

from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to sections 123 b. and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153(b), (d)) (the "Act"), the text of a proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the "Agreement"). I am also pleased to transmit my written approval, authorization, and determination concerning the proposed Agreement, and an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) concerning the proposed Agreement. (In accordance with section 123 of the Act, as amended by Title XII of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-277), two classified annexes to the NPAS, prepared by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified information, will be submitted to the Congress separately.) The joint memorandum submitted to me by the Secretaries of State and Energy and a letter from the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission stating the views of the Commission are also enclosed. An addendum to the NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the export control system of the Republic of Korea (ROK) with respect to nuclear-related matters, including interactions with other countries of proliferation concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or missile-related transfers to such countries, pursuant to section 102A(w) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(w)), is being submitted separately by the Director of National Intelligence.

The proposed Agreement has been negotiated in accordance with the Act and other applicable law. In my judgment, it meets all applicable statutory requirements and will advance the nonproliferation and other foreign policy interests of the United States.

The proposed Agreement contains all of the requirements established by section 123 a. of the Act. It provides a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation with the ROK based on a mutual commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. It would permit the transfer of material, equipment (including reactors), components, information, and technology for nuclear research and nuclear power production. It would not permit the transfer of Restricted Data, and sensitive nuclear technology or technology or information that is not in the public domain concerning fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium could only be transferred if specifically provided by an amendment to the proposed Agreement or a separate agreement. Any

special fissionable material transferred could only be in the form of low enriched uranium, with two exceptions: small quantities of material for use as samples; or for other specified applications such as use in loading and operation of fast reactors or the conduct of fast reactor experiments. The proposed Agreement would also obligate the United States to endeavor to take such actions as may be necessary and feasible to ensure a reliable supply of low enriched uranium fuel to the ROK, similar to terms contained in other recent civil nuclear cooperation agreements.

The proposed Agreement would also establish a new standing High-Level Bilateral Commission (HLBC) to be led by the Deputy Secretary of Energy for the Government of the United States of America and the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Government of the ROK. The purpose of the HLBC is to facilitate peaceful nuclear and strategic cooperation between the parties and ongoing dialogue regarding areas of mutual interest in civil nuclear energy, including the civil nuclear fuel cycle.

The proposed Agreement will have an initial term of 20 years and would renew for one additional period of 5 years unless either party gives written notice at least 2 years prior to its expiration that it does not want to renew the proposed Agreement. The proposed Agreement also requires the parties to consult as soon as possible after the seventeenth anniversary of its entry into force to decide whether to pursue an extension of the proposed Agreement. In the event of termination of the proposed Agreement, key nonproliferation conditions and controls will continue in effect as long as any nuclear material, moderator material, byproduct material, equipment, or component subject to the proposed Agreement remains in the territory of the party concerned or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, or until such time as the parties agree that, in the case of nuclear material or moderator material, such items are no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of international safeguards or have become practically irrecoverable, or in the case of equipment, components, or byproduct material, such items are no longer usable for nuclear purposes.

The ROK has a strong track record on nonproliferation and its government has consistently reiterated its commitment to nonproliferation. The ROK is a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has an International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol in force, is a member of the four multilateral nonproliferation export control regimes (Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, and Nuclear Suppliers Group, for which it served as Chair in 2003-2004 and is scheduled to do so again in 2015-2016), and is an active participant in the Pro-

liferation Security Initiative. A more detailed discussion of the ROK's civil nuclear program and its nuclear nonproliferation policies and practices, including its nuclear export policies and practices, is provided in the NPAS and in two classified annexes to the NPAS submitted to you separately. As noted above, the Director of National Intelligence will provide an addendum to the NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the export control system of the ROK with respect to nuclear-related matters.

I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested departments and agencies in reviewing the proposed Agreement and have determined that its performance will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved the proposed Agreement and authorized its execution and urge that the Congress give it favorable consideration.

This transmission shall constitute a submittal for purposes of both sections 123 b. and 123 d. of the Act. My Administration is prepared to begin immediately the consultations with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee as provided in section 123 b. Upon completion of the 30 days of continuous session review provided for in section 123 b., the 60 days of continuous session review provided for in section 123 d. shall commence.

BARACK OBAMA.
THE WHITE HOUSE, June 16, 2015.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material on H.R. 2596, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HOLDING). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 315 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2596.

The Chair appoints the gentleman from Utah (Mr. BISHOP) to preside over the Committee of the Whole.

□ 1406

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2596) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States

Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. BISHOP of Utah in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the first time.

The gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES) and the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES).

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The Intelligence Authorization Act is the annual blueprint for the work of the intelligence community and America's military intelligence efforts. The bill sets priorities for our critical intelligence efforts and the legal framework of guidance and oversight for those efforts. As you may recall, the House has passed intelligence authorization bills with strong bipartisan support in the past several Congresses.

The ranking member, Mr. SCHIFF, and I worked in a bipartisan manner to draft this legislation in front of you today. Passing annual intelligence authorization legislation is the most effective way for Congress to exercise oversight over the executive branch and helps ensure that the country's intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities necessary to keep Americans safe. This legislation passed unanimously out of our committee.

As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified programs, the bulk of the committee's recommendations each year are found in the classified annex of the bill, which has been available for Members to review since June 4. Among other initiatives, the bill provides authorization for critical national security functions, including fighting terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, funding efforts to recover from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities, and investing in the resiliency of our national security space architecture.

At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for fiscal year 2016 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget request level. Its funding levels are in line with the House-passed Defense Appropriations bill for the National Intelligence Program and with the National Defense Authorization Act for the Military Intelligence Program. Overall, this bill sustains today's intelligence capabilities and provides for future capabilities while staying within the funding constraints of the Budget Control Act and the budget resolution.

Mr. Chair, we are currently facing one of the most challenging global environments in our Nation's history. Nearly 14 years after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. continues to hunt al Qaeda and its affiliates. We have taken the fight to the enemy and achieved tremendous success. But despite various

strategies employed by two administrations to prevent the spread of radical Islam, that threat remains. The Arab Spring civil war in Syria and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in places such as north Africa highlight only a few of the many events in the past several years that now define U.S. policy failures in the Middle East. In just over a year, ISIL has exploded from a largely localized force in Iraq to seriously challenge al Qaeda as the vanguard of global jihad.

Moreover, nation-states like Russia and China continue to expand their spheres of influence and diminish U.S. clout worldwide. Russia has taken advantage of indecisiveness in Europe and exploited uneven leadership in the U.S. to pressure Ukraine and its neighbors on core Russian interests. China bullies its neighbors in the South and East China Sea and, if left unchecked, will likely exercise de facto control over maritime trade in its perceived territorial waters in the next decade. Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran continue to pose significant proliferation risks and remain strategic threats to the U.S. and its allies. State actors can bring a tremendous amount of resources to counter U.S. policy, placing an immense burden on the intelligence community to collect information on and to assess these activities carefully and accurately.

Perhaps more troubling, state and nonstate actors alike are developing new ways to project power, particularly in cyberspace. Cyber attacks are becoming so pervasive that network defenders are overwhelmed. Attackers seem to gain access to sensitive systems at will. The most recent attacks on the Office of Personnel Management servers, possibly one of the most significant national security incidents in the past decade, highlight the continued threat to our Nation's infrastructure.

Mr. Chair, in this year's intelligence authorization bill, the committee has taken a great deal of care in addressing the wide range of issues described above. This bill is an essential tool in supporting our Nation's efforts to tackle today's challenges while also directing the intelligence community to make strategic investments in the future. In particular, I believe that the bill goes a long way toward encouraging the intelligence community to make much-needed investments, such as recovering from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities.

Additionally, this year's authorization bill comes on the heels of the committee's recent bipartisan successes on key national security issues, like reauthorizing important provisions related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and overwhelmingly passing bipartisan legislation on cyber threat sharing information. I applaud Ranking Member SCHIFF for his help on these issues, and I look forward to working together in the future.

Finally, I want to thank all the Intelligence Committee staff on both

sides of the aisle for their support drafting this bill. The committee staff spent countless hours assisting Members and finalizing the legislation.

In particular, I would like to recognize our Sandia National Labs fellow, Mr. Randy Smith. He has been with the committee for almost 2 years and will be leaving us soon to return to Sandia. He has been a tremendous asset to this committee, and I would like to thank him for all his hard work.

I would also like to thank the men and women of the intelligence community for all their efforts to continue to protect this Nation.

I look forward to passing this legislation.

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The Ranking Member, Mr. SCHIFF, and I worked in a bipartisan manner to draft the legislation in front of you today. Passing annual intelligence authorization legislation is the most effective way for Congress to exercise oversight over the executive branch and helps ensure that the country's intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities necessary to keep Americans safe. This legislation passed unanimously out of our Committee.

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exploded from a largely localized force in Iraq to seriously challenge al-Qa'ida as the vanguard of the global jihad.

Moreover, nation states like Russia and China continue to expand their spheres of influence and diminish U.S. clout worldwide. Russia has taken advantage of indecisiveness in Europe and exploited uneven leadership in the U.S. to pressure Ukraine and its neighbors on core Russian interests. China bullies its neighbors in the South and East China Sea, and if left unchecked, will likely exercise de facto control over maritime trade in its perceived territorial waters in the next decade. Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran continue to pose significant proliferation risks and remain strategic threats to the U.S. and its allies. State actors can bring a tremendous amount of resources to counter U.S. policy, placing an immense burden on the Intelligence Community to collect information on, and assess, these activities carefully and accurately.

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Finally, I want to thank all the Intelligence Committee staff on both sides of the aisle for their support drafting this bill. The Committee staff spent countless hours assisting Members and finalizing the legislation. In particular, I would like to recognize our Sandia National Labs fellow, Randy Smith. He has been with the Committee for almost two years and will be leaving us soon to return to Sandia. He has been a tremendous asset to this Committee and I thank him for all his hard work. I would also like to thank the men and women of the Intelligence Community for all their efforts protecting this nation. I look forward to passing this legislation.

Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

First, I want to say thank you to Chairman NUNES. This Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 is

our third major piece of legislation together, and it once again demonstrates the fruits of our commitment to bipartisanship.

We also have our difference of opinion from time to time, and on this bill, we have some differences. But I know that as long as we continue to work together, there is no end to the good that we can accomplish.

Through our cyber bill and our surveillance reform bill, we have been guided by two core principles: first, that national security is truly the security of the entire Nation and all Americans; second, that national security can and must coexist with privacy and civil liberties. I believe the bill today largely furthers these principles as well.

The IAA funds, equips, and sets the priorities for the U.S. intelligence community; and it is a crucial vehicle by which Congress provides oversight of the IC and ensures that U.S. intelligence professionals and intelligence programs have the funds and authorities they need to keep us safe, as well as our allies and partners.

As the annual IAA provides hundreds of pages of detailed guidance, strict authorizations, and precise limitations, it is also the single most important means by which Congress conducts its oversight of the intelligence community.

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As in past years, this year's IAA is a carefully considered bill and the result of thoughtful oversight.

The Fiscal Year 2016 IAA funds the intelligence community at about 1 percent below the President's budget request and about 7 percent above last year's enacted budget level.

The bill makes cuts to less-effective programs, adds money to underfunded programs, and requires intelligence agencies to regularly inform Congress of their activities, ensuring funds are spent responsibly and lawfully.

Notably, the bill today holds, or "fences," significant amounts of money to make sure Congress' direction is followed to the letter and on time.

I want to highlight just a few particular aspects of the bill. It continues the committee's longstanding emphasis on counterintelligence and security reforms. It also continues to support our overhead architecture by funding our most critical space programs, investing in space protection and resiliency, preserving investments in cutting-edge technologies, and enhancing oversight of contracting and procurement practices.

It also promotes enhancements to our foreign partner capabilities, which are critical to multiplying the reach and impact of our own intelligence efforts. It enhances human intelligence, or HUMINT, capabilities, which are often the key to understanding and predicting global events.

It provides resources to safeguard vulnerable signals intelligence, or

SIGINT, collection while enhancing oversight of these and other sources of intelligence. It emphasizes collection to monitor and ensure compliance with treaties and potential international agreements. It greatly enhances oversight of Defense special operation forces activities worldwide.

The bill also incorporates some excellent provisions championed by the Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee, as well as the Republican members.

In particular, I want to highlight Mr. HIMES' provision to enhance the quality of metrics we receive to enable more thorough oversight; Ms. SEWELL's multiple provisions to enhance diversity within the intelligence community; Mr. CARSON's provisions to better understand FBI resource allocation against domestic and foreign threats and the role of the FBI and DNI in countering violent extremism, particularly in minors; Ms. SPEIER's provision to provide greater human rights oversight of the IC's relationship with certain foreign partners; Mr. QUIGLEY's provision regarding intelligence support to Ukraine; and Mr. SWALWELL's provision to ensure that Department of Energy National Labs can work with State and local government recipients of homeland security grants.

All this said, while I believe the bill largely reflects sound choices, I am concerned that it uses the overseas contingency operations—or OCO—funding as a way to evade the sequestration levels mandated by the ill-conceived Budget Control Act.

Again, I largely support the funding levels and the programs which the IAA authorizes, but I cannot endorse how it has funded them. We need to be serious and thoughtful about the budget and undo sequestration—not just employ accounting tricks to evade its levels only for defense and national security-related items.

Even some domestic programs and agencies that contribute to our homeland security cannot qualify for OCO dollars, while vital programs like our children's education and our social services are left to languish.

Instead of arbitrary, across-the-board cuts, let's do what this bill does substantively: make cuts to some areas and add money to others in a deliberate, well thought out manner. It is time to forthrightly deal with sequestration for all of our national priorities, not just for defense.

I am also opposed to provisions in this bill which would tie the hands of the administration and prevent the orderly transfer of detainees from the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. These restrictions have never been included in prior versions of the IAA, and there is no reason to introduce them into the IAA process now.

