Calendar No. 244

111TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION

H. R. 730

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

March 26, 2009

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

December 17, 2009

Reported by Mr. LIEBERMAN, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

AN ACT

To strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland Security to develop nuclear forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of nuclear material, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Nuclear Forensics and
- 5 Attribution Act".
- 6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
- 7 Congress finds the following:

(1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one of the most serious threats to the national security of the United States. In the wake of an attack, attribution of responsibility would be of utmost importance. Because of the destructive power of a nuclear weapon, there could be little forensic evidence except the radioactive material in the weapon itself.

(2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using both existing techniques and those under development, it may be possible to identify the source and pathway of a weapon or material after it is interdicted or detonated. Though identifying intercepted smuggled material is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post-detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, and the challenges are compounded by the pressures and time constraints of performing forensics after a nuclear or radiological attack.

(3) A robust and well-known capability to identify the source of nuclear or radiological material intended for or used in an act of terror could also deter prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of effective attribution could compel improved security at material storage facilities, preventing the

unwitting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials.

(4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear material and other radioactive materials confidently, it is necessary to have a robust capability to acquire samples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize samples, and compare samples against known signatures of nuclear and radiological material.

(B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost importance. Over the past several decades, the ability of the United States to gather atmospheric samples—often the preferred method of sample acquisition—has diminished. This ability must be restored and modern techniques that could complement or replace existing techniques should be pursued.

(C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may provide the most useful tools for analysis and characterization of samples. The number of radiochemistry programs and radiochemists in United States Na-

tional Laboratories and universities has dramatically declined over the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and credible nuclear forensics program.

(5) Once samples have been acquired and characterized, it is necessary to compare the results against samples of known material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities, and from medical, academic, commercial, and other facilities containing such materials, throughout the world. Some of these samples are available to the International Atomic Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and some countries maintain internal sample databases. Access to samples in many countries is limited by national security concerns.

(6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is necessary to have the capability to positively identify the source of nuclear or radiological material, and potential traffickers in nuclear or radiological material must be aware of that capability. International cooperation may be essential to catalogue all existing sources of nuclear or radiological material.

1 SEC 3 SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREE.

1	SEC. 0. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
2	MENTS FOR FORENSICS COOPERATION.
3	It is the sense of the Congress that the President
4	should—
5	(1) pursue bilateral and multilateral inter-
6	national agreements to establish, or seek to establish
7	under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilat-
8	eral agreements, an international framework for de-
9	termining the source of any confiscated nuclear or
10	radiological material or weapon, as well as the
11	source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear or
12	radiological material used in such a weapon;
13	(2) develop protocols for the data exchange and
14	dissemination of sensitive information relating to nu-
15	clear or radiological materials and samples of con-
16	trolled nuclear or radiological materials, to the ex-
17	tent required by the agreements entered into under
18	paragraph (1); and
19	(3) develop expedited protocols for the data ex-
20	change and dissemination of sensitive information
21	needed to publicly identify the source of a nuclear

detonation.

1 SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETEC-

2	TION OFFICE.
3	(a) Additional Responsibilities.—Section 1902
4	of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as redesignated
5	by Public Law 110–53; 6 U.S.C. 592) is amended—
6	(1) in subsection (a)—
7	(A) in paragraph (9), by striking "and"
8	after the semicolon;
9	(B) by redesignating paragraph (10) as
10	paragraph (14); and
11	(C) by inserting after paragraph (9) the
12	following:
13	"(10) develop and implement, with the approval
14	of the Secretary and in coordination with the heads
15	of appropriate departments and agencies, methods
16	and capabilities to support the attribution of nuclear
17	or radiological material to its source when such ma-
18	terial is intercepted by the United States, foreign
19	governments, or international bodies or is dispersed
20	in the course of a terrorist attack or other nuclear
21	or radiological explosion;
22	"(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear
23	Detection Office, the National Technical Nuclear
24	Forensies Center to provide centralized stewardship,
25	planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, im-
26	provement, and integration for all Federal nuclear

1	forensies activities in order to ensure an enduring
2	national technical nuclear forensics capability and
3	strengthen the collective response of the United
4	States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear attacks
5	"(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensies
6	Expertise Development Program which—
7	"(A) is devoted to developing and main-
8	taining a vibrant and enduring academic path-
9	way from undergraduate to post-doctorate
10	study in nuclear and geochemical science spe-
11	cialties directly relevant to technical nuclear
12	forensics, including radiochemistry, geo-
13	chemistry, nuclear physics, nuclear engineering
14	materials science, and analytical chemistry; and
15	"(B) shall—
16	"(i) make available for undergraduate
17	study student scholarships, with a duration
18	of up to four years per student, which shall
19	include, whenever possible, at least one
20	summer internship at a national laboratory
21	or appropriate Federal agency in the field
22	of technical nuclear forensics during the
23	course of the student's undergraduate ca-
24	1'001';

1	"(ii) make available for graduate
2	study student fellowships, with a duration
3	of up to five years per student, which—
4	"(I) shall include, whenever pos-
5	sible, at least two summer internships
6	at a national laboratory or appro-
7	priate Federal agency in the field of
8	technical nuclear forensics during the
9	course of the student's graduate ca-
10	reer; and
11	"(H) shall require each recipient
12	to commit to serve for two years in a
13	post-doctoral position in a technical
14	nuclear forensics-related specialty at a
15	national laboratory or appropriate
16	Federal agency after graduation;
17	"(iii) make available to faculty
18	awards, with a duration of three to five
19	years each, to ensure faculty and their
20	graduate students a sustained funding
21	stream; and
22	"(iv) place a particular emphasis on
23	reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics
24	programs, while encouraging the participa-
25	tion of undergraduate students, graduate

1	students, and university faculty from his-
2	torically Black colleges and universities,
3	Hispanic-serving institutions, and Tribal
4	Colleges and Universities;
5	"(13) provide an annual report to Congress on
6	the activities carried out under paragraphs (10),
7	(11), and (12); and"; and
8	(2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
9	section:
10	"(b) Definitions.—In this section:
11	"(1) HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGE OR UNI-
12	VERSITY.—The term 'historically Black college or
13	university' has the meaning given the term 'part B
14	institution' in section 322(2) of the Higher Edu-
15	eation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061(2)).
16	"(2) Hispanic-serving institution.—The
17	term 'Hispanic-serving institution' has the meaning
18	given that term in section 502 of the Higher Edu-
19	eation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a).
20	"(3) Tribal college or university.—The
21	term 'Tribal College or University' has the meaning
22	given that term in section 316(b) of the Higher
23	Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)).".
24	(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
25	authorized to be appropriated the sum of \$30,000,000 for

- 1 each of the fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011 to earry
- 2 out paragraphs (10) through (13) of section 1902(a) of
- 3 the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by sub-
- 4 section (a) of this section.
- 5 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 6 This Act may be cited as the "Nuclear Forensics and
- 7 Attribution Act".
- 8 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
- 9 Congress finds the following:
- 10 (1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on
- 11 American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one
- of the most serious threats to the national security of
- 13 the United States. In the wake of an attack, attribu-
- tion of responsibility would be of utmost importance.
- 15 Because of the destructive power of a nuclear weapon,
- 16 there could be little forensic evidence except the radio-
- 17 active material in the weapon itself.
- 18 (2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using
- both existing techniques and those under development,
- it may be possible to identify the source and pathway
- of a weapon or material after it is interdicted or deto-
- 22 nated. Though identifying intercepted smuggled mate-
- rial is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation
- forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post-
- detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature,

- and the challenges are compounded by the pressures and time constraints of performing forensics after a nuclear or radiological attack.
 - (3) A robust and well-known capability to identify the source of nuclear or radiological material intended for or used in an act of terror could also deter prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of effective attribution could compel improved security at material storage facilities, preventing the unwitting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials.
 - (4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear material and other radioactive materials confidently, it is necessary to have a robust capability to acquire samples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize samples, and compare samples against known signatures of nuclear and radiological material.
 - (B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost importance. Over the past several decades, the ability of the United States to gather atmospheric samples—often the preferred method of sample acquisition—has diminished. This ability must be restored and modern techniques that could complement or replace existing techniques should be pursued.

(C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may provide the most useful tools for analysis and characterization of samples. The number of radiochemistry programs and radiochemists in United States National Laboratories and universities has dramatically declined over the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and credible nuclear forensics program.

(5) Once samples have been acquired and characterized, it is necessary to compare the results against samples of known material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities, and from medical, academic, commercial, and other facilities containing such materials, throughout the world. Some of these samples are available to the International Atomic Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and some countries maintain internal sample databases. Access to samples in many countries is limited by national security concerns.

1 (6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is 2 necessary to have the capability to positively identify 3 the source of nuclear or radiological material, and po-4 tential traffickers in nuclear or radiological material 5 must be aware of that capability. International co-6 operation may be essential to catalogue all existing 7 sources of nuclear or radiological material.

8 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREE-

9 MENTS FOR FORENSICS COOPERATION.

- 10 It is the sense of the Congress that the President 11 should—
 - (1) pursue bilateral and multilateral international agreements to establish, or seek to establish under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, an international framework for determining the source of any confiscated nuclear or radiological material or weapon, as well as the source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear or radiological material used in such a weapon;
 - (2) develop protocols for the data exchange and dissemination of sensitive information relating to nuclear or radiological materials and samples of controlled nuclear or radiological materials, to the extent required by the agreements entered into under paragraph (1); and

25 graph (1); and

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1	(3) develop expedited protocols for the data ex-
2	change and dissemination of sensitive information
3	needed to publicly identify the source of a nuclear det-
4	onation.
5	SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETEC-
6	TION OFFICE.
7	(a) Additional Responsibilities.—Section 1902 of
8	the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as redesignated by
9	Public Law 110–53; 6 U.S.C. 592) is amended—
10	(1) in subsection (a)—
11	(A) in paragraph (9), by striking "and"
12	after the semicolon;
13	(B) by redesignating paragraph (10) as
14	paragraph (14); and
15	(C) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol-
16	lowing:
17	"(10) lead the development and implementation
18	of the national strategic five-year plan for improving
19	the nuclear forensic and attribution capabilities of the
20	United States required under section 1036 of the Na-
21	tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
22	2010;
23	"(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear De-
24	tection Office, the National Technical Nuclear
25	Forensics Center to provide centralized stewardship.

1	planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, im-
2	provement, and integration for all Federal nuclear
3	forensics and attribution activities—
4	"(A) to ensure an enduring national tech-
5	nical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen
6	the collective response of the United States to nu-
7	clear terrorism or other nuclear attacks; and
8	"(B) to coordinate and implement the na-
9	tional strategic five-year plan referred to in
10	paragraph (10);
11	"(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Ex-
12	pertise Development Program, which—
13	"(A) is devoted to developing and maintain-
14	ing a vibrant and enduring academic pathway
15	from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in
16	nuclear and geochemical science specialties di-
17	rectly relevant to technical nuclear forensics, in-
18	cluding radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear
19	physics, nuclear engineering, materials science,
20	and analytical chemistry;
21	"(B) shall—
22	"(i) make available for undergraduate
23	study student scholarships, with a duration
24	of up to 4 years per student, which shall in-
25	clude, if possible, at least 1 summer intern-

1	ship at a national laboratory or appro-
2	priate Federal agency in the field of tech-
3	nical nuclear forensics during the course of
4	the student's undergraduate career;
5	"(ii) make available for doctoral study
6	student fellowships, with a duration of up
7	to 5 years per student, which shall—
8	"(I) include, if possible, at least 2
9	summer internships at a national lab-
10	oratory or appropriate Federal agency
11	in the field of technical nuclear
12	forensics during the course of the stu-
13	dent's graduate career; and
14	"(II) require each recipient to
15	commit to serve for 2 years in a post-
16	doctoral position in a technical nuclear
17	forensics-related specialty at a national
18	laboratory or appropriate Federal
19	agency after graduation;
20	"(iii) make available to faculty
21	awards, with a duration of 3 to 5 years
22	each, to ensure faculty and their graduate
23	students have a sustained funding stream;
24	and

"(iv) place a particular emphasis on 1 2 reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics programs while encouraging the participa-3 4 tion of undergraduate students, graduate students, and university faculty from his-6 torically Black colleges and universities, 7 Hispanic-serving institutions, Tribal Col-8 leges and Universities, Asian American and 9 Native American Pacific Islander-serving 10 institutions, Alaska Native-serving institu-11 tions, and Hawaiian Native-serving institu-12 tions; and "(C) shall— 13 14 "(i) provide for the selection of indi-15 viduals to receive scholarships or fellowships 16 under this section through a competitive 17 process primarily on the basis of academic 18 merit and the nuclear forensics and attribu-19 tion needs of the United States Government; 20 "(ii) provide for the setting aside of up 21 to 10 percent of the scholarships or fellow-22 ships awarded under this section for indi-

viduals who are Federal employees to en-

hance the education of such employees in

areas of critical nuclear forensics and attri-

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1	bution needs of the United States Govern-
2	ment, for doctoral education under the
3	scholarship on a full-time or part-time
4	basis;
5	"(iii) provide that the Secretary may
6	enter into a contractual agreement with an
7	institution of higher education under which
8	the amounts provided for a scholarship
9	under this section for tuition, fees, and
10	other authorized expenses are paid directly
11	to the institution with respect to which such
12	scholarship is awarded;
13	"(iv) require scholarship recipients to
14	maintain satisfactory academic progress;
15	and
16	"(v) require that—
17	"(I) a scholarship recipient who
18	fails to maintain a high level of aca-
19	demic standing, as defined by the Sec-
20	retary, who is dismissed for discipli-
21	nary reasons from the educational in-
22	stitution such recipient is attending, or
23	who voluntarily terminates academic
24	training before graduation from the
25	educational program for which the

1	scholarship was awarded shall be liable
2	to the United States for repayment
3	within 1 year after the date of such de-
4	fault of all scholarship funds paid to
5	such recipient and to the institution of
6	higher education on the behalf of such
7	recipient, provided that the repayment
8	period may be extended by the Sec-
9	retary if the Secretary determines it
10	necessary, as established by regulation;
11	and
12	"(II) a scholarship recipient who,
13	for any reason except death or dis-
14	ability, fails to begin or complete the
15	post-doctoral service requirements in a
16	technical nuclear forensics-related spe-
17	cialty at a national laboratory or ap-
18	propriate Federal agency after comple-
19	tion of academic training shall be lia-
20	ble to the United States for an amount
21	equal to—
22	"(aa) the total amount of the
23	scholarship received by such re-
24	cipient under this section; and

1	"(bb) the interest on such
2	amounts which would be payable
3	if at the time the scholarship was
4	received such scholarship was a
5	loan bearing interest at the max-
6	imum legally prevailing rate;
7	"(13) provide an annual report to Congress on
8	the activities carried out under paragraphs (10), (11),
9	and (12); and"; and
10	(2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
11	section:
12	"(b) Definitions.—In this section:
13	"(1) Alaska native-serving institution.—
14	The term 'Alaska Native-serving institution' has the
15	meaning given the term in section 317 of the Higher
16	Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d).
17	"(2) ASIAN AMERICAN AND NATIVE AMERICAN
18	PACIFIC ISLANDER-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term
19	'Asian American and Native American Pacific Is-
20	lander-serving institution' has the meaning given the
21	term in section 320 of the Higher Education Act of
22	1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059g).
23	"(3) Hawaiian native-serving institution.—
24	The term 'Hawaiian native-serving institution' has

1	the meaning given the term in section 317 of the
2	Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d).
3	"(4) Hispanic-serving institution.—The term
4	'Hispanic-serving institution' has the meaning given
5	that term in section 502 of the Higher Education Act
6	of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a).
7	"(5) Historically black college or univer-
8	SITY.—The term 'historically Black college or univer-
9	sity' has the meaning given the term 'part B institu-
10	tion' in section 322(2) of the Higher Education Act
11	of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061(2)).
12	"(6) Tribal college or university.—The
13	term 'Tribal College or University' has the meaning
14	given that term in section 316(b) of the Higher Edu-
15	cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)).".
16	(b) Joint Interagency Annual Reporting Re-
17	QUIREMENT TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT.—
18	(1) In General.—Section $1907(a)(1)$ of the
19	Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 596a(a)(1))
20	is amended—
21	(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ";
22	and" and inserting a semicolon;
23	(B) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking
24	the period at the end and inserting "; and"; and

1	(C) by adding at the end the following new
2	subparagraph:
3	"(C) the Director of the Domestic Nuclear
4	Detection Office and each of the relevant depart-
5	ments that are partners in the National Tech-
6	nical Forensics Center—
7	"(i) include, as part of the assessments,
8	evaluations, and reviews required under
9	this paragraph, each office's or department's
10	activities and investments in support of nu-
11	clear forensics and attribution activities
12	and specific goals and objectives accom-
13	plished during the previous year pursuant
14	to the national strategic five-year plan for
15	improving the nuclear forensic and attribu-
16	tion capabilities of the United States re-
17	quired under section 1036 of the National
18	Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
19	2010;
20	"(ii) attaches, as an appendix to the
21	Joint Interagency Annual Review, the most
22	current version of such strategy and plan;
23	and
24	"(iii) includes a description of new or
25	amended bilateral and multilateral agree-

1	ments and efforts in support of nuclear
2	forensics and attribution activities accom-
3	plished during the previous year.".

Calendar No. 244

111TH CONGRESS H. R. 730

AN ACT

To strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland Security to develop nuclear forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of nuclear material, and for other purposes.

DECEMBER 17, 2009

Reported with an amendment