

say—and yet we respect each other. That is what this body is all about. We should have people who are on both sides of all these controversial issues talking about it. There has been a silence for 3 years. Now we are talking about it again.

So welcome back to the discussion of global warming. I look forward to future discussions about this.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT S. 3326

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, we are about to do something really important in the Senate. It would increase U.S. textile exports to Central American countries, it would promote development and economic stability by creating jobs in, of course, African countries, and it would extend U.S. import sanctions with Burma, which the Republican leader will speak more about. This bill would help maintain about 2,000 jobs in North Carolina and South Carolina alone. It is a very good bill. It is fully paid for. It is an important piece of legislation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at a time to be determined by the majority leader, after consultation with the Republican leader, the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 459, S. 3326; that the only amendment in order be a Coburn amendment, the text of which is at the desk; that there be 30 minutes for debate equally divided and controlled in the usual form; that upon the use or yielding back of that time, the Senate proceed to vote in relation to the amendment; that if the amendment is not agreed to, the bill be read the third time and passed without further action or debate; that when the Senate receives H.R. 5986 and if its text is identical to S. 3326, the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of H.R. 5986, the bill be read the third time and passed without further debate, with no amendments in order prior to passage; further, that if the Coburn amendment is agreed to, the Finance Committee be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 9 and the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration; that all after the enacting clause be stricken and the text of S. 3326, as amended, be inserted in lieu thereof, the bill be read the third time and passed without further debate; that when the Senate receives H.R. 5986, the Senate proceed to it forthwith and all after the enacting clause be stricken and the text of sections 2 and 3 of S. 3326, as reported, by inserted in lieu thereof, the bill be read the third time and passed, without further debate, as amended, and S. 3326 be returned to the Calendar of Business; finally, that no motions be in order other than motions to waive or motions to table and that motions to reconsider be made and laid on the table with no intervening action or debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will

not be objecting, let me echo the remarks of the majority leader. This is an important piece of legislation.

The part I have the most interest in renews Burma's sanctions—something we have done on an annual basis for 10 years. We are renewing the sanctions in spite of the fact that much progress has been made in Burma in the last year and a half. Secretary Clinton will, of course, recommend to the President that these sanctions be waived in recognition of the significant progress that has been made in the last year and a half in that country, which is trying to move from a rather thuggish military dictatorship to a genuine democracy. There is still a long way to go.

This is an important step in the right direction. America speaks with one voice regarding Burma. My views are the same as the views of the Obama administration as expressed by Secretary Clinton.

I thank the chairman of the Finance Committee also for helping us work through the process, and particularly Senator COBURN, who had some reservations about the non-Burma parts of this bill. I think we have worked those out and are moving forward. It is an important step in the right direction.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House with respect to H.R. 1950.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, that the House agree to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 1905) entitled "An Act to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities, and for other purposes", with an amendment.

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, our legislation which embodies a bipartisan, bicameral agreement to reconcile the current Senate and House-passed versions of Iran sanctions legislation. Once implemented, this comprehensive new set of sanctions will help dramatically to increase the pressure on Iranian government leaders to abandon their illicit nuclear activities and support for terrorism. This bill passed the House of Representatives by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 421 to 6 earlier this evening. I hope all of my colleagues will join me in supporting it so that it can be adopted by the Senate and signed into law by the President as soon as possible.

So far, in the sputtering P5+1 negotiations, Iran has shown no clear signs of a willingness to work with the international community to engage in a serious way on nuclear issues. It remains to be seen whether Iran will ultimately be willing to work towards progress on the central issues at upcoming negotiating sessions, or whether the meetings will simply be another in a series of stalling actions to buy time to enrich additional uranium and further fortify their nuclear program. That is why I think it necessary to intensify the pressure, and move forward quickly now on this new package that leaves no doubts about U.S. resolve on this issue. As we all recognize, economic sanctions are not an end: they are a means to an end. That end is to apply enough pressure to secure agreement from Iran's leaders to fully, completely and verifiably abandon their illicit nuclear activities.

Isolated diplomatically, economically, and otherwise, Iran must understand that the patience of the international community is fast running out. With these new sanctions, including those targeted at the I-R-G-C, we are pressing Iran's military and political leaders to make a clear choice. They can end the suppression of their people, come clean on their nuclear program, suspend enrichment, and stop supporting terrorist activities around the globe. Or they can continue to face sustained multilateral economic and diplomatic pressure, and deepen their international isolation.

This legislation is based on the Senate bill which passed with unanimous support in May. It incorporates new measures from Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate. The sanctions contained in this bill reach more deeply into Iran's energy sector than ever before, and build on the sweeping banking sanctions Congress enacted 2 years ago to reach to insurance, shipping, trade, finance and other sectors, targeting those who help to bolster Iranian government revenues which support their illicit nuclear activities.

As I have said before, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is the most pressing foreign policy challenge we face, and we must continue to do all we can—politically, economically, and diplomatically—to avoid that result. In recent months, we have seen increased signs that the Iranian regime is feeling the pressure of existing sanctions. Their currency has plummeted, their trade revenues have been sharply curtailed, and they are under increasing pressure from the oil sanctions regime currently in place. With passage of this bill, we are taking another significant step to block the remaining avenues for the Iranians to fund their illicit behavior and evade sanctions. The bill also requires sanctions on those who purchase new Iranian sovereign debt, thereby further limiting the regime's ability to finance its illicit activities.

