

rates do not soar to undesirable levels in the years to come.

If this bill is signed into law, rates on new subsidized Stafford and PLUS loans will go down this year. Undergraduates would borrow at 3.86%, a cut from 6.8%, graduate students would borrow Stafford loans at 5.4%, a cut from 6.8% and parents and graduates borrowing PLUS loans would borrow at 6.4%, a cut from 7.9%. For a freshman undergraduate beginning school this year and taking out the maximum amount of loans, he/she will save \$3,300 in interest payments over their college career as compared to current law and undergraduate students would save \$25 billion in debt relief, according to CBO projections, over the next five years as compared to current law. While this bill represents a significant improvement for students, I do have reservations that the undergraduate interest rate cap, currently set at 8.25%, is too high. While it is widely believed that students will enjoy low rates in the short-term, there is a strong possibility that rates will skyrocket as our national economy improves. I believe that, for undergraduates, a lower cap should be considered and I would welcome its continued review by this Congress in the years to come.

Overall, Mr. Speaker, this is a good bill that will give students and families alike significant financial relief and stability in the years to come.

Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my opposition to the Motion to Concur in the Senate Amendment to H.R. 1911, the Smarter Solutions for Students Act.

This bill returns federal student loans to a system of market-based variable rates, an imprudent policy that seeks profits for deficit reduction at the expense of students struggling with the substantial and climbing cost of post-secondary education.

While the bill may appear to reverse the interest rate hike that occurred on July 1, setting rates at 3.8 percent for this year and 4.6 percent for next year for undergraduate Stafford student loan borrowers, it is essentially a bait and switch that will pile extra debt onto students when the current record-low rates inevitably rise.

This is unacceptable. Student loan debt is a major drag on the American economy, reaching \$1 trillion and climbing, and recently surpassing credit card debt as the largest form of consumer debt. Approximately 60 percent of students take out loans to attend college, and increasing the costs of borrowing will prevent millions from being able to pursue higher education.

While the interest rate caps are a step in the right direction, they are too high to meaningfully protect students when the temporarily low rates give way to rates that are even higher than the 6.8 percent rate this bill attempts to fix.

College educated students are the future engine of our country, and anyone who wants to pursue a post-secondary education should have the opportunity to do so without going into crushing debt. I urge my colleagues to vote against this legislation and instead, extend the current interest rate of 3.4 percent until Congress enacts a true long-term solution to the cost of college that is worthy of our Nation's young people.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by

the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. KLINE) that the House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, H.R. 1911.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the yeas have it.

Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

NUCLEAR IRAN PREVENTION ACT OF 2013

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 850) to impose additional human rights and economic and financial sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 850

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings and statement of policy.

TITLE I—HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM SANCTIONS

- Sec. 101. Mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions that engage in certain transactions on behalf of persons involved in human rights abuses or that export sensitive technology to Iran.
- Sec. 102. Prevention of diversion of certain goods, services and technologies to Iran.
- Sec. 103. Designation of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as foreign terrorist organization.
- Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses, engaging in censorship, or engaging in the diversion of goods intended for the people of Iran.
- Sec. 105. Sense of Congress on elections in Iran.
- Sec. 106. Sense of Congress on designation of a Special Coordinator for advancing human rights and political participation for women in Iran.

TITLE II—ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

Subtitle A—Amendments to Iran Sanctions Act of 1996

- Sec. 201. Transfer to Iran of goods, services, or technology that would materially contribute to Iran's ability to mine or mill uranium.
- Sec. 202. Repeal of waiver of sanctions relating to development of weapons of mass destruction or other military capabilities.

Subtitle B—Amendments to Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012

- Sec. 211. Modifications to prohibition on procurement contracts with persons that export sensitive technology to Iran.
 - Sec. 212. Authority of State and local governments to avoid exposure to sanctioned persons and sectors.
 - Sec. 213. Sense of Congress regarding the European Central Bank.
 - Sec. 214. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain transactions in foreign currencies.
 - Sec. 215. Sanctions with respect to certain transactions with Iran.
- Subtitle C—Other Matters
- Sec. 221. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian financial institutions.
 - Sec. 222. Imposition of sanctions with respect to ports, special economic zones, free economic zones, and strategic sectors of Iran.
 - Sec. 223. Report on determinations not to impose sanctions on persons who allegedly sell, supply, or transfer precious metals to or from Iran.
 - Sec. 224. Imposition of sanctions with respect to foreign financial institutions that facilitate financial transactions on behalf of persons owned or controlled by specially designated nationals.
 - Sec. 225. Repeal of exemptions under sanctions provisions of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
 - Sec. 226. Termination of government contracts with persons who sell goods, services, or technology to, or conduct any other transaction with, Iran.
 - Sec. 227. Conditions for entry and operation of vessels.

Sec. 224. Imposition of sanctions with respect to foreign financial institutions that facilitate financial transactions on behalf of persons owned or controlled by specially designated nationals.

Sec. 225. Repeal of exemptions under sanctions provisions of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

Sec. 226. Termination of government contracts with persons who sell goods, services, or technology to, or conduct any other transaction with, Iran.

Sec. 227. Conditions for entry and operation of vessels.

TITLE III—ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT CENSORSHIP ACTIVITIES IN IRAN

- Sec. 301. Report on implementation of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.
- Sec. 302. List of persons who are high-risk re-exporters of sensitive technologies.
- Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on provision of intercept technologies to Iran.
- Sec. 304. Sense of Congress on availability of consumer communication technologies in Iran.
- Sec. 305. Expedited consideration of requests for authorization of transfer of goods and services to Iran to facilitate the ability of Iranian persons to freely communicate.

TITLE IV—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

- Sec. 401. National Strategy on Iran.
- Sec. 402. Report on Iranian nuclear and economic capabilities.
- Sec. 403. Report on plausibility of expanding sanctions on Iranian oil.
- Sec. 404. GAO report on Iranian strategy to evade current sanctions and other matters.
- Sec. 405. Authority to consolidate reports required under Iran sanctions laws.
- Sec. 406. Amendments to definitions under Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.

Sec. 407. Rule of construction.
 Sec. 408. Implementation; penalties.
 Sec. 409. Severability.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability would—

(A) embolden its already aggressive foreign policy, including its arming of terrorist organizations and other groups, its efforts to destabilize countries in the Middle East, and its efforts to target the United States, United States allies, and United States interests globally;

(B) increase the risk that Iran would share its nuclear technology and expertise with extremist groups and rogue nations;

(C) destabilize global energy markets, posing a direct and devastating threat to the American and global economy; and

(D) likely lead other governments in the region to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs, increasing the prospect of nuclear proliferation throughout the region and effectively ending the viability of the global nonproliferation regime, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970.

(2) A nuclear arms-capable Iran possessing intercontinental ballistic missiles, a development most experts expect could occur within a decade, would pose a direct nuclear threat to the United States.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

TITLE I—HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM SANCTIONS

SEC. 101. MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS ON BEHALF OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OR THAT EXPORT SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking “or” at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(F) facilitates a significant transaction or transactions or provides significant financial services for—

“(i) a person that is subject to sanctions under section 105(c), 105A(c), 105B(c), or 105C(a); or

“(ii) a person that exports sensitive technology to Iran and is subject to the prohibition on procurement contracts as described in section 106.”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subsection (a) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to any activity described in subparagraph (F) of section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (as added by subsection (a)(3) of this section) initiated on or after the date that is 90 days after such date of enactment.

(c) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations to carry out the amendments made by subsection (a).

SEC. 102. PREVENTION OF DIVERSION OF CERTAIN GOODS, SERVICES AND TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 301(1) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Account-

ability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8541(1)) is amended by striking “knows or has reason to know” and inserting “knows, has reason to know, or should have known”.

(b) IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTRIES OF CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO THE DIVERSION OF CERTAIN GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES TO OR THROUGH IRAN.—Section 302(b) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8542(b)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “or” at the end;

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) that are—

“(A) items described in the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) and Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions);

“(B) items on the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions;

“(C) items and substances relating to biological and chemical weapons the export of which is controlled by the Australia Group;

“(D) items on the Schedule One or Schedule Two list of toxic chemicals and precursors the export of which is controlled pursuant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; or

“(E) items on the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, and subsequent revisions.”.

(c) DESTINATIONS OF DIVERSION CONCERN.—Section 303(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8543(c)) is amended—

(1) by striking “Not later than” and inserting the following:

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(2) ADDITIONAL MEASURES.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in this section, the President may impose restrictions on United States foreign assistance or measures authorized under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act with respect to a country designated as a country of diversion concern if the President determines such restrictions or measures would prevent the transfer of United States-origin goods, services, and technology to Iran.

“(B) EXCEPTION.—The authority to impose sanctions under subparagraph (A) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions relating to the importation of goods.

“(C) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph, the term ‘good’ has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).”.

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to countries identified in any update to the report that is required under section 302(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010

and submitted to Congress on or after such date of enactment.

SEC. 103. DESIGNATION OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle A of title III of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8741 et seq.) is amended—

(1) by redesignating section 304 as section 305; and

(2) by inserting after section 303 the following new section:

“SEC. 304. DESIGNATION OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall determine if Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps meets the criteria for designation as a foreign terrorist organization as set forth in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).

“(b) AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATION.—If the Secretary of State determines under subsection (a) that Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps meets the criteria set forth under such section 219, the Secretary shall designate Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization under such section 219.

“(c) NEGATIVE DETERMINATION.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—If the Secretary of State determines under subsection (a) that Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps does not meet the criteria set forth under such section 219, the Secretary shall submit to the committees of Congress specified in subsection (e) a report that contains a detailed justification as to which criteria have not been met.

“(2) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, if necessary.

“(d) APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS TO QUDS FORCE.—The sanctions applied to any entity designated as a foreign terrorist organization as set forth in such section 219 shall be applied to the Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force.

“(e) COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS SPECIFIED.—The committees of Congress specified in this subsection are the following:

“(1) The Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

“(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is amended by striking the item relating to section 304 and inserting the following:

“Sec. 304. Designation of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as foreign terrorist organization.

“Sec. 305. Rule of construction.”.

SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, ENGAGING IN CENSORSHIP, OR ENGAGING IN THE DIVERSION OF GOODS INTENDED FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.

(a) FINDING AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Section 401(a) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158; 126 Stat. 1251) is amended to read as follows:

“(a) FINDING AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.—

“(1) FINDING.—Congress finds that Iranian persons holding the following positions in the Government of Iran are ultimately responsible for and have and continue to knowingly order, control, direct and implement

gross violations of the human rights of the Iranian people, the human rights of persons in other countries, censorship, and the diversion of food, medicine, medical devices, agricultural commodities and other goods intended for the Iranian people:

- “(A) The Supreme Leader of Iran.
- “(B) The President of Iran.
- “(C) Members of the Council of Guardians.
- “(D) Members of the Expediency Council.
- “(E) The Minister of Intelligence and Security.
- “(F) The Commander of the Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.
- “(G) The Commander of the Basij-e Mostazafin.
- “(H) The Commander of Ansar-e-Hezbollah.
- “(I) The Commander of the Quds Force.
- “(J) The Commander in Chief of the Police Force.

“(K) Senior officials or key employees of an organization described in any of subparagraphs (C) through (J) or in the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran, the Council of Ministers of Iran, the Assembly of Experts of Iran, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Ministry of Justice of Iran, the Ministry of Interior of Iran, the prison system of Iran, or the judicial system of Iran.

“(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

“(A) the President should include any Iranian person holding a position in the Government of Iran described in paragraph (1) on one or more of the lists of persons subject to sanctions pursuant to section 105(b), 105A(b), 105B(b), or 105C(b) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514(b), 8514a(b), 8514b(b), or 8514c(b)); and

“(B) the President should impose sanctions on such Iranian person pursuant to section 105, 105A, 105B, or 105C of such Act (as the case may be).”

(b) ADDITIONAL FINDING AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Section 401 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158; 126 Stat. 1251) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

“(b) ADDITIONAL FINDING AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.—

“(1) FINDING.—Congress finds that other senior officials of the Government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities, also have and continue to knowingly order, control, direct, and implement gross violations of the human rights of the Iranian people and the human rights of persons in other countries.

“(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

“(A) the President should investigate violations of human rights described in paragraph (1) to identify other senior officials of the Government of Iran that also have or continue to knowingly order, control, direct, and implement gross violations of human rights of the Iranian people and the human rights of persons in other countries;

“(B) the President should include any such official on one or more of the lists of persons subject to sanctions pursuant to section 105(b), 105A(b), 105B(b), or 105C(b) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514(b), 8514a(b), 8514b(b), or 8514c(b)); and

“(C) the President should impose sanctions on any such official pursuant to section 105, 105A, 105B, or 105C of such Act (as the case may be).”

(c) REPORT.—Section 401(c)(1) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158; 126 Stat. 1251)

(as redesignated by subsection (b) of this section) is amended—

(1) by striking “Not later than” and inserting the following:

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than”;

(2) by striking “this Act” and inserting “the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and annually thereafter for 3 years”;

(3) by striking “otherwise directing the commission of” and inserting “otherwise directing—

“(i) the commission of”;

(4) by striking “Iran.” and inserting “Iran;

“(ii) censorship or related activities with respect to Iran; or

“(iii) the diversion of goods, food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural commodities, intended for the people of Iran.”;

(5) by striking “For any such person” and inserting the following:

“(B) REQUIREMENT RELATING TO PERSONS NOT INCLUDED.—For any such person”;

(6) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(C) REQUIREMENT RELATING TO FINANCIAL NET WORTH.—For each such person described in subparagraph (A) and each such person described in subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State shall include in the report a description of the estimated net worth of the person.”

(d) ADDITIONAL REPORT.—Section 401 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158; 126 Stat. 1251), as amended by this section, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(d) ADDITIONAL REPORT.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report with respect to whether each person described in subsection (a) or any family member of such person has facilitated deceptive transactions for or on behalf of any person subject to United States sanctions concerning Iran in violation of Executive Order 13608 of May 1, 2012 (77 Fed. Reg. 26409; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) or any other provision of law.

“(2) FAMILY MEMBER DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘family member’ includes, with respect to a person, any relative of such person to the third degree of consanguinity.”

(e) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The heading for section 401 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158; 126 Stat. 1251) is amended by striking “COMMITTED AGAINST” and all that follows and inserting “, ENGAGING IN CENSORSHIP, OR ENGAGING IN THE DIVERSION OF GOODS INTENDED FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.”

(f) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is amended by striking the item relating to section 401 and inserting the following:

“Sec. 401. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses, engaging in censorship, or engaging in the diversion of goods intended for the people of Iran.”

SEC. 105. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ELECTIONS IN IRAN.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Iranian people are systematically denied free, fair, and credible elections by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(2) The unelected and unaccountable Guardian Council disqualifies hundreds of

qualified candidates, including women and most religious minorities, while the regime intimidates others into staying out of elections completely.

(3) Voting inconsistencies, including an absence of international observers, and fraud are commonplace.

(4) The 2009 presidential elections proved that the regime will engage in large scale vote-rigging to ensure a specific result.

