[Pages H4396-H4418]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

General Leave

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have
5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
insert extraneous material on H.R. 2596, the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2016.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Holding). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 315 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2596.
The Chair appoints the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Bishop) to preside
over the Committee of the Whole.

{time} 1406

In the Committee of the Whole

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 2596) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States

[[Page H4397]]

Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Bishop of Utah in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The Intelligence Authorization Act is the annual blueprint for the
work of the intelligence community and America's military intelligence
efforts. The bill sets priorities for our critical intelligence efforts
and the legal framework of guidance and oversight for those efforts. As
you may recall, the House has passed intelligence authorization bills
with strong bipartisan support in the past several Congresses.
The ranking member, Mr. Schiff, and I worked in a bipartisan manner
to draft this legislation in front of you today. Passing annual
intelligence authorization legislation is the most effective way for
Congress to exercise oversight over the executive branch and helps
ensure that the country's intelligence agencies have the resources and
authorities necessary to keep Americans safe. This legislation passed
unanimously out of our committee.
As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified
programs, the bulk of the committee's recommendations each year are
found in the classified annex of the bill, which has been available for
Members to review since June 4. Among other initiatives, the bill
provides authorization for critical national security functions,
including fighting terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, funding efforts to recover from unauthorized
disclosures of intelligence capabilities, and investing in the
resiliency of our national security space architecture.
At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for fiscal year
2016 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget
request level. Its funding levels are in line with the House-passed
Defense Appropriations bill for the National Intelligence Program and
with the National Defense Authorization Act for the Military
Intelligence Program. Overall, this bill sustains today's intelligence
capabilities and provides for future capabilities while staying within
the funding constraints of the Budget Control Act and the budget
resolution.
Mr. Chair, we are currently facing one of the most challenging global
environments in our Nation's history. Nearly 14 years after the 9/11
attacks, the U.S. continues to hunt al Qaeda and its affiliates. We
have taken the fight to the enemy and achieved tremendous success. But
despite various strategies employed by two administrations to prevent
the spread of radical Islam, that threat remains. The Arab Spring civil
war in Syria and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant in places such as north Africa highlight only a few of the many
events in the past several years that now define U.S. policy failures
in the Middle East. In just over a year, ISIL has exploded from a
largely localized force in Iraq to seriously challenge al Qaeda as the
vanguard of global jihad.
Moreover, nation-states like Russia and China continue to expand
their spheres of influence and diminish U.S. clout worldwide. Russia
has taken advantage of indecisiveness in Europe and exploited uneven
leadership in the U.S. to pressure Ukraine and its neighbors on core
Russian interests. China bullies its neighbors in the South and East
China Sea and, if left unchecked, will likely exercise de facto control
over maritime trade in its perceived territorial waters in the next
decade. Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran continue to pose significant
proliferation risks and remain strategic threats to the U.S. and its
allies. State actors can bring a tremendous amount of resources to
counter U.S. policy, placing an immense burden on the intelligence
community to collect information on and to assess these activities
carefully and accurately.
Perhaps more troubling, state and nonstate actors alike are
developing new ways to project power, particularly in cyberspace. Cyber
attacks are becoming so pervasive that network defenders are
overwhelmed. Attackers seem to gain access to sensitive systems at
will. The most recent attacks on the Office of Personnel Management
servers, possibly one of the most significant national security
incidents in the past decade, highlight the continued threat to our
Nation's infrastructure.
Mr. Chair, in this year's intelligence authorization bill, the
committee has taken a great deal of care in addressing the wide range
of issues described above. This bill is an essential tool in supporting
our Nation's efforts to tackle today's challenges while also directing
the intelligence community to make strategic investments in the future.
In particular, I believe that the bill goes a long way toward
encouraging the intelligence community to make much-needed investments,
such as recovering from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence
capabilities.
Additionally, this year's authorization bill comes on the heels of
the committee's recent bipartisan successes on key national security
issues, like reauthorizing important provisions related to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, and overwhelmingly passing bipartisan
legislation on cyber threat sharing information. I applaud Ranking
Member Schiff for his help on these issues, and I look forward to
working together in the future.
Finally, I want to thank all the Intelligence Committee staff on both
sides of the aisle for their support drafting this bill. The committee
staff spent countless hours assisting Members and finalizing the
legislation.
In particular, I would like to recognize our Sandia National Labs
fellow, Mr. Randy Smith. He has been with the committee for almost 2
years and will be leaving us soon to return to Sandia. He has been a
tremendous asset to this committee, and I would like to thank him for
all his hard work.
I would also like to thank the men and women of the intelligence
community for all their efforts to continue to protect this Nation.
I look forward to passing this legislation.
Mr. Chair, the intelligence authorization act is the annual blueprint
for the work of the intelligence community and America's military
intelligence efforts. The bill sets the priorities for our critical
intelligence efforts, and the legal framework of guidance and oversight
for those efforts. As you may recall, the House has passed intelligence
authorization bills with strong bipartisan support in the past several
Congresses.
The Ranking Member, Mr. Schiff, and I worked in a bipartisan manner
to draft the legislation in front of you today. Passing annual
intelligence authorization legislation is the most effective way for
Congress to exercise oversight over the executive branch and helps
ensure that the country's intelligence agencies have the resources and
authorities necessary to keep Americans safe. This legislation passed
unanimously out of our Committee.
As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified
programs, the bulk of the Committee's recommendations each year are
found in the classified annex to the bill, which has been available for
Members to review since June 4th. Among other initiatives, the bill
provides authorization for critical national security functions,
including: fighting terrorism and countering the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, funding efforts to recover from
unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities, and investing in
the resiliency of our national security space architecture.
At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for Fiscal Year
2016 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget
request level. Its funding levels are in line with the House-passed
Defense Appropriations bill for the National Intelligence Program and
with the National Defense Authorization Act for the Military
Intelligence Program. Overall, this bill sustains today's intelligence
capabilities and provides for future capabilities while staying within
the funding constraints of the Budget Control Act and the Budget
Resolution.
Mr. Chair, we are currently facing one of the most challenging global
environments in our nation's history. Nearly 14 years after the 9/11
attacks, the U.S. continues to hunt al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. We
have taken the fight to the enemy and achieved tremendous success, but
despite various strategies employed by two administrations to prevent
the spread of radical Islam, the threat remains. The Arab Spring, civil
war in Syria, and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant in places such as Northern Africa highlight only a few of the
many events in the past several years that now define U.S. policy
failures in the Middle East. In just over a year, ISIL has

[[Page H4398]]

exploded from a largely localized force in Iraq to seriously challenge
al-Qa'ida as the vanguard of the global jihad.
Moreover, nation states like Russia and China continue to expand
their spheres of influence and diminish U.S. clout worldwide. Russia
has taken advantage of indecisiveness in Europe and exploited uneven
leadership in the U.S. to pressure Ukraine and its neighbors on core
Russian interests. China bullies its neighbors in the South and East
China Sea, and if left unchecked, will likely exercise de facto control
over maritime trade in its perceived territorial waters in the next
decade. Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran continue to pose significant
proliferation risks and remain strategic threats to the U.S. and its
allies. State actors can bring a tremendous amount of resources to
counter U.S. policy, placing an immense burden on the Intelligence
Community to collect information on, and assess, these activities
carefully and accurately.
Perhaps more troubling, state and non-state actors alike are
developing new ways to project power, particularly in cyberspace. Cyber
attacks are becoming so pervasive that network defenders are
overwhelmed; attackers seem to gain access to sensitive systems at
will. The most recent attacks on the Office of Personnel Management
servers--possibly one of the most significant national security
incidents in the past decade--highlight the continued threat to our
nation's infrastructure.
Mr. Chair, in this year's intelligence authorization bill, this
Committee has taken a great deal of care in addressing the wide range
of issues described above. This bill is an essential tool in supporting
our nation's efforts to tackle today's challenges, while also directing
the Intelligence Community to make strategic investments in the future.
In particular, I believe that this bill goes a long way toward
encouraging the Intelligence Community to make much-needed investments,
such as recovering from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence
capabilities.
Additionally, this year's authorization bill comes on the heels of
the Committee's recent bipartisan successes on key national security
issues, including reauthorizing important provisions related to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and overwhelmingly passing
bipartisan legislation on cyber threat information sharing. I applaud
Ranking Member Schiff for his help on these issues and look forward to
working together in the future.
Finally, I want to thank all the Intelligence Committee staff on both
sides of the aisle for their support drafting this bill. The Committee
staff spent countless hours assisting Members and finalizing the
legislation. In particular, I would like to recognize our Sandia
National Labs fellow, Randy Smith. He has been with the Committee for
almost two years and will be leaving us soon to return to Sandia. He
has been a tremendous asset to this Committee and I thank him for all
his hard work. I would also like to thank the men and women of the
Intelligence Community for all their efforts protecting this nation. I
look forward to passing this legislation.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
First, I want to say thank you to Chairman Nunes. This Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 is our third major piece of
legislation together, and it once again demonstrates the fruits of our
commitment to bipartisanship.
We also have our difference of opinion from time to time, and on this
bill, we have some differences. But I know that as long as we continue
to work together, there is no end to the good that we can accomplish.
Through our cyber bill and our surveillance reform bill, we have been
guided by two core principles: first, that national security is truly
the security of the entire Nation and all Americans; second, that
national security can and must coexist with privacy and civil
liberties. I believe the bill today largely furthers these principles
as well.
The IAA funds, equips, and sets the priorities for the U.S.
intelligence community; and it is a crucial vehicle by which Congress
provides oversight of the IC and ensures that U.S. intelligence
professionals and intelligence programs have the funds and authorities
they need to keep us safe, as well as our allies and partners.
As the annual IAA provides hundreds of pages of detailed guidance,
strict authorizations, and precise limitations, it is also the single
most important means by which Congress conducts its oversight of the
intelligence community.

{time} 1415

As in past years, this year's IAA is a carefully considered bill and
the result of thoughtful oversight.
The Fiscal Year 2016 IAA funds the intelligence community at about 1
percent below the President's budget request and about 7 percent above
last year's enacted budget level.
The bill makes cuts to less-effective programs, adds money to
underfunded programs, and requires intelligence agencies to regularly
inform Congress of their activities, ensuring funds are spent
responsibly and lawfully.
Notably, the bill today holds, or ``fences,'' significant amounts of
money to make sure Congress' direction is followed to the letter and on
time.
I want to highlight just a few particular aspects of the bill. It
continues the committee's longstanding emphasis on counterintelligence
and security reforms. It also continues to support our overhead
architecture by funding our most critical space programs, investing in
space protection and resiliency, preserving investments in cutting-edge
technologies, and enhancing oversight of contracting and procurement
practices.
It also promotes enhancements to our foreign partner capabilities,
which are critical to multiplying the reach and impact of our own
intelligence efforts. It enhances human intelligence, or HUMINT,
capabilities, which are often the key to understanding and predicting
global events.
It provides resources to safeguard vulnerable signals intelligence,
or SIGINT, collection while enhancing oversight of these and other
sources of intelligence. It emphasizes collection to monitor and ensure
compliance with treaties and potential international agreements. It
greatly enhances oversight of Defense special operation forces
activities worldwide.
The bill also incorporates some excellent provisions championed by
the Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee, as well as the
Republican members.
In particular, I want to highlight Mr. Himes' provision to enhance
the quality of metrics we receive to enable more thorough oversight;
Ms. Sewell's multiple provisions to enhance diversity within the
intelligence community; Mr. Carson's provisions to better understand
FBI resource allocation against domestic and foreign threats and the
role of the FBI and DNI in countering violent extremism, particularly
in minors; Ms. Speier's provision to provide greater human rights
oversight of the IC's relationship with certain foreign partners; Mr.
Quigley's provision regarding intelligence support to Ukraine; and Mr.
Swalwell's provision to ensure that Department of Energy National Labs
can work with State and local government recipients of homeland
security grants.
All this said, while I believe the bill largely reflects sound
choices, I am concerned that it uses the overseas contingency
operations--or OCO--funding as a way to evade the sequestration levels
mandated by the ill-conceived Budget Control Act.
Again, I largely support the funding levels and the programs which
the IAA authorizes, but I cannot endorse how it has funded them. We
need to be serious and thoughtful about the budget and undo
sequestration--not just employ accounting tricks to evade its levels
only for defense and national security-related items.
Even some domestic programs and agencies that contribute to our
homeland security cannot qualify for OCO dollars, while vital programs
like our children's education and our social services are left to
languish.
Instead of arbitrary, across-the-board cuts, let's do what this bill
does substantively: make cuts to some areas and add money to others in
a deliberate, well thought out manner. It is time to forthrightly deal
with sequestration for all of our national priorities, not just for
defense.
I am also opposed to provisions in this bill which would tie the
hands of the administration and prevent the orderly transfer of
detainees from the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. These
restrictions have never been included in prior versions of the IAA, and
there is no reason to introduce them into the IAA process now.
The bill goes even further than restricting transfer of detainees to
the United States and includes a new provision which restricts
transfers to ``combat zones,'' a term that is so

[[Page H4399]]

broad as to include allies and partners such as Jordan.
As I have long said, keeping the Guantanamo prison serves as a
recruitment tool for militants, undercuts our relationships with our
allies, and undermines our international standing.
With that said, the bill, as a whole, is largely a strong product,
and I appreciate the close partnership we have enjoyed with the
chairman in working on it. But, unfortunately, I cannot support the
bill so long as it includes these Guantanamo restrictions and employs
the OCO budget gimmick at the expense of our domestic spending
priorities.
I look forward to a robust amendment process today, and I am
committed to working with the chairman, the Senate, the administration,
the other committees of jurisdiction, and all Members of Congress to
make critical improvements to the bill as it moves forward, and to
resolve the issues to keep alive the string of consecutive signed IAAs.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, at this time I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from North Carolina (Mr. Pittenger).
Mr. PITTENGER. I thank the chairman for his vital leadership on the
Intelligence Committee.
I rise in support of this legislation providing the intelligence
community the authorization needed to protect and defend the United
States and support critical national security programs protecting
Americans from nation states and Islamic terrorists.
In December, NSA Director Admiral Rogers warned that China has the
capability of shutting down the U.S. electric grid through cyber
attack. Homeland security Secretary Johnson has warned about the threat
of attacks launched by sleeper cells in most of our States. ISIS
continues to expand into new territory, while Americans are more at
risk because President Obama has no strategy for defeating ISIS, whom
he initially referred to as the JV team.
This is not the time to impede our intelligence efforts. America
faces grave danger from those who wish to destroy our way of life.
Please join me in full bipartisan support of the Intelligence
Authorization Act. Let us be united in confronting the perilous threats
of our adversaries.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am pleased to yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), the ranking member
on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. ENGEL. I thank my friend for yielding.
I want to say that I appreciate the bipartisan, hard work of Chairman
Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff, but I want to bring to the House's
attention recent reports that this bill makes drastic cuts in our so-
called covert support to the moderate Syrian opposition.
A headline in the Saturday Washington Post read: ``Secret CIA effort
in Syria faces large funding cut.'' If these reports are true, just as
the moderate Syrian forces may be starting to make progress, especially
in the south, then I am afraid we may be making a big mistake.

