INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

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INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2015

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Kaine, and King.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, good morning.

The committee meets today to continue our series of hearings on defense reform. We have reviewed the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms on our defense acquisition, management, and personnel system, and our past few hearings have considered what most view as the essence of Goldwater-Nichols, the roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries, and service chiefs, and the combatant commanders.

This morning, we seek to understand how Goldwater-Nichols has impacted the effectiveness of U.S. military operations and what reforms may be necessary.

We are pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses who will offer insights from their many years of experience and distinguished service. General Norton Schwartz, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force and President and CEO (Chief Executive Officer) of Business Executives for National Security; Admiral James Stavridis, former Commander, U.S. European Command and U.S. Southern Command, and currently the Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and frequent appearance on various liberal media outlets; Dr. Christopher Lamb, Deputy Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

More than anything else, the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a result of escalating concern in the Congress and in the country about the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. The Vietnam War, the failure of the hostage rescue mission in Iran, and the flawed invasion of Grenada all pointed to deep systemic problems in our defense enterprise that needed to be addressed for the sake of both our warfighters and our national security.
In particular, Goldwater-Nichols focused on ensuring the unity of command and improving the ability of our forces to operate jointly. As we have explored in previous hearings, many questions remain about the balance our military is striking between core military competitiveness, competencies, and joint experience. But as it relates to combat effectiveness, there is no doubt, as one former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it, no other nation can match our ability to combine forces on the battlefield and fight jointly.

The subject of today’s hearing relates directly to the many steps Goldwater-Nichols took to improve the unity of command. The law made unified commanders explicitly responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions and preparedness of their commands. It also removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational chain of command and prevented the services from moving forces in and out of regional commands without approval. Geographic combatant commanders were given the ability to issue authoritative direction on all aspects of operations, joint training and logistics, internal chains of command, and personnel within their assigned areas of responsibility. These steps were effective in establishing clear lines of command authority and responsibilities that translated to a more effective fighting force than we had in the 1980s.

However, 30 years later, we have to take a hard look at this command structure in light of current threats and how our model of warfighting has evolved. The United States confronts the most diverse and complex array of crises since the end of World War II, from rising competitors like China, revanchist powers like Russia, the growing asymmetric capabilities of nations ranging from Iran to North Korea, the persistence of radical Islamic extremism, and the emergence of new domains of warfare such as space and cyberspace. These threats cut across our regional operational structures embodied by geographic combatant commands.

So we must ask whether the current combatant command structure best enables us to succeed in the strategic environment of the 21st century. Should we consider alternative structures that are organized less around geography and transregional and functional missions.

At the same time, as numerous witnesses have observed, while combatant commands were originally envisioned as the warfighting arm of the military, the Department of Defense, that function has largely migrated to joint task forces, especially on an ad hoc basis in response to emerging contingencies. This suggests that people have identified a shortcoming in the current design and have adopted measures to work around the system as we see quite often. This should inform our efforts to reevaluate and re-imagine the combatant commands.

At the same time, combatant commands have come to play very important peacetime diplomatic functions. Do these developments argue for changes in the structure of combatant commands? At a minimum, it would call into question the top-heavy and bloated staff structures that we see in the combatant commands. Time and again during these hearings, we have heard how dramatic increases in civilian and military staffs have persisted even as re-
sources available for warfighting functions are increasingly strained.

As former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy pointed out earlier this week, combatant command staffs have grown to 38,000 people. That is nearly three divisions’ worth of staff in just the combatant commands alone. We have to ask if this is truly necessary and whether it is improving our warfighting capabilities.

At the same time, we have to examine whether there are duplicative functions in the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and subordinate commands that can be streamlined. That includes the question of whether we really need all of the current combatant commands. For example, do we really need a NORTHCOM [Northern Command] and a SOUTHCOM [Southern Command]? Do we really need a separate AFRICOM [Africa Command] headquartered in Germany when the vast majority of its forces reside within EUCOM [European Command]?

As we have to revisit the role of the Chairman and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Goldwater-Nichols strengthened the Joint Staff and operational commanders at the expense of the services. Has that gone too far or not far enough? Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates raised this issue when he testified before this committee because of his frustration with the military services’ lack of responsiveness to current operational requirements.

Many of our witnesses have discussed whether the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has sufficient statutory authority to perform the strategic integration that the Department of Defense all too often seems to do poorly, integrating priorities, efforts, and resources across regions, across domains of military activity, and across time, balancing short-term and long-term requirements. The question has been raised whether the Chairman should be placed in the chain of command with the service chiefs and combatant commanders reporting to him. We have heard testimony in favor and against. I look forward to exploring this further today.

These are critical questions about our defense organization that have direct bearing on the effectiveness of U.S. military operations and, as a consequence, on the wellbeing of our warfighters. We owe it to them to look at this seriously, ask the tough questions, challenge old assumptions, and embrace new solutions if and when it is needed.

I thank our witnesses again and look forward to their testimony.

Senator Reed?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in welcoming the witnesses. I have had the privilege of working with General Schwartz as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Admiral Stavridis as EUCOM Commander, and Dr. Lamb, your service in the Defense Department, now as an analyst and academic. I deeply appreciate it. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for joining us today.

As the chairman has said, we have undertaken a very rigorous, under his direction, review of Goldwater-Nichols. And we heard just a few days ago from former Under Secretary of Defense
Michele Flournoy about one of the issues, and that was in her words, “over the years, the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] has become a routinized, bottom-up staff exercise that includes hundreds of participants and consumes many thousands of man-hours rather than a top-down leadership exercise that sets clear priorities, makes hard choices and allocates risk.”

So one of the things I would hope that the witnesses would talk about with this whole planning process, the formal process, the informal process, and how we can improve that—that is just one of the items. There is a long and I think important list of topics that we could discuss: the role and authorities assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including whether the Chairman should be placed in the chain of for military operations; improving the employment and synchronization of military capabilities through possible structural reforms to our combatant commands, defense agencies, and field activities; and the potential benefits of adopting organizational changes, including consolidation of staff elements and creation of cross-functional teams, to achieve efficiencies and provide senior civilian and military leaders with more impactful and timely recommendations.

And finally, in previous hearings, several of our witnesses have rightly observed that enhancing the effectiveness of our military operations and better capitalizing upon the gains achieved through those improvements may require significant changes to our interagency national security structure and processes as well. And this point was made by Jim Locher, who was the godfather, if you will, of the Goldwater-Nichols. In his words, “No matter how well you transform the Department of Defense, it is still going to be troubled by an interagency system that is quite broken and the problems that confront this Nation and national security require an interagency response. The days of the Department of Defense being able to execute a national security mission by itself are long gone, and we do not have the ability to integrate the expertise and capacity of all of the government agencies that are necessary.” I think it is important to keep that in mind.

And chairman—again, let me commend him for beginning this process with this committee and the Department of Defense, and I hope it is a catalyst under his leadership for serious review by other committees and other agencies about how together we can improve the security of the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Welcome, General Schwartz.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, RETIRED, PRESIDENT AND CEO, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, AND FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE

General Schwartz. Thanks, Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed for your and the committee’s commitment to improving DOD’s internal governance and defense organization shaped by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. It is an unexpected privilege to return to this hearing room and to offer a few related ideas on how to improve performance in the Department of Defense, and it is a
special pleasure to sit beside the finest flag officer of my genera-
tion, Jim Stavridis.

While there are many issues that warrant attention, command
arrangements, resource allocation, acquisition processes, overhead
reduction, joint credentialing of military personnel, and the poten-
tial for consolidation, among others, I wish to focus this morning
on the three that I am persuaded hold the greatest promise for par-
ticularly positive outcomes. They are the role and authority of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, right-sizing the combatant
commands, and establishing standing joint task forces for execution
of COCOM [combatant commands] operational missions. I am cer-
tainly prepared to address the other matters you mentioned at your
discretion.

In my experience as a former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Joint Staff, a functional combatant commander, and a chief
of service, I have come to the conclusion that the Chairman’s infor-
mal role in supervising the combatant commanders and the JCS
[Joint Chiefs of Staff] is insufficient for the demands of our times.
While it is true that delegated authority from the Secretary of De-
fense is an alternative, there should be no doubt in the armed
forces about the directive authority of the Chairman, subject to the
close and continuing scrutiny and oversight of the Secretary of De-
fense.

Strategic guidance for force employment, force allocation trade-
offs between combatant commands and establishing strategic prior-
ities for the armed forces should not be the result of bureaucratic
negotiation or the exquisite application of personal persuasion, but
rather the product of strategic leadership. This capacity is con-
strained by the Chairman’s inability to exercise executive authority
on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, and the remedy I suggest is
to place the Chairman in the line of supervision between the Sec-
retary and his or her combatant commanders.

The nine combatant commands are complex entities, none of
which are alike, some with regional responsibilities and some with
functional roles. The commands strive to serve both peacetime, cri-
sis response, and warfighting obligations. The composition of the
combatant command staffs clearly reflect the inherent tension in
this excessively broad mission array: peacetime administration, de-
terrence, training, and partner engagement versus maintaining the
capacity to conduct complex contingency operations in peace and
war.

The proliferation of resource directorates, J–8’s; joint intelligence
centers, J–2’s; security assistance program offices, typically J–4’s;
partner engagement entities, typically J–9’s; and operations and
training staff, J–3’s, is the result of this expansive assigned mis-
sion set. And over time, the warfighting role of the combatant com-
mands has evolved to the almost exclusive use, some would suggest
excessive use, of joint task forces up to and including four-star-led
joint task forces to execute assigned missions. The simple question
in my mind is, can the combatant command, no matter how well
tailored, perform each and every associated task with equal com-
petence? I do not think so and the attempt to infuse greater inter-
agency heft into the combatant commands has, in my experience,
detracted from the core operational focus in either peacetime or in
conflict.

How have we squared the tension between combatant commands? peacetime and wartime roles? I would argue by again extensive use of joint task force organizations to execute operational missions. It is my conviction that the efficacy of the task force employment model is beyond dispute. The National Counterterrorism Joint Task Force demonstrates conclusively in my mind the enduring value of standing, mature, well-trained, and equipped joint task forces. It may well be that high performance parallels exist for national joint task forces in the surface, maritime, and air domains as well. What we should continue, however—or what, I should say, we should discontinue is the proliferation of joint task forces in each combatant command with the attendant service components and headquarters staffs. Task Force 510 in the Pacific Command might qualify, however, as an exception to the rule.

In short, Mr. Chairman, we need to have within the armed forces a strategic leader who can exercise executive authority. We need to aggressively tailor combatant command headquarters composition to its core mission or missions and refrain from creating subordinate joint task forces out of service headquarters. And finally, we need to drive toward employment of long-term, highly proficient national joint task forces for combatant command employment.

Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee for your attention this morning. I trust my presentation will assist in advancing the noble cause of Goldwater-Nichols reform. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Schwartz follows:]

STATEMENT BY GENERAL NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF (RET.)

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee, thank you for your commitment to improving internal governance and defense organization shaped by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. My remarks are based on my experience in uniform as the 19th Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force and a former Commander of the US Transportation Command. It is an unexpected privilege to return to this hearing room and to offer a few related ideas on how best to improve performance in the Department of Defense.

I now serve as the President and CEO of Business Executives for National Security, a non-partisan organization of business executives with genuine concern for national security. As part of your defense reform review I would be pleased to offer to you, at some future date, my organization’s views on the pressing need to make more efficient use of defense resources and improve Defense Department management—also objectives of the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

As requested, my remarks today are confined to the topic of increasing the effectiveness of military operations. The views are my own.

THE RATIONALE FOR REFORM

First, let me commend the Senate and this Congress for restoring acquisition responsibilities to the Service Chiefs in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act legislation. Not only does it put accountability where it belongs in the Service acquisition structure, it identifies the acquisition career field as central to respective service identities, which is important for promoting viable military career paths.

The need to reconsider the roles of other senior military leaders in the structure of the Department stems, I believe, from two transformational factors that have evolved since implementation of Goldwater-Nichols. The first is the concept of jointness, which has been inculcated over a period of nearly thirty years into the daily cadence of military operations. I cannot foresee us ever going to war in the future with a concept of operations that is not joint. Because of this irreversible development, we should perhaps look at adapting the current joint duty requirements
for officer promotion by emphasizing joint experience at the operational level of command instead.

The second factor is related to the first and involves changing the way we identify and resolve conflict today as opposed to more traditional warfare designs of the past. The evolving threat is political, economic and demographic. In the Middle East the adversary is ideological, made up of proto-state, non-state, and sub-state entities. Think ISIS/ISIL, Hezbollah, Hamas. Internationally, China and Russia seek ascendancy. Across the developing world, nearly 40 percent of the population is under the age of 15 creating a huge demand on future resources and governing institutions. Climate change suggests complex consequences with security implications. Clearly, maintaining national security in this environment requires DoD to plan for a wide range of contingencies. The model we have adopted more often than not as the preferred military response is to task organize for the specific contingency.

Goldwater-Nichols arose in an era of more sharply defined politico-military circumstances. Those boundaries no longer exist. It is therefore appropriate and necessary to evaluate the need to adapt our military operational structure for the new threat environment.

THREE SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING MILITARY OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE

While there are many issues that warrant attention: command arrangements, resource allocation, acquisition processes, overhead reduction, joint credentialing for military personnel and the potential for consolidation among others, I wish to focus on the three I am persuaded hold the greatest promise for particularly positive outcomes. They are: the role and authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, right-sizing the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), and establishing standing Joint Task Forces for execution of COCOM operational missions.

1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operational chain of supervision

In my experience as a former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, I have come to the conclusion that the Chairman’s informal role in supervising the Combatant Commanders and the JCS is insufficient for the demands of our times. While it is true that delegated authority from the Secretary of Defense is an alternative and is routinely implied, there should be no doubt in the Armed Forces of the United States about the directive authority of the Chairman, subject to close and continuing scrutiny and oversight by the Secretary of Defense.

Developing strategic guidance for force employment, deciding force allocation tradeoffs between Combatant Commands and establishing strategic priorities for the Armed Forces of the United States about the directive authority of the Chairman, subject to close and continuing scrutiny and oversight by the Secretary of Defense.

2. Right-sizing the Combatant Commanders for peacetime deterrence and engagement roles

The nine Combatant Commands are complex entities, none alike, some with regional responsibilities and others with functional roles. The commands strive to serve both peacetime, crisis response and warfighting obligations. The composition of the Combatant Command staffs clearly reflects the inherent tension in this excessively broad mission array: peacetime administration, deterrence and partner engagement versus maintaining the capacity to conduct complex contingency operations in peace and war.

The proliferation of organizational elements such as resource directorates (J–8s), Joint Intelligence Centers (J–2s), security assistance program offices (typically J–4s), partner engagement entities (typically J–9s) and operations and training staffs (J–3s) is the result of the expansive assigned mission set. What we see over time is that the warfighting role of the Combatant Commands has evolved to the almost exclusive use of subordinate Joint Task Forces (JTFs).up to and including four-star led JTFs to execute assigned operational missions. Further, the infusion of greater Federal interagency heft into the Combatant Commands has, in my experience, detracted from core operational focus, in both crisis and conflict. This evolution in organizational complexity raises a simple question: can a Combatant Command, however well-tailored, perform each and every associated task with equal competence? I don't think so, and I believe it is necessary to refocus the Combatant Commanders on their core mission: strategic engagement, relationship building, joint training, combat support, and contingency planning; and, adjust their headquarters staffs accordingly.
3. Standing Joint Task Force for land, maritime and air

The proliferation of COCOM organizational elements that I have just described brings up a fundamental question of task and purpose. The COCOMs are supported by separate component commands in land, sea and air. Yet, their component role is largely administrative not operational. Instead, we have squared the tension between Combatant Command peacetime and wartime roles by extensive (some would argue excessive) use of Joint Task Force organizations to execute operational missions. By and large this has been successful.

It is my conviction that the efficacy of the Task Force employment model is beyond dispute. The National Counterterrorism Joint Task Force demonstrates conclusively, in my mind, the enduring value of standing, mature, well-trained and well-equipped Joint Task Forces. It may well be that high performance parallels exist for National Joint Task Forces in the surface, maritime and air domains as well. We need to consider creating highly efficient National Joint Task Forces for global employment when and where needed. What we should discontinue, however, is the proliferation of Joint Task Forces in each Combatant Command, with attendant service components and headquarters staffs (Task Force 510 in the US Pacific Command, PACOM, might qualify as an exception to the rule).