(5) The Iranian regime combines electoral manipulation with the ruthless suppression of dissent. Following the 2009 elections, peaceful demonstrators were met with violence by the regime’s security apparatus, including arbitrary detentions, beatings, kidnappings, rapes, and murders.

(6) The electoral manipulation and human rights violations are in violation of the Government of Iran’s agreed to obligations under the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the Iranian people are deprived by their government of free, fair, and credible elections;

(2) the United States should support freedom, human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law in Iran, and elections that are free and fair, meet international standards, and allow independent international and domestic electoral observers unrestricted access to polling and counting stations; and

(3) the United States should support the people of Iran in their peaceful calls for a representative and responsive democratic government that respects human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law.

SEC. 106. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DESIGNATION OF A SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION FOR WOMEN IN IRAN.

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should designate a Special Coordinator position in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs whose primary function is to facilitate cooperation across departments for the purpose of advancing human rights and political participation for women in Iran, as well as to prepare evidence and information to be used in identifying Iranian officials for designation as human rights violators for their involvement in violating the human rights of women in Iran.

TITLE II—ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

Subtitle A—Amendments to Iran Sanctions Act of 1996

SEC. 201. TRANSFER TO IRAN OF GOODS, SERVICES, OR TECHNOLOGY THAT WOULD MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTE TO IRAN’S ABILITY TO MINE OR MILL URANIUM.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) TRANSFER TO IRAN OF GOODS, SERVICES, OR TECHNOLOGY THAT CAN BE USED FOR MINING OR MILLING OF URANIUM.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly transferred, on or after the date of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, to Iran goods, services, or technology that would materially contribute to Iran’s ability to mine or mill uranium.”

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 5 of such Act is amended in subsection (b)(3), (c), and (f) by striking “paragraph (1) or (2)” each place it appears and inserting “paragraph (1), (2), or (3)”.

SEC. 202. REPEAL OF WAIVER OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

Section 9(c)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

- (1) by striking subparagraph (B);
- (2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (B); and
- (3) in subparagraph (B) (as redesignated by paragraph (2) of this section)—
 - (A) by striking “or (B)” each place it appears; and
 - (B) by striking “, as applicable”.

Subtitle B—Amendments to Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012

SEC. 211. MODIFICATIONS TO PROHIBITION ON PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS WITH PERSONS THAT EXPORT SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.

(a) APPLICATION TO OWNERS AND SUBSIDIARIES.—Subsection (a) of section 106 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C. 8515) is amended—

- (1) by striking “goods or services with a person” and inserting the following: “goods or services—
 - “(1) with a person”;
- (2) in paragraph (1), as added by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking the period at the end and inserting and inserting “; or”;

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(2) with respect to a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, a person described in paragraph (1) or a person who owns or controls a person described in paragraph (1).”

(b) SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY DEFINED.—Subsection (c)(1) of such section is amended by striking “is to be used specifically” and inserting “has been designed or specifically modified”.

(c) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION AND IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS.—Such section, as so amended, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(e) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION AND IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS.—The President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) with respect to—

- “(1) a person if the President determines that the person knowingly exports sensitive technology to Iran; or
- “(2) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, a person described in paragraph (1) or a person who owns or controls a person described in paragraph (1).”

(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The heading of such section is amended by inserting “AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST” after “WITH”.

(e) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 is amended by striking the item relating to section 106 and inserting the following:

“Sec. 106. Prohibition on procurement contracts with and imposition of sanctions against persons that export sensitive technology to Iran.”

(f) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to exports of sensitive technology to Iran that occur on or after such date of enactment.

SEC. 212. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO AVOID EXPOSURE TO SANCTIONED PERSONS AND SEC-TORS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 202 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8532) is amended by striking subsections (a), (b), and (c) and inserting the following:

“(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should respect the decision of any State or local government to divest from or prohibit the investment of assets of the State or local government in a person described in subsection (c) or to impose disclosure and transparency requirements on any person subject to the jurisdiction of such government, except with respect to an activity that is exempt, licensed, or otherwise authorized by a Federal department or agency.

“(b) AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a State or local government may adopt and enforce measures that meet the requirements of subsection (d)—

- “(1) to divest the assets of the State or local government from a person described in subsection (c);
- “(2) to prohibit investment of the assets of the State or local government in any such person; or
- “(3) to impose disclosure and transparency requirements on any person subject to the jurisdiction of such government, except with respect to an activity that is exempt, licensed, or otherwise authorized by a Federal department or agency.

“(c) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A person described in this subsection is a person with respect to which sanctions have been, and continue to be, imposed pursuant to—

- “(1) section 104(c) of this Act;
- “(2) section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note);
- “(3) section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)); or
- “(4) sections 1244, 1245, 1246 or 1247 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8803, 8804, 8805, or 8806).”

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 202 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8532) is amended—

- (1) in subsection (d)(4), by striking “engages in investment activities in Iran described in subsection (c)” and inserting “is a person described in subsection (c)”;
- (2) in subsection (f), by striking “or (i)” and inserting “or (g)”;
- (3) by striking subsection (h) and by redesignating subsections (i) and (j) as subsections (h) and (i), respectively; and
- (4) in paragraph (1) of subsection (i) (as redesignated by paragraph (3) of this subsection), by striking “(determined without regard to subsection (c))”.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section apply to measures adopted by State and local governments on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 213. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The Government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities, continue to have access to, and utilize, euro-denominated transactions, including for goods and services that are subject to sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union and its member states and by the United Nations.

(2) The Guidelines of the European Central Bank (Article 39(1)) states that: “Participants shall be deemed to be aware of, and

shall comply with, all obligations on them relating to legislation on data protection, prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism, proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems, in particular in terms of implementing appropriate measures concerning any payments debited or credited on their PM accounts.”

(3) United States and European convergence with respect to United States sanctions efforts toward the Government of Iran is a vital component of United States policy aimed at preventing the Government of Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue to closely coordinate and cooperate with the European Union and its member states to restrict access to and use of the euro currency by the Government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities, for transactions with the exception of food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural commodities.

SEC. 214. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES.

(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Subtitle B of title II of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 220 the following:

“SEC. 220A. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in this section, the President—

“(1) shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that is a person described in subsection (c); and

“(2) may impose sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with respect to any other person described in subsection (c).

“(b) EXCEPTION.—The authority to impose sanctions under subsection (a)(2) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions relating to the importation of goods.

“(c) PERSON DESCRIBED.—A person described in this subsection is a person the President determines has—

“(1) knowingly conducted or facilitated a significant transaction involving the currency of a country other than the country in which the person is operating at the time of the transaction with, for, or on behalf of—

“(A) the Central Bank of Iran or another Iranian financial institution designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); or

“(B) a person described in section 1244(c)(2) of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (22 U.S.C. 8803(c)(2)) (other than a person described in subparagraph (C)(iii) of that section); or

“(2) knowingly conducted or facilitated a significant transaction by another person involving the currency of a country other than the country in which that other person is operating at the time of the transaction, with, for, or on behalf of a person described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1).

“(d) WAIVER.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive the application of subsection (a) with respect to a person for a period of not more than 180 days, and may renew that waiver for additional periods of not more than 180 days, if the President—

“(A) determines that the waiver is vital to the national security of the United States; and

“(B) not less than 7 days before the waiver or the renewal of the waiver, as the case may

be, takes effect, submits a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the waiver and the reason for the waiver.

“(2) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

“(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any person from, or authorize or require the imposition of sanctions with respect to any person for, conducting or facilitating any transaction in the currency of the country in which the person is operating at the time of the transaction for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices.

“(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms ‘account’, ‘correspondent account’, and ‘payable-through account’ have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.

“(2) AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.—The term ‘agricultural commodity’ has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).

“(3) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘foreign financial institution’ has the meaning given that term in section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

“(4) GOOD.—The term ‘good’ has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).

“(5) IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘Iranian financial institution’ has the meaning given that term in section 104A(d) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513b(d)).

“(6) MEDICAL DEVICE.—The term ‘medical device’ has the meaning given the term ‘device’ in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

“(7) MEDICINE.—The term ‘medicine’ has the meaning given the term ‘drug’ in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

“(8) TRANSACTION.—The term ‘transaction’ includes a foreign exchange swap, a foreign exchange forward, and any other type of similar currency exchange or conversion or similar derivative instrument.”

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—Section 601(a)(1) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8781(a)(1)) is amended by inserting “220A,” after “220.”

(2) PENALTIES.—Section 601(b)(2)(A) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8781(b)(2)(A)) is amended by striking “and 220,” and inserting “220, and 220A.”

(3) TERMINATION.—Section 605(a) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8785(a)) is amended by inserting “220A,” after “220.”

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 220 the following:

“Sec. 220A. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain transactions in foreign currencies.”

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to transactions entered into on or after May 22, 2013.

SEC. 215. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle B of title II of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human

Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 225. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN.

“(a) AUTHORIZATION OF SANCTIONS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in this section, the President may impose sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) on a foreign person that the President determines has, on or after the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, knowingly conducted or facilitated a significant financial transaction with the Central Bank of Iran or other Iranian financial institution that has been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, for—

“(A) the purchase of goods or services by a person in Iran or on behalf of a person in Iran; or

“(B) the purchase of goods or services from a person in Iran or on behalf of a person in Iran.

“(2) EXCEPTION.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The authority to impose sanctions under paragraph (1) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions relating to the importation of goods.

“(B) GOOD.—In this paragraph, the term ‘good’ has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).

“(3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the imposition of sanctions with respect to a financial transaction for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran under section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648).

“(b) EXCEPTION FOR OVERALL REDUCTIONS OF EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM IRAN.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized not to impose sanctions under subsection (a) on a foreign person if the President determines and submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a determination of the President that the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign person has, during the time period described in paragraph (2), significantly reduced the value and volume of imports and exports of goods (other than petroleum or petroleum products) and services between such country and Iran.

“(2) TIME PERIOD DESCRIBED.—The time period referred to in paragraph (1) is the 60-day period ending on the date on which the President makes the determination under paragraph (1) as compared to the immediately preceding 60-day period.

“(c) EXCEPTION FOR SALES OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, FOOD, MEDICINE AND MEDICAL DEVICES.—The President may not impose sanctions under subsection (a) on a foreign person with respect to a transaction for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine or medical devices to Iran.

“(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘foreign person’ has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

“(2) IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘Iranian financial institution’ has the meaning given that term in section 104A(d) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513b(d)).”

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 224 the following:

“Sec. 225. Sanctions with respect to certain transactions with Iran.”

Subtitle C—Other Matters

SEC. 221. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN AND OTHER IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

(a) EXCEPTION TO APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS.—Section 1245(d)(4)(D)(i)(I) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648; 22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(D)(i)(I)) is amended—

(1) by striking “reduced reduced” and inserting “reduced”;

(2) by inserting “value and” before “volume”;

(3) by inserting “or of Iranian origin” after “from Iran”; and

(4) by adding at the end before the semicolon the following: “, and the President certifies in writing to Congress that the President has based such determination on accurate information on that country’s total purchases of crude oil from Iran or of Iranian origin”.

(b) FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS DESCRIBED.—Section 1245(d)(4)(D)(ii)(II) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648) is amended—

(1) by striking “(II)” and inserting “(II)(aa)”;

(2) in item (aa) (as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”;

(3) by adding at the end the following new item:

“(bb) the foreign financial institution holding the account described in item (aa) does not knowingly facilitate any significant financial transfers for, with, or on behalf of the Government of Iran, unless the transaction is excepted from sanctions under paragraph (2) or is a transaction described in subclause (I) and item (aa).”

(c) STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRUDE OIL PURCHASES FROM IRAN OR OF IRANIAN ORIGIN.—

(1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to seek to ensure that countries that have received an exception under subparagraph (D)(i)(I) of section 1245(d)(4) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648) shall reduce their crude oil purchases from Iran or of Iranian origin so that the aggregate amount of such purchases is reduced by not less than an average of 1,000,000 barrels of crude oil per day by the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date of submission of the strategy described in subparagraph (E)(ii) of such section (as added by paragraph (2) of this subsection).

(2) AMENDMENT.—Section 1245(d)(4) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(E) STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRUDE OIL PURCHASES FROM IRAN OR OF IRANIAN ORIGIN.—

“(i) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, the President shall make a determination, based on the information contained in the most recent report required under subparagraph (A), of whether each country that received an exception under subparagraph (D)(i)(I) before such date of enactment is able to reduce its crude oil purchases from Iran or of Iranian origin so that the aggregate amount of such

purchases is reduced by not less than an average of 1,000,000 barrels of crude oil per day by the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date of submission of the strategy described in clause (ii). If the President makes an initial determination under this clause that the requirements of this clause cannot be met, then the President shall continue to make a determination under this clause every 90 days thereafter as to whether or not the requirements of this clause can be met.

“(ii) STRATEGY.—If the President determines that the requirements of clause (i) can be met, then not later than 60 days after the date of such affirmative determination, the President shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy to seek to ensure that the requirements of clause (i) are met by the end of the 1-year period beginning on such date of submission.

“(iii) FUTURE EXCEPTIONS.—

“(I) AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATION.—If the President determines that the strategy described in clause (ii) was achieved, then each country described in clause (i) shall be eligible to receive one or more further exceptions under subparagraph (D)(i)(I) in accordance with the provisions of such subparagraph.

“(II) NEGATIVE DETERMINATION.—Except as provided in subclause (III), if the President determines that the strategy described in clause (ii) was not achieved, then each country described in clause (i) shall be ineligible to receive any further exception under subparagraph (D)(i)(I) in accordance with the provisions of such subparagraph.

“(III) EXCEPTION.—

“(aa) IN GENERAL.—Subclause (II) shall not apply with respect to a country described in clause (i) if the country—

“(AA) dramatically reduced its crude oil purchases from Iran or of Iranian origin during the 1-year period described in clause (ii); and

“(BB) has committed itself to continue to reduce its crude oil purchases from Iran or of Iranian origin to a de minimis level.

“(bb) DATA.—The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees all data used to make a determination under item (aa) not later than 15 days before issuing an exception under item (aa).

“(iv) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this subparagraph, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

“(I) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

“(II) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.”

(d) DEFINITION OF CRUDE OIL.—Section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(D)) is amended by adding at the end the following new clause:

“(iii) CRUDE OIL.—In this subparagraph, the term ‘crude oil’ includes unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum gases, distillate fuel oil, and residual fuel oil.”

(e) WAIVER.—Section 1245(d)(5)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(5)(A)) is amended by striking “in the national” and inserting “vital to the national”.

(f) DEFINITIONS OF “SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION”.—Section 1245(h)(3) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(h)(3)) is amended—

(1) by striking “price or volume” and inserting “price and volume”; and

(2) by adding at the end before the period the following: “and at least a pro rata amount totaling, in the aggregate, not less than an average of 1,000,000 barrels of crude oil per day by the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date of submission of the

strategy described in subsection (d)(4)(E)(ii)”.

