Missouri, and it identified by name three individuals whom it verified had actually voted in elections in both states in 2002. We limited our federal investigation to simply verifying that the three individuals named in the story had in fact voted in both states. In accordance with the directives of the Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses manual, we then consulted with the Public Integrity Section, Election Crimes Branch, before proceeding to indictment. Two Kansas residents had illegally voted in Missouri, and the Western District of Missouri indicted them; one Missouri resident, Leslie McIntosh, had illegally voted in Kansas and my office indicted him. We announced these indictments before the election to discourage further dilution of honest votes by improper double voting (the Star article had implied that many more than these three were double-registered, and thus could vote in both elections).

   b. When you approved these prosecutions and announced them to the press, did you consider the Department’s policy against such actions? Please explain.

3
Prior to proceeding with this matter, I did consider the Department’s policies regarding voter prosecution, and I consulted with the career attorneys in the Election Crimes Branch of the Public Integrity Section of the Department regarding this matter before proceeding.

c. Before announcing these indictments, did you do anything to determine whether doing so might deter voting by eligible citizens? If so, what actions did you take?

In the press conference I held announcing these, I emphasized that we were only seeking to stop multiple voting, and that those individuals who were properly voting only in the state in which they resided had nothing to fear from this prosecution.

5. If you are confirmed, you may have occasion to rule on cases involving voting rights, including claims that voters were improperly intimidated or discouraged from casting a ballot. What assurance can you give the Committee that you are sensitive to the important issues raised by such cases, and that you will consider them impartially?

I can assure the Committee that I recognize that the right of all citizens to freely exercise their rights to vote in accordance with their own will and decisions, free from any improper influence or effect, is foundational to our representative democracy, and that if I am confirmed as a judge I will give the highest concern to the protection of such rights, without any regard to how the citizen exercise such right save that he or she is free to exercise it according to his or her own will.
I am pleased and proud to introduce my friend Eric Melgren, who has been nominated to be a district judge in the District of Kansas. First of all, though, I would like to express my appreciation to Chairman Leahy for scheduling this hearing. He and I have frequently discussed the situation we’re facing in Kansas on our district court, and I’m thankful for his gracious consideration in including Eric’s nomination in today’s hearing.

Eric is a Kansas native. He was born in 1956 in the tiny town of Minneola, in southwestern Kansas. He has been married for nearly 30 years to his wife Denise, and he and Denise are the proud parents of four children. He served as student body president as an undergraduate at Wichita State University and graduated magna cum laude. He went on to study at Washburn Law School, where he earned a spot on the Washburn Law Journal and graduated in the top five percent of his class. After graduation in 1985, he served for two years as a law clerk to Judge Frank Theis, who sat on the district court to which Eric has now been nominated.

Eric took a job as an associate at the law firm of Foulston Siefkin in Wichita, Kansas, where he specialized in tax law and business litigation. He was admitted
to the partnership at Foulston Siefkin in 1992. In 1995, he briefly left the practice of law to help a certain freshman congressman from Kansas transition to his new position in Washington, and I'm tremendously grateful for his assistance.

Even during his time in private practice, Eric devoted considerable effort to charitable and community work. He served on the board and as chairman of the Mental Health Association of South Central Kansas; on the board and as chairman of Leadership Wichita; on the board and as secretary of the Rotary Club of West Wichita; on the board and as chairman of the United Way of the Plains; as director of Wichita Christian Legal Aid, as a Big Brothers/Big Sisters volunteer; and on the board and as chairman of the board at his church.

