

Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Croatia?

The nomination was confirmed.

VOTE ON WALL NOMINATION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination of Anne Elizabeth Wall, of Illinois, to be a Deputy Under Secretary of the Treasury?

The nomination was confirmed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the motions to reconsider are considered made and laid upon the table and the President will be immediately notified of the Senate's action.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume legislative session.

The majority whip.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 20 minutes in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I understand that Senators have some business to wrap up and are expecting an early out here today, and this Senator is letting some of them finish their conversations. I do want to speak, and I appreciate the unanimous consent request to go forward.

NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, the nuclear negotiations with Iran are now approaching a self-imposed deadline of June 30, just a few days from now. The negotiators chose that deadline when they concluded the interim accord 6 months ago and have reportedly been determined to stick to it to focus their efforts.

At the same time, it may be the case that a brief extension deadline rather than a rush to a conclusion that would bring us to a bad deal is something we ought to consider. Senator CORKER has told Secretary Kerry exactly that, cautioning him that there is no need so desperate that requires either accepting a bad deal or yielding to unacceptable Iranian demands. I don't necessarily oppose a short-term extension to reach a better conclusion or a better deal, but I have deep concerns about whether that will be the case, even if we extend for a small amount of time.

I fear the Obama administration is not hearing the message that a poten-

tial bad deal could be in the making, and it raises great concern. I fear that yielding to one Iranian demand after another in order to secure a deal is exactly what the Obama administration has been doing in its negotiations. I fear that we will return from our Independence Day celebrations to take up a pending Iran nuclear deal that neither permanently foils Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions nor makes us or the world more secure. I fear this administration, so seemingly desperately eager for a legacy, will choose to define any Iranian deal at all as a great success for diplomacy, no matter how much it concedes to Iranian positions.

In May, I and many of my colleagues worked hard to impose a requirement for the administration to present any Iran deal to Congress. Despite strong opposition from the Obama administration, 99 of the 100 Senators were convinced that Congress must have the ability to evaluate in detail every aspect of a negotiated settlement and how it is to be imposed, how it is to be monitored, and verified. That is our core task once a deal is presented to us. It is an immensely important duty of historic dimensions.

I hope and pray that each of us will evaluate the proposed deal on its merits alone and what it would mean for our Nation's security, both now and in the future when the terms have expired. Unfortunately, to take up that duty and perform that task, we will have to immerse ourselves in some of the arcane technical details that lie near the heart of such negotiations. I say "near" the heart rather than "at" the heart because the very central issue for me—and hopefully for my colleagues—is the nature of the Iranian regime, their proven, demonstrated ill will revealed by decades of murderous aggression and lying deceit. That is the proven record of our negotiating partner, and all their claimed commitments will have to be evaluated in that light.

However, evaluating the technical details will present its own challenges and we need to prepare ourselves for those challenges. We need to take stock now of some of those details as they appear at the moment any deal is finalized. To do that, we will have to look through a fog of claims and counterclaims to see the outlines of something that is still evolving, even as it remains in the shadows. But with just those partial images, I have some deep concerns.

First, it now appears from public comments that our negotiators—and especially Secretary Kerry himself—are no longer insisting that Iran come clean on its past nuclear weapons development activities. This has long been a central demand by our side, as often confirmed by our negotiators themselves. To cave on this demand would be a fatal flaw and should all by itself lead to rejection of the deal.

Let me state that again. To cave on this demand that Iran come clean on

its past nuclear weapons development activities all by itself should lead to rejection of the deal, if we do not achieve that goal.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, has been pressing for information from Iran about the past nuclear weapons programs for years. Recently, the IAEA Director General explained the importance of the issue this way:

What we don't know [is] whether they have undeclared activities or something else. We don't know what they did in the past. So, we know a part of their activities, but we cannot tell we know all of their activities. And that is why we cannot say that all the activities in Iran is in peaceful purposes . . . the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

The Obama administration has long agreed with the IAEA that Iran needs to come clean on its past activities to create a baseline for understanding future activities under any agreement—an absolutely essential standard that has to be met.

The U.S. head negotiator, Wendy Sherman—who, incidentally, negotiated the utterly failed deal with North Korea as well—told a Senate committee in 2013 that "Iran must agree to address past and present practices, which is the IAEA terminology for possible military dimensions . . . we intend to support the IAEA in its efforts to deal with possible military dimensions." Later, she told the SFRC that "in the Joint Plan of Action we have required that Iran come clean."