CONCLUSION

A major purpose of Goldwater-Nichols was to strengthen the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commanders. Your comprehensive review needs to balance that objective with the Service’s authorities to organize, train and equip. The roles are complementary: operations and support. However, we need to reinforce the chain of supervision and, in turn, accountability. You have done this with the reconstitution of the Service Chiefs’ acquisition role. On the Joint Chiefs’ side, we need to have within the armed forces a strategic leader who can exercise executive authority. We need to aggressively align Combatant Command headquarters composition to its core missions(s) and refrain from creating subordinate Joint Task Forces from Service headquarters. And, finally, we need to drive toward employment of long-term, highly proficient National Joint Task Forces for Combatant Command employment.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today.

Chairman McCain. Admiral Stavridis?

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, RETIRED, DEAN OF THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER COMMANDER OF U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

Admiral Stavridis. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, other distinguished members, a pleasure to be back with you and to be here with General Schwartz, who was not only a service chief but a combatant commander, as well as being Director of the Joint Staff. There is no one who can talk more coherently to these issues than him. And as well, my good friend, Dr. Chris Lamb, who I think an best address the questions of planning and strategy that Senator Reed raised a moment ago.

I spent 37 years in uniform. I spent probably a decade of that in the Pentagon. I wish I had been at sea during those years, but in that time, I managed to serve on the staff of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So I have sort of seen inside the building. And as Senator McCain mentioned, I was twice a combatant commander, once in Europe and once in Southern Command, Latin America and the Caribbean.

So I am going to simply walk into four or five ideas that I think might be interesting for this committee to discuss and debate. None of these are fully firmed ideas, but I think they relate to the objective of what the committee I think very correctly seeks to do as we
sit here kind of 3 decades after Goldwater-Nichols. And they all relate in one way or another to how the Department is organized.

So I am going to start with one that I think is controversial but ought to be considered, and that is do we need a cyber force for the United States. I would invite you to think about where we were 100 years ago. We had an Army, a Navy, and a Marine Corps. Did we have an Air Force? Of course, not. We barely flew airplanes 100 years ago. I would argue today it feels like that moment a few years after the beach at Kitty Hawk, and my thought is clearly we need a Cyber Command, and I think we are moving in that direction. But I think it is time to think about whether we want to accelerate that process because our vulnerabilities in the cyber domain, in my view, are extraordinary, and we are ill-prepared for them. And therefore, some part of our response will have to be done by the Department of Defense, and the sooner we have not only a Cyber Command, but in my view a cyber force, small, capable, I think we would be well served. I think we should have that discussion.

Secondly, to the question of the interagency and the power of how to bring those parts of the government together, I think an interesting organizational change to consider would be at each of the regional combatant commands to have a deputy who is a U.S. ambassador or perhaps some other senior diplomat. I think you would need to continue to have a military deputy in order to conduct military operations, but a great deal of what combatant commands do is diplomatic in nature. And I think having a senior representative from the interagency present would be salutary. This has been tried at SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, and AFRICOM at one time or another, and I think it would be an effective and interesting idea to consider as you look at the combatant commands.

Thirdly—and the chairman mentioned this—in my view geographically we have too many combatant commands. We have six today. I think we should seriously consider merging NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM and merging EUCOM and AFRICOM. I think there are obvious efficiencies in doing so. I think there are operational additional benefits that derive. And I think finally it is a way to begin reducing what has correctly been identified as the bloat in the operational combatant command staffs.

Fourth, I would associate myself with General Schwartz and a number of others who have testified with the idea that we should consider an independent general staff and strengthening the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Frankly, in practice, as a combatant commander I would very typically call the Chairman, check signals with the Chairman. I would not undertake a radical departure without talking to the Chairman. I think putting the Chairman in the chain of command, as General Schwartz has outlined and a number of other witnesses have mentioned, is efficient, sensible, and frankly codifies what is in effect today in many ways.

In addition, I think that Chairman would be well served with what some have termed a general staff. This is the idea of taking mid-grade military officers of extraordinary promise and pulling them from their services and more or less permanently assigning them to this general staff. This model has been used in other points by other nations in history. I think it is a powerful way to
create efficiencies and avoid duplication because by doing so, you can reduce a great deal of what happens in the combatant commands today. So in addition to strengthening the position of the Chairman, I think it would be worth considering whether a general staff model would make sense.

Fifth and finally, I think that we talk a great deal, appropriately, about joint operations. It is important to remember that joint education is extraordinarily important in both ultimately the conduct of operations, the creation of strategy, the intellectual content of our services. So I would advocate considering whether we should integrate our joint educational institutions, probably by taking the National Defense University, putting it back to three-star rank, and giving it directive authority over the National War colleges. This would also create a reservoir of intellectual capability, which I think could match up well with the idea of a general staff.

All five of those ideas are controversial, but I think they should be part of the conversation that this committee is unpackaging, which is one that is deeply important for the Nation’s security.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADMIRAL JAMES STAVRIDIS, USN (RET)

Chairman McCain, Rank Member Reed, other distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for asking me to come and discuss ideas for reform of the Department of Defense.

In the course of my 37 years of active service after passing out of Annapolis in 1976, I served about half of my career in staff assignments in the Pentagon—on the staffs of the Secretary of Defense as his Senior Military Assistant; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs focused on the Unified Command Plan; Secretary of the Navy as his Executive Assistant and Special Assistant; and Chief of Naval Operations with focus on long range and strategic planning. I also served twice in command as a Combatant Commander at US Southern Command for three years; and as US European Commander for four years, currently with serving as Supreme Allied Commander at NATO.

While I did not enjoy staff duty as much as being at sea (true I suspect for most military officers), I learned a great deal and formed some opinions that I am happy to share today based on my years of active duty.

Additionally, since leaving active duty two years, I have served as the 12th Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and as a Senior Fellow at Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. In both capacities, I continue to study and comment on these issues.

All of these remarks, however, are my personal opinions and do not represent the views of any other individual or organization.

I would like to begin by pointing out that I believe that overall that the US Department of Defense is the best functioning entity in the US government, and that it does an enormous amount of good in the world today. And that the vast majority of civilians and military assigned to the Department on staff duty are dedicated, hard-working, and very focused on their jobs in professional and commendable ways.

Having said that, I also believe it is time to take a look at several aspects of the way the Department does business, and the work of this committee is therefore timely and sensible. It is over three decades since Goldwater-Nichols reshaped much of the day-to-day conduct of DoD business, and its effects have been overwhelmingly good. But three decades is a long time, and it makes a great deal of sense to look at new ways to think about how this enormous, $600 billion per year enterprise is run.

All the thoughts that I offer today should quite obviously be regarded merely as starting points for further discussion, as the issues are so significant and complex that they demand much study, collaboration, consideration of second order effects, and caution as we go forward.

As 2016 rolls around, it will be thirty years since the Goldwater-Nichols Act fundamentally reshaped the broad organization and specifically the chain of command of the military. It solidified the Joint requirements for education and promotion, cre-
ated the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and vested the power to conduct military operations solely in the Combatant Commanders, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President. After thirty largely successful years under Goldwater-Nichols, now is a good time to take a fundamental look at what we are doing in the massive Department of Defense and consider some new potential ideas.

Here are five admittedly controversial ideas to think about:

Create a Cyber Force. It is a foregone conclusion that we need a military Cyber Command, i.e. an independent, 4-star commander focused on cyber operations. The real question is: do we need a cyber force as well? If we look back a hundred years ago, we didn’t have an Air Force—quite obviously because we didn’t fly planes in any number. It took us over 50 years to figure out that we needed a separate branch of the military to focus on aviation.

Today we cannot conceive of a world in which we would not have trained, capable Airmen ready to defend their nation in the skies. Seems high time we considered a separate service to do the same in the cyber world, a place where we are increasingly under attack and in which many other nations have already militarized. And while we are at it, we should likewise think about whether this model works for Special Operations as well—i.e. creating a fully formed separate Service to perform all elements of Special Operations.

Give Each Regional Combatant Command a Civilian Deputy. As we look at a 21st century in which we need to exercise national security through not only the military instrument but also via diplomacy and development, having a senior civilian as a Deputy at each COCOM makes sense. The best choice would be a senior State Department official, preferably someone who had served as an Ambassador in the region for the Geographical Commanders. He or she should be detailed at the level of Minister-Counselor (1/2 star) with authority through the command.

This has already been successfully implemented at SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, and AFRICOM; and standardizing it makes sense to increase the interagency reach of the COCOMs. We should also give each of the Combatant Command staff a capable J–9 staff element to do interagency coordination and a very small group J–10 to do private public cooperation.

In terms of the Functional Combatant Commands, there may likewise be arguments for including a civilian deputy above the level of the current “Political Advisors POLAD” provided by State Department, although it is a less clear cut case. These commands should be examined on a case-by-case basis to see if this model is equally effective as it is for the Geographic Combatant Commanders.

Reduce the number of Geographic Combatant Commands, rationalizing them to four in number. This should be done in parallel with reducing the overall size of the staffs, which are too large given that much of the operational activity of the Department is conducted by Joint Task Forces anyway.

—Merge SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM into a single Americas Command. The artificial division of Mexico from SOUTHCOM hurts our unified purpose throughout Latin America and the Caribbean; and our Canadian allies are very involved in the world to the south as well. Making this one command—probably headquartered in Miami, with a sub-unified command in Colorado Springs retaining NORAD and air defense—would be efficient, save resources, and improve focus on the Americas.

—Merge EUCOM and AFRICOM, reconstructing the earlier model, now terming it Euro-Africa Command. The staffs remain collocated in Germany anyway, and there are savings to be had in terms of size much as is the case between the two commands focused on the Americas.

Stand up a truly independent General Staff with Operational Authority, atop the military chain of command. In today’s world, the officers assigned to the Joint Staff in the Pentagon essentially function in this role. The problem is that they know they will return to their parent services for promotion and advancement to the next rung on the career ladder.

An independent General Staff would be manned by the brilliant few, selected from their service at the level of 0–4/0–5, and permanently assigned to the General Staff. Additionally, some number of 0–6 and Flag / General officers could likewise be laterally assigned after their Captain / Colonel and Flag command assignments. But the key would be that they would no longer return to their parent services once they were assigned to the General Staff—only to Joint commands and / or back to the Pentagon General Staff.

It is also time to consider simply making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the senior operational commander, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. The Combatant Commanders should report to the Chairman, not to the Secretary of Defense. Frankly, this is how the system largely works in practice anyway; and it would merely codify the existing custom into a sensible, linear chain of command.
The Service Chiefs should continue to focus on train, equip, and organize functions, with additional responsibility for acquisition, reporting to the Service Secretaries.

Finally in this regard, it is worth looking at the entire system of "Joint Credit" for promotion, and potentially shifting the requirement for "Joint Credit" up to the 0–8 or even the 0–9 level. This would also permit dropping a significant number of "joint billets" which are needed to keep access to joint credit available to everyone. All of this would potentially permit reducing the total size of the officer corps.

**Unify Joint Professional Military Education (i.e. all of the War Colleges) Under one 3-star officer, who would also be the President of the National Defense University.**

Given the need for a coherent, unified curriculum under Joint aegis, having a single chain of command (as opposed to each of the Services) controlling Joint Education at the highest levels might make sense. This officer could then report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, functioning somewhat like a Combatant Commander for intellectual, research, and joint educational matters.

The cultural, educational, and organizational power of unifying the various War Colleges may make sense and, by the way, serve as a central point of effort to organize the study required to consider the other changes discussed herein. This command would then be essentially the intellectual arm of the General Staff described above.

All of these ideas are highly controversial, bordering on heretical. And I freely admit they may not be the exact right next moves. But I offer them as an examples of the kind of thinking we need to undertake on the upcoming 30-year anniversary of Goldwater-Nichols, which shook us up but may not have taken us far enough down the road to truly Joint, Interagency, and International / Coalition operations—which collectively represent the future of security in this turbulent 21st century.

Chairman McCzin. Thank you, Admiral.

Dr. Lamb?

**STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY**

Dr. Lamb. Senator McCain, Senator Reed, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share my views on improving the effectiveness of military operations this morning. Your invitation to testify is a great honor and especially so considering the distinguished service of your other witnesses today, General Schwartz and Admiral Stavridis. It is the high point of my career to be sitting with them today and in front of you, and I am really, truly humbled by the opportunity.

I also want to acknowledge the presence of my wife who, in light of the unconventional things I am about to say, decided I needed moral support, and I agree with her.

Chairman McCzin. We will hold her in no way responsible.

[Laughter.]

Dr. Lamb. She will appreciate that I know.

In my written statement, I argued for three sets of organizational changes to increase the effectiveness of U.S. military operations.

First, to correct a persistent lack of preparedness for irregular threats, I argue that we should give USSOCOM [U.S. Southern Command] the lead for small unit irregular conflict and the Marine Corps the lead for larger irregular conflicts.

Second, to make the best possible investments in military capabilities and maintain our advantages in major combat operations, I believe we should encourage the use of horizontal teams in the Department of Defense and support their work with collaborative management or joint scenarios, operating concepts, data, methods of analysis, risk metrics, and institutional knowledge. And I com-
pletely agree with General Schwartz that we need to reinvigorate our approach to joint headquarters so that we have standing task forces ready to experiment with and test new joint concepts.

And then, finally, to better integrate military operations with other instruments of national power, I believe we need legislation that allows the President to empower leaders to run interagency teams.

None of these recommendations are unique to me, and they have all been made before by various groups and individuals. But I hope now is an opportune time for the Senate and the leadership in the Department of Defense to reconsider their merits.

In the brief time remaining, I would like to address some likely questions about these recommendations, particularly with respect to horizontal or sometimes referred to as cross-functional teams because I know that members of the committee have expressed some interest in that. And so I want to raise a number of questions that are likely to come up in this area.

First of all, it is often asked whether all national security problems are not inherently complex and therefore require cross-functional teams. My response to that would be no. Clausewitz famously argued the most important judgment a statesman and commander have to make is determining, quote, the kind of war in which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature.

I think the same thing holds true for national security problems more generally. We need to determine the kind of problem being addressed. Not all military tasks are intrinsically joint. Not all national security missions are intrinsically interagency. If we say otherwise, we greatly increase the risks of failing to bring the right type of expertise to bear on the problem at hand.

Another question that frequently arises is whether all groups with representatives from functional organizations are, in effect, cross-functional teams. No. There is a huge difference between a committee and a team in the executive branch. The members of the committee, to use some shorthand, typically give priority to protecting their parent organization's equities, and the members of a cross-functional team give priority to the team mission.

So why do some groups work like teams and some groups work like committees? For example, why do all executive branch cross-functional groups not work as well as, say, an Army battalion headquarters, which also has to integrate functional expertise from the artillery, the infantry, armor, et cetera? Well, I think the answer is that the difference is the degree of autonomy exercised by the functional organizations and the degree of oversight exercised by their common authority. In a battalion headquarters, all the participants share a cross-cutting culture, have the obligation to follow legal orders, and receive direct and ongoing supervision from the battalion commander. Most interagency groups consist of members from organizations with quite different cultures, different legal authorities and obligations, and no supervision from the only person in the system with the authority to direct their behavior, the President.

Another question often raised is whether we do not already have in effect good interagency teams with empowered leaders, for ex-
ample, the State Department’s country teams. Ambassadors, after all, have been given chief of mission authority by the President.

Well, first of all, there are notable exceptions to that authority to the ambassador, particularly with respect to military and covert operations. But in any case, the ambassador’s authority is not sufficient. Many ambassadors are perceived as representing State’s interests rather than national interests. Hence, the country team members often feel justified in working around the ambassador, and the direct supervision of the President is so far removed that many of the people on the country teams feel that they can do that and actually be rewarded by their parent organizations for doing so.

I will stop there, but I want to close by anticipating one final reaction to the proposals for horizontal teams. Some will invariably complain that this is all rather complicated and that at the end of the day, we are better off just finding and appointing good leaders. This is an understandable but dangerous simplification.

First, as Jim Locher likes to say, there is no need to choose between good leaders and good organizations. We need both. Horizontal teams cannot be employed to good effect without supportive and attentive senior leaders, but neither can senior leaders of functional organizations solve complex problems without organizations that are engineered to support cross-cutting teams.

Second, in the current environment, titular leaders simply lack the time to supervise every or even the most important cross-cutting problems. Neither is it sufficient to simply insist that their subordinates, quote, get along. The heads of functional organizations have an obligation to represent their organization’s perspectives and expertise. This obligation, reinforced by bureaucratic norms and human nature, ensures that group members with diverse expertise will clash. Conflicting views are healthy, but they must be productively resolved in a way that gives priority to mission success and not less noble factors.

Finally, I would dare to say that the intense focus on leadership, particularly in this town, has always struck me as rather un-American. Our Founding Fathers realized the American people needed more than good leadership. They paid great attention to organizing the government so that it would work well or work well enough, even if it is not always led by saints and savants. We should do the same with respect to the Department of Defense and the national security system. Right now, I do not believe the men and women who go in harm’s way for our collective security are backed up by the best possible policy, strategy, planning, and decision-making system. That can and should change, and I am glad the committee is looking into this matter.