In addition, there are substantial new sanctions for anyone who engages

in joint ventures with the National Iranian Oil Company, NIOC; provides insurance or re-insurance to the National Iranian Oil Company or the National Iranian Tanker Company, NITC; helps Iran evade oil sanctions through reflagging or other means; or sells, leases, or otherwise provides oil tankers to Iran, unless they are from a country that is sharply reducing its oil purchases from Iran.

The bill also expands sanctions against Iranian and Syrian officials for human rights abuses, including against those who engage in censorship, jamming and monitoring of communications, and tracking of Internet use by ordinary Iranian citizens.

Many of my colleagues, both Democrats and Republicans, have helped us get to this point. I want to particularly thank Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Without her help, we would not be here. I also want to thank my colleagues, including Senator MENENDEZ, who crafted many of its original provisions, and Senators SCHUMER, GILLIBRAND, LAUTENBERG, BROWN, KYL, LIEBERMAN, and others who contributed their ideas. I also want to thank Majority Leader REID for his tireless efforts to enact a strong comprehensive sanctions bill.

Finally, I want to thank the staff who crafted the details of this bill, and worked long hours in intensive discussions over the last several weeks to get it done. They include Patrick Grant, Steve Kroll, Georgina Cannon, Ingianne Acosta and Colin McGinnis of my Committee staff; Dr. Yleem Poblete, Matt Zweig, and Ari Friedman of Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN's staff; John O'Hara and Andrew Olmem of Senator SHELBY's staff, and Shanna Winters, Dr. Richard Kessler, and Alan Makovsky of Ranking Member BERMAN's staff.

All told, when enacted this bill and other efforts by the President will significantly increase pressure on Iran to abandon its illicit nuclear activities. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a detailed summary of the bill. I urge all my colleagues to support this measure.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012

SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY

Sec. 1—Short Title, Table of Contents

Sec. 2—Definitions: Provides that the definitions of key terms (“appropriate congressional committees,” and “knowingly,”) will be those found in the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) of 1996, as amended, and that the definition of “United States person” will be that found in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). Also defines “financial transaction,” to mean any transfer of value involving a financial institution, including precious metals and various swaps, futures, and other activities.

Sec. 101—Enforcement of Multilateral Sanctions Regime and Expansion and Implementation of Sanctions: States the sense of Congress that (i) the goal of compelling Iran

to abandon its efforts to achieve nuclear weapons capacity can be effectively achieved through a comprehensive policy that includes expansion and vigorous implementation and enforcement of bilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran, diplomacy, and military planning and options, consistent with the President's 2012 State of the Union Address; and (ii) that intensified efforts to counter Iranian sanctions evasion are necessary.

Sec. 102—Diplomatic Efforts to Expand Multilateral Sanctions Regime: Urges efforts by the US to expand the UN sanctions regime to include (i) imposing additional travel restrictions on Iranian officials responsible for human rights violations, the development of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and Iran's support for terrorism; (ii) withdrawing sea- and airport landing rights for Iran Shipping Lines and Iran Air, for their role in nuclear proliferation and illegal arms sales; (iii) expanding the range of sanctions imposed on Iran by US allies; (iv) expanding sanctions to limit Iran's petroleum development and imports of refined petroleum products; and (v) accelerating US diplomatic and economic efforts to help allies reduce their dependence on Iranian crude oil and other petroleum products. Requires periodic reporting to Congress on the status of such efforts.

Sec. 201—Expansion of Sanctions with Respect to Iran's Energy Sector: Makes a number of substantial changes in and additions to ISA's energy sanctions. These include (i) increasing the number of required sanctions from three to five; (ii) making sanctionable certain construction of transportation infrastructure to support delivery of domestically refined petroleum in Iran; (iii) making sanctionable certain barter transactions, and the purchase or facilitation of Iranian debt issued after the date of enactment, that contribute to Iran's ability to import refined petroleum products; (iv) extending ISA sanctions to persons knowingly participating in petroleum resources joint ventures established on or after January 1, 2002, anywhere in the world in which Iran's government is a substantial partner or investor; an exception is provided for ventures terminated within 180 days of enactment; (v) extending ISA sanctions to those providing certain goods and services (including construction of certain infrastructure) that support Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources; and (vi) extending ISA sanctions to support for Iran's domestic production of petrochemical products.

Sec. 202—Imposition of Sanctions for Transportation of Crude Oil from Iran and Evasion of Sanctions by Shipping Companies: Requires imposition of at least five ISA sanctions on a person who owns or operates a vessel that within 90 days after the date of enactment is used to transport crude oil from Iran to another country; applies only if the President makes a determination, under the NDAA, that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products from countries other than Iran to permit purchasers of petroleum to significantly reduce their purchases from Iran; an exception is provided for transportation of crude oil from Iran to countries that are exempt from NDAA sanctions because they are significantly reducing such purchases. Also applies at least five ISA sanctions to persons that own or operate a vessel that conceals the Iranian origin of crude oil or refined petroleum products transported on the vessel, including by permitting the operator of the vessel to suspend the vessel's satellite tracking devices, or by obscuring or concealing the ownership by the government of Iran, or other entities owned or controlled by Iran. Ships involved could be barred from US ports for up to two years.