The bill goes even further than restricting transfer of detainees to the United States and includes a new provision which restricts transfers to "combat zones," a term that is so

broad as to include allies and partners such as Jordan.

As I have long said, keeping the Guantanamo prison serves as a recruitment tool for militants, undercuts our relationships with our allies, and undermines our international standing.

With that said, the bill, as a whole, is largely a strong product, and I appreciate the close partnership we have enjoyed with the chairman in working on it. But, unfortunately, I cannot support the bill so long as it includes these Guantanamo restrictions and employs the OCO budget gimmick at the expense of our domestic spending priorities.

I look forward to a robust amendment process today, and I am committed to working with the chairman, the Senate, the administration, the other committees of jurisdiction, and all Members of Congress to make critical improvements to the bill as it moves forward, and to resolve the issues to keep alive the string of consecutive signed IAAs.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, at this time I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. PITTENGER).

Mr. PITTENGER. I thank the chairman for his vital leadership on the Intelligence Committee.

I rise in support of this legislation providing the intelligence community the authorization needed to protect and defend the United States and support critical national security programs protecting Americans from nation states and Islamic terrorists.

In December, NSA Director Admiral Rogers warned that China has the capability of shutting down the U.S. electric grid through cyber attack. Homeland security Secretary Johnson has warned about the threat of attacks launched by sleeper cells in most of our States. ISIS continues to expand into new territory, while Americans are more at risk because President Obama has no strategy for defeating ISIS, whom he initially referred to as the JV team.

This is not the time to impede our intelligence efforts. America faces grave danger from those who wish to destroy our way of life. Please join me in full bipartisan support of the Intelligence Authorization Act. Let us be united in confronting the perilous threats of our adversaries.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL), the ranking member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. ENGEL. I thank my friend for yielding.

I want to say that I appreciate the bipartisan, hard work of Chairman NUNES and Ranking Member SCHIFF, but I want to bring to the House's attention recent reports that this bill makes drastic cuts in our so-called covert support to the moderate Syrian opposition.

A headline in the Saturday Washington Post read: "Secret CIA effort in Syria faces large funding cut." If these reports are true, just as the moderate Syrian forces may be starting to make progress, especially in the south, then I am afraid we may be making a big mistake.

Unfortunately, most Members of the House don't know for certain if this legislation will reduce our support for the moderate opposition. Those funding decisions are made behind closed doors. And that is why I believe this bill is not the right place for us to be making decisions that have a major impact on our Syria strategy.

I have no doubt that Chairman NUNES and Ranking Member SCHIFF are determined to get the intelligence piece of our Syria response right, but this is not merely an intelligence issue, and our overall strategy in Syria goes far beyond what is included in any covert program. I believe we shouldn't be dealing with this problem in a piecemeal way.

As we have been doing in the Foreign Affairs Committee on a bipartisan basis, I urge my colleagues to take a step back, look at the big picture, and address our Syria policy in a way that makes sense and involves all the relevant players.

I am troubled if it is true that this bill makes drastic cuts in our so-called covert support to the moderate Syria opposition. And I commend the hard work of our chairman and ranking member.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I would urge my colleague, the ranking member on the Foreign Affairs Committee, that we shouldn't always believe what is in the newspaper. There have been lots of different reports about lots of different things.

I would say that Mr. SCHIFF and I worked in a bipartisan manner to look at all programs across the spectrum of the 17 agencies. And we would be glad to spend some time with the gentleman from New York down in the committee spaces to raise the concerns that he brought up about a newspaper article. As I said, I think there are a lot of things that we read in the newspaper.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The Intelligence Authorization Act is the vehicle by which we ensure that U.S. intelligence professionals and programs have the funds and the authorities that they need. It is the single most important means by which Congress can conduct its oversight. We need to pass this legislation, just as the committee has done over the last several years.

It is my hope that as the legislation moves forward, we will be able to dispose of the Guantanamo provisions—I will have an amendment to address that in a few minutes—and that we can also resolve the issues regarding the overseas contingency account. I look

forward to working with my colleague as the bill moves forward to address those issues.

I want to join the chairman in saluting the members of the intelligence community—the men and women who do such an extraordinary job for us each and every day. They have our sincerest gratitude and full appreciation for their dedication, their patriotism, and their unparalleled skills. I also want to thank again our chairman for his leadership, his commitment to bipartisanship, and his determination to do what is right. I want to thank our colleagues on the committee, who have done an extraordinary job in helping to put this bill together.

I also want to join the chairman in thanking our wonderful staff on our side of the aisle. I want to thank Carly Blake, Linda Cohen, Allison Getty, Robert Minehart, Amanda Rogers Thorpe, Rheanne Wirkkala, as well as Patrick Boland and our shared technical and security staff, including Kristin Jepson, Brandon Smith, and Kevin Klein. We have an extraordinary team on the committee. It is a great pleasure to serve and work with each and every one of them.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to thank the ranking member for his continued cooperation to work in a bipartisan fashion. As I think most Americans know, the threats continue to add up every day, and it is up to the men and women in the intelligence community to help keep us safe. I know the ranking member and I are committed to doing just that.

With that, I look forward to debate on the amendments and passage of the final underlying bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.

Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 5-minute rule.

In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 114-19. That amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read.

The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows:

H.R. 2596

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016".

(b) **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

- Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
 Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
 Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
 Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

- Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subtitle A—General Matters

- Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
 Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
 Sec. 303. Prior congressional notification of initiations of certain new special access programs.
 Sec. 304. Prior congressional notification of transfers of funds for certain intelligence activities.
 Sec. 305. Designation of lead intelligence officer for tunnels.
 Sec. 306. Clarification of authority of Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
 Sec. 307. Reporting process required for tracking certain requests for country clearance.
 Sec. 308. Prohibition on sharing of certain information in response to foreign government inquiries.
 Sec. 309. National Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.
 Sec. 310. Intelligence community business system transformation.
 Sec. 311. Inclusion of Inspector General of Intelligence Community in Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
 Sec. 312. Authorities of the Inspector General for the Central Intelligence Agency.
 Sec. 313. Provision of information and assistance to Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
 Sec. 314. Clarification relating to information access by Comptroller General.
 Sec. 315. Use of homeland security grant funds in conjunction with Department of Energy national laboratories.
 Sec. 316. Technical amendments relating to pay under title 5, United States Code.

Subtitle B—Matters Relating to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

- Sec. 321. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release of individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
 Sec. 322. Prohibition on use of funds to construct or modify facilities in United States to house detainees transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
 Sec. 323. Prohibition on use of funds to transfer or release individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to combat zones.

Subtitle C—Reports

- Sec. 331. Reports to Congress on individuals formerly detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
 Sec. 332. Reports on foreign fighters.
 Sec. 333. Reports on prisoner population at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
 Sec. 334. Report on use of certain business concerns.
 Sec. 335. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(a) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional intelligence committees” means—

(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
 (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2016 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

- (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
- (3) The Department of Defense.
- (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
- (5) The National Security Agency.
- (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
- (7) The Coast Guard.
- (8) The Department of State.
- (9) The Department of the Treasury.
- (10) The Department of Energy.
- (11) The Department of Justice.
- (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
- (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
- (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
- (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS AND PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2016, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2596 of the One Hundred Fourteenth Congress.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) AUTHORITY FOR INCREASES.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2016 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of

the number of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such element.

(b) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PERSONNEL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in—

(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;

(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or

(3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.

(c) NOTICE TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a).

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2016 the sum of \$501,850,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2017.

(b) AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 785 positions as of September 30, 2016. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

(c) CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2016 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2017.

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL.—In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2016, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2016 the sum of \$514,000,000.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subtitle A—General Matters

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity

which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 303. PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF INITIATIONS OF CERTAIN NEW SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.

(a) **LIMITATION.**—Except as provided in subsection (b), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the intelligence community for fiscal year 2016 may be used to initiate any new special access program pertaining to any intelligence or intelligence-related activity or covert action unless the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, submits to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate, by not later than 30 days before initiating such a program, written notification of the intention to initiate the program.

(b) **WAIVER.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, may waive subsection (a) with respect to the initiation of a new special access program if the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, determines that an emergency situation makes it impossible or impractical to provide the notice required under such subsection by the date that is 30 days before such initiation.

(2) **NOTICE.**—If the Director or Secretary issues a waiver under paragraph (1), the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate, by not later than 48 hours after the initiation of the new special access program covered by the waiver, written notice of the waiver and a justification for the waiver, including a description of the emergency situation that necessitated the waiver.

(c) **SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “special access program” has the meaning given such term in Executive Order 13526 as in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 304. PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

(a) **LIMITATION.**—Except as provided in subsection (b), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the intelligence community for fiscal year 2016 may be used to initiate a transfer of funds from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund to be used for intelligence activities unless the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, submits to the congressional intelligence committees, by not later than 30 days before initiating such a transfer, written notice of the transfer.

(b) **WAIVER.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, may waive subsection (a) with respect to the initiation of a transfer of funds if the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, determines that an emergency situation makes it impossible or impractical to provide the notice required under such subsection by the date that is 30 days before such initiation.

(2) **NOTICE.**—If the Director or Secretary issues a waiver under paragraph (1), the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, by not later than 48 hours after the initiation of the transfer of funds covered by the waiver, written notice of the waiver and a justification for the waiver, including a description of the emergency situation that necessitated the waiver.

SEC. 305. DESIGNATION OF LEAD INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR TUNNELS.

The Director of National Intelligence shall designate an official to manage the collection

and analysis of intelligence regarding the tactical use of tunnels by state and nonstate actors.

SEC. 306. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

Section 1061(g) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(g)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(5) **LIMITATIONS.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the Board, or any agent thereof, to gain access to information that an executive branch agency deems related to covert action, as such term is defined in section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3093(e)).”

SEC. 307. REPORTING PROCESS REQUIRED FOR TRACKING CERTAIN REQUESTS FOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—By not later than September 30, 2016, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish a formal internal reporting process for tracking requests for country clearance submitted to overseas Director of National Intelligence representatives by departments and agencies of the United States. Such reporting process shall include a mechanism for tracking the department or agency that submits each such request and the date on which each such request is submitted.

(b) **CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.**—By not later than December 31, 2016, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the progress of the Director in establishing the process required under subsection (a).

SEC. 308. PROHIBITION ON SHARING OF CERTAIN INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INQUIRIES.

(a) **PROHIBITION.**—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for any element of the intelligence community may be used to respond to, share, or authorize the sharing of any non-public information related to intelligence activities carried out by the United States in response to a legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government into the intelligence activities of the United States.

(b) **CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.**—Not later than 30 days after an element of the intelligence community receives a legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government related to intelligence activities carried out by the United States, the element shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees written notification of the inquiry.

(c) **CLARIFICATION REGARDING COLLABORATION WITH FOREIGN PARTNERS.**—The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not be construed as limiting routine intelligence activities with foreign partners, except in any case in which the central focus of the collaboration with the foreign partner is to obtain information for, or solicit a response to, a legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government related to intelligence activities carried out by the United States.

SEC. 309. NATIONAL CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION CENTER.

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended—

(1) by redesignating section 119B as section 119C; and

(2) by inserting after section 119A the following new section:

“SEC. 119B. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION CENTER.

“(a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.

“(b) **DIRECTOR.**—There is a Director of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, who shall be the head of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, and who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.

“(c) **PRIMARY MISSIONS.**—The Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center shall—

“(1) serve as the primary organization within the Federal Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States pertaining to cyber threats;

“(2) ensure that appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government have full access to and receive all-source intelligence support needed to execute the cyber threat intelligence activities of such agencies and to perform independent, alternative analyses;

“(3) disseminate cyber threat analysis to the President, the appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and the appropriate committees of Congress;

“(4) coordinate cyber threat intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government; and

“(5) conduct strategic cyber threat intelligence planning for the Federal Government.

“(d) **LIMITATIONS.**—The Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center—

“(1) may not have more than 50 permanent positions;

“(2) in carrying out the primary missions of the Center described in subsection (c), may not augment staffing through detailees, assignees, or core contractor personnel or enter into any personal services contracts to exceed the limitation under paragraph (1); and

“(3) shall be located in a building owned or operated by an element of the intelligence community as of the date of the enactment of this section.”

(b) **TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENTS.**—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 102 of this title, is further amended by striking the item relating to section 119B and inserting the following new items:

“Sec. 119B. Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.

“Sec. 119C. National intelligence centers.”

SEC. 310. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION.

Section 506D of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3100) is amended to read as follows:

“INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION

“SEC. 506D. (a) **LIMITATION ON OBLIGATION OF FUNDS.**—(1) Subject to paragraph (3), no funds appropriated to any element of the intelligence community may be obligated for an intelligence community business system transformation that will have a total cost in excess of \$3,000,000 unless the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community makes a certification described in paragraph (2) with respect to such intelligence community business system transformation.

“(2) The certification described in this paragraph for an intelligence community business system transformation is a certification made by the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community that the intelligence community business system transformation—

“(A) complies with the enterprise architecture under subsection (b) and such other policies and standards that the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community considers appropriate; or

“(B) is necessary—

“(i) to achieve a critical national security capability or address a critical requirement; or

“(ii) to prevent a significant adverse effect on a project that is needed to achieve an essential capability, taking into consideration any alternative solutions for preventing such adverse effect.

“(3) With respect to a fiscal year after fiscal year 2010, the amount referred to in paragraph (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) shall be equal to the sum of—

“(A) the amount in effect under such paragraph (1) for the preceding fiscal year (determined after application of this paragraph), plus

“(B) such amount multiplied by the annual percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index (all items; U.S. city average) as of September of the previous fiscal year.