Unfortunately, most Members of the House don't know for certain if
this legislation will reduce our support for the moderate opposition.
Those funding decisions are made behind closed doors. And that is why I
believe this bill is not the right place for us to be making decisions
that have a major impact on our Syria strategy.
I have no doubt that Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff are
determined to get the intelligence piece of our Syria response right,
but this is not merely an intelligence issue, and our overall strategy
in Syria goes far beyond what is included in any covert program. I
believe we shouldn't be dealing with this problem in a piecemeal way.
As we have been doing in the Foreign Affairs Committee on a
bipartisan basis, I urge my colleagues to take a step back, look at the
big picture, and address our Syria policy in a way that makes sense and
involves all the relevant players.
I am troubled if it is true that this bill makes drastic cuts in our
so-called covert support to the moderate Syria opposition. And I
commend the hard work of our chairman and ranking member.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would urge my colleague, the ranking member on the Foreign Affairs
Committee, that we shouldn't always believe what is in the newspaper.
There have been lots of different reports about lots of different
things.
I would say that Mr. Schiff and I worked in a bipartisan manner to
look at all programs across the spectrum of the 17 agencies. And we
would be glad to spend some time with the gentleman from New York down
in the committee spaces to raise the concerns that he brought up about
a newspaper article. As I said, I think there are a lot of things that
we read in the newspaper.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The Intelligence Authorization Act is the vehicle by which we ensure
that U.S. intelligence professionals and programs have the funds and
the authorities that they need. It is the single most important means
by which Congress can conduct its oversight. We need to pass this
legislation, just as the committee has done over the last several
years.
It is my hope that as the legislation moves forward, we will be able
to dispose of the Guantanamo provisions--I will have an amendment to
address that in a few minutes--and that we can also resolve the issues
regarding the overseas contingency account. I look forward to working
with my colleague as the bill moves forward to address those issues.
I want to join the chairman in saluting the members of the
intelligence community--the men and women who do such an extraordinary
job for us each and every day. They have our sincerest gratitude and
full appreciation for their dedication, their patriotism, and their
unparalleled skills. I also want to thank again our chairman for his
leadership, his commitment to bipartisanship, and his determination to
do what is right. I want to thank our colleagues on the committee, who
have done an extraordinary job in helping to put this bill together.
I also want to join the chairman in thanking our wonderful staff on
our side of the aisle. I want to thank Carly Blake, Linda Cohen,
Allison Getty, Robert Minehart, Amanda Rogers Thorpe, Rheanne Wirkkala,
as well as Patrick Boland and our shared technical and security staff,
including Kristin Jepson, Brandon Smith, and Kevin Klein. We have an
extraordinary team on the committee. It is a great pleasure to serve
and work with each and every one of them.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to thank the ranking member for his continued cooperation to
work in a bipartisan fashion. As I think most Americans know, the
threats continue to add up every day, and it is up to the men and women
in the intelligence community to help keep us safe. I know the ranking
member and I are committed to doing just that.
With that, I look forward to debate on the amendments and passage of
the final underlying bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment
under the 5-minute rule.
In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it
shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of
amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a
substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 114-19. That
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as
follows:

H.R. 2596

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

[[Page H4400]]

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subtitle A--General Matters

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Prior congressional notification of initiations of certain
new special access programs.
Sec. 304. Prior congressional notification of transfers of funds for
certain intelligence activities.
Sec. 305. Designation of lead intelligence officer for tunnels.
Sec. 306. Clarification of authority of Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board.
Sec. 307. Reporting process required for tracking certain requests for
country clearance.
Sec. 308. Prohibition on sharing of certain information in response to
foreign government inquiries.
Sec. 309. National Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.
Sec. 310. Intelligence community business system transformation.
Sec. 311. Inclusion of Inspector General of Intelligence Community in
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency.
Sec. 312. Authorities of the Inspector General for the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 313. Provision of information and assistance to Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 314. Clarification relating to information access by Comptroller
General.
Sec. 315. Use of homeland security grant funds in conjunction with
Department of Energy national laboratories.
Sec. 316. Technical amendments relating to pay under title 5, United
States Code.

Subtitle B--Matters Relating to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba

Sec. 321. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release of
individuals detained at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 322. Prohibition on use of funds to construct or modify facilities
in United States to house detainees transferred from
United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 323. Prohibition on use of funds to transfer or release
individuals detained at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to combat zones.

Subtitle C--Reports

Sec. 331. Reports to Congress on individuals formerly detained at
United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 332. Reports on foreign fighters.
Sec. 333. Reports on prisoner population at United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 334. Report on use of certain business concerns.
Sec. 335. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(a) Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(b) Intelligence Community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2016 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and,
subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as
of September 30, 2016, for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through
(16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill
H.R. 2596 of the One Hundred Fourteenth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate
portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel
in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2016 by
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence
determines that such action is necessary to the performance
of important intelligence functions, except that the number
of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such
element.
(b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern,
for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment
under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a),
including any exemption from such personnel levels, of
employment or assignment in--
(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
(3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.
(c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15
days prior to each exercise of an authority described in
subsection (a).

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2016 the sum of $501,850,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2017.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 785 positions as of
September 30, 2016. Personnel serving in such elements may be
permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2016 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for
advanced research and development shall remain available
until September 30, 2017.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2016, there are authorized such additional personnel for the
Community Management Account as of that date as are specified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a).

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2016 the sum of $514,000,000.

TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subtitle A--General Matters

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity

[[Page H4401]]

which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States.

SEC. 303. PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF INITIATIONS OF
CERTAIN NEW SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.

(a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), none
of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or
otherwise made available for the intelligence community for
fiscal year 2016 may be used to initiate any new special
access program pertaining to any intelligence or
intelligence-related activity or covert action unless the
Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of
Defense, as appropriate, submits to the congressional
intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives and the Senate, by not later
than 30 days before initiating such a program, written
notification of the intention to initiate the program.
(b) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence or
the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, may waive
subsection (a) with respect to the initiation of a new
special access program if the Director or Secretary, as the
case may be, determines that an emergency situation makes it
impossible or impractical to provide the notice required
under such subsection by the date that is 30 days before such
initiation.
(2) Notice.--If the Director or Secretary issues a waiver
under paragraph (1), the Director or Secretary, as the case
may be, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House
of Representatives and the Senate, by not later than 48 hours
after the initiation of the new special access program
covered by the waiver, written notice of the waiver and a
justification for the waiver, including a description of the
emergency situation that necessitated the waiver.
(c) Special Access Program Defined.--In this section, the
term ``special access program'' has the meaning given such
term in Executive Order 13526 as in effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 304. PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF
FUNDS FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

(a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), none
of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or
otherwise made available for the intelligence community for
fiscal year 2016 may be used to initiate a transfer of funds
from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund to be used for
intelligence activities unless the Director of National
Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate,
submits to the congressional intelligence committees, by not
later than 30 days before initiating such a transfer, written
notice of the transfer.
(b) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence or
the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, may waive
subsection (a) with respect to the initiation of a transfer
of funds if the Director or Secretary, as the case may be,
determines that an emergency situation makes it impossible or
impractical to provide the notice required under such
subsection by the date that is 30 days before such
initiation.
(2) Notice.--If the Director or Secretary issues a waiver
under paragraph (1), the Director or Secretary, as the case
may be, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, by not later than 48 hours after the initiation
of the transfer of funds covered by the waiver, written
notice of the waiver and a justification for the waiver,
including a description of the emergency situation that
necessitated the waiver.

SEC. 305. DESIGNATION OF LEAD INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR
TUNNELS.

The Director of National Intelligence shall designate an
official to manage the collection and analysis of
intelligence regarding the tactical use of tunnels by state
and nonstate actors.

SEC. 306. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

Section 1061(g) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(g)) is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5) Limitations.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to authorize the Board, or any agent thereof, to
gain access to information that an executive branch agency
deems related to covert action, as such term is defined in
section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3093(e)).''.

SEC. 307. REPORTING PROCESS REQUIRED FOR TRACKING CERTAIN
REQUESTS FOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE.

(a) In General.--By not later than September 30, 2016, the
Director of National Intelligence shall establish a formal
internal reporting process for tracking requests for country
clearance submitted to overseas Director of National
Intelligence representatives by departments and agencies of
the United States. Such reporting process shall include a
mechanism for tracking the department or agency that submits
each such request and the date on which each such request is
submitted.
(b) Congressional Briefing.--By not later than December 31,
2016, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the
congressional intelligence committees on the progress of the
Director in establishing the process required under
subsection (a).

SEC. 308. PROHIBITION ON SHARING OF CERTAIN INFORMATION IN
RESPONSE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INQUIRIES.

(a) Prohibition.--None of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for any element of the intelligence
community may be used to respond to, share, or authorize the
sharing of any non-public information related to intelligence
activities carried out by the United States in response to a
legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government
into the intelligence activities of the United States.
(b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 30 days
after an element of the intelligence community receives a
legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government
related to intelligence activities carried out by the United
States, the element shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees written notification of the inquiry.
(c) Clarification Regarding Collaboration With Foreign
Partners.--The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not be
construed as limiting routine intelligence activities with
foreign partners, except in any case in which the central
focus of the collaboration with the foreign partner is to
obtain information for, or solicit a response to, a
legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government
related to intelligence activities carried out by the United
States.

SEC. 309. NATIONAL CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION
CENTER.

(a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 119B as section 119C; and
(2) by inserting after section 119A the following new
section:

``SEC. 119B. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION CENTER.

``(a) Establishment.--There is within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence a Cyber Threat Intelligence
Integration Center.
``(b) Director.--There is a Director of the Cyber Threat
Intelligence Integration Center, who shall be the head of the
Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, and who shall
be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
``(c) Primary Missions.--The Cyber Threat Intelligence
Integration Center shall--
``(1) serve as the primary organization within the Federal
Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence
possessed or acquired by the United States pertaining to
cyber threats;
``(2) ensure that appropriate departments and agencies of
the Federal Government have full access to and receive all-
source intelligence support needed to execute the cyber
threat intelligence activities of such agencies and to
perform independent, alternative analyses;
``(3) disseminate cyber threat analysis to the President,
the appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal
Government, and the appropriate committees of Congress;
``(4) coordinate cyber threat intelligence activities of
the departments and agencies of the Federal Government; and
``(5) conduct strategic cyber threat intelligence planning
for the Federal Government.
``(d) Limitations.--The Cyber Threat Intelligence
Integration Center--
``(1) may not have more than 50 permanent positions;
``(2) in carrying out the primary missions of the Center
described in subsection (c), may not augment staffing through
detailees, assignees, or core contractor personnel or enter
into any personal services contracts to exceed the limitation
under paragraph (1); and
``(3) shall be located in a building owned or operated by
an element of the intelligence community as of the date of
the enactment of this section.''.
(b) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in
the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended by section 102 of this title, is further amended by
striking the item relating to section 119B and inserting the
following new items:

``Sec. 119B. Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.
``Sec. 119C. National intelligence centers.''.

SEC. 310. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEM
TRANSFORMATION.

Section 506D of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3100) is amended to read as follows:

``intelligence community business system transformation

``Sec. 506D. (a) Limitation on Obligation of Funds.--(1)
Subject to paragraph (3), no funds appropriated to any
element of the intelligence community may be obligated for an
intelligence community business system transformation that
will have a total cost in excess of $3,000,000 unless the
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community makes
a certification described in paragraph (2) with respect to
such intelligence community business system transformation.
``(2) The certification described in this paragraph for an
intelligence community business system transformation is a
certification made by the Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community that the intelligence community
business system transformation--
``(A) complies with the enterprise architecture under
subsection (b) and such other policies and standards that the
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community
considers appropriate; or
``(B) is necessary--
``(i) to achieve a critical national security capability or
address a critical requirement; or
``(ii) to prevent a significant adverse effect on a project
that is needed to achieve an essential capability, taking
into consideration any alternative solutions for preventing
such adverse effect.
``(3) With respect to a fiscal year after fiscal year 2010,
the amount referred to in paragraph (1) in the matter
preceding subparagraph (A) shall be equal to the sum of--
``(A) the amount in effect under such paragraph (1) for the
preceding fiscal year (determined after application of this
paragraph), plus

[[Page H4402]]