These are the statements of our negotiators. These are the commitments they made to the Senate and to the American people that these were the standards that could not be breached and that if it was not a part of the arrangement, then we would not accept this deal.

So we are quoting here from the record of what policy and what conditions the United States has laid out before the Iranians that, if not achieved, are a nonstarter of a deal.

Secretary Kerry has repeatedly said that the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program "will have to be addressed" and "that Iranians will have to do it."

"It will be done," he said.

However, I was shocked to read last week that Secretary Kerry told this to the Department of State press corps:

We are not fixated on Iran specifically accounting for what they did at one point in time or another. We know what they did. We have no doubt. We have absolute knowledge with respect to the certain military activities they were engaged in. What we are concerned about is going forward.

First of all, this is completely misleading. It is a complete 180-degree turn from what had been committed to earlier. As a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I can state emphatically that we do not have absolute knowledge of anything. That is not how intelligence works.

Secretary Kerry's statement suggests that he may be misusing one of our most useful tools of statecraft—perhaps a more concerning issue than the statement itself.

If we did have absolute knowledge of what the Iranians had done and have done to this date, we would not have spent the past years joining with the IAEA and the responsible international community to demand that Iran come clean. For the life of me, I cannot understand what the Secretary is thinking about when making such a claim. It is in total contradiction of a key facet—maybe the key facet of this deal.

Now, suddenly we are backing away, saying “We know everything” when we have for years been pursuing with the IAEA to get the knowledge of what we do know and the IAEA basically saying to us: No, we don't know everything. There is a lot we do not know.

In any case, I regard this new position as a blatant reversal of a key part of our negotiating objectives and a capitulation to the Iranians—a capitulation that reveals, perhaps, how desperate the administration is to secure a deal—any deal.

The next point of concern is the type and pace of sanctions relief we seem to be dangling as an incentive for the Iranians to accept any deal. This issue is very complex technically, legally, and legislatively. One key point is that throughout these negotiations, the administration has consistently argued that any deal would lead only to sanctions relief regarding nuclear issues. But the fact sheet that the White House put out following the interim deal framework stated that U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.

Let me say that again. The administration put out this fact sheet following the interim deal stating that U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.

Now it seems this limitation was not good enough for the Iranians, and we have caved again.

Yesterday, the so-called Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, included this matter in his expanded list of redlines. He said that all economic, financial, and banking sanctions implemented either by the United Nations Security Council, the United States Congress, or the administration must be lifted immediately when the deal is signed.

According to media reports, which have not been refuted by the administration since they began appearing last month, the Supreme Leader has won again.

The emerging deal may roll back sanctions that had been imposed for these other nonnuclear reasons. According to these reports, based on leaks from the negotiating teams, 23 out of the 24 currently sanctioned Iranian banks will be delisted as sanctions tar-

gets, including the Central Bank of Iran. This is the Revolutionary Guard Corps-dominated institution that was sanctioned because of its role in money laundering, financing terrorism, ballistic weapons research, and campaign claims of bolstering the Assad regime in Syria. Removing sanctions applied to these banks will give Iran hundreds of billions of dollars that could be used for their terrorism activities in regional proxy wars.

These reports, if true, constitute yet another reversal of clearly stated policy and yet another capitulation to the Iranians.

No. 3, it appears that negotiators may be aiming at an arrangement to set aside the dispute about open, free access to Iranian facilities. We have long maintained that any agreement would have to give the IAEA such access—stated over and over to us through our briefings, by the Secretary, and by others negotiating this. What this means is open, free access anytime, anywhere. It appears this is not now the case. We have long maintained that the IAEA have access anytime, anyplace, as their spokesmen have often emphasized. President Obama himself reassured the region's nervous Arab leaders on this very point in an effort to gain their acceptance of the deal.

In the meantime, once again Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, has stated emphatically that no such access would be granted, and other Iranian authorities repeated this redline that the Iranians have drawn in the deal and that we are capitulating to, one after another. Their Parliament even recently passed a law to this effect. It looked like an unbridgeable gap. Khamenei repeated this firm position again just yesterday.

Some argue that Khamenei's declarations are part of the negotiating strategy. Well, if so, it seems to have worked. Anyplace access for intrusive inspection has been taken out. We have dropped “anytime, anyplace.”