Thank you again for this opportunity to share some results of our research at National Defense University. I look forward to answering any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lamb follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB*

Senator McCain, Senator Reed, and members of the Committee, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to share some of my research and views on defense reform. The invitation to testify to the Senate Armed Service Committee is a great honor, especially considering the stature of your other witnesses today and their records of service to our country. It is humbling to be sitting next to them and in front of you today. I understand the Committee is interested in organizational changes that could increase the effectiveness of U.S. military operations and whether current combatant command and Service structures provide the necessary strategic planning and military readiness to ensure operational excellence. I hope to provide some useful insights for your consideration on those topics.

My testimony identifies three major impediments to high performance in military operations that can be corrected. Most of my recommendations involve the Department of Defense, but I also argue that interagency teams could be structured and incentivized to improve performance for some types of military operations. Fielding interagency teams would require some changes in the way we structure and run the larger national security system.

My views on these topics are shaped by my experience as a Foreign Service officer and mid-grade executive serving in both the Pentagon and Department of State over the past 20 years, and by research this past decade at National Defense University, including organizational performance studies in support of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and for the Project on National Security Reform. I am on record as a strong proponent of defense and national security organizational reform, and this testimony draws heavily upon previous research. Where appropriate I cite such research in support of my recommendations.

WHY REFORM?

Not everyone will agree there is a defense performance problem worthy of the Senate's attention. However, I believe that reforms in several areas could improve the effectiveness of military operations. A brief overview of major trends helps explain why. At the outset of World War II we were not as well prepared for war as our enemies, but we prevailed by learning, adapting and out-producing our foes. At war's end the United States accounted for just under forty percent of global gross domestic product. The resource preeminence of the United States put us in a good position to ensure permanent readiness against the global Soviet threat. During the Cold War we built new institutions to safeguard our freedoms, and we outlasted the enemy. After Vietnam we instituted an all-volunteer military, executed a revolution in military training techniques, leveraged technology successfully with increasingly realistic testing (compared to our World War II performance), and finally fixed our most egregious operational command and control problems with the Goldwater-Nichols legislative reforms. The result was stable nuclear deterrence and unparalleled world-leading conventional military forces. Our one glaring weakness throughout this period was poor performance against irregular threats.

The terror attacks on September 11, 2001 highlighted this weak spot and also its strategic import. 9/11 drove home the reality that terrorists are willing to and capable of launching mass-casualty attacks against us and our allies. In responding to 9/11 the national security system performed well in some areas. Success was usually a function of departments and agencies conducting their core missions extremely well, or leaders pioneering ways to generate new levels of interdepartmental cooperation on nontraditional missions. However, the system performed poorly on the whole, demonstrating our historic inability to counter irregular threats well. The United States spent prodigious sums, organized world-wide coalitions, swept large enemy formations from the field, and targeted terrorists and insurgent leaders on an industrial scale, but exercised little influence over eventual outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq. We squandered resources, lost public support, and arguably generated as many terrorists as were eliminated.

Despite fifteen years of war, the threat of catastrophic terrorist attacks remains. Distracted, if not exhausted by fifteen years of conflict, we have seen our notable advantages in major combat capabilities diminish relative to some nations that are exploiting the global explosion in information technologies. Areas that used to constitute an unhindered, unilateral advantage for U.S. forces are now subject to challenge. The credibility of our aging deterrent forces against weapons of mass destruction is also growing suspect. With our share of global gross domestic product roughly half of what it was following World War II and projected to decline in relative

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* The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
terms, peer competitors are likely to emerge much earlier than we anticipated following the collapse of the Soviet Union and prior to 9/11.

This broad overview of defense performance prompts several observations about the need for defense reform. First, we are long past due for correcting our persistent difficulties in dealing with irregular threats. Second, if resource overmatch was ever a good strategy, it has lost its luster and is no longer affordable. To maintain our current advantages in major combat operations we need to improve our ability to make good decisions on investments in military capabilities going forward. Third, effective military operations alone are insufficient. They must be integrated effectively with other instruments of power, something we currently do quite poorly. It is imperative that we improve our ability to collaborate across departments and agencies. In particular, the time has come to give the President the authority to delegate his authority for integrating department and agency efforts to manage or resolve complex, high-priority national security problems. In sum, we need a Pentagon that can manage the full range of security challenges; rationally allocate resources to priority missions; and collaborate well with other departments, agencies and allies. Consequently it is important to identify major impediments to these performance aspirations and understand how they might be overcome.

REFORMING IRREGULAR CONFLICT CAPABILITIES

Although irregular conflict is the subject of endless debate and terminological controversies, we understand its distinguishing features and why they require different military capabilities. In large-scale, force-on-force combat operations, the primary operational objective is destruction of enemy capabilities, which sets the conditions for subsequent political relationships. In major combat operations military necessity take precedence over all other concerns except the purpose for which the war is being fought. All other objectives remain in doubt until the adversary’s ability to resist is overcome. In contrast, military objectives are subordinate to, and constantly informed by, numerous political considerations in irregular conflict. In irregular conflict the immediate objective is not to take terrain and destroy forces, but to alter political relationships and, by extension, adversary behavior. Military operations are constantly tailored to and constrained by political considerations even down to the tactical level, which these kinds of military operations different and demanding.

Irregular conflicts take much longer, so patience and perseverance are necessary, and taxing. Protracted engagements make it imperative that costs—human, material, and political—be kept low. Popular political support (host country, U.S. domestic and international) determines which side will be able to best inform and sustain their operations, and our partners know and understand local populations far better than we do. When one of the protagonists can no longer count on the passive or active support of key population groups, they must reduce their presence, withdraw, or otherwise abandon their efforts. Thus, both to reduce costs and be effective, it is often advisable for the United States to work well with third parties, which is not easy to do.

For all these reasons, prevailing in irregular conflict requires military forces with some new or modified capabilities, or increased quantities of existing capabilities in the following areas:

- **Force protection** to keep casualties proportionate to the perceived US interests at stake; without it U.S. public support dwindles over time. In irregular conflict force protection is more demanding because it is difficult to identify the enemy, which means ambushes, surprise attacks, and acts of terror are the norm.
- **Discriminate and proportionate force** to keep the enemy on the defensive without provoking popular discontent, and over time to make the population feel secure enough to resist enemy coercion or better, to assist U.S. and allied forces. In major combat operations the U.S. military wants to avoid harm to non-combatants or exerting more force than necessary to achieve military objectives. However, these objectives are subordinate to the success of their military missions. In irregular conflicts the opposite is true; proportionate and highly discriminate use of force is a prerequisite for success.
- **Special intelligence** in irregular conflict is complex and more critical. In large-scale combat operations the intelligence community can focus on a standard set of primary indicators and warnings for enemy disposition, composition, and movement. Our most likely combat opponents and their order of battle are usually known well in advance of hostilities. In irregular conflict intelligence is required on short notice and for a broad set of social, political and military subjects, often cannot be collected by traditional technical means, and is more difficult to interpret once collected.
• Persuasive communications to influence foreign audiences with messages supportive of U.S. policy are more important in irregular conflict for the simple reason that it is difficult for terrorists to survive without popular support and impossible for insurgents. Hence, every effort must be made to convince the population that even passive support of the enemy is not in its interests. Persuasive communications are always difficult because they require a deep understanding of target audiences, but in irregular conflicts they also need to be immediately responsive to tactical developments to be effective.

• Modified command and control to ensure unified effort across diverse government departments and agencies and with allies. The requirement to apply all instruments of national power instead of relying primarily on military force means that irregular conflict is an intensely interagency effort. Moreover, policy and strategy in irregular conflicts are more fluid and must repeatedly be translated into realistic operational requirements. In turn operational plans must be carefully tailored to support policy objectives and repeatedly updated.

The list could be expanded, and the nomenclature, relative importance, situational impact, role of technology and many other aspects of irregular conflict could be debated, but these broad requirements are well-known and well-represented in all the classic literature on the topic, including our own U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual. So it is significant that the Department of Defense did a poor job of fielding capabilities for irregular conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This past year researchers at National Defense University completed a comprehensive review of lessons from the past decade and a half of war. After reviewing 23 senior leader accounts from both the Bush and Obama administration, as well as more than one hundred insider accounts, influential articles, blue-ribbon commissions, think tank and inspector general reports, it is clear there is a broad consensus that we performed poorly on strategic communications, specialized intelligence and equipment, and in providing civil-military administrative capacity for better governance.

There were bright spots to be sure. We achieved unprecedented integration of all-source intelligence in support of high-value targeting, and ground forces received equipment previously available only to Special Operations Forces (SOF): body armor, latest generation night vision goggles, intra-squad communications gear, tactical satellite radios, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, etc. We went from having 8 unmanned aerial vehicles in Iraq in 2003 to 1,700 by 2008, and within 18 months we deployed thousands of mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles to theater—an accomplishment some have described as an industrial feat not seen since World War II. To get these kinds of capabilities to the troops the Pentagon created new organizations and streamlined procedures and Congress supported these efforts by making copious amounts of funding available. Even so, and despite urgent requests from commanders in the field, much of this type of capability was late to need, and arrived only after senior leaders mounted extraordinary efforts to squeeze them out of a reluctant bureaucracy. Worse, much of this new-found capacity is now being abandoned.

For example, it took the Department a long time to realize that defeating insurgents, partnering with host-nation officials, and winning popular support are hardly possible without a profound understanding of local social and political relationships at all levels. The need for socio-cultural understanding has been cited as one of the “top 5” lessons learned from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a view echoed by many senior leaders in the Department of Defense. Yet the U.S. military’s traditional pattern of behavior on sociocultural knowledge is reemerging. After we develop sociocultural expertise at greater-than-necessary expense and too late to ensure success, we then abandon the hard-won capability as part of post-conflict budget reductions or out of deference to prevailing American strategic culture, which favors technology, small-unit combat skills, and large-scale military maneuver training rather than a deep understanding of our adversaries and their societies. Much of the organizational architecture developed to provide sociocultural knowledge to U.S. forces is being dismantled. The Army’s Irregular Warfare Center and Human Terrain Team programs have been shut down, and officers participating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program are not being promoted at rates comparable to the rest of the Army.

We also were slow to recognize irregular threats that arose in the aftermath of our regime-change operations. It took years to produce leadership, concepts, and via-

ble plans for countering insurgents. When some of our more capable and innovative field commanders combined traditionally effective counterinsurgency techniques with an astute appreciation of local political realities, they were uncommonly successful. In a healthy, high performing organization these extraordinary successes would have been rapidly recognized, rewarded, and replicated. Our record in this regard is spotty. Anecdotally, it appears extremely successful field commanders were passed over for promotion or promoted only after intervention by senior civilian leaders.

The replication of these successful examples was even more limited. The U.S. military adopted proven counterinsurgency techniques slowly and unevenly. In part this was because the methods used to achieve tactical successes challenged prevailing policy and strategy. Tactical partnering with local forces could fuel sectarian sentiments and undermine formal Iraqi governmental structures the United States was committed to supporting; it also often involved working with local leaders with checkered pasts or who were judged to be marginal players; and it ran counter to our policy of transferring responsibility for security to Iraqi military forces as quickly as possible, which was based on the assumption that the mere presence of U.S. forces was an irritant to be minimized as a matter of priority. For all these and other reasons the tactical successes of Marine and Army field commanders in late 2004 and 2005 failed to prompt a rapid reassessment of these policy and strategy assumptions.

Our desire to pass responsibility for security to host-nation forces also was handicapped by lack of preparedness for irregular conflict. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States had no plans for establishing local security forces and proceeded on an ad hoc basis. Once the efforts were under way we developed security forces modeled on U.S. institutions even though the local political, economic, and social conditions “made U.S. approaches problematic and unsustainable without a significant U.S. presence.” We also encouraged short tours and optimistic reporting, which made it difficult to evaluate actual progress. In turn, the longer it took commanders to recognize gaps between desired and actual performance, the longer it takes to adapt more effective methods.

In short, our performance in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced awareness that we are poorly prepared for irregular conflict. This was true before 9/11 and, with the exception of hunting high-value targets, largely remains the case today. Innumerous studies and Pentagon directives over the past decades have identified this problem and attempted to fix it by encouraging the Services to take the mission more seriously. On at least three occasions since World War II national leaders spent major political capital trying to force a solution. The Soviet Union’s support for “wars of national liberation” led President John F. Kennedy to embrace Special Forces and unconventional warfare, even replacing an Army Chief of Staff who he believed was unsympathetic to his plans. In 1986, after years of poor responses to terrorism and other political-military problems, Congress mandated new special operations and low-intensity conflict organizations over the objections of the Pentagon. More recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates launched his own personal effort to get the Pentagon to better balance conventional and irregular capabilities. These efforts failed, and it is not hard to see why.

We keep asking organizations that are raised, trained and equipped to conduct large-scale force-on-force combat operations to also conduct irregular conflict as a lesser-included mission. They invariably give priority to what they consider their more important core missions, and are slow to comprehend, much less invest in irregular conflict concepts and capabilities. They argue irregular conflict is not sufficiently different from conventional war to justify separate capabilities. They insist SOF have the mission covered, and that allies and other U.S. departments and agencies should do more. If forced to invest in irregular capabilities, the Services pursue less costly non-material initiatives like education and training that can be more easily reversed. They argue their future capabilities will be equally effective in all types of conflicts, so there is no need to buy equipment for irregular conflict now. If they must buy such equipment they typically abandon it as quickly as possible to avoid maintenance costs. If assigned an irregular conflict campaign, our field commanders learn on the fly.

Besides Service cultures focused on major combat operations, there are other factors handicapping readiness for irregular conflicts. Asking all the Services to be

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equally responsible for the mission just makes it easier for everyone to ignore the responsibility and harder for anyone to be held accountable for results. Also, irregular conflicts require a flexible approach to requirements and acquisition but the Pentagon usually does not do business this way. General requirements for irregular conflict are well-known but the amount and specific types of equipment needed are highly situation-dependent, transitory and difficult to establish in advance. What we need is a solid research and development base and some programs of record that can be rapidly expanded depending on emergent needs. This is precisely what Secretary Gates wanted to do when he called for the institutionalize procurement of [irregular] warfare capabilities.” But with the exception of USSOCOM, which was granted unusual acquisition authorities by Congress, this sort of approach to irregular conflict programs is difficult in today’s Pentagon. Finally, without a clear mission-lead the largest rather than the best-suited military organizations dominate command and control of deployed forces in irregular conflict (again SOF sometimes being an exception). As a result we often operate with less effectiveness early on, make the situation worse and inadvertently raise costs.

In my opinion we now have overwhelming evidence that the United States will not have a standing and ready irregular conflict capability until it clearly assigns that mission to specific organizations that are culturally capable of executing it and rewarded for doing so. USSOCOM promulgates four SOF “truths:” that in special operations humans are more important than hardware; SOF cannot be massed produced; quality is better than quantity; and competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur. These same truths largely apply to irregular conflict. We did not get world-class SOF without a powerful organization assigned to organize, train, equip and employ these forces, and the same has proven true for irregular conflict more broadly. Conventional forces can “learn” and prepare for irregular conflict after the fact, but the costs of doing so are high and the results are poor.

Different ways of ensuring irregular conflict capabilities have been proposed, including the creation of large new organizations, but the most sensible and politically feasible option would be to leverage the parts of the Department of Defense that are historically most proficient in irregular conflict: Special Operations Forces and the U.S. Marine Corps. In effect, we need to adjust military roles and missions to accommodate requirements for irregular conflict in a tiered approach. USSOCOM should be, and to some extent already is, the preferred option for small unit direct and indirect irregular conflict, but it needs to be upgraded to conduct indirect missions better. The U.S. Marine Corps has comparative advantages at the lower-end of the conflict spectrum compared to the Army, and with some increases in authori-

ties, force structure and equipment could take the lead role successfully for larger-scale irregular conflicts.

USSOCOM already is assigned the lead for many irregular conflict missions that can be conducted by small units, but its indirect capabilities need to be upgraded. By indirect, I do not mean “non-lethal,” as is often supposed. I mean working by, with and through foreign forces and populations with both lethal and non-lethal capabilities. Our preferred approach to irregular conflict should be working with host-nation forces, both to be more effective and to reduce the resource and political commitments of the United States. Indirect missions require greater specialization in what some call SOF’s “warrior-diplomat” or “cross-cultural” skill sets, including a deeper understanding of indigenous forces and populations. Direct SOF missions require more emphasis on technical skills, particularly those highly specialized capabilities involved in direct action behind enemy lines. For SOF to be equally well prepared for indirect and direct missions some units must weight their training and equipment toward warrior-diplomat skills while others concentrate on what some refer to as the SOF “commando” skills.

