Ralph Hall will be greatly missed in this Congress. I am privileged to call him a colleague and a friend. I would like to wish him Godspeed and all the best as he continues to recover from a recent car accident at home in Rockwall. I look forward to seeing what he accomplishes in the next chapter of his long and storied life.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.

SSCI STUDY OF THE CIA’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I listened with interest to the tremendous statement made by the Senator from California, Mrs. Feinstein, earlier today. She has spoken of this issue on other occasions, and we Americans should listen.

More than a decade ago the Central Intelligence Agency began detaining and torturing human beings in the name of the war on terrorism. Then employees and contractors of the U.S. Government, paid for by our taxpayers’ dollars, were happy to take American people and strip them of their basic humanity. But more than stripping them of their basic humanity, they stripped America of its standing in the world as the leader of promoting and protecting human rights. Instead of protecting us as Americans, by their actions they hurt all Americans.

President Obama banned torture and cruel treatment when he took office, but only now, because of the courage and conviction of Senator Feinstein and the other members of the Intelligence Committee and their staffs, do we have a full and public accounting of the CIA’s actions—an accounting the American people deserve.

The decision to release this historic report, as Senator Feinstein has courageously said, has been difficult, but it was the right and moral thing to do. If something is right and something is moral, no matter how difficult it is, you should do it. Releasing the report demonstrates that America—the America I love—is different. As Americans, we cannot sweep our mistakes under the rug and pretend they did not happen. We have to acknowledge our mistakes. We have to learn from our mistakes. In this case, we as Americans must and will do everything we can to ensure that our government never tortures again.

Five years ago, in 2009, I called for a commission of inquiry to review the Bush administration’s detention and interrogation program and other sweeping claims of executive power by the Bush administration. I believe that in order to restore America’s moral leadership, we have to acknowledge what went wrong in our name. Much of the leadership we can show around the world is not based on our wealth or on the power of our military but on our moral leadership. Our Nation needed back then a full accounting of the CIA’s treatment of detainees, and we need it today. With this report, at long last we have it.

This is not the first report to record or critique the CIA’s interrogation policies and practices that were used during the last administration, but it is the first to fully chronicle the actions of the most secretive of our government agencies, the Central Intelligence Agency. The final report is sure to be a shock to those who have worked for their program. That truth is far worse and it is far more brutal than most Americans ever imagined.

We have all seen the shocking pictures from Abu Ghraib. We have read the cold, clinical description of “harsh” or “enhanced” techniques written by Department of Justice attorneys to justify such treatment. We know that what was done at Abu Ghraib terribly diminished the image of the United States throughout the world. It did not make us safer by one iota. In fact, many would argue it made us less safe.

The report makes clear one fundamental truth: The CIA tortured people. That is an inescapable, irrefutable, and dramatic description or legal obfuscation or petitifogery can hide that fact any longer. The Intelligence Committee report shows that techniques such as waterboarding and sleep deprivation were more frequent and cruel and harmful than previously known. It shows that gross mismanagement by those in charge at the CIA and a shocking indifference to human dignity led to horrendous treatment and conditions of confinement that went far beyond even what they had been approving. It turns out that the senior CIA leadership did not even know that “enhanced” techniques were being used at one CIA detention facility. In fact, in one instance, one of their prisoners died as a result, left shackled on a concrete floor in a dungeon room, and likely died of hypothermia.

This is America? This is what we stand for? This is the image we want to give the rest of the world? This American does not think so. This American does not think so. It is not what brought my grandparents and great-grandparents to this country.

These so-called “enhanced” interrogation techniques were not just used on the worst of the worst either. In some instances, the CIA did not even know whom it was holding. CIA records show that at least 26 people detained by the CIA did not meet the CIA’s own standard for detention. Some of these individuals were subjected to—and this is a wonderful slogan—“enhanced” techniques. What an evil slogan. Some detainees were determined not even to be members of Al Qaeda.