The buzzword phrase that now is being giving to us is “managed access.” When I first heard that, I said, what in the world does that mean, “managed access”? With this concept, it appears there would now be a mechanism that would evaluate requests for access to determine if there is a genuine need. Instead of anytime, anyplace, anywhere, for any reason, in order to verify that the Iranians are not cheating, that has turned into now a request for a search or for access at their time and their decision as to what the place will be or what the place will not be. This makes a mockery of the state of the original required demand for access at anytime, anyplace. “Access where needed, when needed” seems to be the new mantra—where needed, when needed, giving them plenty of time to make a decision as to yea or nay or to remove from those sites damning evidence of their pursuit of nuclear capabilities.

Because this issue of access is crucial to the issue of credibility, verification, and compliance, it arguably is the most important requirement of all for an acceptable deal. Those advocating for the emerging deal are actually boasting that this artful dodging is a negotiating victory.

Is there anything more we need to say about the weak and compromising negotiating strategy of those who are currently at the table representing the United States? I have just named and spelled out three major concerns regarding these negotiations, but there are many other aspects of the apparently emerging deal that separately and together show a pattern—a very disturbing pattern of constant retreat and capitulation by this administration in the negotiations with the Iranians. I won't go into the details of each of these, but let me just run off several other issues of major concern.

One, the clearly inadequate timeframe for any agreement, the sunset clause—it is no longer a part of the negotiations; two, outrageously generous details of sanctions relief, both scale and timing; the almost laughable, specious claims of sanctions snapback provisions—whatever that means—once the sanctions regime has been dismantled; the number of and types of enrichment equipment to be retained by the Iranians; the types of enrichment activities that will be permitted in the thousands of modern centrifuges in the most fortified, bunkered facilities; fatal limitations on our ability to monitor and verify compliance; and the Joint Plan of Action provisions that Iran has already blatantly violated without any White House comment.

My colleagues, once a deal is announced, it will be critical that we exercise the wisdom and courage to evaluate it honestly. My doubts about our ability to do so are aggravated by the public relations campaign we can foresee. Indeed, we have seen it before when the Clinton administration told us the nuclear deal with North Korea was “good for America.” I was a Member of the Senate at that time. I raised a number of issues and concerns about whether this deal with North Korea was good for America. I did not vote to support that effort. Nevertheless, the treaty was agreed to.

The framework agreement with North Korea, President Clinton said in 1994, “is a good deal for the United States. North Korea will freeze and dismantle its nuclear programs.” North Korea will freeze and dismantle its nuclear programs. “South Korea and our other allies will be better protected. The entire world will be safer as we slow the spread of nuclear weapons. . . . The United States and international inspectors will carefully monitor North Korea to make sure it keeps its commitments. Only as it does so will North Korea fully join the community of nations.”

That is what was promised in 1994. That is what was stated to Senators on

this floor in 1994—that we can count on the fact that we are going to know if the North Koreans cheat and we are not going to allow them to do that. How significantly this resonates now, all these years later, as we are assured by the administration and by Secretary Kerry: Don't worry. Everything is covered. Inspections will take place. They won't be able to cheat. We will know it if they do. The sanctions will come back on. We will snap back those sanctions, et cetera, et cetera.

Some Members took a bite of that apple and regret that. I did not. I am sure not going to take another bite of that apple, and no one else should view this current negotiation with Iran without putting it in the context of what was done before. We have been here before. We need to learn the lessons from that. We now know that North Korea possesses dozens of nuclear weapons and the ballistic missile capacity to deliver those weapons. We now know they cheated blatantly and we did not know it. The so-called guarantee of verification was not accomplished and not achieved.

So before making a final decision on the Iran so-called deal, we need to learn the lessons from the Clinton administration and the agreement with North Korea. The similarities between the secret negotiations then and the secret ones now are remarkable.

In 1994, a key sticking point was complete access to nuclear sites, and then, too, we caved in order to get the deal.

In 1994, the White House and major media outlets trumpeted a deal that would make the world safer—a victory for diplomacy over force and hostility. Those who did not see this as something that was going to be enforced were called warmongers.

Here is the choice, war or peace. Some choice. North Korea promised to forgo their nuclear weapons ambitions, and although I could not vote to support President Clinton's request, enough of the Senate did to approve the agreement with North Korea.

Now we know they have between 20 to 40 nuclear weapons, possibly miniaturized, ICBMs—intercontinental ballistic missiles—to put them on and recently tested submarine launch missiles.