“(b) ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEMS.—(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall develop and implement an enterprise architecture to cover all intelligence community business systems, and the functions and activities supported by such business systems. The enterprise architecture shall be sufficiently defined to effectively guide, constrain, and permit implementation of interoperable intelligence community business system solutions, consistent with applicable policies and procedures established by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

“(2) The enterprise architecture under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

“(A) An information infrastructure that will enable the intelligence community to—

“(i) comply with all Federal accounting, financial management, and reporting requirements;

“(ii) routinely produce timely, accurate, and reliable financial information for management purposes;

“(iii) integrate budget, accounting, and program information and systems; and

“(iv) provide for the measurement of performance, including the ability to produce timely, relevant, and reliable cost information.

“(B) Policies, procedures, data standards, and system interface requirements that apply uniformly throughout the intelligence community.

“(c) RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION.—The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for the entire life cycle of an intelligence community business system transformation, including review, approval, and oversight of the planning, design, acquisition, deployment, operation, and maintenance of the business system transformation.

“(d) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEM INVESTMENT REVIEW.—(1) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall establish and implement, not later than 60 days after October 7, 2010, an investment review process for the intelligence community business systems for which the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community is responsible.

“(2) The investment review process under paragraph (1) shall—

“(A) meet the requirements of section 11312 of title 40, United States Code; and

“(B) specifically set forth the responsibilities of the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community under such review process.

“(3) The investment review process under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

“(A) Review and approval by an investment review board (consisting of appropriate representatives of the intelligence community) of each intelligence community business system as an investment before the obligation of funds for such system.

“(B) Periodic review, but not less often than annually, of every intelligence community business system investment.

“(C) Thresholds for levels of review to ensure appropriate review of intelligence community business system investments depending on the scope, complexity, and cost of the system involved.

“(D) Procedures for making certifications in accordance with the requirements of subsection (a)(2).

“(e) RELATION TO ANNUAL REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the requirements of section 8083 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108–287; 118 Stat. 989), with regard to information technology systems (as defined in subsection (d) of such section).

“(f) RELATIONSHIP TO DEFENSE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE.—Intelligence community business system transformations certified under this section shall be deemed to be in compliance with section 2222 of title 10, United States Code. Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for activities other than an intelligence community business system transformation from the requirements of such section 2222, to the extent that such requirements are otherwise applicable.

“(g) RELATION TO CLINGER-COHEN ACT.—(1) Executive agency responsibilities in chapter 113 of title 40, United States Code, for any intelligence community business system transformation shall be exercised jointly by—

“(A) the Director of National Intelligence and the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community; and

“(B) the head of the executive agency that contains the element of the intelligence community involved and the chief information officer of that executive agency.

“(2) The Director of National Intelligence and the head of the executive agency referred to in paragraph (1)(B) shall enter into a memorandum of understanding to carry out the requirements of this section in a manner that best meets the needs of the intelligence community and the executive agency.

“(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) The term ‘enterprise architecture’ has the meaning given that term in section 3601(4) of title 44, United States Code.

“(2) The terms ‘information system’ and ‘information technology’ have the meanings given those terms in section 11101 of title 40, United States Code.

“(3) The term ‘intelligence community business system’ means an information system, including a national security system, that is operated by, for, or on behalf of an element of the intelligence community, including a financial system, mixed system, financial data feeder system, and the business infrastructure capabilities shared by the systems of the business enterprise architecture, including people, process, and technology, that build upon the core infrastructure used to support business activities, such as acquisition, financial management, logistics, strategic planning and budgeting, installations and environment, and human resource management.

“(4) The term ‘intelligence community business system transformation’ means—

“(A) the acquisition or development of a new intelligence community business system; or

“(B) any significant modification or enhancement of an existing intelligence community business system (other than necessary to maintain current services).

“(5) The term ‘national security system’ has the meaning given that term in section 3552(b) of title 44, United States Code.”

SEC. 311. INCLUSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY.

Section 11(b)(1)(B) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (Public Law 95–452; 5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking “the Office of the Director of National Intelligence” and inserting “the Intelligence Community”.

SEC. 312. AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE.—Paragraph (9) of section 17(e) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(9)) is amended to read as follows:

“(9)(A) The Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General provided by this section from any Federal, State, or local governmental agency or unit thereof.

“(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from a department

or agency of the Federal Government, the head of the department or agency involved, insofar as practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of such department or agency, shall furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance.

“(C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide any new authority to the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct intelligence activity in the United States.

“(D) In this paragraph, the term ‘State’ means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.”

(b) TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SELECTION OF EMPLOYEES.—Paragraph (7) of such section (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(7)) is amended—

(1) by inserting “(A)” before “Subject to applicable law”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(B) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final approval of—

“(i) the selection of internal and external candidates for employment with the Office of Inspector General; and

“(ii) all other personnel decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General, including selection and appointment to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based determinations that are not within the authority of a head of other Central Intelligence Agency offices.”

SEC. 313. PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE TO INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 103H(j)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government” and inserting “any Federal, State (as defined in section 804), or local governmental agency or unit thereof”; and

(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting “from a department, agency, or element of the Federal Government” before “under subparagraph (A)”.

SEC. 314. CLARIFICATION RELATING TO INFORMATION ACCESS BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL.

Section 348(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–259; 124 Stat. 2700; 50 U.S.C. 3308) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(4) REQUESTS BY CERTAIN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Consistent with the protection of classified information, the directive issued under paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the Comptroller General from obtaining information necessary to carry out the following audits or reviews:

“(A) An audit or review carried out—

“(i) at the request of the congressional intelligence committees; or

“(ii) pursuant to—

“(I) an intelligence authorization Act;

“(II) a committee report or joint explanatory statement accompanying an intelligence authorization Act; or

“(III) a classified annex to a committee report or joint explanatory statement accompanying an intelligence authorization Act.

“(B) An audit or review pertaining to intelligence activities of the Department of Defense carried out—

“(i) at the request of the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code); or

“(ii) pursuant to a national defense authorization Act.”

SEC. 315. USE OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT FUNDS IN CONJUNCTION WITH DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL LABORATORIES.

Section 2008(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 609(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by inserting “including by working in conjunction with a National Laboratory (as defined in section 2(3) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801(3))” after “plans.”.

SEC. 316. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO PAY UNDER TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE.

Section 5102(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in clause (vii), by striking “or”;

(2) by inserting after clause (vii) the following new clause:

“(viii) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;”;

(3) in clause (x), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon.

Subtitle B—Matters Relating to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

SEC. 321. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR TRANSFER OR RELEASE OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence community may be used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release, to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or any other individual detained at Guantanamo (as such term is defined in section 322(c)).

SEC. 322. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO CONSTRUCT OR MODIFY FACILITIES IN UNITED STATES TO HOUSE DE-TAINEES TRANSFERRED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence community may be used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to construct or modify any facility in the United States, its territories, or possessions to house any individual detained at Guantanamo for the purposes of detention or imprisonment in the custody or under the control of the Department of Defense.

(b) **EXCEPTION.**—The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not apply to any modification of facilities at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

(c) **INDIVIDUAL DETAINED AT GUANTANAMO DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “individual detained at Guantanamo” means any individual located at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of October 1, 2009, who—

(1) is not a citizen of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States; and

(2) is—
(A) in the custody or under the control of the Department of Defense; or

(B) otherwise under detention at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

SEC. 323. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO TRANSFER OR RELEASE INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, TO COMBAT ZONES.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence community may be used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release of any individual detained in the custody or under the control of the Department of Defense at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to a combat zone.

(b) **COMBAT ZONE DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “combat zone” means any area designated as a combat zone for purposes of section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for which the income of a member of the Armed Forces was excluded during 2014, 2015, or 2016 by reason of the member’s service on active duty in such area.

Subtitle C—Reports

SEC. 331. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON INDIVIDUALS FORMERLY DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

(a) **ADDITIONAL MATTERS FOR INCLUSION IN REPORTS.**—Subsection (c) of section 319 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32; 123 Stat. 1874; 10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by adding after paragraph (5) the following new paragraphs:

“(6) A summary of all contact by any means of communication, including telecommunications, electronic or technical means, in person, written communications, or any other means of communication, regardless of content, between any individual formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and any individual known or suspected to be associated with a foreign terrorist group.

“(7) A description of whether any of the contact described in the summary required by paragraph (6) included any information or discussion about hostilities against the United States or its allies or partners.

“(8) For each individual described in paragraph (4), the period of time between the date on which the individual was released or transferred from Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the date on which it is confirmed that the individual is suspected or confirmed of reengaging in terrorist activities.

“(9) The average period of time described in paragraph (8) for all the individuals described in paragraph (4).”.

(b) **FORM.**—Subsection (a) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following: “The reports may be submitted in classified form.”.

(c) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section shall be construed to terminate, alter, modify, override, or otherwise affect any reporting of information required under section 319(c) of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32; 123 Stat. 1874; 10 U.S.C. 801 note), as in effect immediately before the enactment of this section.

SEC. 332. REPORTS ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS.

(a) **REPORTS REQUIRED.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60 days thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on foreign fighter flows to and from Syria and to and from Iraq. The Director shall define the term “foreign fighter” in such reports.

(b) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.**—Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) The total number of foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria or Iraq since January 1, 2011, the total number of foreign fighters in Syria or Iraq as of the date of the submittal of the report, the total number of foreign fighters whose countries of origin have a visa waiver program described in section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1187), the total number of foreign fighters who have left Syria or Iraq, the total number of female foreign fighters, and the total number of deceased foreign fighters.

(2) The total number of United States persons who have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq since January 1, 2011, the total number of such persons who have arrived in Syria or Iraq since such date, and the total number of such persons who have returned to the United States from Syria or Iraq since such date.

(3) The total number of foreign fighters in Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment and the status of each such foreign fighter in that database, the number of such foreign fighters who are on a watchlist, and the number of such foreign fighters who are not on a watchlist.

(4) The total number of foreign fighters who have been processed with biometrics, including face images, fingerprints, and iris scans.

(5) Any programmatic updates to the foreign fighter report since the last report was issued, including updated analysis on foreign country cooperation, as well as actions taken, such as denying or revoking visas.

(6) A worldwide graphic that describes foreign fighters flows to and from Syria, with points of origin by country.

(c) **FORM.**—The reports submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

(d) **TERMINATION.**—The requirement to submit reports under subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is three years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 333. REPORTS ON PRISONER POPULATION AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

(a) **REPORTS REQUIRED.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 30 days thereafter, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Members of Congress specified in subsection (b) a report on the prisoner population at the detention facility at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

(b) **SPECIFIED MEMBERS AND COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.**—The Members of Congress specified in this subsection are the following:

(1) The majority leader and minority leader of the Senate.

(2) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(3) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(4) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(5) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(6) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(7) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(8) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(9) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(c) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.**—Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) The name and country of origin of each prisoner detained at the detention facility at United States Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of the date of such report.

(2) A current summary of the evidence, intelligence, and information used to justify the detention of each prisoner listed under paragraph (1) at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

(3) A current accounting of all the measures taken to transfer each prisoner listed under paragraph (1) to the individual’s country of citizenship or another country.

(4) A current description of the number of individuals released or transferred from detention at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after such release or transfer.

(5) An assessment of any efforts by foreign terrorist organizations to recruit individuals released from detention at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

(6) A summary of all contact by any means of communication, including telecommunications, electronic or technical means, in person, written

communications, or any other means of communication, regardless of content, between any individual formerly detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and any individual known or suspected to be associated with a foreign terrorist group.

(7) A description of whether any of the contact described in the summary required by paragraph (6) included any information or discussion about hostilities against the United States or its allies or partners.

(8) For each individual described in paragraph (4), the period of time between the date on which the individual was released or transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the date on which it is confirmed that the individual is suspected or confirmed of reengaging in terrorist activities.

(9) The average period of time described in paragraph (8) for all the individuals described in paragraph (4).

SEC. 334. REPORT ON USE OF CERTAIN BUSINESS CONCERNS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence communities a report on the representation, as of the date of the report, of covered business concerns among the contractors that are awarded contracts by elements of the intelligence community for goods, equipment, tools, and services.

(b) **MATTERS INCLUDED.**—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The representation of covered business concerns as described in subsection (a), including such representation by—

(A) each type of covered business concern; and

(B) each element of the intelligence community.

(2) If, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director does not record and monitor the statistics required to carry out this section, a description of the actions taken by the Director to ensure that such statistics are recorded and monitored beginning in fiscal year 2016.

(3) The actions the Director plans to take during fiscal year 2016 to enhance the awarding of contracts to covered business concerns by elements of the intelligence community.

(c) **COVERED BUSINESS CONCERNS DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “covered business concerns” means the following:

(1) Minority-owned businesses.

(2) Women-owned businesses.

(3) Small disadvantaged businesses.

(4) Service-disabled veteran-owned businesses.

(5) Veteran-owned small businesses.

SEC. 335. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) **QUADRENNIAL AUDIT OF POSITIONS REQUIRING SECURITY CLEARANCES.**—Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended—

(1) by striking subsection (a); and

(2) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively.

(b) **REPORTS ON ROLE OF ANALYSTS AT FBI AND FBI INFORMATION SHARING.**—Section 2001(g) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458; 118 Stat. 3700; 28 U.S.C. 532 note) is amended by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).

(c) **REPORT ON OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT BY OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 102A(u) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended—

(A) by striking “(1) The Director” and inserting “The Director”; and

(B) by striking paragraph (2).

(2) **CONFORMING AMENDMENT.**—Subsection (a) of section 507 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3106(a)) is amended—

(A) by striking paragraph (5); and

(B) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (5).

(3) **TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.**—Subsection (c)(1) of such section 507 is amended by striking “subsection (a)(1)” and inserting “subsection (a)”.

(d) **REPORTS ON NUCLEAR ASPIRATIONS OF NON-STATE ENTITIES.**—Section 1055 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371) is repealed.

(e) **REPORTS ON ESPIONAGE BY PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**—Section 3151 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (42 U.S.C. 7383e) is repealed.

(f) **REPORTS ON SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF NATIONAL LABORATORY COMPUTERS.**—Section 4508 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2659) is repealed.

The CHAIR. No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed in House Report 114–155. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question.

