[Pages S10199-S10208]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION
ENHANCEMENT ACT--Continued

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, first, let me thank Senator Dorgan for
his leadership on this issue and for his heartfelt and very well-
articulated statement about the reasons why we need to amend this
agreement before we proceed any further. I strongly agree with him, and
I am honored to join with him in proposing an amendment that will
improve the agreement that is coming to the Senate floor tonight for
consideration.
The bill we are dealing with tonight seeks to obtain expedited
approval of

[[Page S10200]]

the United States-India nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement
was the result of a bill we passed into law 2 years ago--nearly 2 years
ago--that exempted India from the very export controls that were placed
into the Atomic Energy Act as a result of India's decision to detonate
a nuclear weapon in 1974--with United States-supplied technology, I
would point out.
Let me be clear: I do believe it is time that we as a nation did more
to reach out to India in areas such as energy and high technology. The
President deserves credit for recognizing that the India of the 1960s
and 1970s is not the India of today. India is a great leader in
technology and needs to be an ally of our country on a great many
issues, but I cannot support the proposed agreement before us today in
the form we are being presented.
By modifying our nonproliferation laws for India, and just for India,
and in a circumstance where India has not signed the nonproliferation
treaty, not only are we sending the wrong signal to Iran, which is a
signatory and desires to have its own nuclear program, but we are also
sending the wrong signal to North Korea, to Pakistan, and to Israel.
Those three countries are not signatories to the nonproliferation
treaty, and they have detonated nuclear weapons. So approval of the
agreement as it is now presented makes it difficult for us to justify
our nonproliferation policies to the world at large, and in particular
it makes it very difficult for us to justify them to other
nonproliferation treaty signatories, such as South Africa, Brazil, and
Taiwan, which have foresworn their nuclear weapons program as part of
signing up for the nonproliferation treaty.
The net result of approving the agreement as proposed today is that
we are making India a de facto weapon state without them having to sign
the nonproliferation treaty. India gets to have their cake and to eat
it too. They obtain nuclear weapon state status but, by not signing the
NPT, they do not have to adhere to its fundamental article VI
requirement that nuclear weapon states shall ``pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race.''
The amendment Senator Dorgan and I are offering seeks to make several
improvements to the underlying bill that relate to the question of what
happens if India again decides to detonate a nuclear weapon. The first
section, developed by Senator Dorgan, states simply that the United
States will not conduct trade in nuclear technology with India if they
detonate a nuclear weapon. That is sensible policy. It is consistent
with the Atomic Energy Act, which cuts off trade in nuclear technology
if states such as India detonate a nuclear device.
The second part of the amendment, which I have added to the combined
amendment, requires the President to certify to Congress that the
United States-supplied technology is not what has enabled India to go
forward with detonation of a nuclear weapon.
Let me explain why this is important. India detonated five nuclear
weapons in 1998 without the aid of advanced technology supplied by
other nations. The reason is because the 45-nation group that is called
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or NSG, developed a consensus that they
would not ship to India sensitive nuclear technology. As a result of
the bill we passed 2 years ago, this Nuclear Suppliers Group has now
approved the export of sensitive nuclear technology to India. It is
entirely conceivable that India may want to improve their nuclear
weapons now that they have access to advanced technology from this
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The certification we provide for in this amendment would force the
President to ensure ahead of time that appropriate export controls are
in place to begin with. It is one of the strictest conditions Congress
can place on a President, but it can be met. We routinely require end-
use monitoring of sensitive technologies that we export to other
countries. Embassy personnel inspect their purported destination to
make sure they are not used for illicit purposes. Certification, as we
provide for in this amendment, also places pressure on the President to
work with the IAEA to ensure that the safeguards applied to Indian
facilities are effective so the exported technology does not make its
way into their weapons program. It seems to me that the President
should place this level of scrutiny on our nuclear exports to India.
Let me put up a chart to make the point I am trying to make with this
part of the amendment. This chart tries to make the distinction
between--that is reflected in the underlying agreement we are going to
be voting on--between the parts of India's nuclear program that are
safeguarded--and that is, to be specific, 14 nuclear reactors and 1
fuel reprocessing plant--and then the parts of India's nuclear program
that are not subject to any safeguards--and that is substantially more.
That is eight power reactors, a fast breeder program, and its entire
military program, which consists of two plutonium reprocessing plants,
two uranium enrichment plants, and two heavy water plutonium production
reactors.
The underlying agreement we are voting on contemplates that all the
nonsafeguarded parts of the nuclear weapons program in India will be
supplied only with domestically produced fuel. The safeguarded parts
are the parts that can be supplied with imported uranium fuel. So the
theory is we can take great consolation in knowing that nothing we are
sending to India is, in fact, affecting the nonsafeguarded part of
their nuclear program.
Now, around here, I don't know if you would call this a Chinese
firewall or what you would call it--this yellow line that separates the
safeguarded from the nonsafeguarded parts of the nuclear weapons
program--but the truth is, under this agreement and the way it now
stands, it is virtually impossible for us to be assured, in any
credible way, that what is being provided in the way of technologies or
fuel to India for its nuclear program is, in fact, being kept just for
the safeguarded part.
Obviously, the other point is, as to the fuel, it is all fungible.
If, in fact, we are providing imported uranium fuel that can be used
for safeguarded reactors, there is no reason why the domestically
produced fuel can't be used for the nonsafeguarded reactors.
It is, in my view, vitally important that we try to make some
amendment to ensure that there is some degree of scrutiny over what is,
in fact, occurring there, and that is the second part of the amendment
I referred to--the net result of improving this. By modifying our
nonproliferation laws for India, which has not signed the
nonproliferation treaty, it is clear we are making an exception that
will cause great difficulty in our ability to encourage other countries
to comply with the nonproliferation treaty.
The third part of the amendment we are offering requires that if
India tests a nuclear weapon, we will not enable other countries to
further India's nuclear program. This is called the third-party
problem; whereby, we enable other countries to help India's nuclear
program. If India detonates a nuclear weapon, the President, under our
amendment, would have to recommend to Congress what export control
authorities can be used so our exports to other nuclear suppliers do
not end up helping India's program. The President, of course, would
have a wide array of such authorities to apply--from end-use monitoring
of the technologies that were supplied to outright prohibition on
providing any of these technologies.
The United States and India, obviously, have deep and important ties.
Many of our leading citizens have ancestry in India. Many of our
leading citizens in our high-tech community were originally born in
India. They have greatly contributed to the strength of our Nation. We
owe them a great debt of gratitude, and we honor them as we raise
questions about this agreement.
We need to draw a line in the sand in certain areas. The area of
nonproliferation, and the nonproliferation treaty in particular, is one
such area where we do need to maintain black and white distinctions,
given the terrible consequence we face if a nuclear detonation were to
occur, either on our soil or on the soil of any other nation.
The amendment Senator Dorgan and I are offering that will be voted on
this evening places clear and unambiguous requirements on the
President, should India detonate another nuclear weapon. I think that
is the least we should

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do in our consideration of this very important agreement. I urge my
colleagues to support the amendment.
I yield the remainder of the time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator wish to call up his
amendment?

