

that provide opportunities for legitimate travel, trade, and recreation.

There are currently 328 ports of entry to the U.S., including 167 land ports of entry with Canada and Mexico, staffed by approximately 21,000 CBP officers in the U.S. and abroad.

There are more people and goods coming through our ports of entry than ever before.

Last fiscal year, CBP inspected more than 360 million travelers at our air, land, and sea ports of entry.

Since 2009, we have seen growth in both trade and travel.

In Fiscal Year 2013, total passenger volume was 6.4% higher and total import value was nearly 40% higher than in Fiscal Year 2011.

Houston's George Bush International and the William P. Hobby Airports are vital hubs for domestic and international air travel:

1. Nearly 40 million passengers traveled through Bush International Airport (IAH) and an additional 10 million traveled through William P. Hobby (HOU);

2. More than 650 daily departures occur at IAH;

3. IAH is the 11th busiest airport in the U.S. for total passenger traffic; and

4. IAH has 12 all-cargo airlines that handled more than 419,205 metric tons of cargo in 2012.

It was reported in October 2015 that the William P. Hobby Airport has opened a new 280,000 ft complex that includes 5 gates for its international concourse in an effort to re-establish the airport's daily international air service.

The addition is expected to support travel service for nearly 7,500 international passengers and 25 departing flights a day.

At the same time, these waterways offer opportunities for terrorists and their instruments, drug smugglers, and undocumented persons to enter our country.

Protecting the nation's border—land, air, and sea—from illegal entry of people, weapons, drugs, and contraband is vital to our homeland security, as well as economic prosperity.

The Border and Maritime Coordination Improvement Act:

Creates an office of Biometric Identity Management;

Establishes the Border Security Joint Task Forces in the East, West and for investigations;

Updates the Maritime Operations Coordination Plan;

Establishes an Asset Development for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Air and Marine;

Secures the Transportation Worker Identification credential against use by unauthorized aliens;

Creates a cost-benefit analysis of co-located operational entities;

Evaluates the Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces;

Constructs an evaluation of Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces; and

Establishes a Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism Improvement among other important changes.

I support this legislation because it will help protect the integrity of our borders and the security of our homeland.

H.R. 3586 provides specific responsibilities for the Undersecretary to establish and operate the newly implemented departmental Joint

Task Forces and appointing the directors to those joint task forces.

Under H.R. 3586, the Joint Task Force—East and Joint Task Force—West is to execute a strategic plan to secure the land and maritime borders, which will coordinate criminal investigations supporting such task forces.

The bill also directs the the DHS to establish additional Joint Task Forces to:

1. coordinate operations along the northern border;

2. prevent and respond to homeland security crises;

3. establish other regionally based operations; and

4. combat cybersecurity.

The smuggling of illicit drugs, illegal immigrants, and contraband weapons over the Texas border is a major problem that needs to be addressed.

Approximately 1 million passengers and pedestrians cross the Texas border on a daily basis; of these, on average 23 of these persons are wanted for arrest.

H.R. 3586 is a positive step in the right direction and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting its passage.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from Michigan (Mrs. MILLER) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3586, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SOUTHWEST BORDER SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENT ACT OF 2016

Ms. MCSALLY. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 4482) to require the Secretary of Homeland Security to prepare a southwest border threat analysis, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 4482

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Southwest Border Security Threat Assessment Act of 2016".

SEC. 2. SOUTHWEST BORDER THREAT ANALYSIS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a southwest border threat analysis that includes the following:

(1) An assessment of current and potential terrorism and criminal threats posed by individuals and organized groups seeking to—

(A) unlawfully enter the United States through the southwest border; or

(B) exploit security vulnerabilities along the southwest border.

(2) An assessment of improvements needed at and between ports of entry along the southwest border to prevent terrorists and instruments of terror from entering the United States.

(3) An assessment of gaps in law, policy, and coordination between State, local, or tribal law enforcement, international agreements, or tribal agreements that hinder effective and efficient border security, counterterrorism, and anti-human smuggling and trafficking efforts.

(4) An assessment of the flow of legitimate trade along the southwest border.

(5) An assessment of the current percentage of situational awareness achieved by the Department of Homeland Security along the southwest border.

(6) An assessment of the current percentage of operational control (as such term is defined in section 2 of the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (8 U.S.C. 1701 note; Public Law 109-367)) achieved by the Department of Homeland Security of the southwest.

