wage, blocking millions of Latino families from earning a livable wage.

These are the priorities of the Republican Party—a Republican Party that has abandoned Latino families. We as Democrats will do everything in our power to stop the Republican attack on these families. Democrats will continue to fight for Latino families to help them tackle the challenges they face every day.

Today, as we celebrate the first day of Hispanic Heritage Month, we honor the many incredible contributions Latino Americans make every day to our Nation. We also recommit ourselves to protecting Hispanic families and communities from the likes of Donald Trump and the Republican Party and treating them with dignity and respect because a prosperous America needs a strong and thriving Hispanic community.

RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved.

HIRE MORE HEROES ACT OF 2015

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will resume consideration of H.J. Res. 61, which the clerk will report.

The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A joint resolution (H.J. Res. 61) amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exempt employees with health coverage under TRICARE or the Veterans Administration from being taken into account for purposes of determining the employers to which the employer mandate applies under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

Pending:

McConnell amendment No. 2640, of a perfecting nature.

McConnell amendment No. 2641 (to amendment No. 2640), to change the enactment date

McConnell amendment No. 2642 (to amendment No. 2641), of a perfecting nature.

McConnell amendment No. 2643 (to the language proposed to be stricken by amendment No. 2640), to change the enactment date.

McConnell amendment No. 2644 (to amendment No. 2643), of a perfecting nature.

McConnell motion to commit the joint resolution to the Committee on Foreign Relations, with instructions, McConnell amendment No. 2645, to change the enactment date.

McConnell amendment No. 2646 (to (the instructions) amendment No. 2645), of a perfecting nature.

McConnell amendment No. 2647 (to amendment No. 2646), of a perfecting nature.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time until 6 p.m. will be equally divided between the two leaders or their designees.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time be charged equally.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, as you know, today we are going to have a number of speakers coming down to talk about the deal that has been negotiated between the P5+1 countries-China, Russia, Great Britain, Germany, France, and the United States-and Iran. What is before us today is something called a resolution of disapproval. I know the procedures we deal with sometimes here on the Senate floor can be very confusing to the public. We are going through a process where we are trying to seek cloture. Cloture is a vote where people decide whether they are going to end debate on a topic and move toward the final vote, to cast their vote on the substance of what is before us.

We had a similar type of vote before we left on Thursday. We had 58 Senators—a bipartisan majority—who wanted to move to a final vote. As a matter of fact, we had Senators from both sides of the aisle on the floor for some time debating the issue. It was one of the most sober, respectful debates we have had since I have been in the Senate. But a minority of the Senators voted not to end the debate. In other words, that is what the general public believes is a filibuster. And it kept us from being able to move to a final vote.

Because there has been some confusion, what I thought I would do is lay out what exactly is happening here and how we got to this process.

Under our form of government, when the President enters into an international agreement, he decides as to whether that is going to be a treaty, which, as we know, requires a twothirds approval by the Senate, or whether it is something called a congressional-executive agreement, which is a little bit lower threshold, or whether it is just a pure executive agreement, in other words, the President himself has the ability, if he so decides, to enter into an executive agreement. One of the problems with an executive agreement is that it doesn't live beyond that President's term.

When you invoke an executive agreement, what you are really doing is bypassing the buy-in of Congress. As a matter of fact, last week on the floor, I thought Senator FLAKE made one of the most salient points that have been made; that is, since the President and his team decided to cut out Congress and to attempt to do an executive agreement, they made no attempt whatsoever to get the buy-in of Congress. That is why we have ended up in the situation we are in.

When I realized that the President, through this process, was going to enter into this agreement solely by himself—an executive agreement, which he has the ability to do—but

that he was also going to use something called a national security waiver to do so—again, this gets a little complicated, and foreign policy can sometimes be complicated. Congress, on four different occasions, passed overwhelmingly in this body and overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives something that puts sanctions in place on Iran to try to bring them to the negotiating table. We did it four times

I have to say that in almost every instance, the administration pushed back against us putting sanctions in place. They said, "Oh, the other countries won't be with us, and this will create problems." What happened as a result of us saying "No, we are going to sanction Iran; we are going to do what we can to bring them to the table to end their nuclear program" was that the other countries fell in line. They put in place similar sanctions to the ones Congress put in place.

When we passed those four sets of sanctions, we gave the President something that is common, and that is called a national security waiver, where, if a crisis came up, he had the ability to waive those sanctions if he thought it was in our country's national interest.

So when he decided to enter into an executive agreement around these negotiations with Iran and bypass Congress, what he also decided he was going to do is to use his national security waiver to waive the sanctions Congress put in place.

Some of us on this side of the aisle realized that was very problematic, that because we brought Congress to the table and because we put the sanctions in place, we thought it was inappropriate for the President to use the national security waiver.

By the way, we realize now that he was going to put a national security waiver in place for $8\frac{1}{2}$ years and come to Congress $8\frac{1}{2}$ years down the road to waive those sanctions permanently. That would have been long after the essence of this deal was done and over.

So we were able to work with the other side of the aisle and pass a bill that has put us in the position we are in today, and that is allowing Congress to weigh in before those congressionally mandated sanctions are waived. Of course, if those sanctions are not waived, then, in essence, the Iranian deal cannot go forward under the terms that have been laid out.

A lot of people have said: Well, Congress gave away authority. They enabled the President to do this without entering into a treaty.

That is totally untrue. The President has the ability to decide to enter into an international arrangement through an executive arrangement, as he has done, if he so chooses. Now, again, the problem with that is, it doesn't stand the test of time because the next President can come in and alter that.

As a matter of fact, this is the first time I can remember that Congress has