Moreover, the CIA relied on contractors—not even CIA personnel but contractors—who had no experience as interrogators to develop this program. They were happy to take American taxpayers’ money. They did not know what they were doing, but they said: Give us the money. Eventually the CIA outsourced all aspects of the program to the company these contractors set up. Did they make a few thousand dollars? No. They made $90 million. This program has cost us $100 million. It is yet another reason why Congress has to exercise its oversight responsibility.

The report also disproves CIA claims that torture programs were necessary to protect our Nation, and that they thwarted attacks. How many times have we heard it before—that we need this to protect us; we need this to protect us from another 9/11? We had all of the evidence we needed to stop 9/11, but the government had not even bothered to translate some of the material that our intelligence people had already obtained. After the fact, they decided: We should really translate some of that material. Then we found out it could have been stopped.

Torture did not make us safer. As laid out in meticulous detail in the report, the use of these techniques did not generate uniquely valuable intelligence. In fact, the report thoroughly repudiates each of the most commonly cited claims of tortured and terrorists captured. That should not come as a surprise.

The Senate Judiciary Committee held numerous hearings on the Bush administration’s interrogation policies and practices. What we heard is that the program thwarted attacks and saved lives. They defend the CIA’s action. They argue that the report does not tell the full story. But these are often the same people who participated in the rampant misrepresentations of the CIA’s action. They argue that the report does not tell the full story. But these are often the same people who participated in the rampant misrepresentations of the CIA’s action. They argue that the report does not tell the full story. But these are often the same people who participated in the rampant misrepresentations of the CIA’s action.

The report shows that CIA officials consistently misled virtually everyone outside the Agency about what was actually going on and about the results of the CIA interrogations—very similar to what we heard leading up to the war in Iraq after 9/11. I remember being in those hearings. I remember listening to the then-Vice President. I remember listening to others in those secret hearings and thinking: It does not ring true. I stated to others that I thought some of the things they were telling us did not ring true.

I remember walking early one morning with my wife near our home and two joggers coming up, calling us by name. They were some heartland folks I had never seen before in the neighborhood.

One of them said, “I hear you have some questions.” He asked whether I had asked to see a particular document.

I said, “I haven’t. I didn’t know there was such a thing.”

He said, “You might find it interesting to read.”
So I did. Then I raised even more questions about what I read there, which totally contradicted what the Vice President and others were saying. I mentioned that to some.

A few days later we are out walking again. Both my wife and I were jogging—my wife remembers this so well—she said, “I see you read the document.” I said, “I did.”

“But did they tell you about this other document?”

I said, “I don’t know there was such a document.”

“You may find it interesting.”

And so I then reviewed it. It was obvious from what I read that they were withholding evidence that Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with 9/11. But instead we rushed into war because we sought to avenge 9/11, even though they had nothing to do with 9/11. Now almost $3 trillion later, look at the mess we are in.

The report released today details how, in the wake-up to the war in Iraq material that was held back from people who should have seen it. This included Members of Congress, White House officials, even Justice Department lawyers who were being asked to review CIA techniques.

In the coming weeks, as we go into the new Congress, we are going to hear a lot about the need for oversight. I hope the new leadership would look at the report Senator Feinstein and her committee have come out with, because this is where oversight should be—at the top of the list. So too should the unprecedented spying by the CIA on the congressional staff investigating this program. Just think about that. They investigated Members of Congress, we were asking them about things they had done wrong. Then there is also the troubling pattern of intimidation, which includes the CIA referring its own congressional overseers to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. My God, we are going back to the Joseph McCarthy days with things like this. This report and those actions show a CIA out of control. It is incumbent upon all of us—Republicans and Democrats alike—in the Congress to hold the Agency accountable.

The Judiciary Committee should take a hard look at the role of the Department of Justice and its legal justifications for this program. Much ink has been spilled criticizing the OLC opinion written during the Bush administration by John Yoo, Jay Bybee, and Stephen Bradbury. The OLC has always had a good reputation, but these opinions sundered the reputation of that office, and they have been rightly repudiated. That report also connotes that even those opinions were the result of key misrepresentations by the CIA on the seniority of the people subjected to these techniques, the implementation of the techniques, and the intelligence resulting from them.

As an institution, if we truly represent 325 million Americans, do we not have a responsibility to examine the systemic failure that allowed this to happen and then to ensure that it does not happen again?

