[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2736 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 616
115th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2736
To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive,
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific
region, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
April 24, 2018
Mr. Gardner (for himself, Mr. Markey, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Young,
Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Perdue, Mr. Graham, Mr. Coons, and Mr. Kaine)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations
October 3 (legislative day, September 28), 2018
Reported by Mr. Corker, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive,
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific
region, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018''.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:</DELETED>
<DELETED>Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
<DELETED>Sec. 2. Findings.
<DELETED>Sec. 3. Statement of policy on United States engagement in the
Indo-Pacific region.
<DELETED>TITLE I--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC REGION
<DELETED>Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
<DELETED>Sec. 102. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
<DELETED>Sec. 103. United States-China relationship.
<DELETED>Sec. 104. United States-India strategic partnership.
<DELETED>Sec. 105. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
<DELETED>Sec. 106. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral
security partnership.
<DELETED>Sec. 107. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
<DELETED>Sec. 108. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
<DELETED>Sec. 109. Commitment to Taiwan.
<DELETED>Sec. 110. North Korea strategy.
<DELETED>Sec. 111. New Zealand and the Pacific islands.
<DELETED>Sec. 112. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of
international law.
<DELETED>Sec. 113. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
<DELETED>Sec. 114. Cybersecurity cooperation.
<DELETED>Sec. 115. Nuclear nonproliferation and arms control in the
Indo-Pacific region.
<DELETED>TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC REGION
<DELETED>Sec. 201. Findings; sense of Congress.
<DELETED>Sec. 202. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and
regional economic summits.
<DELETED>Sec. 203. United States-ASEAN Economic Partnership.
<DELETED>Sec. 204. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
<DELETED>Sec. 205. Intellectual property protection.
<DELETED>Sec. 206. Energy programs and initiatives.
<DELETED>Sec. 207. Lower Mekong Initiative.
<DELETED>TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
REGION
<DELETED>Sec. 301. Findings.
<DELETED>Sec. 302. Trafficking-in-persons.
<DELETED>Sec. 303. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people
engagement.
<DELETED>Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions and suspension of United
States assistance.
<DELETED>Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations.
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) The Indo-Pacific region--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) represents nearly \1/2\ of the global
population;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) is home to some of the most dynamic
economies in the world; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) poses security challenges that
threaten to undermine United States national security
interests, regional peace, and global
stability.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) The core tenants of the United States-backed
international system are being challenged with increasingly
coercive behavior, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) China's illegal construction and
militarization of artificial features in the South
China Sea;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) North Korea's acceleration of its
nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the increased presence throughout
Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to in
this Act as ``ISIS'') and other international terrorist
organizations that threaten the United
States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region
continues to transform, presenting both opportunities and
challenges to United States economic interests.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) The United States has a fundamental interest
in defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the
Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in that region
have improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-
Pacific countries continue to be human rights abusers and there
are serious concerns with political rights and civil liberties
throughout the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Without strong leadership from the United
States, the international system, fundamentally rooted in the
rule of law, may wither, to the detriment of United States,
regional, and global interests. It is imperative that the
United States continue to play a leading role in the Indo-
Pacific region by--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) defending peace and
security;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) advancing economic prosperity;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) promoting respect for fundamental
human rights.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the
Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of
hearings on United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific
region, in which--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) experts, including Representative
Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami
Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador Derek Mitchell,
Ambassador Robert King, Mr. Murray Hiebert, and others
detailed the security challenges, economic
opportunities, and imperatives of promoting rule of
law, human rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific
region; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon
Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University, testified, ``As
realistic students of history, Chinese leaders
recognize that the role the U.S. has played since World
War II as the architect and underwriter of regional
stability and security has been essential to the rise
of Asia, including China itself. But they believe that
as the tide that brought the U.S. to Asia recedes,
America must leave with it. Much as Britain's role in
the Western Hemisphere faded at the beginning of the
twentieth century, so must America's role in Asia as
the region's historic superpower resumes its
place.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) The United States National Security Strategy
(referred to in this Act as the ``National Security
Strategy''), which was released in December 2017, states--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) ``A geopolitical competition between
free and repressive visions of world order is taking
place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which
stretches from the west coast of India to the western
shores of the United States, represents the most
populous and economically dynamic part of the world.
The U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific
extends back to the earliest days of our republic.'';
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) ``Our vision for the Indo-Pacific
excludes no nation. We will redouble our commitment to
established alliances and partnerships, while expanding
and deepening relationships with new partners that
share respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal
trade, and the rule of law. We will reinforce our
commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful
resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in
accordance with international law. We will work with
allies and partners to achieve complete, verifiable,
and irreversible denuclearization on the Korean
Peninsula and preserve the non-proliferation regime in
Northeast Asia.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC REGION.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the policy of the United States to develop, and to
commit to, a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive,
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific
region that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) preserves peace through strength by securing
the vital national security interests of the United
States;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) promotes American prosperity by advancing the
economic interests of the United States;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) advances American influence by reflecting the
values of the American people and universal human rights;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) accords with and supports the rule of law and
international norms.</DELETED>
<DELETED>TITLE I--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC REGION</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated
for the Department of State, the United States Agency for International
Development, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense
$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which
shall be used--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to advance United States foreign policy
interests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in
recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and programs
in the furtherance of United States strategy;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to bolster the United States military presence
and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region for the purpose of
deterring and defending against provocative actions, including
by improving the defense infrastructure and critical munitions
stockpiles of the United States Armed Forces;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to improve the defense capacity of partner
nations to resist coercion and to deter and defend against
security threats, including through foreign military financing
and international military education and training
programs;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral
exercises, particularly with our most highly-capable allies and
partners, to meet strategic challenges, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) certain destabilizing activities of
the People's Republic of China; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear
and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) to build new counterterrorism partnership
programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of
ISIS and other terrorist organizations that pose a significant
threat to the United States, our allies, and our citizens'
interests abroad; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) to increase maritime domain awareness programs
in Southeast Asia--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) by expanding the scope of naval and
coast guard training efforts with Southeast Asian
countries;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) through intelligence sharing and other
information-sharing efforts; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) through multilateral exercises,
including by involving Japan, Australia, and India in
such efforts and exercises.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Countering China's Influence To Undermine the
International System.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a)
shall be made available for United States Government efforts to counter
the strategic influence of the People's Republic of China, in
accordance with the strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat.