Amendment No. 5683

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I do call up amendment No. 5683.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman], for himself and
Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Feingold, and Mrs.
Boxer, proposes an amendment numbered 5683.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To prohibit nuclear trade with India in the event that India
detonates a nuclear weapon and to impose certain certification,
reporting, and control requirements)

At the end of title I, add the following:

SEC. 106. PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR TRADE IN EVENT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPON DETONATION BY INDIA.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United
States may not export, transfer, or retransfer any nuclear
technology, material, equipment, or facility under the
Agreement if the Government of India detonates a nuclear
explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 107. CERTIFICATION, REPORTING, AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
IN EVENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DETONATION BY INDIA.

In the event the Government of India detonates a nuclear
weapon after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall--
(1) certify to Congress that no United States technology,
material, equipment, or facility supplied to India under the
Agreement assisted with such detonation;
(2) not later than 60 days after such detonation, submit to
Congress a report describing United States nuclear related
export controls that could be utilized with respect to
countries that continue nuclear trade with India to minimize
any potential contribution by United States exports to the
nuclear weapons program of the Government of India; and
(3) fully utilize such export controls unless, not later
than 120 days after such detonation, Congress adopts, and
there is enacted, a joint resolution disapproving of the full
utilization of such export controls.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. DODD. First, let me thank my two colleagues from North Dakota and
New Mexico for combining their amendments in a way that I think makes
sense. My colleague can correct me if I am wrong, the House was similar
to both. There were somewhat different approaches, but I think they
offer some clarity as to their concerns which, let me say at the
outset, these are concerns I believe all of us share. There is not a
single one of us, that I am aware of, in this body who doesn't have the
same worries and concerns that my colleague from North Dakota
expressed, as well as my friend and colleague from New Mexico. I will
not debate the number, whether it was 25,000 or 30,000 or 20,000--
clearly, the problem with having a proliferation of nuclear devices
around is a concern to all of us. Obviously, each and every one of us
bears a responsibility to do everything we can to minimize the threat
such weapons pose.
I don't know anyone more vigilant in that effort than my colleague
from Indiana, along with my former colleague, Senator Nunn. The Nunn-
Lugar proposals, which regrettably were not pursued as aggressively as
I think they should have been by the Bush administration, were to
convince the former Soviet Union and other nations to dismantle weapons
of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in particular. That exists, and
there are those of us who would like to see it pursued more
aggressively. There are countless examples over the years of Members
who have sought various means by which we could reduce the threat. I
would argue, and I will, that this bill is very much in that tradition.
This is not a deviation from that effort. It is very much in that same
tradition others have pursued, to create and formulate the means by
which we can reduce those threats.
This bill is comprehensive in many ways. It is certainly not perfect
by anyone's stretch of imagination. Contrary to the suggestion that
there has been one hearing on this, as if somehow this has been thrown
together in the last couple weeks, there have been five major hearings
with multiple panels conducted by Senators Biden and Lugar. The other
body has conducted at least that many hearings. It all began about 4
years ago, this process, not something just a week or two ago that has
led to this.
You heard Senator Lugar say that he alone submitted 174 questions to
the State Department and other agencies, demanding their responses to
those questions and publicized them on his Web site. So the very
questions many of us have, have been addressed, maybe not to the
satisfaction of everyone but certainly pursuing the very issues.
The reason I mentioned that is if, in fact, this amendment were
adopted, of course, there would be no means by which you could resolve
these matters with the other body. They have already adopted a bill
without this language in it. Therefore, this would presumably pass
without consideration. The fact is, that come next year the
administration--because the time runs out on this--would be submitting
the agreement without any of the agreements we have included in this
bill, many of which do exactly what my colleagues from New Mexico and
North Dakota are seeking to achieve. So the irony of ironies would be
that while I respect immensely their intent, what they seek, in fact,
it would be counterproductive of the very goal they are trying to
achieve and that is to strip away everything we have achieved under the
leadership of Senators Lugar and Biden, along with Howard Berman's
leadership in the other body, to include the kind of understandings and
requirements this bill mandated.
Is this a perfect bill? Absolutely not. But if we allow the perfect
to become the enemy of the good, we are going to find ourselves, I
think, in a far more serious situation than the one Senator Dorgan and
Senator Bingaman has described to you.
I would never make the argument to my colleagues that if you adopt
this amendment--I don't say hate; my wife advises that I don't use the
word ``hate'' in front of the children--I deplore arguments that
suggest that if you adopt this, it is a killer amendment, and we would
have to go back and do further work. I think that is an insulting
argument. In fact, if an amendment is a good amendment and ought to be
adopted, we ought not to shy away from our responsibility. As a matter
of fact, I will argue, the amendment is unnecessary; existing law does
exactly what my colleagues are asking us to do today. But if we adopt
them, we run the risk of something coming back a lot worse than what
Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, the Foreign Relations Committee, over
extensive hearings, along with the work of the other body, have
accomplished and achieved. As my colleagues listen to this debate, I
hope they will take that under consideration.
I point out, the United States-India agreement will be resubmitted in
January if it is not approved now. The next President would not have to
seek any special law, which is what we have, to speed up the process.
Rather, he could wait us out until the Atomic Energy Act forces us to
take a vote on a clean resolution of approval of the agreement, without
any of the amendments we have adopted and worked on over the years.
Let me mention an argument Senator Lugar raised; I didn't. I regret
not having mentioned it because I think it is a compelling argument as
well. One of the arguments people need to understand is India does not
have an unlimited supply of materials by which to create nuclear
weapons. They will be faced, without outside sources of supply, to make
a choice between nuclear weapons or the commercial powerplants.
I do not intend to speak as a great expert on Indian politics or the
public mood in India, but nations, particularly ones that live in the
neighborhood--I don't have the map up here any longer--where India
resides, what choice would they make if they could only make one? Is it
going to be energy or security? That is a difficult choice. While all
of us want to see the energy choices made, a nation surrounded by
nations that have nuclear capabilities, not exactly close to the
democracy India is, by the way, may very well decide to have different
alternatives. If

[[Page S10202]]

you are sitting in India's Parliament, you are a member of their
Congress and you have one choice to make, security or energy, security
or energy--how would we vote? How would we vote confronted by that
choice?
That is a choice with which India may well be confronted without
additional sources of energy here or supplies that would allow them to
promote the more commercial use of this power.
I don't necessarily want to put India in that position to make that
choice because I think I know what choice they would make. I suspect it
is the same choice we would make. We bear an obligation to the people
of this country to keep them secure. I suspect the Indian
parliamentarians feel likewise. When confronted by that choice, my view
is they would choose to make security the choice, the very thing my
colleagues argued against would, in fact, be driving them to that
conclusion.
Obviously, the energy debate is a critical one. Again, no one has
been more of an advocate of green technologies than our colleague from
New Mexico, one of the stalwarts in this debate for many years--not
just recently, where it has become popular to argue for alternative
energy resources. But if we take away this alternative, India is
growing--1.3 billion people. It has 300 million people living at
middle-class or upper middle-class standards. They have a billion
people living in abject poverty in India. They are seeking ways, of
course, to bring many of those people out of poverty and improve the
quality of their lives.
India understands that coal-fired electrical power plants are a
liability, but India cannot afford to slow the growth of energy
production at the same time its population is growing and trying to
deal with the economic circumstances of its people.