(g) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section take effect beginning on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 222. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PORTS, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES, FREE ECONOMIC ZONES, AND STRATEGIC SECTORS OF IRAN.

(a) FINDINGS.—Subsection (a)(1) of section 1244 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8803) is amended by striking “and shipbuilding” and inserting “shipbuilding, automotive, construction, engineering, or mining”.

(b) DESIGNATION OF PORTS, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES, FREE ECONOMIC ZONES, AND ENTITIES IN STRATEGIC SECTORS AS ENTITIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN.—Subsection (b) of such section is amended—

(1) in the subsection heading, by striking “AND ENTITIES IN THE ENERGY, SHIPPING, AND SHIPBUILDING SECTORS” and inserting “, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES, FREE ECONOMIC ZONES, AND ENTITIES IN STRATEGIC SECTORS”; and

(2) by striking “and entities in the energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors” and inserting “, entities that operate special economic zones or free economic zones, and entities in strategic sectors (as defined in subsection (c)(4))”.

(c) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY OF PORTS, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES, FREE ECONOMIC ZONES, AND ENTITIES IN STRATEGIC SECTORS.—Subsection (c) of such section is amended—

(1) in the subsection heading, by striking “ENTITIES IN ENERGY, SHIPPING, AND SHIPBUILDING SECTORS” and inserting “PORTS, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES, FREE ECONOMIC ZONES, AND ENTITIES IN STRATEGIC SECTORS”; and

(2) in paragraph (2)—
(A) by striking “the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors” each place it appears and inserting “a strategic sector (as defined in paragraph (4)(A))”; and

(B) by inserting “, special economic zone, or free economic zone” after “port” each place it appears; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

“(4) STRATEGIC SECTOR DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘strategic sector’ means—

“(A) the energy, shipping, shipbuilding, automotive, or mining sector of Iran; and

“(B) the construction or engineering sector of Iran if the President determines and reports to Congress not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013 that the construction or engineering sector of Iran, as the case may be, is of strategic importance to Iran.

“(5) NOTIFICATION AND REPORT RELATING TO STRATEGIC SECTORS.—

“(A) NOTIFICATION.—The President shall submit to Congress a notification of the designation of a sector as a strategic sector of Iran for purposes of paragraph (4)(C) not later than 30 days after the date on which the President makes such designation.

“(B) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress a notification of the designation of a sector as a strategic sector of Iran under subparagraph (A), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to Congress a report that contains—

“(i) a review and comment on such designation; and

“(ii) recommendations regarding the designation of additional sectors as strategic sectors of Iran for purposes of paragraph (4).”

(d) ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC SECTORS.—Subsection (d) of such section is amended—

(1) in the subsection heading, by striking “THE ENERGY, SHIPPING, AND SHIPBUILDING SECTORS” and inserting “STRATEGIC SECTORS”; and

(2) in paragraph (3), by striking “the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors” and inserting “a strategic sector (as defined in subsection (c)(4)(A))”.

(e) EXCEPTION FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION.—Subsection (f) of such section is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting “for a period of not more than 1 year, and may renew that exception for additional periods of not more than 1 year” after “economic development for Afghanistan”;

(2) in paragraph (1)—

(A) by striking “to the extent that” and inserting “if”;

(B) by striking “or the renewal of the exception, as the case may be,” after “such an exception”; and

(C) by striking “in the national interest” and inserting “in the national security interest”; and

(3) in paragraph (2)—

(A) by inserting “or the renewal of the exception, as the case may be,” before “not later than 15 days”; and

(B) by inserting at the end before the period the following: “or the renewal of the exception”.

(f) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Such section is further amended in the section heading by striking “THE ENERGY, SHIPPING, AND SHIPBUILDING SECTORS” and inserting “PORTS, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES, FREE ECONOMIC ZONES, AND STRATEGIC SECTORS”.

(g) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section—

(1) take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2)(A) with respect to subsection (c) of section 1244 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, as so amended, apply with respect to all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person described in subsection (c)(2) of such section that occur on or after the date that is 180 days after such date of enactment; and

(B)(i) with respect to subsection (d)(1) of section 1244 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, apply with respect to the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of goods or services described in subsection (d)(3) of such section, as so amended, that occurs on or after the date that is 180 days after such date of enactment; and

(ii) with respect to subsection (d)(2) of section 1244 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, apply with respect to the conduct or facilitation of a significant financial transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of goods or services described in subsection (d)(3) of such section, as so amended, that occurs on or after the date that is 180 days after such date of enactment.

SEC. 223. REPORT ON DETERMINATIONS NOT TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY SELL, SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER PRECIOUS METALS TO OR FROM IRAN.

Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8804) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (i); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new subsection:

“(h) REPORT ON DETERMINATIONS NOT TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY SELL, SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER PRECIOUS METALS TO OR FROM IRAN.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on each determination of the President during the preceding 90-day period not to impose sanctions under subsection (a) or (c) with respect to a person who allegedly sells, supplies, or transfers precious metals, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, together with the reasons for such determination.

“(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, if necessary.”.

SEC. 224. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT FACILITATE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS ON BEHALF OF PERSONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS.

Section 1247 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8806) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection:

“(F) PERSONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose sanctions described in subsection (a) with respect to a foreign financial institution, including but not limited to a foreign central bank, that the President determines has, on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, knowingly facilitated a significant financial transaction on behalf of any person determined by the President to be directly owned or controlled by an Iranian person included on the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury (other than an Iranian financial institution described in subsection (b)).

“(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President routinely should determine on or after the date of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013 those persons that are directly or indirectly owned or controlled by an Iranian person included on the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury (other than an Iranian financial institution described in subsection (b)).

“(3) CONSIDERATION OF DATA FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.—The President shall consider credible data already obtained by other countries and nongovernmental organizations in making determinations described in paragraph (1).”.

SEC. 225. REPEAL OF EXEMPTIONS UNDER SANCTIONS PROVISIONS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013.

Subtitle D of title XII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in section 1244—

(A) in subsection (c)(1)—

(i) by striking “(1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—” and all that follows through “On and after” and inserting “(1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—On and after”; and

(ii) by striking subparagraph (B); and

(B) in subsection (d)(1)—

(i) by striking “(1) SALE, SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER OF CERTAIN GOODS AND SERVICES.—” and all that follows through “Except as provided” and inserting “(1) SALE, SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER OF CERTAIN GOODS AND SERVICES.—Except as provided”; and

(ii) by striking subparagraph (B);

(2) in section 1245(a)—

(A) by striking “(a) SALE, SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER OF CERTAIN MATERIALS.—” and all that follows through “The President” and inserting “(a) SALE, SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER OF CERTAIN MATERIALS.—The President”;

(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively (and by redesignating all subunits therein accordingly);

(C) in paragraph (3)(B) (as redesignated by subparagraph (B) of this paragraph)—

(i) in clause (i), by striking “subclause (I) of clause (i)” and inserting “clause (i) of subparagraph (A)”;

(ii) in clause (ii), by striking “subclause (II) of that clause” and inserting “clause (ii) of that subparagraph”; and

(iii) in clause (iii), by striking “subclause (III) of that clause” and inserting “clause (iii) of that subparagraph”; and

(D) by striking “(2) EXCEPTION.—” and all that follows through “paragraph (1).”; and

(3) in section 1246(a)—

(A) by striking “(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—” and all that follows through “Except as provided” and inserting “(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Except as provided”;

(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively (and by redesignating all subunits therein accordingly); and

(C) by striking “(2) EXCEPTION.—” and all that follows through “paragraph (1).”; and

SEC. 226. TERMINATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS WITH PERSONS WHO SELL GOODS, SERVICES, OR TECHNOLOGY TO, OR CONDUCT ANY OTHER TRANSACTION WITH, IRAN.

(a) MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal Acquisition Regulation shall be revised to require a certification from each person that is a prospective contractor that the person, and any person under common ownership or control with the person, does not sell goods, services, or technology to, or conduct any other transaction with, Iran for which sanctions may be imposed under this Act.

(b) REMEDIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If the head of an executive agency determines that a person has submitted a false certification under subsection (a) on or after the date on which the applicable revision of the Federal Acquisition Regulation required by this section becomes effective, the head of that executive agency shall terminate a contract with such person or debar or suspend such person from eligibility for Federal contracts for a period of not less than 2 years. Any such debarment or suspension shall be subject to the procedures that apply to debarment and suspension under the Federal Acquisition Regulation under subpart 9.4 of part 9 of title 48, Code of Federal Regulations.

(2) INCLUSION ON LIST OF PARTIES EXCLUDED FROM FEDERAL PROCUREMENT AND NON-PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS.—The Administrator of General Services shall include on the List of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs maintained by the Administrator under part 9 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation each person that is debarred, suspended, or proposed for debarment or suspension by the head of an executive agency on the basis of a determination of a false certification under paragraph (1).

(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—This section shall not be construed to limit the use of other remedies available to the head of an executive agency or any other official of the Federal Government on the basis of a determination of a false certification under subsection (a).

(d) WAIVERS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may on a case-by-case basis waive the requirement that a person make a certification under subsection (a) if the President determines and certifies in writing to the congressional committees described in paragraph (2) that it is essential to the national security interests of the United States to do so.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DESCRIBED.—The congressional committees referred to in paragraph (1) are—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) EXECUTIVE AGENCY.—The term “executive agency” has the meaning given that term in section 133 of title 41, United States Code.

(2) FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.—The term “Federal Acquisition Regulation” means the regulation issued pursuant to section 1303(a)(1) of title 41, United States Code.

(f) APPLICABILITY.—The revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation required under subsection (a) shall apply with respect to contracts for which solicitations are issued on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 227. CONDITIONS FOR ENTRY AND OPERATION OF VESSELS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Ports and Waters Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1221 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 16. PROHIBITION ON ENTRY AND OPERATION.

“(a) PROHIBITION.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—No foreign vessel described in subsection (b) shall enter or operate in the navigable waters of the United States or transfer cargo in any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States.

“(2) LIMITATION ON APPLICATION.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a vessel described in subsection (b)(2) on and after any date on which the Secretary of State determines that the vessel is no longer registered as described in that subsection. The Secretary of State shall publish a notice of each such determination in the Federal Register.

“(b) VESSELS DESCRIBED.—A vessel referred to in subsection (a) is a foreign vessel for which a Notice of Arrival is required to be filed under section 160 of title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date of enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and that—

“(1) is on a list of vessels published in Federal Register under subsection (c)(2); or

“(2) more than 180 days after the publication of such a list, is registered, pursuant to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (13 U.S.T. 2312; TIAS 5200; 450 UNTS 82), by a government the agents or instrumentalities of which are maintaining a registration of a vessel that is included in such list.

“(c) INFORMATION AND PUBLICATION.—The Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall—

“(1) maintain timely information on registrations of all foreign vessels over 300 gross tons that are—

“(A) owned or operated by or on behalf of—

“(i) the National Iran Tanker Company or the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line; or

“(ii) any successor to an entity referred to in clause (i); or

“(B) otherwise owned or operated by or on behalf of Iran; and

“(2) publish in the Federal Register a list of vessels described in paragraph (1), including periodic updates of such list.

“(d) NOTIFICATION OF GOVERNMENTS.—The Secretary of State shall notify each government the agents or instrumentalities of which are maintaining a registration of a foreign vessel that is included on the list published under subsection (c)(2), that all vessels registered under such government's authority are subject to the prohibition under subsection (a) if more than 180 days after such publication the government continues to maintain a registration for a vessel that is included on the list published under subsection (c)(2).

“(e) NOTIFICATION OF VESSELS.—Upon receiving a Notice of Arrival under section 160 of title 33, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013) from a vessel described in (b), the Secretary shall notify the master of such vessel that the vessel may not enter or operate in the navigable waters of the United States or transfer cargo in any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States, unless—

“(1) the Secretary has made a determination described in subsection (a)(2); or

“(2) the Secretary allows provisional entry of the vessel, or transfer of cargo from the vessel, under subsection (f).

“(f) PROVISIONAL ENTRY OR CARGO TRANSFER.—Notwithstanding subsection (e), the Secretary may allow provisional entry of, or transfer of cargo from, a foreign vessel described in subsection (b), if such entry or transfer is necessary for the safety of the vessel or persons aboard.

“(g) RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE.—This section shall not be construed as authority to restrict the right of innocent passage as recognized under international law.

“(h) FOREIGN VESSEL DEFINED.—In this section the term ‘foreign vessel’ has the meaning given that term in section 110 of title 46, United States Code.”

(b) DEADLINE FOR PUBLICATION.—The Secretary shall publish a list under section 16(c)(2) of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, as amended by this section, by not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

(1) Section 13(e) of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1232(e)) is amended by striking “section 9” and inserting “sections 9 and 16”.

(2) Section 4(b)(2) of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1223(b)(2)) is amended by striking “section 9” and inserting “section 9 or 16”.

TITLE III—ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT CENSORSHIP ACTIVITIES IN IRAN

SEC. 301. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN BROADCASTING.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a report on the following:

(1) The current status of availability of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) on international satellites, entities that facilitate its operation by providing services or equipment, and the technical means that it engages in jamming.

(2) The instances, since January 1, 2012, in which the IRIB engaged in activities that violated Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including broadcasting forced confessions and hate speech against minorities.

(3) The instances, since January 1, 2012, in which international broadcasting programs originating from the United States and Eu-

rope have been subject to disruption in Iran, with relevant details such as which programs were disrupted, available location information on the origin of the disruption, and the extent of the disruption.

(b) COORDINATION.—In developing the report required by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies.

(c) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—All unclassified portions of the report required by subsection (a) shall be made publicly available on the Internet web site of the Department of State.

SEC. 302. LIST OF PERSONS WHO ARE HIGH-RISK RE-EXPORTERS OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of Commerce, in conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall make publicly available and update as appropriate a list of persons who are high-risk re-exporters of sensitive technologies in order to seek to ensure that the Government of Iran or an entity owned or controlled by that Government is unable to obtain sensitive technologies through the re-export of such sensitive technologies by third-party intermediaries.

(b) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “sensitive technology” has the meaning given that term in section 106 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8515).

SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PROVISION OF INTERCEPT TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) those that provide intercept technologies that limit freedom of speech or expression to the Government of Iran should be held accountable for the repression of the Iranian people; and

(2) no person should use an existing contract with the Government of Iran as a justification to continue to supply intercept technologies to the Government of Iran for purposes of restricting the free flow of information.

SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN IRAN.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Department of State should encourage the free flow of information in Iran to counter the Government of Iran's repression of its own people; and

(2) in order to facilitate the free flow of information in Iran, the Department of State should promote the availability of certain consumer communication technologies to Iranian civil society and the Iranian people.

SEC. 305. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF REQUESTS FOR AUTHORIZATION OF TRANSFER OF GOODS AND SERVICES TO IRAN TO FACILITATE THE ABILITY OF IRANIAN PERSONS TO FREELY COMMUNICATE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 413 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8753) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection:

“(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The expedited process for the consideration of complete requests for authorization to engage in the activities described in subsection (a) shall be construed to also apply to the transfer of goods and services to Iran to facilitate the ability of Iranian persons to freely communicate, obtain information, and access the

Internet and other communications systems.”