``(B) such amount multiplied by the annual percentage
increase in the Consumer Price Index (all items; U.S. city
average) as of September of the previous fiscal year.
``(b) Enterprise Architecture for Intelligence Community
Business Systems.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence
shall develop and implement an enterprise architecture to
cover all intelligence community business systems, and the
functions and activities supported by such business systems.
The enterprise architecture shall be sufficiently defined to
effectively guide, constrain, and permit implementation of
interoperable intelligence community business system
solutions, consistent with applicable policies and procedures
established by the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget.
``(2) The enterprise architecture under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
``(A) An information infrastructure that will enable the
intelligence community to--
``(i) comply with all Federal accounting, financial
management, and reporting requirements;
``(ii) routinely produce timely, accurate, and reliable
financial information for management purposes;
``(iii) integrate budget, accounting, and program
information and systems; and
``(iv) provide for the measurement of performance,
including the ability to produce timely, relevant, and
reliable cost information.
``(B) Policies, procedures, data standards, and system
interface requirements that apply uniformly throughout the
intelligence community.
``(c) Responsibilities for Intelligence Community Business
System Transformation.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall be responsible for the entire life cycle of an
intelligence community business system transformation,
including review, approval, and oversight of the planning,
design, acquisition, deployment, operation, and maintenance
of the business system transformation.
``(d) Intelligence Community Business System Investment
Review.--(1) The Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community shall establish and implement, not
later than 60 days after October 7, 2010, an investment
review process for the intelligence community business
systems for which the Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community is responsible.
``(2) The investment review process under paragraph (1)
shall--
``(A) meet the requirements of section 11312 of title 40,
United States Code; and
``(B) specifically set forth the responsibilities of the
Chief Information Office of the Intelligence Community under
such review process.
``(3) The investment review process under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
``(A) Review and approval by an investment review board
(consisting of appropriate representatives of the
intelligence community) of each intelligence community
business system as an investment before the obligation of
funds for such system.
``(B) Periodic review, but not less often than annually, of
every intelligence community business system investment.
``(C) Thresholds for levels of review to ensure appropriate
review of intelligence community business system investments
depending on the scope, complexity, and cost of the system
involved.
``(D) Procedures for making certifications in accordance
with the requirements of subsection (a)(2).
``(e) Relation to Annual Registration Requirements.--
Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the
requirements of section 8083 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-287; 118 Stat. 989),
with regard to information technology systems (as defined in
subsection (d) of such section).
``(f) Relationship to Defense Business Enterprise
Architecture.--Intelligence community business system
transformations certified under this section shall be deemed
to be in compliance with section 2222 of title 10, United
States Code. Nothing in this section shall be construed to
exempt funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department
of Defense for activities other than an intelligence
community business system transformation from the
requirements of such section 2222, to the extent that such
requirements are otherwise applicable.
``(g) Relation to Clinger-Cohen Act.--(1) Executive agency
responsibilities in chapter 113 of title 40, United States
Code, for any intelligence community business system
transformation shall be exercised jointly by--
``(A) the Director of National Intelligence and the Chief
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community; and
``(B) the head of the executive agency that contains the
element of the intelligence community involved and the chief
information officer of that executive agency.
``(2) The Director of National Intelligence and the head of
the executive agency referred to in paragraph (1)(B) shall
enter into a memorandum of understanding to carry out the
requirements of this section in a manner that best meets the
needs of the intelligence community and the executive agency.
``(h) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `enterprise architecture' has the meaning
given that term in section 3601(4) of title 44, United States
Code.
``(2) The terms `information system' and `information
technology' have the meanings given those terms in section
11101 of title 40, United States Code.
``(3) The term `intelligence community business system'
means an information system, including a national security
system, that is operated by, for, or on behalf of an element
of the intelligence community, including a financial system,
mixed system, financial data feeder system, and the business
infrastructure capabilities shared by the systems of the
business enterprise architecture, including people, process,
and technology, that build upon the core infrastructure used
to support business activities, such as acquisition,
financial management, logistics, strategic planning and
budgeting, installations and environment, and human resource
management.
``(4) The term `intelligence community business system
transformation' means--
``(A) the acquisition or development of a new intelligence
community business system; or
``(B) any significant modification or enhancement of an
existing intelligence community business system (other than
necessary to maintain current services).
``(5) The term `national security system' has the meaning
given that term in section 3552(b) of title 44, United States
Code.''.

SEC. 311. INCLUSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY IN COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON
INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY.

Section 11(b)(1)(B) of the Inspector General Act of 1978
(Public Law 95-452; 5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking
``the Office of the Director of National Intelligence'' and
inserting ``the Intelligence Community''.

SEC. 312. AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) Information and Assistance.--Paragraph (9) of section
17(e) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3517(e)(9)) is amended to read as follows:
``(9)(A) The Inspector General may request such information
or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties
and responsibilities of the Inspector General provided by
this section from any Federal, State, or local governmental
agency or unit thereof.
``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information
or assistance from a department or agency of the Federal
Government, the head of the department or agency involved,
insofar as practicable and not in contravention of any
existing statutory restriction or regulation of such
department or agency, shall furnish to the Inspector General,
or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
``(C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide
any new authority to the Central Intelligence Agency to
conduct intelligence activity in the United States.
``(D) In this paragraph, the term `State' means each of the
several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, and any territory or possession of the United
States.''.
(b) Technical Amendments Relating to Selection of
Employees.--Paragraph (7) of such section (50 U.S.C.
3517(e)(7)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(A)'' before ``Subject to applicable
law''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources
allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final
approval of--
``(i) the selection of internal and external candidates for
employment with the Office of Inspector General; and
``(ii) all other personnel decisions concerning personnel
permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General,
including selection and appointment to the Senior
Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based
determinations that are not within the authority of a head of
other Central Intelligence Agency offices.''.

SEC. 313. PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE TO
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.

Section 103H(j)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3033) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``any department,
agency, or other element of the United States Government''
and inserting ``any Federal, State (as defined in section
804), or local governmental agency or unit thereof''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``from a department,
agency, or element of the Federal Government'' before ``under
subparagraph (A)''.

SEC. 314. CLARIFICATION RELATING TO INFORMATION ACCESS BY
COMPTROLLER GENERAL.

Section 348(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259; 124 Stat. 2700; 50
U.S.C. 3308) is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(4) Requests by certain congressional committees.--
Consistent with the protection of classified information, the
directive issued under paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the
Comptroller General from obtaining information necessary to
carry out the following audits or reviews:
``(A) An audit or review carried out--
``(i) at the request of the congressional intelligence
committees; or
``(ii) pursuant to--

``(I) an intelligence authorization Act;
``(II) a committee report or joint explanatory statement
accompanying an intelligence authorization Act; or
``(III) a classified annex to a committee report or joint
explanatory statement accompanying an intelligence
authorization Act.

``(B) An audit or review pertaining to intelligence
activities of the Department of Defense carried out--
``(i) at the request of the congressional defense
committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10,
United States Code); or
``(ii) pursuant to a national defense authorization Act.''.

[[Page H4403]]

SEC. 315. USE OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT FUNDS IN CONJUNCTION
WITH DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL
LABORATORIES.

Section 2008(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 609(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph
(1) by inserting ``including by working in conjunction with a
National Laboratory (as defined in section 2(3) of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801(3)),'' after ``plans,''.

SEC. 316. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO PAY UNDER TITLE 5,
UNITED STATES CODE.

Section 5102(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in clause (vii), by striking ``or'';
(2) by inserting after clause (vii) the following new
clause:
``(viii) the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence;''; and
(3) in clause (x), by striking the period and inserting a
semicolon.

Subtitle B--Matters Relating to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba

SEC. 321. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR TRANSFER OR RELEASE
OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL
STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available to an element of the intelligence community may be
used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment
of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to transfer,
release, or assist in the transfer or release, to or within
the United States, its territories, or possessions, Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed or any other individual detained at
Guantanamo (as such term is defined in section 322(c)).

SEC. 322. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO CONSTRUCT OR MODIFY
FACILITIES IN UNITED STATES TO HOUSE DETAINEES
TRANSFERRED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION,
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

(a) In General.--No amounts authorized to be appropriated
or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence
community may be used during the period beginning on the date
of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016,
to construct or modify any facility in the United States, its
territories, or possessions to house any individual detained
at Guantanamo for the purposes of detention or imprisonment
in the custody or under the control of the Department of
Defense.
(b) Exception.--The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not
apply to any modification of facilities at United States
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
(c) Individual Detained at Guantanamo Defined.--In this
section, the term ``individual detained at Guantanamo'' means
any individual located at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of October 1, 2009, who--
(1) is not a citizen of the United States or a member of
the Armed Forces of the United States; and
(2) is--
(A) in the custody or under the control of the Department
of Defense; or
(B) otherwise under detention at United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

SEC. 323. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO TRANSFER OR RELEASE
INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL
STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, TO COMBAT ZONES.

(a) In General.--No amounts authorized to be appropriated
or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence
community may be used during the period beginning on the date
of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016,
to transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release of
any individual detained in the custody or under the control
of the Department of Defense at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to a combat zone.
(b) Combat Zone Defined.--In this section, the term
``combat zone'' means any area designated as a combat zone
for purposes of section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 for which the income of a member of the Armed Forces was
excluded during 2014, 2015, or 2016 by reason of the member's
service on active duty in such area.

Subtitle C--Reports

SEC. 331. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON INDIVIDUALS FORMERLY
DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION,
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

(a) Additional Matters for Inclusion in Reports.--
Subsection (c) of section 319 of the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 123 Stat. 1874;
10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by adding after paragraph (5)
the following new paragraphs:
``(6) A summary of all contact by any means of
communication, including telecommunications, electronic or
technical means, in person, written communications, or any
other means of communication, regardless of content, between
any individual formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, and any individual known or suspected to be
associated with a foreign terrorist group.
``(7) A description of whether any of the contact described
in the summary required by paragraph (6) included any
information or discussion about hostilities against the
United States or its allies or partners.
``(8) For each individual described in paragraph (4), the
period of time between the date on which the individual was
released or transferred from Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, and the date on which it is confirmed that the
individual is suspected or confirmed of reengaging in
terrorist activities.
``(9) The average period of time described in paragraph (8)
for all the individuals described in paragraph (4).''.
(b) Form.--Subsection (a) of such section is amended by
adding at the end the following: ``The reports may be
submitted in classified form.''.
(c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or the
amendments made by this section shall be construed to
terminate, alter, modify, override, or otherwise affect any
reporting of information required under section 319(c) of the
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 123
Stat. 1874; 10 U.S.C. 801 note), as in effect immediately
before the enactment of this section.

SEC. 332. REPORTS ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS.

(a) Reports Required.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60 days
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
on foreign fighter flows to and from Syria and to and from
Iraq. The Director shall define the term ``foreign fighter''
in such reports.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under
subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
(1) The total number of foreign fighters who have traveled
to Syria or Iraq since January 1, 2011, the total number of
foreign fighters in Syria or Iraq as of the date of the
submittal of the report, the total number of foreign fighters
whose countries of origin have a visa waiver program
described in section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1187), the total number of foreign fighters who
have left Syria or Iraq, the total number of female foreign
fighters, and the total number of deceased foreign fighters.
(2) The total number of United States persons who have
traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq since
January 1, 2011, the total number of such persons who have
arrived in Syria or Iraq since such date, and the total
number of such persons who have returned to the United States
from Syria or Iraq since such date.
(3) The total number of foreign fighters in Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment and the status of each such
foreign fighter in that database, the number of such foreign
fighters who are on a watchlist, and the number of such
foreign fighters who are not on a watchlist.
(4) The total number of foreign fighters who have been
processed with biometrics, including face images,
fingerprints, and iris scans.
(5) Any programmatic updates to the foreign fighter report
since the last report was issued, including updated analysis
on foreign country cooperation, as well as actions taken,
such as denying or revoking visas.
(6) A worldwide graphic that describes foreign fighters
flows to and from Syria, with points of origin by country.
(c) Form.--The reports submitted under subsection (a) may
be submitted in classified form.
(d) Termination.--The requirement to submit reports under
subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is three
years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 333. REPORTS ON PRISONER POPULATION AT UNITED STATES
NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

(a) Reports Required.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 30 days
thereafter, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence,
shall submit to the Members of Congress specified in
subsection (b) a report on the prisoner population at the
detention facility at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
(b) Specified Members and Committees of Congress.--The
Members of Congress specified in this subsection are the
following:
(1) The majority leader and minority leader of the Senate.
(2) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate.
(3) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
(4) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
(5) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(6) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(7) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(8) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(9) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(c) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under
subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
(1) The name and country of origin of each prisoner
detained at the detention facility at United States Naval
Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of the date of such report.
(2) A current summary of the evidence, intelligence, and
information used to justify the detention of each prisoner
listed under paragraph (1) at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
(3) A current accounting of all the measures taken to
transfer each prisoner listed under paragraph (1) to the
individual's country of citizenship or another country.
(4) A current description of the number of individuals
released or transferred from detention at United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected
of returning to terrorist activities after such release or
transfer.
(5) An assessment of any efforts by foreign terrorist
organizations to recruit individuals released from detention
at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
(6) A summary of all contact by any means of communication,
including telecommunications, electronic or technical means,
in person, written

[[Page H4404]]

communications, or any other means of communication,
regardless of content, between any individual formerly
detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, and any individual known or suspected to be associated
with a foreign terrorist group.
(7) A description of whether any of the contact described
in the summary required by paragraph (6) included any
information or discussion about hostilities against the
United States or its allies or partners.
(8) For each individual described in paragraph (4), the
period of time between the date on which the individual was
released or transferred from United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the date on which it is confirmed
that the individual is suspected or confirmed of reengaging
in terrorist activities.
(9) The average period of time described in paragraph (8)
for all the individuals described in paragraph (4).

SEC. 334. REPORT ON USE OF CERTAIN BUSINESS CONCERNS.

(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
communities a report on the representation, as of the date of
the report, of covered business concerns among the
contractors that are awarded contracts by elements of the
intelligence community for goods, equipment, tools, and
services.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The representation of covered business concerns as
described in subsection (a), including such representation
by--
(A) each type of covered business concern; and
(B) each element of the intelligence community.
(2) If, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director does not record and monitor the statistics required
to carry out this section, a description of the actions taken
by the Director to ensure that such statistics are recorded
and monitored beginning in fiscal year 2016.
(3) The actions the Director plans to take during fiscal
year 2016 to enhance the awarding of contracts to covered
business concerns by elements of the intelligence community.
(c) Covered Business Concerns Defined.--In this section,
the term ``covered business concerns'' means the following:
(1) Minority-owned businesses.
(2) Women-owned businesses.
(3) Small disadvantaged businesses.
(4) Service-disabled veteran-owned businesses.
(5) Veteran-owned small businesses.