Those who attack the credibility of this report are wrong. This report is not based on the theory or insinuation. Anyone who reads it can see that this careful, thorough report was meticulously researched and written. It is based on more than 6 million pages of CIA cables, emails, and other documents containing descriptions that CIA employees and contractors themselves recorded.

I believe Senator Feinstein and the other members of the Intelligence Committee who worked on this deserve our respect and our appreciation. Intelligence committee staffers, too, have dedicated years of their lives to this report. They have demonstrated courage and dedication in the face of enormous challenges, because they thought first and foremost about the United States of America.

In the past year they were even threatened with criminal prosecution. Why? For doing the job they are supposed to do for the United States of America. But they would not allow themselves to be intimidated. They have served their country well, and they have my deepest appreciation for bringing us this truly historic study.

I thank their families, because they couldn’t tell their families the things they were reading. I imagine the families knew of some of these attacks on them. Their families too deserve our thanks.

I am disappointed that those same honorable staffers had to spend so many months working with the White House about redactions to this report—a White House that is supposed to be dedicated to transparency. This report should have been issued months ago, and it still contains more redactions than it should. I can think of some who will wonder why the redactions are there, but I am gratified that we can finally shed light on this dark chapter.

Among the many lessons we can take from this report is that Americans deserve greater government transparency, and that is essential to a strong democracy. Just yesterday the Senate unanimously passed a bipartisan bill, the Leahy-Cornyn FOIA Improvement Act. It significantly improves the Freedom of Information Act. Today’s release of this report is another important victory for greater government transparency.

I strongly disagree with those who argue that the reports should not come out and who have tried to pressure and intimidate Senator Feinstein. Don’t place the blame on those who are telling the truth. Place the blame squarely where it belongs: on those who authorized and carried out a systematic program of torture and secret detention, which is in violation of domestic law, and in violation of international law. But more importantly it is in violation of the fundamental principles of morality our great country was founded on.

In trying times, such as those we faced after September 11 and those we face now, we look to our intelligence, military, and law enforcement professionals to keep us safe. We are fortunate to have so many dedicated and talented people serving in the intelligence community, military, and law enforcement. But one lesson for their sake, our sake, and our country’s sake, is that we should never become so blinded by fear that we are willing to sacrifice our own principles, laws, and humanity.

We are the greatest, most powerful Nation on Earth. We cannot turn our backs on our laws, our history, and our Constitution because we are afraid. This Senator is not afraid.

No matter what, our enemies are human beings. And no matter how despicable and evil they are, no matter how repulsive their actions—and many are—no matter how horribly they have treated their own victims, we do not torture them—because we don’t join them on that dark side of history. We stand on the other side of history as Americans. Generations of men and women who have given their lives and many have even endured torture themselves in order to protect this Nation. They did so not to protect our way of life, but to protect our principles, our understanding of right and wrong, of humanity, of evil.

The shameful actions uncovered by this report dishonored those men and women who have fought to protect what is the best of our Nation, as well as the men and women even today who continue to put their lives at risk for this country.

As an institution, if we truly represent 325 million Americans know, throughout this country, that we are better than this. As we heard after Abu Ghraib and we will hear now, we are better than this and we should never let this happen again. Let’s show the rest of the world, too.

I have spoken much longer than I normally do, but this is important to me.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.

Mr. KING. Mr. President, I also want to address the report that was released this morning by the Chair of the Intelligence Committee. I come at this in a slightly different way than some of my colleagues, because I came to this process late.

I joined the Intelligence Committee in January of 2013. By that time the report had been authorized, had been written, and actually had been finalized. So I came to it as a final product and the decision was whether it should be released.

Before talking about the report, there are two very important points that should be made.
No. 1, one of my problems with this discussion is that everybody talks about the CIA. The CIA did this, the CIA did that. The fact is the CIA as an institution doesn’t do anything. People do things.

I have been around the world and met with CIA people in many countries. I have met with them here. They are patriotic, they are dedicated, they are smart, and they are brave. The problem with this situation is that their reputation has been sullied by a relatively small group of people early in the prior decade.