Sec. 203—Expansion of Sanctions with Respect to the Development by Iran of WMDs: Requires imposition of five or more ISA sanctions on persons who export, transfer, or otherwise facilitate the transshipment of goods, services, technology or other items and know or should have known this action would materially contribute to the ability of Iran to develop WMDs. Also requires ISA sanctions to be imposed (subject to certain conditions) on persons who knowingly participate in joint ventures with Iran's government, Iranian firms, or persons acting for or on behalf of Iran's government, in the mining, production or transportation of uranium anywhere in the world. Exempts persons if they withdraw from such joint ventures within six months after date of enactment.

Sec. 204—Expansion of Sanctions Available under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: Expands the current menu of sanctions available to the President under ISA, to include a prohibition on any US person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person, an exclusion from the United States of aliens who are corporate officers, principals or controlling shareholders in a sanctioned firm, and application of applicable ISA sanctions to the CEO or other principal executive officers (or persons performing similar functions) of a sanctioned firm, which could include a freeze of their US assets.

Sec. 205—Modification of Waiver Standard under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: Revises the standard under section 9 of ISA for waivers of sanctions by the President (i) to require that energy-related sanctions can only be waived if waiver is essential to the national security interests of the United States; (ii) require that WMD-related sanctions can only be waived if waiver is “vital to the national security interests of the United States; (iii) to eliminate the “permanent” waiver in prior law and replace it with a one-year renewable waiver; and (iv) to clarify that all waivers must be on a case-by-case basis.

Sec. 206—Briefings on Implementation of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: Amends ISA to require briefings by the Secretary of State to the appropriate congressional committees on ISA implementation.

Sec. 207—Expansion of Definitions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: Adds definitions of “credible information,” “petrochemical product,” and “services.” “Credible information” includes public announcements by persons that they are engaged in certain activities, including those made in a report to stockholders, and may include announcements by the Government of Iran, and reports from the General Accountability Office (GAO), the Energy Information Administration, the Congressional Research Service, or other reputable governmental organizations, or trade or industry publications. “Petrochemical product” is defined consistent with Executive Order 13590. “Services” include software, hardware, financial, professional consulting, engineering, specialized energy information services, and others.

Sec. 208—Sense of Congress on Iran's Energy Sector: States the sense of Congress that Iran's energy sector remains a zone of proliferation concern, since the Iranian Government continues to divert substantial revenue from petroleum sales to finance its illicit nuclear and missile activities, and that the President should apply the full range of ISA sanctions to address the threat posed by Iran.

Sec. 211—Sanctions for Shipping WMD or Terrorism-Related Materials to or from Iran: Requires the blocking of assets of, and imposes other sanctions on, persons who knowingly sell, lease, or provide ships, insurance or reinsurance, or other shipping services,

for transportation of goods that materially contribute to Iran's WMD program or its terrorism-related activities. Applies as well to parents of the persons involved if they knew or should have known of the sanctionable activity and to any of subsidiaries or affiliates of the persons involved that knowingly participated in the activity. Permits the President to waive sanctions in cases "vital to the national security interest," but requires a report to Congress regarding the use of such a waiver; the President must, in any event, submit a report to Congress identifying operators of vessels and other persons that conduct or facilitate significant financial transactions that manage Iranian ports designated for IEEPA sanctions.

Sec. 212—Imposition of Sanctions for Provision of Underwriting Services or Insurance or Reinsurance for NIOC and NITC: Requires five or more ISA sanctions against companies providing underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance to National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) or a successor entity to either company. Provides an exemption for persons providing such services for activities relating to the provision of food, medicine, and medical devices or humanitarian assistance to Iran.

Sec. 213—Imposition of Sanctions for Purchase, Subscription to, or Facilitation of the Issuance of Iran Sovereign Debt: Requires the imposition of five or more ISA sanctions on persons the President determines knowingly purchase, subscribe to, or facilitate the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, or debt of an entity owned or controlled by the Iranian Government, issued on or after the date of enactment.

Sec. 214—Imposition of Sanctions on Subsidiaries and Agents of UN-Sanctioned Persons: Amends CISADA to ensure that US financial sanctions imposed on UN-designated entities reach those persons acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, the designated entities. Requires the Treasury Department to revise its regulations within 90 days of enactment to implement the change.

Sec. 215—Imposition of Sanctions for Transactions with Persons Sanctioned for Certain Activities Relating to Terrorism or Proliferation of WMD: Extends CISADA to impose sanctions on a foreign financial institution that facilitates a significant transaction or transactions or provides significant services not only to certain designated financial institutions but also to designated persons whose property or interests in property are blocked based on their connection to Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or support of terrorism.

Sec. 216—Expansion of Mandatory Sanctions with Respect to Financial Institutions that Engage in Certain Activities Relating to Iran: Requires the Treasury Secretary to revise regulations under Section 104 of CISADA to apply rules cutting off access to the U.S. financial institutions to foreign financial institutions knowingly facilitating, participating or assisting in, or acting on behalf of or as an intermediary, in connection with financial activities involving designated Iranian banks, whether or not the transactions are directly with those banks.