SEC. 335. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Quadrennial Audit of Positions Requiring Security
Clearances.--Section 506H of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (a); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(a) and (b), respectively.
(b) Reports on Role of Analysts at FBI and FBI Information
Sharing.--Section 2001(g) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118
Stat. 3700; 28 U.S.C. 532 note) is amended by striking
paragraphs (3) and (4).
(c) Report on Outside Employment by Officers and Employees
of Intelligence Community.--
(1) In general.--Section 102A(u) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended--
(A) by striking ``(1) The Director'' and inserting ``The
Director''; and
(B) by striking paragraph (2).
(2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (a) of section 507 of
such Act (50 U.S.C. 3106(a)) is amended--
(A) by striking paragraph (5); and
(B) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (5).
(3) Technical amendment.--Subsection (c)(1) of such section
507 is amended by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and
inserting ``subsection (a)''.
(d) Reports on Nuclear Aspirations of Non-state Entities.--
Section 1055 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371) is repealed.
(e) Reports on Espionage by People's Republic of China.--
Section 3151 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000 (42 U.S.C. 7383e) is repealed.
(f) Reports on Security Vulnerabilities of National
Laboratory Computers.--Section 4508 of the Atomic Energy
Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2659) is repealed.

The CHAIR. No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a
substitute shall be in order except those printed in House Report 114-
155. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in
the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered
read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally
divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be
subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division
of the question.

Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Israel

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 12, line 10, strike ``The Director'' and insert ``(a)
In General.--The Director''.
Page 12, after line 13, insert the following:
(b) Annual Report.--Not later than the date that is 10
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
biennially thereafter until the date that is four years after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees (as such term is defined in section 101(a)(16) of
title 10, United States Code) a report describing--
(1) trends in the use of tunnels by foreign state and
nonstate actors; and
(2) collaboration efforts between the United States and
partner countries to address the use of tunnels by
adversaries.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Israel) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer an amendment with my very good friend
from Colorado (Mr. Lamborn) and my very good friend from Florida (Ms.
Graham). This is a bipartisan amendment with respect to tunnels being
used as a military tactic, technology, and strategy in asymmetric
warfare.
Mr. Chairman, almost exactly a year ago, when war broke out in the
Middle East and Hamas attacked Israel, I visited Israel and saw for
myself the sophistication of the tunnels being dug from Gaza to Israel
through which terrorists traveled. They went to the other side of the
tunnels, popped up, and tried to kill innocent civilians.
These tunnels are not the tunnels that many of us characterize in our
own minds. These tunnels are sophisticated. These are expressways
underground. It is like the Queens-Midtown Tunnel going from Gaza to
Israel. They are ventilated. They are lit. They are massive. They are
deep. They are huge. They are impenetrable, and they are very difficult
to detect.
Mr. Chairman, the FY16 Intelligence Authorization bill properly says
that the Director of National Intelligence will designate an official
to manage the collection and analysis of intelligence regarding the
tactical use of tunnels by state and nonstate actors.

{time} 1430

This bipartisan amendment simply asks for accountability. It requires
a report from this new lead intelligence officer for tunnels describing
the trends in the use of tunnels by foreign state and nonstate actors
and collaborative efforts between the United States and partner nations
to address the use of tunnels by our adversaries.
Mr. Chairman, I talked about tunnels in the Middle East, but in fact,
these tunnels are dynamic force multipliers for our enemies and enemies
of our allies around the world. They are used for terrorist attacks,
but they are also used to smuggle arms and contraband.
We have learned that these tunnels are being used well beyond Israel.
Korea is another example. Tunnels have been found in North Korea. Here
at home, more than 150 tunnels have been found since 2009.
Mr. Chairman, we have plenty of enemies today looking for ways to
attack the United States and our interests around the globe. This bill
recognizes these threats and, very wisely, creates a lead intelligence
officer for tunnels.
This amendment simply encourages greater oversight by Congress. It
allows Congress to make informed decisions on how and where to spend
future funds in order to counter this threat and protect U.S. national
security interests.
Most importantly, Mr. Chairman, these reports will help shape the
efforts of the newly created position, making it clear that Congress
expects accountability and transparency, and that is something that the
American people require.
I ask my colleagues to support this bipartisan amendment, and I
reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do
not intend to oppose the amendment.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr.
Lamborn).

[[Page H4405]]

Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Congressman Steve Israel
and Congresswoman Gwen Graham for working together with me on this
bipartisan effort in the defense bills, as well as now in the
Intelligence Authorization Act. I would also like to thank Chairman
Nunes and his staff for working together with me on this important
issue.
Mr. Chairman, as Representative Israel just described, there is a
real and growing tunnel threat to American bases and embassies around
the world, to our southern border, as well as to our ally Israel, both
in Gaza, as well as Israel's northern border.
Language I offered in the base intelligence bill, combined with this
amendment, will ensure that our intelligence community stays focused on
this threat. There will be a dedicated person watching on this issue.
Going forward, partnership with Israel is the best way to address
this growing threat. As we have seen with Iron Dome and other missile
defense efforts, partnering with a vital ally like Israel enables both
countries to learn quickly, while sharing costs and new technologies.
It is a win-win situation for Israel and the U.S. and, hopefully, a
loss situation for the bad guys.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank my very good friend from Colorado
for his bipartisan support of this bill.
I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Florida. (Ms. Graham).
Ms. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of Representative Steve
Israel's amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act to provide
oversight for the joint U.S.-Israel antitunneling defense project.
The joint antitunneling project, which was added to the National
Defense Authorization Act in an amendment sponsored by my good friend
Representative Lamborn and myself, will help our closest ally in the
Middle East, Israel, protect its borders.
The terrorist group Hamas has spent years developing a complex
network of tunnels under the Gaza Strip and Israel to smuggle weapons,
kidnap Israelis, and launch mass murder attacks.
This project will develop new technology to detect and destroy these
tunnels, and it will send a clear message to our allies and enemies
alike. The United States is committed to protecting Israel and to
rooting out and destroying the terrorists who wish to do her harm.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff), the distinguished ranking member of the
committee.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank Mr.
Israel, Mr. Lamborn, and Ms. Graham for this very important amendment
and issue.
This will call for a report on our adversaries' use of tunnels and an
update on our collaboration with international partners in ways to
detect and defeat tunnels.
All of us remember the fear that set in, in much of southern Israel
last summer, as Hamas militants used a complex network of tunnels to
attack Israeli soldiers from the Gaza Strip. This was not the first use
of tunnels by Hamas. Cross-border tunnels were used in the capture of
IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006.
In addition to using them against military targets, Israel has
uncovered evidence that the tunnels are being prepared for large-scale
attacks against Israeli civilians.
Tunnels are not just a problem for Israel. For decades, the North
Korean military has also been digging tunnels under the DMZ to
facilitate infiltration of South Korea.
According to press reports, four tunnels from the north have been
found in all, although none since 1990. The South Korean Defense
Ministry believes there may be 20 in all, and they could pose a mortal
threat to Koreans and American service personnel in the region.
I strongly support the amendment and urge my colleagues to do the
same.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to support the amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, all that I can say is thank you.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Israel).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Israel

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 16, after line 24, insert the following new
subsection:
``(e) Reports.--Not later than 10 months after the date of
the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter for
three years, the Director of the Cyber Threat Intelligence
Integration Center shall submit a report to Congress that
includes the following:
``(1) With respect to the year covered by the report, a
detailed description of cyber threat trends, as compiled by
the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.
``(2) With respect to the year covered by the report, a
detailed description of the coordination efforts by the Cyber
Threat Intelligence Integration Center between departments
and agencies of the Federal Government, including the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the
Department of Homeland Security.
``(3) Recommendations for better collaboration between such
departments and agencies of the Federal Government.''.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Israel) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I will attempt to continue my winning
streak on the floor this morning.
I rise to offer an amendment with my distinguished friend and partner
from New York (Mr. Hanna).
This bipartisan amendment addresses an issue that has concerned many
of us for some time, and that is the fact that, when it comes to cyber
defense and cyber war, many Federal agencies are doing something; it is
just that they may not be aware of what each of them is doing. We need
closer coordination and collaboration among all the Federal agencies
and entities dealing with cyber war.
Mr. Chairman, we recently found out that the United States Office of
Personnel Management suffered a cyber attack impacting millions of
Federal workers. This attack, in my view, highlights a disconnect
between agencies tasked to provide cyber defense, a foreign government
hacking into a Federal government system, taking the records of
millions of government employees, spanning the jurisdiction of several
Federal agencies.
It is clear that there is an obvious need for greater collaboration
between these agencies to create a credible defense and, if needed, a
deterrent to those wishing to attack through the cyber domain.
That is why I was very pleased in February of this year when the
President directed the DNI to establish the Cyber Threat Intelligence
Integration Center, CTIIC. This bill very properly authorizes that
position.
CTIIC will serve as the primary organization within the Federal
Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or
acquired by the U.S. pertaining to cyber threats and coordinate cyber
threat intelligence activities.
This bipartisan amendment, Mr. Chairman, simply ensures congressional
oversight of CTIIC by requiring an annual report detailing three
things: number one, cyber attack trends identified by the CTIIC; number
two, an assessment of the collaborative efforts between the CTIIC and
various Federal agencies tasked to defend this country against cyber
attacks; and number three, recommendations for better collaboration
between these agencies.
Mr. Chairman, we have entered a new era of warfare. Our networks are
being attacked daily. We need to do a much better job of coordinating,
collaborating, and cooperating at the Federal level. This amendment
ensures oversight and accountability.
I want to thank my partner on this measure, Mr. Hanna, for his
bipartisan assistance and support.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I
do not intend to oppose the amendment.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.

[[Page H4406]]

There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, over the last several years, cyber attacks have
become a pressing concern for the United States. The recent breach of
the Office of Personnel Management has put the personal information of
millions of current and former Federal employees, including many of the
men and women of our intelligence community, at risk.
Every day, cyber thieves attack private companies, stealing credit
card numbers, accessing medical records, leaking proprietary
information, and publishing confidential emails, affecting tens of
millions of Americans.
The intelligence community has worked to improve our cyber defenses
by improving information sharing between the private sector and the
Federal Government through the support of H.R. 1560, the Protecting
Cyber Networks Act.
While the Senate has yet to act on this bill, the legislation we
consider today will help improve the Federal Government's ability to
detect and defeat cyber attacks by creating the new Cyber Threat
Intelligence Integration Center.
This thoughtful amendment by Mr. Israel and Mr. Hanna will require
that the Center produce a report on cyber threat trends and
coordination on cyber threats between different government agencies.
I thank the gentlemen from New York for their work on this issue and
urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff), the ranking member of the committee.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman, and I thank him for his excellent
amendment and support in the intelligence process.
With each passing day, we are learning more about the cyber breach at
the Office of Personnel Management. The volume of personal information
lost during these events is of tremendous concern. Mr. Israel's
amendment will help us better inform Congress on the effectiveness of
the government's collaborative efforts to defend against future cyber
events.
I thank my colleagues for their work on it, and I urge support of Mr.
Israel's amendment.
Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the distinguished chairman
for his bipartisan leadership and the distinguished ranking member. I
appreciate their support for this amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Israel).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Crowley

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 29, after line 17, insert the following:

SEC. 317. INCLUSION OF HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTIONS IN GRANT
PROGRAM TO ENHANCE RECRUITING OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY WORKFORCE.

Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. ) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, Hispanic-serving
institutions, and'' after ``universities''; and
(B) in the subsection heading for such subsection, by
striking ``Historically Black'' and inserting ``Certain
Minority-serving''; and
(2) in subsection (g)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new
paragraph (5):
``(5) Hispanic-serving institution.--The term `Hispanic-
serving institution' has the meaning given that term in
section 502(a)(5) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1101a(a)(5)).''.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Crowley) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, like many of my colleagues, I am focused on growing
educational opportunities for young Hispanic Americans, particularly in
the areas that will be so critical to our Nation's success in the years
ahead.
Last month, the House approved a bipartisan amendment to the America
COMPETES Reauthorization Act designed to increase opportunities for
Latinos in the STEM fields.
The amendment I am offering today with my colleagues, Mr. Serrano and
Mr. Curbelo, builds upon that effort and would further expand
opportunities for Hispanic students.
Our proposal would allow the Director of National Intelligence to
offer grants to Hispanic-Serving Institutions of higher education for
advanced foreign language education programs that are in the immediate
interest of the intelligence community.
It would also promote study abroad and cultural immersion programs in
those areas, which we all know are crucial to truly understanding the
intricacies of other languages and other cultures. This is a time when
we need to be encouraging more of our young people to enter careers
aimed at making our Nation safer.
Of the nearly 2 million Latino students enrolled in college today,
the majority attend Hispanic-Serving Institutions. With these targeted
grants, HSIs would be able to help increase the ranks of Latinos going
into the intelligence community, where they are underrepresented today.
This amendment would not only promote diversity in national security
and intelligence communities, but it would also strengthen our youngest
and fastest growing minority, Hispanic Americans.
We must ensure that these young people are prepared with the
knowledge and skills that will contribute to our Nation's future
strength, security, and global leadership because, when education is
available to everyone, our entire Nation is a stronger nation.
I want to thank my colleagues who have worked with me on this issue,
Mr. Serrano and Mr. Curbelo, who have cosponsored this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do
not intend to oppose the amendment.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I thank Mr. Crowley, Mr. Serrano, and Mr.
Curbelo for offering this amendment to include Hispanic-Serving
Institutions in the grant program to improve recruitment efforts for
the intelligence community.
I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Curbelo).

{time} 1445

Mr. CURBELO of Florida. I thank the chairman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of this amendment and
thank my colleague from New York for allowing me to join in leading on
this important issue.
This amendment would allow the Director of National Intelligence to
provide grants to Hispanic-Serving Institutions of higher education to
offer advanced foreign language programs that are important to our
intelligence community. These students, in addition to the traditional
classroom setting, would also be able to travel and study abroad so
they can gain a firsthand perspective of the culture in which they are
immersing themselves.
Mr. Chairman, the study of Farsi, Middle Eastern, and South Asian
dialects is of the utmost importance in developing our country's
continued relationships abroad. I am proud to advocate for Hispanic-
Serving Institutions, like Florida International University and Miami
Dade College in my district, and will strive to provide them the
opportunity to train their students so that they can go on to serve our
country.
I am proud to be working with the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Crowley) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Serrano) to provide more
opportunities for these young Hispanic students who want to serve their
country and to provide our intelligence community this special tool to
recruit those who could be useful in advancing the cause of building
the relationships that are so critical to our intelligence services
operating throughout the world.