So I want to make clear, at least as far as I am concerned, this is not an attempt to discredit or otherwise undermine the CIA or the good people who are there, but to point out that mistakes were made.

No. 2, I think we need to acknowledge that those were extraordinary times, the year or so after September 11. We thought there was going to be another attack. There was a lot of pressure to uncover that information. It is easy, 10 years later, to look back and say: Well, we shouldn’t have done this or we shouldn’t have done that. I understand that. We have to acknowledge that the circumstances cannot justify a basic violation of who we are as Americans and what our values are.

The process the report was completed and accepted by the committee on a bipartisan basis. My predecessor, Olympia Snowe, voted in favor of the acceptance of the report in December of 2012.

It was then sent to the CIA. They responded, a rather full response. It took about 6 months, and then they submitted their response to the committee.

I knew the vote was going to be coming up last spring as to whether to release the report. I went to the secure site at the CIA. I spent about 6 months, and then they sat down every night for a week and read through the report, made my own judgment as to what was done in our name and not conclude that it was way outside the values of our country and constituted torture by any definition.

No. 2, it was terribly managed. That is not a very exciting point about whole management, but nobody was in charge.

Contractors were actually designing the program and assessing whether it was successful—the people who had designed it and were implementing it. There was no central place at the CIA that managed it, so that was a problem.

No. 3, and this we are going to talk about for a few minutes—it was not effective. The guts of this report are an analysis of the 20 principal cases the CIA presented as justification for the torture to say that it worked, that it led to intelligence that was reliable and current, and the report goes through it in detail looking at each one of those allegations. It basically finds that the information was either already available, it was available in our hands, it was available in other ways, and the witnesses had given up the data prior to their being subjected to these extraordinary measures. I am going to talk, as I mentioned, in a couple of minutes about this issue of effectiveness.

I should have said this at the beginning. My few words can’t contribute a great deal to this debate, but the speech Senator John McCain made on this floor this morning should be required viewing for every schoolchild in America, every Member of this body, everyone whom we captured after September 11, every American. He spoke eloquently about the violation of our ideals of this program and the fact that it cannot, will not, and could not work.

The final point I take from the report is that the report is continually misrepresented. It was misrepresented to the President, it was misrepresented to the Justice Department, it was misrepresented to the Congress, and it was misrepresented to the Intelligence Committee.

The problem is that continues today. In the past few days we have seen an outburst of statements, speeches, and interviews on television saying it was effective. It wasn’t effective, and the report makes that clear.

There is a semantic sleight of hand going on, and I have already seen it in two or three interviews on television where people slide from the report and they say: The program of detention of people whom we captured after September 11 was effective in generating intelligence.

Absolutely true. There is no doubt of that. People were detained, they were interrogated, they gave good intelligence. Not about Al Qaeda, and it was very helpful to the country in preventing future plots.

The question for the House, though, is was the torture effective? If you have somebody in custody, they give up some information, and then later you torture them and they don’t give you anymore information, the torture didn’t create that information or that intelligence. The question is did the extraordinary methods create additional evidence.

People should cock their ears when people say the program created this good intelligence. It did. But the program is not what we are talking about today. We are talking about so-called enhanced interrogation techniques.

I would suggest when people come up with a euphemism such as enhanced interrogation techniques, that should tip us off that something is on that we should be concerned about.

I wrestled with this decision. It was not easy. There is risk involved. There has been a lot of commentary today. Our people are on the line. Will someone attack us because of this report?

I can’t deny that risk. I think it is impossible to say. But we have already learned that these people will attack us for any or no reason. They have been trying to attack us for 10 years. That is their reason for existing.

ISIL has beheaded Americans, not because of this report, but because that is their agenda. Now they may issue a press release or a YouTube video and say we are doing this because of the report. I would submit they are going to do it anyway.

What they are going to cite—it is not the report, it is what we did that has inflamed opposition around the world, and it has done so for many years already.

Finally, on the question of the risk, when the terrible activities at Abu Ghraib came to the attention of the Congress, we did a report. The Armed Services Committee did a study and the report was misrepresented. It was misrepresented to the President, and it was misrepresented to the Congress.