AMENDMENT NO. 1 OFFERED BY MR. ISRAEL

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 114–155.

Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 12, line 10, strike “The Director” and insert “(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director”.

Page 12, after line 13, insert the following:

(b) **ANNUAL REPORT.**—Not later than the date that is 10 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and biennially thereafter until the date that is four years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees (as such term is defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code) a report describing—

(1) trends in the use of tunnels by foreign state and nonstate actors; and

(2) collaboration efforts between the United States and partner countries to address the use of tunnels by adversaries.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New York (Mr. ISRAEL) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer an amendment with my very good friend from Colorado (Mr. LAMBORN) and my very good friend from Florida (Ms. GRAHAM). This is a bipartisan amendment with respect to tunnels being used as a military tactic, technology, and strategy in asymmetric warfare.

Mr. Chairman, almost exactly a year ago, when war broke out in the Middle East and Hamas attacked Israel, I visited Israel and saw for myself the sophistication of the tunnels being dug

from Gaza to Israel through which terrorists traveled. They went to the other side of the tunnels, popped up, and tried to kill innocent civilians.

These tunnels are not the tunnels that many of us characterize in our own minds. These tunnels are sophisticated. These are expressways underground. It is like the Queens-Midtown Tunnel going from Gaza to Israel. They are ventilated. They are lit. They are massive. They are deep. They are huge. They are impenetrable, and they are very difficult to detect.

Mr. Chairman, the FY16 Intelligence Authorization bill properly says that the Director of National Intelligence will designate an official to manage the collection and analysis of intelligence regarding the tactical use of tunnels by state and nonstate actors.

□ 1430

This bipartisan amendment simply asks for accountability. It requires a report from this new lead intelligence officer for tunnels describing the trends in the use of tunnels by foreign state and nonstate actors and collaborative efforts between the United States and partner nations to address the use of tunnels by our adversaries.

Mr. Chairman, I talked about tunnels in the Middle East, but in fact, these tunnels are dynamic force multipliers for our enemies and enemies of our allies around the world. They are used for terrorist attacks, but they are also used to smuggle arms and contraband.

We have learned that these tunnels are being used well beyond Israel. Korea is another example. Tunnels have been found in North Korea. Here at home, more than 150 tunnels have been found since 2009.

Mr. Chairman, we have plenty of enemies today looking for ways to attack the United States and our interests around the globe. This bill recognizes these threats and, very wisely, creates a lead intelligence officer for tunnels.

This amendment simply encourages greater oversight by Congress. It allows Congress to make informed decisions on how and where to spend future funds in order to counter this threat and protect U.S. national security interests.

Most importantly, Mr. Chairman, these reports will help shape the efforts of the newly created position, making it clear that Congress expects accountability and transparency, and that is something that the American people require.

I ask my colleagues to support this bipartisan amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not intend to oppose the amendment.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. LAMBORN).

Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Congressman STEVE ISRAEL and Congresswoman GWEN GRAHAM for working together with me on this bipartisan effort in the defense bills, as well as now in the Intelligence Authorization Act. I would also like to thank Chairman NUNES and his staff for working together with me on this important issue.

Mr. Chairman, as Representative ISRAEL just described, there is a real and growing tunnel threat to American bases and embassies around the world, to our southern border, as well as to our ally Israel, both in Gaza, as well as Israel's northern border.

Language I offered in the base intelligence bill, combined with this amendment, will ensure that our intelligence community stays focused on this threat. There will be a dedicated person watching on this issue.

Going forward, partnership with Israel is the best way to address this growing threat. As we have seen with Iron Dome and other missile defense efforts, partnering with a vital ally like Israel enables both countries to learn quickly, while sharing costs and new technologies. It is a win-win situation for Israel and the U.S. and, hopefully, a loss situation for the bad guys.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank my very good friend from Colorado for his bipartisan support of this bill.

I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Florida. (Ms. GRAHAM).

Ms. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of Representative STEVE ISRAEL's amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act to provide oversight for the joint U.S.-Israel antitunneling defense project.

The joint antitunneling project, which was added to the National Defense Authorization Act in an amendment sponsored by my good friend Representative LAMBORN and myself, will help our closest ally in the Middle East, Israel, protect its borders.

The terrorist group Hamas has spent years developing a complex network of tunnels under the Gaza Strip and Israel to smuggle weapons, kidnap Israelis, and launch mass murder attacks.

This project will develop new technology to detect and destroy these tunnels, and it will send a clear message to our allies and enemies alike. The United States is committed to protecting Israel and to rooting out and destroying the terrorists who wish to do her harm.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), the distinguished ranking member of the committee.

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank Mr. ISRAEL, Mr. LAMBORN, and Ms. GRAHAM for this very important amendment and issue.

This will call for a report on our adversaries' use of tunnels and an update

on our collaboration with international partners in ways to detect and defeat tunnels.

All of us remember the fear that set in, in much of southern Israel last summer, as Hamas militants used a complex network of tunnels to attack Israeli soldiers from the Gaza Strip. This was not the first use of tunnels by Hamas. Cross-border tunnels were used in the capture of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006.

In addition to using them against military targets, Israel has uncovered evidence that the tunnels are being prepared for large-scale attacks against Israeli civilians.

Tunnels are not just a problem for Israel. For decades, the North Korean military has also been digging tunnels under the DMZ to facilitate infiltration of South Korea.

According to press reports, four tunnels from the north have been found in all, although none since 1990. The South Korean Defense Ministry believes there may be 20 in all, and they could pose a mortal threat to Koreans and American service personnel in the region.

I strongly support the amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to support the amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, all that I can say is thank you.

I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. ISRAEL).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 2 OFFERED BY MR. ISRAEL

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 16, after line 24, insert the following new subsection:

“(e) REPORTS.—Not later than 10 months after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter for three years, the Director of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center shall submit a report to Congress that includes the following:

“(1) With respect to the year covered by the report, a detailed description of cyber threat trends, as compiled by the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.

“(2) With respect to the year covered by the report, a detailed description of the coordination efforts by the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center between departments and agencies of the Federal Government, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security.

“(3) Recommendations for better collaboration between such departments and agencies of the Federal Government.”

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New York (Mr. ISRAEL) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I will attempt to continue my winning streak on the floor this morning.

I rise to offer an amendment with my distinguished friend and partner from New York (Mr. HANNA).

This bipartisan amendment addresses an issue that has concerned many of us for some time, and that is the fact that, when it comes to cyber defense and cyber war, many Federal agencies are doing something; it is just that they may not be aware of what each of them is doing. We need closer coordination and collaboration among all the Federal agencies and entities dealing with cyber war.

Mr. Chairman, we recently found out that the United States Office of Personnel Management suffered a cyber attack impacting millions of Federal workers. This attack, in my view, highlights a disconnect between agencies tasked to provide cyber defense, a foreign government hacking into a Federal government system, taking the records of millions of government employees, spanning the jurisdiction of several Federal agencies.

It is clear that there is an obvious need for greater collaboration between these agencies to create a credible defense and, if needed, a deterrent to those wishing to attack through the cyber domain.

That is why I was very pleased in February of this year when the President directed the DNI to establish the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, CTIIC. This bill very properly authorizes that position.

CTIIC will serve as the primary organization within the Federal Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S. pertaining to cyber threats and coordinate cyber threat intelligence activities.

This bipartisan amendment, Mr. Chairman, simply ensures congressional oversight of CTIIC by requiring an annual report detailing three things: number one, cyber attack trends identified by the CTIIC; number two, an assessment of the collaborative efforts between the CTIIC and various Federal agencies tasked to defend this country against cyber attacks; and number three, recommendations for better collaboration between these agencies.

Mr. Chairman, we have entered a new era of warfare. Our networks are being attacked daily. We need to do a much better job of coordinating, collaborating, and cooperating at the Federal level. This amendment ensures oversight and accountability.

I want to thank my partner on this measure, Mr. HANNA, for his bipartisan assistance and support.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not intend to oppose the amendment.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, over the last several years, cyber attacks have become a pressing concern for the United States. The recent breach of the Office of Personnel Management has put the personal information of millions of current and former Federal employees, including many of the men and women of our intelligence community, at risk.

Every day, cyber thieves attack private companies, stealing credit card numbers, accessing medical records, leaking proprietary information, and publishing confidential emails, affecting tens of millions of Americans.

The intelligence community has worked to improve our cyber defenses by improving information sharing between the private sector and the Federal Government through the support of H.R. 1560, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act.

While the Senate has yet to act on this bill, the legislation we consider today will help improve the Federal Government's ability to detect and defeat cyber attacks by creating the new Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.

This thoughtful amendment by Mr. ISRAEL and Mr. HANNA will require that the Center produce a report on cyber threat trends and coordination on cyber threats between different government agencies.

I thank the gentlemen from New York for their work on this issue and urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), the ranking member of the committee.

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman, and I thank him for his excellent amendment and support in the intelligence process.

With each passing day, we are learning more about the cyber breach at the Office of Personnel Management. The volume of personal information lost during these events is of tremendous concern. Mr. ISRAEL's amendment will help us better inform Congress on the effectiveness of the government's collaborative efforts to defend against future cyber events.

I thank my colleagues for their work on it, and I urge support of Mr. ISRAEL's amendment.

Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the distinguished chairman for his bipartisan leadership and the distinguished ranking member. I appreciate their support for this amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. ISRAEL).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 3 OFFERED BY MR. CROWLEY

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 29, after line 17, insert the following:
SEC. 317. INCLUSION OF HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTIONS IN GRANT PROGRAM TO ENHANCE RECRUITING OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE.

Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.) is amended—

(1) in subsection (c)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting “, Hispanic-serving institutions, and” after “universities”; and

(B) in the subsection heading for such subsection, by striking “HISTORICALLY BLACK” and inserting “CERTAIN MINORITY-SERVING”; and

(2) in subsection (g)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph (5):

“(5) HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term ‘Hispanic-serving institution’ has the meaning given that term in section 502(a)(5) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a(a)(5)).”

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New York (Mr. CROWLEY) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, like many of my colleagues, I am focused on growing educational opportunities for young Hispanic Americans, particularly in the areas that will be so critical to our Nation's success in the years ahead.

Last month, the House approved a bipartisan amendment to the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act designed to increase opportunities for Latinos in the STEM fields.

The amendment I am offering today with my colleagues, Mr. SERRANO and Mr. CURBELO, builds upon that effort and would further expand opportunities for Hispanic students.

Our proposal would allow the Director of National Intelligence to offer grants to Hispanic-Serving Institutions of higher education for advanced foreign language education programs that are in the immediate interest of the intelligence community.

It would also promote study abroad and cultural immersion programs in those areas, which we all know are crucial to truly understanding the intricacies of other languages and other cultures. This is a time when we need to be encouraging more of our young people to enter careers aimed at making our Nation safer.

Of the nearly 2 million Latino students enrolled in college today, the majority attend Hispanic-Serving Institutions. With these targeted grants, HSIs would be able to help increase the ranks of Latinos going into the intelligence community, where they are underrepresented today.

This amendment would not only promote diversity in national security and

intelligence communities, but it would also strengthen our youngest and fastest growing minority, Hispanic Americans.

We must ensure that these young people are prepared with the knowledge and skills that will contribute to our Nation's future strength, security, and global leadership because, when education is available to everyone, our entire Nation is a stronger nation.

I want to thank my colleagues who have worked with me on this issue, Mr. SERRANO and Mr. CURBELO, who have cosponsored this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not intend to oppose the amendment.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I thank Mr. CROWLEY, Mr. SERRANO, and Mr. CURBELO for offering this amendment to include Hispanic-Serving Institutions in the grant program to improve recruitment efforts for the intelligence community.

I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. CURBELO).

□ 1445

Mr. CURBELO of Florida. I thank the chairman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of this amendment and thank my colleague from New York for allowing me to join in leading on this important issue.

This amendment would allow the Director of National Intelligence to provide grants to Hispanic-Serving Institutions of higher education to offer advanced foreign language programs that are important to our intelligence community. These students, in addition to the traditional classroom setting, would also be able to travel and study abroad so they can gain a firsthand perspective of the culture in which they are immersing themselves.

Mr. Chairman, the study of Farsi, Middle Eastern, and South Asian dialects is of the utmost importance in developing our country's continued relationships abroad. I am proud to advocate for Hispanic-Serving Institutions, like Florida International University and Miami Dade College in my district, and will strive to provide them the opportunity to train their students so that they can go on to serve our country.

I am proud to be working with the gentleman from New York (Mr. CROWLEY) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. SERRANO) to provide more opportunities for these young Hispanic students who want to serve their country and to provide our intelligence community this special tool to recruit those who could be useful in advancing the cause of building the relationships that are so critical to our intelligence services operating throughout the world.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida's comments on this bill and his support.

At this time, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank my colleague from New York (Mr. CROWLEY) for yielding and for his work on this amendment. I am very happy to support it.

Diversity and language skills are critical to national security. Together, they allow the intelligence community to reach its potential and expand its reach, its access, as well as its understanding.

This amendment would further both goals by providing better language-learning opportunities to students of Hispanic-Serving Institutions. I am very proud to support this amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Again, I thank my friend from New York (Mr. CROWLEY) as well as my other colleagues who worked with him on this amendment. I urge passage.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for his support of this amendment as well as the ranking member, Mr. SCHIFF, for his support of this amendment, and all the Members who have worked on this amendment.

I think the amendment speaks for itself. It is providing a great opportunity for a growing minority community within our country who want to serve our country in this capacity.

With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. CROWLEY).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 4 OFFERED BY MR. KEATING

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 35, after line 17, insert the following new subsection (and redesignate the subsequent subsections accordingly):

(C) ADDITIONAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes—

(1) with respect to the travel of foreign fighters to and from Iraq and Syria, a description of the intelligence sharing relationships between the United States and member states of the European Union and member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and

(2) an analysis of the challenges impeding such intelligence sharing relationships.

Page 35, line 19, insert "and (c)" after "(a)".