(7) An assessment of impact of trusted traveler programs on border wait times and border security.

(8) An assessment of traveler crossing times and any potential security vulnerability associated with prolonged wait times.

(b) ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS.—For the southwest border threat analysis required under subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consider and examine the following:

(1) Technology needs and challenges, including such needs and challenges identified as a result of previous investments that have not fully realized the security and operational benefits that were sought.

(2) Personnel needs and challenges, including such needs and challenges associated with recruitment and hiring.

(3) Infrastructure needs and challenges.

(4) The roles and authorities of State, local, and tribal law enforcement in general border security activities.

(5) The status of coordination among Federal, State, local, tribal, and Mexican law enforcement entities relating to border security.

(6) The terrain, population density, and climate along the southwest border.

(7) International agreements between the United States and Mexico related to border security.

(c) CLASSIFIED THREAT ANALYSIS.—To the extent possible, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit the southwest border threat analysis required under subsection (a) in unclassified form. The Secretary may submit a portion of such threat analysis in classified form if the Secretary determines such is appropriate.

SEC. 3. BORDER PATROL STRATEGIC PLAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the submission of the threat analysis required under section 2 but not later than June 30, 2017, and every five years thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Chief of U.S. Border Patrol, shall, in consultation with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department of Homeland Security, issue a Border Patrol Strategic Plan.

(b) CONTENTS.—The Border Patrol Strategic Plan required under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, a consideration of the following:

(1) The southwest border threat analysis required under section 2, with an emphasis on efforts to mitigate threats identified in such threat analysis.

(2) Efforts to analyze and disseminate border security and border threat information between Department of Homeland Security border security components and with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies with missions associated with the border.

(3) Efforts to increase situational awareness, including the following:

(A) Surveillance capabilities, including capabilities developed or utilized by the Department of Defense, and any appropriate technology determined to be excess by the Department of Defense.

(B) Use of manned aircraft and unmanned aerial systems, including camera and sensor technology deployed on such assets.

(4) Efforts to detect and prevent terrorists and instruments of terrorism from entering the United States.

(5) Efforts to detect, interdict, and disrupt aliens and illicit drugs at the earliest possible point.

(6) Efforts to focus intelligence collection to disrupt transnational criminal organizations outside of the international and maritime borders of the United States.

(7) Efforts to ensure that any new border security technology can be operationally integrated with existing technologies in use by the Department of Homeland Security.

(8) Technology required to maintain, support, and enhance security and facilitate trade at ports of entry, including nonintrusive detection equipment, radiation detection equipment, biometric technology, surveillance systems, and other sensors and technology that the Secretary of Homeland Security determines necessary.

(9) Operational coordination unity of effort initiatives of the border security components of the Department of Homeland Security, including any relevant task forces of the Department.

(10) Lessons learned from Operation Jumpstart and Operation Phalanx.

(11) Cooperative agreements and information sharing with State, local, tribal, territorial, and other Federal law enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction on the northern or southern border.

(12) Border security information received from consultation with State, local, tribal, territorial, and Federal law enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction on the northern or southern border, or in the maritime environment, and from border community stakeholders (including through public meetings with such stakeholders), including representatives from border agricultural and ranching organizations and representatives from business and civic organizations along the northern or southern border.

(13) Staffing requirements for all departmental border security functions.

(14) A prioritized list of departmental research and development objectives to enhance the security of the southwest border.

(15) An assessment of training programs, including training programs regarding the following:

(A) Identifying and detecting fraudulent documents.

(B) Understanding the scope of enforcement authorities and the use of force policies.

(C) Screening, identifying, and addressing vulnerable populations, such as children and victims of human trafficking.

(16) An assessment of how border security operations affect crossing times.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) **SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.**—The term “situational awareness” means a knowledge and unified understanding of unlawful cross-border activity, including threats and trends concerning illicit trafficking and unlawful crossings (which may be used to forecast future shifts in such threats and trends), and the operational capability to conduct continuous and integrated surveillance of the international borders of the United States.

(2) **SOUTHWEST BORDER.**—The term “southwest border” means the land and maritime borders between the United States and Mexico.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania). Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from Arizona (Ms. MCSALLY) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PAYNE) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Arizona.