Sec. 217—Continuation of Sanction for the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, and Sanctions Evaders: Requires that various sanctions imposed by Executive Order, including blocking the property of the Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions, imposing penalties on foreign sanction evaders, and blocking the property of the CBI, will remain in effect until the President certifies that Iran and the CBI have ceased to support terrorism and Iranian development of WMD.

Sec. 218—Liability of Parent Companies for Violations of Sanctions by Foreign Subsidiaries: Requires the imposition of civil penalties under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of up to twice the amount of the relevant transaction, on US parent companies for the activities of their foreign subsidiaries which, if undertaken by a US person or in the United States, would violate US sanctions law. Subsidiaries are defined as those entities in which a US person holds more than fifty percent equity interest or a majority of the seats on the board, or that a US person otherwise controls. Covers activities under the current US trade embargo with Iran and would apply regardless of whether the subsidiary was established to circumvent US sanctions.

Sec. 219—Securities and Exchange Commission Disclosures on Certain Activities in Iran: Amends the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers whose stock is traded on US stock exchanges to disclose whether they or their affiliates have knowingly engaged in activities (i) described in section 5 of ISA (energy sector activity); (ii) described in 104(c)(2) or (d)(1) of CISADA (related to foreign financial institutions who facilitate WMD/terrorism, money laundering, IRGC activity, and other violations); (iii) in 105A(b)(2) of CISADA (related transfer of weapons and other technologies to Iran likely to be used for human rights abuses); (iv) involving persons whose property is blocked for WMD/terrorism and; (v) involving persons or entities in the government of Iran (without the authorization of a Federal department or agency). Provides for periodic public disclosure of such information, and communication of that information by the SEC to Congress and the President. Requires the President to initiate an investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions as specified, and to make a sanctions determination within six months.

Sec. 220—Reports on, and Authorization of Imposition of Sanctions with Respect to, the Provision of Specialized Financial Messaging Services to the Central Bank of Iran and Other Sanctioned Iranian Financial Institutions: States the sense of Congress that specialized financial messaging services are a critical link to the international financial system; requires the Secretary of the Treasury to report periodically listing the persons who provide such services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian banks that have been designated for involvement in WMD or support for terror, and assessing efforts to cut off the direct provision of such services to such institutions. Authorizes the imposition of sanctions under CISADA or IEEPA on persons continuing to provide such services to the CBI or such other Iranian institutions, subject to an exception for persons subject to foreign sanctions regimes that require them to cut off services to a substantially similar group of Iranian institutions.

Sec. 221—Identification and Immigration Restrictions on Senior Iranian Officials and their Family Members: Requires the identification of and denial of visa requests to senior officials, including the Supreme Leader, the President, members of the Assembly of Experts, senior members of the Intelligence Ministry of Iran, and senior members of the IRGC that are involved in nuclear proliferation, support international terrorism or the commission of serious human rights abuses against citizens of Iran. Also includes their family members. Provides for Presidential waiver if essential to the national interest or if necessary to meet our UN obligations; requires a report to Congress regarding the use of such a waiver.

Sec. 222—Sense of Congress and Rule of Construction Relating to Certain Authori-

ties of State and Local Governments: States the sense of Congress that the US should support actions by States or local governments, within their authority, including determining how investment assets are valued for financial institutions safety and soundness purposes, that are consistent with and in furtherance of this Act. Amends CISADA to state that it shall not be construed to abridge the authority of a State to issue and enforce rules governing the safety, soundness, and solvency of a financial institution subject to its jurisdiction or the business of insurance pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act.

Sec. 223—GAO Reports on Foreign Investment in Iran's Energy Sector: Mandates reports from GAO on foreign investment in Iran's energy sector, exporters of refined petroleum products to Iran, entities providing shipping and insurance services to Iran, Iranian energy joint ventures worldwide, and countries where gasoline and refined petroleum products exported to Iran are produced or refined.

Sec. 224—Expanded Reporting on Iran's Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products: Amends section 110(b) of CISADA to require additional reporting by the President on the volume of crude oil and refined petroleum products imported to and exported from Iran, the persons selling and transporting crude oil and refined petroleum products, the countries with primary jurisdiction over those persons and the countries in which those products were refined, the sources of financing for such imports and the involvement of foreign persons in efforts to assist Iran in developing its oil and gas production capacity, importing advanced technology to upgrade existing Iranian refineries, converting existing chemical plants to petroleum refineries, and maintaining, upgrading or expanding refineries or constructing new refineries.

Sec. 301—Identifications and Sanctions on Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps Officials, Agents, and Affiliates: Requires the President to identify, and designate for sanctions, officials, affiliates and agents of the IRGC within 90 days of enactment, and periodically thereafter; designation requires exclusion of such persons from the United States, and imposition of sanctions related to WMD under IEEPA, including freezing their assets and otherwise isolating them financially. Also, outlines priorities for investigating certain foreign persons, entities, and transactions in assessing connections to the IRGC. Requires the President to report on designations and provides for a waiver if vital to the national security interest of the US.

Sec. 302—Identification and Sanctions on Foreign Persons Supporting IRGC: Subjects foreign persons to ISA sanctions if those persons knowingly provide material assistance to, or engage in any significant transaction—including barter transactions—with officials of the IRGC, its agents or affiliates. Requires imposition of similar sanctions against those persons who engage in significant transactions with UN-sanctioned persons, those acting for or on their behalf, or those owned or controlled by them. Provides for additional sanctions under IEEPA as the President deems appropriate. Requires the President to report on designations and waivers, as applicable. Waiver is available if essential to the national security interests of the US.