India says we would like to build more commercial powerplants. It
seems to me, for those of us who want to reduce the carbon footprint,
the carbon emitters with India being a major supplier of carbon
emissions it is in our interests to encourage them to move in a
different direction. If we do not have some sort of arrangement or
understanding on how to achieve that while simultaneously moving them
away from that choice I mentioned a moment ago, we end up potentially
where they have more weapons, doing little or nothing about energy
production. It is a lose-lose proposition. We end up with India with
nuclear weapons, and we end up with a nation that continues to use
coal-fired plants, of course, endangering us further when it comes to
the issue of global warming and the like. That is a further reason, I
would argue, we ought seriously to understand the import of these
amendments and appreciate the alternative presented by the bill before
us.
I mentioned earlier, in fact, the very concerns raised by my two
colleagues are covered by existing law. It is not as if there is some
vacuum that exists, that there would be no repercussions should India
decide to pursue and test nuclear weapons. Let me share with my
colleagues. Again, I invite Members or their staffs to come over and be
briefed by staff who spent literally their adult lives, their
professional careers working on these bills. The suggestion that this
was thrown together somehow in a quick hearing before the Foreign
Relations Committee in a sense fails to understand the work done by our
collective staffs on these matters going back years. In fact, previous
Members of this body--no one cared more about this issue than John
Glenn of Ohio. He was an advocate on this issue long before many were.
I am going to share in a minute some of the law that bears his name and
is still the law of the land when it comes to these issues, the Glenn
amendment, and how we deal with the issue of countries that would, in a
sense, go into the use of nuclear weapons.
This amendment would bar any and all nuclear exports for all time,
without any exception or waiver, if India detonates a nuclear device.
Section 106 sets a different standard for India than we have for any
other nonnuclear weapons state, which is what it is under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. law. There is no need, I think. I
think it would be very harmful to single India out in such a manner.
There are other nations in a similar situation. I don't hear amendments
being offered to suggest they all ought to be treated the same way. I
suspect you would run into a buzzsaw if you did so. We are picking out
the one great democracy in south Asia, with whom we have had a very
testy relationship for 35 years, which is critical for dealing with the
fragile issues that section of the world poses, and we are going to
say: They and no one else gets that kind of treatment.
You can imagine the reaction we might get from a nation that is now
reaching out to us for the first time in approaching half a century to
get us back on a far different track than the one we are on.
India would clearly see this provision as an effort to put in place
special penalties against that nation, if it were ever to respond.
Frankly, the proposed new section, as I said earlier, is a section I
think poses some serious issues. I have commented before, I have put
the language in of the administration. I think everyone mentioned
earlier, and I will quote from the Secretary of State, she said:

We have been very clear with the Indians. Should India test, as it
has agreed not to do so, or should India in any way violate the IAEA
safeguards agreements to which it would be adhering, the deal from our
point of view would be at that point off.

Under Secretary of State Bill Burns, before our committee, repeated
that quote to us.
What is more, as I said, the amendment is unnecessary. Several
provisions of existing law already apply to India.
The Glenn amendment sanctions under the Arms Export Control Act cut
off a wide array of foreign aid, defense exports, bank credits and
dual-use items.
There is no waiver. No waiver under the Glenn amendment. That was
modified some years later, but there would be no waiver. The Glenn
amendment is tougher in many ways than what we talking about here, we
can argue, in that it doesn't provide any kind of relief. Congress
enacted a waiver in 1999, somewhat of a waiver, after India and
Pakistan tested in the 1990s, but that waiver authority terminates for
either country that tests again. So under the modified Glenn amendment,
there is no waiver authority. Under Glenn, the role of the United
States and our relationship with India is clear.
Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act already prohibits exports to a
nonnuclear weapon State if it detonates a nuclear device. That one is
subject to waiver by the President. India is still a nonnuclear weapon
state by definition, and therefore would be included under this. That
law is on the books, very similar to what is being advocated in the
amendment posed by our two colleagues. The President could only use the
waiver under section 129, I would add, if he finds that ceasing exports
would be ``seriously prejudicial'' to the achievement of the U.S.
nonproliferation objectives or would otherwise ``jeopardize the common
defense and security of the country.'' That is a high standard, I might
add, for the waiver authority.
Even if the President makes that determination, cooperation cannot
proceed until 60 days of continuous session has passed after that
determination has been submitted to Congress, further making that
provision almost impossible to apply that waiver standard.

So there are two sections, one under the Atomic Energy Act, one under
the Glenn amendment, that virtually do what our two colleagues talk
about with their amendment. The bill before us would amend the Atomic
Energy Act to ensure, by the way, that the Senate can take advantage of
expedited procedures--limits on debate and amendment--to pass a joint
resolution to overturn such a Presidential waiver.
Even if you got to that point, we have now put a further safeguard in
against it, making it virtually impossible to waive the authority under
section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act.
So the bill already improves the law relating to what could happen
with a so-called nonnuclear weapons state. We are using the language
here, but this applies to states that we all, to be honest, know have
nuclear weapons. There are several nations we all know about in that
category, but they are called nonnuclear weapons states. And yet, here
the language is very strong.
Again, I think these sections are important to note. The combination
of

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the two amendments does cover the ground on all of this. I point out
that Senator Bingaman's part of this amendment, this new section 107,
is not necessary either.
U.S. obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty already
compel the United States to assure that its nuclear exports do not help
nonnuclear weapons states to produce weapons. That obligation bars
helping not only India but any nonnuclear weapons state. The Atomic
Energy Act and the Hyde Act already provide tools to address the
concern Senator Bingaman has raised.
Let's look at the specific provision, if you will, under the proposed
section 107. It would require a certification in the event of a nuclear
detonation by India that no United States material, equipment, or
technology contributed to the detonation.
And what happens if the President makes that certification? The
amendment does not say what happens. What happens if the President does
not make the certification, or says it does not know whether any U.S.
material, equipment, or technology was involved? This is a
certification that may well be impossible to make under the law as
drafted in this amendment.
So even with the intent to do something about it, how can you make
it? How are you going to determine whether, in fact, materials have
been used, or is it just the assumption that if one occurred, it would
be, which may be an entirely false assumption when it comes to that
country? How will we ever know for sure that no U.S. technology was
diverted?
In any case, it is the certification that carries no consequences.
The certification is not needed. Again section 104 of the Hyde act
already requires the President to keep Congress fully and currently
informed of any violation by India of its nonproliferation commitments
and of this agreement.
Any contributions by U.S. exports to an India weapons program under
the United States-India agreement would certainly be a violation of
India's commitments and of the agreement, and so would need to be
reported to us, and would very likely be reported to us long before any
detonation, I might add.
Section 2 of the proposed act requires a report from the President
after an Indian test describing those United States export controls
that could be used to minimize any potential contribution that United
States nuclear exports to third countries might make to an Indian
nuclear weapons program.
The Hyde act and the Atomic Energy Act already address this issue.
And let me quote to my colleagues again. I apologize for citing in
detail these things, but you need to know this, because statements
being made here on the floor about this, I say respectfully, are not
accurate, about what existing laws require and mandate and demand in
these areas.
Section 104(d)(5) of the Hyde act requires the President of the
United States:

shall ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to
maintain accountability with respect to nuclear materials,
equipment and technology . . . reexported to India so as to
ensure . . . United States' compliance with [obligations
under] article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Section 104(g)(2) of the Hyde Act explicitly requires detailed
reporting on any United States authorizations for the reexport to India
of nuclear materials and equipment.
The Atomic Energy Act further requires that the United States not
engage in civil nuclear cooperation with any country without an
agreement for nuclear cooperation and that every such agreement must
contain a guarantee by the other country that it will not transfer any
nuclear material or facility to a third country without the prior
approval of the United States.
Section 127 of that act makes it explicit that for any U.S. export of
source or special nuclear material, nuclear facilities, or sensitive
nuclear technology, that material, facility, or technology may not be
retransferred to a third party without the United States's prior
consent. The transfer cannot go forward unless the third party agrees
to abide by all of the agreements of section 127.
That section also requires that the source and special nuclear
material, nuclear facilities, and sensitive nuclear technology being
exported must be under IAEA safeguards, and may not be used in or for
research and development on a nuclear explosive device.
This assures us that any such report does not contribute to India's
weapons program. The truth is that if India were to conduct another
nuclear test or reexport by third countries, United States-origin
nuclear material, equipment, or technology would be the least likely
way for India to evade a cut-off of cooperation.
If any third country were to provide United States-origin nuclear
material, or equipment, or material device from the United States-
origin material or equipment for India without the United States's
consent, the United States would have the right to cease nuclear
cooperation with that country and to demand the return of material and/
or equipment that has been provided under that country's nuclear
cooperation agreement with the United States.
So third countries are highly unlikely, given the implications under
the existing law, to reexport without our permission, or run the risk,
obviously, of facing all of the admonitions that the previously
existing law requires. A much more serious concern would be the risk
that other countries would export their own nuclear material or
equipment, not our material but their own nuclear equipment and
material technology, to India after we had cut off exports. That
concern is not addressed at all by the Dorgan and Bingaman amendment.
But the bill before us does address that concern. Their amendment
leaves that out entirely, which is actually a far more dangerous way
that this may happen.
So under the bill before us, by reiterating a provision under the
Hyde Act that if India should test again:

It is the policy of the United States to seek to prevent a
transfer to India of nuclear equipment, of materials or
technology from other participating governments in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group or from any other source.

This bill already lays down a marker regarding the real concern if
India were to test. Again, whether it is reexport or direct shipments,
we are in a position, I think, to respond aggressively. I point out,
you defeat this bill, we are back to the agreement and a lot of this,
other than what I have mentioned in existing law, does not apply.
So, again, I say to my friends and colleagues who offered the
amendment, this is not a debate about whether some people care about
nuclear weapons and others do not. The question is, are we being smart
and intelligent about moving a major democracy that lives in a
dangerous part of the world into a direction that will make it far more
cooperative with us in doing exactly what the underlying amendment
seeks to do, that is, to move away from weapons to commercial use, to
dealing with the carbon emissions that are occurring here, to provide
that kind of new relationship with India that I think is absolutely
critical for our safety and security in the 21st century.
Walk away from this, drive a wedge between India and the United
States in that part of the world, then I think you are going to have
exactly the kind of problem our two colleagues have suggested. It gets
closer to what they fear most. I believe what we have offered our
colleagues today drives us further away from that outcome, which is
what all of us ought to be trying to achieve. That is the reason I
reject these amendments, and urge my colleagues to do so when they
occur on a vote later today. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I join my distinguished colleague Senator
Dodd in rising in opposition to the amendment offered by the Senators
from North Dakota and New Mexico.
I believe the bill before us today and the Hyde act passed by
Congress in 2006 addressed the possibility of a future Indian nuclear
test in a very clear and definitive way. I am confident the Congress
has provided the necessary assurances and authorities to protect United
States interests and promote strong nonproliferation policies in the
event of an Indian nuclear detonation.
The amendment seeks to address a concern that the Foreign Relations
Committee addressed in 2006, and last month when we voted 19 to 2 to
report the legislation pending before the Senate. Both bills ensure
that there is no

[[Page S10204]]

ambiguity about the United States's legal and policy responses to a
future Indian nuclear test.
If India tests a nuclear weapon, the 123 Agreement is over. This
means the President could terminate all United States nuclear
cooperation with India and fully and immediately use the United
States's rights to demand the return of all items previously exported
to India. This would include any special nuclear material produced by
India, through the use of any nuclear materials and equipment or
sensitive nuclear technology exported or reexported to India by the
United States. These steps can occur as a response to any nuclear test,
including instances in which India describes its actions as being ``for
peaceful purposes.''
In addition, the United States could suspend and revoke any current
or pending licenses. One of the primary purposes of this agreement is
to deter India from testing nuclear weapons. New Delhi has more to gain
from peaceful nuclear cooperation through this agreement than in
testing.
The Hyde act and the bill before us were crafted to ensure that this
is the case. Indian leaders argue that they retain the right to test.
This is true. They are a sovereign nation. However, India has been
warned repeatedly that consequences of another nuclear test would be
dire.
In 2006, Secretary Rice stated in testimony that:

We have been very clear with the Indians. Should India
test, as it has agreed not to do, or should India in any way
violate the IAEA safeguards agreements to which it would be
adhering, the deal from our point of view would at that point
be off.

In a question for the record, I asked Secretary Rice at that time
what the consequences of an Indian test would be. And she noted that
under existing law:

No nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear
technologies shall be exported to any nonnuclear weapons
state that is found by the President to have detonated a
nuclear explosive device.

