Mr. GRASSLEY. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination of Paul A. Engelmayer, of New York, to be United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York?

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. ROCKEFELLER) is necessarily absent.

Mr. KYL. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. INHOFE).

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. COONS). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 98, nays 0, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 117 Ex.]

YEAS—98

Akaka	Franken	Mikulski
Alexander	Gillibrand	Moran
Ayotte	Graham	Murkowski
Barrasso	Grassley	Murray
Baucus	Hagan	Nelson (NE)
Begich	Harkin	Nelson (FL)
Bennet	Hatch	Paul
Bingaman	Heller	Portman
Blumenthal	Hoeven	Pryor
Blunt	Hutchison	Reed
Boozman	Inouye	Reid
Boxer	Isakson	Risch
Brown (MA)	Johanns	Roberts
Brown (OH)	Johnson (SD)	Rubio
Burr	Johnson (WI)	Sanders
Cantwell	Kerry	Schumer
Cardin	Kirk	Sessions
Carper	Klobuchar	Shaheen
Casey	Kohl	Shelby
Chambliss	Kyl	Snowe
Coats	Landrieu	Stabenow
Coburn	Lautenberg	Tester
Cochran	Leahy	Thune
Collins	Lee	Toomey
Conrad	Levin	Udall (CO)
Coons	Lieberman	Udall (NM)
Corker	Lugar	Vitter
Cornyn	Manchin	Warner
Crapo	McCain	Webb
DeMint	McCaskill	Whitehouse
Durbin	McConnell	Wicker
Enzi	Menendez	Wyden
Feinstein	Merkley	

NOT VOTING—2

Inhofe	Rockefeller

The nomination was confirmed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination of Ramona Villagomez Manglona, of the Northern Mariana Islands, to be Judge for the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands?

The nomination was confirmed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the motions to reconsider are considered made and laid on the table, and the President shall be immediately notified of the Senate's actions.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will resume legislative session.

RECESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate stands in recess until 2:15 p.m. today.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 12:46 p.m., recessed until 2:15 p.m., and reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. WEBB).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXTENSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that morning business be extended, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

The junior Senator from Illinois.

NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS

Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, this past Sunday a New York Times editorial entitled ''In the Wake of Fukushima'' noted:

> If nuclear power is to have a future in this country, Americans have to have confidence that regulators and the industry are learning the lessons of Fukushima and are taking all steps necessary to ensure safety.

Following the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in March, it is clear that maintaining America's confidence in the safety of our nuclear reactors is paramount. The disaster at Fukushima should not lead to a freeze of the nuclear industry; instead, it should be an opportunity to upgrade the safety of our nuclear fleet. Both industry and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission assure us that currently there is no immediate threat to the operation of our nuclear plants.

Nuclear power is especially important to my home State of Illinois, where nearly half of all electricity in the State is nuclear. With 11 of 104 operating nuclear power plants and stations in our State, we have more reactors than any other State in the Union.

In the near term, it is my hope that nuclear regulators and the industry will take actions necessary to increase safety measures and integrate emergency operating procedures. Furthermore, nuclear plants should swiftly implement sensible measures to increase flood protections, enhance containment-venting capabilities, install remote monitoring controls of spent fuel pool conditions, and upgrade the ability to cope and maintain operations by a single station sustained for initially 8 hours and eventually up to 72 hours utilizing preplanned and prestaged resources.

Moving forward, one of our top priorities should be enhancing flood protection at reactors. Obviously reactors, for their cooling, need to be near large bodies of water, subject to flood. Fukushima highlighted the need to take additional protections to guarantee that current backup pumps and generators are also protected against flood or other seismic events. A recent flooding on the Missouri River is a demonstration of the need for such enhancements. Although flood barriers and procedures have so far protected the Fort Calhoun nuclear powerplant in Nebraska, this is not the time to look away from making further efforts on protecting reactors from floods.

One of the ringing lessons of the Fukushima disaster is the need for enhanced capabilities for nuclear operators to cope with prolonged power outages. Every U.S. nuclear powerplant should be able to cope with a prolonged loss of power for at least 8 hours for an initial period and eventually 72 hours using only the resources onsite so that powerplant operators can utilize preplanned and prestaged equipment and muster other resources if necessary. We should be prepared for simultaneous events for multiple reactors onsite and should be able to maintain key power functions in the face of varying circumstances, including debilitated infrastructure, lack of communication, and especially the loss of onsite power.

It is clear that operators' ability to cope with the prolonged loss of power was critical at Fukushima. We know that the tsunami hit the Fukushima Daiichi powerplant and wiped out all alternating power and backup power necessary to provide resources to the cooling pumps. This eventually caused overheating in both reactor vessels and cooling ponds. The ability to perform these critical functions and to monitor them—providing power to fans and pumps and to remotely open and close vents and valves—the inability of the Japanese to perform these functions caused them to lose control of key areas or to maintain cooling to critical spent fuel ponds and reactor vessels.

The Japanese also were unable to remotely monitor conditions, especially in their spent fuel pools, and struggled continuously to pump enough water into the reactors. Operators need to have proper instrumentation at far, remote locations so they can continue to understand what is happening in reactors and cooling ponds if an event occurs.

Furthermore, we need to install proper venting upgrades on all reactors with the Mark II containment design. This is an important step in preventing any kind of overpressurization and in reducing the risk of operations that we saw so clearly at Fukushima.