They are going to cite—they are going to cite what was done, and at that point we had 100,000 troops in Iraq. If ever there was a report that would have inflamed public opinion in a foreign country and generated retribution against us, it was that. We cannot be intimidated by people who tell us that we cannot exercise and be true to our own ideals.

But if there is any risk, why should we do it? Because these actions are so alien to our values, they are so alien to our principles that we simply can’t countenance them.

By the way, if this wasn’t torture, if this wasn’t a problem, why did the CIA destroy the tapes of one of these interrogations? That is what started all of this, when the Senate learned they had destroyed tapes. If they thought this was not torture—which is what they were telling us—then why are they destroying the tapes? That is what began this process.

I would say one of the most telling quotes in the whole report was a back-and-forth between the CIA and I think the White House—but I think it was within the CIA where the statement was made: “Whatever you do, don’t let Colin Powell find out about this, he’ll blow his stack.” Now that tells me they knew they were doing something that wasn’t acceptable to our country and to the American people. But the second reason to release this report is the key: so it will never happen again.

The campaign of the last few days of people saying it worked and it wasn’t torture and you shouldn’t do it because...
of the risk—that, to me, validates my concern because these people are essentially saying: We would do it again if we had the chance. And the only thing standing between them and doing it again is an Executive order signed by this President in January of 2009, which the President signed out in the first week of a new Presidency or in the first month of a new Presidency. We cannot have this happen again.

The oratory is that they work. I have a letter, which I will submit for the Record, from former terrorist interrogators—Army, Air Force, CIA, FBI—saying these kinds of tactics don’t work and, in fact, they produce bad intelligence. There is an article in Politico today by Mark Fallen, who is a 30-year interrogator, saying it doesn’t work.

We have to have this discussion and lay that to rest because the people who are saying it works are really saying: And we will do it again if we have to. And in fact, we are asking for it.

Interestingly, in the CIA’s response to the report—all during the early part of this past decade the argument was—and we are hearing it today—it works. We are certain it works. We got valuable intelligence. We got Osama bin Laden.

The CIA is not saying that today. When they submitted their response to the committee’s report, what they said about effectiveness was that it is unknown. It was effectively unknown. I believe the migration from the certainty they gave to Members of Congress and the President and the Department of Justice—the migration from ‘certainty’ to ‘unknowable’ speaks volumes because they couldn’t refute the facts that are in this report.

If this idea that this kind of interrogation works becomes conventional wisdom, it will definitely happen again.

I go back in conclusion to John McCain’s statement this morning. I can’t match his eloquence. It was one of the most powerful messages I have ever heard in this body or anywhere else. He talked about who we are as Americans, and he also talked from personal experience about what torture will do and whether it will produce good information, and I would submit that John McCain knows more about that particular subject than all the rest of us in this body, but together.

I quote from a friend in Maine this morning that said “You know, you are naïve” and all those kinds of things. I just wrote him back and said, “Don’t take it from me; watch what John McCain had to say.”

We are exceptional. But we are not exceptional because of natural resources or because we are smarter and better looking than anybody else; we are exceptional because of our values. We are one of the few countries in the world that was founded on explicit values and ideas and principles. And principles aren’t something you discard when times get tough. That is when they are important. That is like saying: I am in favor of free press unless somebody says something offensive. These are principles that make us distinct and different.

I believe this debate is about the soul of America. It is about who we want to be. It is a hard debate. It is difficult. It is hard to talk about these things. This was a dark period. But I believe that having this discussion, having this debate, getting this information out—and by the way, all the information about the report; the CIA’s response was made public today; the minority had their own statement that is quite substantial. So the public is going to be able to look at all this information and make their own decisions. I looked at the information, and the decision I made was that this is important information the people of America are entitled to, they should understand, and we should move forward consistent with our ideals and universal principles as a nation and see that something like this never happens again.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the letter I referred to earlier.