Sec. 303—Identification and Sanctions on Foreign Government Agencies Carrying Out Activities or Transactions with Certain Iran-Affiliated Persons: Requires the President, within 120 days and every 180 days thereafter, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies

each agency of the government of a foreign country, other than Iran, that the President determines knowingly and materially supported a foreign person that is an official, agent, or affiliate of IRGC designated pursuant to IEEPA or various UN Resolutions. Provides authority for the President to impose various measures described in the section, such as denying assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act or proscribing certain US loans to the agency involved.

Sec. 304—Rule of Construction: Clarifies that sections 301 to 303 sanctions do not limit the President's authority to designate persons for sanction under IEEPA.

Sec. 311—Expansion of US Procurement Ban to Foreign Persons who Interact with the IRGC: Requires certification by prospective US government contractors (for contract solicitations issued beginning 120 days from the date of enactment) that neither they nor their subsidiaries have engaged in significant economic transactions with designated IRGC officials, agents, or affiliates. Waiver is also amended, so that it is available if "essential to the national security interests." Establishes a minimum procurement ban penalty of two years for violators.

Sec. 312—Sanctions Determinations on NIOC and NITC: Amends CISADA to require the Secretary of the Treasury to determine and notify Congress whether the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) are agents or affiliates of the IRGC. If found to be IRGC entities, sanctions apply to transactions or relevant financial services for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from the NIOC or NITC, but only if the President determines that there exists a sufficient supply of petroleum from countries other than Iran to permit purchasers to significantly reduce in volume their purchases from Iran. Provides for an exception to financial institutions of a country that is significantly reducing its purchases of Iranian petroleum or petroleum products within specified periods which track those provided for in section 1245 of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.

Sec. 401—Sanctions on those Complicit in Human Rights Abuses: States the sense of Congress that the Supreme Leader, senior members of the Intelligence Ministry, senior members of the IRGC and paramilitary groups, and other Ministers, are responsible for directing and controlling serious human rights abuses against the Iranian people and should be included on the list of persons responsible for or complicit in those abuses and subject to property blocking and other CISADA 105 sanctions. Requires a report to appropriate congressional committees within 180 days detailing the involvement of the persons mentioned above in human rights abuses against the citizens of Iran.

Sec. 402—Sanctions on those Transferring to Iran Certain Goods or Technologies: Imposes sanctions provided for in CISADA, including a visa ban and property blocking/asset freeze, on persons and firms which supply Iran with equipment and technologies including weapons, rubber bullets, tear gas and other riot control equipment, and jamming, monitoring and surveillance equipment which the President determines are likely to be used by Iranian officials to commit human rights abuses. Requires the President to maintain and update lists of such persons who commit human rights abuses, submit updated lists to Congress, and make the unclassified portion of those lists public. Requires the President to report on designations and waivers, as applicable.

Sec. 403—Sanctions on those Engaging in Censorship and Repression in Iran: States the sense of Congress that satellite service providers and other entities that directly

provide satellite service to the Iranian government or its entities should cease to provide such service unless the government ceases its activities intended to jam or restrict the signals and the US should address the illegal jamming through voice and vote at the UN International Telecommunications Union. Requires imposition of sanctions as in section 401 against individuals and firms found to have engaged in censorship or curtailment of the rights of freedom of expression or assembly of Iran's citizens.

Sec. 411—Codification of Sanctions with Respect to Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Using Information Technology: Codifies Executive Order 13606, Blocking The Property And Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons with Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Via Information Technology.

Sec. 412—Clarification of Sensitive Technologies for Purposes of Procurement Ban under CISADA: Requires the Secretary of State to issue guidelines, within 90 days of the date of enactment, describing technologies that may be considered "sensitive technologies" for the purposes of Sec. 106 of CISADA, with special attention to new technologies, determine the types of technology that enable Iran's indigenous capabilities to disrupt and monitor information and communications, and review the guidelines no less than once each year, adding items to the guidelines as necessary.

Sec. 413—Expedited Processing of Human Rights, Humanitarian, and Democracy Aid: Requires the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department to establish a 90-day process to expedite processing of US Iran-related humanitarian, human rights and democratization aid by entities receiving funds from the State Department; the Broadcasting Board of Governors; and other federal agencies. Requires the State Department to conduct a foreign policy review within 30 days of request submission. Provides for additional time for processing of applications involving certain specified sensitive goods and technology, and requests involving extraordinary circumstances.

Sec. 414—Comprehensive Strategy to Promote Internet Freedom in Iran: Requires the Administration to devise a comprehensive strategy and report to Congress on how best to assist Iran's citizens in freely and safely accessing the Internet, developing counter-censorship technologies, expanding access to "surrogate" programming including Voice of America's Persian News Network, and Radio Farda inside Iran, and taking other similar measures.

Sec. 415—Statement of Policy on Political Prisoners: Declares the policy of the US to expand efforts to identify, assist, and protect prisoners of conscience in Iran, intensify work to abolish Iranian human rights violations, and publicly call for the release of political prisoners, as appropriate.