GENERAL LEAVE

Ms. MCSALLY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and to include any extraneous materials on the bill under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Arizona?

There was no objection.

Ms. MCSALLY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Today, we are considering a critical piece of legislation that would require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a full assessment of the threats that are coming across our southern border.

Evaluating our border threats regularly seems like common sense, especially given the ever-evolving nature of cartel and smuggling activity; yet DHS has not conducted a systematic threat assessment of our southern border in over 20 years. A lot has changed since then.

Southern Arizonans know well that our border is not secure. Transnational criminal organizations are trafficking drugs, money, people, and weapons into and through our communities. This poses a significant public safety risk and national security threat. For my constituents, this is not just an abstract issue but is something that is a part of their everyday lives.

The brave men and women of the Border Patrol do all they can with the tools they are provided, but they are restricted by outdated strategies and political leadership that does not have the resolve to let agents do what they do best—secure the border. In addition, not only is our strategy based off of outdated information, but the metrics used to measure that strategy are inconsistent and incomplete.

The last time DHS measured security along the border, which was in 2010, a mere 44 percent of it was under operational control. Recently, DHS claimed they have been over 80 percent effective along the border; yet the best analytical research, using all available data, puts the true probability of apprehension much closer to 50 percent. Likewise, a month ago, in a hearing I led as the chairwoman of the Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee, the Border Patrol confirmed they have only a little over 50 percent situational awareness of the border. That means, of illicit activity coming across our, roughly, 2,000-mile southern border, we only know of a little over half of it. We will never secure the border unless we have a full awareness of where we are getting beat by the cartels.

The first step to fixing something is actually understanding the problem.

My bill requires a full assessment of the threats along our southern border, including where we have vulnerabilities, where we can better leverage technology, and what percentage of situational awareness and operational control we have. Once we understand and identify the gaps in our defenses, then we can develop a better plan to address those shortfalls through a change of strategy that modifies how we deploy agents, technology, and infrastructure. That is why my bill also requires the U.S. Border Patrol to design a new strategic plan that is based on a new threat analysis required by this bill.

Mr. Speaker, there is always a lot of talk about securing the border here in Washington, D.C. It is time to actually take some action. This bill is a critical first step in building trust in our system and in our ability to accurately measure illicit activity along the border and respond to it. I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in support of H.R. 4482, the Southwest Border Security Threat Assessment Act of 2016.

H.R. 4482 would help enhance the Department of Homeland Security's border security efforts by enhancing DHS' understanding of the relevant vulnerabilities and capabilities and by requiring a strategic plan to ensure border security personnel, technology, and infrastructure resources are being used to their fullest.

Specifically, the bill would require the Secretary of Homeland Security to assess vulnerabilities and capabilities on the southwest border to help counter threats and illegal activities. The assessment is to include an analysis of the improvements needed at and between the ports of entry; gaps in law and policy between State, local, and tribal law enforcement and international agreements that hinder border security efforts; the flow of legitimate trade along the southwest border; and the percentage of situational awareness and operational control achieved by DHS in the region. The bill also requires the Chief of the Border Patrol to issue a Border Patrol Strategic Plan every 5 years based on this assessment.

Last month, the bill was reported to the House by the Committee on Homeland Security after the inclusion of provisions that were offered by the ranking member, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. THOMPSON), in order to strengthen an already good, common-sense bill.

H.R. 4482 would help the DHS and the Border Patrol, in particular, to understand and to mitigate border security threats, to improve coordination and cooperation between DHS' border security components and partners, and to increase situational awareness along the border.

I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 4482.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. MCSALLY. Mr. Speaker, once again, I urge all of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support H.R. 4482.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from Arizona (Ms. MCSALLY) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 4482, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

STATE AND HIGH-RISK URBAN AREA WORKING GROUP ACT

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 4509) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to clarify membership of State planning committees or urban area working groups for the Homeland Security Grant Program, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 4509

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “State and High-Risk Urban Area Working Group Act”.

SEC. 2. ADMINISTRATION AND COORDINATION OF CERTAIN DHS GRANTS.

Subsection (b) of section 2021 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 611) is amended to read as follows:

“(b) PLANNING COMMITTEES.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Any State or high-risk urban area receiving a grant under section 2003 or 2004 shall establish a State planning committee or urban area working group to assist in preparation and revision of the State, regional, or local homeland security plan or the threat and hazard identification and risk assessment, as the case may be, and to assist in determining effective funding priorities for grants under such sections.