In 2002, Eric answered the call to full-time public service, when he became the United States Attorney for the District of Kansas. Eric has already served our state and our nation with distinction as U.S. Attorney over the past six years, and I am confident that he will continue to serve with distinction as a judge on the federal district bench. The American Bar Association evaluated Eric's fitness and qualifications to serve on the District of Kansas and granted him its highest rating: unanimously well-qualified.
Mr. Chairman and fellow members of the Committee, it is my distinct honor and great pleasure to know Eric Melgren, to call him my friend, and to give him my highest recommendation for the position of District Judge for the District of Kansas. Kansas is blessed to have such a wonderful person and outstanding attorney willing to serve as a federal judge. I hope my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee will act swiftly to approve his nomination, and that the full Senate will confirm him as the newest District Judge for the District of Kansas before the 110th Congress adjourns. Thank you.

* * * * *

3
Testimony of
The Honorable Robert P. Casey Jr.
September 23, 2008

Thank you Chairman Leahy for conducting this hearing at this time. And I especially want to thank my colleague and my fellow senator from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter, with whom I've been very pleased to work on recommending their nominations to the White House. I think a bipartisan relationship as productive as ours is rare in this political environment and I appreciate it very much. I thank the Committee for inviting me here to introduce these nominees and express my strong support for the confirmation of all three to serve on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Joel H. Slomsky has practiced law for 38 years as a federal and state prosecutor, criminal defense attorney, and sole practitioner, and currently practices law in Philadelphia. After graduating from New York Law School, Mr. Slomsky worked with the Criminal Division, Organized Crime Section with the United States Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. and he then transferred to the Philadelphia Strike Force where he worked from 1971-1973.

Mr. Slomsky then moved into private practice, where he has handled civil and criminal matters in state and federal courts. He has also fulfilled his pro bono and public service obligations through contributions to legal education and legal services organizations in the Philadelphia community. He has accepted court appointments in criminal cases at reduced fees, and offered his services without court appointment for reduced fees to ensure that all defendants receive adequate representation in our judicial system. Mr. Slomsky's wife, Paula Beth Slomsky, serves as a clinical social worker and therapist at Northeast Philadelphia Community Center for Mental Health/Mental Retardation and is similarly devoted to the City of Philadelphia.

Mr. Slomsky has worked on a diverse array of civil and criminal matters, and has served in both the public and private sectors. His diverse background, strong legal skills, and ethical integrity makes him strongly qualified to serve as a federal district judge.

Judge Mitchell Steven Goldberg is a judge on the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, a position he has held since 2003. After graduating from Temple University's School of Law, he served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a senior partner with the Philadelphia law firm of Cozen O'Connor, and an Assistant District Attorney for the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. He was also an Adjunct Professor in Trial Advocacy at Temple Law School. As a trial judge, he has presided over more than 70 jury trials, both civil and criminal in nature. He has handled Family Court cases, included protracted custody matters and complex equitable distribution cases. He is married to Helene Goldberg, a Financial Manager at Heartside Inc., and they have two children.

His experience as an attorney in both the public and private sectors and his tenure as a judge with the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas should give the Senate great
confidence that Judge Goldberg is well-qualified to serve on the federal bench.

While I am proud to support all three nominees, I am particularly happy to support Judge Jones' elevation to the federal judiciary. My father, Governor Casey, appointed Judge Jones to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in 1987. Judge Jones has risen through the ranks by virtue of his hard work and commitment to the rule of law. Pennsylvanians have twice voted to retain Judge Jones and in 2006, he was elected President Judge by his fellow judges on the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. He is a highly respected voice of reason and the federal judicial system will be well-served by his presence on the federal bench.

In his 33 year legal career, Judge Jones has been a common pleas court judge, a state government attorney, a public defender, and a law professor. Prior to becoming a judge, he worked as an Office Assistant at the Citizens Crime Commission. Judge Jones practiced law at the Defender Association of Philadelphia, holding the positions of Chief of the Family Court Division, Assistant Chief of the Family Court Division, Special Defense Unit and Trial Attorney. Judge Jones became the Deputy Chief of the Family Court Division and the Chief of the Family Court Division, where he represented indigent juvenile defendants charged with criminal offenses.