[[Page H4407]]

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida's
comments on this bill and his support.
At this time, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr.
Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank my colleague from New York (Mr. Crowley) for
yielding and for his work on this amendment. I am very happy to support
it.
Diversity and language skills are critical to national security.
Together, they allow the intelligence community to reach its potential
and expand its reach, its access, as well as its understanding.
This amendment would further both goals by providing better language-
learning opportunities to students of Hispanic-Serving Institutions. I
am very proud to support this amendment and urge my colleagues to do
the same.
Again, I thank my friend from New York (Mr. Crowley) as well as my
other colleagues who worked with him on this amendment. I urge passage.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for his support of
this amendment as well as the ranking member, Mr. Schiff, for his
support of this amendment, and all the Members who have worked on this
amendment.
I think the amendment speaks for itself. It is providing a great
opportunity for a growing minority community within our country who
want to serve our country in this capacity.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Crowley).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Keating

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 35, after line 17, insert the following new subsection
(and redesignate the subsequent subsections accordingly):
(c) Additional Report.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report that includes--
(1) with respect to the travel of foreign fighters to and
from Iraq and Syria, a description of the intelligence
sharing relationships between the United States and member
states of the European Union and member states of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
(2) an analysis of the challenges impeding such
intelligence sharing relationships.
Page 35, line 19, insert ``and (c)'' after ``(a)''.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Keating) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I offer this bipartisan amendment with the
support of Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul and
Representatives Katko and Loudermilk to help Congress identify ways to
improve intelligence sharing on the flow of foreign fighters around the
world--with particular attention to their travel to and from Iraq and
Syria.
Already, this legislation that we are considering today makes
substantial strides in ensuring that intelligence surrounding the flow
of foreign fighters is shared with Congress. These continuous reports
will shed light on the total number of attempted and successful
fighters since the beginning of 2011.
My amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to
report to Congress on the intelligence community's progress in forging
information-sharing agreements with foreign partners and help Congress
identify the challenges impeding coordinated intelligence efforts.
Over 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to join rebel and
terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, including ISIS and al Qaeda
affiliates like al-Nusrah. Their movements are proving increasingly
difficult to track in our globalized world, particularly given the
uneven or nonexistent tracking efforts from some of our foreign
partners.
As the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and as a member of the Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, I have
engaged on the issue of intelligence sharing from two perspectives--
from our efforts to improve the intelligence community's coordination
with State, local, and other Federal agencies and from our work to
better improve our information-sharing practices with our overseas
allies to prevent terrorist attacks and the flow of foreign fighters
here at home.
While the intelligence community has made improvements to the
processes of sharing pertinent information with the relevant Federal,
State, and local agencies, there still exists a blind spot in our
intelligence-gathering efforts on foreign fighters. That blind spot
stems from the failure of some foreign governments to take commonsense
information-sharing steps, and it has made the task of tracking foreign
fighters even more challenging.
The inability or unwillingness of some foreign governments to pass
along even the most basic information about these individuals
represents a major risk to the safety of the American people.
An additional threat looms when some of these individuals return to
their homelands from Iraq and Syria, battle-hardened and radicalized.
Once back home, some can travel between international borders with
relative ease, which makes tracking them a truly difficult feat.
This amendment will also provide insight into our current
intelligence-sharing relationships and will give Congress the
opportunity to highlight best practices while also revealing areas for
improvement.
I thank Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff for their
cooperation.
I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
McCaul).
Mr. McCAUL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of the Keating-McCaul amendment
in the Intelligence Authorization Act. If adopted, our amendment would
require the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress on
the state of intelligence information sharing with overseas partners to
help us identify security gaps so that we can improve international
monitoring of foreign fighter travel both in and out of Syria and Iraq.
Islamist fanatics from more than 100 countries have traveled overseas
to fight with groups like ISIS and al Qaeda. Thousands of the jihadists
carry Western passports and can exploit security gaps in places like
Europe to return to the West, where they can plot attacks against
America and our allies.
Last month, I led a congressional delegation to the Middle East to
investigate the flow of these foreign fighters. And while progress is
being made, I am still troubled by intelligence and screening gaps,
especially with our foreign partners. We need to make sure our allies
not only share the identities of terrorists and foreign fighters with
us but also with each other so that these extremists can be stopped
before they cross our borders into the United States.
This amendment will provide Congress critical information needed to
close these security gaps and improve intelligence information sharing
to defend our homeland.
I applaud the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating) for his hard
work on the amendment and for his strong participation in our
delegation overseas, where we learned quite a bit. It is not very often
you can pass something you think can save American lives, and I think
this is one of them. I thank the gentleman again.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of Homeland Security
for his leadership on this issue. We really have established a very
strong bipartisan effort, putting our national security first and
realizing what holes there are in our system, in our security for our
country.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from California
(Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the work of my colleagues
from Massachusetts and from Texas. This is a superb amendment that will
help us track foreign fighters, and I am proud to support it.

[[Page H4408]]

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Keating

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I have another amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 41, line 8, strike ``paragraphs (3) and (4)'' and
insert ``paragraph (3) and redesignating paragraph (4) as
paragraph (3)''.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Keating) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, the recent events involving the plan of
radicalized individuals in Massachusetts to target law enforcement
officials--police, in particular--underscore the truth that protecting
America will require the efforts of local, State, and Federal law
enforcement.
Since the Boston Marathon bombings, the FBI has made great efforts to
improve their information-sharing efforts with the Joint Terrorism Task
Force and other Federal agencies.
With my work and the work of my colleagues on the congressional
investigation of the Boston Marathon bombings through the Homeland
Security Committee, I can attest to the seriousness in which the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has set out to improve their
information-sharing practices.
However, the FBI's efforts to institutionalize sharing across law
enforcement and intelligence are still a work in progress.
The current version of this bill eliminates the requirement for the
FBI to report to Congress on their progress to implement information-
sharing principles. This is a reporting requirement that has kept
Congress aware of the FBI's information-sharing practices since 2004,
and it has been vital to understand what works and what can be
improved.
This amendment will reinstate that requirement, with the recognition
that the FBI has more work to do on information sharing to better
protect the American public.
These necessary reforms include re-executing FBI current memorandums
of understanding with local partners, improving training and
accessibility for the eGuardian platform, and formalizing methods for
disseminating intelligence to relevant consumers up- and downstream.
Without information on the progress the FBI is making in these
reforms, Congress is hindered in taking the critical steps needed to
protect the American public.
I would like to again thank Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff.
I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California
(Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank my colleague from Massachusetts, who has been an
active and important voice on national security since he joined the
Congress several years ago. In particular, he has worked to ensure that
we maintain a strong focus on information sharing across agencies.
One of the key lessons we learned from 9/11 is the need to tear down
stovepipes and to ensure that inappropriate barriers to information
sharing across agencies never reappear.
The gentleman from Massachusetts' amendment seeks to maintain our
vigilance on this issue and would require the FBI to report to Congress
on its information-sharing progress.
As a fellow native Bostonian, I am very pleased to see my colleague
do such great work. I want to thank him for his commitment to the
issue. And I am very happy to support the amendment.
Mr. KEATING. I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Schiff

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Strike sections 321, 322, 323, and 331.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, my amendment would strike the sections of
the bill which would undermine the administration's ability to close
the prison at Guantanamo by transferring the remaining detainees to the
United States for further disposition of their cases or to third
countries that agree to accept them, secure them, and monitor them.
I am grateful that my colleague from Washington, Adam Smith, ranking
member of the Armed Services Committee, has joined me in urging the
House to make this important change to the bill.
Every day that it remains open, the prison at Guantanamo Bay damages
the United States. Because there are other, better options for the
prosecution and detention of these inmates, we are not safer for
Guantanamo's existence. In fact, it makes us more vulnerable by drawing
new recruits to the jihad.
The Congress, the administration, and the military can work together
to find a solution that protects our people even as we maintain our
principles and devotion to the rule of law.
Under the provisions included in this bill, the administration would
be barred from transferring Guantanamo detainees to a ``war zone.''
While I agree that it would be foolhardy to seek to send a detainee
to Yemen while that country is immersed in civil war, the definition of
``war zone'' used here is derived from the U.S. Tax Code and is
extremely broad, ruling out countries like Jordan, for example, that
have either successfully resettled and monitored former detainees or
demonstrated a genuine commitment to doing so.
These provisions also prevent the administration from transferring
Guantanamo detainees to the United States for further proceedings under
the military commissions process or for trial in an article III court.

{time} 1500

The Department of Justice and our courts have proven themselves time
and time again to be more than capable of handling the toughest
terrorism cases and doing so in a way that ennobles us and sets an
example to the world that a great nation can both safeguard its people
and the rule of law.
As a practical matter, our civilian courts have proven much more
adept at handling these cases than the military commissions process
has. In fact, this past Friday, a three-judge panel of the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, one of the most important appellate
courts in the Nation, further struck down the legality of commission
charges, so narrowing the jurisdiction of the military commissions
themselves that any utility as an alternative to article III courts has
been called into further question.
And while Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his fellow Guantanamo terrorists
still await their date with justice, a host of others--including
Richard Reid, the shoe bomber; and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the
underwear bomber; and Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber--have
been tried, convicted, and sent to ADX Florence, the toughest prison in
America. They are gone, and they are not coming back.
The inclusion of these provisions is the first time that restrictions
related to Guantanamo have been included in the Intelligence
Authorization Act, and I believe that alone sets an unfortunate
precedent that could undermine what has been a largely bipartisan
effort. These provisions are unnecessary and unwise, and they do not
belong in this bill.
Mr. Chairman, I urge the House to reconsider these provisions, to
trust in American justice, diplomacy, and the best military advice, and
to give the administration a means to shutter a prison that both shames
us and perpetuates the threat to the Nation.

[[Page H4409]]

I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.
The CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, although I appreciate the ranking member's concerns
about these provisions, I do remain concerned that further releases
from Guantanamo will threaten our national security.
Press reports now indicate that the administration intends to
transfer up to 10 additional detainees this month. As the committee
learned through its many briefings and hearings, the five detainees
released to Qatar last May have participated in activities that
threaten the United States and its allies and are counter to U.S.
national security interests, not unlike their activities before they
were detained. No intelligence community element should enable any
future transfers that endanger national security.
Furthermore, I would note that these provisions are substantively
identical to the provisions passed by the House Armed Services
Committee as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. Mr.
Chairman, 26 of the 27 Democrats on that committee voted to advance an
NDAA that contained similar restrictions. The provisions in our bill
will complement those restrictions, as well as the restrictions put
forward in the defense appropriations bills for several years running
and this committee's previous intelligence authorization bills. The
ranking member may have forgotten, but in 2012, there were provisions
similar to this one that were included in the legislation.
In sum, these provisions represent a strong and enduring consensus in
Congress that Guantanamo should remain open and that detainees should
not be transferred to the U.S. for any reason. As everyone here is
aware, several detainees who have been released from Guantanamo have
gone back to the fight and killed and wounded Americans. Putting
detainees in U.S. prisons, as the administration originally proposed,
would be disruptive and potentially disastrous. The threat is real, and
Guantanamo is already equipped to handle the detention and military
trial of these individuals, as appropriate.
For those reasons, I would urge my colleagues to oppose this
amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to urge support for this amendment. This is one of the few
areas of disagreement between the chairman and myself. When we look at
how we are progressing or the lack of more progress in our struggle
against ISIS and al Qaeda in places like Syria and Iraq, we are often
tempted to consider those that we take off the battlefield as a metric
of our success--we have eliminated so many combatants from the
battlefield. But of course that number in isolation means very little.
And the challenge is that with every one we take off the battlefield,
there are new foreign fighters coming onto the battlefield.
The recruitment of those additional fighters uses a variety of images
and issues to attract people to join the jihad. One of the issues that
is continually used as recruiting propaganda is the presence of the
detention center at Guantanamo Bay. This is a recruitment vehicle for
the jihadis. It is a rallying cry for the jihadis.
The closure of this prison will not end the threat from ISIS or al
Qaeda. There will be other efforts to recruit. But why give them this
recruitment tool when there are other, better ways that these people
can be incarcerated? Why give them this recruitment vehicle when there
are ways that we can secure the people at Guantanamo Bay, prosecute the
people at Guantanamo Bay, uphold our highest standards and the rule of
law, and remove at least one part the jihadi social media and other
propaganda campaign?
Mr. Chairman, I think it is in our national security interest to do
so. I would urge support for the amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chair, I know that the gentleman believes every word that he is
saying. We have had robust debate in the Intelligence Committee behind
closed doors, and we have had robust debate out in open session, and it
is a debate I think that will always continue.
However, the concern remains from the majority Members of Congress
that they would prefer to keep Guantanamo open because no one wants to
bring those terrorists to the United States, to their backyard, to try
them in their State or their county or their community.
So I respect the gentleman's concerns, and we will continue to debate
those, but I will continue to oppose closing Guantanamo or having our
intelligence community participate in the removal of detainees from
Guantanamo.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from California (Mr. Schiff).
The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on
the amendment offered by the gentleman from California will be
postponed.

Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Rooney of Florida

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following
new section:

SEC. 3__. REPORT ON HIRING OF GRADUATES OF CYBER CORPS
SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the
National Science Foundation, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
employment by the intelligence community of graduates of the
Cyber Corps Scholarship Program. The report shall include the
following:
(1) The number of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship
Program hired by each element of the intelligence community.
(2) A description of how each element of the intelligence
community recruits graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholar
Program.
(3) A description of any processes available to the
intelligence community to expedite the hiring or processing
of security clearances for graduates of the Cyber Corps
Scholar Program.
(4) Recommendations by the Director to improve the hiring
by the intelligence community of graduates of the Cyber Corps
Scholarship Program, including any recommendations for
legislative action to carry out such improvements.
(b) Cyber Corps Scholarship Program Defined.--In this
section, the term ``Cyber Corps Scholarship Program'' means
the Federal Cyber Scholarship-for-Service Program under
section 302 of the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (15
U.S.C. 7442).