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subsection (a) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to requests described in section 413 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, as so amended, that are submitted to the Office of Foreign Assets Control on or after such date of enactment.

TITLE IV—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 401. NATIONAL STRATEGY ON IRAN.

(a) NATIONAL STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The President shall develop a strategy, to be known as the “National Strategy on Iran”, that provides strategic guidance for activities that support the objective of addressing the threats posed by Iran.

(b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act or January 30, 2014, whichever occurs first, and every January 30 thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the National Strategy on Iran required under subsection (a).

(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (b) shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(1) A description of Iran's grand strategy and security strategy, including strategic objectives, and the security posture and objectives of Iran.

(2) A description of the United States strategy to—

(A) address and counter the capabilities of Iran's conventional forces and Iran's unconventional forces;

(B) disrupt and deny Iranian efforts to develop or augment capabilities related to nuclear, unconventional, and missile forces development;

(C) address the Government of Iran's economic strategy to enable the objectives described in this subsection;

(D) exploit key vulnerabilities; and

(E) combat Iranian efforts to suppress Internet freedom, including actions of the United States to—

(i) work to promote expanded Internet access for democracy activists in Iran;

(ii) add a public diplomacy page to the United States' virtual embassy in Iran; and

(iii) leverage multilateral organizations committed to Internet connectivity in Iran.

(3) An implementation plan for the United States strategy described in paragraph (2).

(d) FORM.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 402. REPORT ON IRANIAN NUCLEAR AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the following:

(1) An estimate of the timeline for Iranian capabilities to develop nuclear weapons, including—

(A) an estimate of the period of time it would take Iran to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single implosion-type nuclear weapon, taking into account all known relevant technical data;

(B) an estimate of the period of time it would take Iran to produce sufficient separated plutonium for a single nuclear weapon;

(C) a description of the assumptions underlying the estimates referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B), and any information about developments that might alter or otherwise affect those assumptions;

(D) an estimate of the date by which the periods of time referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) will be less than 45 days; and

(E) a description of any efforts by the United States to increase the frequency of inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency of nuclear facilities in Iran.

(2) An assessment of Iranian strategy and capabilities relating to development of nuclear weapons, including—

(A) a summary and analysis of current nuclear weapons capabilities;

(B) an estimate of the amount and sources of funding expended by, and an analysis of procurement networks utilized by, Iran to develop its nuclear weapons capabilities;

(C) a summary of the capabilities of Iran's unconventional weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise missile forces;

(D) a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran's unconventional weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise missile forces as delivery systems for a nuclear device;

(E) a description of all efforts of Iran to design and develop a nuclear weapon, including efforts to design or fit warheads, and any other possible military dimensions of the nuclear program of Iran; and

(F) an analysis of the procurement network, including the amount and sources of funding expended by Iran on programs to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

(3) Projected economic effects of international sanctions on Iran, including—

(A) an estimate of the capital accounts, current accounts, and amounts of foreign exchange reserves (including access to foreign exchange reserves) of the Government of Iran, and other leading indicators of the status of the economy of Iran;

(B) an estimate of timelines with respect to macroeconomic viability of Iran, including the time by which the Government of Iran will exhaust its foreign exchange reserves;

(C) an estimate of the date by which the reserves of the Central Bank of Iran will be insufficient for the Government of Iran to avoid a severe balance of payments crisis that prevents it from maintaining a functioning economy, including—

(i) the inflation rate, exchange rates, unemployment rate, and budget deficits in Iran; and

(ii) other leading macroeconomic indicators used by the International Monetary Fund, professional rating agencies, and other credible sources to assess the economic health of a country;

(D) a description of the assumptions underlying the estimate referred to in paragraph (3) and an indication of how changes in each of those assumptions could affect the estimate;

(E) an assessment of the effect of sanctions imposed with respect to Iran on moving forward the date referred to in subparagraph (C); and

(F) a description of actions taken by the Government of Iran to delay the date referred to in subparagraph (C).

(b) UPDATE.—The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an

update of the report required by subsection (a) every 60 days after the date of submission of the report that includes any pertinent developments to Iranian nuclear or economic capabilities.

(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) and the update required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.—The term “nuclear explosive device” means any device, whether assembled or disassembled, that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

SEC. 403. REPORT ON PLAUSIBILITY OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS ON IRANIAN OIL.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the following:

(1) Whether petroleum and petroleum products originating in and exported from Iran are refined and sold outside of Iran.

(2) Whether products that contain Iranian-origin petroleum or petroleum products as part of their contents are imported into the United States and, if any such products are imported into the United States, whether such importation violates the ban on importation into the United States of Iranian-origin petroleum or petroleum products.

(3) Whether it is feasible to ban the importation into the United States of products described in paragraph (2), regardless of whether the ban on importation into the United States of Iranian-origin petroleum or petroleum products applies to such products.

(b) BASIS OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) may be based on publicly-available information and classified information. The information that is not classified information shall be made publically available.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

SEC. 404. GAO REPORT ON IRANIAN STRATEGY TO EVADE CURRENT SANCTIONS AND OTHER MATTERS.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to Congress a report that—

(1) evaluates the strategy of the Government of Iran to evade current economic and financial sanctions; and

(2) specifically evaluates the ability of Iran to successfully diversify its economy beyond

its energy sector, thereby lessening the impact and effectiveness of economic and financial sanctions.

SEC. 405. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS REQUIRED UNDER IRAN SANCTIONS LAWS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Any or all reports required to be submitted to Congress under the provisions of law described in subsection (c) that are subject to a deadline for submission consisting of the same unit of time may be consolidated into a single report that is submitted to Congress pursuant to such deadline.

(b) EXCEPTION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to the initial report of any report described in subsection (a).

(c) PROVISIONS OF LAW DESCRIBED.—The provisions of law referred to in this section are the following:

(1) This Act and the amendments made by this Act.

(2) The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.).

(3) The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.).

(4) The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.).

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and applies with respect to reports required to be submitted to Congress under the provisions of law described in subsection (c) on or after such date of enactment.

SEC. 406. AMENDMENTS TO DEFINITIONS UNDER IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012.

(a) IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.—Section 14(4)(B) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking “may include, in the discretion of the President” and inserting “includes”.

(b) IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012.—Section 211 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(f) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ includes the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.”.

SEC. 407. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall be construed to apply with respect to—

(1) any activity relating to a project described in subsection (a) of section 603 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8783) to which the exception under that section applies at the time of the activity; or

(2) any authorized intelligence activity of the United States.

SEC. 408. IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.

(a) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this Act and the amendments made by this Act.

(b) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this Act or any amendment made by this Act or regulations prescribed under this Act to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in

section 206(a) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(a)).

SEC. 409. SEVERABILITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is found to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, or the application of that provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE UNDER SECTION 214.—If subsection (d) of section 214 is found to be unconstitutional in accordance with subsection (a), the amendments made by such section 214 take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to transactions entered into on or after such date of enactment.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition to the motion.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from New York opposed to the motion?

Mr. ENGLE. I am not opposed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) and the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. ELLISON) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL) one-half of my time and that he be allowed to control that time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from New York will control 10 minutes.

There was no objection.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, there is no higher national security priority than preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. Foreign Affairs Ranking Member ENGEL and I have worked closely in a bipartisan way to bring this legislation to the floor, and we do it with unanimous support of the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, all Democrats and all Republicans on that committee. Indeed, 375 Members of the House are co-sponsors of this legislation. That's the broad recognition that exists right now, that more needs to be done to stop Iran's nuclear program, which is a danger not only to us in the United States, but certainly to the region and to the world.

Today, we act with that sense of urgency, urgency because Iran's march to nuclear weapons continues. In less than 2 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency has told us that they have doubled in Iran the installed cen-

trifuges at the facilities at Natanz and Fordo. They've doubled those from 8,500 to more than 15,700 centrifuges. And these new centrifuges, many of them are five times more powerful. They spin much faster than those earlier models.

A key facility is buried deep below a mountain, and Iran continues to stone-wall the IAEA on its development of nuclear explosive devices. So Iran's intent to develop this weapons capability is very evident.

New President in Iran or not, I am convinced that Iran's supreme leader intends to continue on this path because that is what he says he intends to do; that is, unless sanctions bite to the point where the regime has to make a choice between compromise on its nuclear weapons program or the consequences of the sanctions on the regime.

That is why this legislation dramatically steps up the pressure on the regime in Iran:

It targets the energy sector by compelling countries that are currently purchasing oil from Iran to reduce their collective total by 1 million barrels per day within a year;

It targets additional sectors of Iran's economy;

It further denies the regime access to foreign currency reserves;

It effectively targets Iran's efforts to circumvent international sanctions against the shipping sector in the country;

Equally important, this legislation increases sanctions against Iranian human rights abusers, making clear that it's the Iranian people that we are siding with.

Only when the Iranian leadership truly feels a choice between maintaining power and obtaining the bomb does our diplomacy have a chance to succeed. And we know the Iran regime's view of the world, we know it only too well because its support of keeping the brutal Assad regime in power is self-evident. It has resupplied Hezbollah with 25,000 new rockets, which target Israel.

In recent years, there have been Iranian-sponsored attacks or plots uncovered by the Europeans in Bulgaria, also in India, Thailand, in Georgia, in Azerbaijan, in Cyprus, in Kenya, and even here in Washington, D.C. I'd hate to see an Iran emboldened by a nuclear weapon, but that is the course we are on unless we dramatically step up the pressure. So let's pass this bill.

I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.

Hon. ED ROYCE,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN ROYCE, I am writing with respect to H.R. 850, the "Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013," which the Committee on Foreign Affairs ordered reported favorably on May 22, 2013. As a result of your hav-

ing consulted with us on provisions in H.R. 850 that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary, and your agreement to support mutually-agreeable changes to the legislation, I agree to discharge our Committee from further consideration of this bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor for consideration.

The Judiciary Committee takes this action with our mutual understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 850 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that our Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as the bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may address any remaining issues in our jurisdiction. Our Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this or similar legislation, and asks that you support any such request.

I would appreciate a response to this letter confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 850, and would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the Congressional Record during Floor consideration of H.R. 850.

Sincerely,

BOB GOODLATTE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.

Hon. BOB GOODLATTE,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and for your agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on the Judiciary so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House Floor. I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding regarding your Committee's continuing Rule X legislative jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, and my support for your Committee's participation in any conference committee that may be named to consider this bill.

I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important legislation for Floor consideration.

Sincerely,

EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.

Hon. DARRELL E. ISSA,
Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and for your agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House Floor. I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding regarding your Committee's continuing Rule X legislative jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, and my support for your Committee's participation in any conference committee that may be named to consider this bill.

I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important legislation for Floor consideration.

Sincerely,

EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.

Hon. EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing concerning H.R. 850, the "Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013," which your Committee reported on May 22, 2013.

H.R. 850 contains provisions within the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's Rule X jurisdiction. As a result of your having consulted with the Committee and in order to expedite this bill for floor consideration, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will forego action on the bill. This is being done on the basis of our mutual understanding that doing so will in no way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform with respect to the appointment of conferees, or to any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matters contained in the bill or similar legislation.

I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming this understanding, and would request that you include a copy of this letter and your response in the Committee Report and in the Congressional Record during the floor consideration of this bill. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

DARRELL ISSA,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES,
Washington, DC, July 30, 2013.

Hon. Hon. EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN ROYCE: On May 22, 2013, the Committee on Foreign Affairs ordered H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, as amended, to be reported favorably to the House. As a result of your having consulted with the Committee on Financial Services concerning provisions of the bill that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction, I agree to discharge our committee from further consideration of the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House Floor.

The Committee on Financial Services takes this action with our mutual understanding that, by foregoing consideration of H.R. 850, as amended, at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that our committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as the bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may address any remaining issues that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction. Our committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this or similar legislation, and requests your support for any such request.

Finally, I appreciate your July 26 letter confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 850, as amended, and would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in your committee's report to accompany the legislation and/or in the Congressional Record during floor consideration thereof.

Sincerely,

JEB HENSARLING,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.

Hon. JEB HENSARLING,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran

Prevention Act of 2013, and for your agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on Financial Services so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House Floor. I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding regarding your Committee's continuing Rule X legislative jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, and my support for your Committee's participation in any conference committee that may be named to consider this bill.

I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important legislation for Floor consideration. Sincerely,

EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.

Hon. EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN ROYCE: I am writing regarding H.R. 850, the "Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013," which was favorably reported out of your Committee on May 22, 2013. I commend you on your efforts to make sure that the United States is better able to address the critical threats that Iran poses.

I appreciate that in response to the concerns raised by the Committee on Ways & Means, you have agreed to modify sections 102, 201, 214, 215, and 222 of H.R. 850 as reported out of your Committee. As a result, in order to expedite floor consideration of the bill, the Committee on Ways and Means will forego action on H.R. 850. Further, the Committee will not oppose the bill's consideration on the suspension calendar, based on our understanding that you will work with us as the legislative process moves forward to ensure that our concerns in the sections indicated above as well as other provisions in the Committee's jurisdiction continue to be addressed. This is also being done with the understanding that it does not in any way prejudice the Committee with respect to the appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation.

I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 850, and would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the Congressional Record during Floor consideration.

Sincerely,
DAVE CAMP,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.

Hon. DAVE CAMP,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and for your agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on Ways and Means so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House Floor. I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding regarding your Committee's continuing Rule X legislative jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, and my support for your Committee's participation in any conference committee that may be named to consider this bill.

I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important legislation for Floor consideration. Sincerely,

EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, July 9, 2013.

Hon. BILL SHUSTER,
Chairman, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your consultation with the Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and your agreement to forgo a sequential referral of that bill. I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding regarding your Committee's continuing Rule X legislative jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, and my support for your Committee's participation in any conference committee that may be named to consider that bill.

I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important legislation for floor consideration. Sincerely,

EDWARD R. ROYCE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
Washington, DC, June 26, 2013.

Hon. ED ROYCE,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I write concerning H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, as ordered reported. There are certain provisions in the legislation that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

As a result of your having consulted with the Committee and in order to expedite this legislation for floor consideration, the Committee will not assert a jurisdictional claim over this bill by seeking a sequential referral. However, this is conditional on our mutual understanding and agreement that doing so does not in any way alter or diminish the jurisdiction of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure with respect to the appointment of conferees or to any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matters contained in the bill or similar legislation. I request you urge the Speaker to name members of the Committee to any conference committee named to consider such provisions.

Please, place a copy of this letter and your response acknowledging our jurisdictional interest into the committee report on H.R. 850 and into the Congressional Record during consideration of the measure on the House floor.

Sincerely,
BILL SHUSTER,
Chairman.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

My colleagues come here today proposing this new, intensified legislation on the basis that they would like to stop Iran from having a nuclear weapon. So do we.

□ 1700

Everything that my colleague, Mr. ROYCE, detailed a moment ago is something that we are concerned about.