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KEATING) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I offer this bipartisan amendment with the support of Homeland Security Chairman MICHAEL MCCAUL and Representatives KATKO and LOUDERMILK to help Congress identify ways to improve intelligence sharing on the flow of foreign fighters around the world—with particular attention to their travel to and from Iraq and Syria.

Already, this legislation that we are considering today makes substantial strides in ensuring that intelligence surrounding the flow of foreign fighters is shared with Congress. These continuous reports will shed light on the total number of attempted and successful fighters since the beginning of 2011.

My amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress on the intelligence community's progress in forging information-sharing agreements with foreign partners and help Congress identify the challenges impeding coordinated intelligence efforts.

Over 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to join rebel and terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, including ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates like al-Nusrah. Their movements are proving increasingly difficult to track in our globalized world, particularly given the uneven or nonexistent tracking efforts from some of our foreign partners.

As the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and as a member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, I have engaged on the issue of intelligence sharing from two perspectives—from our efforts to improve the intelligence community's coordination with State, local, and other Federal agencies and from our work to better improve our information-sharing practices with our overseas allies to prevent terrorist attacks and the flow of foreign fighters here at home.

While the intelligence community has made improvements to the processes of sharing pertinent information with the relevant Federal, State, and local agencies, there still exists a blind spot in our intelligence-gathering efforts on foreign fighters. That blind spot stems from the failure of some foreign governments to take common-sense information-sharing steps, and it has made the task of tracking foreign fighters even more challenging.

The inability or unwillingness of some foreign governments to pass along even the most basic information about these individuals represents a major risk to the safety of the American people.

An additional threat looms when some of these individuals return to their homelands from Iraq and Syria, battle-hardened and radicalized. Once back home, some can travel between international borders with relative ease, which makes tracking them a truly difficult feat.

This amendment will also provide insight into our current intelligence-sharing relationships and will give Congress the opportunity to highlight best practices while also revealing areas for improvement.

I thank Chairman NUNES and Ranking Member SCHIFF for their cooperation.

I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MCCAUL).

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of the Keating-McCaul amendment in the Intelligence Authorization Act. If adopted, our amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress on the state of intelligence information sharing with overseas partners to help us identify security gaps so that we can improve international monitoring of foreign fighter travel both in and out of Syria and Iraq.

Islamist fanatics from more than 100 countries have traveled overseas to fight with groups like ISIS and al Qaeda. Thousands of the jihadists carry Western passports and can exploit security gaps in places like Europe to return to the West, where they can plot attacks against America and our allies.

Last month, I led a congressional delegation to the Middle East to investigate the flow of these foreign fighters. And while progress is being made, I am still troubled by intelligence and screening gaps, especially with our foreign partners. We need to make sure our allies not only share the identities of terrorists and foreign fighters with us but also with each other so that these extremists can be stopped before they cross our borders into the United States.

This amendment will provide Congress critical information needed to close these security gaps and improve intelligence information sharing to defend our homeland.

I applaud the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KEATING) for his hard work on the amendment and for his strong participation in our delegation overseas, where we learned quite a bit. It is not very often you can pass something you think can save American lives, and I think this is one of them. I thank the gentleman again.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of Homeland Security for his leadership on this issue. We really have established a very strong bipartisan effort, putting our national security first and realizing what holes there are in our system, in our security for our country.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the work of my colleagues from Massachusetts and from Texas. This is a superb amendment that will help us track foreign fighters, and I am proud to support it.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KEATING).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 5 OFFERED BY MR. KEATING

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I have another amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 41, line 8, strike “paragraphs (3) and (4)” and insert “paragraph (3) and redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3)”.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KEATING) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, the recent events involving the plan of radicalized individuals in Massachusetts to target law enforcement officials—police, in particular—underscore the truth that protecting America will require the efforts of local, State, and Federal law enforcement.

Since the Boston Marathon bombings, the FBI has made great efforts to improve their information-sharing efforts with the Joint Terrorism Task Force and other Federal agencies.

With my work and the work of my colleagues on the congressional investigation of the Boston Marathon bombings through the Homeland Security Committee, I can attest to the seriousness in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation has set out to improve their information-sharing practices.

However, the FBI’s efforts to institutionalize sharing across law enforcement and intelligence are still a work in progress.

The current version of this bill eliminates the requirement for the FBI to report to Congress on their progress to implement information-sharing principles. This is a reporting requirement that has kept Congress aware of the FBI’s information-sharing practices since 2004, and it has been vital to understand what works and what can be improved.

This amendment will reinstate that requirement, with the recognition that the FBI has more work to do on information sharing to better protect the American public.

These necessary reforms include re-executing FBI current memorandums of understanding with local partners, improving training and accessibility for the eGuardian platform, and formalizing methods for disseminating intelligence to relevant consumers up- and downstream.

Without information on the progress the FBI is making in these reforms, Congress is hindered in taking the critical steps needed to protect the American public.

I would like to again thank Chairman NUNES and Ranking Member SCHIFF.

I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank my colleague from Massachusetts, who has been an active and important voice on national security since he joined the Congress several years ago. In particular, he has worked to ensure that we maintain a strong focus on information sharing across agencies.

One of the key lessons we learned from 9/11 is the need to tear down stovepipes and to ensure that inappropriate barriers to information sharing across agencies never reappear.

The gentleman from Massachusetts’ amendment seeks to maintain our vigilance on this issue and would require the FBI to report to Congress on its information-sharing progress.

As a fellow native Bostonian, I am very pleased to see my colleague do such great work. I want to thank him for his commitment to the issue. And I am very happy to support the amendment.

Mr. KEATING. I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KEATING).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 6 OFFERED BY MR. SCHIFF

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Strike sections 321, 322, 323, and 331.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, my amendment would strike the sections of the bill which would undermine the administration’s ability to close the prison at Guantanamo by transferring the remaining detainees to the United States for further disposition of their cases or to third countries that agree to accept them, secure them, and monitor them.

I am grateful that my colleague from Washington, ADAM SMITH, ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, has joined me in urging the House to make this important change to the bill.

Every day that it remains open, the prison at Guantanamo Bay damages the United States. Because there are other, better options for the prosecution and detention of these inmates, we are not safer for Guantanamo’s existence. In fact, it makes us more vulnerable by drawing new recruits to the jihad.

The Congress, the administration, and the military can work together to find a solution that protects our people even as we maintain our principles and devotion to the rule of law.

Under the provisions included in this bill, the administration would be barred from transferring Guantanamo detainees to a “war zone.”

While I agree that it would be foolhardy to seek to send a detainee to Yemen while that country is immersed in civil war, the definition of “war zone” used here is derived from the U.S. Tax Code and is extremely broad, ruling out countries like Jordan, for example, that have either successfully resettled and monitored former detainees or demonstrated a genuine commitment to doing so.

These provisions also prevent the administration from transferring Guantanamo detainees to the United States for further proceedings under the military commissions process or for trial in an article III court.

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The Department of Justice and our courts have proven themselves time and time again to be more than capable of handling the toughest terrorism cases and doing so in a way that ennobles us and sets an example to the world that a great nation can both safeguard its people and the rule of law.

As a practical matter, our civilian courts have proven much more adept at handling these cases than the military commissions process has. In fact, this past Friday, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, one of the most important appellate courts in the Nation, further struck down the legality of commission charges, so narrowing the jurisdiction of the military commissions themselves that any utility as an alternative to article III courts has been called into further question.

And while Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his fellow Guantanamo terrorists still await their date with justice, a host of others—including Richard Reid, the shoe bomber; and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber; and Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber—have been tried, convicted, and sent to ADX Florence, the toughest prison in America. They are gone, and they are not coming back.

The inclusion of these provisions is the first time that restrictions related to Guantanamo have been included in the Intelligence Authorization Act, and I believe that alone sets an unfortunate precedent that could undermine what has been a largely bipartisan effort. These provisions are unnecessary and unwise, and they do not belong in this bill.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the House to reconsider these provisions, to trust in American justice, diplomacy, and the best military advice, and to give the administration a means to shutter a prison that both shames us and perpetuates the threat to the Nation.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.

The CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, although I appreciate the ranking member's concerns about these provisions, I do remain concerned that further releases from Guantanamo will threaten our national security.

Press reports now indicate that the administration intends to transfer up to 10 additional detainees this month. As the committee learned through its many briefings and hearings, the five detainees released to Qatar last May have participated in activities that threaten the United States and its allies and are counter to U.S. national security interests, not unlike their activities before they were detained. No intelligence community element should enable any future transfers that endanger national security.

Furthermore, I would note that these provisions are substantively identical to the provisions passed by the House Armed Services Committee as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. Mr. Chairman, 26 of the 27 Democrats on that committee voted to advance an NDAA that contained similar restrictions. The provisions in our bill will complement those restrictions, as well as the restrictions put forward in the defense appropriations bills for several years running and this committee's previous intelligence authorization bills. The ranking member may have forgotten, but in 2012, there were provisions similar to this one that were included in the legislation.

In sum, these provisions represent a strong and enduring consensus in Congress that Guantanamo should remain open and that detainees should not be transferred to the U.S. for any reason. As everyone here is aware, several detainees who have been released from Guantanamo have gone back to the fight and killed and wounded Americans. Putting detainees in U.S. prisons, as the administration originally proposed, would be disruptive and potentially disastrous. The threat is real, and Guantanamo is already equipped to handle the detention and military trial of these individuals, as appropriate.

For those reasons, I would urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to urge support for this amendment. This is one of the few areas of disagreement between the chairman and myself. When we look at how we are progressing or the lack of more progress in our struggle against ISIS and al Qaeda in places like Syria and Iraq, we are often tempted to consider those that we take off the battlefield as a metric of our success—we have eliminated so many combatants from the battlefield. But of course that number in isolation means very little.

And the challenge is that with every one we take off the battlefield, there are new foreign fighters coming onto the battlefield.

The recruitment of those additional fighters uses a variety of images and issues to attract people to join the jihad. One of the issues that is continually used as recruiting propaganda is the presence of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. This is a recruitment vehicle for the jihadis. It is a rallying cry for the jihadis.

The closure of this prison will not end the threat from ISIS or al Qaeda. There will be other efforts to recruit. But why give them this recruitment tool when there are other, better ways that these people can be incarcerated? Why give them this recruitment vehicle when there are ways that we can secure the people at Guantanamo Bay, prosecute the people at Guantanamo Bay, uphold our highest standards and the rule of law, and remove at least one part the jihadi social media and other propaganda campaign?

Mr. Chairman, I think it is in our national security interest to do so. I would urge support for the amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chair, I know that the gentleman believes every word that he is saying. We have had robust debate in the Intelligence Committee behind closed doors, and we have had robust debate out in open session, and it is a debate I think that will always continue.

However, the concern remains from the majority Members of Congress that they would prefer to keep Guantanamo open because no one wants to bring those terrorists to the United States, to their backyard, to try them in their State or their county or their community.

So I respect the gentleman's concerns, and we will continue to debate those, but I will continue to oppose closing Guantanamo or having our intelligence community participate in the removal of detainees from Guantanamo.

Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California will be postponed.

AMENDMENT NO. 7 OFFERED BY MR. ROONEY OF FLORIDA

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following new section:

SEC. 3. REPORT ON HIRING OF GRADUATES OF CYBER CORPS SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National Science Foundation, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the employment by the intelligence community of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship Program. The report shall include the following:

(1) The number of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship Program hired by each element of the intelligence community.

(2) A description of how each element of the intelligence community recruits graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholar Program.

(3) A description of any processes available to the intelligence community to expedite the hiring or processing of security clearances for graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholar Program.

(4) Recommendations by the Director to improve the hiring by the intelligence community of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship Program, including any recommendations for legislative action to carry out such improvements.

(b) CYBER CORPS SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM DEFINED.—In this section, the term "Cyber Corps Scholarship Program" means the Federal Cyber Scholarship-for-Service Program under section 302 of the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (15 U.S.C. 7442).

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. ROONEY) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, as we debate this bill today, hackers across the world are trying furiously to break into our cyber networks, as we all know. And as we have seen in recent weeks, they are occasionally successful, and the consequences are grave. These cracks in our cyber defense put our security at risk. They also threaten American businesses and the privacy and credit of individuals across this country.

For the sake of our national security and our economy, we must work together to improve our cyber capabilities. This requires a stronger, more capable cyber workforce, which our bipartisan amendment will help facilitate.

The Federal CyberCorps Scholarship for Service program gives scholarships to students who study in the cybersecurity field. In exchange, those students commit to serving in government cybersecurity positions after graduation. Leaders within the intelligence community and DOD have told us that they need to expand their workforce and want to hire graduates from this program. Unfortunately, outdated personnel rules and insufficient direct hire authority make it extremely difficult for them to do so. As a result, these

students aren't able to fulfill their work commitment and we are unable to meet our workforce needs, and our cybersecurity suffers.

We believe Congress should help remove those obstacles and make it easier to bring those graduates into the cyber workforce. Our amendment starts that process by requiring a report back to us on how many CyberCorps graduates go to work for the intelligence community and how these agencies recruit them. This information will help us determine how to streamline the hiring process so we are capitalizing on the best cybersecurity talent available.

Mr. Chairman, this is a simple, bipartisan amendment, but it will pay dividends to improve and expand our cyber workforce and strengthen our national security.

I would like to thank Congresswoman SEWELL from Alabama for her assistance in this amendment.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition, even though I am not opposed.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized.

There was no objection.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to thank the gentleman from Florida and the gentlewoman from Alabama, both HPSCI colleagues, for their amendment, and I am happy to support it.

This amendment furthers two important goals: first, to ensure that academic programs that should serve as a resource to the government—in this case, the National Science Foundation's CyberCorps Scholarship for Service—actually do result in a good number of students choosing employment within the intelligence community; and second, to deepen the bench of our cyber defenders.