Sec. 501—Exclusion of Certain Iranian Students from the US: Requires the Secretary of State to deny visas and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude certain Iranian university students who may seek to come to the U.S. to study to prepare for work in Iran's energy sector or in fields related to its nuclear program, including nuclear sciences or nuclear engineering.

Sec. 502—Interests in Financial Assets of Iran: Makes certain blocked assets available for execution to satisfy any judgment or judgments to the extent of any compensatory damages against Iran for state-sponsored terrorism, so long as the court determines that Iran has an equitable title to or beneficial interest in those assets (subject to an exception for certain custodial interests),

and the court also determines that no one possesses a constitutionally-protected interest in the blocked assets under the Fifth Amendment.

Sec. 503—Technical Corrections: Reaffirms longstanding US policy allowing sale of certain licensed agricultural commodities to Iran by amending the National Defense Authorization Act to allow for continued payments related to such commodities. Adjusts date of delivery of EIA reports.

Sec. 504—Expansion of NDAA Sanctions: Amends the NDAA to provide that financial institutions located in countries that have been exempted because they are significantly reducing their reliance on Iranian oil may continue to do business with the Central Bank of Iran only for petroleum transactions and limited bilateral trade between Iran and those countries; for the first time treats state-owned banks (other than central banks) as subject to the same sanctions rules as foreign private banks; provides incentives for "significantly reducing" countries to reduce to zero; clarifies that "significantly reducing" includes a reduction in price or volume toward a complete cessation of crude oil imports; ties termination date to termination certification in CISADA. Makes other technical corrections.

Sec. 505—Report on Natural Gas Exports from Iran: Requires the Administrator of the Energy Information Administration to submit a report to Congress and the President within 60 days on Iran's natural gas sector, including an assessment of exports of Iranian natural gas, identification of countries purchasing the most Iranian natural gas, assessment of alternative supplies available to those countries, and assessment of the impact a reduction on exports would have on global supplies and pricing. Requires the President to submit a report to Congress within 60 days of receiving the EIA report, and using the information it contains to provide analysis and recommendations on the revenues received by Iran from its natural gas exports and whether further steps should be taken to limit such revenues.

Sec. 506—Report on Membership of Iran in International Organizations: Requires the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress listing the international organizations of which Iran is a member and detailing the amount the US contributes to each such organization annually.

Sec. 507—Sense of Congress on Exportation of Goods, Services, and Technologies for Aircraft Produced in the US: States the sense of Congress that licenses to export or re-export goods, services, or technologies for aircraft produced in the US should be provided, in the case of Iran, only in situations where such licenses are essential and in a manner consistent with US laws and foreign policy goals.

Sec. 601—Implementation; Penalties: Provides the President with the necessary procedural tools to administer the provisions of the new law, including subpoena and other enforcement authorities for specified provisions of the bill.

Sec. 602—Applicability to Authorized Intelligence Activities: Provides a general exemption for authorized intelligence activities of the U.S.

Sec. 603—Applicability to Certain Natural Gas Projects: Contains special conditions for a project outside Iran of substantial importance to U.S. national interests and European energy security interests and energy independence from the Government of the Russian Federation.

Sec. 604—Rule of Construction: Provides that nothing in this Act shall be construed as a declaration of war or an authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.

Sec. 605—Termination: Provides for termination of some provisions of the new law if

the President certifies as required in CISADA that Iran has ceased its support for terrorism and ceased efforts to pursue, acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology, and has verifiably dismantled its WMD.

Sec. 701—Short Title for Title VII: The “Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012.”

Sec. 702—Sanctions on those Responsible for Human Rights Abuses of Syria’s Citizens: Requires the President to identify within 90 days, and sanction under IEEPA, officials of the Syrian government or those acting on their behalf who are complicit in or responsible for the commission of serious human rights abuses against Syria’s citizens, regardless of whether the abuses occurred in Syria.

Sec. 703—Sanctions on those Transferring to Syria Technologies for Human Rights Abuses: Requires the President to identify and sanction persons determined to have engaged in the transfer of technologies—including weapons, rubber bullets, tear gas and other riot control equipment, and jamming, monitoring and surveillance equipment—which the President determines are likely to be used by Syrian officials to commit human rights abuses or restrict the free flow of information in Syria. Provides for exceptions where a person has agreed to stop providing such technologies, and agreed not to knowingly provide such technologies in the future. Requires the President to report on designations and waivers, where applicable, and to update the list periodically.

Sec. 704—Sanctions on those Engaging in Censorship and Repression in Syria: Requires the President to identify and report to Congress within 90 days of enactment those persons and firms found to have engaged in censorship or repression of the rights of freedom of expression or assembly of Syria’s citizens, and impose sanctions under IEEPA on such persons. Requires periodic updating of the list, and public access via the websites of the Departments of State and Treasury.

Sec. 705—Waiver: Provides for Presidential national security interest waiver for Syria provisions; requires a report to Congress on the reasons for the waiver.

Sec. 706—Termination: Provides for termination of the Syria provisions if the President certifies that certain conditions are met.

PARENT COMPANIES

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise today to engage in a colloquy with my friend, the distinguished Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, regarding HR 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. I want to thank the chairman for crafting a strong sanctions package that includes language I authored to close a loophole in current law that allows foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to continue doing business with Iran without imposing any penalties on their U.S. parent companies. We must close this loophole once and for all, and I am pleased the Chairman agrees with me.