If USSOCOM is going to excel not only at special operations but also at irregular conflict more generally, it must put much greater emphasis on its ability to conduct missions indirectly. SOF indirect approaches and capabilities are as valuable and challenging to build, maintain and employ as SOF direct action capabilities. Some-what counter-intuitively, SOF indirect capabilities have actually atrophied this past decade; arguably when they could have been most useful. Successful indirect efforts in places like the Philippines were overshadowed by SOF direct action missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even SOF units that traditionally demonstrate greater appreciation for indirect approaches often paid more attention to direct action against ter-

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4 The case for improving USSOCOM’s indirect capabilities is made in “The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,” a prepared statement of Christopher J. Lamb before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representa-

9ves, July 11, 2012.
rorists and insurgent leaders in those countries.\textsuperscript{5} Army Special Forces in particular have sacrificed area orientation, language proficiency, and cultural appreciation within their assigned regions since 9/11. The operational demands of the Iraq and Afghan theaters led to a substantial degradation of SOF indirect skills.

Reconstituting these critical capabilities requires significant investment and leadership. USSOCOM leaders are aware of the problem and have been trying to upgrade SOF indirect capabilities. How well they are doing is a matter of great import. USSOCOM needs better socio-cultural knowledge; better persuasive information capabilities; more robust and quicker access to civil affairs skills; adjustments to the SOF selection process; a Washington presence for its indirect leadership and some indirect programs; new approaches to interagency collaboration on indirect approaches to irregular conflict; new authorities to oversee security assistance programs on a multi-year basis; and perhaps separate budget lines for direct and indirect capabilities. If the Committee looks into it and concludes USSOCOM is failing to provide these kinds of improvements, it may want to investigate new sub-unified commands for USSOCOM that cooperate but concentrate on the direct and indirect approaches, respectively.\textsuperscript{6}

For irregular conflict problems that cannot be contained and well-managed by small SOF teams, we would call upon the U.S. Marine Corps. The Marines would be assigned the lead role for large-scale, direct interventions against irregular opponents. The Marines would partner with USSOCOM, concentrate on the least secure areas that demand the most direct attention, and in more secure areas use their infrastructure to assist USSOCOM’s small-unit, indirect operations with host-nation forces. Of course the Army, Navy and Air Force would lend support for joint operations as necessary, but in terms of training and equipping their forces, they would be free to concentrate on major combat operations. Any irregular conflict mission requiring more than the combined forces of USSOCOM and the U.S. Marine Corps should probably be reconsidered, but \textit{in extremis} other forces could be assigned to operate under their direction as necessary.

The U.S. Marine Corps would require additional resources to be well prepared for its new, priority irregular conflict responsibilities. It would need new authorities for command of irregular conflict missions and fielding of irregular conflict equipment similar to the authorities Congress granted USSOCOM. Similarly, and again like USSOCOM, the Marines should be granted special irregular conflict acquisition authorities so that they could rapidly integrate and field relevant technology and equipment tailored for irregular conflicts. In addition, it would be necessary to increase Marine force structure and transfer some existing capabilities for irregular conflict from the Services; the types of irregular conflict capabilities the other Services have long refused to purchase and maintain. This would include slower fixed-wing aircraft for reconnaissance and close fire support; brown- and green-water vessels for inland waterways and coastal patrol boats; up-armored vehicles; etc. The Marines would maintain a prudent technology base for irregular conflict capabilities. If the Committee looks into it and concludes USSOCOM is failing to provide these kinds of improvements, it may want to investigate new sub-unified commands for USSOCOM that cooperate but concentrate on the direct and indirect approaches, respectively.\textsuperscript{6}

For irregular conflict problems that cannot be contained and well-managed by small SOF teams, we would call upon the U.S. Marine Corps. The Marines would be assigned the lead role for large-scale, direct interventions against irregular opponents. The Marines would partner with USSOCOM, concentrate on the least secure areas that demand the most direct attention, and in more secure areas use their infrastructure to assist USSOCOM’s small-unit, indirect operations with host-nation forces. Of course the Army, Navy and Air Force would lend support for joint operations as necessary, but in terms of training and equipping their forces, they would be free to concentrate on major combat operations. Any irregular conflict mission requiring more than the combined forces of USSOCOM and the U.S. Marine Corps should probably be reconsidered, but \textit{in extremis} other forces could be assigned to operate under their direction as necessary.

The U.S. Marine Corps would require additional resources to be well prepared for its new, priority irregular conflict responsibilities. It would need new authorities for command of irregular conflict missions and fielding of irregular conflict equipment similar to the authorities Congress granted USSOCOM. Similarly, and again like USSOCOM, the Marines should be granted special irregular conflict acquisition authorities so that they could rapidly integrate and field relevant technology and equipment tailored for irregular conflicts. In addition, it would be necessary to increase Marine force structure and transfer some existing capabilities for irregular conflict from the Services; the types of irregular conflict capabilities the other Services have long refused to purchase and maintain. This would include slower fixed-wing aircraft for reconnaissance and close fire support; brown- and green-water vessels for inland waterways and coastal patrol boats; up-armored vehicles; etc. The Marines would maintain a prudent technology base for irregular conflict capabilities. If the Committee looks into it and concludes USSOCOM is failing to provide these kinds of improvements, it may want to investigate new sub-unified commands for USSOCOM that cooperate but concentrate on the direct and indirect approaches, respectively.\textsuperscript{6}

With USSOCOM taking the lead on small unit irregular conflict missions like the raid on Bin Laden’s hideaway and the advisory mission to the Philippines, and the Marines taking responsibility for larger direct interventions against irregular opponents such as we faced in Afghanistan and Iraq, the nation would be much better prepared for irregular conflicts. And the Services would not be distracted from their prepared for major combat operations. Instead of spending valuable senior leader time and scarce training resources on difficult programs like regionally-aligned brigades, the Army, Navy and Air Force could concentrate on reestablishing our diminishing training lead in major combat operations.

This division of labor would be more efficient in the short and long-term. Short-term savings would come from abandoning universal requirements like language training, irregular forces at major combat training centers, efforts to improve training of foreign forces throughout our force structure, etc. Critical irregular conflict requirements such as force protection (e.g. up-armored vehicles), discriminate force (e.g. non-lethal weapons, Military Police); intelligence (e.g. persistent counter-insur-

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{6}A case for this is made in David Tucker and Christopher Lamb, \textit{U.S. Special Operations Forces}, Columbia University Press, 2007.
\end{footnotesize}

The Department of Defense already expends considerable resources to maintain a high state of readiness for SOF and the Marines, particularly in training, air and sea-lift, and amphibious capabilities. These organizations are already postured for global, expeditionary operations with minimum overseas infrastructure. It is inherently more efficient to ask them to serve as the first, second and preferred proponents for irregular conflict than to ask all the Services to maintain readiness for the same. For example, the Marines already have the expeditionary infrastructure to manage brown- and green-water operations more efficiently than the Navy, and provide responsive close air support in irregular conflict operations more readily than the Air Force.

Over the long-term the Department of Defense could expect better performance and additional savings from operational efficiencies. Assigning the irregular conflict mission to USSOCOM and the U.S. Marine Corps would increase the chances that such operations could be conducted with a small footprint and expert command and control. Irregular conflict requires inherently “joint,” interagency and multinational operations. Both USSOCOM and the Marines are intrinsically joint and capable of working with interagency partners as demonstrated historically and in recent operations. SOF are particularly well adapted to work through third parties with small numbers of advisors. If an irregular conflict problem exceeded SOCOM’s capacity the Marines could draw upon those historical, cultural and structural attributes that make them a more efficient irregular conflict mission partner than the larger Services, including a higher tooth-to-tail ratio. If, in extreme circumstances, the other Services were needed they would support the Marines and SOF. Inverting the general rule that the largest forces have the top command slots would help ensure tactical irregular operations are controlled by appropriate expertise from the beginning.

This new division of labor makes particular sense in a time of declining resources when organizations naturally focus on what they consider to be their “core competencies.” A better division of labor takes advantage of this natural tendency to focus on core missions by reducing duplication and increasing specialization (i.e., competence). Currently Army efficiency is undermined by the view that it should be a “full-spectrum” rather than a decisive land force. For example, a proper active-reserve balance would be easier to achieve if the Army focused just on decisive land battle. Similarly, Marine Corps efficiency would improve if the Marines’ strategic concept unequivocally included irregular conflict. The Department of Defense already absorbs the cost of amphibious expeditionary units that have air, sea and land elements in an organization that has historically conducted irregular conflict well. It is more efficient to ask that organization to expand its existing elements to include capabilities for irregular conflict. In an emergency, the Marines—supported by Air Force and other naval forces—would still pack enough punch to stop most conventional aggressors until the Army arrived on the scene.

REFORMING PENTAGON DECISION MAKING

Limited Pentagon decision-making capacity also constrains the effectiveness of military operations. A decade ago the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report put major emphasis on improving decision-making capacity. It said “the complex strategic environment demands that our structure and processes be streamlined and integrated to better support the President and joint warfighter;” and “recent operational experiences demonstrated the need to bring further agility, flexibility and horizontal integration to the defense support infrastructure.” The report asserted the Department had “moved steadily toward a more integrated and transparent senior decision-making culture and process for both operational and investment matters;” that it had “made substantial strides in … the creation of new organizations and processes that cut across traditional stovepipes;” and “most importantly, the Department has made notable progress toward an outcome-oriented, capabilities-based planning approach that provides the joint warfighter with the capabilities needed to address a wider range of asymmetric challenges.”

7 It has been argued that the “every marine is a rifleman” ethos “allows a high degree of adaptability” for irregular warfare missions. Michael R Melillo, “Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities,” Parameters, Carlisle Barracks: Autumn 2006. Vol.36, Issue 3.

The report was correct about the need to improve Pentagon decision-making capacity, but overly optimistic about the amount of progress in that direction. Like many organizations the Pentagon is divided into hierarchical structures that represent different bodies of expertise: e.g., policy, intelligence, personnel, program analysis, acquisition, and budgeting. Within these bodies are subdivisions that further specialize in more narrowly defined subjects. These stove piped divisions each build and nurture expertise in a relatively narrow body of knowledge. There are advantages to such organizations but typically they are incapable of rapid, integrated decision making, which the 2006 report acknowledged the Pentagon needed to keep pace with the evolving security environment. That conclusion is even more valid today.

The Pentagon has elaborate processes and laborious coordination procedures to integrate diverse expertise across its functional organizations. Generally speaking, however, these attempts at integration produce compromises that paper over critical assumptions, distinctions, and differences of opinion that need to be resolved. Separate organizations in in the Office of the Secretary of Defense lead various stages of these decision-making processes. Each office leading a component part of the strategy process depends on other parties in the process to do their work well and protect the integrity of the decision process. Each organizational boundary crossed opens up an opportunity for the dilution of strategic logic.

The overall process values compromise more than clear choices among competing alternatives. All organizations’ equities are protected to the extent possible, which results in long lists of desired objectives. Offices managing the process further down the line often use those wide-ranging priorities as justification for picking and choosing their own areas to emphasize, which loosens the strategy logic, sometimes beyond recognition. The same types of compromises affect the Joint Staff’s efforts to create meaningful joint operational concepts. Because the Department cannot make trades at these broader levels in the analytic chain of reasoning—strategy, planning and operational concepts—the rest of the downstream processes—requirements, programs and budgets—is managed without the benefit of broader context. Each link in the chain of reasoning tends to operate semi-autonomously. Thus the process is not truly “strategy driven,” which is a major reason the Department is unable to rationally allocate resources to produce the most valuable capabilities for the most important missions.

When diverse groups do meet to cooperate there are disincentives for information sharing and collaboration. Involving other parties slows and waters down the resultant products. One Joint Staff assessment in support of the 2006 QDR effort identified over 860 cross-cutting groups that Joint Staff personnel attended. All but a handful of these groups were information-sharing and not decision-making bodies. Even so, they shared information incompletely because extant organizational incentives militate against transparency. When measured by what they produce, these groups absorb large amounts of staff time and energy without producing what the Chairman and Secretary need most, which is truly integrated assessments of problems, their causes and preferred solutions.

The bureaucracy’s penchant for producing consensus products encourages talented and highly motivated officials to get their positions directly to senior decision-makers by circumventing the formal coordination process. If the issue is simply a narrow functional concern, then a quick decision this way can be made without much risk. But the most important issues are increasingly multidisciplinary or cross-functional, and proposals presented by one functional entity invariably reflect a limited perspective that does not benefit from all relevant information. The narrow, functional proposals presented to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary often contradict one another, and with the limited information provided, it is difficult for these senior officials to determine which position is the more compelling and why. Thus it is difficult for senior leaders to make well-reasoned tradeoffs among competing alternatives.

In essence, Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries have to serve as their own integrators of functional expertise, diving deeply into the issues that matter most to them to investigate the “stove piped” or “least common denominator” products they receive and root out critical issues. This is what Secretary Gates did to ensure the delivery of needed armor and theater intelligence and surveillance assets to Iraq. Yet this is a difficult task for Secretaries of Defense and an inefficient use of their

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limited time. Pentagon organizations husband their information carefully. Data is safeguarded; analysis is not collaborative, methods, metrics and lexicon are not common or agreed upon; and institutional knowledge is not easily retained or retrieved for the benefit of all components. So it takes a great deal of time for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to assess the competing positions presented to them. Moreover, they are constrained by the political liabilities of overriding powerful personalities and institutional interests. Hence, decisions tend to be made slowly if at all, or if in response to a crisis, made without the benefit of requisite information and supporting analysis.

Not surprisingly, these circumstances frustrate Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries, who feel poorly supported by their staff. They often conclude, incorrectly, that it is the sheer size of the staff that prevents better decision support. In reality, it is the inability of their functional leaders to collaborate and produce integrated problem assessments and solution proposals. Staffs could be cut in half and the Secretary would receive 50 percent less paperwork, but he would not receive one smidgen more of the better reality. Pentagon middle managers and action officers are working extremely hard; just not to good effect. The Pentagon’s large staff ends up working marginal resource allocation issues, and consumes too much time and energy for too little effect. In essence, large amounts of the Secretary’s most important and expensive commodity—human talent—is wasted.

Improving decision-making capacity in the Department of Defense requires holistic organizational reform. However, several fundamental changes are especially important. The Secretary cannot be the first point of integration for the Department’s most important cross-functional endeavors. He needs horizontal organizations empowered to generate cross-cutting problem assessments and solution alternatives. Such teams could manage cross-cutting functions for the Secretary but also oversee real-world missions that require the rapid integration of diverse functional specialties. They would examine problems “end-to-end” and be the designated strategic integration point across all bodies of expertise, freeing up senior leaders to focus on key strategic decisions. The teams would intervene selectively to eliminate friction and sub-optimal efforts where component parts of the Department are not collaborating to maximum effect. The presumption is that the Secretary will back up their authority to intervene and obtain the results he wants. Leaders of functional organizations would be free to focus on problems resident within their domains.

For the horizontal organizations to succeed, they must be constituted correctly and their leaders empowered appropriately. They must be given proper resources, to include office space, administrative support, and members committed for specific periods of duration and levels of effort. The groups also must be given clear objectives; preferably a clear, written mandate that identifies what is to be accomplished and why. The groups must be allowed to decide how to accomplish their objectives, identify their metrics for evaluation and feedback, and what expertise they need. Group members that represent bodies of functional expertise must be given incentives to collaborate with the other members of the group and not simply represent their parent organization’s interests. This means the group leader must be able to return the expert in question to his parent organization and must have a say in their evaluations. If these horizontal organizations are not empowered, the reorganization efforts will fail. They will simply become another layer of advisory groups that further confuse the rest of the Pentagon entities about their respective roles and responsibilities.

These cross-cutting teams would encounter less resistance from functional organizations if the Department could do a better job of determining which problems are actually cross-functional rather than primarily the responsibility of a single functional domain. In this regard the Department’s tendency to label all operating concepts “joint” complicates a proper division of labor between the Services and joint entities. Our broadest operating concepts are invariably joint but many subordinate operating concepts like anti-submarine warfare should be considered “Service-centric” and left to the Services to formulate and update. There may be an element of joint command and control or information sharing involved in Service-centric military concepts of operation but the vast bulk of the requisite expertise is resident in a single Service. Distinguishing between operating concepts that are intrinsically joint, like theater air and missile defense, and concepts that are largely the preserve of one Service, would make a meaningful division of labor between the Services and joint entities much easier.

To better support decision making by senior officials and their cross-cutting teams, the Pentagon also needs a reformed decision support culture. In the training revolutions of the 1970s the Services transformed their combat capabilities by introducing objective, empirical feedback into training exercises with the aid of new sim-
ulation technologies and after-action reports to improve learning and future battlespace decision making. The new training approaches instilled respect for collaboration, information sharing, and empirical objectivity. A similar transformation of Pentagon decision support capabilities is needed, and it would require sustained attention from the Secretary.

