

The national security handmaidens of those presidents, especially those who served Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford, were supposedly the best and brightest that Harvard and Yale and Princeton could contribute.

Presidents right up to today's like to surround themselves with such self-assured and certain men, men whose eagerness to find war the answer to most problems often grows in direct proportion to their lack of experience in uniform or combat.

This small history lesson can be read as a cautionary tale to President Barack Obama's team as it oversees an excruciating slow-motion end of one war, Iraq, and a pell-mell rush to wade ever deeper into another one in the mountains and deserts of remote and tribal Afghanistan.

The story grows out of a battle in the very beginning of the American takeover of the war in South Vietnam in the fall of 1965 when a defense secretary, Robert S. McNamara, counted the bodies and the beans and offered his president two directly opposing options.

In the wake of the Ia Drang Valley battles of November 1965—the first major collision between an experimental airmobile division of the U.S. Army and regular soldiers in division strength from the People's Army of North Vietnam—President Johnson ordered McNamara to rush to Vietnam and assess what had happened and what was going to happen.

Up till then, just more than 1,000 Americans, mostly advisers and pilots, had been killed in Vietnam since Ovnand and Buis. Then, in just five days 234 more Americans had been killed and hundreds wounded in the Ia Drang. McNamara took briefings from Gen. William Westmoreland, the top U.S. commander in Vietnam, and from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and assorted spy chiefs and diplomats. Then he flew to An Khe in the Central Highlands and was briefed on the Ia Drang battles by then Lt. Col. Hal Moore, who had commanded on the ground in Landing Zone XRAY in the Ia Drang.

On the plane home to Washington, McNamara dictated a Top Secret/Eyes Only memo to Johnson dated Nov. 30, 1965. In that report he stated that the enemy had not only met but had exceeded our escalation of the war and we had reached a decision point. In his view there were two options:

Option One: We could arrange whatever diplomatic cover we could arrange and pull out of South Vietnam.

Option Two: We could give Gen. Westmoreland the 200,000 more U.S. troops he was asking for, in which case by early 1967 we would have more than 500,000 Americans on the ground, and they would be dying at the rate of 1,000 a month. (He was wrong; the death toll would reach over 3,000 a month at the height of the war). "All we can possibly achieve (by this) is a military stalemate at a much higher level of violence," McNamara wrote.

On Dec. 15, 1965, the president assembled what he called the "wise men" for a brainstorming session on Vietnam. He entered the Cabinet room holding McNamara's memo. He shook it at McNamara and asked: "Bob, you mean to tell me no matter what I do, I can't win in Vietnam?" McNamara nodded yes; that was precisely what he meant.

The wise men sat in session for two days. Participants say there was no real discussion of McNamara's Option One—it would have sent the wrong message to our Cold War allies—and at the end there was a unanimous vote in favor of Option Two—escalating and continuing a war that our leaders knew we could not win.

Remember. This was 1965, 10 years before the last helicopter lifted off that roof in Sai-

gon. It's a hell of a lot easier to get sucked into a war or jump feet first into a war than it is to get out of a war.

There's no question that Obama inherited these two wars, Iraq and Afghanistan, from the Bush/Cheney administration. But the buildup in Afghanistan and the change in strategy belong to Obama and his version of the best and brightest.

The new administration has dictated an escalation from 30,000 U.S. troops to more than 60,000, and even before most of them have actually arrived commanders on the ground are already back asking for more, and why not? When you are a hammer everything around you looks like a nail.

Some smart veterans of both Iraq and Afghanistan, on the ground now or just back, say that at this rate we will inevitably lose the war in Afghanistan; that the situation on the ground now is far worse than Iraq was at its lowest point in 2006 and early 2007. They talk of a costly effort both in lives and national treasure that will stretch out past the Obama administration and maybe the two administrations after that.

Obama needs to call in the "wise men and women" for a fish-or-cut bait meeting on his two ongoing wars. Let's hope that this time around, there's an absence of the arrogance and certainty of previous generations of advisers. Let's hope that they choose to speed up the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq and get out before the Iraqi people and leaders order us to leave. Let's hope, too, that they weigh very carefully all the costs of another decade or two of war in Afghanistan.

Failing that, they should at the very least begin an immediate drive to increase the number of available beds in military and Veterans Administration hospitals and to expand Arlington National Cemetery and the national military cemeteries nationwide.

Mr. Speaker, perhaps the column's most salient point is its description of a time in 1965 when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara presented President Lyndon Baines Johnson with a top secret memo. It indicated that the United States had reached a decision point with two available options. The first option was to arrange diplomatic cover and to pull out of South Vietnam. The second option was to increase the number of American troops by 200,000, bringing the total to more than 500,000 Americans on the ground.

Regarding this second option, Mr. McNamara stated, "All we can possibly achieve is a military stalemate at a much higher level of violence." I want to repeat that.

Regarding the second option, Mr. McNamara stated, "All we can possibly achieve is a military stalemate at a much higher level of violence."

From that time when President Johnson chose to escalate and to continue the war until its conclusion, America suffered 56,000 more casualties.

Mr. Speaker, President Obama's administration has reached a similar decision point with regard to Afghanistan. Last month, on June 25 of 2009, I joined Congressman JIM MCGOVERN in offering an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that would have required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress which outlines an exit strategy for our Armed Forces in Afghanistan.

While I regret that this amendment was not approved, I still believe it's critical for the current administration to clearly articulate benchmarks for success and an end point to its war strategy in Afghanistan. The men and women of our military who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan have done a magnificent job. Many have been deployed four or five times.

Let's not forget, as General Petraeus has said, "Afghanistan has been known over the years as the graveyard of empires. We cannot take that history lightly."

That is why it is so important for this current administration to have an end point to its strategy in Afghanistan. This strategy must be articulated sooner rather than later so we can avoid going down the path of other failed empires, and so we can avoid the tragedy and the mistake of Vietnam, when elected officials in Washington never articulated an end point or an understanding of what was to be achieved.

Mr. Speaker, I have Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point Marine Air Station, Camp Lejeune being a Marine base, and I have Seymour Johnson Air Force Base. I've talked to many of all ranks in the Marine Corps. They're willing to go back and to go back again and again and again, but we're getting to the point where we're about to break our military. It is time that the new administration has an end point to whatever we're trying to achieve in Afghanistan.

With that, Mr. Speaker, before I close, as I do frequently on the floor, I tell you without pride that I've signed over 8,000 letters in the last 6 years because of my mistake in giving President Bush the authority to go into Iraq. So I close tonight by asking God to please bless our men and women in uniform. I ask God to please bless the families of our men and women in uniform, and I ask God, in his loving arms, to hold the families who have given a child dying for freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq. Mr. Speaker, I close by asking three times: God, please, God, please, God, please continue to bless America.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Ms. KAPTUR) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Ms. KAPTUR addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

WORK WITH THE GOP ON HEALTH CARE REFORM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. BROWN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BROWN of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, The Hill newspaper today reports that President Obama is pointing his finger at the Republicans, at the GOP, for the