There being no objection, the material is ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

**Hon. Angus King, U.S. Senate, 335 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.**

**Dear Senator King:** We write to you as current and former professional interrogators, interviewers, and intelligence officials regarding the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s (SSCI) 6000-plus page study of the CIA’s post-9/11 rendition, detention, and interrogation program. We understand that the SSCI is soon to release the report, and we believe that the SSCI’s release of the study and public release of the study. In the interest of transparency and furthering an understanding of effective interrogation practices, we urge you to support declassification and release of as much of the study as possible, with only such redactions as are necessary to protect national security.

Since the CIA program was established over a decade ago, there has been substantial public interest in, and discussion of, the fundamental efficacy of the so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” (EITs). Despite the employment of these methods, critical questions remain unanswered as to whether EITs are an appropriate, lawful, or effective means of consistently eliciting accurate, timely, and comprehensive intelligence from terrorist suspects, and how our experience, torture and other forms of abusive or coercive techniques are more likely to generate unreliable information and have repeated, unpredictable adverse effects on the enduring cooperation of a detained individual. They increase the likelihood of receiving false or misleading information, undermine this nation’s ability to work with key international partners, and bolster the narrative of torture groups.

We would like to emphasize that this view is supported by relevant studies in the behavioral sciences and publicly available evidence, which show that coercive interrogation methods substantially disrupt a subject’s ability to accurately recall and convey information, cause a subject to emotionally and psychologically “shut down,” produce the circumstances where resistance is increased, or create incentives for a subject to provide false information to lessen the experience of pain, suffering, or anxiety.

Despite this body of evidence, some former government officials who authorized the CIA’s detention and interrogation program after 9/11 claim that it produced a significant and sustained stream of accurate and reliable intelligence that helped disrupt terrorist plots, save lives, and even locate Osama bin Laden. While some of the particular claimed successes of the program have been disproven based on publicly available information, they also claim that the ETI program was necessary to disrupt terrorist plots and save American lives is based on classified information unavailable to the public.

The SSCI study—a review of more than 6 million pages of official records—provides an important opportunity to shed light on these important questions. We understand that the SSCI minority and CIA have separate views regarding the meaning and significance of the official documentary record. And it is our hope that this study will also be made public so that the American people have an opportunity to decide for themselves whether the CIA program was ultimately worth it.

It is beyond time for this critical issue of national importance to be driven by facts—not rhetoric or partisan interest. We therefore urge you to vote in favor of declassifying and releasing the SSCI study on the CIA’s post-9/11 interrogation program.

Sincerely,

Tony Camerino, Glenn Carle, James T. Clemente, Jack Cloonan, Gerry Downes, Mark Fallon, Brigadier General David E. Irvine, USA (Ret.), Steven Kleinman, Marcus Lowry, Mike Marks, Robert McFadden, Charles Mink, Joe Navarro, Torin Nelson, Erik Phillips, William Quinn, Buck Revell, Mark Safarik, Haviland Smith, Lieutenant General Harry E. Syoster (Ret.).

Mr. KING. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico?

**Mr. Heinrich.** Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Levin be permitted to follow my remarks and speak for up to 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**Mr. Heinrich.** Mr. President, torture is wrong, it is un-American, and it doesn’t work. Recognizing these important realities, the President signed an Executive order in January of 2009 that limited interrogations by any American personnel to the guidelines that are in the Army Field Manual, and he reinforced U.S. commitment to the Geneva Conventions. This closed the book on the Bush administration’s interrogation program. But make no mistake—these weren’t enhanced interrogations. This was torture. I would challenge anyone to read this report and not be truly disturbed by some of these techniques.

Releasing the Intelligence Committee’s study of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program to the American people today will provide a thorough accounting of what happened and how it happened. In addition, like my colleague and friend from Maine...
who spoke before me, I hope this process helps to ensure that it never ever happens again.

This was a grave chapter in our history, and the actions taken under this program cost our Nation global credibility, the blunt—right—American lives at risk. Some have suggested that releasing this report would put American lives at risk. But let's be clear. It has been the use of torture that has unnecessarily put Americans in harm's way.

The real question is whether there will never be a good time to release this study. We all know that for months, terrorists in the extremist group ISIS have been kidnapping and barbarically killing innocent Americans because of what we as a nation stand for. The response to their threats and terrorism should not be for us to change our American values; it should be to stand firm in our values and work with our allies to root out extremism and terrorism.