As a recent series of serious cyber breaches has demonstrated, it is an imperative for the protection of this Nation's workforce, privacy, and sensitive intelligence that we strengthen the IC's cyber cadre with our best and brightest. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a fine addition to the gentleman's and the gentlewoman's other initiatives already represented in the bill, particularly those that advance diversity in the intelligence community.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleagues for their work. I urge support for this bipartisan amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of this bipartisan, common sense amendment that seeks to streamline and strengthen our Intelligence Community's (IC) cyber workforce. I am pleased to join my fellow colleague, Rep. ROONEY, who shares

my deeply held desire to help meet the incredible need to raise the number of professionals in the critically important field of cybersecurity.

The recent breach of OPM which compromised the personal information of nearly 4 million federal employees further illustrates our urgent and immediate need to make substantial improvements to our cyber databases and overall cyber infrastructure. Cyberattacks have become increasingly common, and state sponsored bad actors pose a serious threat to our national security. These types of attacks are one of the most urgent modern challenges to our nation. Our government must be poised to do more to prevent future attacks. We must position ourselves to curtail any threat, no matter how great or small.

In December 2011, the National Science and Technology Council, in cooperation with the National Science Foundation (NSF), advanced a broad, coordinated federal strategic plan to enhance cybersecurity research and education. As part of this plan, the NSF launched the CyberCorps Scholarship for Service (SFS) program. In an effort to bolster our federal workforce's capacity and advance the nation's economic prosperity and national security, this program provides funding for undergraduate and graduate level scholarships to students interested in cybersecurity. In return, scholarship recipients are required to work for a Federal, State, Local, or Tribal Government organization in a position related to cybersecurity for a period equal to the length of the scholarship. In essence, students receive a scholarship in exchange for their commitment to federal civil service. This program seeks to cultivate pipelines for applicants from undergraduate and graduate programs into federal careers focusing on combatting emerging cyber security threats.

Leaders within the Intelligence Community tell me, however, that outdated policies and onerous clearance procedures are inhibiting their ability to fill industry vacancies with young and diverse cybersecurity professionals.

Our amendment simply requires the Intelligence Community to report to Congress on how many CyberCorps graduates actually go to work for the IC and how IC agencies recruit these CyberCorps graduates. This information will help Congress determine how we can best improve the hiring process.

I strongly believe that Congress should be facilitating ways to help the Intelligence Community hire these critically important CyberCorps graduates and create a pipeline directly into our cyber workforce.

I encourage my colleagues to vote yes on this amendment.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. ROONEY).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 8 OFFERED BY MR. MOULTON

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following new section:

SEC. 3 —. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF DATA BREACH OF OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the data breach of the Office of Personnel Management disclosed in June 2015.

(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The effects, if any, of the data breach on the operations of the intelligence community abroad, including the types of operations, if any, that have been negatively affected or entirely suspended or terminated as a result of the data breach.

(2) An assessment of the effects of the data breach to each element of the intelligence community.

(3) An assessment of how foreign persons, groups, or countries may use the data collected by the data breach (particularly regarding information included in background investigations for security clearances), including with respect to—

(A) recruiting intelligence assets;

(B) influencing decision-making processes within the Federal Government, including regarding foreign policy decisions; and

(C) compromising employees of the Federal Government and friends and families of such employees for the purpose of gaining access to sensitive national security and economic information.

(4) An assessment of which departments or agencies of the Federal Government use the best practices to protect sensitive data, including a summary of any such best practices that were not used by the Office of Personnel Management.

(5) An assessment of the best practices used by the departments or agencies identified under paragraph (4) to identify and fix potential vulnerabilities in the systems of the department or agency.

(c) BRIEFING.—The Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees an interim briefing on the report under subsection (a), including a discussion of proposals and options for responding to cyber attacks.

(d) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MOULTON) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, recently, the Office of Personnel Management disclosed a massive security breach that may have exposed personal information of millions of current and former Federal employees, including those who work in sensitive national security positions. Simply put, this cyber breach is unacceptable and breaks faith with those dedicated military and civilian personnel who commit their lives to keeping our country safe.

Although responsibility has not yet been officially confirmed, many observers believe that individuals in China, who may have been acting on orders of the Chinese Government, were responsible for hacking into OPM databases.

Two things are clear, Mr. Chairman. First, we must ensure this does not

happen again; we must protect our Federal employees—our foreign service officers, State Department staff, members of the intelligence community, and many others. Second, we must make clear to the rest of the world that these attacks will not be tolerated and that there will be consequences.

Mr. Chairman, that is why my amendment takes the first of many critical steps to respond to this breach. My amendment starts the process of holding OPM accountable. It makes sure we leverage the best data security practices that our intelligence agencies use to protect sensitive personal information about our military and civilian personnel who work day in and day out to keep our country safe.

Finally, my amendment ensures that the United States Congress can play a constructive role in developing a meaningful, forceful response to cyber attacks—especially attacks aimed at our Nation's security. We must stop these attacks and protect those who commit their lives to our safety. This amendment is an important first step in doing just that.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, we are prepared to accept the amendment.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Committee, I think, in a bipartisan manner, has the same concerns as the gentleman.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

We expect timely briefs on all major cyber attacks, but in this case, I agree, we need to require specific reporting and briefing on the impacts of the recent OPM breach. We need to learn far more about how hackers accessed the systems, what they obtained, and how we can prevent this from happening again. In addition, this will help us understand the impact to the intelligence community.

Mr. Chairman, as I have said before, our public and private networks are not sufficiently secure, and they are a regular target for cyber attacks. We must do everything we can to shore them up, and we must do so now.

I want to thank my colleague for his work, and I urge support of his amendment.

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MOULTON).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 9 OFFERED BY MR. TURNER

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following:

SEC. 3. ASSESSMENT ON FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an intelligence community assessment on the funding of political parties and nongovernmental organizations in former Soviet states and countries in Europe by the Russian Federation and the security and intelligence services of the Russian Federation since January 1, 2006. Such assessment shall include the following:

(1) The country involved, the entity funded, the security service involved, and the intended effect of the funding.

(2) An evaluation of such intended effects, including with respect to—

(A) undermining the political cohesion of the country involved;

(B) undermining the missile defense of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and

(C) undermining energy projects that could provide an alternative to Russian energy.

(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:

(1) The congressional intelligence communities.

(2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

(3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. TURNER) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

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Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, my bipartisan amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit a report to Congress on the funding of political parties and NGOs in former Soviet states by the Russian Federation and its associated security and intelligence services.

As Congress well knows, a resurgent Russia, led by President Vladimir Putin, is once again determined to destabilize the West and various Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO.

While we have seen the blatant use of military force both in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has employed a variety of nontraditional methods to disrupt the West. These methods include the use of propaganda through state-owned media outlets such as Russia Today, manipulation of European natural gas markets, and the use of money to influence political parties and nongovernmental organizations throughout Europe.

In a recent New York Times article, authors Peter Baker and Steven Er-

langer highlight a series of instances in which the Russian Federation covertly funneled money to political organizations in Europe in order to influence various decisionmakers and parties.

While their ultimate goal remains the fragmentation of institutions such as the EU and NATO, Russia hopes to achieve incremental victories like influencing the EU's upcoming decision on whether or not to renew sanctions against them.

As president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and chair of the Assembly's U.S. delegation, I have had the opportunity to meet frequently with my European counterparts to discuss this issue. In all instances, Assembly members continue to validate and echo the concerns discussed here today. Only through an increased understanding can we begin to effectively plan and combat President Putin and a resurging Russia.

I ask all of my colleagues to rise in support of this bipartisan amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition, even though I am not opposed.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlemen from Ohio, Alabama, and New York for their amendment, which I am proud to support.

This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to provide an assessment on funding of political parties and NGOs in the former Soviet states and countries in Europe by the Russian Federation and its security and intelligence services.

Over the past few years, we have witnessed a number of highly visible, aggressive actions by Russia, particularly in Ukraine; but Moscow's efforts to destabilize its neighbors are also subtler and more nefarious. Russia is sponsoring and funding political parties to groom the next generation of puppets which they can control from Moscow.

We must better understand what they are doing, even if what they are doing is very deep behind the scenes; so long as sources and methods are properly protected, I support this effort.

Again, I want to thank my colleagues for their work, and I urge support of the amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, as the chairman well remembers, with the cold war, there was a time when the conflict between the United States and Russia was very tense. This amendment will help us bring to bear light on the actions of Russia so that we can make certain our policies reflect the new aggressiveness of the Russian Federation.

Mr. NUNES. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TURNER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. NUNES. I really appreciate the gentleman. He is one of the most involved Members of Congress with NATO, so I know that his concerns are valid. I, too, share those concerns and would urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. TURNER).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 10 OFFERED BY MR. FARR

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following new section:

SEC. 3. REPORT ON CONTINUOUS EVALUATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code) a report on the continuous evaluation of security clearances of employees, officers, and contractors of the intelligence community. The report shall include the following:

(1) The status of the continuous evaluation program of the intelligence community, including a timeline for the implementation of such program.

(2) A comparison of such program to the automated continuous evaluation system of the Department of Defense.

(3) Identification of any possible efficiencies that could be achieved by the intelligence community leveraging the automated continuous evaluation system of the Department of Defense.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from California (Mr. FARR) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, today, I rise to offer an amendment which strengthens the process for granting security clearances to those working in the intelligence community through a continuous evaluation process.

This amendment directs the National Intelligence Director to provide the intelligence and defense committees a report on the status of its current efforts for continuous evaluation of security clearance holders, including a timeline for its rollout. The report will also provide a cost-benefit analysis of DNI's efforts to similar efforts that are being carried on in the Department of Defense.

We learned, after the tragic shooting in the Navy Yard in September 2013, the DOD should continuously evaluate these personnel, rather than do it every once every 5 years.

Clearance starts by an initial vetting that determines a person's suitability

and eligibility to have access to classified material by examining the person's past and making a judgment on future reliability. Now, once cleared, a continuous evaluation process is designed to examine a person's behavior to ensure its continued reliability.

Congress directed the DOD to create a process that would be a government-wide solution for continuous personnel security evaluations. This solution is called ACES, Automated Continuous Evaluation System.

Now, the Director of National Intelligence is also seeking its own capability for continuous evaluation. While I support the intelligence community's requirement, their efforts may be redundant.

DOD's system already has measurable successes. Their system is also flexible enough to be tailored to meet any specific requirements that the intelligence community may need.

My amendment simply assures that the DNI does not work towards a continuous evaluation system in a vacuum. By working together to share lessons learned or build a common evaluation system, the DNI and the DOD can build a better program that ensures our national security and uses taxpayer dollars effectively.

As we have all seen recently, the insider threat to our national security is real. We must continue to ensure that we remain secure by only granting security clearances to those who are suitable and reliable.

I ask for an "aye" vote on the amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I am not opposed.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to accept the amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), my colleague, the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman and my good friend from California for his amendment, which I am very happy to support.

An important role of Congress and of this bill is to ensure that our intelligence agencies protect sensitive information and protect taxpayer dollars.

This amendment supports both of these goals by requiring that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report to Congress on its continuous evaluation process for security clearances and to compare those processes to those the Department of Defense uses. This comparative study will help identify places where we may be able to make improvements and save money.

I want to thank Mr. FARR for his amendment and his diligence.

Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. FARR).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 11 OFFERED BY MS. SINEMA

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11 printed in House Report 114-155.

Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, and I offer that amendment at this time.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

SEC. 336. REPORT ON STRATEGY, EFFORTS, AND RESOURCES TO DETECT, DETER, AND DEGRADE ISLAMIC STATE REVENUE MECHANISMS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the intelligence community should dedicate necessary resources to defeating the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic State.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the intelligence committees a report on the strategy, efforts, and resources of the intelligence community that are necessary to detect, deter, and degrade the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic State.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Arizona (Ms. SINEMA) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.

Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to say thank you to Mr. FITZPATRICK for cosponsoring this amendment and for his leadership as the chairman of the Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing. Thank you also to Chairman NUNES and Ranking Member SCHIFF for supporting this important amendment.

The purpose of the bipartisan Sinema-Fitzpatrick amendment is to choke off the Islamic State's revenue stream. Our amendment directs the intelligence community to detect, deter, and degrade Islamic State's revenue sources and to report on the strategy and resources needed for success.

The Islamic State is one of the world's most violent and dangerous terrorist groups. Its goals to build a caliphate in the Middle East and encourage attacks in Europe and the United States represent a new threat to our country and to global stability.

ISIL is also believed to be the richest terrorist organization in history, controlling a huge territory in Iraq and Syria containing significant oil resources. In 2014, the Islamic State generated approximately \$1 million per day through the sale of smuggled oil, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom.

U.S. strikes have reportedly diminished ISIL's oil revenues, but the breadth of this terrorist organization's

funding sources represents a serious challenge to our national security.

A February report by the Financial Action Task Force estimated that ISIL now largely finances itself through extortion in the territory it controls, and another study places this extortion revenue at \$360 million per year. In Iraq, ISIL levies a 5 percent tax on all withdrawals from banks, and the organization also gains tens of millions of dollars from kidnapping on an annual basis.

To defeat ISIL and protect our country, we must cut off the Islamic State's diverse and substantial sources of revenue.

I encourage my colleagues to support this commonsense bipartisan amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not intend to oppose the amendment.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FITZPATRICK).

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman, and I thank my colleague Ms. SINEMA for her work on this important amendment and for her work as well on the task force established to investigate terrorism financing.

Today, the terror threat faced by our Nation and our intelligence community is more diverse and sophisticated than it has ever been before. Organizations like Hezbollah, ISIS, and Boko Haram can no longer simply be considered terrorist groups.

They have grown into much more dangerous entities, ones with the abilities to self-finance their actions through means far beyond traditional methods, from illicit oil sales and human trafficking to regional taxation and antiquity dealing.

In order to effectively combat such evolved threats, U.S. policy must also evolve. As chair of the bipartisan Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing, established by the Committee on Financial Services, I have worked with lawmakers and policy experts to guarantee the U.S. response to terror's new revenue streams are quickly and effectively choked out.