Judge Jones, who is a graduate of The American University's Washington College of Law, has authored over 400 trial court opinions. It is not uncommon for him to preside over five bench trials per day, for three weeks per month. As a result, Judge Jones issues opinions on a constant basis. During his 21 years on the bench, appellate courts have rarely overturned his rulings.

Judge Jones and his wife Evelyn Antonia Jones, formerly Evelyn Antonia Williams, who works in the Capital Habeas Unit of the Defender Association of Philadelphia-Federal Division, have demonstrated a lifetime commitment to our legal system. My father recognized that Judge Jones possesses the intelligence, temperament, and commitment to ethical behavior required of a jurist when he first appointed him 21 years ago. I am very honored to support his confirmation to serve as a U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and look forward to following what will surely be a distinguished career on the federal bench.

Mr. Chairman, each of the nominees comes to the bench with superior legal experience that will serve them well in their new duties as federal district court judges. Each possesses the judicial temperament, humility and strong sense of ethical responsibility required to interpret the law in a thoughtful, thorough and objective manner. I therefore encourage my colleagues to confirm these well-qualified individuals for service on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Opening Statement of Chairman Patrick Leahy,
Senate Judiciary Committee,
Hearing on Nominations
September 23, 2008

I am holding this exceptional hearing late in a presidential election year as an accommodation to Senator Specter, the Ranking Republican Member of our Committee and a former Chairman. The Thurmond Rule, established and followed by Republicans when there is a Democratic President in the White House, calls for Senate consideration of judicial nominations to stop in the last several months before a presidential election in order to await the outcome of the election. Senator Hatch followed that practice in both 1996 and 2000 when he chaired the Judiciary Committee. In fact, in 1996, no one nominated after June 6 was considered and there were no judicial confirmations after the August recess. In 2000, there were no hearings after July 25.

I have said throughout my chairmanship that I would treat President Bush’s nominees better than Republicans treated President Clinton’s, and I have done so. This hearing is another example of that. It is the second hearing I have held for judicial nominees in September of this presidential election year. I have already included the five judicial nominees from Utah, California, Florida and Colorado who participated in our September 9 hearing on the Committee’s agenda for consideration at our business meeting later this week. Today we hear from five additional nominees for lifetime appointment to the Federal bench in Pennsylvania, Virginia and Kansas.

I have consistently said that by this stage of the year I will be working with the Majority Leader, as well as our Republican counterparts, in order to be able to proceed on consensus nominations. At this late date of a presidential election year, progress on judicial nominees requires consensus and the cooperation of all Senators. I want to thank the Majority Leader, with whom I have consulted, for his willingness to have us proceed with these nominations.

Three of the nominees are included at Senator Specter’s request. C. Darnell Jones II, Mitchell S. Goldberg, and Joel H. Slomsky also have the support of Senator Casey. President Bush did not get around to nominating these men until just before the August recess. At the time I set this hearing last week, we still had not received ABA ratings based on peer reviews of all of them. We are expediting these proceedings as a courtesy to Senator Specter and waiving the one-week notice required by Senate Rules and the rules and practices of our Committee.

I am also happy to accommodate the request of the senior Senator from Virginia that we include the nomination of Anthony J. Trenga to a judicial vacancy in Virginia. Senator Warner is one of our most distinguished members and he is retiring at the end of this Congress. Senator Webb has worked with Senator Warner on nominations and supports this nomination, as well.

The final nominee is Eric Melgren of Kansas. I am accommodating the request of Senator Brownback by including this nomination. I do so despite the Senator’s rather constant criticism of my efforts, including his complaining when the Committee worked to provide consideration of long-delayed judicial nominations for Michigan earlier this year, and his having personally delayed Senate consideration of Judge Janet Neff along with a dozen other judicial nominees at the end of the last Congress when the Committee was chaired by Senator Specter.
We have already confirmed more judicial nominations in the 20 months of this Congress than were confirmed during the previous two years when a Republican Senate majority and Republican chairman of this Committee did not have to worry about the Thurmond Rule and an abbreviated session due to a presidential election. Indeed, in the 37 months I have served as Judiciary chairman, the Senate has already confirmed 158 of President Bush’s judicial nominees, the same number of President Bush’s nominees confirmed in the more than four years the Senate Republicans were in charge. We have cut the judicial vacancies I encountered in the summer of 2001 more than in half. In the prior six years of Senate Republican majority control during the Clinton administration, the pocket filibusters and obstruction of moderate, qualified nominees forced circuit court vacancies to more than double. By contrast, we have cut circuit court vacancies by two-thirds.