The release of this study will finally let face what was done in the name of the American people and afford for future generations to use these findings to learn from the mistakes made by those who were in charge. This program is an objective, fact-based study. It is a fair study. And it is the only comprehensive study conducted of this program and the CIA's treatment of its detainees in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Today marks an enormous, albeit painful, step into our future.

It is important to know that these torture methods were the brainchild of a few CIA officials and their contractors. When I joined the Intelligence Committee two years ago, I began to read the classified report and was surprised to learn this. Frankly, it was not consistent with all of my assumptions. It wasn't what my prejudices told me. But that is exactly why a fact-based study is so important.

Furthermore, it is important to know that at every turn, CIA leadership avoided congressional oversight of these activities and, even worse, misled Congress. That leadership deliberately kept the vast majority of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees in the dark on the interrogation techniques employed by the CIA and its treatment of its detainees.

Myths of the effectiveness of torture have been repeated, perpetuating the fable that this was a necessary procedure that somehow saved lives.

The committee found that the torture techniques employed by the CIA were not effective in gaining intelligence and were unsanctioned by the Department of Justice or the Department of Defense. The committee also found that the CIA's treatment of its detainees, as well as the CIA's claims of plots thwarted and detainees captured as a result of intelligence gained through torture, were false. The CIA's techniques did not produce uniquely valuable intelligence that saved lives.

The report was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program represents many, many years of hard work by Members and staff who faced incredible obstacles in completing their work. The fact that this study is finished is a testament to the dedication and focus of Chairmen ROCKEFELLER and CHAIRMAN FEINSTEIN in deciding that oversight is our job, regardless of how long it takes.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

STEIN in deciding that oversight is our job, regardless of how long it takes.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the report released today by the Intelligence Committee is an important addition to the public's knowledge about the CIA's use of torture, euphemistically described by some as "enhanced interrogation techniques" in the period following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

The use of these techniques was a failure on both moral and practical grounds. These tactics violated the values this Nation has long stood for, while adding little benefit to our security. As GEN David Petraeus and others have pointed out, their use has placed U.S. personnel at greater risk of being tortured. They have tarnished America's standing in the world and undermined our moral authority to confront tyrants and torturers. I am glad this report will fully inform a public debate that has been kept behind closed doors for too long, and I hope it ensures that our Nation never again resorts to such brutal and misguided methods.

The report lays out clearly that, contrary to claims by former CIA and Bush administration officials, these techniques did not produce uniquely valuable intelligence that saved lives. The report examines 20 such specific representations that were used frequently by the CIA to make the case to policymakers for continued use of abusive techniques. In every case, the committee found that the intelligence was already available from other sources or provided by the detainees themselves before they were tortured.

However, we need to stop treating the intelligence as one worth—worth—worth the debate over its practical merits. This is about torture being immoral, being un-American. Reducing a human being to a state of despair through systematic subjugation, pain, and humiliation is unquestionably immoral. It should never happen again, and let us never repeat these mistakes that our country made out of fear.

When America engages in these acts, with authorization from the highest levels of government, others will treat our citizens and our soldiers the same way. This study should serve as a warning to those who would make similar choices in the future or argue about the efficacy of these techniques. Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.

Before I close, I wish to say how important it is to acknowledge that the Intelligence Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program was released today by the Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.

Let us learn from the mistakes of the past, and let us never repeat these mistakes again.
was making false claims about the effectiveness of these techniques, it was failing to mention that some detainees subjected to these techniques provided false, fabricated information—information that led to time-consuming wild-goose chases to locate people who turned out not to exist.

This is not at all surprising when we consider the origin of these abusive interrogation techniques. In 2008 the Senate Armed Services Committee produced a detailed investigative report into the treatment of detainees in military custody. That report traced the path of techniques such as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and forced nudity from the military’s survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training, or SERE training, the path to interrogations of U.S. detainees. SERE training was not designed to train U.S. personnel to torture detainees. Rather, it was designed to prepare U.S. personnel to survive torture at the hands of our enemies. SERE training simulated techniques that were used by the Chinese interrogators during the Korean War—techniques designed to elicit a confession—any confession—whether true or false. Those who tortured U.S. troops were after valuable intelligence. They were after confessions they could use for propaganda purposes.