This amendment is important to ensure each level of our government, from Congress to the intelligence community, has identified the problem, as well as potential weaknesses, and is ready to address the threats that we face.

By both expressing the sense of Congress that our intelligence agencies must dedicate resources to eradicate terror revenue mechanisms, as well as report to relevant committees on their strategies, this amendment strengthens the underlying bill and Congress'

understanding of our global response to terrorism.

The threat to freedom and democracy posed by the Islamic State and groups like it circles the globe, and the United States can ill afford to combat these enemies on the battlefield alone. Any strategy against terror groups worldwide must attack not only militarily, but at their funding source. Organizations, no matter how complex, cannot effectively function without requisite resources.

Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community is second to none, and I am certain that, together, we can formulate and carry out long-term solutions to combat terror financing.

I thank the chairman for his leadership on this issue and Ms. SINEMA for offering this amendment.

Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California, Ranking Member SCHIFF, and thank him for his leadership on national security issues.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlewoman from Arizona for her amendment, as well as the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I am proud to support it.

Behind ISIL's rapid and dangerous rise are its many sources of illicit funding. This amendment expresses the conviction of Congress that the intelligence community should dedicate resources to finding and eliminating those revenue sources and that the IC must report on its effort to do so.

Again, I want to thank both of my colleagues for their leadership on this issue, and I urge strong support of their amendment.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. PITTENGER).

Mr. PITTENGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment and congratulate Ms. SINEMA and Mr. FITZPATRICK, the chairman of the committee. This will help our terrorism task force efforts undermine the funding of ISIS.

Terrorism experts concur that ISIS is the most well-funded terrorist threat that we have ever faced. Through the illicit sale of stolen oil and antiquities, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, bank robberies, and usurious taxation, ISIS continues to amass tens of millions of dollars.

Stopping this flow of money to terrorists must be a top priority if we are to defeat ISIS. Unfortunately, earlier this month, the President admitted he does not have a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS.

This amendment will require the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress the current efforts they use to undermine the funding of ISIS, increasing our ability to ensure these efforts are a priority.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I will look forward to the continued bipartisan support of the Financial Services Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing.

□ 1530

Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chair, as a member of the Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing, I am working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to keep money out of the hands of terrorists and to find solutions like this amendment, which strengthens America's security.

Again, I would like to thank Mr. FITZPATRICK for his partnership and leadership on this issue. I also thank Chairman NUNES, Ranking Member SCHIFF, and Mr. PITTENGER for their work on this important legislation.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, we are prepared to support the amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Arizona (Ms. SINEMA).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 12 OFFERED BY MR. CROWLEY

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:
SEC. 336. REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN UNITED STATES, INDIA, AND ISRAEL.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on possibilities for growing national security cooperation between the United States, India, and Israel.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New York (Mr. CROWLEY) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise today to urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan amendment.

I appreciate the support of my colleagues from California, Ohio, North Carolina, Arizona, and New York, who are coleaders on this effort. They are Mr. BERA, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. NADLER, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. SCHWEIKERT, and Mr. HOLDING. I also thank the chairman and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee for their support of this amendment.

This amendment is about expanding the cooperation between the world's oldest democracy, the world's largest democracy, and a true democracy within the Middle East. That is the United States, India, and Israel. In recent years, the United States has expanded relations with Israel, as well as with India, in a number of areas.

We have also seen India and Israel work more and more together on a bilateral basis. Of course, that is because a lot of their interests overlap, but it is

also because many of our values overlap.

There is so much that our three countries can be doing together in the realm of scientific cooperation, research, best practices, national security implementation, defense, and much, much more.

There is also a lot that we can learn from each other, whether it is about drip irrigation to build food supplies, desalinization to address water shortages, or refrigeration practices to prevent the kind of food spoilage that leads to hunger, not to mention how much potential there is in technological research and economic development.

This amendment, of course, just deals with a narrow portion of these areas because the underlying bill is limited to security issues, but it is a needed start.

I truly believe that the United States-India relationship has the potential to be the world's most important "big country" relationship in the 21st century. As our ties with India grow, it is important to see the India-Israel ties increasing as well.

Here in the United States, as a former co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, I have met with many members of the Indian American community, and I have consistently heard from visiting members of India's Government that there is a genuine desire to expand relations between India and Israel now and in the future.

In fact, it has already been reported that, in the coming months, India's Prime Minister will become the first-ever Indian Prime Minister to travel to Israel. We are going to see the leader of what will be the world's most populous nation visiting and engaging with one of the smallest nations.

The sky is really the limit on this effort going forward, and that is why the amendment asks the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a plan on how to grow the U.S.-India-Israel national security relationship. This is a real possibility, and I hope the DNI can identify a solid number of ways to work together even more in the future.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not intend to oppose the amendment.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, Mr. HOLDING was just here, but unfortunately, he got called away to another meeting because I know he worked closely with Mr. CROWLEY and others as chair of the India Caucus, and he wanted me to express his strong support for this amendment. I also urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chair, working with international partners is an essential element of the IC's mission to understand the global threat environment, as well as the political, social, and economic trends around the world.

For nearly 70 years, Israel has been a close friend and ally, as well as a vital source of intelligence about the world's most volatile region. In recent years, India, the world's largest democracy, has upgraded its bilateral relationships with both the United States and Israel. Given India's complex relationship with both Pakistan and China, exploring the potential for enhanced trilateral intelligence cooperation is very much in our interest.

Mr. CROWLEY's amendment to direct the DNI to report to Congress on the potential for intelligence sharing is timely, and I urge the House to support it.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, again, let me thank Mr. NUNES, the chair of the committee, as well as the ranking member, Mr. SCHIFF, for their support of this valuable amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. CROWLEY).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 13 OFFERED BY MR. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:
SEC. 336. CYBER ATTACK STANDARDS OF MEASUREMENT STUDY.

(a) **STUDY REQUIRED.**—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a study to determine appropriate standards that—

(1) can be used to measure the damage of cyber incidents for the purposes of determining the response to such incidents; and

(2) include a method for quantifying the damage caused to affected computers, systems, and devices.

(b) **REPORTS TO CONGRESS.**—

(1) **PRELIMINARY FINDINGS.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives the initial findings of the study required under subsection (a).

(2) **REPORT.**—Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services,

the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report containing the complete findings of such study.

(3) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required by paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. WILSON) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for Chairman NUNES and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for their leadership on this important legislation.

I am particularly grateful that I was here to hear the presentation by Congressman JOE CROWLEY relative to promoting a better relationship with the world's largest democracy, India, by the world's oldest democracy, the United States.

He and I have served as the past co-chairs of the Caucus of India and Indian Americans, and I know of his commitment to promoting a better relationship between India and the United States.

Last week, the Office of Personnel Management revealed they were the targets of an extended cyber attack on Federal employee personnel records. These attacks stole personal data, such as Social Security numbers, financial information, and security clearance documents, putting the personal and financial security of our citizens at risk.

This cyber attack was not a novelty. Recently, we have seen a growing number of cyber attacks on government Web sites, national retailers, and small businesses. Indeed, according to Symantec, most businesses reported a completed or an attempted cyber attack in the last year, and 60 percent of those facing an attack were small- or medium-sized businesses. These cyber attacks are a sober reminder to Congress that all government agencies need to work together to better protect their public and private networks.

After each of these attacks, we have had a number of questions: Who is behind it? Is it an agent of a foreign government or a nonstate actor? How many records were affected? What kind of information was accessed?

As of now, we gather this information through various government agencies, and each uses a different measure to assess and quantify the damage of the attack, so we waste valuable time and resources when trying to piece together a response.

We need a clear, unified system of measurement for cyber attacks that can be used across all government agencies and military branches. By putting government agencies and branches of the military on the same

page, we can have an effective and rapid response.

This amendment directs the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the FBI, and the Secretary of Defense, to conduct a study to define a method of measuring a cyber incident so we can determine an appropriate response.

As chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, it is apparent that cyber is a new domain of warfare. This amendment is a critical first step in building a more comprehensive cyber defense system.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition even though I am not opposed.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman from South Carolina for his important amendment.

There is a limit to how effective a defensive cyber strategy can be because, while we have to defend everything at all times, our adversaries get to attack everywhere and need to be successful only once, so we need to create a more effective deterrent, which this amendment will help further.

It would require that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report to Congress on how we measure cyber attacks so that we can know how best to respond once we are attacked or to communicate in advance how we would respond if we were attacked. Measuring the scale and effects of cyber attacks is no easy task, especially as we must factor in second and third order effects.

I want to thank Mr. WILSON for his amendment. I am proud to support it.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. WILSON).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 14 OFFERED BY MR. POE OF TEXAS

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:
SEC. 336. REPORT ON WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING.

(a) REPORTS REQUIRED.—Not later than 365 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) a report on wildlife trafficking.

(b) SPECIFIED MEMBERS AND COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The congressional committees specified in this subsection are the following:

(1) Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(3) Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate.

(4) Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(5) Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(6) Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives.

(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) An assessment of the major source, transit, and destination countries for wildlife trafficking products or their derivatives and how such products or derivatives are trafficked.

(2) An assessment of the efforts of those countries identified as major source, transit, and destination countries to counter wildlife trafficking and to adhere to their international treaty obligations relating to endangered or threatened species.

(3) An assessment of critical vulnerabilities that can be used to counter wildlife trafficking.

(4) An assessment of the extent of involvement of designated foreign terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations in wildlife trafficking.

(5) An assessment of key actors and facilitators, including government officials, that are supporting wildlife trafficking.

(6) An assessment of the annual net worth of wildlife trafficking globally and the financial flows that enables wildlife trafficking.

(7) An assessment of the impact of wildlife trafficking on key wildlife populations.

(8) An assessment of the effectiveness of efforts taken to date to counter wildlife trafficking.

(9) An assessment of the effectiveness of capacity-building efforts by the United States Government.

(10) An assessment of the impact of wildlife trafficking on the national security of the United States.

(11) An assessment of the level of coordination between United States intelligence and law enforcement agencies on intelligence related to wildlife trafficking, the capacity of those agencies to process and act on that intelligence effectively, existing barriers to effective coordination, and the degree to which relevant intelligence is shared with and acted upon by bilateral and multilateral law enforcement partners.

(12) An assessment of the gaps in intelligence capabilities to assess transnational wildlife trafficking networks and steps currently being taken, in line with the Implementation Plan to the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking, to remedy such information gaps.

(d) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. POE) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

This amendment, cosponsored by the ranking member on the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, Mr. KEATING from Massachusetts, requires the Director of National Intelligence to produce a report on wildlife trafficking, how terrorist organizations are involved, how they

are making money off of wildlife trafficking, and the impact it has on U.S. national security.

During our Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee hearing on this very issue in February, we learned that rhinos and elephants are on the path to extinction.

For example, back in the seventies, there were approximately 65,000 rhinos in Africa. Since then, about 1,000 a year have been killed, and now, there are only 5,000 left in Africa. That is a 94 percent drop in those rhinos. There are only five white rhinos in the whole world.

Elephants are not faring much better. From 2002 to 2010, the elephant population across Africa dropped 66 percent. Back in the thirties and forties, Mr. Chairman, there were approximately 5 million African elephants. Now there are about a half a million African elephants.

One of the most famous was Satao in this photograph that was taken last year. He was, presumably, the oldest elephant that was in existence in Africa. He was killed last year for his tusks, which almost touched the ground. In fact, National Geographic, a year ago today, did an article on him and how he was killed for his tusks and how other elephants are being killed for their tusks. He was about 46 years old when he was killed for those tusks.

The reason that poaching seems to be on the increase over the last few years is that there is a low risk of apprehension, and it is easy to commit these crimes. Also, even when someone is captured, penalties for wildlife trafficking are far less than for drug trafficking.

Who uses these tusks? Who uses these rhino horns? The number one country in the world that is the consumer of the illegal ivory trade is China. Vietnam is the number one country in the world that uses the illegal trade of rhino horns. This is where these tusks and these rhino horns go, and it brings in a lot of money.

For example, a kilogram of rhino horns—if I remember my math correctly, that is 2.2 pounds—sells for \$60,000. So there is a lot more money involved in the sale of rhino horns and of elephant tusks than even of gold and platinum.

Overall, the illegal wildlife trade is about \$10 billion to \$20 billion a year. It should come as no surprise that terrorist organizations are also involved in this criminal enterprise, like al Qaeda's affiliate al Shabaab and like Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army. They are cashing in on the illegal wildlife trafficking.

It is getting so bad that the poachers have become very sophisticated in the sense that they no longer just shoot elephants, for example, because that makes a noise, that warns them. They are even being poisoned. An elephant is poisoned, and the elephant dies.

Then, when people approach the elephant, they not only see the dead elephant, but they see other animals that

were feeding on the carcass of the elephant, and they are all dead, too, so that the poachers can get those tusks. They have become very innovative.

□ 1545

Local park rangers are under-resourced; they are ill-equipped; and some of them are corrupt as well. So we can't fight what we don't know.

There is a lot about this issue—and terrorist involvement in wildlife trafficking—that is murky, so we need to find out, for example: How much money do terrorists get from wildlife trafficking? Who are the key facilitators of the trade? What government officials are complicit? What impact does this have on the U.S. national security?

This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress on these and other questions. The better we understand the threat, the better we understand what is happening and how terrorists are involved in the illegal killing of rhinos and elephants, the more effective we can be against fighting those terrorists. And that is just the way it is.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, even though I am not opposed.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlemen from Texas and Massachusetts for their amendment, which I am proud to support.

The trafficking of wildlife by terrorist organizations is an important issue, not only because it threatens to wipe out elephants, rhinos, and tigers, but also because it could threaten our national security. The World Wildlife Fund estimates that the amount of money generated by wildlife trafficking trade reaches into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and much of this goes to fund terrorists, including The Lord's Resistance Army, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram. That is money going into the coffers of those who every day seek to harm us and others.