We proceed with this hearing at a time when the country is confronting the worst financial crisis we have experienced since the Great Depression, one that has exposed the American taxpayers to trillions in losses. Homeowners and investors are close to panic. The American economy has experienced job losses every month this year and they now total more than 650,000. Even the Republican candidate for President admits that the economy is in recession. We are working with Chairman Dodd and the Senate leadership on those overriding issues and this Committee has reported a number of legislative relief efforts that can help. In addition, just as I held a judicial confirmation hearing two days after the attacks of September 11, I also proceed this afternoon.

Despite our efforts to step away from the tit for tat of the nomination battles of the past, I have yet to hear praise from a single Republican for our fair consideration of this President’s nominees. Despite our success in dramatically lowering judicial vacancies by approving the nominees of a President from the other party, those efforts have yet to be acknowledged. Yet despite the persistent difficulties we have had this Congress at gaining Republican cooperation to consider important matters in Committee and in the Senate, including bills with bipartisan support, we proceed with this hearing today.

I intend to continue in this Congress, and with a new President in the next Congress, to work with Senators from both sides of the aisle to ensure that the Federal judiciary remains independent, and able to provide justice to all Americans,

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2
Statement by Senator Pat Roberts
Confirmation Hearing of Eric F. Melgren
Senate Committee on the Judiciary
September 23, 2008

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing on judicial nominations. It is important
that we deliver solid judges to our court system. With that said, I support President
Bush’s nomination of Eric F. Melgren as Federal District Judge for the District of Kansas.

I associate my remarks with those of Senator Brownback. Eric Melgren is qualified for
this important responsibility. Since 2002, he has been serving as U.S. Attorney for the
District of Kansas. Between 2002 and 2003, the District of Kansas had a fourteen percent
increase in the number of criminal cases filed in U.S. District and State Courts.

It is necessary that this committee approve and send Eric’s nomination to the full Senate
for a vote. Due to an increase in caseload, a temporary judgeship was created in the
District of Kansas in 1990. Since the temporary judgeship was created, we have seen an
increase in the caseload for the District of Kansas.

Currently, Kansas has five active Federal District Judges. With Eric’s confirmation, we
will have six active judges. However, one of these judgeships is temporary and set to
expire on November 21st of this year. If the temporary judgeship expires before the Senate
confirms Eric and another judge takes senior status this year, the District of Kansas will
only have four active judges. Therefore, with the increase in caseload, it is vital that we
confirm Eric before the expiration of this temporary judgeship.

The Senate has a duty to confirm Eric. He is a man of integrity and sound judgement.
Eric’s passion for the law will be of great benefit to the state of Kansas and the rest of
the nation.

Again, I urge Eric’s confirmation at the committee’s earliest convenience. We need Eric
Melgren as soon as possible.
Chairman Leahy, Senator Specter, and my other distinguished colleagues on the Senate Judiciary Committee, I thank you for holding this important confirmation hearing.

Senator Webb and I join together in introducing to the Committee an outstanding nominee, Anthony J. Trenga, who has been nominated by our President to serve on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

Mr. Trenga is supported here today by his family, including: his wife, Rita; his daughter, Elizabeth; his brother, G. Lawrence Trenga; his sister and her husband, Marilyn and Charles Dahl; and his brother-in-law, Colonel Ken Dahl.
In my view, Mr. Trenga’s background makes him highly qualified to sit as a jurist on this illustrious court. I note that the American Bar Association and the Virginia State Bar concur in this assessment, as both have given him their highest rating.