To begin with, the Secretary would have to make a point of insisting on collaboration from senior leaders. He can do this through his personal example and key hiring decisions. The Secretary also would need a small technical support staff that I have referred to elsewhere as a Decision Support Cell, to oversee the new approach to information sharing in support of analysis. The cell would ensure that decision support is transparent, based upon clear assumptions about security challenges and options to meet those challenges. In particular, it would be responsible for ensuring all organizations have equal access to the same joint scenarios (to bound the assumptions about priority problem sets); authoritative joint operating concepts (testable preferred ways to solve operational problems); joint data (common assumptions about forces, performance, terrain, etc.); joint methods of analysis (transparent means of assessing risk); joint operational risk metrics (standards for measuring value and risk); and repositories of institutional knowledge (the means to retrieve and build upon knowledge). Currently no single entity has the authority to produce these necessary precursors for good analysis of alternatives.

Finally, the Department needs some selective investments in greater jointness that would allow it to empirically test and exercise innovative improvements in operational military capabilities. Even though Joint Forces Command was disbanded and widely assessed as inefficient, we still need the ability to generate standing joint task force headquarters that can conduct realistic experimentation in and testing of innovative joint operating concepts. The Services have the technical capacity and resources to fully explore Service-centric operating concepts, but we lack commensurate capability to test new joint concepts with joint headquarters.

In fact, the ability to optimize joint headquarters and operations has largely eluded us. It is stunning to realize that we were not even able to achieve unified command of all military forces in Afghanistan until 10 years of war had passed. Secretary Gates is forthright in acknowledging command relationships in Afghanistan were a “jerry-rigged arrangement [that] violated every principle of the unity of command.” SOF and conventional forces had trouble coordinating their operations, and even within the SOF community, which ostensibly shares a common chain of command and considers unified effort a core organizational value, we could not achieve unified effort. Despite broad agreement among national security leaders, USSOCOM leaders and many individual SOF commanders that the indirect approach to counterinsurgency should take precedence over kill/capture operations, the opposite occurred. SOF units pursuing counterterrorism took precedence and often failed to sufficiently coordinate their efforts with other SOF units conducting counterinsurgency. It is apparent we need a much more aggressive effort to field truly joint task force headquarters and experiment with the same during peacetime.

ENABLING UNIFIED EFFORT IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

The national security system’s inability to routinely integrate the efforts of diverse departments and agencies has long been recognized, but the impact of this limitation on successful military operations is less appreciated. For example, it is widely assumed that senior leaders are uniquely responsible for the unsatisfactory outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq. When things go wrong it is natural to blame leaders, reasoning that things would have gone better if they had made better decisions. It also is understandable that poor outcomes are often linked to common decision-making errors such as flawed assumptions, improper analogies, tunnel vision, and cognitive dissonance. Almost by definition when things go badly, these types of limitations are in play to some extent. However, it is also important to acknowledge that leaders are not in complete control of outcomes and that they are constrained to make their decisions within an organizational and political system with behaviors they do not fully control. For these reasons, good outcomes are not always the result of great decision making, and bad outcomes are not always the result of flawed decision making. The war in Iraq is a case in point.

A close examination of the historical record demonstrates that disunity of effort provides a better explanation for what went wrong in Iraq than the belief that sen-


ior leaders based their decisions on optimistic assumptions, made them without ex-
amining a sufficient range of options, or failed to adjust their decisions as cir-
cumstances changed. For example, many believe U.S. leaders made the “heroic” as-
sumption that Iraqis would welcome U.S. forces with open arms and there would
be no civil unrest in response to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. U.S.
leaders were not so naive. They thought the majority Shiite population would wel-
come Saddam’s ouster but the Sunnis much less so, and that in any case whatever
welcome U.S. forces received would not last. Intelligence on Iraq predicted a “short
honeymoon period” after deposing Saddam, and almost all decision-makers in De-
fense, State, and the White House worried that an extended American occupation
would be costly and irritate the local population. Most senior leaders preferred a
“light footprint” approach in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As many commentators
have noted, there were multiple planning efforts prior to the war by State, Defense,
and other national security institutions that underscored how difficult the occupa-
tion might be. These insights found a ready audience in the Bush administration,
which came to office disdaining extended nation-building missions and warning that
the U.S. military was “most certainly not designed to build a civilian society.”

Yet there were deep disagreements among senior leaders about how best and how
fast to pass authority to the Iraqis while reducing U.S. presence. The Department
of Defense preference was a short transition period for military forces with a quick
turnover of authority to Iraqi expatriates. The Department of State, including Sec-
retary Colin Powell (and later Ambassador Bremer), did not want an extended occu-
pation of Iraq either. However, State believed it would be difficult to find others
willing to take responsibility for the future of Iraq and that the United States would
have to do so since it had engineered the war. State wanted the speed and scale
of U.S. postwar activities commensurate with the U.S. interests at stake. It thought
the quickest way out of Iraq was to make the maximum effort to stabilize it fol-
lowing the termination of large-scale fighting, which meant a large ground force for
security, plenty of development assistance, and as much international support as
could be mustered.

The White House explicitly considered the U.S. obligation to Iraq after deposing
Saddam Hussein. The President decided to give Iraqis a chance at democracy be-
cause he thought it was the right thing to do, albeit not a vital security interest for
the United States. This decision meant State and DOD could not ignore the post-
war mission but left plenty of wiggle room for disagreements about how the mission
should be conducted. The two departments obliged. They disagreed over the impor-
tance of ensuring good governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, over the appropriate
level of U.S. commitment to this mission, over how it should be carried out, and over
which department would do what to execute postwar tasks. These disagreements
should not have been a surprise; they had been a longstanding bone of contention
between the two departments.

Consistent with previous experience, President Bush did not resolve the dif-
ferences. The President gave the lead for postwar planning to DOD to preserve “uni-
fied effort.” But he also promised Ambassador Bremer that he would have the au-
thority and time he needed to stabilize Iraq (that is, to take the Department of
State approach). As the situation deteriorated, State was increasingly adamant
about security and DOD was increasingly adamant about early departure for U.S.
forces. State increased its appeals for more troops, while Rumsfeld’s generals told
him counterinsurgency was an intelligence-dependent mission and that more troops
would be counterproductive. When Ambassador Bremer worried the Department of
Defense was setting him up to take responsibility for failure by pushing an acceler-
ated schedule for turning over authority to the Iraqis, President Bush reiterated his
promise to support more time and resources for Iraq. The NSC staff refereed the
debates between State and DOD, looking for ways to effect compromises. The views
of the two departments were not reconciled and the success of the postwar mission
was compromised—not because of optimistic assumptions about Iraqi sentiments,
but because differences between strong departments were not managed well.

I believe our greatest, most persistent, most deleterious implementation problem
in Afghanistan and Iraq was our inability to integrate the vast capabilities resident
in the national system for best effect. Many blue-ribbon commissions and senior De-
partment of Defense leaders agree. General Wayne Downing, a former four-star
commander of the nation’s special operations forces, argued after 9/11 that, “the in-
eragency system has become so lethargic and dysfunctional that it materially in-
hibits the ability to apply the vast power of the U.S. government on problems,” a
fact made evident by “our operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan” and elsewhere. Several Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also are on record lamenting insufficient interagency cooperation, including General Richard Meyers and General Peter Pace. General Pace, after years of managing the military portion of the effort against Al-Qaeda, argued the enemy could not be defeated without better interagency cooperation. He bluntly concluded, “We do not have a mechanism right now to make that happen.” Pace and other senior military officers argued for legislation to force interagency cooperation much as the Goldwater Nichols legislation at the end of the 1980s forced joint cooperation among the military services.

Recent Secretaries of Defense are also on record complaining that interagency mechanisms do not work well. Secretary Cohen called the interagency policymaking process in the late 1990s “dysfunctional,” and Secretary Rumsfeld made the same point, saying the endless and fruitless interagency meetings he participated in “sucked the life” out of senior officials. He told the 9/11 Commission that a legislative fix was needed. When Secretary Robert Gates replaced Secretary Rumsfeld he told Congress that:

“Nearly nine years under four Presidents on the National Security Council staff taught me well about the importance of interagency collaboration and cooperation. The U.S. clearly needs a government-wide approach to the challenges we face today and will face in the future. If confirmed, this type of interagency collaboration and cooperation will be one of my priorities.”

Not long into his tenure as Secretary of Defense, however, Secretary Gates concluded wholesale reform of the national security system was needed to improve cross-organizational collaboration. He noted: “The U.S. government has tried, incrementally, to modernize our posture and processes in order to improve interagency planning and cooperation mostly through a series of new directives, offices, coordinators, tsars, and various initiatives,” and he concluded these half-measures were insufficient. Two years later he was even more emphatic, arguing that: “America’s interagency toolkit is a hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.” Michelle Flournoy, Secretary Gates’ Under Secretary of Defense for Policy matters later added an exclamation point to his concerns:

“...to face 21st century threats with national security processes and tools that were designed for the Cold War—and with a bureaucracy that sometimes seems to have been designed for the Byzantine Empire, which, you will recall, didn’t end well. We’re still too often rigid when we need to be flexible, clumsy when we need to be agile, slow when we need to be fast, focused on individual agency equities when we need to be focused on the broader whole of government mission...”

In other words, we have long recognized that insufficient unity of effort in the national security system is a major handicap for successful military operations, but we have been at a loss for how to correct this liability. My hope is that recent research from National Defense University can help point the way forward.

Various senior leaders and studies increasingly argue for interagency groups that operate as teams (sometimes labeled as fusion cells, task forces, etc.). One prob-

A careful comparison of the case studies reveals several prerequisites for success. Many interagency groups fail to perform well because representatives attending initial meetings begin to doubt that senior leaders care whether the effort succeeds or not. Evidence that senior leaders strongly support the group’s mission is therefore a critical first prerequisite. The nature of the support senior leaders provide varied in the cases studied, but was sufficient to strongly suggest that both Congress and the Executive Branch leaders considered the missions assigned to the groups national priorities and wanted them pursued on an interagency basis. These preferences were communicated formally through directives and mandates, and informally through attention paid to the groups and their issues. Otherwise, the senior leaders generally allowed the groups great latitude, and did not provide a lot of overt intervention to smooth the way to success.

After senior leader support, agreement on purpose seems to be the next most important precondition for success. The case studies suggest it is possible to start with a broad idea of the group’s mission and then forge a more specific concept for execution as the group better understands the problems it is tackling. All four groups also benefited from access to required resources, although they were managed differently by each group. When senior leaders make a point of providing special resources for a group it reinforces and communicates their support. Not all missions require the same types or amounts of resources, however. For example, in the case of the group charged with countering Soviet disinformation, the primary resource required was information resident in multiple departments and agencies about Soviet activities and techniques. In the case of the U.S. program to arm and train Bosnian Federation forces, substantial amounts of cash and equipment were required.

The next most important prerequisite for success was team leadership. Successful interagency team leaders exhibited a propensity for taking charge, taking risk, and assuming responsibility for outcomes. They put mission success ahead of parent organization’s preferences, which was risky bureaucratic behavior. Successful interagency team leaders all delegated substantial authority, trusted their subordinates and encouraged initiative. Interestingly, teams were able to produce great results with a mix of high performing and mainstream personnel from diverse departments and agencies and without an extraordinary reward system in place. Some enduring teams shifted from more mainstream membership to higher performers as time went by and recruiting new team members became easier. However, the ability of these

have made the same recommendation. For example, see Project Horizon Progress Report, Washington D.C., Summer 2006.

teams to perform at a high level with the members initially assigned to them is noteworthy.

It also is interesting that team members proved highly productive without tangible incentives. The vast majority of members on all the teams had no expectations of personal recognition or monetary rewards, either before or during their service. On the contrary, many assumed their careers would be put on hold or retarded by assignment to the teams. It was actually more important for team leaders to provide positive feedback to the departments and agencies providing the personnel than to the personnel themselves. This was true for all four teams, although some team leaders made point of making their team members feel appreciated. What team members in all four cases did receive, however, were huge psychological dividends when it became clear they were making a difference on important missions. As a result, most members were devoted to their teams and motivated to work long hours—around the clock and seven days a week when circumstances demanded it.

In addition, successful teams also required some unique structure. In particular, their lead role benefited from colocation and full-time focus on their missions. Small size was another common structural attribute. All the groups were between seven and fifteen persons (in the case of Joint Interagency Task Force South, the organization’s leadership team was this size). However, all four teams aggressively pursued support from outside the team by engaging senior leaders, negotiating partnerships with other organizations, and monitoring entities conducting work on behalf of the teams. Even more important for high productivity, all four groups were structured for end-to-end mission management. This meant that within the scope of their mission they took responsibility for the entire sequence of functions required to achieve desired outcomes. If the group operated at the national level, as was true for the Reagan-era Active Measures Working Group and the Clinton-era Bosnia Train and Equip task force, end-to-end mission management meant taking responsibility for policy, strategy, plans, operations, assessments and adjustments to all components of the mission effort to ensure desired outcomes.

The willingness to take responsibility for all activities necessary to produce results was critically dependent upon each group’s leadership. Typically an interagency group conceives its mission in limited terms. At the national level, the strong inclination is to limit an interagency group to just a policy or planning exercise. At lower levels there is a tendency to limit a group’s mission to whatever the lead or most powerful participant prefers to do. However, in the four success cases we studied, the team leaders accepted a broader “end-to-end” mission concept that increased responsibility for actual results but also increased the risks of failure. In some cases, like the Bosnia Train and Equip task force, the need to produce results in the field was essentially part of the original mission statement. Even so, the task force embraced the intensely operational responsibility for results when they could have avoided doing so. In other cases, like the Active Measures Working Group and Joint Interagency Task Force South, the leaders dared to take responsibility for “end-to-end” mission performance when it was much less necessary.

The “end-to-end” conceptualization of all four missions was critical for productivity. It encouraged responsibility and accountability. Once the groups established their lead role for all components of the mission, there were no acceptable excuses for poor performance. There were no other actors working a portion of the process that could be held responsible for failures. In such circumstances, only the inherent difficulty of the mission or inadequate group performance were likely explanations for poor results. In all four cases, the interagency groups rose to the challenge and held themselves accountable for demonstrable progress toward group objectives.

The “end-to-end” approach adopted by the four groups did not mean they operated independently or that they did everything themselves. The groups received guidance. The groups had to work within the parameters established by higher authorities. Sometimes the scope of the group’s activities was clear; other times it had to be discerned or explored. For example, the Active Measures Working Group determined that it had to concentrate on countering Soviet disinformation rather than taking on more aggressive active measures against the Soviet Union. This was a point of dispute in the group, but the leaders knew the more aggressive measures would collapse support for the group and decided to leave those efforts to a classified group working out of the National Security Council staff.

The research identified other group attributes correlated with success, including the need to preserve good to great levels of trust and the ability to learn from experience, which includes leader support for innovation and a willingness to delegate responsibilities. However, the main point to be made here is that stellar interagency performance is possible even in our current system; it’s just exceedingly uncommon. The reason for this is that the groups require special empowerment and must work around strong system impediments and disincentives. We would be much better
served by a national security system that supports rather than thwarts such interagency collaboration.

At first the prerequisites for success identified by our research might seem mundane. Most people would assume that a team requires adequate authority and resources to perform its mission well, and that having senior leaders assign a small group a clear mission, a capable leader and necessary resources meet those requirements. However, it is important to note that the groups did not have the directive authority that some observers believe is essential for high-performing interagency groups. They were able to use the senior leader support they received to encourage collaboration across departments and agencies, and once they had a collaborative effort under way, the legal authorities resident in multiple departments and agencies were sufficient to accomplish their missions. Having directive authority would make it easier to field and sustain high performing interagency teams, but the case studies suggest it is not a necessary precondition for success when other support is in place.

In addition, we need to recognize how rare it is for interagency groups to have a clear purpose and adequate resources to accomplish their missions in the current national security system. Most interagency small groups are assigned broad missions without a clear focus. It has long been argued that it is much more difficult for standing interagency committees with general responsibilities for coordination to perform effectively, in contrast to interagency groups that are organized to pursue a more limited objective and that "go out of business once their assigned task is accomplished." Joint Interagency Task Force South, which manages the counter-narcotics mission on a continuing basis, belies the notion that standing interagency groups cannot perform well. However, it does seem from the four cases researched that a well-defined mission and group consensus on what is being accomplished are critically important to team performance.

Normally interagency groups also lack the resources necessary to accomplish their missions. Because of the way government is structured and resourced, it is common to approve interagency strategies without providing the resources essential for success. The participating departments and agencies are expected to provide the resources voluntarily. In the national security system, other departments and agencies frequently look to the large Department of Defense to pick up the tab for new initiatives, and it typically resists. The tendency to assign missions without identifying commensurate resources for the group means many interagency small group efforts are doomed to fruitless bickering over which organization will pay, or to a loose coordination effort since every organization naturally demands control over any resources it contributes.