But we have a changed circumstance, a changed circumstance that this legislation does not acknowledge, and that is that the Iranian people had a choice between candidates, and they selected the candidate who decided to reject extremism and actually campaign on the basis of moderation. Why not? At least until Mr. Rouhani has a chance to forestall legislation like this and engage in

diplomacy to reach the goals that Mr. ROYCE has identified.

Mr. Rouhani ran on a policy of promise to pursue a path of moderation. He promised to pursue a “policy of reconciliation and peace.” Obviously, we don’t have rose-colored glasses. We don’t know. But why don’t we wait and see. Why aren’t we at least curious to find out whether or not President Rouhani means that he wants to pursue this course of peace. It is what we want—negotiated settlement. Why are we slapping his hand down when apparently the Iranian people are willing to support a candidate who is willing to extend a hand?

The New York Times agrees. It said:

While sanctions are an important element of American strategy, piling on more at this time and this moment could harm, rather than advance, the chances for a negotiated deal with Iran.

In fact, Secretary of State John Kerry warned that additional sanctions at this moment might undermine diplomatic efforts.

The fact of the matter is, why do we want to strengthen the hand of extremists who will say to Rouhani, See, you thought you could work with them. We were right all along.

I say they’re wrong. I say let’s accept the olive branch extended by the Iranian people who selected a more moderate candidate.

In fact, I would like to submit this document into the RECORD. The headline reads:

Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s Nominee for Foreign Minister, Seen as Olive Branch to United States.

Let me also acknowledge and put into the RECORD this letter, dated July 19, by 130 Members of Congress on a bipartisan basis to say President Obama pursued negotiations in this window of time when we have a President who won on the basis of extending a hand for negotiation.

We don’t have to do this now. We can do this when we come back after at least Mr. Rouhani is inaugurated into the presidency of Iran.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time, and I do have a number of speakers, when we’re ready for that.

[From HuffPost World, July 31, 2013]

MOHAMMAD JAVAD ZARIF, IRAN’S NOMINEE FOR FOREIGN MINISTER, SEEN AS OLIVE BRANCH TO UNITED STATES

(By Marcus George and Paul Taylor)

DUBAI/PARIS, July 29, 2013 (Reuters).—If Iranian President-elect Hassan Rouhani wanted to signal his determination to rebuild relations with the United States and strike a “grand bargain,” he could hardly do better than pick Mohammad Javad Zarif as his foreign minister.

Iranian news agencies reported on Monday that Zarif, a former ambassador to the United Nations and Tehran’s leading connoisseur of the U.S. political elite, is set to be in the cabinet Rouhani will announce after taking office on Sunday. A source close to Rouhani confirmed Zarif will be nominated as foreign minister.

A fluent English speaker who earned his doctorate at the University of Denver, Zarif has been at the centre of several secret nego-

tiations to try to overcome 35 years of estrangement between Washington and Tehran, diplomats said.

Those talks failed because of deep mistrust on a range of disputes from Iran’s secretive nuclear programme and support for anti-Israeli militants to U.S. sanctions and hopes of engineering “regime change” in Tehran.

Zarif’s elevation, however, suggests the moderate new president is keen to make another try at breaking the deadlock.

“He was always trying to do what was possible to improve relations in a very intelligent, open and clear way,” said a senior Western diplomat who had repeated dealings with Zarif.

“This is someone who knows the United States very well and with all the frustrations of the past is still someone they know in Washington,” he said.

The usual caveats about Iran apply: under the Islamic Republic’s complex institutional set-up, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calls the shots in foreign and security policy and controls the nuclear programme, which Western powers say is aimed at developing atomic weapons.

The foreign minister ranks roughly fourth in the foreign policy pecking order, after Khamenei, the head of the National Security Council, who also serves as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, and the president.

Nevertheless, assuming he is confirmed by Iran’s prickly, conservative-dominated parliament, Zarif’s appointment would be a strong gesture of positive intent towards the United States.

The two countries have had no official ties since 1980 after Iranian students occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking 52 diplomats hostage in protest against Washington’s admission of the former Shah after he was toppled by the Islamic revolution.

CONTACT BOOK

Zarif’s Washington contact book includes Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel and a who’s who of U.S. national security officials on both sides of the aisle.

The soft-spoken career diplomat resigned from the nuclear negotiating team after hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005.

In 2007, he returned from New York after five years as Iran’s permanent representative to the United Nations and found himself out of favour as his country turned its back on the notion of seeking better ties with the West and Ahmadinejad sidelined English-speaking diplomats.

Since then, Zarif has been in a holding pattern, nominally senior adviser to the foreign minister from 2007 to 2010, then from 2011 international director of Islamic Azad University, a network of educational institutions established by ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, his political patron.

Rafsanjani, who is also Rouhani’s mentor, has long favoured a pragmatic rapprochement with the United States, but Khamenei has stamped on all such efforts since he succeeded the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in 1989.

Dennis Ross, a veteran U.S. diplomat who served as President Barack Obama’s top Middle East adviser until 2011, said Zarif had shown a willingness to negotiate in good faith and his appointment would be seen in Washington and Europe as an indication that Rouhani wants to “do business” with the West.

But he cautioned that the question remained whether this would translate into an easing of Tehran’s resistance to curbing its nuclear drive. “Zarif is not someone who does favours for the United States,” Ross said. “He fits the category of a sign or signal

until you see Iran actually doing something.”

Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President George H.W. Bush, described Zarif as “reasonable” but said much would depend on how much leeway he is given.

Western diplomats said Zarif was a central negotiator in the last major effort to negotiate a “grand bargain” between Tehran and Washington that began after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States and foundered in mid-2003.

U.S. newspapers published in 2007 the bare text of a draft agreement, put together in secret talks in Paris, Geneva and New York, that would have established negotiations between the two countries on all outstanding issues.

While the draft fell short of an agreement on substance, it noted both sides’ expectations on issues such as assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme has no military capability, and assurances that the United States would act against anti-government People’s Mujahideen activists based in Iraq.

“The texts are authentic,” said a Western diplomat who was involved in the back-channel talks, confirming that Khamenei had given the green light for negotiations to go ahead.

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATOR

Years earlier, as a junior diplomat Zarif was involved in negotiations to win the release of U.S. hostages held by pro-Iranian gunmen in Lebanon, according to the memoirs of former U.N. envoy Giandomenico Picco. Even though the United States did not make a promised reciprocal goodwill gesture at the time, Zarif remained committed to improving ties.

In Washington, Trita Parsi, president of the pro-dialogue National Iranian American Council, said Zarif has been involved in multiple U.S.-Iranian negotiations, including talks on Afghanistan after the U.S.-led 2001 invasion, and Tehran’s 2003 proposal for a “grand bargain” with the United States.

“Based on my interviews with him, (Zarif) was involved in the drafting of it,” Parsi said of that offer of a comprehensive new start, which then President George W. Bush’s administration spurned.

Veteran U.S. diplomat James Dobbins, the U.S. point man at a 2001 Bonn conference that formed a new Afghan government after the overthrow of the Taliban, credited Zarif with a pivotal, positive role in the diplomacy—and with a sense of humour.

Dobbins—now the State Department’s special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan—recalled in 2007 testimony to the U.S. Congress how Zarif, then a deputy foreign minister, persuaded the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance to drop its demand for control of an outsize proportion of Afghan ministries.

The Northern Alliance delegate “remained obdurate. Finally, Zarif took him aside and whispered to him for a few moments, following which the Northern Alliance envoy returned to the table and said: ‘Okay, I agree. The other factions can have two more ministries. And we can create three more, which they can also have.’ We had a deal,” Dobbins recalled.

“Zarif had achieved the final breakthrough without which the (Hamid) Karzai government might never have been formed.”

[From the New York Times, July 26, 2013]

IRAN IS SAID TO WANT DIRECT TALKS WITH U.S. ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM

(By Michael R. Gordon)

WASHINGTON.—Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq told the Obama administration this month that Iran was interested in direct talks with the United States on Iran’s

nuclear program, and said that Iraq was prepared to facilitate the negotiations, Western officials said Thursday.

In a meeting in early July with the American ambassador in Baghdad, Mr. Maliki suggested that he was relaying a message from Iranian officials and asserted that Hassan Rouhani, Iran's incoming president, would be serious about any discussions with the United States, according to accounts of the meeting.

Although Mr. Maliki indicated that he had been in touch with confidants of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, he did not disclose precisely whom he was dealing with on the Iranian side. Some Western officials remain uncertain whether Iran's leaders have sought to use Iraq as a conduit or whether the idea is mainly Mr. Maliki's initiative.

State Department officials declined to comment on Mr. Maliki's move or what steps the United States might have taken in response. American officials have said since the beginning of the Obama administration that they would be open to direct talks with Iran.

"Iraq is a partner of the United States and we are in regular conversations with Iraqi officials about a full range of issues of mutual interest, including Iran," said Patrick Ventrell, a State Department spokesman. "As we have repeatedly said, we are open to direct talks with Iran in order to resolve the international community's concerns about Iran's nuclear program."

Gary Samore, who served as the senior aide on nonproliferation issues at the National Security Council during President Obama's first term in office, said that it was plausible that Iran would use Iraq to send a message about its willingness to discuss nuclear issues.

"The Iranians see Maliki as somebody they have some trust in," said Mr. Samore, who is the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. "From Maliki's standpoint, it would serve a number of different purposes. He does not want to be squeezed between Washington and Tehran."

In a separate move on Thursday, the State and Treasury Departments announced that the United States was expanding the list of medical devices, like dialysis machines, that could be sold to Iran without a license.

In a conference call with reporters, David Cohen, the under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said that the move was intended to "accelerate trade" in these medical devices and address humanitarian needs in Iran. The announcement was also seen by many observers as a good-will gesture before Mr. Rouhani prepares to take office in Tehran on Aug. 4.

Direct talks have the potential to ratchet down some of the pressure on President Obama over one of his greatest foreign policy challenges, the buildup of Iran's nuclear program.

Mr. Obama has said that he will not permit Iran to have a nuclear weapon and has asserted that the use of military force is an option. Israeli officials have staked out a far tougher position, asserting that Iran should not be allowed to have the ability to build a weapon—and that the United States should do more to convince the Iranians that its threat to use force is credible. Israel has not ruled out military action of its own.

International sanctions have taken a serious toll on the Iranian economy and have helped bring Iran to the negotiating table, but have not yet extracted significant concessions from Iran on its nuclear program. For years, the United States and its partners—Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China—have met on and off with Iranian officials in a dialogue that has become known as the "P5 plus 1" talks.

Nonproliferation experts continue to argue that it is difficult to make major headway in such a committee-like forum, and that if progress is to be made, it will have to happen in private one-on-one discussions between Iranian officials and the Obama administration.

Whether Iran is genuinely interested in such talks, however, has been a subject of debate. In 2009, William J. Burns, then the under secretary of state for political affairs, met with Saeed Jalili, the Iranian nuclear negotiator, on the margins of the "P5 plus 1" talks. They agreed in principle that a portion of Iran's enriched uranium could be used to make fuel for Tehran's research center, which would preclude that material from being further enriched to make nuclear weapons.

But that deal fell through after Ayatollah Khamenei objected, and there have been no direct talks since. In a meeting this month with Iran's departing president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Khamenei was sharply critical of the American stance.

"The Americans are unreliable and illogical, and are not honest in their approach," Ayatollah Khamenei said. But he also said that he did not oppose talks "on certain issues."

Even if direct talks are agreed to they are almost certain to be tough.

"The establishment of a bilateral channel is a necessary but not sufficient condition for coming to an agreement," Mr. Samore said. "They want a nuclear weapons capability, and we want to deny them a nuclear weapons capability. Finding a compromise between those two objectives is going to be very difficult."

Mr. Maliki, Western officials said, is not the only Iraqi politician who has encouraged a dialogue between the United States and Iran. Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of a major Shiite party in Iraq, is also said to have made that point.

During the war in Iraq, Iraqi officials also urged direct dealings between the United States and Iran.

Talks were held in Baghdad, but they were focused on the conflict in Iraq and Iran's support for Shiite militias there—not the nuclear question—and got nowhere.

Mr. Maliki's government appears to have been aligned with Iran on some issues, like its support for President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. Iranian aircraft have ferried huge quantities of arms through Iraqi airspace. Iraqi officials have asserted that they do not have the means to stop the flights, but Mr. Maliki has also been concerned that Mr. Assad's fall will lead to an escalation of Sunni challenges to his government in Iraq.

American officials have repeatedly said that Mr. Maliki is not a pawn of Iran and that the United States should try to expand its influence in Iraq, including by selling arms.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, DC, July 19, 2013.

President BARACK OBAMA,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR PRESIDENT OBAMA: As Members of Congress who share your unequivocal commitment to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, we urge you to pursue the potential opportunity presented by Iran's recent presidential election by reinvigorating U.S. efforts to secure a negotiated nuclear agreement.

As you know, on June 14 the Iranian people elected Hassan Rouhani president with over 50 percent of the vote in the first round, overcoming repression and intimidation by the Iranian government to cast their ballots in favor of reform. Dr. Rouhani campaigned

on the promise to "pursue a policy of reconciliation and peace" and has since promised "constructive interaction with the outside world." As Iran's former lead nuclear negotiator, he has also publicly expressed the view that obtaining a nuclear weapon would run counter to Iran's strategic interests and has been critical of the nuclear "extremism" of outgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

We are mindful of the limitations of the Iranian presidency within the country's political system, of the fact that previous Iranian presidents elected on platforms of moderation have failed to deliver on promised reforms, and of the mixed signals that Dr. Rouhani himself has sent regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions. It remains to be seen whether his election will indeed bring significant change with regard to Iran's relations with the outside world. His government's actions will certainly speak louder than his words.

Even so, we believe it would be a mistake not to test whether Dr. Rouhani's election represents a real opportunity for progress toward a verifiable, enforceable agreement on Iran's nuclear program that ensures the country does not acquire a nuclear weapon. In order to test this proposition, it will be prudent for the United States to utilize all diplomatic tools to reinvigorate ongoing nuclear talks. In addition, bilateral and multilateral sanctions must be calibrated in such a way that they induce significant and verifiable concessions from Iran at the negotiating table in exchange for their potential relaxation.

We must also be careful not to preempt this potential opportunity by engaging in actions that delegitimize the newly elected president and weaken his standing relative to hardliners within the regime who oppose his professed "policy of reconciliation and peace." Likewise, it will be critical for the United States to continue its efforts to foster unprecedented international cooperation on this issue so that the international community remains united in its opposition to Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon.

We look forward to working with your Administration on this important issue in the months ahead.

Sincerely,

CHARLES DENT,
DAVID PRICE,
Members of Congress.

