

The TANF Emergency Contingency Fund has been used to support the successful Jobs Now program in Rhode Island, which has provided local businesses with subsidies to hire workers from struggling families. In addition to providing jobs to out-of-work Americans, this program is a win for businesses that could not otherwise bring new workers on board. Without this fund, these businesses will be hard-pressed to keep these new employees on the payroll. Unfortunately, in outcome that has become all too common, this extension was subject to an objection from the other side of the aisle.

I hope my colleagues on the other side of the aisle will recognize what is at stake and join us in the effort to give American workers and businesses the help they need. I remain committed to pressing for innovative and commonsense efforts that will bolster the economy, create jobs, and help the middle class.

EDUCATION JOBS AND MEDICAID FUNDING

Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I want colleagues and those who read the RECORD to know that the nonpartisan Joint Committee on Taxation has made available to the public the document entitled "Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Senate Amendment to the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 1586, Scheduled for Consideration by the House of Representatives on August 10, 2010." This document is an explanation of the education jobs and Medicaid funding bill that the Senate passed last month. This explanation reflects the intentions of the Senate and its understanding of the legislative text. It is available on the Joint Committee's Web site at <http://www.jct.gov/publications.html>?

func=startdown&id=3702 and is listed as document number JCX-46-10.

In addition, I would like to comment on the Secretary's grant of authority to issue regulations in section 211 of the legislation, which adds new section 909 to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. I note that this grant of authority allows the Secretary to provide exceptions, as appropriate, from the application of the provision to certain foreign tax credit splitting events resulting from foreign consolidation regimes, group relief, or similar loss-sharing arrangements.

DEFENSE MODERNIZATION

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I read an article from the October 2010 edition of the Defense Technology International this morning that discussed military and other technology advances. Entitled "Big Guns: China muscles up artillery punch," this article details China's efforts in the development of artillery and rocket systems and the associated doctrine they have created. Specifically, it addresses Chinese efforts in

research and development in areas such as computer-based fire control, digital communication, and command capabilities, use of sophisticated radars and jammers, and the development of ramjet powered and stealth coated artillery shells, to name a few key areas. Though not necessarily new items of research and development for the United States, China's efforts in these areas tells me one thing: China is pursuing modernization and development initiatives that, based on our recent history of research and development specific to artillery and rockets, may be superior if they are not at least equal to our efforts.

Now let me shift same gears to another potential peer country: Russia and its fifth-generation fighter development. In the same context as China's efforts in artillery and rocket capability, Russia is pursuing the deployment of a fifth-generation fighter, known as the PAK FA advanced tactical frontline fighter. Russia has publicly stated that this aircraft is the peer to the F-22. This aircraft, together with upgraded fourth-generation fighters, will define Russian Air Force potential for the next several decades and will challenge our aviation efforts without question. And don't think that China isn't developing their own fifth-generation aircraft; they are. It is called the JA-12 it is also going to go head to head with our F-22.

The point to this is not a comparison of capabilities or numbers but a public reinforcement of an assessment I have maintained for a long time. We, the United States of America, are not taking our future national security seriously, because we are failing to focus on maintaining the edge that we have had for the last several decades.

So where is the United States in terms of future military hardware necessary to maintain that edge? Did you know that the oldest combat vehicle in the Army inventory is the M109A6 Paladin howitzer and we are on the sixth version of this vehicle which is built around a refurbished chassis circa 1963? The Army's answer to artillery modernization has been the Crusader, which was supposed to replace the Paladin, the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon as part of FCS, the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, another FCS related system, and now the Paladin Integrated Management, or PIM program, which is a modification of the Paladin to a Bradley chassis. All but the PIM program have been cancelled in the last 8 years or so, and the PIM program has been delayed in production.

Current Army fleets of armored personnel carriers, tanks, wheeled vehicles, and helicopters were developed and procured 30 to 60 years ago. DOD and the President's answer to that: cancel FCS, with no viable replacement options, and continue to "upgrade" current fleets of Bradleys and Abrams tanks until the next-generation ground combat vehicle can be figured out.

Our strategic bomber fleet of B-52s, B-1s and B-2s vary in age from 10 to 30 years. The SECDEF has publicly stated in the press and in Congress that 2020 will be the first time we see a new bomber, which means that current airframes will have to remain in service until at least 2040.

One of our two fifth-generation aircraft, the F-22, the peer to the Russian's PAK FA and Chinese JA-12, has had the production line cancelled with only 187 aircraft built out of a requested 750, pulling us in a "high risk" state for air dominance. The other fifth-generation aircraft, the F-35, will not be ready until at least 2015, has suffered significant cost and timing problems, and will be 250 aircraft less than the requested 1,240.

Our Ohio class Trident submarines, the ones that deliver ballistic missiles from the sea, are an average of 20 years old. Replacement builds don't start till 2019 and won't be finished until 2028. As well, the administration remains opaque about plans for replacement of the 30-year-old air-launched cruise missile which is a critical component of our nuclear and long-range conventional strike capability. This is the same for our Minuteman ICBM, which is decades old as well.

