

Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Croatia?

The nomination was confirmed.

VOTE ON WALL NOMINATION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination of Anne Elizabeth Wall, of Illinois, to be a Deputy Under Secretary of the Treasury?

The nomination was confirmed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the motions to reconsider are considered made and laid upon the table and the President will be immediately notified of the Senate's action.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume legislative session.

The majority whip.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 20 minutes in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I understand that Senators have some business to wrap up and are expecting an early out here today, and this Senator is letting some of them finish their conversations. I do want to speak, and I appreciate the unanimous consent request to go forward.

NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, the nuclear negotiations with Iran are now approaching a self-imposed deadline of June 30, just a few days from now. The negotiators chose that deadline when they concluded the interim accord 6 months ago and have reportedly been determined to stick to it to focus their efforts.

At the same time, it may be the case that a brief extension deadline rather than a rush to a conclusion that would bring us to a bad deal is something we ought to consider. Senator CORKER has told Secretary Kerry exactly that, cautioning him that there is no need so desperate that requires either accepting a bad deal or yielding to unacceptable Iranian demands. I don't necessarily oppose a short-term extension to reach a better conclusion or a better deal, but I have deep concerns about whether that will be the case, even if we extend for a small amount of time.

I fear the Obama administration is not hearing the message that a poten-

tial bad deal could be in the making, and it raises great concern. I fear that yielding to one Iranian demand after another in order to secure a deal is exactly what the Obama administration has been doing in its negotiations. I fear that we will return from our Independence Day celebrations to take up a pending Iran nuclear deal that neither permanently foils Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions nor makes us or the world more secure. I fear this administration, so seemingly desperately eager for a legacy, will choose to define any Iranian deal at all as a great success for diplomacy, no matter how much it concedes to Iranian positions.

In May, I and many of my colleagues worked hard to impose a requirement for the administration to present any Iran deal to Congress. Despite strong opposition from the Obama administration, 99 of the 100 Senators were convinced that Congress must have the ability to evaluate in detail every aspect of a negotiated settlement and how it is to be imposed, how it is to be monitored, and verified. That is our core task once a deal is presented to us. It is an immensely important duty of historic dimensions.

I hope and pray that each of us will evaluate the proposed deal on its merits alone and what it would mean for our Nation's security, both now and in the future when the terms have expired. Unfortunately, to take up that duty and perform that task, we will have to immerse ourselves in some of the arcane technical details that lie near the heart of such negotiations. I say "near" the heart rather than "at" the heart because the very central issue for me—and hopefully for my colleagues—is the nature of the Iranian regime, their proven, demonstrated ill will revealed by decades of murderous aggression and lying deceit. That is the proven record of our negotiating partner, and all their claimed commitments will have to be evaluated in that light.

However, evaluating the technical details will present its own challenges and we need to prepare ourselves for those challenges. We need to take stock now of some of those details as they appear at the moment any deal is finalized. To do that, we will have to look through a fog of claims and counterclaims to see the outlines of something that is still evolving, even as it remains in the shadows. But with just those partial images, I have some deep concerns.

First, it now appears from public comments that our negotiators—and especially Secretary Kerry himself—are no longer insisting that Iran come clean on its past nuclear weapons development activities. This has long been a central demand by our side, as often confirmed by our negotiators themselves. To cave on this demand would be a fatal flaw and should all by itself lead to rejection of the deal.

Let me state that again. To cave on this demand that Iran come clean on

its past nuclear weapons development activities all by itself should lead to rejection of the deal, if we do not achieve that goal.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, has been pressing for information from Iran about the past nuclear weapons programs for years. Recently, the IAEA Director General explained the importance of the issue this way:

What we don't know [is] whether they have undeclared activities or something else. We don't know what they did in the past. So, we know a part of their activities, but we cannot tell we know all of their activities. And that is why we cannot say that all the activities in Iran is in peaceful purposes . . . the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

The Obama administration has long agreed with the IAEA that Iran needs to come clean on its past activities to create a baseline for understanding future activities under any agreement—an absolutely essential standard that has to be met.

The U.S. head negotiator, Wendy Sherman—who, incidentally, negotiated the utterly failed deal with North Korea as well—told a Senate committee in 2013 that "Iran must agree to address past and present practices, which is the IAEA terminology for possible military dimensions . . . we intend to support the IAEA in its efforts to deal with possible military dimensions." Later, she told the SFRC that "in the Joint Plan of Action we have required that Iran come clean."

These are the statements of our negotiators. These are the commitments they made to the Senate and to the American people that these were the standards that could not be breached and that if it was not a part of the arrangement, then we would not accept this deal.

So we are quoting here from the record of what policy and what conditions the United States has laid out before the Iranians that, if not achieved, are a nonstarter of a deal.

Secretary Kerry has repeatedly said that the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program "will have to be addressed" and "that Iranians will have to do it."

"It will be done," he said.

However, I was shocked to read last week that Secretary Kerry told this to the Department of State press corps:

We are not fixated on Iran specifically accounting for what they did at one point in time or another. We know what they did. We have no doubt. We have absolute knowledge with respect to the certain military activities they were engaged in. What we are concerned about is going forward.

First of all, this is completely misleading. It is a complete 180-degree turn from what had been committed to earlier. As a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I can state emphatically that we do not have absolute knowledge of anything. That is not how intelligence works.