LIST OF COSIGNERS (131)

Dent, Charles (PA-15); Price, David (NC-04); Barber, Ron (AZ-02); Bass, Karen (CA-37); Becerra, Xavier (CA-34); Bera, Ami (CA-07); Bishop, Sanford (GA-02); Bishop, Tim (NY-01); Blumenauer, Earl (OR-03); Bonamici, Suzanne (OR-01); Bordallo, Madeleine (GU); Braley, Bruce (IA-01); Bustos, Cheri (IL-17); Campbell, John (CA-45); Capps, Lois (CA-24); Capuano, Michael (MA-07); Cárdenas, Tony (CA-29); Carson, André (IN-07); Cartwright, Matthew (PA-17); Christensen, Donna (VI); Clay, William Lacy (MO-01); Cleaver, Emanuel (MO-05); Clyburn, James (SC-06); Coble, Howard (NC-06); Cohen, Steve (TN-09); Cole, Tom (OK-04); Connolly, Gerald (VA-11); Conyers, John (MI-13); Courtney, Joe (CT-02); Cuellar, Henry (TX-28).

Cummings, Elijah (MD-07); Davis, Danny (IL-07); DeFazio, Peter (OR-04); DeGette, Diana (CO-01); DeLauro, Rosa (CT-03); DelBene, Susan (WA-01); Dingell, John (MI-12); Doggett, Lloyd (TX-35); Doyle, Michael (PA-14); Duckworth, Tammy (IL-08); Duffy, Sean (WI-07); Duncan, Jr., John (TN-02); Edwards, Donna (MD-04); Ellison, Keith (MN-05); Enyart, William (IL-12).

Eshoo, Anna (CA-18); Esty, Elizabeth (CT-05); Farr, Sam (CA-20); Fattah, Chaka (PA-02); Fitzpatrick, Michael (PA-08); Fortenberry, Jeff (NE-01); Foster, Bill (IL-11);

Garamendi, John (CA-03); Grijalva, Raúl (AZ-03); Grimm, Michael (NY-11); Gutiérrez, Luis (IL-04); Hanna, Richard (NY-22); Hastings, Alcee (FL-20); Heck, Denny (WA-10); Higgins, Brian (NY-26).

Himes, James (CT-04); Holt, Rush (NJ-12); Honda, Michael (CA-17); Jackson Lee, Sheila (TX-18); Johnson, Eddie B. (TX-30); Johnson, Hank (GA-04); Jones, Walter (NC-03); Kaptur, Marcy (OH-09); Kelly, Robin (IL-02); Kind, Ron (WI-03); Kuster, Ann (NH-02); Larsen, Rick (WA-02); Larson, John (CT-01); Lee, Barbara (CA-13); Lewis, John (GA-05).

Loebbeck, David (IA-02); Lofgren, Zoe (CA-19); Lujan, Ben Ray (NM-03); Lujan Grisham, Michelle (NM-01); Matheson, Jim (UT-04); McCollum, Betty (MN-04); McDermott, Jim (WA-07); McGovern, James P. (MA-02); Meeks, Gregory W. (NY-05); Miller, George (CA-11); Moore, Gwen (WI-04); Moran, James P. (VA-08); Napolitano, Grace F. (CA-32); Neal, Richard E. (MA-01); Nolan, Richard (MN-08).

Norton, Eleanor Holmes (DC); Nugent, Richard B. (FL-11); O'Rourke, Beto (TX-16); Pascrell, Bill, Jr. (NJ-09); Pastor, Ed (AZ-07); Payne, Donald M., Jr. (NJ-10); Perlmutter, Ed (CO-07); Peters, Scott H. (CA-52); Peterson, Collin C. (MN-07); Petri, Thomas E. (WI-06); Pingree, Chellie (ME-01); Pocan, Mark (WI-02); Polis, Jared (CO-02); Rahall, Nick J., II (WV-03); Rangel, Charles B. (NY-13).

Roybal-Allard, Lucille (CA-40); Ruiz, Raul (CA-36); Runyan, Jon (NJ-03); Rush, Bobby L. (IL-01); Ryan, Tim (OH-13); Sablan, Gregorio Kilili Camacho (MP); Schakowsky, Janice D. (IL-09); Scott, Robert C. "Bobby" (VA-03); Serrano, José E. (NY-15); Shea-Porter, Carol (NH-01); Sinema, Kyrsten (AZ-09); Slaughter, Louise McIntosh (NY-25).

Speier, Jackie (CA-14); Takano, Mark (CA-41); Thompson, Glenn (PA-05); Thompson, Mike (CA-05); Tiberi, Patrick (OH-12); Tierney, John (MA-06); Tonko, Paul (NY-20); Tsongas, Niki (MA-03); Visclosky, Peter (IN-01); Walz, Timothy (MN-01); Waters, Maxine (CA-43); Welch, Peter (VT-At Large); Whitfield, Ed (KY-01); Yarmuth, John (KY-03).

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

I rise in strong support of H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013.

It's been a pleasure working with Chairman ROYCE to craft this bipartisan legislation, which, by the way, passed unanimously in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Every Republican, every Democrat voted "yes" on this. It now has more than 370 cosponsors. We share the goal of preventing a nuclear-capable Iran, and I could not ask for a better partner than Mr. ROYCE in this effort.

Mr. Speaker, I think all of us agree that a nuclear-capable Iran would pose a grave threat to the U.S., a threat to our allies in the region, and a threat to the future of the global nonproliferation regime. All of us are aware that Iran has violated numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions and repeatedly blocked IAEA inspectors seeking to investigate its nuclear program.

After many years of deceit and stonewalling by the Iranian regime, I continue to hold out hope that we can achieve a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis through diplomatic means. But time is growing short. According to the IAEA, Iran is installing advanced centrifuges to enrich more uranium and continues to

build a heavy water reactor that could produce plutonium.

We must not allow the Iranians to play the same old game, engaging in endless negotiations with no results while continuing to advance the nuclear program. That's why we must continue to pursue a two-track approach to Iran, one that incorporates both pressure and negotiations.

The legislation before us today will significantly ratchet up the pressure and hopefully give our diplomats the leverage they need to persuade Iran that its only viable option is to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Among other things, this bill seeks to cut Iran's oil exports by another 1 million barrels a day, a reduction of two-thirds from current levels. It also strengthens existing sanctions by authorizing the President to restrict significant commercial trade with Iran.

In addition, the bill seeks to deny the Iranian regime hard currency by enhancing efforts to cut off Iran's access to euros.

Finally, the legislation imposes new sanctions against Iranian shipping ports and expands existing sanctions against Iranian human rights violators.

Mr. Speaker, some of my colleagues argue that we should delay sanctions until after the new President of Iran takes office. I respectfully disagree. I know they share the goal of preventing a nuclear-capable Iran, but I believe we should take a different approach.

Our efforts to impose new sanctions should not be based on the Iranian political calendar. In my view, the paramount consideration should be the Iranian nuclear clock, the nuclear calendar, the amount of time it will take Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.

I have no reason to believe that the results of the recent Iranian election will fundamentally alter Iran's current course. The unelected supreme leader, the Ayatollah, remains the one true decision-maker at the pinnacle of the regime. And president-elect Rouhani, who was directly involved in efforts to deceive the international community when he served as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, made clear during the campaign that he supports Iran's nuclear ambitions.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself an additional 30 seconds.

If Rouhani truly has the willing authority to make a bold gesture on Iran's nuclear program, like suspending enrichment, he has a small window of opportunity before this bill becomes law. I think all of us would welcome such a gesture, but I'm not holding my breath.

In closing, I would like to reiterate that by strengthening sanctions we are not calling for an end of diplomacy. After many years of fruitless negotiations, it is clear that talks will only succeed if the regime feels pressure to

change course. That is what we are trying to accomplish with this legislation today.

I look forward to working with Chairman ROYCE to ensure that the strongest possible sanctions are enacted into law, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. PRICE).

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant opposition to this measure before us today.

I have supported the repeated rounds of sanctions that Congress has already enacted. I have supported them because of the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and because of the intransigence of the Iranian Government in defiance of the international community.

These sanctions have brought the Iranian economy to its knees, they have yet to produce meaningful concessions by the Iranian Government. I have thus remained open to the possibility of additional sanctions as part of a broader strategy to induce the Iranian Government to change its course.

But the bill before us today could not come at a worse time. In 3 days, Iran will inaugurate a new President, Hassan Rouhani, elected on promises of moderation and openness despite repression and intimidation by the Iranian regime, trying to deny him that election.

Since his election, Dr. Rouhani has made repeated overtures to the international community, signaling his intent to resume the stalled P-5+1 nuclear talks upon taking office and promising greater transparency and confidence-building measures. He reportedly intends to appoint as his foreign minister a seasoned diplomat who favors closer ties with the West.

Let us be clear: we do not know whether Rouhani truly intends to follow through on these promises. We don't know if he'll be able to overcome the resistance of Iran's hardliners. We do know that history counsels us to be cautious about the prospects for meaningful change in Iran, and Rouhani's actions will surely speak louder than his words.

But to rush through a new round of sanctions before the new President has even taken office could slam the window of opportunity shut before we even have a chance to test whether it is genuine.

A recent letter to the President signed by a group of respected former diplomats and military officials—including Ambassador Tom Pickering and the former commander of CENTCOM, General Joseph Hoar—has warned that further sanctions "could empower hardliners, in the Iranian Government, who are opposed to nuclear concessions, at the expense of those seeking to shift policy in a more moderate direction."

Moreover, by removing the President's authority to relax sanctions on countries that are cooperating with

our strategy toward Iran, this bill risks shattering the unprecedented international coalition which we have worked so hard to build, thus making sanctions less effective than they are at this moment.

Some argue that we should not be concerned about the House passing this bill, since it will be some time before the Senate follows with an improved bill, and longer still before the new sanctions take effect. I must say, that is not a very compelling argument for rushing this bill to the floor right now. Why not act when we can assess the diplomatic prospects more accurately?

Mr. Speaker, I will take a back seat to no one when it comes to my concern about the threat posed by a nuclear Iran to our ally Israel, to the broader Middle East, and to the United States.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional minute to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. I will yield to no one in my concerns about these matters. I believe we must redouble our efforts to secure an enforceable agreement that ensures Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

But sanctions alone are not a strategy. In order to be effective, they must be integrated into a broader strategy that brings all other elements of American power to bear on the challenge. The administration is working hard to advance such a strategy, with unprecedented cooperation from our international partners.

If the strategy fails to induce the new Iranian Government to change its course, then new sanctions may, indeed, be warranted. But to pass them now only undercuts our Nation's strategic objectives.

I urge my colleagues to oppose this ill-timed bill.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. CANTOR), the esteemed majority leader.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act.

I want to commend the gentleman from California, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in his leadership in bringing this bill to the floor. I also would like to commend Congressman ENGEL for his leadership in working through this issue bringing forward this piece of legislation.

The authoritarian regime in Iran is a brutal theocracy that suppresses dissent at home and sponsors terrorism and chaos abroad. For years, our State Department has listed Iran as the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, and many Americans have lost their lives at the hands of Iranian-backed killers. In a bid to establish reasonable dominance, Iran foments instability in neighboring countries and is a co-belligerent in Bashar Assad's ruthless war against the Syrian people. Despite rhetoric that may lead some to

a contrary conclusion, this is the nature of a regime that continues its headlong effort to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Like all Americans, I want to see Iran abandon its nuclear aspirations through peaceful negotiations, but its leaders must understand the path they are on now will only lead to more condemnation and pressure.

Considering that Iran continues to flagrantly violate numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions that call for the suspension of its nuclear enrichment program, while denying inspectors access to suspected nuclear sites, it is clear that Iran has negotiated again and again in bad faith. America's policies must be based on facts and not some hope about a new government perhaps in Iran that somehow will change the nature of the clerical regime in Tehran. We must respond to Iran's policies and behavior, not to its rhetoric.

This act will strengthen the sanctions already in place and provide the President with new economic tools to pressure Iran to change course before it is too late.

□ 1715

Strengthening these measures will help our diplomatic efforts to encourage Tehran to become a responsible member of the international community and, once and for all, to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Again, I want to thank the gentleman from California, the gentleman from New York, and the rest of the Foreign Affairs Committee for their hard work on this issue, and I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. ELLISON. May I inquire as to the time we have remaining.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Minnesota has 12½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from New York has 6½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from California has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. ELLISON. I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. MORAN).

Mr. MORAN. I thank the gentleman from Minnesota, my friend.

Mr. Speaker, 29 prominent policymakers and experts who understand Iran and international relations, which includes former CENTCOM Commander, Ambassador Tom Pickering, stated in a letter to President Obama just 2 weeks ago: "No further sanctions should be imposed or considered at this time."

There were 131 bipartisan Representatives who also urged the President to test the opportunity presented by Iran's recent election to avoid actions that could delegitimize the democratic election that just took place in Iran, because the fact is that the Iranian people rejected the very cleric of government that we have all opposed that has been defined by hostile actions against the United States. In fact, when Mr. Rouhani was running, the

people of Iran knew he was a former nuclear negotiator, and he promised greater nuclear transparency and to pursue, in his words, peace and reconciliation with the outside world.

Isn't that just what we are looking for?

I can't imagine we are looking for another war of choice, that we want to escalate the rhetoric. This is the best opportunity we have had in at least 8 years, if not more. Why throw that away?

Now, some will say, "Well, what we do in the House doesn't really matter. The Senate isn't going to do anything," but that's a nuance. We may understand why the House is acting, but the rest of the world doesn't likely understand what's going on here.

The fact is that this bill empowers the very hard-liners who are the problem. The Iranian people are extraordinarily diverse. In fact, they used to be America's best friend in the Muslim world, and they just rejected a government that represented all of the things we oppose, and they did it democratically. I can't imagine that we have to operate in such a vacuum that we are going to continue to impose sanctions, that we are going to take away the President's ability to exercise leverage in those negotiations, and that, in fact, we are even going to lay it on further by taking away the exemption for necessary food and medicine.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ELLISON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. MORAN. This is destructive because it punishes the Iranian people and empowers the hard-liners. We have no problem with punishing the clerical government and many of the people in the military. They don't represent our values, but we want the Iranian people to seize democracy, to represent our values, to enter into negotiations. We've got to be able to bring about a more peaceful and productive world.

So I would strongly urge this House to hold off. Let the new President at least be inaugurated. Let him at least take over. Let's see what we can do. Let's not act so prematurely and destructively.

Mr. ROYCE. At this time, Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the Speaker of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BOEHNER).

Mr. BOEHNER. Let me thank my colleague from California—the chairman of the committee—and his whole committee for their hard work on this issue, and a special thanks to the chairman emeritus of the committee, my colleague from Florida (Ms. ROSELEHTINEN), on whose efforts we are building today.

I also want to thank the committee chairs and the members who have worked so hard to get this bill to the floor today.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act. This legislation recognizes a stark

truth, and that is that Iran is a global menace, and this bill empowers the President to act decisively to address it.

We know Iran is the world's most aggressive sponsor of terrorism, extending now into Syria, Libya, Lebanon, even into our hemisphere. We know that Iran is attempting to build an illicit nuclear weapons capability in willful defiance of both the U.N. Security Council and the IAEA, and we know the Supreme Leader and the Ayatollahs remain committed to the destruction of Israel, one of our dearest allies.

