

their assigned missions brilliantly and have once again demonstrated that they are the best in the world;

Whereas, prior to the United States transferring command to NATO, President Obama stated, "Going forward, the lead in enforcing the no-fly zone and protecting civilians on the ground will transition to our allies and partners, and I am fully confident that our coalition will keep the pressure on Qaddafi's remaining forces.";

Whereas, President Obama also stated that the United States would "play a supporting role" following transition to NATO, and that because of this transition, the risk and cost of this operation would be reduced significantly;

Whereas, after April 2, 2011, no United States combat aircraft were to fly strike missions over Libya unless specifically requested by NATO;

Whereas, after April 2, 2011, NATO immediately requested and was granted approval for a 48-hour extension of United States strike aircraft for participation in operations over Libya;

Whereas United States combat aircraft are currently scheduled to remain on standby in the region, in the event NATO commanders request additional assistance;

Whereas, Abdel Fattah Younes, head of the rebel forces, stated on April 5, 2011 that NATO has been "disappointing" and "slow" in calling in airstrikes, which have allowed Moammar Qaddafi's military to gain momentum and push back rebel forces;

Whereas, of the 21 members in the Arab League, only 2 countries have contributed any military resources to support United Nations Resolutions 1970 and 1973; and

Whereas it is in the interest of Arab nations to work with coalition forces to work to end violence, attacks, and abuses of civilians in Libya: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) United States military intervention in Libya, as explained by the President, is not in the vital interests of the United States;

(2) the President should have consulted with members of Congress prior to committing the United States Armed Forces either independently or as a major part of NATO operations;

(3) the President should obtain authorization from Congress before providing further military and financial support to operations in Libya and should not assume that such an authorization would equate to the United States Armed Forces leading any future strike or support operations;

(4) Prior to further involvement of United States military personnel or equipment, fellow NATO members and other nations that have a vital interest in the region should agree to provide a substantial portion of the military and financial burdens associated with Operation Unified Protector; and

(5) members of the Arab League should ensure that all of their military resources are available to enforce United Nations Resolutions 1970 and 1973 (2011).

SENATE RESOLUTION 147—RECOGNIZING THE CELEBRATION OF NATIONAL STUDENT EMPLOYMENT WEEK AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA DULUTH

Ms. KLOBUCHAR submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions:

S. RES. 147

Whereas National Student Employment Week offers the University of Minnesota Du-

luth the opportunity to recognize students who work while attending college;

Whereas the University of Minnesota Duluth is committed to increasing awareness of student employment as an educational experience for students, as well as an alternative to financial aid;

Whereas there are nearly 1,500 student employees at University of Minnesota Duluth;

Whereas the University of Minnesota Duluth recognizes how important student employees are to their employers; and

Whereas National Student Employment Week is celebrated the week of April 11 through 17, 2011: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate recognizes the celebration of National Student Employment Week at the University of Minnesota Duluth.

SENATE RESOLUTION 148—CALLING ON THE PRESIDENT TO SUBMIT TO CONGRESS A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF UNITED STATES POLICY OBJECTIVES IN LIBYA, BOTH DURING AND AFTER MUAMMAR QADDAFI'S RULE, AND A PLAN TO ACHIEVE THEM, AND TO SEEK CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST LIBYA

Mr. CORNYN (for himself, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. BLUNT, Mr. LEE, Mr. ROBERTS, and Mr. INHOFE) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 148

Whereas, on February 15, 2011, protests against longtime Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi began in Benghazi, Libya, following the arrest of human rights advocate Fathi Tarbel;

Whereas, on March 10, 2011, rebels in Libya, armed with outdated anti-aircraft guns and facing overwhelming firepower from Qaddafi forces, were forced to retreat from strongholds in eastern Libya, while doctors in Libya reported that civilian casualties had doubled, mostly as the result of airstrikes ordered by Qaddafi;

Whereas, on March 10, 2011, France became the first country to recognize the Libyan Transitional National Council, organized by the Libyan rebel leadership, as the legitimate government of Libya;

Whereas, on March 12, 2011, Amr Moussa, secretary general of the Arab League, announced, "The Arab League has officially requested the United Nations Security Council to impose a no-fly zone against any military action against the Libyan people.";

Whereas, on March 16, 2011, Muammar Qaddafi's forces neared the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, and Saif al-Islam, Qaddafi's son, vowed that "everything will be over in 48 hours";

Whereas, on March 16, 2011, following United Nations Security Council negotiations, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Susan Rice announced United States support for a no-fly zone, stating, "But the U.S. view is that we need to be prepared to contemplate steps that include, but perhaps go beyond, a no-fly zone.";

Whereas, on March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council voted to approve a no-fly zone over Libya, passing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians;

Whereas, on March 19, 2011, President Barack Obama authorized United States

military operations against Libya, and Operation Odyssey Dawn commenced;

Whereas, on March 19, 2011, the United States Armed Forces began air and sea strikes against targets along the coast of Libya against Libyan air defenses;

Whereas, on March 21, 2011, President Obama sent a letter notifying Congress that he had ordered strikes on Libya and outlining United States military actions in Libya during the preceding 48 hours;

Whereas, on March 23, 2011, Muammar Qaddafi's forces shelled the town of Misrata, held by Libyan rebels, killing dozens of civilians;

Whereas, on March 24, 2011, coalition forces hit military targets deep inside Libya, but failed to prevent Qaddafi's tanks from re-entering Misrata and besieging its main hospital;

Whereas, on March 24, 2011, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced that NATO would take command of enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya and was considering taking control of the full United Nations-backed military mission;

Whereas, on March 30, 2011, forces loyal to Muammar Qaddafi pressed further east with an artillery offensive, pushing Libyan rebels back more than 95 miles towards Brega;

Whereas, on March 31, 2011, United States Africa Command, which had led the initial phases of military operations against Libya under Operation Odyssey Dawn, transferred command and control of international air operations over Libya to NATO;

Whereas, as of March 31, 2011, Operation Unified Protector, under sole command of NATO, is now responsible for the arms embargo, no-fly zone, and actions to protect civilians in Libya;

Whereas, as of April 4, 2011, in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector, the United States had flown approximately 1,600 military sorties and, as of April 7, 2011, had launched 228 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles and spent approximately \$632,000,000;

Whereas President Obama has repeatedly indicated that his policy on Libya is that Muammar Qaddafi should no longer serve as the leader of the Government of Libya;

Whereas, on February 26, 2011, 11 days after the protests began, President Obama discussed the situation in Libya with Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel and, according to a White House statement, said, "When a leader's only means of staying in power is to use mass violence against his own people, he has lost the legitimacy to rule and needs to do what is right for his country by leaving now.";

Whereas, on March 3, 2011, President Obama, at a joint press conference with President of Mexico Felipe Calderon, said, "Muammar Qaddafi has lost the legitimacy to lead and he must leave. . . [W]e will continue to send the clear message that it's time for Qaddafi to go.";

Whereas, on March 18, 2011, President Obama, at a joint press conference with President of Chile Sebastian Pinera, said, "I have also stated that it is U.S. policy that Qaddafi needs to go. And we got a wide range of tools in addition to our military efforts to support that policy.";

Whereas, on March 28, 2011, President Obama, in an address to the Nation, began to draw a distinction between United States political and military objectives in Libya, saying, "There is no question that Libya—and the world—would be better off with Qaddafi out of power. I, along with many other world leaders, have embraced that goal, and will actively pursue it through non-military means.";