I am convinced well beyond any reasonable doubt that we are heading down a slippery slope due to a short-sighted and dangerous strategy from our current administration. The litany of programs cancelled, modified, or mismanaged over the last two budget periods is mind-boggling—FCS, F-22, F-35, NLOS-C and LS, PIM, missile defense, nuclear stockpile, surface and submarine ships, strategic bombers—the list is overwhelming.

I, for one, will not let this happen. I will continue to voice my concerns over this issue. I will continue to fight for a flat expenditure of at least 4 percent of GDP spent on defense to ensure that this country continues to have the best military in the world. I will continue to press the administration to do more for the future of our national security.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the article "Big Guns" to which I referred.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Defense Technology International, Oct. 2010]

BIG GUNS—CHINA MUSCLES UP ARTILLERY PUNCH

(By Richard D. Fisher, Jr.)

The International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance 2010 report places China third in the number of artillery systems it fields, after Russia and North Korea. But China doubtless exceeds both in resource commitment and breadth of artillery investments. Credited with an estimated 17,700-plus towed, self-propelled and rocket systems, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has at least 56 artillery systems in use, development or available for export. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps, by contrast, have 8,187-plus artillery pieces of roughly 10 types.

China has had a mixed record of using artillery for military and political-military goals. Its successes as when it routed Indian forces in 1962 with the high-altitude use of artillery and mortars, have been offset by incidents provoking third-party responses or leading to regional standoffs. Examples include the shelling of islands controlled by Taiwan in 1955-58, resulting in U.S. intervention and a stalemate over the Taiwan Strait. In July, a unit based in the Nanjing military region fired missiles from 300-mm. PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) into the Yellow Sea to show China's anger at U.S. naval exercises with South Korea. The exercises, a result of China-backed North Korea's sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan in March, went ahead anyway.

China evolution as an artillery power stems from Soviet and Russian influences dating to the Korean War Soviet artillery and training improved PLA artillery operations during the war and led to the formation of the first formal artillery command. Soviet aid continued through the 1950s, and by the time of the Sin-Soviet split of the 1960s, China was producing copies or modified versions of Soviet pieces.

The PLA makes extensive use of Soviet-origin 152-, 130- and 122-mm. calibers, though Western calibers such as the 155- and 105-mm. are seeing greater use. China purchased the Russian 9A52 Smerch 300-mm. MRL in the 1990s, and the PLA produced a near facsimile in the A-100/PHL-03 MRL. The 155-mm. PLZ-05 self-propelled artillery system that emerged in 2005 bears an uncanny resemblance to the Russian 2S19 MST.

In the 1990s, PLA artillery was affected by reforms in strategy (its closest concept to doctrine) and organization. Toward the end of the decade, the PLA was immersed in strategy goals of "informatization" and "mechanization." The former included the broad application of improving information technologies, which for artillery included new computer-based fire controls and ever-improving digital communication and command linkages. PLA artillery units increasingly include firefinding counter-battery radar such as the 50-km.-range (31-mi.) SLC-2 and Type 704, and use sophisticated electronic warfare systems such as the Russian SPR-2 radio fuse jammer, a possible Chinese facsimile and possibly a recently revealed artillery radar jammer. Artillery recon vehicles and recon troops feature advanced optronic and digital communication capabilities. In addition, PLA artillery units have sophisticated meteorological capabilities and use muzzle velocity radar to improve accuracy.

Mechanization put renewed emphasis on developing tracked and wheeled self-propelled tubed artillery, with rocket artillery largely truck-mounted. This trend was emphasized in late 2004 when Chinese Communist Party and PLA leader Hu Jintao enunciated the PLAs new "historic missions," a euphemism for invasions, which call on the PLA to defend state interests abroad. It is likely that new medium-weight artillery systems based on airmobile armored personnel carriers will follow for these strategic missions.

Organic PLA artillery units have decreased in size, following the pattern of general large-scale troop reductions. When combined with "informatization" advances, this will permit many infantry and armored divisions to be reformed into mechanized brigades. However, in a counter-trend that emphasizes their continued importance, the PLA maintains five independent artillery divisions and 20 independent brigades. Of these, two divisions and six brigades are stationed in the Shenyang and Beijing military regions, for potential Korean contingencies. Three divi-

sions and eight brigades are in the Nanjing Guangzhou and Jinan military regions, for Taiwan contingencies.

Among artillery systems, mortars include a 60-mm. hand-held system used by infantry and special forces. The new Type 93 60-mm. fixed mortar weighs 22.4 kg. (49.2 lb.) and fires 20 rounds/min. to 5.5 km. There are also fixed W91 and W87 81-mm. mortars that fire to 8 km. and 5.6 km., respectively. The PLA has largely copied Russia's Vasilyek 81-mm. automatic mortar, called the W99 or SM-4, which comes in a towed version or mounted in a Hummer-like vehicle. It fires four rounds in 2 sec. out to 6.2 km. The W86 120-mm. towed mortar weighs 206 kg. and fires 20 rounds/min. to 4.7 km.