We must put our intelligence professionals to the task. We must understand from beginning to end how terrorists acquire, transfer, and profit from wildlife trafficking. This is the first step to putting an end to it.

Again, I want to thank my colleagues for offering this amendment. I urge support.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. POE of Texas. I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. POE).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 15 OFFERED BY MR. POE OF TEXAS

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:
SEC. 336. REPORT ON TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA.

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) a report that represents the coordinated assessment of the intelligence community on terrorist use of social media.

(b) **SPECIFIED MEMBERS AND COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.**—The congressional committees specified in this subsection are the following:

(1) Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(3) Committee on Judiciary of the Senate.

(4) Committee on Homeland and Government Affairs of the Senate.

(5) Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(6) Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(7) Committee on Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

(8) Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

(c) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.**—The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) An assessment of what role social media plays in radicalization in the United States and elsewhere.

(2) An assessment of how terrorists and terrorist organizations are using social media, including trends.

(3) An assessment of the intelligence value of social media posts by terrorists and terrorist organizations.

(4) An assessment of the impact on the national security of the United States of the public availability of terrorist content on social media for fundraising, radicalization, and recruitment.

(d) **FORM.**—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. POE) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, terrorists' use of social media has exploded over the past several years. A recent study by The Brookings Institution found that ISIS had over 40,000 Twitter accounts. Terrorist groups from ISIS to the Taliban use social media platforms to recruit, to radicalize, to spread propaganda, and to raise money. I have seen fan pages for the Khorasan Group, an online press conference held on Twitter by the al Qaeda branch in Yemen, and we all remember al-Shabaab live tweeting the murder of 72 people in Kenya. All terrorist groups.

The benefits of social media are clear. Social media is easy to use, it is free, and it reaches huge audiences across the world. We need to better un-

derstand why terrorists' use of social media is effective and what impact it is having on the world.

This bipartisan amendment is co-sponsored by the ranking member on our Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation, and Trade, Mr. KEATING from Massachusetts. This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to assess four parts of the social media problem: First, what role does social media play in radicalizing people in the United States and abroad?

The rise of the lone wolf terrorism in recent years has been fueled, in part, by terrorists' use of social media. Just recently, in Garland, Texas, two individuals claiming ISIS connections were killed while they were attacking an assembly on free speech and peaceable assembly of religion. Evidence shows that they had some social connection, social media connection with ISIS. The Boston bombers made two pressure cooker bombs. The recipes for those bombs were published before the attack in al Qaeda's Inspire magazine. That magazine was released and promoted on social media.

Second, how exactly are terrorists using social media? Social media is constantly evolving, just like terrorists' use of social media platforms. Following online trends is an essential element in putting resources where they have the most impact. We need to make fast-paced improvements in this area as new trends and platforms emerge.

Third, what is the real intelligence value of terrorists' posts? In 2012, a number of my colleagues and I sent a letter to the FBI asking, What intelligence value is terrorists' use of social media? The FBI has not come up with an answer. We need a detailed understanding from the whole intelligence community on just how valuable the intelligence is that we are getting from terrorists' use of social media.

Finally, how does online fundraising, radicalization, and recruitment by terrorists impact U.S. national security? We know social media is a valuable tool to the terrorists just by how often they use it. Unfortunately, the United States is way behind on countering terrorists' use of social media, so we should do more. Terrorists like ISIS are out to destroy us. We have to fight to defeat them on every battlefield, and that includes in social media.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, even though I am not opposed.

The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, social media, like any other form of communication, can be exploited by bad actors for nefarious purposes. While we are lucky to live in a time of remarkable innovation that brings us closer to

one another no matter what our geographical distance may be, our adversaries use the same tools to spread hateful and dangerous messages across the globe.

I, therefore, support this amendment that calls on the intelligence community to provide Congress with greater information about how terrorist organizations use social media for fundraising, radicalization, and recruitment. Armed with that knowledge, we are more capable of stopping them.

I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. POE of Texas. I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. POE).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 16 OFFERED BY MR. POE OF TEXAS

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 16 printed in House Report 114-155.

Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:
SEC. 336. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY TO DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT ISIL, AL-QAEDA, AND THEIR AFFILIATED GROUPS, ASSOCIATED GROUPS, AND ADHERENTS.

(a) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a comprehensive report on the United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qaeda, and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents.

(2) COORDINATION.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense, and the head of any other department or agency of the United States Government that has responsibility for activities directed at combating ISIL, al-Qaeda, and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents.

(3) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include each of the following:

(A) A definition of—

(i) al-Qaeda core, including a list of which known individuals constitute al-Qaeda core;

(ii) ISIL, including a list of which known individuals constitute ISIL leadership;

(iii) an affiliated group of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a list of which known groups constitute an affiliate group of ISIL or al-Qaeda;

(iv) an associated group of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a list of which known groups constitute an associated group of ISIL or al-Qaeda;

(v) an adherent of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a list of which known groups constitute an adherent of ISIL or al-Qaeda; and

(vi) a group aligned with ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a description of what actions a group takes or statements it makes that qualify it as a group aligned with ISIL or al-Qaeda.

(B) An assessment of the relationship between all identified ISIL or al-Qaeda affili-

ated groups, associated groups, and adherents with ISIL leadership or al-Qaeda core.

(C) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of ISIL or al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, from January 1, 2010, to the present, including a description of the metrics that are used to assess strengthening or weakening and an assessment of the relative increase or decrease in violent attacks attributed to such entities.

(D) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a member of al-Qaeda core if such individual is not located in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

(E) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a member of al-Qaeda core as well as a member of an al-Qaeda affiliated group, associated group, or adherent.

(F) A definition of defeat of ISIL or core al-Qaeda.

(G) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command, and control between ISIL or core al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, specifically addressing each such entity.

(H) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations against ISIL or core al-Qaeda, their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, and whether such operations have had a sustained impact on the capabilities and effectiveness of ISIL or core al-Qaeda, their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents.

(4) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. POE) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment requires a strategy to defeat ISIS and other like-minded groups. It is incredible that after 4 years of the rise of ISIS, we still have to talk about needing a strategy, but here we are.

Four years, Mr. Chairman, what is that? Well, in 4 years the United States mobilized the whole country and had to fight two wars—one in the Pacific and one in Europe—during World War II, and we were successful in protecting the United States, but here after 4 years of the rise of ISIS, we are not sure even what our strategy is.

One thing we do know: controlling land is a top priority for ISIS. Its own credibility is wrapped up in the idea of establishing a caliphate. Without land, ISIS has no caliphate. Without a caliphate, ISIS loses its legitimacy among its hardcore fighters. Controlling land is also how ISIS makes a lot of its money. See, ISIS extorts the people that it controls. It also taxes them. ISIS is still bringing in millions of dollars a day by other illegal activities.

The only way to stop that source of money is by taking back land that ISIS controls. Because ISIS is embedded in civilian populations, U.S. airstrikes are not enough to take the land back. The Iraqi Army is still too unprofessional to show that they are up to the job, and we have all seen ourselves how the Iraqis have dropped American weapons and run. We have yet to give the Kurds the weapons they need to fight for themselves, and we don't expect the dictator Assad to get the job done.

The problem of ISIS is only getting bigger. Thousands of foreign fighters are still streaming into Iraq and Syria from other countries. Outside of Iraq and Syria, ISIS still has 10 networks, not including Iraq and Syria. There are three in Libya, two in Saudi Arabia, and one each in the Sinai, Nigeria, Yemen, Algeria, and one in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Saudi Arabia is known for its strong government control, but the ISIS affiliate in Saudi Arabia recently pulled off two successful suicide attack bombings in 2 weeks. Its affiliate in Yemen has taken advantage of the fall of the government to take over more land. The ISIS affiliate in Libya is running free in a lawless area throughout the same country that killed our Ambassador and three other Americans. All of ISIS' 10 networks are growing stronger, not weaker, by the day.

The President said last year that the United States would defeat and dismantle ISIS. Well, here we are a year later; we still do not have that strategy. That is at least according to the President himself last week when he was meeting with the world leaders at the G7 summit. He said: We do not yet have a complete strategy against ISIS.

This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress within 6 months a complete strategy to defeat ISIS and other groups like it. The same amendment did pass unanimously last year with this committee's support. So I ask Members to support it once again this year and make it become the law of the land. Today's terrorists control more land than they have at anytime since World War II. We need a strategy; we need a plan; and we need it soon.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

The CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the United States continue to refine and implement a comprehensive and aggressive strategy to counter ISIL, al Qaeda, and their affiliates, but that responsibility does not lie with the Director of National Intelligence. The DNI's job is to ensure that our national leadership, who do generate our counterterrorism strategy, have the timeliest, most germane, and detailed information to be sure our strategy will be successful.

Mr. POE's amendment misclassifies that responsibility and misconstrues

the important role of the Director of National Intelligence. Our intelligence community must be free to collect and assess intelligence outside of the scope of political decisions to be sure their analysis remains impartial and objective.

So, reluctantly, I must oppose this amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. POE of Texas. The amendment does state that the Director of National Intelligence will work with other appropriate agencies.

Mr. Chairman, it is hard to fathom that this Nation does not have a plan to deal with ISIS. This amendment says Congress will move forward and expect and put into law that we will have a plan; we will have a strategy; and if the Director of National Intelligence is not an individual who is supposed to help form that plan, then I don't know who would be.

I would ask that this amendment be adopted.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, with respect to my colleague, we have a strategy with respect to defeating al Qaeda and ISIL, with respect to the war in Syria and Iraq. It is a comprehensive strategy and, frankly, it is a difficult strategy to implement. It is a strategy that involves cutting off terrorism financing. It is a strategy that involves cutting off the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq. It is a strategy that involves drying up the resources, the propaganda, the attacking of the recruitment mechanism of ISIS. It is a strategy that involves enlisting the support of our partners in the region and within the Islamic world to combat the perversion of their faith that is used to recruit people to this jihad. It is a strategy that is also military in character, that employs our air assets, that seeks to train and assist Iraqi forces. So we have a strategy. It is comprehensive, and it is tough.

While I recognize that there is frustration that many of my colleagues have that our strategy has thus far not borne more success—and I share that frustration—I have yet to hear any of my colleagues offer an alternative. It is one thing to bash the administration because you don't like the strategy; it is another to ignore the fact that we have a strategy or to propose improvements to it.

But the subject matter of this amendment is whether the top intelligence official in the country should be charged with the responsibility of developing the policy to defeat ISIS, and I think it is rather his responsibility to make sure that the policymakers in Congress and the administration have the very best intelligence to inform those decisions.

We see, frankly, this misunderstanding of the role of the intelligence community many times even in our committee when committee members will ask witnesses from the intel-

ligence community to state policy positions on how they think certain policies should be implemented when that is really not their responsibility.

Here, much as I concur with the need to perfect our strategy, improve our strategy, and the execution of that strategy, I don't believe that this is something that we should lay at the feet of the Director of National Intelligence.

I urge a "no" vote on the amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 1600

Mr. POE of Texas. I don't have anything to say, believe it or not, Mr. Chairman, so I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. POE).

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. POE of Texas) having assumed the chair, Mr. BISHOP of Utah, Chair of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2596) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 12(a) of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess subject to the call of the chair.

Accordingly (at 4 o'clock and 2 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess.

□ 1700

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. WESTMORELAND) at 5 p.m.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 315 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 2596.

Will the gentleman from Texas (Mr. POE) kindly take the chair.

□ 1701

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the

further consideration of the bill (H.R. 2596) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. POE of Texas (Acting Chair) in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The Acting CHAIR. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, amendment No. 16 printed in House Report 114-155 offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. POE) had been disposed of.

AMENDMENT NO. 6 OFFERED BY MR. SCHIFF

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, the unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote.

The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.

The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

RECORDED VOTE

The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 176, noes 246, not voting 11, as follows:

[Roll No. 367]

AYES—176

Adams	Doyle, Michael	Levin
Amash	F.	Lewis
Ashford	Duckworth	Lieu, Ted
Bass	Duncan (TN)	Loebsack
Beatty	Edwards	Lofgren
Becerra	Ellison	Lowenthal
Bera	Engel	Lowe
Beyer	Eshoo	Lujan Grisham
Bishop (GA)	Esty	(NM)
Blumenauer	Farr	Lujan, Ben Ray
Bonamici	Foster	(NM)
Brady (PA)	Frankel (FL)	Lynch
Brown (FL)	Fudge	Maloney,
Bustos	Gabbard	Carolyn
Butterfield	Gallego	Massie
Capps	Garamendi	Matsui
Capuano	Grayson	McCollum
Cárdenas	Green, Al	McDermott
Carney	Grijalva	McGovern
Carson (IN)	Gutiérrez	McNerney
Cartwright	Hahn	Meeks
Castor (FL)	Hastings	Meng
Castro (TX)	Heck (WA)	Moore
Chu, Judy	Higgins	Moulton
Cicilline	Himes	Murphy (FL)
Clark (MA)	Hinojosa	Nadler
Clarke (NY)	Honda	Napolitano
Clay	Hoyer	Neal
Cleaver	Huffman	Nolan
Clyburn	Israel	Norcross
Cohen	Jackson Lee	O'Rourke
Connolly	Jeffries	Pallone
Conyers	Johnson (GA)	Pascarell
Cooper	Johnson, E. B.	Payne
Costa	Jones	Pelosi
Courtney	Kaptur	Perlmutter
Crowley	Keating	Peters
Cummings	Kelly (IL)	Peterson
Davis (CA)	Kennedy	Pingree
Davis, Danny	Kildee	Pocan
DeFazio	Kilmer	Polis
DeGette	Kind	Price (NC)
Delaney	Kuster	Quigley
DeLauro	Langevin	Rangel
DelBene	Larsen (WA)	Rice (NY)
Deutch	Larson (CT)	Richmond
Dingell	Lawrence	Roybal-Allard
Doggett	Lee	Rush