“(2) COMPOSITION.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The State planning committees and urban area working groups referred to in paragraph (1) shall include at least one representative from each of the following significant stakeholders:

“(i) Local or tribal government officials.

“(ii) Emergency response providers, which shall include representatives of the fire service, law enforcement, emergency medical services, and emergency managers.

“(iii) Public health officials and other appropriate medical practitioners.

“(iv) Individuals representing educational institutions, including elementary schools, community colleges, and other institutions of higher education.

“(v) State and regional interoperable communications coordinators, as appropriate.

“(vi) State and major urban area fusion centers, as appropriate.

“(B) GEOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION.—The members of the State planning committee or urban area working group, as the case may be, shall be a representative group of individuals from the counties, cities, towns, and In-

dian tribes within the State or high-risk urban area, including, as appropriate, representatives of rural, high-population, and high-threat jurisdictions.

“(3) EXISTING PLANNING COMMITTEES.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to require that any State or high-risk urban area create a State planning committee or urban area working group, as the case may be, if that State or high-risk urban area has established and uses a multijurisdictional planning committee or commission that meets the requirements of this subsection.”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New York (Mr. DONOVAN) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PAYNE) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and to include any extraneous materials on the bill under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

As the chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, I rise in support of H.R. 4509, the State and High-Risk Urban Area Working Group Act, which was introduced by the subcommittee's ranking member, Congressman PAYNE.

The Homeland Security Act requires States and urban areas that are receiving State Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative funds to have planning committees to determine how to efficiently and effectively expend these funds. H.R. 4509 expands the stakeholders who are required to be involved in these committees to include representatives from public health, educational institutions, fusion centers, and interoperability coordinators, as appropriate.

In New York City, the New York City Police Department, the FDNY, emergency management, and public health, along with other partners, work together to ensure that these grant funds provide the biggest return on investment for the city's security. Time and again, these officials have told me how important these funds are to their ability to ensure the security of millions of residents, commuters, and visitors in the city each day. They have used these funds to train personnel, to conduct exercises, and to procure helicopters, fireboats, cameras, and radiation detection equipment.

This funding is vital now more than ever. Securing high-risk urban areas, like New York City, becomes more challenging every day considering the fact that we are at our highest threat level since the September 11 terrorist attacks. That is why it is so outrageous that the President's fiscal year 2017 budget proposes to cut more than

\$500 million from grants to support States, localities, ports, and transit systems.

The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications held a hearing last month on the proposed cuts. We heard from representatives of emergency management, law enforcement, the fire service, and fusion centers. They all had the same message: these grants have made a difference, and cutting them now would have disastrous effects on their ability to prevent, to prepare for, and to respond to terrorist attacks. Not only would they be unable to make new security investments, but the investments they have made since 9/11 would be eroded. In this threat environment, this is not the time to back away from our support of our Nation's first responders.

Mr. Speaker, the States and urban areas that are receiving Homeland Security grant funding take their responsibilities to secure their areas very seriously. They diligently work through the planning committees that are discussed in this bill in order to make sure they make sound investments to secure their jurisdictions. The President must take the security of these jurisdictions equally as seriously and fund these programs accordingly.

I support the passage of H.R. 4509.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in support of H.R. 4509, the State and High-Risk Urban Area Working Group Act.

Before I begin my statement, I would like to support the comments made by my chairman in his being very concerned about the cuts to the grant that have been proposed.

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Mr. Speaker, I represent the 10th Congressional District of the State of New Jersey. Communities throughout my district from Newark to Jersey City have built robust capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks and natural disasters with State Homeland Security grants and the Urban Areas Security Initiative funding.

I am proud of the progress New Jersey has made in preparing and protecting against terrorist attacks with these important grant dollars. I cannot stress enough the critical role these funds play in my district's ability to protect itself from terrorist attacks and natural disasters.

Over the past 3½ years, I have served as the ranking member of the Committee on Homeland Security's Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee. In this capacity, I have seen the benefits realized across the Nation from DHS' Homeland Security Grant Program.

With this funding, State and local governments equip first responders with the much-needed protective equipment and emergency communications technologies as well. These