The United States, especially its Congress, has a duty to respond to Iran's actions, not to its rhetoric, so this bill seeks to reduce Iran's oil exports by an additional 1 million barrels a day, which would be a two-thirds reduction from its current levels. We are also looking to target human rights violators, to close loopholes on access to hard foreign currency, and we will give the President the authority to restrict significant commercial trade with Iran. These strong and targeted sanctions will ensure that the administration has both the political and the economic tools to deal with this regime.

Because the American people are not interested in allowing Iran another shot at running out the clock on negotiations while it marches toward developing a breakout of nuclear capability, I will cast my vote for this measure, and I would urge all of my House colleagues to join me.

Mr. ENGEL. It is my pleasure now to yield 1½ minutes to the minority whip, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER).

Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I rise in support of this legislation, but I also thank my friend KEITH ELLISON for his perspective on this, and I want to speak to that as well. I want to thank Chairman ROYCE and Ranking Member ENGEL for their leadership on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I believe the most dangerous threat to peace and stability in the Middle East continues to be that posed by Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, which would launch this turbulent region into a nuclear arms race that no one can afford to risk, including our troops in the region. Time and again, Security Council resolutions after Security Council resolutions, Iran has refused to heed the international community's warnings, and it has, instead, continued along a path toward the bomb, choosing isolation over integration.

We are here today to talk about how to stop Iran's pursuit. As a government, we have many tools to use. Diplomacy is one and diplomacy must continue. Indeed, many feel the time is right to test President-elect Rouhani's sincerity, and I agree, but he must expect us to turn his positive talk of a policy of reconciliation and peace into

action. We should welcome and pursue his willingness to come to the table to negotiate. We need to test that, but delay has been too long for us not to pursue concurrent approaches. That tool of economic pressure, which is working, should also be pursued additionally. That is why I support this resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I thank him for his thoughtfulness.

Hopefully, negotiations will prove successful and such pressure can be either moderated or removed. President-elect Rouhani campaigned on a promise to ease the burden of sanctions on the Iranian people, and he won. We would welcome a second victory for him and the United Nations in seeing that objective of denuclearization realized.

I support today's bill because I believe a robust sanctions regime could help encourage Iran to abandon its pursuit of the bomb and to end its support for terrorist groups and human rights abuses. President-elect Rouhani is uniquely positioned, I believe, to show leadership on this and achieve early success in his new administration.

However, our skepticism about the Iranian leadership's action in the past has been more than justified, but we must nevertheless continue to work for a resolution of this challenging issue. Engaging President-elect Rouhani in our quest for early resolution is appropriate, but these sanctions are also appropriate. Therefore, I rise in their support.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN), the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism.

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, in February, I joined with our ranking member and our chairman and others in introducing this legislation, which passed our committee unanimously.

Congress needs to act now because, while we go on summer break, new, faster centrifuges will be spinning 24–7365. We are seeing Iran, as we've seen in hearings before our committee, evade the current sanctions. So, if we're going to keep the sanctions in force, we need this legislation to plug the loopholes that they are exploiting.

Two facts remain unchanged by the Iranian elections: first, their program to create nuclear weapons continues; and second, the supreme leader, not the newly elected President, is making the decisions.

Our committee adopted many amendments unanimously, including four of mine, and two I'd like to mention: one provides sanctions for those who sell uranium mining equipment to Iran, and another imposes sanctions on

those who sell them dissident-suppressing technology.

Those who oppose this bill need to come to the floor and say why Iran needs uranium mining equipment and dissident-suppressing technology. Let's pass this bill.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. BLUMENAUER).

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you.

Mr. Speaker, we have heard on the floor that we shouldn't base our diplomacy on the Iranian political calendar—I agree—but we shouldn't base our diplomacy and our foreign policy based on our political calendar.

Recently, we enacted the most effective, crippling economic sanctions against Iran—ever—and it was done by the hard work of the administration, supported by Congress, to be able to mobilize an unprecedented coalition of people who agreed with us that they wanted to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons and sending that signal.

But sadly, you can forget about President-elect Rouhani. This weakens President Obama. The optics now are to pull the rug out from underneath the newly elected moderate candidate. He's not my guy, he's not yours, but of the choices, it was a signal by the Iranian people.

Think about the future tools. Are you really going to be able to ratchet up these sanctions much more dramatically? Do you expect China and Japan are going to follow that path? And, if they work, what about the dislocations to the American economy and the global economy in moving this oil off the market? I think people ought to consider that. Ultimately, the only solution is a diplomatic solution to try and work this through. We're not going to go to war and nuclear bomb them. We are not going to occupy Iran.

It's ironic. Until recently—maybe still—Iran is the only country in the Middle East that had a positive view of Americans despite the fact that we helped the British overthrow their popularly elected President, Mossadegh, in 1953 and install the Shah as a dictator to rule over them.

□ 1730

I think there is a possibility that that recent election makes a difference in Iran. I hope it does. But one way to guarantee that it doesn't is to tell the Iranian people, We don't care what you do. We're going to ratchet up the sanctions. We're going to undercut the new guy. We're going to tell you that we're just going to go down this path. It ought to be based on facts, on reason. Let these sanctions work. Don't undercut our President and the ability to be flexible if there is some daylight. Don't poke the Iranian people in the eye and ignore the sorry history we've had of fumbling the relationship with that country.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the Democratic leader, Ms. PELOSI.

Ms. PELOSI. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank you for the time and for your leadership as the ranking member on the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to reiterate my strong belief that one of the basic objectives of U.S. foreign policy is to build a world free of nuclear weapons. I applauded President Jimmy Carter at his inauguration in 1977 on a cold January day; I saluted President Reagan when he made his visit to Reykjavik, Iceland; and the commitment that many of our Presidents have made, including President Obama on this score.

One of the pillars of our foreign policy must be to end the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; that is, to get rid of them. To meet that task today, our actions must be clear and our commitment must be unwavering. It must be to continue this policy of the United States to prevent any country from developing a nuclear weapons capability. That is why I offer my support for this bill today, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act.

This legislation recognizes that an Iran with a nuclear weapon would be an urgent threat to regional security and to global security, and, therefore, to the security of the United States of America. This measure builds on the progress made in 2010 when we enacted the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act. That law imposed sanctions to companies that sell Iran technology, services, know-how, and materials for its energy sector. It was the strongest Iran sanctions legislation ever passed by the Congress, but we must do more.

With President Obama's strong, clear, and effective leadership, with broad bipartisan backing for a comprehensive strategy to halt Iran's nuclear program, we are seeing the results of the actions we have taken. More and more, Iran is being cut off from the financial system. Iran's oil is coming off the market. Iran's partners are cutting off ties of trade, business, and commerce. That's the way I think we should get this done, with economic sanctions.

In short, Iran is feeling the bite of our sanctions, but we must keep the pressure on. Iran's nuclear pursuits continue. Iran's leaders refuse to change their approach and their policies. Iran's neighbors still feel the threat of the regime's declarations and actions. So our message must remain firm: Iran must suspend uranium enrichment, return to the negotiating table, and abandon its reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Now I appreciate and I have listened carefully and have the highest respect for Mr. MCGOVERN and others, Mr. ELLISON, who are opposing the resolution and have a different idea. I think as we weigh the equities, as they say, with all due respect to that approach, which I think is a reasonable one if we were dealing with a reasonable country with a reasonable leadership, but we are not.

I know that the proximity to Israel is a cause for concern for Israel, our partner in the Middle East, and a concern for those of us who value the Israel-U.S. relationship. Israel has proximity, but we all have the problem. If Iran were to go farther in the development of a nuclear weapon, who else would want one in the region? What message does that send about our resolve to arrive at a world free of nuclear weapons?

Anyway, I hope, as our colleagues say, a new regime is going to do all these things. I happen to think that no matter who is in power in Iran, that they probably would not abandon a nuclear program, calling it one for domestic and civilian use. That may be true. I hope it is. But I do think it is really important for us, because we have to make this opportunity—I hope that the inauguration of a new President, talks with the U.S. and the European allies and all the rest, can bear fruit. We can only hope that those reports prove true. We hope that progress is made toward an agreement that puts an end to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and advances the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and around the world. Until that day comes, the Congress must continue to apply pressure. We must pursue all avenues of diplomacy and international leadership.

Again, what are the pillars of our foreign policy? To promote our economy, the creation of jobs by promoting exports—that's on the economic side; export our values, the commitment to freedom and democracy throughout the world. What does that mean? To protect the American people and our national security. An important part of that pillar of our foreign policy is to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction and make sure that we're not adding countries to that club. For that reason, we must prevent a nuclear armed Iran. Let's do it diplomatically. Let's do it with economic sanctions. Let's do it by encouraging dialogue, engagement, and the rest. But let's do that engagement from strength.

I urge a "yes" vote on the resolution. Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlelady from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN), the chairman emeritus of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the author of the previous Iran sanctions legislation.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, a nuclear Iran is one of our biggest national security threats and the number one existential threat to our ally, the democratic Jewish State of Israel. We cannot and must not allow Iran, who is a designated state sponsor of terrorism, to reach nuclear breakout capability.

The Obama administration should not be mistaken. The Iranian regime does not want peace. It still wants to wipe Israel off the map. Iran may be able to process low-enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by next year.

Iran has agreed to offer Syria a \$3.6 billion credit facility to buy oil prod-

ucts to help keep Assad's murderous regime afloat. Iran supports and fights alongside Assad's forces, brutally slaughtering thousands of Syrians. Rouhani has no intention of changing Iran's dangerous path, and the ultimate decisionmaker in this oppressive regime remains the Ayatollah Khamenei, who has a blatant hatred of us and our allies.

This bill includes my amendment that would eliminate the authority to waive sanctions against persons who are guilty of the most egregious activities in direct support of the Iranian regime's nuclear program.

This is a commonsense provision. This is a strong bill, and I urge all of my colleagues to fully support its passage.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MCGOVERN).

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I have great respect for Chairman ROYCE and Ranking Member ENGEL and incredible respect for my Democratic leaders and the Republican leaders who have spoken in favor of this bill. But I must rise in opposition to H.R. 850.

This Sunday on August 4, Iran will inaugurate a new President, Hassan Rouhani. It is a moment that allows President Obama, Secretary of State Kerry, Secretary of Defense Hagel, and the international community an opportunity to reengage with Iran on key issues of concern, most importantly the development of Iran's capacity to develop and launch a nuclear weapon.

This may be a very small window of opportunity for a fresh start on dialogue and action on the future of a nuclear Iran. It may be short-lived, depending on how Iran's new President views this moment. But it is a time when I, for one, want to support the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon's ability to move forward our relationship and dialogue with Iran on this most serious matter.

It is not the moment for Congress to increase and expand the level of U.S. sanctions against Iran. We have plenty of sanctions right now against Iran. If for some reason we need to increase even further the pressure against Iran and its new President, then we have the time to do so. It does not need to be done before the new Iranian President even takes office. We have time to weigh his sincerity and, more importantly, his actions to improve Iran's relations with the international community in the weeks and months to come. If he does not, if Iran remains intransigent and determined to develop a nuclear weapon, then the current onerous regimen of sanctions can be increased. But now is not the time to undermine U.S. diplomacy before it even has a chance to take shape.

Like all my House colleagues on both sides of the aisle, I'm skeptical that President-elect Rouhani will change the course of Iran's nuclear development, but I am willing to give him a chance. I'm willing to give Secretary

Kerry a chance. If nothing changes, then we can revisit this bill or others at a later date. But not now.

I urge all of my colleagues to join me and vote against the untimely consideration of this bill.

Mr. ENGEL. At this time, I yield to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. HASTINGS) for the purpose of making a unanimous consent request.

(Mr. HASTINGS of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, and I rise in support of the measure that is being offered.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, first of all, let me thank Chairman ROYCE for offering this urgent and necessary bill, and ELIOT ENGEL for his good cooperation on this important bill.

The Iranian government is estimated to be a little more than a year away from developing nuclear weapons, an unprecedented and absolutely unacceptable threat. Iran's repeated threats to annihilate Israel are unconscionable and constitute a direct and public incitement to commit genocide in violation of article III of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei speaks of Israel as a cancerous tumor, calls for the annihilation and destruction of the Jewish state, and the leveling of Tel Aviv and Haifa. These are not idle threats. President-elect Rouhani, the past master of using negotiations as a cover to move Iran's nuclear program forward, is now being presented as a moderate, yet last year referred to Israel as the "Great Zionist Satan."

Mr. Speaker, this bill dramatically ramps up sanctions pushed so effectively by Congresswoman ROSLEHTINEN last Congress not only to pressure Iran to negotiate, but also to mitigate Iran's emerging capability to launch the genocidal war against Israel it has been threatening for years.

This is a bipartisan bill, and it sends a clear, unmistakable message to Iran that we mean business. Those loopholes need to be closed, and Iran needs to be told that we want the sanctions to work. This tightens those loopholes and moves us in that direction.

□ 1745

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. MCDERMOTT)

(Mr. MCDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MCDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I am standing here asking: What's the rush? The Iranian President is being sworn in in 4 days. For the first time in years, there is a moderate who's been elected as head of Iran, who promises us

progress on the issues that are of most concern to us.

I'm not a blind optimist, and I have no illusions about the nature of Iran's Government. I understand that one election won't ensure us peace, but it could mean change, and we need to see what it looks like. Experts and former military officers, including the Commander in Chief of Central Command, warn that more sanctions right now will "undercut the new President and his pledged plan of moderation." It gives ammunition to the hardliners who will operate against him. So the timing of this bill could not be worse from a foreign policy perspective.

In addition, Members have not had a chance to fully review the bill, which is significantly different than when it was marked up coming out of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The marked-up version became public only a few days ago, and I know that many Members who cosponsored the original bill are not aware of the changes made in it. For these reasons, we sent a letter to our leadership asking, along with 15 other Members, urging them to delay consideration until after September. We could come back after our vacation and deal with this if it's really needed. It doesn't have to happen now, except because we're going out on Friday.

Passing this legislation would support the hardliners' claims that we have no intention of negotiating; we hit the President before he even sits down in the chair. It's a dangerous sign to send and it limits our ability to find a diplomatic solution on nuclear arms in Iran.

There is no public support in this country for another war. We've seen this movie before. We put sanctions on Iraq. I was here when they put them on. I saw us squeeze them for 10 years. The World Health Organization said 500,000 Iraqi kids died because we cut off medicine and food and other essentials to the Iraq community. Did it end in a change? No. We went to war with them. And if you think that this is going to squeeze and bring us to war, and you think that what happened in Iraq is going to happen here, remember we're 11 years in Iraq. And we do not have a stable democracy today. We have a government that's about to collapse.

What we think we can do by squeezing people—and you're squeezing Iranian children today. Iranians cannot buy medicine on the world market and pay because we have cut off all of the banking connections everywhere so that there's no way for them to slip money through the banking system to pay for medicine for kids.

We should delay this vote. Vote "no."

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. SCHNEIDER), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I want to thank the ranking member.

Mr. Speaker, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon through sanctions and diplomatic pressure is one of the paramount issues of our time, and I am appreciative that today we will continue this important work to contain the threat.