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Rooney) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, as we debate this bill today, hackers across the world
are trying furiously to break into our cyber networks, as we all know.
And as we have seen in recent weeks, they are occasionally successful,
and the consequences are grave. These cracks in our cyber defense put
our security at risk. They also threaten American businesses and the
privacy and credit of individuals across this country.
For the sake of our national security and our economy, we must work
together to improve our cyber capabilities. This requires a stronger,
more capable cyber workforce, which our bipartisan amendment will help
facilitate.
The Federal CyberCorps Scholarship for Service program gives
scholarships to students who study in the cybersecurity field. In
exchange, those students commit to serving in government cybersecurity
positions after graduation. Leaders within the intelligence community
and DOD have told us that they need to expand their workforce and want
to hire graduates from this program. Unfortunately, outdated personnel
rules and insufficient direct hire authority make it extremely
difficult for them to do so. As a result, these

[[Page H4410]]

students aren't able to fulfill their work commitment and we are unable
to meet our workforce needs, and our cybersecurity suffers.
We believe Congress should help remove those obstacles and make it
easier to bring those graduates into the cyber workforce. Our amendment
starts that process by requiring a report back to us on how many
CyberCorps graduates go to work for the intelligence community and how
these agencies recruit them. This information will help us determine
how to streamline the hiring process so we are capitalizing on the best
cybersecurity talent available.
Mr. Chairman, this is a simple, bipartisan amendment, but it will pay
dividends to improve and expand our cyber workforce and strengthen our
national security.
I would like to thank Congresswoman Sewell from Alabama for her
assistance in this amendment.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition,
even though I am not opposed.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized.
There was no objection.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to thank the gentleman from Florida and the gentlewoman from
Alabama, both HPSCI colleagues, for their amendment, and I am happy to
support it.
This amendment furthers two important goals: first, to ensure that
academic programs that should serve as a resource to the government--in
this case, the National Science Foundation's CyberCorps Scholarship for
Service--actually do result in a good number of students choosing
employment within the intelligence community; and second, to deepen the
bench of our cyber defenders.
As a recent series of serious cyber breaches has demonstrated, it is
an imperative for the protection of this Nation's workforce, privacy,
and sensitive intelligence that we strengthen the IC's cyber cadre with
our best and brightest. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a fine addition
to the gentleman's and the gentlewoman's other initiatives already
represented in the bill, particularly those that advance diversity in
the intelligence community.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleagues for their work. I
urge support for this bipartisan amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of this
bipartisan, common sense amendment that seeks to streamline and
strengthen our Intelligence Community's (IC) cyber workforce. I am
pleased to join my fellow colleague, Rep. Rooney, who shares my deeply
held desire to help meet the incredible need to raise the number of
professionals in the critically important field of cybersecurity.
The recent breach of OPM which compromised the personal information
of nearly 4 million federal employees further illustrates our urgent
and immediate need to make substantial improvements to our cyber
databases and overall cyber infrastructure. Cyberattacks have become
increasingly common, and state sponsored bad actors pose a serious
threat to our national security. These types of attacks are one of the
most urgent modern challenges to our nation. Our government must be
poised to do more to prevent future attacks. We must position ourselves
to curtail any threat, no matter how great or small.
In December 2011, the National Science and Technology Council, in
cooperation with the National Science Foundation (NSF), advanced a
broad, coordinated federal strategic plan to enhance cybersecurity
research and education. As part of this plan, the NSF launched the
CyberCorps Scholarship for Service (SFS) program. In an effort to
bolster our federal workforce's capacity and advance the nation's
economic prosperity and national security, this program provides
funding for undergraduate and graduate level scholarships to students
interested in cybersecurity. In return, scholarship recipients are
required to work for a Federal, State, Local, or Tribal Government
organization in a position related to cybersecurity for a period equal
to the length of the scholarship. In essence, students receive a
scholarship in exchange for their commitment to federal civil service.
This program seeks to cultivate pipelines for applicants from
undergraduate and graduate programs into federal careers focusing on
combatting emerging cyber security threats.
Leaders within the Intelligence Community tell me, however, that
outdated policies and onerous clearance procedures are inhibiting their
ability to fill industry vacancies with young and diverse cybersecurity
professionals.
Our amendment simply requires the Intelligence Community to report to
Congress on how many CyberCorps graduates actually go to work for the
IC and how IC agencies recruit these CyberCorps graduates. This
information will help Congress determine how we can best improve the
hiring process.
I strongly believe that Congress should be facilitating ways to help
the Intelligence Community hire these critically important CyberCorps
graduates and create a pipeline directly into our cyber workforce.
I encourage my colleagues to vote yes on this amendment.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Rooney).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Moulton

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following
new section:

SEC. 3__. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF DATA BREACH OF OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.

(a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the data
breach of the Office of Personnel Management disclosed in
June 2015.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The effects, if any, of the data breach on the
operations of the intelligence community abroad, including
the types of operations, if any, that have been negatively
affected or entirely suspended or terminated as a result of
the data breach.
(2) An assessment of the effects of the data breach to each
element of the intelligence community.
(3) An assessment of how foreign persons, groups, or
countries may use the data collected by the data breach
(particularly regarding information included in background
investigations for security clearances), including with
respect to--
(A) recruiting intelligence assets;
(B) influencing decision-making processes within the
Federal Government, including regarding foreign policy
decisions; and
(C) compromising employees of the Federal Government and
friends and families of such employees for the purpose of
gaining access to sensitive national security and economic
information.
(4) An assessment of which departments or agencies of the
Federal Government use the best practices to protect
sensitive data, including a summary of any such best
practices that were not used by the Office of Personnel
Management.
(5) An assessment of the best practices used by the
departments or agencies identified under paragraph (4) to
identify and fix potential vulnerabilities in the systems of
the department or agency.
(c) Briefing.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
provide to the congressional intelligence committees an
interim briefing on the report under subsection (a),
including a discussion of proposals and options for
responding to cyber attacks.
(d) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Moulton) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, recently, the Office of Personnel Management disclosed
a massive security breach that may have exposed personal information of
millions of current and former Federal employees, including those who
work in sensitive national security positions. Simply put, this cyber
breach is unacceptable and breaks faith with those dedicated military
and civilian personnel who commit their lives to keeping our country
safe.
Although responsibility has not yet been officially confirmed, many
observers believe that individuals in China, who may have been acting
on orders of the Chinese Government, were responsible for hacking into
OPM databases.
Two things are clear, Mr. Chairman. First, we must ensure this does
not

[[Page H4411]]

happen again; we must protect our Federal employees--our foreign
service officers, State Department staff, members of the intelligence
community, and many others. Second, we must make clear to the rest of
the world that these attacks will not be tolerated and that there will
be consequences.
Mr. Chairman, that is why my amendment takes the first of many
critical steps to respond to this breach. My amendment starts the
process of holding OPM accountable. It makes sure we leverage the best
data security practices that our intelligence agencies use to protect
sensitive personal information about our military and civilian
personnel who work day in and day out to keep our country safe.
Finally, my amendment ensures that the United States Congress can
play a constructive role in developing a meaningful, forceful response
to cyber attacks--especially attacks aimed at our Nation's security. We
must stop these attacks and protect those who commit their lives to our
safety. This amendment is an important first step in doing just that.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, we are prepared to accept the amendment.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Committee, I think, in a
bipartisan manner, has the same concerns as the gentleman.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
We expect timely briefs on all major cyber attacks, but in this case,
I agree, we need to require specific reporting and briefing on the
impacts of the recent OPM breach. We need to learn far more about how
hackers accessed the systems, what they obtained, and how we can
prevent this from happening again. In addition, this will help us
understand the impact to the intelligence community.
Mr. Chairman, as I have said before, our public and private networks
are not sufficiently secure, and they are a regular target for cyber
attacks. We must do everything we can to shore them up, and we must do
so now.
I want to thank my colleague for his work, and I urge support of his
amendment.
Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Moulton).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Turner

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following:

SEC. 3__. ASSESSMENT ON FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS BY THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees an intelligence community assessment on the
funding of political parties and nongovernmental
organizations in former Soviet states and countries in Europe
by the Russian Federation and the security and intelligence
services of the Russian Federation since January 1, 2006.
Such assessment shall include the following:
(1) The country involved, the entity funded, the security
service involved, and the intended effect of the funding.
(2) An evaluation of such intended effects, including with
respect to--
(A) undermining the political cohesion of the country
involved;
(B) undermining the missile defense of the United States
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
(C) undermining energy projects that could provide an
alternative to Russian energy.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence communities.
(2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Turner) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

{time} 1515

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, my bipartisan amendment requires the
Director of National Intelligence to submit a report to Congress on the
funding of political parties and NGOs in former Soviet states by the
Russian Federation and its associated security and intelligence
services.
As Congress well knows, a resurgent Russia, led by President Vladimir
Putin, is once again determined to destabilize the West and various
Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO.
While we have seen the blatant use of military force both in Georgia
and Ukraine, Russia has employed a variety of nontraditional methods to
disrupt the West. These methods include the use of propaganda through
state-owned media outlets such as Russia Today, manipulation of
European natural gas markets, and the use of money to influence
political parties and nongovernmental organizations throughout Europe.
In a recent New York Times article, authors Peter Baker and Steven
Erlanger highlight a series of instances in which the Russian
Federation covertly funneled money to political organizations in Europe
in order to influence various decisionmakers and parties.
While their ultimate goal remains the fragmentation of institutions
such as the EU and NATO, Russia hopes to achieve incremental victories
like influencing the EU's upcoming decision on whether or not to renew
sanctions against them.
As president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and chair of the
Assembly's U.S. delegation, I have had the opportunity to meet
frequently with my European counterparts to discuss this issue. In all
instances, Assembly members continue to validate and echo the concerns
discussed here today. Only through an increased understanding can we
begin to effectively plan and combat President Putin and a resurging
Russia.
I ask all of my colleagues to rise in support of this bipartisan
amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition, even though I am not
opposed.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlemen from Ohio,
Alabama, and New York for their amendment, which I am proud to support.
This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to
provide an assessment on funding of political parties and NGOs in the
former Soviet states and countries in Europe by the Russian Federation
and its security and intelligence services.
Over the past few years, we have witnessed a number of highly
visible, aggressive actions by Russia, particularly in Ukraine; but
Moscow's efforts to destabilize its neighbors are also subtler and more
nefarious. Russia is sponsoring and funding political parties to groom
the next generation of puppets which they can control from Moscow.
We must better understand what they are doing, even if what they are
doing is very deep behind the scenes; so long as sources and methods
are properly protected, I support this effort.
Again, I want to thank my colleagues for their work, and I urge
support of the amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, as the chairman well remembers, with the
cold war, there was a time when the conflict between the United States
and Russia was very tense. This amendment will help us bring to bear
light on the actions of Russia so that we can make certain our policies
reflect the new aggressiveness of the Russian Federation.
Mr. NUNES. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TURNER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

[[Page H4412]]

Mr. NUNES. I really appreciate the gentleman. He is one of the most
involved Members of Congress with NATO, so I know that his concerns are
valid. I, too, share those concerns and would urge my colleagues to
support the amendment.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Turner).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Farr

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following
new section:

SEC. 3__. REPORT ON CONTINUOUS EVALUATION OF SECURITY
CLEARANCES.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees (as defined in section
101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code) a report on the
continuous evaluation of security clearances of employees,
officers, and contractors of the intelligence community. The
report shall include the following:
(1) The status of the continuous evaluation program of the
intelligence community, including a timeline for the
implementation of such program.
(2) A comparison of such program to the automated
continuous evaluation system of the Department of Defense.
(3) Identification of any possible efficiencies that could
be achieved by the intelligence community leveraging the
automated continuous evaluation system of the Department of
Defense.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Farr) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, today, I rise to offer an amendment which
strengthens the process for granting security clearances to those
working in the intelligence community through a continuous evaluation
process.
This amendment directs the National Intelligence Director to provide
the intelligence and defense committees a report on the status of its
current efforts for continuous evaluation of security clearance
holders, including a timeline for its rollout. The report will also
provide a cost-benefit analysis of DNI's efforts to similar efforts
that are being carried on in the Department of Defense.
We learned, after the tragic shooting in the Navy Yard in September
2013, the DOD should continuously evaluate these personnel, rather than
do it every once every 5 years.
Clearance starts by an initial vetting that determines a person's
suitability and eligibility to have access to classified material by
examining the person's past and making a judgment on future
reliability. Now, once cleared, a continuous evaluation process is
designed to examine a person's behavior to ensure its continued
reliability.
Congress directed the DOD to create a process that would be a
governmentwide solution for continuous personnel security evaluations.
This solution is called ACES, Automated Continuous Evaluation System.
Now, the Director of National Intelligence is also seeking its own
capability for continuous evaluation. While I support the intelligence
community's requirement, their efforts may be redundant.
DOD's system already has measurable successes. Their system is also
flexible enough to be tailored to meet any specific requirements that
the intelligence community may need.
My amendment simply assures that the DNI does not work towards a
continuous evaluation system in a vacuum. By working together to share
lessons learned or build a common evaluation system, the DNI and the
DOD can build a better program that ensures our national security and
uses taxpayer dollars effectively.
As we have all seen recently, the insider threat to our national
security is real. We must continue to ensure that we remain secure by
only granting security clearances to those who are suitable and
reliable.
I ask for an ``aye'' vote on the amendment, and I reserve the balance
of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I
am not opposed.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to accept the amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff), my colleague, the ranking member of the
Intelligence Committee.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman and my good
friend from California for his amendment, which I am very happy to
support.
An important role of Congress and of this bill is to ensure that our
intelligence agencies protect sensitive information and protect
taxpayer dollars.
This amendment supports both of these goals by requiring that the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence report to Congress on
its continuous evaluation process for security clearances and to
compare those processes to those the Department of Defense uses. This
comparative study will help identify places where we may be able to
make improvements and save money.
I want to thank Mr. Farr for his amendment and his diligence.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from California (Mr. Farr).
The amendment was agreed to.

amendment no. 11 offered by ms. sinema

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, and I
offer that amendment at this time.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