Defenders of the CIA’s actions have claimed that abusive techniques produced key intelligence on Osama bin Laden that couldn’t have been acquired through other means. This is false, as the Intelligence Committee’s report demonstrates in detail. Not only was the key information leading to bin Laden obtained through other means not involving abusive interrogation techniques by the CIA, but, in fact, the CIA detainee who provided the most significant information about the courier provided the information prior to being subjected to abusive interrogation.

There has been a great deal of conversation, and rightly so, about the need for effective congressional oversight of our intelligence community and the obstacles that exist to that oversight. This report highlights many such obstacles. In one case, this report makes public the likely connection between the Senate’s efforts to oversee intelligence and the destruction of CIA tapes documenting abusive interrogation in 2001, 2002, and 2003. It was acceptable and useful, we are at risk of repeating the same horrific mistakes. That is a threat to our security.

Torture is never the American way. Concealing the truth never the American way. Our Nation stands for something better. Our people deserve something better—they deserve an intelligence community that conducts itself according to the law, according to basic human values, and with the safety of our troops always in mind. They deserve better than intelligence tactics that are likely to produce useless lies from people trying to end their torture being used against them, instead of producing valuable intelligence.

I thank Chairman Feinstein for her leadership in completing and releasing this report. I thank Senator Rockefeller for his longstanding effort in this regard. I thank Senator McCain and others for pushing for the need to ensure that the United States never again repeats these mistakes.

Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. Moran. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMERICAN SAVINGS PROMOTION ACT

Mr. Moran. Mr. President, I am on the floor this afternoon to speak briefly about the American Savings Promotion Act, H.R. 3747.

My understanding is that this bill may soon pass the Senate—it was passed by the House of Representatives in September—and I wish to speak briefly about its value to our country, to its citizens, and to our country’s future.

I believe this is a fairly narrow circumstance with broad consequences. I believe if there is a primary responsibility we have in being a citizen of this country, it is to make sure, among other things, that we pass on to future generations of Americans the opportunity to pursue the American dream—to be able to have a business plan, to save for your family’s and children’s education, to save for your own retirement, to prepare yourself for a bright financial future. Unfortunately, many Americans struggle to do just that.

Certainly, one of the aspects of that circumstance is there is very little savings that goes on in our country today. People are unable or unwilling, or perhaps undisciplined, in a way that allows them to prepare for their financial security and their financial future. The problem is—and statistics bear this out—people aren’t saving. The reality is, according to a recent survey, 44 percent of American households lack the savings to cover basic expenses for 3 months. If an unexpected emergency or another crisis leads to a loss of stable income, many Americans have the inability—almost the majority of Americans have the inability to care for themselves and their families if there is an emergency for more than 3 months. That is something we ought to try to resolve.

I also think there has been over a period of time a disparity of incomes. We have made certain those at the lowest income levels have an opportunity to increase their income and to increase their financial stability. In fact, the Senator from Oregon, Senator Wyden, and I created sometime ago the Senate Economic Mobility Caucus, trying to make certain that people have a chance to move up the ladder of economic success and security in our economy and in our country. Senator Wyden and I came together to bring some of the best minds from conserva- tive to more liberal thought-provoking organizations and policy organizations to visit with Republican and Democratic Senators and their staffs about what ideas are out there that might increase the chances that a person or a family has the chance to improve their financial circumstances.

One of the ideas that arose from that caucus’s discussions was this legislation called the American Savings Promotion Act, again, with the realization that more people are not saving for their own financial security, that they lack stability in times of emergency and difficult economic challenges to care for themselves, how can we encourage Americans to save more?

One of the ideas that came forth in this regard is the opportunity to link savings to prizes. When I first heard this, I thought it sounded a little bit odd, a little bit like a gimmick. But the reality is with little savings, people still believe—in fact, 20 percent of people believe that the lottery is a meaningful strategy to build wealth. Americans spend more than $60 billion every year on lottery