Now, under United States law, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, India is a nonnuclear weapons state. In 2006 the Hyde act
waived the application of the sanctions in the Atomic Energy Act to
events that occurred before July 2005 when President Bush and Prime
Minster Singh signed the joint statement. This waiver was intended to
capture India's nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998, and permit U.S.-Indian
cooperation in spite of those actions.
This does not apply to future Indian actions. So if India were to
test tomorrow, the waiver provided by Congress in 2006 would not apply,
and nuclear cooperation could be terminated. Let me repeat that. Under
a law passed 2 years ago setting the parameters for congressional
consideration of this agreement, if India were to test a nuclear
weapon, terminate, or abrogate IAEA safeguards, materially violate IAEA
safeguards, violate an agreement for cooperation with the United
States, encourage another nonnuclear weapons state to engage in
proliferation activities, or engage in unauthorized proliferation of
sensitive nuclear technology, the agreement and United States
cooperation could be terminated.
If that is not enough to satisfy the Senators' concerns, I would
direct them to article 14 of the agreement:

Should India detonate a nuclear explosive device, the
United States has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation
with India immediately, including the supply of fuel as well
as the request for the return of any items transferred from
the United States, including fresh nuclear fuel.

Under Secretary Rood stated in testimony before the Foreign Relations
Committee on September 18, 2008 that:

Just as India has maintained its sovereign right to conduct
a test, so too have we maintained our right to take action in
response.

Under article 14, the United States can also demand the return of any
nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to the agreement
for cooperation as well as any special nuclear material produced in
India, if it detonates a nuclear explosive device. This was confirmed
in response to a question posed by the House of Representatives. The
administration answered that even ``the fuel supply assurances
[contained in the 123 agreement] are not . . . meant to insulate India
against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of
nonproliferation commitments.
The United States would be able to exercise its right under article
14 of the agreement to require the return of materials and equipment
subject to the agreement after, one, giving written notice to India
that the agreement is terminated and, two, ceasing all cooperation
based on a determination that a mutually acceptable resolution of
outstanding issues has been impossible or cannot be achieved through
consultation.
Both of these actions are within the discretion of the U.S.
Government and do not require Indian agreement, and both can be taken
at once.
In sum, the United States-India peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreement ceases if India tests. This conclusion is consistent with any
reasonable interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act, the Hyde Act, and
article 14 of this agreement. As a result, this amendment is
unnecessary. The issues it seeks to address have been remedied. I urge
colleagues to vote against the amendment. The real effect of adoption
of this amendment would be to, once again, delay consideration and
approval of this important agreement. It is time to move forward and to
vote on this legislation and start peaceful nuclear cooperation between
the world's two largest democracies.
The second portion of the amendment we are considering now requires a
certification and a report that are at best duplicative of provisions
already in law. This amendment would simply delay implementation of the
U.S.-India 123 agreement in order to effect requirements that have
already been enacted. First, the amendment requires the President to
certify to Congress that no technology, material, or equipment, nor any
facility supplied by the United States to India under the 123 agreement
assisted with a nuclear detonation, if one occurs in India. In my
opinion, this provision is duplicative of section 104(g) of the Hyde
Act passed by Congress in 2006. Under that existing law, the President
is already required to report annually on whether U.S. civil nuclear
cooperation with India is in any way assisting India's nuclear weapons
program. This report is to include information on whether any U.S.
technology has been used by India for any activity related to the
research, testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. It is
unclear what additional information is required by the Senator's
amendment than is available each year now to Congress under the Hyde
Act.
Second, the amendment requires a report on any export controls that
could be used by the United States if India detonated a nuclear
explosive. The purpose of the export controls would be to ensure that
no U.S. materials, equipment, or technology that may be in countries
other than India could be reexported by those nations to India so as to
minimize all trade with India and ensure that no U.S. technology or
exports contributed to their nuclear weapons program.
Again, this provision is repetitive. In 2006, Congress endorsed
section 105 of the Hyde Act that created a Nuclear Export
Accountability Program for all U.S. exports to India. The purpose of
section 105 was to ensure that our country was taking all appropriate
measures to maintain accountability of all nuclear materials,
equipment, and technology sold, leased, exported, or reexported to
India to ensure full implementation of the IAEA safeguards in India and
U.S. compliance with article I of the NPT. The program created by the
Hyde Act is a highly detailed accounting system focused on ensuring
that India is complying with the relevant requirements, terms, and
conditions of any licenses issued by the United States regarding
exports to India. This program represents the most comprehensive and
detailed system of accounting ever imposed. I believe it provides
substantially the same information that is required in the Senator's
amendment, without the need for a new law.
The Hyde Act also addressed the concern that other nations might
continue to supply India with any technology or fuel in the event of a
cutoff by the United States. Section 103 of the Hyde Act makes it the
policy of the United States to strengthen the guidelines and decisions
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to move other nations toward
``instituting the practice of a timely

[[Page S10205]]

and coordinated response by [Nuclear Suppliers Group] members to all
such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an
involved recipient'' and discourage ``individual NSG members from
continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a
consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.''
The conference report on the Hyde Act clearly states the definitive
interpretation of that provision. It reads:

The conferees intend that the United States seek agreement
among [Nuclear Suppliers Group] members that violations by
one country of an agreement with any NSG member should result
in joint action by all members, including, as appropriate,
the termination of nuclear exports. In addition, the
conferees intend that the Administration work with individual
states to encourage them to refrain from sensitive exports.

Section 103 of the Hyde Act also made it U.S. policy to seek to
prevent the transfers of nuclear equipment, material, or technology
from NSG participating governments to those countries with whom nuclear
commerce has been suspended or terminated pursuant to the Hyde Act, the
Atomic Energy Act, or any other U.S. law.
In other words, if U.S. exports to a country were to be suspended or
terminated pursuant to U.S. law, it would be U.S. policy to seek to
prevent the transfer of nuclear equipment, material, or technology from
other sources, including from other countries with which the United
States has substantial nuclear trade.
In sum, the amendment is duplicative. The issues raised here have
been thoroughly dealt with under the Hyde Act of 2006, and the
legislation currently before us. As a result, the impact of this
amendment would simply be to delay congressional approval of this
important agreement by sending it back to the House of Representatives.
I do not believe such a course serves the U.S. security interests, and
I urge defeat of the amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.

Financial Rescue

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I am in strong agreement with the bipartisan
leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee. I will address those
issues shortly. But, first, since we have a rather full legislative
calendar this evening, I will touch briefly on the financial system
rescue, a rescue of a locked-up credit system which is having its
impact on Main Street, where I live in the hearthand, and in every
community in the Nation where credit is locked up.
Today I was advised that the State of Missouri cannot issue bonds to
build highways. The State of Maine is also having trouble. Local
governments can't get loans. There is no money available in the credit
markets for municipal bonds at reasonable rates. There is a threat that
workers will not get their paychecks if businesses or payroll companies
cannot get the loans they need. Families will not be able to get loans
for college education, to buy a car, to buy a home. Farmers will not be
able to get operating loans they must have in Missouri to begin their
normal agricultural operations.
When I came to the floor a week ago yesterday, I said we must pass
something. At that time I said the Treasury's proposal lacks
accountability, taxpayer protection, and transparency. Thanks to the
good work of our negotiators--and I commend the Senator from
Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, Senator Gregg from our side, and the House
negotiators for putting in those elements, as they are critical--the
taxpayers have a triple level of protection against losses. The CBO has
come out with a score saying it will be far less than the $700 billion.
There are some who think we might recoup all of it, but it is far
cheaper than continuing the process we have right now where Federal tax
dollars are being used to come to the rescue of failing savings and
loans, investment banks, and we don't get any equity from those
efforts. We don't have a means of recouping it. What is even more
important, it does nothing to unlock the credit gridlock that threatens
to bring this economy to a halt, with workers losing their jobs, small
businesses unable to operate.