SEC. 336. REPORT ON STRATEGY, EFFORTS, AND RESOURCES TO
DETECT, DETER, AND DEGRADE ISLAMIC STATE
REVENUE MECHANISMS.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the intelligence community should dedicate necessary
resources to defeating the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic
State.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the intelligence committees a report on the
strategy, efforts, and resources of the intelligence
community that are necessary to detect, deter, and degrade
the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic State.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentlewoman from
Arizona (Ms. Sinema) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Arizona.
Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to say thank you to Mr. Fitzpatrick for cosponsoring this
amendment and for his leadership as the chairman of the Task Force to
Investigate Terrorism Financing. Thank you also to Chairman Nunes and
Ranking Member Schiff for supporting this important amendment.
The purpose of the bipartisan Sinema-Fitzpatrick amendment is to
choke off the Islamic State's revenue stream. Our amendment directs the
intelligence community to detect, deter, and degrade Islamic State's
revenue sources and to report on the strategy and resources needed for
success.
The Islamic State is one of the world's most violent and dangerous
terrorist groups. Its goals to build a caliphate in the Middle East and
encourage attacks in Europe and the United States represent a new
threat to our country and to global stability.
ISIL is also believed to be the richest terrorist organization in
history, controlling a huge territory in Iraq and Syria containing
significant oil resources. In 2014, the Islamic State generated
approximately $1 million per day through the sale of smuggled oil,
extortion, and kidnapping for ransom.
U.S. strikes have reportedly diminished ISIL's oil revenues, but the
breadth of this terrorist organization's

[[Page H4413]]

funding sources represents a serious challenge to our national
security.
A February report by the Financial Action Task Force estimated that
ISIL now largely finances itself through extortion in the territory it
controls, and another study places this extortion revenue at $360
million per year. In Iraq, ISIL levies a 5 percent tax on all
withdrawals from banks, and the organization also gains tens of
millions of dollars from kidnapping on an annual basis.
To defeat ISIL and protect our country, we must cut off the Islamic
State's diverse and substantial sources of revenue.
I encourage my colleagues to support this commonsense bipartisan
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I
do not intend to oppose the amendment.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Fitzpatrick).
Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman, and I thank my
colleague Ms. Sinema for her work on this important amendment and for
her work as well on the task force established to investigate terrorism
financing.
Today, the terror threat faced by our Nation and our intelligence
community is more diverse and sophisticated than it has ever been
before. Organizations like Hezbollah, ISIS, and Boko Haram can no
longer simply be considered terrorist groups.
They have grown into much more dangerous entities, ones with the
abilities to self-finance their actions through means far beyond
traditional methods, from illicit oil sales and human trafficking to
regional taxation and antiquity dealing.
In order to effectively combat such evolved threats, U.S. policy must
also evolve. As chair of the bipartisan Task Force to Investigate
Terrorism Financing, established by the Committee on Financial
Services, I have worked with lawmakers and policy experts to guarantee
the U.S. response to terror's new revenue streams are quickly and
effectively choked out.
This amendment is important to ensure each level of our government,
from Congress to the intelligence community, has identified the
problem, as well as potential weaknesses, and is ready to address the
threats that we face.
By both expressing the sense of Congress that our intelligence
agencies must dedicate resources to eradicate terror revenue
mechanisms, as well as report to relevant committees on their
strategies, this amendment strengthens the underlying bill and
Congress' understanding of our global response to terrorism.
The threat to freedom and democracy posed by the Islamic State and
groups like it circles the globe, and the United States can ill afford
to combat these enemies on the battlefield alone. Any strategy against
terror groups worldwide must attack not only militarily, but at their
funding source. Organizations, no matter how complex, cannot
effectively function without requisite resources.
Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community is second to none, and I am
certain that, together, we can formulate and carry out long-term
solutions to combat terror financing.
I thank the chairman for his leadership on this issue and Ms. Sinema
for offering this amendment.
Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California, Ranking Member Schiff, and thank him for his leadership on
national security issues.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlewoman from
Arizona for her amendment, as well as the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
I am proud to support it.
Behind ISIL's rapid and dangerous rise are its many sources of
illicit funding. This amendment expresses the conviction of Congress
that the intelligence community should dedicate resources to finding
and eliminating those revenue sources and that the IC must report on
its effort to do so.
Again, I want to thank both of my colleagues for their leadership on
this issue, and I urge strong support of their amendment.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pittenger).
Mr. PITTENGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment and
congratulate Ms. Sinema and Mr. Fitzpatrick, the chairman of the
committee. This will help our terrorism task force efforts undermine
the funding of ISIS.
Terrorism experts concur that ISIS is the most well-funded terrorist
threat that we have ever faced. Through the illicit sale of stolen oil
and antiquities, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, bank robberies, and
usurious taxation, ISIS continues to amass tens of millions of dollars.
Stopping this flow of money to terrorists must be a top priority if
we are to defeat ISIS. Unfortunately, earlier this month, the President
admitted he does not have a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS.
This amendment will require the Director of National Intelligence to
submit to Congress the current efforts they use to undermine the
funding of ISIS, increasing our ability to ensure these efforts are a
priority.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I will look forward
to the continued bipartisan support of the Financial Services Task
Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing.

{time} 1530

Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chair, as a member of the Task Force to Investigate
Terrorism Financing, I am working with my colleagues on both sides of
the aisle to keep money out of the hands of terrorists and to find
solutions like this amendment, which strengthens America's security.
Again, I would like to thank Mr. Fitzpatrick for his partnership and
leadership on this issue. I also thank Chairman Nunes, Ranking Member
Schiff, and Mr. Pittenger for their work on this important legislation.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, we are prepared to support the amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Arizona (Ms. Sinema).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. Crowley

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

SEC. 336. REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN
UNITED STATES, INDIA, AND ISRAEL.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on
possibilities for growing national security cooperation
between the United States, India, and Israel.

[[Page H4414]]

also because many of our values overlap.
There is so much that our three countries can be doing together in
the realm of scientific cooperation, research, best practices, national
security implementation, defense, and much, much more.
There is also a lot that we can learn from each other, whether it is
about drip irrigation to build food supplies, desalinization to address
water shortages, or refrigeration practices to prevent the kind of food
spoilage that leads to hunger, not to mention how much potential there
is in technological research and economic development.
This amendment, of course, just deals with a narrow portion of these
areas because the underlying bill is limited to security issues, but it
is a needed start.
I truly believe that the United States-India relationship has the
potential to be the world's most important ``big country'' relationship
in the 21st century. As our ties with India grow, it is important to
see the India-Israel ties increasing as well.
Here in the United States, as a former co-chair of the Congressional
Caucus on India and Indian Americans, I have met with many members of
the Indian American community, and I have consistently heard from
visiting members of India's Government that there is a genuine desire
to expand relations between India and Israel now and in the future.
In fact, it has already been reported that, in the coming months,
India's Prime Minister will become the first-ever Indian Prime Minister
to travel to Israel. We are going to see the leader of what will be the
world's most populous nation visiting and engaging with one of the
smallest nations.
The sky is really the limit on this effort going forward, and that is
why the amendment asks the Director of National Intelligence to submit
to Congress a plan on how to grow the U.S.-India-Israel national
security relationship. This is a real possibility, and I hope the DNI
can identify a solid number of ways to work together even more in the
future.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do
not intend to oppose the amendment.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, Mr. Holding was just here, but unfortunately,
he got called away to another meeting because I know he worked closely
with Mr. Crowley and others as chair of the India Caucus, and he wanted
me to express his strong support for this amendment. I also urge my
colleagues to support the amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chair, working with international partners is an essential
element of the IC's mission to understand the global threat
environment, as well as the political, social, and economic trends
around the world.
For nearly 70 years, Israel has been a close friend and ally, as well
as a vital source of intelligence about the world's most volatile
region. In recent years, India, the world's largest democracy, has
upgraded its bilateral relationships with both the United States and
Israel. Given India's complex relationship with both Pakistan and
China, exploring the potential for enhanced trilateral intelligence
cooperation is very much in our interest.
Mr. Crowley's amendment to direct the DNI to report to Congress on
the potential for intelligence sharing is timely, and I urge the House
to support it.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, again, let me thank Mr. Nunes, the chair
of the committee, as well as the ranking member, Mr. Schiff, for their
support of this valuable amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Crowley).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Wilson of South Carolina

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at
the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

SEC. 336. CYBER ATTACK STANDARDS OF MEASUREMENT STUDY.

(a) Study Required.--The Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a study to determine
appropriate standards that--
(1) can be used to measure the damage of cyber incidents
for the purposes of determining the response to such
incidents; and
(2) include a method for quantifying the damage caused to
affected computers, systems, and devices.
(b) Reports to Congress.--
(1) Preliminary findings.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall provide to the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives the initial
findings of the study required under subsection (a).
(2) Report.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland
Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives a report containing the
complete findings of such study.
(3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (2)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from South
Carolina (Mr. Wilson) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina.
Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for
Chairman Nunes and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
for their leadership on this important legislation.
I am particularly grateful that I was here to hear the presentation
by Congressman Joe Crowley relative to promoting a better relationship
with the world's largest democracy, India, by the world's oldest
democracy, the United States.
He and I have served as the past co-chairs of the Caucus of India and
Indian Americans, and I know of his commitment to promoting a better
relationship between India and the United States.
Last week, the Office of Personnel Management revealed they were the
targets of an extended cyber attack on Federal employee personnel
records. These attacks stole personal data, such as Social Security
numbers, financial information, and security clearance documents,
putting the personal and financial security of our citizens at risk.
This cyber attack was not a novelty. Recently, we have seen a growing
number of cyber attacks on government Web sites, national retailers,
and small businesses. Indeed, according to Symantec, most businesses
reported a completed or an attempted cyber attack in the last year, and
60 percent of those facing an attack were small- or medium-sized
businesses. These cyber attacks are a sober reminder to Congress that
all government agencies need to work together to better protect their
public and private networks.
After each of these attacks, we have had a number of questions: Who
is behind it? Is it an agent of a foreign government or a nonstate
actor? How many records were affected? What kind of information was
accessed?
As of now, we gather this information through various government
agencies, and each uses a different measure to assess and quantify the
damage of the attack, so we waste valuable time and resources when
trying to piece together a response.
We need a clear, unified system of measurement for cyber attacks that
can be used across all government agencies and military branches. By
putting government agencies and branches of the military on the same

[[Page H4415]]

page, we can have an effective and rapid response.
This amendment directs the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of
the FBI, and the Secretary of Defense, to conduct a study to define a
method of measuring a cyber incident so we can determine an appropriate
response.
As chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, it is apparent that cyber is a new domain of
warfare. This amendment is a critical first step in building a more
comprehensive cyber defense system.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition even though I am not
opposed.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman from
South Carolina for his important amendment.
There is a limit to how effective a defensive cyber strategy can be
because, while we have to defend everything at all times, our
adversaries get to attack everywhere and need to be successful only
once, so we need to create a more effective deterrent, which this
amendment will help further.
It would require that the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence report to Congress on how we measure cyber attacks so that
we can know how best to respond once we are attacked or to communicate
in advance how we would respond if we were attacked. Measuring the
scale and effects of cyber attacks is no easy task, especially as we
must factor in second and third order effects.
I want to thank Mr. Wilson for his amendment. I am proud to support
it.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mr. Poe of Texas

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

SEC. 336. REPORT ON WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING.

(a) Reports Required.--Not later than 365 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional committees
specified in subsection (b) a report on wildlife trafficking.
(b) Specified Members and Committees of Congress.--The
congressional committees specified in this subsection are the
following:
(1) Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(3) Committee on Environment and Public Works of the
Senate.
(4) Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
(5) Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(6) Committee on Natural Resources of the House of
Representatives.
(c) Matters to Be Included.--The report submitted under
subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
(1) An assessment of the major source, transit, and
destination countries for wildlife trafficking products or
their derivatives and how such products or derivatives are
trafficked.
(2) An assessment of the efforts of those countries
identified as major source, transit, and destination
countries to counter wildlife trafficking and to adhere to
their international treaty obligations relating to endangered
or threatened species.
(3) An assessment of critical vulnerabilities that can be
used to counter wildlife trafficking.
(4) An assessment of the extent of involvement of
designated foreign terrorist organizations and transnational
criminal organizations in wildlife trafficking.
(5) An assessment of key actors and facilitators, including
government officials, that are supporting wildlife
trafficking.
(6) An assessment of the annual net worth of wildlife
trafficking globally and the financial flows that enables
wildlife trafficking.
(7) An assessment of the impact of wildlife trafficking on
key wildlife populations.
(8) An assessment of the effectiveness of efforts taken to
date to counter wildlife trafficking.
(9) An assessment of the effectiveness of capacity-building
efforts by the United States Government.
(10) An assessment of the impact of wildlife trafficking on
the national security of the United States.
(11) An assessment of the level of coordination between
United States intelligence and law enforcement agencies on
intelligence related to wildlife trafficking, the capacity of
those agencies to process and act on that intelligence
effectively, existing barriers to effective coordination, and
the degree to which relevant intelligence is shared with and
acted upon by bilateral and multilateral law enforcement
partners.
(12) An assessment of the gaps in intelligence capabilities
to assess transnational wildlife trafficking networks and
steps currently being taken, in line with the Implementation
Plan to the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife
Trafficking, to remedy such information gaps.
(d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
This amendment, cosponsored by the ranking member on the Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, Mr. Keating from
Massachusetts, requires the Director of National Intelligence to
produce a report on wildlife trafficking, how terrorist organizations
are involved, how they are making money off of wildlife trafficking,
and the impact it has on U.S. national security.
During our Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee
hearing on this very issue in February, we learned that rhinos and
elephants are on the path to extinction.
For example, back in the seventies, there were approximately 65,000
rhinos in Africa. Since then, about 1,000 a year have been killed, and
now, there are only 5,000 left in Africa. That is a 94 percent drop in
those rhinos. There are only five white rhinos in the whole world.
Elephants are not faring much better. From 2002 to 2010, the elephant
population across Africa dropped 66 percent. Back in the thirties and
forties, Mr. Chairman, there were approximately 5 million African
elephants. Now there are about a half a million African elephants.
One of the most famous was Satao in this photograph that was taken
last year. He was, presumably, the oldest elephant that was in
existence in Africa. He was killed last year for his tusks, which
almost touched the ground. In fact, National Geographic, a year ago
today, did an article on him and how he was killed for his tusks and
how other elephants are being killed for their tusks. He was about 46
years old when he was killed for those tusks.
The reason that poaching seems to be on the increase over the last
few years is that there is a low risk of apprehension, and it is easy
to commit these crimes. Also, even when someone is captured, penalties
for wildlife trafficking are far less than for drug trafficking.
Who uses these tusks? Who uses these rhino horns? The number one
country in the world that is the consumer of the illegal ivory trade is
China. Vietnam is the number one country in the world that uses the
illegal trade of rhino horns. This is where these tusks and these rhino
horns go, and it brings in a lot of money.
For example, a kilogram of rhino horns--if I remember my math
correctly, that is 2.2 pounds--sells for $60,000. So there is a lot
more money involved in the sale of rhino horns and of elephant tusks
than even of gold and platinum.
Overall, the illegal wildlife trade is about $10 billion to $20
billion a year. It should come as no surprise that terrorist
organizations are also involved in this criminal enterprise, like al
Qaeda's affiliate al Shabaab and like Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance
Army. They are cashing in on the illegal wildlife trafficking.
It is getting so bad that the poachers have become very sophisticated
in the sense that they no longer just shoot elephants, for example,
because that makes a noise, that warns them. They are even being
poisoned. An elephant is poisoned, and the elephant dies.
Then, when people approach the elephant, they not only see the dead
elephant, but they see other animals that

[[Page H4416]]

were feeding on the carcass of the elephant, and they are all dead,
too, so that the poachers can get those tusks. They have become very
innovative.