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. I thank Senator LAUTENBERG for his longstanding leadership on this issue. As I have previously noted, it is long past time for foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to end their business in Iran. That is already happening due to US and international pressure on the business and financial sectors, and this

new provision will accelerate that process. Firms realize the huge risks such activity poses, reputationally and otherwise, to their companies. I note that it is already a violation of U.S. law for U.S. subsidiaries to engage in sanctionable activity in Iran’s energy sector and certain other activities under U.S. sanctions laws. It is also a violation of U.S. trade law for a U.S. firm to do business of any kind in Iran via a subsidiary that it directs. The balance that has been struck in prior law is to focus only on the activity of U.S. companies. Foreign subsidiaries are not, by definition, U.S. companies, and your provision takes a major new step forward in this area of the law. I agree with you that the way we have addressed this issue authorizing for the first time penalties on U.S. parents if their foreign subsidiaries engages in an activity that would be sanctionable if committed by a U.S. person—is a sound and responsible one, and will hopefully shut down this activity once and for all.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Does the chairman agree that the language in the bill currently under consideration would apply the same penalties that can be imposed on U.S. companies that directly violate the U.S. trade ban to those U.S. parent companies whose foreign subsidiaries are doing business with Iran?

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. The bill would authorize the imposition of similar civil penalties on such U.S. parent companies.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Does the chairman also agree that this language subjects to penalties U.S. parent companies if their foreign subsidiaries knew or should have known that the subsidiary was directly or indirectly doing business with an Iranian entity, even if it was the case that the parent companies were not actually aware of the activity of the subsidiary?

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. I agree this legislation mandates penalties on a U.S. parent company if its foreign subsidiary has knowledge or should have had knowledge that the subsidiary was doing prohibited business with Iran, even if the U.S. parent company has no knowledge of these transactions.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. And does the chairman agree that this requirement that the foreign subsidiary knew or should have known that they were doing business with Iran relates only to the actual business transaction and does not require that the subsidiary had or should have had knowledge of current U.S. sanctions law in order to place penalties on the U.S. parent company?

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Yes. That is my intent.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank Chairman JOHNSON for all of his work on this important Iran sanctions package. Iran continues to defy numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions. It funds Hamas, Hezbollah, and other ter-

rorist organizations, and it commits severe human rights abuses against its own people. We must do everything we can to place as much pressure on the Iranian regime as possible to change its behavior, and I am pleased that we have finally closed this loophole in current law and put U.S. companies on notice that they will be held responsible for the activities of their subsidiaries with respect to Iran.

Mr. REID. I move to concur in the House amendment, and I believe the Senate is ready to act on this motion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate and that any statements related to this bill be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Humanitarian trade, including agricultural commodities, food, medicine and medical products has long been specifically exempted by Congress from successive rounds of Iran sanctions legislation, as long as such trade is licensed by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC.

With the sharp drop in the value of Iran’s currency, and the worsening economic situation in Iran, it is becoming more apparent that U.S. financial sanctions targeting Iran’s banking sector are causing increased concern among U.S. and other businesses, and banks of our allies engaged in such trade.

The fear is that engaging in humanitarian trade in the current sanctions environment might lead to sanctions for legitimately licensed humanitarian trade. We must underscore with other countries and their banks that humanitarian trade with Iran is not subject to sanctions if it is appropriately licensed by OFAC.

This has been a concern since the Senate first considered this bill and this concern still remains. It is not and has not been the intent of U.S. policy to harm the Iranian people by prohibiting humanitarian trade that is licensed by the U.S. Treasury Department, and we should do all we can to avoid this outcome. OFAC consistently issues many licenses, both general and specific, for this type of trade.

The practical financing difficulties arising today between banks and those engaging in licensed humanitarian trade can be best addressed by U.S. government officials, who should do more to make it clear that no U.S. sanctions will be imposed against third-country banks that facilitate OFAC-licensed or exempted humanitarian trade. The Administration must continue to make this clear in public statements, in private meetings with foreign financial institutions, and elsewhere as appropriate. Misinterpretation of U.S. law, among foreign financial institutions, should no longer deny

the people of Iran the benefit of OFAC-approved humanitarian trade.

Mr. REID. I am pleased that the Senate has just passed the final version of the Iran Sanctions legislation.

I want to thank Senators JOHNSON, SHELBY and MENENDEZ for their leadership and all of their hard work getting this bill completed.

At a time when Iran continues to defy the international community with its nuclear weapons program, it is critical we continue to tighten our sanctions regime.

This legislation expands our existing sanctions on Iran's energy sector, and imposes new sanctions targeting shipping and insurance.

Iran continues to try to evade existing sanctions. But this legislation, in combination with newly announced measures by the Obama administration, closes loopholes and stops the use of front companies or financial institutions to get around international sanctions.

Our current sanctions, and a recent European Union ban on purchasing Iranian oil, have already had an impact.

In spite of the rhetoric coming out of Iran, the regime is clearly feeling the heat.

Oil exports are down by 50 percent, and the Iranian currency has lost nearly 40 percent of its value.

Iranian tankers full of oil are crowding the waters around Iran, acting as floating storage facilities for oil the rogue nation cannot sell.

Over the past year, I have come to the floor many times urging passage of this measure.

I am pleased we have finally completed this important work.