It is even rarer for interagency small groups in the national security system to own an entire mission area as opposed to being assigned just one segment of the enterprise; for example, establishing policy; making plans; and executing some portion of the required operations. Rarely does an interagency group manage its mission "end-to-end" as was true for the four cases studied. Members of the four successful groups believed mission focus and comprehensive responsibility for the mission were keys to success. Groups with a more diverse set of responsibilities that dilute the group's focus, and groups that are responsible for only one segment of a mission chain find it much more difficult to achieve success.

In the current system most small groups operate without directive authority. Instead, they are based on the voluntary cooperation of the departments and agencies that staff them. In cases where simple information sharing is all that is necessary or desired, interagency small groups can succeed. If active cooperation or a high performing team is necessary, then interagency groups needs assistance to escape the centrifugal forces that pull them apart and incline their members to protect their parent organizations' equities rather than give priority to the group's mission. Assuming our case studies are a good representation of system tendencies, senior leaders who want an interagency small group to succeed need to set it up for success by:


1) Communicating the group’s mission clearly, the priority they attach to it and the fact that it can only be undertaken on an interagency basis;
2) Providing the group resources as required by the mission;
3) Finding a leader committed to the mission who is willing to buck his own parent organization’s predilections;
4) Permitting the group to collocate and work the problem full-time if the mission’s level of difficulty demands it; and
5) Allowing the leader and his or her team the latitude to manage their problem “end-to-end,” or from strategy to its execution and assessment, so that the group effectively controls all aspects of the solution chain.

It helps if Congress supports the Executive Branch on the first two points. In taking these steps it also helps if senior leaders provide tangible evidence of the importance they attach to the interagency group’s mission. Implicit in these conditions is the recognition by all parties (senior leadership, parent organizations and the team leader and members) that mission success takes priority over protecting department and agency preferences. If the group is established with the opposite expectation it will not be able to solve a complex problem and the wisdom of allocating scarce resources (human and materiel) to the effort probably needs to be reevaluated.

High-level political support cleared the way for the four groups we investigated to function, but did not guarantee their success. The team’s leader and members must exploit the opportunity they have been given by forging a consensus on how to accomplish their assigned purpose. They need to:
1) Define the group’s purpose with an “end-to-end” conceptualization of the problem and solution, taking responsibility for all activities necessary to achieve results;
2) Pursue an open if not collaborative decision making process;
3) Partner aggressively with other entities to manage each segment of the end-to-end solution chain;
4) Establish and maintain trust among group members; and
5) Learn from experience and adjust accordingly to manage the assigned problem well.

Although our case studies demonstrate that interagency collaboration is possible in the current system, they also suggest why it is an uncommon and fragile commodity. Successful interagency groups require national leaders, group leaders and teams that are willing to challenge the structure, decision-making norms, culture and incentives of the current national security system. This is seldom the case, which is why high performing interagency small groups are rare, and even when they do occur, are prone to breakdown and atrophy.

Ironically, the President will need more help from Congress to generate these kinds of interagency teams than the Secretary of Defense would need for producing cross-functional teams in the Department of Defense. One reason for this is that the authorities of the President’s cabinet members are well-established in law and not easily overridden except by direct personal intervention by the President. This point was illustrated by the Department of Defense shortly after 9/11. The Department cited current law on the chain of command for our armed forces to argue Defense had to be put in charge of everything involving Iraq. “No one else could take charge of security, because no one else had the legal authority to command our armed forces.” Thus, Defense argued, if the President wanted “unity of leadership” and “unity of effort” he would have to put the Secretary of Defense in charge of everything involving Iraq. Defense thought this argument was conclusive and it apparently convinced the President. However, the actual result of making Defense the lead agency for Iraq was less unified effort.

Legislation allowing the president to appoint leaders, or what some call “mission managers,” to run interagency teams is also probably a legal requirement. Gordon Lederman, the former leader of the Project on National Security Reform’s Legal Working Group, argues that, “Any individual in the interagency space who exercises meaningful authority to compel departments to act” would have to be an “officer of the United States,” and officers of the United States must have their positions established by statute as required by the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.

27 This is a lesson from a case study of the Senior Interagency Strategy Team at the National Counterterrorism Center, which turned out to have some major performance problems. Christopher Lamb and Lt Col Erin Staine-Pyne, “9/11, Counterterrorism, and the Senior Interagency Strategy Team: Interagency Small Group Performance in Strategy Formulation and Implementation,” Col. Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, Ft. Leavenworth, March 2014.
Codifying mission manager authorities in statute would also help secure resources for the President’s priority interagency missions: “The President may create structures and processes and fund them temporarily by transferring resources, but ultimately it is Congress that provides resources on a sustained basis. Without Congress’s input and resources, a presidentially-imposed solution to interagency integration may wither for lack of funding.” Thus, the legislation allowing the president to delegate his integration authorities should also include a mechanism for funding interagency team activities and provide for associated congressional oversight.

In addition to legislation, it would be important to structure and lead the teams well. The Project on National Security Reform has proposed some baseline standards for such groups that would be a good place to begin. If such teams were empowered and structured to emulate the attributes of teams that have performed well in the past, the President would find them useful. Empowered teams would produce better strategy because they would be less susceptible to the bureaucratic and political pressures that militate against strategy formulation. They also would execute strategy with much greater unity of effort. Hence they would be more effective, and the President would be inclined to use them more frequently. Their use would then proliferate, which would create the need for some complementary reforms in the National Security Council staff.

As the use of interagency teams increases, the need to de-conflict their efforts will grow. Such teams tend to pursue their objectives with great determination and without regard for work in adjacent or overlapping strategic challenges. The good news is that the National Security Council staff, freed from intense issue management, could then pay more attention to system management and better de-conflict the work of the interagency teams. It also would be important to ensure such teams were not assigned inappropriate problems to solve; i.e. ones that are not inherently cross-functional. If the teams encroached on issue areas that are predominantly the responsibility of one department or agency, there would be much greater substantive and political resistance to their use.

Ultimately, these developments would move us in the direction of a new model for the National Security Advisor and staff. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the choice is not merely between an “honest broker,” and “a commanding intellect,” or some combination thereof. What the President needs is a “system manager” with responsibility for making the national security system better serve presidential intent. The Project on National Security Reform has made a detailed case for how such a revised national security staff should work.

CONCLUSION

In my estimation our historic unpreparedness for irregular conflict, our inability to rationally allocate defense resources to priority military capabilities and missions, and the lack of unified effort among our departments and agencies are major impediments to improving military effectiveness. Fixing these problems will be as difficult as it is necessary. Not fixing them means we will continue to be vulnerable to irregular threat in an age where small groups have the intent and increasingly the capability to execute catastrophic terrorist attacks; that potential adversaries will be much more likely to close the gap on our advantages in major combat operations; and that future national security missions will experience the same frustrating lack of unified purpose and effort that has handicapped and in some cases crippled us in the past.

For all these reasons I am encouraged and appreciative of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s decision to thoroughly investigate Pentagon performance issues. Congress has intervened to improve military capabilities in the past, and done so to very good effect when it has developed a deep understanding of the underlying causes of performance problems. The Committee’s thorough, bipartisan approach to identifying the root causes of behaviors that limit military performance is altogether

30The bureaucratic and political pressures that militate against strategy are discussed at length in “Pentagon Strategies,” and “National-Level Coordination and Implementation,” op. cit.
Chairman McCAIN. Thank you very much, Doctor.

Let us start out with a fairly easy one. Is there a reason why we should have a NORTHCOM and a SOUTHCOM? And is there a reason for us to have an AFRICOM that is based in Germany right next to your old command, Admiral Stavridis? And let me add onto that question. Is there not now a need, as much as we are trying to reduce and streamline—is there not now a need for a Cyber Command, given the nature of that threat? I will begin with you, General.

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the original thinking on NORTHCOM was concern about having assigned forces to a senior officer with responsibility for the U.S., the domestic circumstances. That notion foreclosed at the time the possibility of having a joint command for both North and South America. It is time now with the passage of time to consolidate both of those organizations, as Admiral Stavridis suggested.

The rationale for AFRICOM was somewhat different. As you will recall, there was actually an effort to place AFRICOM on the African continent.

Chairman McCAIN. That did not turn out too well.

General SCHWARTZ. It did not. But you can appreciate how that thought process sort of preempted other considerations at the time. But again, with the passage of time, that is an act of consolidation that certainly makes sense to me.

And with respect to CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command], yes. Once they have assigned forces, it is time to establish CYBERCOM as an independent COCOM.

Chairman McCAIN. Admiral?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I think we absolutely should merge NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, not only for the efficiencies, but I think there are cultural connections that are important to get Canada and Mexico, two of the largest economies in the Americas, into the flow with our work and our world to the south. Predictably, there will be some objections based on NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command]. I think that can be easily handled with a subunified command in some way.

AFRICOM was a good experiment, but I think it is time to admit merging it back together. The forces, as you said, are all in Europe. And I think those connections between Europe and Africa actually would be very positive and in some sense well received in the African world.

And then Cyber Command I have already addressed. I think it is absolutely time to do it. The real question we should be considering, do we want to go one step further to a cyber force?

Chairman McCAIN. That is really important. Thank you.

Doctor?

Dr. LAMB. I would not have strong feelings on the span of control we assign to the combatant commands, but I would make the fol-
lowing observation. I think that decision is probably best linked to other recommendations that have been made here today, including whether we increase and beef up our ability to field joint task forces, standing joint task forces, whether we have a general staff, or we have the Chairman in the chain of command. I think that would impact a lot the effective span of control the combatant commanders could exercise.

Chairman McCain. Thank you.

And this whole issue of the joint task forces I think is one of the most important aspects of it, obviously, since there is now a gap between the organizations in being and the appointment in every crisis of a joint task force, whether it comes from that command or from others. It is obvious that is where the operations are.

Finally, in a more philosophical plane here, one of the much criticized but yet pretty successful staff structure has been the German general staff, names like Schlieffen and Ludendorff and others, as well as Keitel and others. And every time we start talking about centralizing authority in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that issue is raised. The German general staff system is not something that we want to emulate, and yet, there are others who say that it was not because of the staff system that they lost, it was for other reasons.

So give me more of a fundamental view. Do you want to centralize this much power in the hands of one individual or authority in the hands of this one individual? General?

General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, I would not create a general staff. I actually believe that there is risk of having the brilliant few become self-serving. However, it is not necessary that a Chairman in the chain of command connect to a general staff. By retaining a similar arrangement as we have now, where the Joint Staff is a creature of the Joint Chiefs, you minimize concern about a rogue individual.

Admiral Stavridis. I would at least have a robust discussion about the pros and cons of a general staff, in addition to placing the Chairman atop it operationally.

In terms of the concerns raised about the German general staff, you know, that rattles old ghosts in our memories, but at the end of the day, it was political leadership and economic collapse in Germany that led to the rise of fascism. The German general staff was perhaps a tool of that.

I think here in the United States, the culture in the military is so strongly one of subservience to civilian leadership that I would not believe that to be a significant concern when weighed against the efficiencies that could be derived from such a structure.

Dr. Lamb. I would just second what Admiral Stavridis said about there not being a threat to civilian control of the military from a general staff. But I do think it is worthwhile for the committee to ask or take up an issue that Michele Flournoy raised earlier in the week about the tyranny of consensus. Even compared to OSD, the Joint Staff is well known for its extensive coordination to ensure consensus on positions that are forwarded to the Chairman. And I think it would be very interesting to hear from former Chairmen or the current Chairman what they think of their staff’s performance in that regard and for the committee to get to the heart of
why consensus tends to rule in the way the Joint Staff operates and runs. I think it has not served us particularly well or the Chairman particularly well to date.

Chairman McCain. Well, I just would finally make a comment, and that is that being a student of World War II, they did not have any of all this stuff. There were just some very brilliant guys named Marshall and Leahy and King and others that won the most seminal war probably of modern times. So I do not know how we look at that aspect of it, but it certainly was the major factor in winning World War II.

Senator Reed?

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for your very, very thoughtful testimony.

Two issues are emerging, among many. One is putting the Chairman in the chain of command, and two, creating a general staff. And there are pros and cons, as Admiral Stavridis pointed out. And since you gentlemen are some of the most intellectually honest people I know, it helps us—we get the pros a lot. What is the con? What do you worry about, General Schwartz? If we had a Chairman in the chain of command—if we did it, we would have to create sort of a buffer against those downsides. So both you and Admiral Stavridis, please, and Dr. Lamb.

General Schwartz. The traditional thinking of having the Chairman in the chain of command is potentials for abuse, for excessive exercise of one's authority, and undermining, as Chris Lamb mentioned, the fundamental principle of civilian authority. That is the downside.

But I believe that—and given my experience—the Chairman and the Secretary operate so closely in today's environment that there is a level of supervision which mitigates that possibility. But that is a legitimate consideration.

Senator Reed. Let me follow up with a question. Even in your concept of putting the Chairman in the chain, he would be still subordinate to the Secretary of the Defense.


Senator Reed. The practical effect would be injecting him between the service chiefs and service secretaries? What is the practical effect?

General Schwartz. The practical effect is that there is an authoritative referee in uniform. At the moment, that authoritative referee is either the Deputy Secretary or the Secretary. And it seems to me that having someone in uniform with executive authority, properly supervised contributes to effective activity.

Senator Reed. Admiral Stavridis, your points on both these issues, the general staff, standalone general staff, and the Chairman in the chain.

Admiral Stavridis. Sir, let me take the Chairman position first. We have identified and already correctly identified one of the cons. I will give you another one. It is having put that much power and authority into one person, what if you get an extremely mediocre Chairman, someone who is not smart, not effective? We have a very good up and out system. We are probably going to get a very good Chairman. But that level of power and authority—you need
to worry not only about abuse of power but lack of capability in it as well.

In terms of the general staff, I think a con would be that a general staff, because the officers would have been plucked out of their services at the 04/05 level in their late 30's, they would not have the robust level of operational experience that we see on the Joint Staff today. That would be a con. Again, my intuition is that in both cases the pros would outweigh the cons, but that would be part of the conversation, looking at both sides.

Senator Reed. Dr. Lamb, your comments.

Dr. Lamb. First, with respect to the Chairman in the chain of command, I think I would agree with General Schwartz that in the past the relationship between the Chairman and the Secretary has been extremely tight. And so I am not sure what the value added in inserting someone formally into the chain of command is. There are issues there. Some Chairman and Secretary teams have worked very closely, and the Secretary's interests and decisions have been passed through the Chairman. And in other cases, you can think of Secretaries who have dealt directly with the combatant commanders at length. So I think I would be kind of agnostic on that, but I am generally inclined to believe there is not a lot of value added to that.

The more important decisions that I think the Chairman needs to work on are future force development. This is where we really have to work hard to preserve the qualitative advantages that we currently enjoy and which I think most people agree are diminishing. And there, to get to the issue of the general staff, I think he needs really dedicated, deep expertise on his staff, and currently we tend not to have that. We bring people directly in from operational commands who have never worked those broad issues before. We throw them at a problem for a couple years, then rotate them out. My view would be that more stability like a general staff would bring to the Chairman would probably be a good thing on the whole.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for your service and for your testimony.

Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?

Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us today. It is nice to have you here. Some interesting comments.

Admiral and Dr. Lamb, if you would please. In 2009, in relation to the DOD, former DOD Secretary Bob Gates said this is a Department that principally plans for war. It is not organized to wage war, and that is what I am trying to fix. Again, that was from Bob Gates.

And from both of you, please, do you believe that it can be fixed within the Department? And if so, if you could share your thoughts on that. Yes, please. General, go ahead.

General Schwartz. I agree that the model for employment—once again, I would try to reemphasize my earlier point, that we have migrated perhaps more by chance than by design, but the joint task forces are the way we operate today. And it seems to me that professionalizing those entities in the same way that we have
grown the special operations national joint task force is the model for the future in the other operating domains.

Senator Ernst. Thank you.

Admiral Stavridis. I agree with General Schwartz as a general position. I think we should make the point that the Department of Defense today operates very effectively in a number of venues, but we could be better and more efficient if we had a model like General Schwartz is suggesting in my view.

Dr. Lamb. I really appreciate the question. I am personally fascinated by Secretary Gates and his tenure as Secretary of Defense. I think he is a remarkable man, and he has been very candid in his memoirs about the experience he had leading the Department of Defense at a time of war. And I have looked at what he had to say very carefully, and I think it is interesting.

And what really seemed to frustrate him was that even though we had troops on the battlefield in contact with the enemy, the service chiefs were called to their statutory obligation to raise, train, and equip the force of the future, and he could not get enough capability in the field for the problem we were currently trying to master. And this was a source of great frustration to the Secretary, and I think it underlies the comment that you just quoted him on.