Another lesson is the time gap between the heralded diplomatic breakthrough and the revelation that we had been taken to the cleaners. It took years to learn what we had really done in North Korea and not done in North Korea.

The failure of a bad deal with Iran will not be evident to most of us for years perhaps—perhaps even 10, 11 or 12 years, even when President Obama concedes that Iran's nuclear breakout time will be zero.

In fact, such a delay—in the unlikely event Iran actually complies with a deal—is the stated objective of the P5+1 negotiators—to impose a delay of a decade or so on Iran's nuclear weap-

ons program. That is what they will define as success.

But we must remember this: Today's brutal, unhinged, nuclear-armed North Korea is actually a product of misguided and naive American diplomacy, sold to the Senate as something other than what it was. We now know the agreement with North Korea was not a diplomatic victory but a diplomatic and policy failure, an absolute failure. My deep concern is that this time many will, once again, see the emerging deal as a great victory for diplomacy, no matter what it contains.

The utterly false claim that it presents a choice between peaceful resolution of a dispute and war, as a consequence of not arranging and agreeing to a deal, will be a central part of the discourse and salesmanship that will confront us as Senators. Those opposed will potentially be labeled as war mongers.

It is good of us to remember something that was said by Winston Churchill leading up to World War II: Peace at any price does not lead to peace. It only lengthens the path for war with far greater consequences in terms of cost or blood.

So, for us, we are going to have to stand up to those who posit the false choice between peace and between war. We have a more difficult obligation of historic consequences, looking to the following decade. Such a duty must not be guided by party. It must not be guided by politics. It must not be guided by deference either to the White House, our own leadership or even our constituents.

We must look at each and every detail of any agreement presented to us to reach a judgment on whether this so-called deal with Iran will prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. Then, and only then, we must decide on that basis whether to approve or reject the deal that will be presented to us by the President and his Secretary of State. To do anything less than fulfilling this obligation and this duty that each one of us has, will be a failure of our duty as a U.S. Senator, with historic consequences if we get it wrong.

My hope, prayer, wish, desire, and admonition is that each one of us sees this as something with historic consequences that will affect not only the future of our Nation and our people but will affect the future of the world. Therefore, we must give full attention and every ounce of our best wisdom and judgment in determining, not for political or party or any other reason—other than finding out and determining whether this deal is acceptable or not acceptable and make our yes be yes and our no be no and well reasoned, well judged, and well decided.

With that, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana.

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AWARENESS DAY

Mr. DAINES. Mr. President, this Saturday, June 27, marks Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder—or PTSD—Awareness Day.

This marks a critical opportunity to remind people about the prevalence of mental illnesses such as PTSD among our Active-Duty troops and our veterans. By generating more awareness, we can help remove the stigma about PTSD and encourage people to seek treatment and, in turn, save lives. PTSD is a serious problem affecting too many of our country's bravest individuals, and we must do more to help our heroes.

According to a study by the RAND Corporation, 20 percent of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans report symptoms of PTSD and, of those, only about half actually seek treatment.

Our Nation made a promise to our men and women in uniform: When they come home from war and their time in service to our country, we will be there for them. We need to have the same concern for our servicemembers' mental health as we do for their physical health. For far too long, we have been focused on the physical wounds of war, but as many of our veterans know too well, the mental wounds also inflict great damage.

I am proud to serve as a Senator from a State with a rich legacy of service. I am proud to be the son of a U.S. marine. One in ten Montanans have proudly served in our Armed Forces, making the Treasure State home to more veterans per capita than almost any other State in our Nation. According to the VA, Montana is home to nearly 100,000 veterans, 75,000 of whom served our Nation during wartime.

As the son of a marine, I strongly believe we have a duty to ensure that the promises we have made to these men and these women are kept. There is no greater honor or responsibility than fighting for our veterans. We owe them our freedom. We owe them nothing but our best. Anything less is unacceptable.

I have had many conversations with the brave men and women who have gone overseas in the name of freedom, and one of the many concerns they have expressed is the negative stigma surrounding post-traumatic stress in our military. For too long, our service men and women have attempted to hide mental health issues from their superiors out of fear of being discharged. That is why I am committed to raising PTSD awareness to overcome the misinformation and the stigma surrounding these mental health challenges.

I am proud to be working on S. 1567 with GARY PETERS and THOM TILLIS to ensure due process for veterans who suffer from mental health illnesses and may have been erroneously given an administrative discharge rather than an honorable discharge. It helps ensure that Active-Duty servicemembers who