

115TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. R. 7180

To limit the availability of funds to extend the implementation of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 28, 2018

Ms. CHENEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

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## A BILL

To limit the availability of funds to extend the implementation of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Stopping Russian Nu-  
5 clear Aggression Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS TO EX-**  
7 **TEND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW**  
8 **START TREATY.**

9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1           (1) The New START Treaty provides that,  
2           “[w]hen a Party believes that a new kind of stra-  
3           tegic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall  
4           have the right to raise the question of such a stra-  
5           tegic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral  
6           Consultative Commission”.

7           (2) Russian Federation President Vladimir  
8           Putin stated in a March 1, 2018, public speech  
9           that—

10                   (A) “I will speak about the newest systems  
11                   of Russian strategic weapons that we are cre-  
12                   ating . . . we have embarked on the develop-  
13                   ment of the next generation of missiles.”;

14                   (B) “We started to develop new types of  
15                   strategic arms that do not use ballistic trajec-  
16                   tories at all when moving toward a target.”;

17                   (C) “One of them is a small-scale heavy-  
18                   duty nuclear energy unit that can be installed  
19                   in a missile like our latest X-101 air-launched  
20                   missile . . . . In late 2017, Russia successfully  
21                   launched its latest nuclear-powered missile at  
22                   the central training ground. During its flight,  
23                   the nuclear-powered engine reached its design  
24                   capacity and provided the necessary propul-  
25                   sion.”;

1 (D) “[i]n December 2017, an innovative  
2 nuclear power unit for this unmanned under-  
3 water vehicle completed a test cycle that lasted  
4 many years . . . [t]he tests that were con-  
5 ducted enabled us to begin developing a new  
6 type of strategic weapon that would carry mas-  
7 sive nuclear ordnance”;

8 (E) “[b]y the way, we have yet to choose  
9 names for these two new strategic weapons, the  
10 global range cruise missile and the unmanned  
11 underwater vehicle. We are waiting for sugges-  
12 tions from the Defense Ministry”;

13 (F) “A real technological breakthrough is  
14 the development of a strategic missile system  
15 with fundamentally new combat equipment—a  
16 gliding wing unit, which has also been success-  
17 fully tested . . . [w]e called it the Avangard”;  
18 and

19 (G) “I want to specifically emphasize that  
20 the newly developed strategic arms—in fact,  
21 new types of strategic weapons—are not the re-  
22 sult of something left over from the Soviet  
23 Union. Of course, we relied on some ideas from  
24 our ingenious predecessors. But everything I  
25 have described today is the result of the last

1           several years, the product of dozens of research  
2           organizations, design bureaus and institute.”.

3           (3) During the House Armed Services Com-  
4           mittee hearing on April 12, 2018, Secretary of De-  
5           fense James Mattis was asked whether Russia  
6           should honor the terms of the treaty and limit its  
7           new strategic offensive arms under the New START  
8           Treaty as it requires and he stated, “Sir, I believe  
9           they should.”.

10           (4) At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
11           Hearing on September 18, 2018, Under Secretary of  
12           State for Arms Control and International Security  
13           Andrea Thompson stated that, “The value of any  
14           arms control agreement is derived from our treaty  
15           partners maintaining compliance with their obliga-  
16           tions and avoiding actions that result in mistrust  
17           and the potential for miscalculation. Russia con-  
18           tinues to violate a series of arms control obligations  
19           that undermine the trust the United States can  
20           place in treaties.”.

21           (5) At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
22           Hearing on September 18, 2018, Deputy Undersec-  
23           retary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg  
24           stated that—

1 (A) “The bottom line is that arms control  
2 with Russia is troubled because the Russian  
3 Federation apparently believes it need only  
4 abide by the agreements that suit it. As a re-  
5 sult, the credibility of all international agree-  
6 ments with Russia is at risk”; and

7 (B) “Any decision on extending the treaty  
8 will, and should be, based on a realistic assess-  
9 ment of whether the New START treaty re-  
10 mains in our national security interests in light  
11 of overall Russian arms control behavior”.

12 (b) LIMITATION.—Notwithstanding any other provi-  
13 sion of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated or oth-  
14 erwise made available for fiscal year 2019 and subsequent  
15 fiscal years may be obligated or expended to extend the  
16 implementation of the New START Treaty beyond the  
17 current expiration date in 2021 unless the President cer-  
18 tifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

19 (1) extending the New START Treaty is in the  
20 national security interest of the United States; and

21 (2) the Russian Federation has—

22 (A) agreed to include all covered Russian  
23 systems under the limits set by the New  
24 START Treaty; and

1 (B) per paragraph (a)(12) of the Resolu-  
2 tion of Ratification for the New START Treaty  
3 adopted in the Senate on December 22, 2010  
4 (Treaty Document 111–5), entered into an  
5 agreement with the United States to address  
6 the disparity between the nonstrategic (tactical)  
7 nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Fed-  
8 eration and of the United States by securing  
9 and reducing in a verifiable manner Russian  
10 tactical nuclear weapons.

11 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

12 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
13 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
14 mittees” means—

15 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of  
16 the Senate and the Committee on Armed Serv-  
17 ices of the House of Representatives; and

18 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of  
19 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-  
20 fairs of the House of Representatives.

21 (2) NEW START TREATY.—The term “New  
22 START Treaty” means the Treaty between the  
23 United States of America and the Russian Federa-  
24 tion on Measures for the Further Reduction and  
25 Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at

1 Prague, April 8, 2010, and entered into force Feb-  
2 ruary 5, 2011.

3 (3) COVERED RUSSIAN SYSTEMS.—The term  
4 “covered Russian systems” means the following:

5 (A) The heavy intercontinental missile sys-  
6 tem known as “Sarmat”, or otherwise identi-  
7 fied.

8 (B) An air-launched nuclear-powered  
9 cruise missile known as “X-101”, or otherwise  
10 identified.

11 (C) An unmanned underwater vehicle  
12 known as “Status 6”, or otherwise identified.

13 (D) The long-distance guided flight  
14 hypersonic weapons system known by  
15 “Avanguard”, or otherwise identified.

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