In 2001, the PLA revealed the PLL-05 mobile mortar based on the Russian 120-mm. 2S23 NONA-SVK that it purchased in the 1990s, but mounted on a WZ-551 6 X 6 armored personnel carrier (APC). It fires a rocket-assisted round 13.5 km. In 2007, the PLA revealed a laser-guided 120-mm. mortar round, though it is not clear if it is in service.

Towed and self-propelled tubed systems dominate artillery units. The largest number of towed guns are likely the 122-mm. versions. These include the Type-96, based on the Russian D-30, with a 360-deg. traversing base, and the simpler Type-83. Their rocket-assisted rounds have a 27-km. range. The Type-59 130-mm. towed gun fires a rocket-assisted round 44 km. Of heavy towed artillery, the 152-mm. Type-66, a copy of the Russian D-20, is most numerous and fires rocket-assisted rounds 28 km. In 1999, the PLA revealed the 155-mm. PLL01/WA 021 towed artillery system, based on the Austrian Norinco GH N-45, which fires a rocket-assisted round 50 km. The PLL01 and the Type-66 fire 155- and 152-mm. versions of the Russian Krasnopol laser-guided shell.

Self-propelled tubed artillery includes the PLL02, which places the Type-86 100-mm. gun on a WZ-551 APC. In 2009, the PLA revealed the new Type-07 122-mm. tracked artillery system, which features hull and electronic improvements over the previous Type-89 Tracked 122-mm. system. In 2009, photographs appeared on the Internet of the SH-3, a truck-mounted 122-mm. artillery system with digital control systems in a hatch over the cab.

Heavy self-propelled systems include the 155-mm. PLZ-05, which has a version of the PLL01 gun, and appeared in 2005. It is replacing the 152-mm. Type-83, which entered service in 1983. The PLZ-05 also fires the Krasnopol laser-guided projectile and a rocket-assisted round 50 km., and is capable of flat-trajectory antitank fire. Unconfirmed reports state the PLZ-05 has an automatic gun-loading system and weighs 35 tons.

PLA investments in rocket artillery are impressive. A five-wheel all-terrain vehicle has been modified to carry a 107-mm. MRL for experimental mechanized special forces units. The tracked Type-89 and more recent Type-90 truck-mounted 122-mm. MRL feature self-contained 40-round rocket reloaders. In addition, the Smerch-derived 12-round PHL-03, which reportedly fires a 150-km.-range missile, is entering increasing numbers of artillery units. The latest AR1A export variant features a modular U.S. MRL system-style 5-round rocket carrier, which speeds reloading. In 2009, Norinco revealed an as yet unidentified truck carrier for this 5-round rocket box, similar to Lockheed Martin's High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System.

The PLA is also investing in larger MRL systems. The 400-mm. WS-2D reportedly has a range of 400 km., and one payload features three "killer unmanned aerial vehicles," according to a Chinese report. An earlier 200-km.-range version, the WS-3, uses navigation satellite guidance to achieve a remarkable

50-meter (164-ft.) circular error probable. The WS family complements the 150-km.-range P-12 and 250-km. B-611M maneuverable navsat-guided short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which could supplement or replace the PLA's two brigades of 300-600-km. DF-11A SRBMs.

New artillery systems are entering amphibious and airborne units for possible missions abroad. PLA marine and army amphibious units are receiving the Type-07B tracked 122-mm. amphibious artillery system, which places the gun from the Type-07 on a larger hull. Airborne units are equipped with a version of the Type-96 122-mm. gun, but a new tracked airmobile APC may feature a mortar or gun system. The ZBD-09 122-mm. gun system could eventually feature in airmobile army units. Future artillery systems may feature electromagnetic launch, an area of extensive research. The PLA is also interested in ramjet-powered and stealth-coated artillery shells.

SUDAN

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, in just over 100 days, Sudan will face a defining moment. The choices its leaders make can lead to a peaceful two-state solution. Or, as many fear, they could result in a return to chaos and war in a place too often synonymous with both.

Responding to this urgency, the Obama administration has recently launched a heightened campaign of diplomatic engagement with both North and South Sudan to help the parties to find their way through this process. I traveled to Sudan in April 2009 and I have met with Sudanese from all parts of the country since that time, including Salva Kiir, the leader of Southern Sudan, last week. Today, joined by Senators BROWNBACK, DURBIN, WICKER and FEINGOLD, I am introducing legislation known as the Sudan Peace and Stability Act. Congress must not be silent at this critical time.

On January 9, 2011, the people of Southern Sudan and the adjoining territory of Abyei are scheduled to hold referenda on secession. Realistically, Sudan's choice is no longer between unity and separation—southerners have apparently made that decision. Every reliable source indicates that they will vote for separation, dividing Africa's largest country and taking with them some eighty percent of known Sudanese oil reserves. The Secretary of State has called a vote for separation inevitable. No, the choice before the peoples of Sudan is that between a future of peaceful coexistence or a return to the country's bloody past.

The Sudanese, both North and South, set out on this path when they signed the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The CPA brought to a close a war that had raged for two decades and claimed millions of lives. And it offered Southern Sudan the promise of a choice in 2011 between continuing unity and separation from the Sudanese government in Khartoum.

The landmark agreement ended the war, but it intentionally postponed the