There is no time to waste, as the Iranian regime continues to threaten our ally Israel and the national security of the United States.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators allowed to speak for up to 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

REMEMBERING CHIEF ROD MAGGARD

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise today in memory of former Hazard Police Chief Rod Maggard. Chief Maggard was a prominent member of the Perry County, KY, community, and he dedicated his life to serving his country, State, and city.

A native of the southeastern Kentucky region, Chief Maggard was born on April 9, 1944, to Ivory and Margaret Maggard. After graduating from Cumberland High School, he attended Southeast Community College. Shortly thereafter, Chief Maggard received his draft notice for the Vietnam War. Initially, he was stationed in Biloxi, MI,

where he worked as a Morse radio intercept operator, and he ultimately served a 14-month tour in DaNang, Vietnam.

Chief Maggard became a State trooper in 1967 when he returned home from the war. He was a decorated trooper and even received the Trooper of the Year Award for the Hazard KSP Post. In 1981, Maggard left public service and became director of Blue Diamond Coal's security. However, in 1991, he returned to public duty when he accepted the position of police chief for the City of Hazard.

His career was highly distinguished as he earned many different forms of recognition. Chief Maggard was invited to the White House to represent the Kentucky Chiefs of Police; he also served on the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council from 1995 to 2001; in 1997 he was appointed to the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center Advisory Council; and he was president of the Kentucky Association of Chiefs of Police from 1999 to 2000. In 2001, Chief Maggard retired from the police force and became the director of the Rural Law Enforcement Technology Center in Hazard.

Though a decorated police officer and public servant, the legacy Chief Rod Maggard hoped to leave was that of a good member of his community. Current Hazard police chief Minor Allen said that Chief Maggard was not just a mentor but more like a second father to him. It was his love of Hazard and Kentucky that set Maggard apart as a great police chief, and that is the reason why Rod will be dearly missed by those he knew and with whom he worked.

Today, I ask that my colleagues in the U.S. Senate would join me in honoring Chief Rod Maggard. I extend my most sincere condolences to his wife, Beverly; their daughters, Lesley Buckner, Brandi Townsley, and Vali Dye; his sons-in-law; brother; grandchildren; and many more beloved family members and friends. The Hazard Herald, a publication from Hazard, KY, published an obituary that highlighted Chief Maggard's outstanding service to Kentucky. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that said article appear in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Hazard Herald, June 20, 2012]

ROD MAGGARD

Rodney Mitchell Maggard, 68, of Hazard, passed away on Wednesday, June 13, at the hospice care center in Hazard. He was the former director of the Rural Law Enforcement Technology Center and former chief of police with the Hazard Police Department.

He was the son of the late Ivory Mitchell Maggard and the late Margaret McIntosh Maggard, and was also preceded in death by his brother, James Charles Maggard.

He is survived by his wife, Beverly Maggard; daughters Lesley Buckner and husband Jay, Brandi Townsley and husband Jeff, and Vali Dye and husband Kevin; brother Tommy Wayne Maggard; godson Anthony

Bersaglia; grandchildren Ali Townsley, Walker Townsley, Mitchell Buckner, Grayson Dye, and Avery Dye; along with a host of family and friends.

Arrangements were handled by Maggard Mountain View Chapel of Hazard. Funeral services were held on Saturday, June 16, at the Forum, with Dr. Bill Scott and Rev. Chris Fugate officiating. Interment was at Charlie Maggard Cemetery at Blair, Kentucky.

REMEMBERING AURORA'S LOSS

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, as we gain perspective on the recent horrific shooting in Aurora, CO, our thoughts and prayers are with the victims, their families, and on all those who have been impacted by this tragedy. I, like many Americans, have been uplifted by the many examples of courage and heroism that have emerged from this dark moment. A young woman refusing to leave her injured friend, pulling her out of harm's way. A man giving his life to shield a loved one. A 19-year-old stepping back into danger to rescue a mother and her two young daughters. These stories and the others that will almost certainly emerge as time goes on serve as powerful reminders of the simple decency that makes our Nation strong.

But as we reflect on these stories, it is also important that we begin to understand what caused or contributed to this heinous act. When the alleged shooter burst into the theater, he opened fire on the audience with an AR-15 assault rifle. The AR-15 is a type of military-style assault weapon, built for no purpose other than combat. According to the Congressional Research Service, they were designed in the aftermath of the Second World War to give soldiers a weapon suited for the modern battlefield. Such weapons often use high-capacity ammunition magazines, which allow shooters to continuously fire rounds without reloading. It has been reported that the alleged shooter used an oversized drum magazine, which reports have indicated could fire 100 rounds without reloading.

Between 1994 and 2004, a Federal ban prohibited the purchase of assault weapons. The idea was that if we took lethal weapons with no sporting purpose off the streets, it would make our society safer and protect American lives. Our law enforcement community strongly supported it. And it worked. After the ban was enacted, Brady Campaign studies observed a 66 percent decrease in the number of assault weapons that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, ATF, traced back to a crime scene. When assault weapons were taken off the market, our Nation became safer. But, unfortunately, Congress allowed the assault weapons ban to lapse in 2004, and repeated efforts to reinstate it have been unsuccessful.

So this past May, when the alleged gunman walked into a local gun shop, he was able to purchase an AR-15 assault rifle. The sale was completely