But for me, the problem there was in part our lack of preparedness for irregular warfare. The services, whether we are talking about preparing for future irregular conflicts or we are engaged in them currently, have always given priority to what they consider their core responsibility of fighting and winning the Nation's large-scale force-on-force conflicts. We have never been very good at being prepared for irregular war, and I think that is true over the last 60 years.

So I think we do need some changes there. But for me, the solution there is to put someone definitively in charge of being prepared for irregular conflict. That is something we have not done. We always turn to all the services and say you are all equally responsible for being prepared for irregular conflict, and they invariably consider a lesser included case. So we do not go to those conflicts thinking about them, planning for them, prepared for them with the niche capabilities, et cetera. I think that is what frustrated the Secretary, and I think it can and should be fixed.

Senator Ernst. Yes, and there were a lot of very provocative comments that the Secretary has made, and that is good because now we are spending the time talking about some of those reforms and thoughts that he had in regards to irregular warfare, asymmetrical warfare. We really did not start talking—at least I was not so much aware of it until about 15 years ago or so when we really started taking a look at our force.

But how can we empower those combatant commanders to take that prudent risk and make those decisions on their own? Do we empower them to do that, or how can we empower them to do that? Any thoughts? Or does it need to be a top-down approach? Why can it not be a more bottom-up approach in taking some of those risks? General?

General Schwartz. I think thoughtful combatant commanders like Jim Stavridis did exactly that. However, it is important to as-
sign missions and to distinguished what the priorities are. That is a function of the Pentagon in this town. And we have not been terribly good at that.

Senator Ernst. We have not. Thank you, General.

Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?

Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all of you for your service.

And I am going to direct these to General Schwartz and Admiral Stavridis.

I am so appreciative of you all coming and so candid with us and tell us exactly what you have seen and what your experience. The hard thing I am having a hard time with, why either you cannot make these changes when you are in that command, when you are on the front line, when you are in charge. Is the system bogged down to where we are throwing so much stuff at you from here to the intermediators that is coming to us? But also, how do we keep the separation of the civilian oversight, as we do, which is unbelievable, and I am glad we do. And that is the concern we might have, the balance.

But you know, when you have—the 2010 report by McKinsey and Company found that less than 25 percent, or one-quarter, of active duty troops were in combat roles, with the majority instead performing overhead activities. And if you look at it from the standpoint of all the pay increases, we are giving the same pay increases to 75 percent of the people who do not see any action. I think we need to know from you now in your role, not being constrained in your remarks, how do we get to where you are able to make the decision when you are in charge and in power. They are saying they cannot be made. The military cannot change. Under the Goldwater Act that we had way back when, that only we can force it from here. But yet, we have thrown so many regulations and so many oversights, that it makes it impossible to govern. Where is the intermediate? Who makes that decision? Is there a commission that should be in place?

And for those who are concerned about giving total power to the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman, still having the civilians in the control in an advisory capacity—I do not know how to circumnavigate this.

And the final question you all two can answer. I know that we are talking about NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. I would ask the same question about National Guard and Reserves. I as a Governor, former Governor. I was over my Guard. And I would have gladly shared with the President, and if the only reason we have the Reserves doing what they are doing and the Guard doing what they are doing is because of separation of oversight, it does not make any sense to me. We could save a tremendous amount and use our Guard and Reserves in a much more, I think, effective role and much more cost-effective. But I do not see that happening either.

So whoever wants to chime in, please do.

General Schwartz. Thank you.

I actually believe that giving the Chairman, hopefully a very capable individual, directive authority, executive authority would change the dynamic in what you are saying.
Senator MANCHIN. And right now, you are saying that that person does not have that.

General SCHWARTZ. At the moment, he does not have that. He can encourage. He can persuade, but he cannot compel. And that is not a business-like approach to the problem.

Secondly, with regard to the Guard and Reserve, it is at least in part a function of the statutory authority, as you are aware being a former Governor and others here on the dais. The Reserve is a Title 10 entity which is responsive to the service leadership, and the Guard, of course, is Title 32 and a little more complex arrangement. And I think it is safe to say that at least the Army and the Air Force have a preference for maintaining both of those entities because access to the Reserve is cleaner and more expeditious in most cases than it is in some cases with the Guard.

Senator MANCHIN. Admiral?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. A couple of thoughts, sir. You do touch on, I think, an important aspect of all this, which is reforming pay, benefits. I think those authorities derive from all of you here on Capitol Hill based on proposals that can come, and I think you are spot-on to look at why do we pay an 03 essentially exactly the same amount of money.

Senator MANCHIN. Right.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It really is in my view ripe for a new look. You could drive it from here, but I think in the building, they have the authority to build that into proposals and move it forward. And I hope you spur them to do it.

In terms of authorities to really make changes, I think providing the SecDef more authority to go into government and move civilians that have been there, simple authorities over the GS system I think would be helpful in creating efficiencies.

In terms of the Guard and Reserve, to the degree the committee wants to really lick your finger, reach up, and touch the third rail, you could look at an alternative model in the maritime world. We have an Air Guard and a land Guard, if you will, but we have a Coast Guard. The Coast Guard resides, as you all well know, in the Department of Homeland Security. It is a very different model. If you want to look at efficiencies and structures, that might be an interesting model to look at as to whether it pertains in the air and on the land, as it seems to work quite effectively in my view at sea.

So these are huge questions. In terms of do you need a commission, I would say what this committee is doing right now is the basis of driving these thoughts forward, and I hope you continue at this.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman McCAIN. Senator Fischer?

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, recently a friend and I have been having discussions on a 1984 speech by Caspar Weinberger, which of course became known as the Weinberger Doctrine. And the third rule that he laid out would be that military forces should only be committed after the military and political objectives have been clearly defined.

There has been criticism lately because of recent campaigns that we have seen in Afghanistan and Syria, criticisms that perhaps we have not seen that end result, that end state really clearly defined.
I think in future conflicts, especially when we look at the cyber area, it is going to be difficult. It is going to be a challenge there to be able to define what is ahead.

I guess I would like to hear from all of you, if you believe these evolving trends are going to change, how we look at laying out those objectives in the future, and are we going to be able to look at a comprehensive strategy and comprehensive plan for the future? Or are we going to have to look at it more incrementally as we move forward, and what are the risks that would be involved with that? If I could start with you, General.

General SCHWARTZ. As I see it, ma'am, the role of civilian leadership is to decide the why and the where, and the role of the uniforms is to offer advice on the how. Both are essential ingredients of success. And the desire for clarity in the why and the where is important to those who serve in uniform, without a doubt.

I think the clear thing here is that there is a need for understanding that these are complex circumstances, but it is important for there to be support for the mission.

And if I may offer an unsolicited piece of advice, the absence of an authorization for use of military force in the current setting is less than ideal.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree with General Schwartz. Clearly, ideally the ideal structure, Senator, would be crisp, clear direction from the political level, a coherent strategy that has been explained to the American people and has a reasonable level of support in our democracy. Then the military conducts the detailed planning, which really is the precision piece of this going forward. How to make that link more effective—I think a lot of what we are discussing today would be helpful in that regard. And the degree to which that our military can be given that kind of strategic clarity will be the degree to which we are successful in our engagements overseas.

Senator FISCHER. So would you both say that that is a rule that we as Members of the Senate should continue to require to limit risk even into a future where the nature of warfare may change?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes.

Senator FISCHER. And, Dr. Lamb, if you had comments, please.

Dr. LAMB. Yes. One of the jobs I had in the Pentagon was helping prepare the contingency planning guidance and the defense planning guidance and overseeing the Nation’s war plans for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. And one of my observations was that the operational plans were crystal clear compared to the strategic guidance that we often are able to promulgate. And I know that some of your previous witnesses have talked about strategy from the point of view of the need for more gray matter, greater strategists, better strategists, et cetera.

My view is a little bit different. I think there are political and bureaucratic forces at work that tend to militate against strategy. You ask why do we not have a clear end state. Why do we not have a clear center of gravity? Why do we not marshal our resources against that center of gravity, et cetera? I think the answer is twofold.

First of all, in formulating a strategy with that kind of clarity, right now there are great political and even bureaucratic disincen-
tives for that kind of clarity. So if you say there are three ways to attack this problem and we are going to choose door B, so to speak, someone will always criticize you for not having taken option A or option C. So the safer thing to do is to say we are going to do all those things. So in the war on terrorism, we are going to emphasize strategic communications and we are going to go after the terrorists themselves and we are going to dissuade state sponsors, and on and on and on. So if you look at all of our public strategy documents, they are just long laundry lists of objectives, and you do not have that clarity.

And then when it comes to implementing the strategy, you similarly have bureaucratic forces at play. I am firmly convinced, after a year of study, that a lot of popular opinion about what went wrong in Iraq is in fact wrong. Because of the point we just made about formulating strategy, if you have real strategy, it really exists not on paper but in the minds of the key decision-makers because they cannot promulgate the strategy for the reasons I just mentioned. So it is in their minds. So if you are going to get a clear, cohesive implementation of the strategy, everybody has to be working together and have a mind-meld, if you will.

That did not happen in Iraq, and we could go into detail on why that did not happen. But the point is we had people in one part of our national security system working very hard to go in one direction and people on the ground in Baghdad supported by other people trying to go in a different direction. And the results were not good.

So when it comes to strategy, I think we have political and bureaucratic problems. And it is one reason I favor these cross-functional teams. I think they can put the strategy together and have a better chance of implementing it in a cohesive and a unified way.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine?

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And I appreciate Senator Fischer bringing up the Weinberger Doctrine and, General Schwartz, your comment about the authorization. I think there are many reasons why an authorization is really important. One is just the legal requirements of Article I and Article II. The second is the sign of resolve that you show to adversaries, allies, and especially your troops. But the third is sort of the one that the Weinberger Doctrine gets at, which is it helps you clash out at the beginning what is the mission and goal. So traditionally the President would present an authorization, but then Congress usually does not just accept it verbatim. President Bush presented an authorization right after the attack on 9/11. Congress rejected the originally presented version and batted it around and came up with something different.

The war against ISIL is one that we started on August 8th, 2014—the President to protect Yazidis on Mount Sinjar and to protect the American consulate in Irbil. But within a couple of weeks, it was, okay, now we have to go on offense, but we did not have the discussion. We did not have the administration’s presentation of the rationale and then the withering cross examination that that deserves. I fault the President for not sending an authorization to Congress for, I mean, essentially 6 months after the beginning of
the war, and now it has been 10 months since the President sent an authorization. We still really have not had the discussion that you ought to have at the front end if you are going to ask people to risk their lives. So I think the Weinberger Doctrine is a good way to look at it.

A couple questions just to clarify. You have all offered some interesting ideas. So, Admiral Stavridis, the cyber force. Just walk through, if you are looking 15 years ahead, how does that look. There is a force. There is a command. Is there a cyber academy? Most of us have just done our service academy nominations. Is there a cyber academy? Talk to us about what that would look like.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I can. I think it is small. It is probably numbered in thousands of members, so quite small, less than 10,000 probably.

I think what you have today is each of the service academies is building inside itself a small cyber academy, and this is kind of the inefficiency of it that I think we need to overcome.

So, yes, I think there would be an educational pipeline. I think there would be a career path. I think you would have to get away from some of the, if you will, traditional go to boot camp, shave your head, crawl your way up a hierarchical organization. I am not sure that is going to attract the kind of people we need in a cyber force. So it probably has somewhat different paid benefits back to Senator Manchin’s question a moment ago about are we paying the right people the right amount. So this may be a highly paid cadre. I think probably the closest analog to what we have, quite obviously, is special forces, and that is roughly what it would look like.

I do believe it is time we get after this because I think our vulnerabilities are significant in this area.

Senator Kaine. A second question to another idea you had. I thought it was intriguing, the idea of an ambassadorial level sort of civilian deputy within the COCOMs. And I gather there is sort of an unstated assumption that is kind of about the nature of the American military mission now that so much of it is diplomacy, you know, the nations that want us to send the special purpose MAGTFs throughout Africa to train their militaries. I mean, so much of it is kind of on the border between diplomacy and military or working out with the Japanese the Okinawan situation. That is diplomatic as much as it is military. Is that sort of your thinking behind the recommendation?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is. The structure, as it was in effect when I was at Southern Command and while I was at U.S. European Command, I had a military deputy, and I think you need to continue to have a military deputy for the conduct—


Admiral STAVRIDIS.—of operations.

But we also had, instead of a POLAD, a political advisor from the State Department—we had a senior ambassador who was our civilian deputy, and he or she was capable of doing that kind of engagement, diplomatic work, working with host nations, helped resolve innumerable individual challenges in, if you will, the smart power side of the equation. It is low cost, and it also is a strong signal to the interagency about how we want to work together to address problems that I think is salutary.
Senator Kaine. It sounds like a Fletcher School dean idea.

And then, Dr. Lamb, one last question for you. The idea that you advocate in your opening testimony about having some primary responsibility for irregular war, if it is small or if it is large, rather than everybody feeling like the irregular wars are sort of a lesser responsibility, which means we are not really preparing for regular wars. Talk a little bit about that. Elaborate on that if you would.

Dr. Lamb. Yes. I mean, I think that we have a parallel with regard to special operations forces in general. All the services, before we combined them under SOCOM [Southern Command], had special operations forces. They knew what they wanted to use them for, et cetera. But they were not a priority for the services. So Congress in its wisdom—and I think rightly so—created USSOCOM, and we now have world-class special operations forces particularly for the high value target mission. So the direct action, go there, go to a site, get what you need done, and come back. We have unparalleled capabilities. And those have only improved over the last 10 or 15 years.

But when it comes to working by, with, or through host nation forces, we are not quite as sharp. And there is a number of complex reasons for that which have been discussed by many individuals. But I think the committee needs to take that issue up with SOCOM. SOCOM leadership has repeatedly told Congress that they think the indirect mission is in fact more important and they intend to improve their indirect capabilities. But whether or not that is happening I think is a matter of great import.

With regard to the Marine Corps, not every problem, unfortunately, not every low end of the conflict spectrum problem could be handled with a small special operations team. So the question is who in the Department of Defense, amongst all our forces, is really responsible for being prepared for that mission. Time and time again, we go on these missions, whether it is Panama, Somalia, Bosnia. We go on these missions not really prepared for them, kind of learning on the job, seeing what the situation demands, not having the equipment, as Secretary Gates found, not only not having the equipment, but not being able to generate it quickly in response even to urgent requests from forces in the field.

I think we can do better than that. The Marine Corps, from my point of view, would work well in that regard for a number of reasons. It has a history of greater involvement in these. It is already kind of a joint force with amphibious, air, land capabilities that are well integrated. So there is a lot of advantages there.

I think we have come to a point where we cannot afford all the duplication we have without some clarification of roles in the Department. So this is something that made sense to me.

Senator Kaine. I thank all of you.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?

Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.

I want to thank all of you for being here today.

Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to ask you about your prior position as Commander of SOUTHCOM. And we had testimony this spring from General John Kelly, the Commander of SOUTHCOM, about how the networks are working over our southern border, the so-
phisticated smuggling networks that I can assure you now, unfortunately, are being used to devastate my State with how heroin is coming into my State, but also the issue that he raised as well was that he believed that adherents to ISIS have called for infiltration of our southern border.

So I wanted to ask you about your thoughts on that in terms of the use of those networks not only on things like drugs, but also as we look at this terrorism challenge. Is this something we should be worried about?

Admiral Stavridis. It absolutely is something we should be worried about, Senator. And I have called this before convergence, and it is the convergence of these drug routes, which are extremely efficient, with the possibility of using them to move terrorists or, at the really dark end of the spectrum, weapons of mass destruction, along with the narcotics. So when those drug routes and those higher-level threats converge—convergence—I think we are at great risk.

What we should do about it is exactly what we are talking about here is think holistically about how you create a network to combat a network. This is a very sophisticated, private-public, if you will, collaboration with international abilities ranging from moving submarines with 10 tons of cocaine to aircraft, et cetera, et cetera. So you need to bring the interagency to bear. You need to bring special operations to bear. And I think this also argues for merging NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM because it creates one sphere through which these routes are coming at us. So there is a quick basket of ideas.

Senator Ayotte. I appreciate it. I do not know if anyone else wants to comment on that. Thank you.

I also wanted to, not to pick on you today, Admiral, but given your prior position as certainly the Commander of NATO, what we have seen recently with Iran—on October 10th, Iran conducted a ballistic missile test, a medium-range missile, and then also recently we have learned that they have tested a missile on November 21st. And as I look at these, first of all, a clear violation of U.N. resolutions. Also from what we understand, the reports suggest that the missile tested last month has a range of approximately 1,200 miles. So that would give Iran a capability, of course, of hitting eastern Europe and places that we are concerned about in the NATO context.