Yesterday, I strongly urged that we raise the Federal deposit
insurance limit from $100,000 so small businesses that have more than
$100,000 don't have to continue taking their money out of the banks,
leaving the banks less capital available to make loans, in order to get
protection of U.S. Treasury deposits. I heard the stories, and I talked
with a broker in Missouri yesterday who said: Small business clients
are trying to move all their money out of banks above $100,000 and put
it into Treasuries. Again, I am delighted that the leaders, our
negotiators, and the bipartisan leadership in both Houses agreed to
extend the FDIC limit to $250,000. We will be looking at all of those
things, as well as general regulation of the financial markets when we
return. I have lots of ideas. If anybody cares, I will be sharing them
at the appropriate time.
I am also delighted that we are going to include the tax extenders,
tax extenders that businesses need to continue to operate; tax
extenders that, unfortunately, would only extend on a year-to-year
basis but are necessary for profitable operation so businesses can
continue to hire and build the economy. Probably the greatest part of
that is delaying the burdensome and punitive alternative minimum tax
that is now threatening to hit many middle-income working Americans,
unless we pass this bill. Another element, on which my colleague from
Iowa, Senator Harkin, has been a leader, is getting disaster relief.
Residents in Missouri need it. Iowa needs it. Our neighbors in Illinois
need it. Many other places in the Nation need disaster relief. That is
another must-pass piece of legislation.
To return to the subject that the Senators from Connecticut and
Indiana are addressing, we currently have before us a number of
legislative opportunities that, if we act and act properly, would send
a reinforcing signal to our allies and friends in the world that the
United States values and appreciates their support and cooperation. We
all know that anti-Americanism is growing throughout the world. It is
most evident in the socialist vitriol being spewed by Hugo Chavez in
Venezuela, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran, and the widespread suspicion
throughout the Muslim world about America's intentions. In places such
as Southeast Asia and south Asia, where we are competing for influence
with an emerging China, we must increase our engagement and strengthen
our economic and strategic links with countries such as India, which I
will speak to in a minute.
Let's face it, we have a lot of work to do in rebuilding America's
image abroad and increasing security and stability throughout the
world. But we have a number of opportunities before us, opportunities
we must act upon. The way in which we get there is by engaging and
deploying our Nation's smart power. This consists of, but is not
limited to, public diplomacy efforts, educational exchanges, deployment
of more Peace Corps volunteers and USAID foreign service officers, and
supporting free-trade agreements and increased economic engagement.
The first target of opportunity where America must act is Colombia.
Congress must act on the Colombia FTA and renew the Andean Trade
Preferences. Doing so would solidify our image as a nation committed to
helping a strategic ally in Latin America that is, in fact, standing
shoulder to shoulder with us.
Colombia is a remarkable success in the fight against terrorism and
narcotrafficking that needs to be told. It is a country where its pro-
American leader, President Alvaro Uribe, has led a surge against
narcoterrorists militarily while simultaneously improving the overall
security, economy, and safety of the civilian population. They have
done so while ensuring that protection of human rights and adherence to
international humanitarian law are fully integrated into their security
forces.

In my visit there just over a month ago, I was greatly encouraged by
the tangible evidence I saw of a country in complete transformation.
Just 6 years ago, in 2002, as much as 40 percent of Colombia was
controlled by terrorist groups and ruthless narcotics-trafficking
cartels. Many of my colleagues visited Colombia at that time and
brought back grim reports of a country slipping into a failed state.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is an agreement to recess at 12:30.

[[Page S10206]]

Mr. BOND. Well, Mr. President, might I ask consent to conclude my
remarks.
Mr. DODD. I say to the Senator, he can do that. I will propound a
consent request, Mr. President, that the Senator be allowed to conclude
in 5 minutes. Is that appropriate?
Mr. BOND. Yes.
Mr. DODD. Five minutes; and my colleague would like 15 minutes. So I
ask, Mr. President, unanimous consent that the Senator from Missouri be
allowed to proceed for 5 minutes and the Senator from Iowa for an
additional 20 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and thank my colleagues.
Since 1998, the United States has been supporting the
counternarcotics effort President Clinton initiated known as Plan
Colombia, and today our mutual objectives have evolved from a strict
counternarcotics focus to encompass counterterrorism activities as
well. Our investment has paid off.
With U.S. aid to Colombian security forces and assistance and trade
preferences under the Andean trade preferences agreement, the Colombian
people have been positively transforming their nation. Others, however,
under the Andean trade preference agreement in Bolivia and Ecuador have
produced less encouraging results, even taking sides with aggressively
hostile Hugo Chavez.
I believe we ought to have a debate about extending them the full
benefits of the Andean trade agreement. If I had the opportunity to
offer an amendment, I would have limited the questionable Governments
of Ecuador and Bolivia to 1 year while giving much longer protection to
Colombia.
The message is simple: reward our friends and allies in the world,
not those who wish us ill or support our enemies.
Colombia has been our friend and ally in an increasingly left-
leaning, anti-American Latin America. We must take the opportunity to
reward and thank them by passing the Colombia FTA.
This agreement also benefits America's economy by increasing exports
and generating jobs. Upon entry into force of the agreement, over 80
percent of U.S. exports of agricultural, consumer, and industrial goods
to Colombia would enter duty-free immediately.
The Colombian free-trade agreement will benefit America.
Another strategically important part of the world where the United
States has an opportunity to increase cooperation and deploy its smart
power is in India.
India is a friendly democracy strategically sitting between the two
places American strategists worry most about: China and the Middle
East.
We are natural allies as two of the world's largest democracies and
we should be much closer. And the feeling, by and large, is mutual
among the people of India.
India has more Muslims--150 million or so--than any other country in
the world except Indonesia, which I have spoken extensively on this
floor about engaging more proactively. Positive engagement of American
smart power and increased economic opportunities will help prevent the
likelihood of al-Qaida or radicalization of this large Muslim
population.
During my trip to India in March of 2006, the major item of interest
to all of the Government and private-sector officials I met, from Prime
Minster Singh to businessmen in New Dehli, was the support for the
civilian nuclear technology agreement which was signed as I was in the
air. I was asked about it when I landed and could not answer. But I
spent a day being fully briefed by our Embassy and intelligence
officials.
After extensive discussions with Indian and American officials, as
well as intelligence briefings, I reached the conclusion that this
agreement is a very positive step for the United States and India.
It would aid in cementing a good working relationship with the
world's largest democracy in a strategic part of the world. I support
this agreement and agree with our bipartisan leadership that we must
defeat the amendments which would merely delay and possibly sidetrack
approval.
India has three paramount challenges ahead that it must address:
First, it must improve its infrastructure and roads. Second, it must
deal with the extreme poverty of its huge rural population. Thirty
percent of its population live below the official poverty line. Third,
India, just like the United States, must be able to meet the demand for
increases in energy.
A strong relationship between India and the U.S. is vital to ensuring
peaceful development and continued prosperity in South and Southeast
Asia.
Regional rivalries, particularly with China will continue to heat up
in a race for energy to fuel both India's and China's rapidly expanding
economies and societies. An increase in nuclear power production in
India through the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement would help to cool
these rivalries in their race for energy resources.
In a land where air quality is a major problem, despite recent
improvements, this agreement would allow India to meet its surging
energy requirements in an environmentally friendly manner.
Further, increasing the supply of energy in India, make no mistake
about it, also indirectly helps consumers at the pump here at home as
well.
In addition to nuclear power, during my visit I also encouraged the
development of clean coal technology. With the fourth largest coal
reserves in the world, India and the U.S. should work together to
develop that source of energy as well.
Developing energy solutions together with India will increase our
engagement and lead to other economic opportunities for Americans.
I hope my colleagues will support this agreement between the United
States and India without amendment.
It will safeguard Indian nuclear facilities and help meet the surging
demand for global energy supplies in this critical Nation.
And most importantly, it will solidify our relationship with a
strategically important country that for too long suffered under the
burden of a Soviet-style economy. Now it is opening its market, shares
our democratic values, and is on its way to becoming one of the world's
three largest economies.
I urge my colleagues to act on solidifying our partnership with two
critically important countries, Colombia and India.