{time} 1545

Local park rangers are underresourced; they are ill-equipped; and
some of them are corrupt as well. So we can't fight what we don't know.
There is a lot about this issue--and terrorist involvement in
wildlife trafficking--that is murky, so we need to find out, for
example: How much money do terrorists get from wildlife trafficking?
Who are the key facilitators of the trade? What government officials
are complicit? What impact does this have on the U.S. national
security?
This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to
report to Congress on these and other questions. The better we
understand the threat, the better we understand what is happening and
how terrorists are involved in the illegal killing of rhinos and
elephants, the more effective we can be against fighting those
terrorists. And that is just the way it is.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, even though
I am not opposed.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlemen from Texas
and Massachusetts for their amendment, which I am proud to support.
The trafficking of wildlife by terrorist organizations is an
important issue, not only because it threatens to wipe out elephants,
rhinos, and tigers, but also because it could threaten our national
security. The World Wildlife Fund estimates that the amount of money
generated by wildlife trafficking trade reaches into the hundreds of
millions of dollars, and much of this goes to fund terrorists,
including The Lord's Resistance Army, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram. That
is money going into the coffers of those who every day seek to harm us
and others.
We must put our intelligence professionals to the task. We must
understand from beginning to end how terrorists acquire, transfer, and
profit from wildlife trafficking. This is the first step to putting an
end to it.
Again, I want to thank my colleagues for offering this amendment. I
urge support.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. POE of Texas. I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Poe).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Poe of Texas

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

SEC. 336. REPORT ON TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA.

(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional committees
specified in subsection (b) a report that represents the
coordinated assessment of the intelligence community on
terrorist use of social media.
(b) Specified Members and Committees of Congress.--The
congressional committees specified in this subsection are the
following:
(1) Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(3) Committee on Judiciary of the Senate.
(4) Committee on Homeland and Government Affairs of the
Senate.
(5) Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
(6) Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(7) Committee on Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(8) Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives.
(c) Matters to Be Included.--The report submitted under
subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
(1) An assessment of what role social media plays in
radicalization in the United States and elsewhere.
(2) An assessment of how terrorists and terrorist
organizations are using social media, including trends.
(3) An assessment of the intelligence value of social media
posts by terrorists and terrorist organizations.
(4) An assessment of the impact on the national security of
the United States of the public availability of terrorist
content on social media for fundraising, radicalization, and
recruitment.
(d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, terrorists' use of social media has exploded over the
past several years. A recent study by The Brookings Institution found
that ISIS had over 40,000 Twitter accounts. Terrorist groups from ISIS
to the Taliban use social media platforms to recruit, to radicalize, to
spread propaganda, and to raise money. I have seen fan pages for the
Khorasan Group, an online press conference held on Twitter by the al
Qaeda branch in Yemen, and we all remember al-Shabaab live tweeting the
murder of 72 people in Kenya. All terrorist groups.
The benefits of social media are clear. Social media is easy to use,
it is free, and it reaches huge audiences across the world. We need to
better understand why terrorists' use of social media is effective and
what impact it is having on the world.
This bipartisan amendment is cosponsored by the ranking member on our
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Mr. Keating
from Massachusetts. This amendment requires the Director of National
Intelligence to assess four parts of the social media problem: First,
what role does social media play in radicalizing people in the United
States and abroad?
The rise of the lone wolf terrorism in recent years has been fueled,
in part, by terrorists' use of social media. Just recently, in Garland,
Texas, two individuals claiming ISIS connections were killed while they
were attacking an assembly on free speech and peaceable assembly of
religion. Evidence shows that they had some social connection, social
media connection with ISIS. The Boston bombers made two pressure cooker
bombs. The recipes for those bombs were published before the attack in
al Qaeda's Inspire magazine. That magazine was released and promoted on
social media.
Second, how exactly are terrorists using social media? Social media
is constantly evolving, just like terrorists' use of social media
platforms. Following online trends is an essential element in putting
resources where they have the most impact. We need to make fast-paced
improvements in this area as new trends and platforms emerge.
Third, what is the real intelligence value of terrorists' posts? In
2012, a number of my colleagues and I sent a letter to the FBI asking,
What intelligence value is terrorists' use of social media? The FBI has
not come up with an answer. We need a detailed understanding from the
whole intelligence community on just how valuable the intelligence is
that we are getting from terrorists' use of social media.
Finally, how does online fundraising, radicalization, and recruitment
by terrorists impact U.S. national security? We know social media is a
valuable tool to the terrorists just by how often they use it.
Unfortunately, the United States is way behind on countering
terrorists' use of social media, so we should do more. Terrorists like
ISIS are out to destroy us. We have to fight to defeat them on every
battlefield, and that includes in social media.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, even though
I am not opposed.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, social media, like any other form of
communication, can be exploited by bad actors for nefarious purposes.
While we are lucky to live in a time of remarkable innovation that
brings us closer to

[[Page H4417]]

one another no matter what our geographical distance may be, our
adversaries use the same tools to spread hateful and dangerous messages
across the globe.
I, therefore, support this amendment that calls on the intelligence
community to provide Congress with greater information about how
terrorist organizations use social media for fundraising,
radicalization, and recruitment. Armed with that knowledge, we are more
capable of stopping them.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. POE of Texas. I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Poe).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 16 Offered by Mr. Poe of Texas

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 16 printed in
House Report 114-155.
Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

SEC. 336. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY
TO DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT ISIL, AL-
QAEDA, AND THEIR AFFILIATED GROUPS, ASSOCIATED
GROUPS, AND ADHERENTS.

(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a comprehensive report on the United States
counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qaeda,
and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and
adherents.
(2) Coordination.--The report required by paragraph (1)
shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General,
and the Secretary of Defense, and the head of any other
department or agency of the United States Government that has
responsibility for activities directed at combating ISIL, al-
Qaeda, and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and
adherents.
(3) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include each of the following:
(A) A definition of--
(i) al-Qaeda core, including a list of which known
individuals constitute al-Qaeda core;
(ii) ISIL, including a list of which known individuals
constitute ISIL leadership;
(iii) an affiliated group of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a
list of which known groups constitute an affiliate group of
ISIL or al-Qaeda;
(iv) an associated group of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a
list of which known groups constitute an associated group of
ISIL or al-Qaeda;
(v) an adherent of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a list of
which known groups constitute an adherent of ISIL or al-
Qaeda; and
(vi) a group aligned with ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a
description of what actions a group takes or statements it
makes that qualify it as a group aligned with ISIL or al-
Qaeda.
(B) An assessment of the relationship between all
identified ISIL or al-Qaeda affiliated groups, associated
groups, and adherents with ISIL leadership or al-Qaeda core.
(C) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of ISIL
or al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and
adherents, from January 1, 2010, to the present, including a
description of the metrics that are used to assess
strengthening or weakening and an assessment of the relative
increase or decrease in violent attacks attributed to such
entities.
(D) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a
member of al-Qaeda core if such individual is not located in
Afghanistan or Pakistan.
(E) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a
member of al-Qaeda core as well as a member of an al-Qaeda
affiliated group, associated group, or adherent.
(F) A definition of defeat of ISIL or core al-Qaeda.
(G) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command,
and control between ISIL or core al-Qaeda and their
affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents,
specifically addressing each such entity.
(H) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism
operations against ISIL or core al-Qaeda, their affiliated
groups, associated groups, and adherents, and whether such
operations have had a sustained impact on the capabilities
and effectiveness of ISIL or core al-Qaeda, their affiliated
groups, associated groups, and adherents.
(4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(b) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed
Services of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment requires a strategy to defeat ISIS and
other like-minded groups. It is incredible that after 4 years of the
rise of ISIS, we still have to talk about needing a strategy, but here
we are.
Four years, Mr. Chairman, what is that? Well, in 4 years the United
States mobilized the whole country and had to fight two wars--one in
the Pacific and one in Europe--during World War II, and we were
successful in protecting the United States, but here after 4 years of
the rise of ISIS, we are not sure even what our strategy is.
One thing we do know: controlling land is a top priority for ISIS.
Its own credibility is wrapped up in the idea of establishing a
caliphate. Without land, ISIS has no caliphate. Without a caliphate,
ISIS loses its legitimacy among its hardcore fighters. Controlling land
is also how ISIS makes a lot of its money. See, ISIS extorts the people
that it controls. It also taxes them. ISIS is still bringing in
millions of dollars a day by other illegal activities.
The only way to stop that source of money is by taking back land that
ISIS controls. Because ISIS is embedded in civilian populations, U.S.
airstrikes are not enough to take the land back. The Iraqi Army is
still too unprofessional to show that they are up to the job, and we
have all seen ourselves how the Iraqis have dropped American weapons
and run. We have yet to give the Kurds the weapons they need to fight
for themselves, and we don't expect the dictator Assad to get the job
done.
The problem of ISIS is only getting bigger. Thousands of foreign
fighters are still streaming into Iraq and Syria from other countries.
Outside of Iraq and Syria, ISIS still has 10 networks, not including
Iraq and Syria. There are three in Libya, two in Saudi Arabia, and one
each in the Sinai, Nigeria, Yemen, Algeria, and one in Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
Saudi Arabia is known for its strong government control, but the ISIS
affiliate in Saudi Arabia recently pulled off two successful suicide
attack bombings in 2 weeks. Its affiliate in Yemen has taken advantage
of the fall of the government to take over more land. The ISIS
affiliate in Libya is running free in a lawless area throughout the
same country that killed our Ambassador and three other Americans. All
of ISIS' 10 networks are growing stronger, not weaker, by the day.
The President said last year that the United States would defeat and
dismantle ISIS. Well, here we are a year later; we still do not have
that strategy. That is at least according to the President himself last
week when he was meeting with the world leaders at the G7 summit. He
said: We do not yet have a complete strategy against ISIS.
This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to
report to Congress within 6 months a complete strategy to defeat ISIS
and other groups like it. The same amendment did pass unanimously last
year with this committee's support. So I ask Members to support it once
again this year and make it become the law of the land. Today's
terrorists control more land than they have at anytime since World War
II. We need a strategy; we need a plan; and we need it soon.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the United States
continue to refine and implement a comprehensive and aggressive
strategy to counter ISIL, al Qaeda, and their affiliates, but that
responsibility does not lie with the Director of National Intelligence.
The DNI's job is to ensure that our national leadership, who do
generate our counterterrorism strategy, have the timeliest, most
germane, and detailed information to be sure our strategy will be
successful.
Mr. Poe's amendment misclassifies that responsibility and
misconstrues

[[Page H4418]]

the important role of the Director of National Intelligence. Our
intelligence community must be free to collect and assess intelligence
outside of the scope of political decisions to be sure their analysis
remains impartial and objective.
So, reluctantly, I must oppose this amendment and urge my colleagues
to do the same.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. POE of Texas. The amendment does state that the Director of
National Intelligence will work with other appropriate agencies.
Mr. Chairman, it is hard to fathom that this Nation does not have a
plan to deal with ISIS. This amendment says Congress will move forward
and expect and put into law that we will have a plan; we will have a
strategy; and if the Director of National Intelligence is not an
individual who is supposed to help form that plan, then I don't know
who would be.
I would ask that this amendment be adopted.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, with respect to my colleague, we have a
strategy with respect to defeating al Qaeda and ISIL, with respect to
the war in Syria and Iraq. It is a comprehensive strategy and, frankly,
it is a difficult strategy to implement. It is a strategy that involves
cutting off terrorism financing. It is a strategy that involves cutting
off the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq. It is a strategy
that involves drying up the resources, the propaganda, the attacking of
the recruitment mechanism of ISIS. It is a strategy that involves
enlisting the support of our partners in the region and within the
Islamic world to combat the perversion of their faith that is used to
recruit people to this jihad. It is a strategy that is also military in
character, that employs our air assets, that seeks to train and assist
Iraqi forces. So we have a strategy. It is comprehensive, and it is
tough.
While I recognize that there is frustration that many of my
colleagues have that our strategy has thus far not borne more success--
and I share that frustration--I have yet to hear any of my colleagues
offer an alternative. It is one thing to bash the administration
because you don't like the strategy; it is another to ignore the fact
that we have a strategy or to propose improvements to it.
But the subject matter of this amendment is whether the top
intelligence official in the country should be charged with the
responsibility of developing the policy to defeat ISIS, and I think it
is rather his responsibility to make sure that the policymakers in
Congress and the administration have the very best intelligence to
inform those decisions.
We see, frankly, this misunderstanding of the role of the
intelligence community many times even in our committee when committee
members will ask witnesses from the intelligence community to state
policy positions on how they think certain policies should be
implemented when that is really not their responsibility.
Here, much as I concur with the need to perfect our strategy, improve
our strategy, and the execution of that strategy, I don't believe that
this is something that we should lay at the feet of the Director of
National Intelligence.
I urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.

{time} 1600

Mr. POE of Texas. I don't have anything to say, believe it or not,
Mr. Chairman, so I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Poe).
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Poe
of Texas) having assumed the chair, Mr. Bishop of Utah, Chair of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2596) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to
no resolution thereon.

____________________