Anthony Trenga has been practicing law before federal courts in Virginia for more than thirty years. He has served as lead counsel in more than fifty cases before the federal court in the eastern district of Virginia on a wide range of subject areas. Since 1998, Mr. Trenga has worked at the law firm of Miller and Chevalier, where he specializes in litigation and trial practice. He is a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers and has served as a member of the faculty of the National Trial Advocacy College at the University of Virginia, sponsored by the Virginia CLE Committee of the Virginia Bar Foundation.
Mr. Trenga received his law degree from the University of Virginia School of Law and completed his undergraduate studies at Princeton University. Upon graduation, he was a law clerk to the Honorable Ted Dalton, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia from 1974 to 1975.

From 1982 to 1998, Mr. Trenga was a partner at Sachs, Greenbaum & Tayler in Washington, D.C. and a managing partner at Hazel & Thomas based in Fairfax, Virginia.

Equally impressive to his legal career, though, is that despite the rigors of a busy legal practice, Mr. Trenga has always found time to be actively involved in community affairs. In addition to participating in his firm’s pro bono program, Mr. Trenga serves as chairman and member of the Alexandria Human Rights Commission, the Board of Directors of the Northern Virginia Urban League, the Board of Trustees of the Alexandria Symphony Orchestra, and the Board of Directors for the Bethesda Center of Excellence.
Clearly, Anthony Trenga is a highly qualified nominee and I am thankful for his willingness to serve as a district court judge. I thank the Committee for holding today's hearing, and I look forward to Senate confirmation.
Statement of Senator Jim Webb

On the Confirmation of Anthony J. Trenga to be a Judge on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

Mr. Chairman, today it is my distinct pleasure to offer my support along with my colleague Senator Warner for the nomination of Anthony J. Trenga to be a judge on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

Mr. Trenga has enjoyed a long career in which he has earned the respect of both colleagues and clients. Mr. Trenga received a rating of "highly qualified" by the Virginia Bar Association. He has been described as an attorney of the highest integrity, unbiased, diligent; and one that possesses superlative legal skills. Mr. Trenga's practice has been exclusively litigation, and he has worked primarily in the U.S. District Court in Alexandria to which he seeks appointment.

In 1974, Mr. Trenga served as a law clerk for the Honorable Ted Dalton, who served on the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Mr. Trenga then joined the law firm of Sachs, Greenbaum & Taylor in 1975 and became a partner in 1982. Mr. Trenga served as managing partner at Hazel and Tomas, P.C. from 1987-1998. Presently, Mr. Trenga is Chairman of the Litigation Department at Miller & Chevalier Chartered. In addition to a distinguished professional career, Mr. Trenga has received numerous professional and civic awards for community involvement.

Mr. Trenga received his A.B. from Princeton University in 1971, his J.D. from the University of Virginia in 1974, and has taken non-degree graduate law courses at the Georgetown University Law Center. He is married to Rita Marie FlorCruz Trenga and is the father of Elizabeth and Anthony Trenga.

I should note that the U.S. Senate exercises critical oversight in the confirmation of judges to U.S. Courts. I am pleased that Senator Warner and I have been able to work jointly, in a bipartisan way, to help ensure that persons appointed to U.S. courts in the Commonwealth of Virginia take seriously their role in defending the principles of the U.S. Constitution and will serve in a fair and unbiased manner. Mr. Trenga is an outstanding example of our collaboration.

I want to thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to make these remarks about this outstanding Virginian. In particular, Mr. Chairman, I want to express my gratitude for the expeditious way the Senate has moved the nomination of Mr. Trenga through the process during the 110th Congress. Again, it is with pride that I join Senator Warner in commending Mr. Trenga to each of my colleagues on this committee.