Tribute To Senator

Pete Domenici

Mr. President, I want to say that the passing of the mental health
parity bill will be a great tribute to a wonderful friend, Pete
Domenici, a true icon. He has been a longtime champion of this issue,
and this will be a great testament to his leadership.
I worked with Pete on the Budget Committee. I say thanks, Pete, for
making me take all the tough votes. It was ugly but necessary, just
like the financial rescue package.
He is most recognized for his work on energy. I am very proud to have
supported him in his efforts over many years to develop an abundant
energy resource, long before $4 gasoline brought the issue home to
every American.
Just as important to me, I will miss the great friendship of a
wonderful man, Pete Domenici, and his magnificent wife Nancy.
Pete is known for his devotion to his friends and family--to his wife
Nancy of 50 years and their 8 children.
Pete is also known for his devotion and dedication to New Mexico.
Born and raised in New Mexico, Pete has served his State in the U.S.
Senate now for 36 years--making him the most senior Senator New Mexico
has ever had.
Pete has also earned the title as the only Republican to ever be
elected by New Mexico for a 6-year Senate term--in a State not known to
lean Republican.
Pete's contributions to his State are well known to his constituents
in New Mexico--whether it is fighting for solutions to the State's
water crisis, supporting New Mexico schools, or ensuring New Mexico
gets their fair share of tax dollars.
Pete's contributions to our Nation are also well known. He
understands the importance of keeping America as a leader in science
and technology and has worked for improvements to the math and science
education our school children need to succeed.
Pete has also fought passionately for fiscal responsibility to ensure
tax

[[Page S10207]]

payer dollars are spent wisely and curbing nuclear proliferation to
keep our communities safe.
In recent years, Pete has used his role as chairman or ranking member
of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee to fight for our Nation's
energy security.
Pete worked across the aisle to pass the first comprehensive energy
legislation since 1992. Because of Pete and the bill he got through
Congress, our Nation began investing in our own energy sources.This
bill provided incentives to expand the production of energy from wind,
solar, geothermal and biomass sources to promote cleaner alternative
sources of energy.
Pete also ensured that this bill promoted research and development of
hydrogen and fuel-cell technology.
Pete didn't end the fight for our Nation's energy independence in
2005 though.Since that time, he has been a leader in the Senate calling
for more action.
Before the gas price crisis that is now affecting families across the
country, Pete sounded the alarm.He has called for bringing relief to
families struggling with pain at the pump by tapping our own domestic
supplies of gas and oil.
Pete has proposed the commonsense proposal--the Gas Price Reduction
Act--to end our Nation's energy crisis.
It is this foresight, this leadership, and this passion to making our
Nation a better place and for making our communities better for our
families that will make Pete Domenici missed by all--Republicans and
Democrats alike.
Mr. President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rockefeller). The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I understand there is an order that the
distinguished Senator from Iowa will be recognized next. But I asked
him graciously, would he give me a minute to speak in support of the
United States-India nuclear cooperation agreement. I strongly endorse
this agreement because as one of those who advocate greater nuclear
power in our Nation, the industrial base of India will work with our
industrial base at this time when we need to increase the number of
plants we have in our Nation.
The United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and
Nonproliferation Enhancement Act will provide congressional approval of
the agreement reached between the United States and India that will
pave the way for bilateral cooperation in civilian nuclear energy. This
agreement resulted from years of diplomatic negotiations. I note that
my dear friend, Ambassador Nick Burns, helped lay the foundation for
this agreement during his tenure as Under Secretary of State for
Policy.
As I publicly stated when this agreement was first announced in March
2006, it is important that as we move to implement this historic
arrangement with India, we preserve two equally important objectives: a
strengthened strategic partnership with India that includes mutually
beneficial cooperation in civilian nuclear energy; and preservation of
the nuclear nonproliferation regime to prevent the further spread of
nuclear weapons and related technologies. I believe the bill ably
crafted by Senators Biden and Lugar seeks to advance both of those
objectives.
As part of this agreement, India has agreed to separate its civilian
nuclear fuel cycle from its military program, and to place the civilian
program under full safeguards to be monitored by the International
Atomic Energy Agency. This arrangement is intended to ensure that
cooperation in civil nuclear energy will not assist India's nuclear
weapons program in any way. India has also agreed to maintain its
moratorium on nuclear testing, work toward a Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty, and strengthen its domestic nuclear export control laws. The
bill providing congressional approval for the agreement makes clear
that in the event India were to test a nuclear weapon in the future,
cooperation under this agreement would be terminated.
Facilitating India's development of civilian nuclear energy will make
an important contribution to a cause I value highly: reducing the
emission of greenhouse gasses into the environment. As nations such as
India grow and have increasing requirements for energy, it is
imperative for the health of our global environment that they turn
increasingly to clean sources of energy such as nuclear power.
I am also hopeful that this agreement will open the door to United
States-India trade and investment in nuclear energy, and lead to new
business opportunities for American firms with expertise in civilian
nuclear power. Today, the United States is looking to expand its
production of civilian nuclear power; to do so with the participation
of the industrial base of India should help to expand the safe and
economical production of civilian nuclear energy in both countries.
Mr. President, I support Senate approval of the United States-India
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement because I believe it will advance the
United States-India strategic partnership, promote a clean energy
source to meet India's growing demand for energy, open the door to new
business opportunities for the U.S. nuclear energy sector, and still
promote and preserve important nonproliferation practices and
principles which remain in the interest of the United States and indeed
the international community.
I thank the Presiding Officer and my colleagues.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tester). The Senator from Iowa.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I come to the floor to express my
opposition to this deeply unwise United States-India Nuclear
Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. In truth,
this is not a nonproliferation enhancement act; it is a
nonproliferation degradation and weakening act. If we pass this
legislation, we will reward India for flouting the most important arms
control agreement in history, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
we will gravely undermine our case against hostile nations that seek to
do the same.
At a time when one of our primary national security objectives is to
mobilize the global community to prevent Iran from producing nuclear
weapons, the legislation before us would severely undermine our
credibility and consistency.
India has refused to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--
one of only four nations, by the way--and, three decades ago, produced
its first nuclear weapon. It was precisely for this reason that
following India's first nuclear test in 1974, the United States felt
compelled to create the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Since the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the United States has prohibited--
has prohibited--the sale of any nuclear technology, peaceful or not, to
any nation, such as India, that does not have full nuclear safeguards--
full nuclear safeguards. As was pointed out earlier by my colleague
from North Dakota, Senator Dorgan, right now India has 22 nuclear
reactors. Under this agreement, only 14 will come under IAEA,
International Atomic Energy Agency, safeguards--14. What about the
other eight? What is going to happen to them? They are not under any
safeguards at all. So, again, we are undermining and we are overturning
what the United States has been doing for over 50 years.
The legislation we now have before us permits the United States to
unilaterally break that ban. It will open the floodgates for other
nations, such as France and Russia, that already have agreements to
sell to India pending--pending--the approval of this deal.
Listen to the views of LTG Robert Gard, chairman of the Center for
Arms Control and Proliferation. I quote his words:

The greatest threat to the security of the United States is
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This deal [with India]
significantly weakens U.S. and international security by
granting an exception to the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group and American laws, thereby undermining the entire non-
proliferation regime and inviting violations by other
nations.

I would add there is nothing in this agreement to prevent India from
continuing on a parallel path its robust nuclear weapons program. India
is allowed to continue producing--to continue producing--bomb-making
material, and it is free to expand its arsenal of nuclear weapons. Even
worse, there is nothing in this legislation to prevent India from
resuming nuclear weapons testing.
So I ask, why, in the twilight of the Bush Presidency--and we know
what

[[Page S10208]]

his ratings are and how the people feel about this Presidency--why are
we rushing to pass this gravely flawed agreement? It was hustled
through the other body without any hearings and without a vote in the
House Foreign Affairs Committee. Here in the Senate, the Foreign
Relations Committee held just one hearing with just one witness who
spoke in support of the agreement. Until Senators objected, an attempt
was made to pass the bill on the floor without any debate whatsoever.
Given the monumental national security implications of this
legislation--casting aside core principles of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty--this lack of debate and due diligence is simply
extraordinary.
Leading arms control experts have condemned this agreement. Leonor
Tomero, director of nuclear nonproliferation at the Center for Arms
Control and Nonproliferation, rendered this verdict:

The Bush administration ignored congressional conditions
and gave away the store in its negotiations with India, with
nothing to show for the deal now except having helped foreign
companies, enabled the increase of nuclear weapons and
nuclear-weapons materials in India, and seriously eroded a
thirty-year norm of preventing nuclear proliferation.

India is a peaceful nation, a strong democracy, and a friend of the
United States. I have tremendous respect for India. But there are facts
that must be acknowledged: India is one of only four states that have
refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; India continues
to produce fissile material and expand its nuclear arsenal; India does
not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all elements
of its civilian nuclear program; and India has failed to file a list of
facilities that will be subject to the IAEA safeguards. According to
the U.S. Department of State, in the past, Indian entities have sold
sensitive missile technologies to Iran--to Iran--in violation of U.S.
export control laws.
I might just add one other thing. It has been said time and time
again that India is a great friend of the United States. I suggest that
one go back and look at the votes in the United Nations General
Assembly and see how many times India votes with the United States and
has since the establishment of the United Nations. It is dismal. I was
trying to get that before the debate today, going all the way back. I
had that at one time. But I can tell you, last year, in 2007, in the
General Assembly, India voted with the United States 14 percent of the
time--one of the lowest in the world. This great friend of the United
States supported us in the United Nations 14 percent of the time. Is
that a real friend?
As I said, one more item: India, 22 reactors; only 14 are going to
come under IAEA safeguards, the other 8 used for military weapons
programs. Yet, despite this record, the legislation before us would
give India the rights and privileges of civil nuclear trade that
heretofore have been restricted to members in good standing of the
nonproliferation treaty.
As others have pointed out, this would create a dangerous precedent.
It would create a distinction between kind of ``good'' proliferators
and ``bad'' proliferators. It would send mixed, misleading signals to
the international community with regard to what is and is not permitted
under the nonproliferation treaty. Under this legislation, the United
States would be saying, in effect, that India is a ``good''
proliferator and it should get special favorable treatment. What if, in
the months ahead, China or Russia decides to recognize Iran as a
``good'' proliferator? On what grounds would we object, having
rewritten the rules to suit our own interests and certain special
interests with regard to India?
I oppose this legislation. But there is one element of this
prospective agreement with India that I believe is particularly
dangerous and needs to be changed. It was talked about earlier. Under
the 2006 Henry J. Hyde Act, the United States must--must--ban the
transfer of enrichment or reprocessing technologies to India and it
must cut off--must cut off--nuclear trade with India if that nation
resumes nuclear testing. The administration has successfully pressured
the Nuclear Suppliers Group to approve an India-specific waiver that
does not incorporate these consequences if India resumes nuclear
testing. This is virtually an invitation to India to resume nuclear
testing, secure in the knowledge that a resumption of testing would not
nullify this new nuclear trade agreement.

I believe this to be a grave mistake. That is why I am joining with
Senator Dorgan and Senator Bingaman and others to offer a commonsense
amendment to this legislation in order to send an unambiguous warning
to India with regard to resumption of nuclear testing. Our amendment
states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United
States may not export, transfer, or retransfer any nuclear
technology, material, equipment, or facility under the
Agreement if the Government of India detonates a nuclear
device after the date of the enactment of this Act.

It is very simple, very straightforward.
In order to protect the integrity of the world's nonproliferation
regime, I urge my colleagues to vote against the United States-India
nuclear energy cooperation agreement. It will set a dangerous
precedent, and it will weaken our efforts to deny Iran a nuclear
weapon. But if nothing else, at least we can adopt the amendment being
offered by Senator Dorgan and Senator Bingaman and others to say that
if, in fact, they do detonate a nuclear device, the United States will
stop any export, transfer, or retransfer of any nuclear technology,
material, or equipment to India. So, again, I am a realist. I recognize
that this seems to be on a fast track. It will likely go to passage. So
to minimize the damage, I urge Senators to support the Dorgan-Bingaman
amendment which will give India strong incentives not to resume nuclear
testing.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.

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