The bill before us seeks to expand the instruments available to the administration in implementing targeted sanctions against the Iranian Government, while at the same time providing flexibility to relieve undue burden on the population of Iran. I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member and the committee for working diligently on this bill, and I want to thank the members of the committee for joining me in support of this bill.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 30 seconds to the chairman from Texas (Mr. POE), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation.

Mr. POE of Texas. This new so-called President of Iran is no different than Ahmadinejad. Rouhani is no moderate; he's just slick. He has lied to the United States in the past. Don't be deceived; he is not even in charge of Iran.

The Ayatollah is in charge, and the Ayatollah picked all of the candidates running for president. The Ayatollah is still running the shots and is determined to get nuclear weapons and eliminate Israel and then the United States. And then what? Are we going to say, Oops, we made a mistake.

We need these sanctions. We need a regime change in Iran, a peaceful one with the Iranian people. This Ayatollah has Hezbollah running all over the world causing terror, including killing his own people in Camp Liberty. We need to pass this legislation.

Mr. ENGEL. I am pleased to yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. AL GREEN).

Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, with respect to all of my colleagues and the various positions that are being put forth, I support H.R. 850, a copy of which I happen to have in my hand; and I would point to page 38, line 11, which deals with exceptions for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices. I wanted to bring some clarity to this issue.

With global security at risk, I don't think that we can take the risk. I do believe that we can proceed with diplomacy and sanctions at the same time. I support H.R. 850.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. COTTON), who helped forge this legislation, H.R. 850.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. Speaker, Hassan Rouhani is no moderate. He was a devoted follower of the 1979 revolutionary cabal in Iran. He led the 1999 crackdown on students in Iran. He's bragged about deceiving Western nuclear inspectors. He's called Israel a Zionist Satan. He's not even a President-elect because he was chosen in a sham democracy and a sham election.

Iran isn't looking for a chance to get to "yes" in negotiations. They are looking to give you a pretext to get to "no" on this legislation. Stand strong and vote "yes" to sanction Iran to stop their nuclear weapons capabilities.

Mr. ENGEL. At this time I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DEUTCH), the ranking member of the Middle East Subcommittee.

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank Chairman ROYCE and Ranking Member ENGEL for working so hard to shepherd this bill through the House in a bipartisan way.

This legislation before us today takes a significant step forward in our efforts to prevent the Iranian regime from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. Sanctions passed by this House have had devastating effects on the Iranian economy, and this legislation will continue our efforts to financially squeeze the regime by dramatically reducing Iran's oil exports and by diminishing Iran's ability to access other currencies, all of this while ensuring that humanitarian aid will continue to flow.

Despite claims made earlier, this does not cut off medicine for children.

Beyond that, this bill recognizes that despite a somewhat surprising outcome to the June presidential elections, the Iranian people are still living under a regime that too often brutally represses democratic ideals, and it imposes sanctions on those who aid the regime's active violation of human rights.

To my friends who argue that this is the wrong time, I'd ask you to consider this: newly elected President Rouhani is scheduled to be sworn in in 4 days. He campaigned on economic sanctions relief. This relief will only come when the Ayatollah, when the supreme leader, decides to relinquish the nuclear weapons program. Now is the time to let President-elect Rouhani's actions speak louder than his words. Let him tell the supreme leader that the United States House of Representatives has passed new, devastating sanctions, and the only way to relief is through a negotiated end to the nuclear weapons program.

Our policy on Iran has always been dual track: sanctions and diplomacy. Now is not the time to give up on either.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.

We have to look at things as they really are, not as we wish them to be. To my friends who say, What's the hurry? The hurry is we don't have time to wait. While we're talking, centrifuges are spinning and Iran is getting ever closer to having a nuclear weapon. By waiting, we're only aiding and abetting them.

Mr. Rouhani is no moderate. Moderates were not allowed to run in this Iranian election. He may be the least hard-core of all the hardliners; but make no mistake about it, he was directly involved in efforts to deceive the international community when he

served as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator. And he made clear during his campaign that he supports Iran's nuclear ambitions.

This is a bipartisan bill, and for good reason we have over 370 cosponsors. I respectfully ask my colleagues to vote "yes."

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, Mr. Speaker, the centrifuges are, indeed, spinning. And it is Mr. Rouhani as chief negotiator who met the international community with delay, with more centrifuges, more missiles, more stonewalling. And as my colleagues have pointed out, during that campaign he was the hand-picked candidate of the Ayatollah, one of eight hand-picked candidates because reformers were not allowed to run, was the one on the campaign who said—who boosted—about how he, as chief negotiator in Iran, didn't suspend enrichment but instead completed the program.

This is the individual who, when he chaired Iran's National Security Council between 1989 and 2005, was at the table when Iran masterminded the 1994 bombing of the Jewish center in Buenos Aires. He is the individual who gave the order and boasted of it; the man who called on the regime's besieging militia to attack the students in 1999 and crush them, in his words, crush them mercilessly, crush them monumentally—a thousand arrested; hundreds tortured; 70 disappeared; many, many killed. This is the nature of that man. Do not misunderstand his intentions. That's why we need this legislation.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, last week The Hill published a column entitled "Don't force an irresponsible vote on Iran sanctions." The column started with the following two sentences: "The House of Representatives is under pressure to vote on a new Iran sanctions bill, H.R. 850, before members leave town for August recess. Scheduling such a vote would be irresponsible and highly counterproductive to U.S. strategy on Iran."

The authors of the column were not some peaceniks or pundits, but experts with real life experiences in military, diplomacy and fighting for a future of freedom for the people of Iran—Gen. (retired) Joseph Hoar, former Commander in Chief of United States Central Command, Col. (retired) Lawrence Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to General Colin Powell, and Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council.

Today, the House of Representatives is advancing this "irresponsible and highly counterproductive" bill to push Iran deeper into a state of isolation and push the U.S. further away from a diplomatic resolution to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Most disturbing, by severely limiting diplomatic options for the U.S. and our international partners, this bill advances the agenda of those who seek to once again push the U.S. towards military confrontation. Our nation has been down this irresponsible, dangerous and costly path before with the war in Iraq and I completely reject the idea that war with Iran is inevitable or a viable solution to this situation.

On August 3rd the new president of Iran, Dr. Hassan Rouhani, will take office. Dr. Rouhani was elected as a moderate voice who campaigned to "pursue a policy of peace and reconciliation" with the West. The new president was Iran's former lead nuclear negotiator and was critical of the nuclear "extremism" of his dangerous predecessor, President Ahmadinejad. This is the absolute best opportunity and most favorable conditions to proceed with a diplomatic course.

Just in the past month, I received over 100 calls, e-mails and letters urging me to sign a letter to President Obama calling for a renewed diplomatic effort with Iran's new leader.

On July 19th I joined 130 Democrats and Republicans in signing the letter to Mr. Obama urging him "to pursue the potential opportunity presented by Iran's recent presidential election by reinvigorating U.S. efforts to secure a negotiated nuclear agreement." Our letter goes on to say, "we believe it would be a mistake not to test whether Dr. Rouhani's election represents a real opportunity for progress toward a verifiable, enforceable agreement on Iran's nuclear program that ensures the country does not acquire a nuclear weapon. In order to test this proposition, it will be prudent for the United States to utilize all diplomatic tools to reinvigorate ongoing nuclear talks."

H.R. 850 and its extreme sanctions takes the opposite course. It sends the signal that the U.S. wishes to punish the Iranian people and will only settle for submission, rather than a negotiated, face saving solution that meets the security needs of the United States, Israel, and the entire international community and the economic needs of the Iranian people. This bill is a blunt instrument that harms U.S. interests, undercuts President Obama, and gives no hope to the millions of Iranians who look to the U.S. as a beacon of freedom and inspiration.

Clearly there are no guarantees that diplomacy will work in the near term and preventing a nuclear-armed Iran is an absolute. So, advancing H.R. 850 and tougher sanctions can proceed at anytime in the months ahead if Iran rejects negotiations or refuses to take tangible, verifiable steps towards an agreement. The House could vote on this bill in October or November, giving President Obama, our international partners, and the new Iranian leadership a legitimate window of time to seek peaceful progress.

This bill has 375 co-sponsors so there is absolute certainty that this bill will pass and then Congress can go on its August recess. This bill will not move in the U.S. Senate in the days ahead so nothing will be accomplished by the passage of H.R. 850 other than some chest pounding by politicians, the imposition of an embarrassing obstacle to U.S. diplomats, and a victory for the hardliners in Iran who reject negotiations as much as hardliners in this country.

Today, at this moment in time, this is a bill that harms U.S. interests and I will vote against it.

Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express concern about the decision to bring H.R. 850 to the floor for a vote today. We must act strongly and strategically to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, and I believe diplomatic negotiations are currently the best possible means at our disposal for achieving this goal.

Unfortunately, I am concerned that voting on H.R. 850 now may undermine efforts to

achieve a peaceful, negotiated elimination of Iranian nuclear capacity. At a time when a new Iranian President-elect has made statements indicating a greater openness to diplomacy, returning this message with a vote on tougher sanctions only serves to empower Iranian hardliners and weaken Iranian moderates.

U.S. policy must make it clear that the goal of sanctions on Iran is to elicit verifiable concessions from Iran that have a material impact on its ability to develop a nuclear weapon. In order to achieve this goal, the President must have the ability to waive sanctions in exchange for Iranian concessions. Yet H.R. 850 places significant restrictions on the President's authority to waive sanctions.

Mr. Speaker, while we must maintain a credible military threat towards Iran, we must also make every effort to promote the success of diplomatic negotiations with Iran. If we fail to negotiate a solution that ensures the safety of the U.S. and our close ally Israel by verifying that Iran does not have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons, we will be left with few alternatives but military engagement. I urge my colleagues to come together and support tough but fair diplomacy with Iran.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 850, which provides our diplomats the leverage they need to persuade Iran that the only viable course of action is to suspend work on its nuclear program.

The bill restricts oil exports from Iran and cuts off various Iranian industries from the global marketplace. It also expands sanctions on Iranian human rights violators. Lastly, this bill provides flexibility for the President to not apply sanctions when he deems it appropriate.

There is adequate time to test the willingness and ability of President Rouhani to pursue good faith talks and reach an acceptable resolution. That said, complete inaction could signal indifference or a weakening of our resolve to pro-nuclear forces in Iran. Incoming President Rouhani and the other regime leaders must be made to understand that U.S. economic pressure and other sanctions will remain in force until there is a reliable and verifiable halt to Iran's nuclear program. Given Iran's progress in nuclear enrichment, time is of the essence and Iran's past delaying tactics cannot be allowed to continue.

As an original cosponsor of H.R. 850, I urge my colleagues to send a strong, unequivocal message to the Iranian regime.

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I am a co-sponsor of this legislation and I urge my colleagues to support it today.

It is clear that the current regime in Iran poses troubling security challenges to the world community and our allies in the Middle East. The hateful and threatening comments made by the President of Iran against Israel cannot be tolerated. Further, the provocative actions taken by Iran to further their nuclear weapons program must be stopped. A nuclear Iran would destabilize the region and threaten the United States and our allies. Iran must alter its dangerous course, and the United States needs to be fully involved to help bring this about.

I continue to support the Obama Administration's actions to seek a diplomatic solution to Iran's unnecessary and unwise pursuit of nuclear weapons. It is unacceptable for Iran to possess nuclear weapons. However, despite having imposed some of the most stringent

sanctions on Iran ever, the United States and our international partners have thus far been unable to compel Iran to abandon its quest for a nuclear weapon. Accordingly, the House has no choice but to pass H.R. 850.

This bill would designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization, impose sanctions on specific Iranian officials (i.e., the Supreme Leader, Guardians Council, MOIS, Quds Force, etc.), and tie additional sanctions to human rights abuses. I regret that the failure of Iran's government to change its course makes this bill necessary, as many ordinary Iranians have already suffered much as a result of the existing sanctions. We all want to see the people of Iran freed from the tyranny and oppression of the current clerical regime, but above all our greatest obligation is to prevent Iran from building and fielding nuclear weapons. This bill, if enacted into law, will hopefully bring us one step closer to that goal.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I, along with the Gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. COTTON, recognize that this critical legislation requires countries still purchasing oil from Iran to reduce their combined imports by 1 million barrels per day within a year. Iran's energy sector provides the regime the resources needed to fund its nuclear weapons program. We remain extremely concerned with the pace of Iran's nuclear program. Some estimate that Iran may achieve a nuclear weapons breakout capability next year.

For this reason, we remain committed to sending the toughest possible sanctions bill to the President's desk, as quickly as possible.

Mr. GINGREY of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 850—the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013. As a cosponsor of this important legislation, I would like to commend the bipartisan leadership of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman ROYCE of California and Ranking Member ENGEL of New York on this issue.

Mr. Speaker, it goes without saying that our strongest ally in the Middle East is the State of Israel. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to provide them with our unwavering support. In order to uphold this commitment, we must stop Iran's nuclear proliferation efforts. That is why I am pleased that from the outset of this legislation, the statement of policy is absolutely clear when it states, "It shall be the policy of the United States to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability."

Congress took an important step during 2012 to implement economic sanctions on Iran through the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. This important legislation punishes individuals who knowingly sell more than 1,000,000 barrels of refined product, or individuals that sell, lease, or provide Iran with goods, services, technology, or information.

However, despite this effort, Iran's nuclear program has continued to grow. It was reported today that Iran has an additional 5,000 new centrifuges are ready to start operation to complement the existing 12,000 already in place. This comes on the heels of the International Atomic Energy Agency's statement in June that Tehran was violating international regulations by increasing the number of centrifuges. This continued growth in Iran's nuclear proliferation is simply unacceptable.

Mr. Speaker, while we took a critical first step in the 112th Congress, it is abundantly

clear that further action is needed to curtail Iran's nuclear program. H.R. 850 today will only expand sanctions targeting Iran's human rights violations, and—for the first time—allow the President of the United States to impose sanctions on any entity that maintains significant commercial ties to Iran. H.R. 850 hits Iran where it hurts the most. By strengthening existing sanctions on 1,000,000 barrels of crude per day, this bill essentially takes money away from the Iranian regime that it would potentially use on the nuclear program.

Once again, this legislation will show our strong support of Israel and its ability to remain a beacon of democracy in the Middle East. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 850.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 850, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the yeas have it.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, proceedings will resume on motions to suspend the rules previously postponed.

Votes will be taken in the following order:

H.R. 1911, by the yeas and nays;

H.R. 850, by the yeas and nays;

The first electronic vote will be conducted as a 15-minute vote. The second electronic vote will be conducted as a 5-minute vote.

BIPARTISAN STUDENT LOAN CERTAINTY ACT OF 2013

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The unfinished business is the vote on the motion to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 1911) to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to establish interest rates for new loans made on or after July 1, 2013, to direct the Secretary of Education to convene the Advisory Committee on Improving Postsecondary Education Data to conduct a study on improvements to postsecondary education transparency at the Federal level, and for other purposes, on which the yeas and nays were ordered.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. KLINE) that the House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 392, nays 31, not voting 10, as follows: