

issues in particular have been raised: the limitation on telemetry, and the loss of portal and perimeter monitoring at the Votkinsk missile assembly facility in Russia. I want to say a little about each of these. Both criticisms are, in my mind, misguided, though for different reasons.

The criticism of the treaty's provisions on telemetry appears to neglect relevant differences between the New START treaty and the old START treaty. Telemetry is the information generated and transmitted during missile test flights. In the original START treaty, each side was prohibited from encrypting or otherwise denying access to its telemetry. The telemetric data helped us understand, for verification purposes, the capabilities of the missiles tested. The article-by-article analysis of the original START treaty singled out missiles' throw-weight and the number of reentry vehicles as central items telemetry helped verify.

The New START treaty allows for a more limited exchange of telemetry, on no more than five ICBM and SLBM launches each year. Critics have seized on this reduction. The limited telemetric exchanges under the new treaty are an important source of ongoing transparency and confidence-building between our two countries.

However, the simple fact is, as Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen have both testified, we don't need telemetry to monitor compliance with this treaty. Unlike the original START, the new treaty has no limits on missile throw-weight. Hence, we don't need to verify compliance with such limits. We also don't need telemetry to help attribute a number of warheads to a missile type. The new treaty doesn't use such an attribution rule the way the old treaty did. Instead, we actually count the number of warheads on a missile. This is both more precise and eliminates a problem we had run into with the old treaty's rule, which forced us to overcount the number of warheads that are actually on our missiles.

The other alleged monitoring gap has to do with the loss of the perimeter-portal continuous monitoring system—or PPCMS—at Russia's Votkinsk missile production facility. That loss is unfortunate, but probably inevitable after our previous administration expressed to the Russians its intention to bring the monitoring at Votkinsk to an end.

However, thanks to our existing knowledge of Russian missiles and launchers, the verification measures in the treaty, and our National Technical Means, the treaty makes up for the loss of the Votkinsk portal monitoring. In particular, the new treaty requires the Russians to notify us 48 hours in advance of any missile leaving the Votkinsk facility, which allows us to cue our National Technical Means.

They also must notify us when the missile arrives for deployment or storage. In this way, we can in fact achieve birth-to-death insight into their mis-

siles. The unique identifiers and inspection system will also deter cheating. Finally, the Russians are producing few enough missiles, and their existing ones are few enough in number, that it is hard to envision a realistic breakout scenario.

The loss of the Votkinsk portal monitoring is thus unfortunate, but compensated for by other provisions of the treaty. And if Members are concerned about the loss of Votkinsk, think about how much worse it would be if we didn't ratify the New START treaty—that is, the loss of all monitoring and verification measures and the treaty's central limits themselves.

To sum up, our negotiators got a very good deal on verification, and I commend them. There simply are not monitoring gaps opened up by the treaty. On the contrary, the verification regime established by the treaty is a significant reason to support it. It serves to ensure compliance with the central limits in the treaty. It also will pay off by boosting transparency and confidence in our relationship with Russia and sustaining our insight into Russian forces.

What would open up a significant monitoring gap over time would be the failure to bring this treaty into force. For the same reason, we should move without delay in our consideration of the treaty. The old treaty expired last December. The longer we go before we establish the new verification regime, the more our insight into Russian forces will degrade. We need to diligently consider all the materials the administration has furnished us. We also need to do it without unnecessary delay. There is no question we are better off with the verification regime under the new treaty than without it.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. UDALL of New Mexico). The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.

Mr. WYDEN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE CALENDAR

Mr. WYDEN. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the following postal naming bills en bloc: Calendar Nos. 380, 384 through 387, and 389 through 395, and 397; S. 2874, S. 3200, H.R. 3250, H.R. 3634, H.R. 3892, H.R. 4017, H.R. 4095, H.R. 4139, H.R. 4214, H.R. 4238, H.R. 4425, H.R. 4547, H.R. 4628.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bills en bloc.

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bills be read the third time and passed en bloc, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table en bloc, with no intervening

action or debate, and that any statements relating to the bills be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ROY RONDENO, SR. POST OFFICE BUILDING

The bill (S. 2874) to designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 2000 Louisiana Avenue in New Orleans, Louisiana, as the "Roy Rondeno, Sr. Post Office Building," ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, as passed, as follows:

S. 2874

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ROY RONDENO, SR. POST OFFICE BUILDING.

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal Service located at 2000 Louisiana Avenue in New Orleans, Louisiana, shall be known and designated as the "Roy Rondeno, Sr. Post Office Building".

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the "Roy Rondeno, Sr. Post Office Building".

ZACHARY SMITH POST OFFICE BUILDING

The bill (S. 3200) to designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 23 Genesee Street in Hornell, New York, as the "Zachary Smith Post Office Building," ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed, as follows:

S. 3200

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ZACHARY SMITH POST OFFICE BUILDING.

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal Service located at 23 Genesee Street in Hornell, New York, shall be known and designated as the "Zachary Smith Post Office Building".

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the "Zachary Smith Post Office Building".

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS GARFIELD M. LANGHORN POST OFFICE BUILDING

The bill (H.R. 3250) to designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 1210 West Main Street in Riverhead, New York, as the "Private First Class Garfield M. Langhorn Post Office Building," was ordered to a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

GEORGE KELL POST OFFICE

The bill (H.R. 3634) to designate the facility of the United States Postal