So I have been asking why are we not responding to this, and what do you think our response should be? Should there be some response? It strikes me as a very important issue because it is already, in light of the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]—they are violating existing U.N. resolutions. And it seems to me if there is not some response from us, that they are going to continue. Not only this does not bode well for the JCPOA, but also to continue to develop ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] capability, as you know, that could go even further to hit the United States.

Admiral Stavridis. As I have said often, Senator, we ought to be concerned about Iran's nuclear program, but it is a much bigger problem than that. Iran views itself as an imperial power dating back two and a half millennia. They currently are in control of five
capitals in this region. The JCPOA I think is going to shower resources upon them. And so they are a highly dangerous opponent and will be going forward.

So what should we do?

First, we should hold Iran to the commitments they have made in the JCPOA, and if that means that agreement is broken and we, therefore, return to a sanctions regime, we need to face that.

Secondly, we need to use all of our clandestine, our intelligence capability to truly understand what is going on in Iran.

Thirdly, we need to stand with our Sunni allies in the region and, of course, with Israel, who are going to be the bulwark against this kind of expansion.

Fourthly, in Europe, as you well know, Senator—I took you around there—we looked at the missile defense system. We should continue to move in that direction. That is kind of a beginning, but I think Iran will continue to be a geopolitical threat to the United States.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you all.

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.

On behalf of Senator McCain, Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much both for your service and for being here today.

Dr. Lamb, you talk about flattening the structure of the military to set up special teams that have a commitment to mission as opposed to what often interagency groups bring to task. It seems to me that I really like that idea. I think that one of the things—if we look at the private sector, one of the things they figured out is that the top-down approach, a hierarchical approach, is not as good for decision-making for what they are trying to accomplish as a team approach.

But what are the challenges—and I guess maybe I ought to ask both General Schwartz and Admiral Stavridis what you think the challenges are of trying to move from what has been such a traditional hierarchical structure to one that allows that team approach to really address the challenges that we are facing? And, General Schwartz, do you want to start?

General SCHWARTZ. Sure. You know, I do not know, ma’am, if the committee has had Stan McChrystal before you, but here is an example, maybe the best recent example, of how the team approach produces extraordinary results with his organization. And he has written two books and what have you. But the bottom line is that Chris Lamb’s model does work. There is evidence of that. And there is a new generation of military leadership that gets it I think, and we should support that, encourage it, and through your oversight, mandate it.

Senator SHAHEEN. Admiral Stavridis?

Admiral STAVRDIS. A core question going forward. And what mitigates against it, what makes it difficult, Senator—and you know this—is the built-in structure of the military. This is an organization where a million people get up in the morning and put on the same outfit. I mean, this is why we call it “uniforms.” And you have got to start cracking that mentality. We will—I think General Schwartz is spot-on—because there is a generational shift.
The question here is this is not an on and off switch between a highly chaotic, Silicon Valley-like entity or a Prussian-style military. It is a rheostat. We need to dial that rheostat more toward team approaches, interagency, international cooperation, strategic communication, all of those smart power things without losing our ability to deliver lethal combat power. I think we can do that. We need to think of it as a rheostat that is turning in the direction you identified.

Senator SHAHEEN. And, Dr. Lamb, you talked about the Coast Guard having a different model. One of the things I remember after the BP oil spill, when they were talking about the response to rescuing people—no. I am sorry. Not the oil spill. Hurricane Katrina—was that the Coast Guard was very effective in responding I think both there and on the BP oil spill because they were able to make decisions on the spot without having to check with anybody.

So what is different about the Coast Guard model, and how do you transfer what is effective about that? Or should we be looking at transferring what is effective about that to address some of the other challenges of building that teamwork capacity?

Dr. LAMB. Well, when I was involved in the project, national security reform, we spent some time looking at the Coast Guard model. And the Coast Guard I think would say—and Admiral Stavridis could speak to this, I think, more directly. But I think they would say their leadership model and their training and education model is different than some of the other services. Because of their very nature, they are used to thinking about problems in a cross-functional way. They both serve the Department of Defense in war and law enforcement in peacetime. And so they have some natural advantages in that respect.

Senator SHAHEEN. So can you explain? When you say their leadership model is different, their training is different, what is different that gives them that different ability to focus? Admiral Stavridis?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. They begin their lives at the Coast Guard Academy with an appreciation of the fact that they are but one entity within the Department of Homeland Security, which has 19 different entities within it. They know they straddle that border between Title 10 combat operations, in which they participated heroically many, many times, as well as law enforcement, as well as rescue at sea, as well as environmental. So their mission, their ethos, their mentality is simply one of cooperation, working together. It is hard to find a better integrated organization than the Coast Guard. I think we could learn a lot from that.

General SCHWARTZ. And they have much greater experience with State and local leadership than typically do the active duty forces.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you all very much.

Senator REED. Thank you.

On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Sullivan, please.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and your years of service, decades of service to our country.

I wanted to focus a little bit, Admiral, on your recommendation perhaps with regard to NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM merging
with a bit of a focus on the Arctic. General Schwartz, I know that you have spent a lot of time in Alaska and so have a sense of that. We have had a lot of discussions here. Senator King and I and the chairman and a lot of others are interested very much in what is going on in the Arctic. Actually in this NDAA, there is a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to put together an Arctic operations plan for the first time, which we think is progress.

But just given your background—actually any of the panelists. You know, one of the many challenges that we have up there is that when you look at the Arctic, it is the classic scenes of different combatant commands where its forces are OPCOM [Coast Guard Operations Command] to PACOM [Pacific Command]. Its advocate is NORTHCOM, and its threat is primarily in EUCOM.

So you, I am sure, all noticed the very massive Russian buildup. Actually just yesterday there was another article about a new missile defense system that they are putting in the Arctic, four new combat brigades, 11 new airfields, on and on and on, huge exercises. And we are looking at actually getting rid of the only airborne BCT in the entire Asia-Pacific and in the Arctic. And as you know, General Schwartz, that takes a lot of training to have your forces up there well trained to be able to operate in 30 below zero.

So I would just really appreciate your views on the Arctic, but also how that NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM merger idea would either enhance or diminish—we do not think it should be much more diminished. We think there should be more attention on the Arctic given all that is going on up there right now. Any panelist, I would welcome your thoughts on it.

General SCHWARTZ. I think it is important that the Arctic be assigned as a mission to one of the combatant commands. That has yet to happen. It should transpire. That is point one.

Point two is a more pedestrian concern, but we only have one operating icebreaker, Senator Sullivan. This is unthinkable for the United States of America. And clearly, that Coast Guard platform—we need more of that, and we need the other kinds of wherewithal that allow us to assert our sovereignty in the Arctic.

Senator SULLIVAN. We have one and the Russians have 40 I believe.

General SCHWARTZ. Understood, sir.

Admiral STAVIDIS. You are absolutely correct. Russia has 38 plus two icebreakers. The Chinese, who are not an Arctic power, to say the least, have 16 icebreakers, et cetera. The Danes, a nation of 5 million, have eight icebreakers. So this is actually beyond a pedestrian point. It is a very good one.

I agree with assigning it to U.S. Northern Command in its entirety. I think that it would not be diminished by the merger between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. When you look at the level of activity to the south and what NORTHCOM is doing, I think that could easily be folded into a unified command responsibility, and I think it would be valuable because it would further solidify our integration with Canada, with whom we ought to be partnering in a very significant way, as you know better than anybody, in the north.
Lastly, we should be working with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] to ensure that NATO perceives this is a NATO frontier. This is a NATO border. Canada and the United States are NATO nations. We need to think of that border as importantly as we do as the borders of the Alliance in eastern Europe and to the south on the Mediterranean.

Senator SULLIVAN. General Schwartz, could you talk to just the strategic location of those forces up there? Because, you know, Admiral, when you talk about having it completely with regard to unified under NORTHCOM, do you think that the operational forces should also be under NORTHCOM, given that they are very oriented towards the Asia-Pacific? And as General Schwartz—and I know you know, sir, the strategic location of Alaska is such that those forces, those air forces, those Army forces, can really be anywhere in the northern hemisphere within 7–8 hours whether it is Korea or the Baltics. Would you mind just talking on that for a bit, sir?

General SCHWARTZ. Quickly, if the constraint of assigned forces to the domestic four-star can be overcome, that makes sense. To assign those assets in Alaska that have the opportunity both to reinforce America’s claims in the Arctic, as well as be deployable for other missions that might be assigned is certainly the right approach.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would only add we talk a lot about the unified command plan, which kind of divides the world among the combatant commanders. The other important document, Senator, is called the “Forces For” document, which actually apportions and assigns those forces. It is renegotiated typically every two years. I think as General Schwartz indicates, that would be a very important new way to think about force assignment.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McCAIN [presiding]. Senator King?

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A couple of quick points. Amen on the icebreakers. It is preposterous that we do not have more significant icebreaker capacity, particularly given what is happening in the Arctic in terms of the opening up of the ice.

Secondly, would all of you agree that it would be advantageous to the U.S. to accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Because I am an Admiral, I get to go first.

Senator KING. Yes, sir.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes.

Senator KING. Thank you.

General, do you agree?

General SCHWARTZ. And airmen agree with that.

Senator KING. Thank you.

Dr. Lamb?

Dr. LAMB. Agnostic, sir.

Senator KING. Agnostic on the treaty? All right. Two to one. We will take those odds.

Chairman McCAIN. Could I ask why agnostic?

Dr. LAMB. I really have not studied it at length, but I am concerned about our willingness to protect freedom of navigation
around the world and the way other nations are interpreting their littoral areas and their control over them. I am not quite sure of the impact of the Law of the Sea Treaty on those kinds of issues. Senator King. My concern is that other nations are going through that process, making claims, and we are standing on the sidelines. Your gestures will not show up in the record. Could you——

Admiral Stavridis. I agree with your assessment. We are much better inside that treaty than outside it in terms of protecting our rights. We could have a long hearing on the Law of the Sea, and I am sure such has been done. But call me back up on that one anytime.

Senator King. Thank you.

I want to associate myself with the comments of Senator Ayotte on this Iran ballistic missile test. It is hard to interpret exactly what they are doing. There is some thinking that maybe this is the struggle of the hardliners and they are trying to torpedo the agreement. On the other hand, it seems to me it would be very dangerous for us to establish the precedent of blinking at violations. I am a great believer that implementation is as important as vision. I voted for the JCPOA but it was based upon an understanding and expectation that it would be scrupulously enforced. And I think this could be interpreted as an early test of our resolve. And, General, I take it you agree.

General Schwartz. I certainly do. And if it is a violation of U.N. resolutions, we should call that out without hesitation.

Senator King. Thank you.

Admiral Stavridis. I agree with General Schwartz. I agree with your comment as well.

I have been hopeful of this agreement, but I am increasingly skeptical that it will be the right step for U.S. national security. This certainly gives weight to the negative side of that equation.

Senator King. Thank you.

Dr. Lamb, in your prepared remarks, you talked about how we need to be thinking about unconventional warfare and suggested several areas, one that I want to emphasize. You talk about persuasive communication. In my view, there are two fronts to the war with ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]. One is military. The other is ideas. And we are badly losing the war of ideas. And it strikes me that that is a huge gap in our national strategy. I know we are doing some things, but my sense is it does not have the priority that it should. Would you agree with that?

Dr. Lamb. Yes, I absolutely would. I think there are two issues here, one substantive and one organizational. Organizationally we are not well organized to treat the issues of communications. We get public affairs, public diplomacy, and then what used to be called psychological operations.

Senator King. And USIA was abolished 15 years ago.

Dr. Lamb. Yes, yes. We do not have a dedicated organization to deal with this anymore, and we are confused about the difference between these different—Americans are very sensitive about government control or use of information. And we are losing this game. I would actually concur.
On the substantive front, we are having some real political problems with deciding the best way to deal with the issue, as General Dempsey once said, with the fact that some terrorists happen to also be Muslim and Islamic. And we want to emphasize that the Islamic religion is peaceful and tolerant and so on and so forth, but we do have this strain within that religion that sees the world differently. And our ability to deal with that in a forthright way has really been handicapped.

And actually I am surprised by the number of senior leaders who have said in their memoirs from their tours of duty during the past 15 years that this is an Achilles heel for us and that we still have not effectively identified the enemy we are up against and how best to deal with that, how to turn that issue back into something that the Islamic world debates itself about what it is going to do about this virulent strain within it.

So I think substantively and organizationally we are really on our heels in this regard. I could not agree more.

Senator KING. And ultimately that is where this battle will be won or lost in my view because there are now—pick a number—100,000, 200,000 jihadists. There are 1.6 billion Muslims. That is the battlefield. And it can only be won within the Muslim community, but we have to lead it, it seems to me, or we at least need to work with the worldwide non-jihadist Muslim community.

General?

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, I just would close by saying we need to give voice to those who have escaped ISIL-occupied areas.

Senator KING. It seems to me a natural.

General SCHWARTZ. Yes.

Admiral STAVRIDS. Just one last thought, if I could. It is a battlefield, but it is also a marketplace. And we have to compete. We have to recognize that. That is a very important aspect of how we communicate. We are pretty good at dominating markets. We should bring some of those skills to bear.

Senator KING. It is ironic in the extreme that we are the people that invented Facebook and Twitter and all of those things, and we are losing on that front.

Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. I have a lot of other questions about the organization, but we will get to those later. Thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. If you would like to ask an additional question——

Senator KING. One additional question on—and maybe this is for the record. We are talking about combining several of the combatant commands, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM and Europe. Are there any savings to be had? And if so, we would like to quantify them because in fiscal year 2017 we are going to face about a $15 billion shortfall from where we would like to be. And that is real money, and we are going to have to find some places where it can be saved in staff, personnel, noncombatant kind of areas. So perhaps you have an immediate response or for the record.

General SCHWARTZ. In the business world, we call those synergies. And I cannot offer a number, but certainly there are
those in the Department who could answer that question for you and I would recommend you press for that.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes. There are savings. And I would recommend not only pressing the Department but getting somebody on the outside to take a good look at that.

Senator KING. Thank you very much. I appreciate your testimony.

Chairman MCCAIN. I appreciate the comments about the hearts and minds, but first you have got to kill them. And as long as the perception is out there that they are winning, then they will also win in other areas as well. I believe that one of the reasons why these young men are most attracted is that they think they are joining a winning cause, and events such as at San Bernardino and Paris are one of the greatest recruitment tools they have. And until we beat them on the battlefield, I think that our messaging efforts will be severely hindered, but I also agree that it is just going to be a long fight on using the most advanced technologies.

And I would also point out that we still have a big problem with the ability now of ISIS to be contacted and direct a young man or young woman to a secure site. That is just not right. That is not right. And I see heads nodding. As Senator King mentioned, that is not recorded.

Senator KING. I agree with the chairman on both fronts. Thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. Admiral, did you have any comment?

Dr. LAMB. For myself, I think this is just a good example of what I was referring to on the indirect approach in special operations, the military information support forces in SOCOM. If you look at how they are raised, trained, and equipped, it is not to the same levels of proficiency that the other aspects of SOCOM are. So I think there is room for improvement there.

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I thank you. And the Doctor is a graduate of the institution in which you are presently employed when it had the correct name. I want to thank you for your continued good work.

And I thank the Admiral and General for your many years of service.

This will probably be the conclusion of a series of hearings that we are having as we try to address this whole issue of reform, ability to get into the challenge, to meet the challenges of the 21st century. I believe that Goldwater-Nichols could never have come from within the Pentagon. I think everybody agrees with that. And we intend, on a bipartisan basis, to work with the Pentagon and Secretary Carter as closely as we possibly can, but I think it is pretty well known that we have to lead. And it is not to the exclusion of the Pentagon, but it certainly is a responsibility that I think that
we have. And I am proud of the modest measures that we have taken in this year, but I think next year is really where we can really make a significant impact. And the series of hearings that we are now concluding with I think gives us an excellent basis for the kinds of reforms that need to be made.

It just is disappointing to our constituents when I go back to Arizona and somebody asks me about a $2 billion cost overrun of one weapon system. It is hard to defend, hard to justify. And then when we see the combat capabilities going down in organizations and yet the staffs and support going up and we are still unable to conduct an audit successfully of the Department of Defense and no one can tell this committee how many contract personnel are employed, there is a pretty large task ahead of us. But if we pursue the principles that you have recommended to us today, some of those other aspects of this challenge will follow.

So you have been very helpful.

And, Admiral, I asked the panel yesterday if you all would prepare notes of condolences to be delivered to Senator Reed on Saturday afternoon, it would be much appreciated.

[Laughter.]
Admiral Stavridis. Con gusto.
Senator Reed. Go Army.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Stavridis. Go Navy.
Chairman McCain. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]