536) and in consultation with the appropriate committees of
Congress.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Burma.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to
subsection (a) may be made available for the programs, initiatives, or
interactions that may benefit the defense sector of the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar (historically known as ``Burma'').</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Philippines.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
subsection (a) may not be made available for counternarcotics
assistance (other than maritime programs) for the Philippine National
Police unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the
appropriate committees of Congress that the Government of the
Philippines has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy
that complies with international norms of due process.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (e) Cambodia.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection
(a) may not be made available for certain United States assistance
programs that benefit the Government of Cambodia.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (f) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 102. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
REGION.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) United States-Japan Alliance.--The United States
Government--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan,
done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and subsequent security
agreements;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance
between the United States and Japan in promoting peace and
security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and Japan.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) United States-Republic of Korea Alliance.--The United
States Government--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty
Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, done at
Washington October 1, 1953, and subsequent security
agreements;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance
between the United States and South Korea in promoting peace
and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and the Republic of Korea.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) United States-Australia Alliance.--The United States
Government--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between
Australia and the United States of America, done at San
Francisco September 1, 1951, and subsequent security agreements
between these 2 nations;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance
between the United States and Australia in promoting peace and
security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and Australia.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) United States-Philippines Alliance.--The United States
Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, done at
Washington August 30, 1951, and subsequent bilateral security
agreements, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done
at Manila April 28, 2014.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (e) Thailand.--The United States Government is committed
to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance
Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17,
1950;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,
done at Manila September 8, 1954; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) all subsequent bilateral security agreements,
including the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense
Alliance, issued in Bangkok November 15, 2012.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 103. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--The United States Government--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions
that seek--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) to further constrain space for civil
society within China; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) to undermine a rules-based order in
the Indo-Pacific region;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) encourages China to play a constructive role
in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the
rule of law and international norms;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and
comprehensive relationship with China--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) by expanding areas of cooperation;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) by addressing areas of disagreement,
including over human rights, economic policies, and
maritime security; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) is committed to working with China on shared
regional and global challenges, especially--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) upholding and strengthening the rules-
based international system; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) welcome China's decision to change course and
pursue responsible engagement on global issues;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) encourage China to play a constructive role in
the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that
undermine the rules-based international system.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 104. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--The United States Government--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic
partnership between the United States and India in promoting
peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and India; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) is committed to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the New Framework for the United
States-India Defense Relationship, done at Arlington,
Virginia June 28, 2005;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the United States-India Defense
Technology and Trade Initiative, launched in
2012;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the
Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on
January 25, 2015; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) all related and subsequent bilateral
and security agreements.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) India as Major Defense Partner.--Congress makes the
following findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130
Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) requires the recognition of
India as a major defense partner.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) The designation of India as a major defense
partner, which is unique to India--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) institutionalizes the progress made to
facilitate defense trade and technology sharing between
the United States and India;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) elevates defense trade and technology
cooperation between the United States and India to a
level commensurate with the closest allies and partners
of the United States;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) facilitates technology sharing between
the United States and India, including license-free
access to a wide range of dual-use technologies, after
taking into account national security concerns;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) facilitates joint exercises,
coordination on defense strategy and policy, military
exchanges, and port calls in support of defense
cooperation between the United States and
India.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 105. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of the Senate that the United States
should--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) support and affirm the elevation of the United
States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
relationship to a strategic partnership;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build
a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economically
integrated, and socially responsible community of nations that
has common rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are
consistent with international law and the principles of a
rules-based Indo-Pacific community;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster
greater integration among its members;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) recognize the value of--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) ASEAN engagement with economic,
political, and security partners within Asia and
elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the European
Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic
of Korea, and Taiwan; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) strategic economic initiatives, such
as the U.S.-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a
commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community
and build upon economic relationships in the Indo-
Pacific region;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) support efforts by the nations comprising
ASEAN--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) to address maritime and territorial
disputes in a constructive manner; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) to pursue claims through peaceful,
diplomatic, and legitimate regional and international
arbitration mechanisms, consistent with international
law, including through the adoption of a code of
conduct in the South China Sea to further promote peace
and stability in the Indo-Pacific region;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) support efforts by United States partners and
allies in ASEAN--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) to enhance maritime capability and
maritime domain awareness;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) to protect unhindered access to, and
use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pacific
region that are critical to ensuring the security and
free flow of commerce;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) to counter piracy;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) to disrupt illicit maritime
trafficking activities such as the trafficking of
persons, goods, and drugs; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities
of countries or regional organizations to respond to
emerging threats to maritime security in the Asia-
Pacific region; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common
approach to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration's ruling with respect to the case between the
Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of
China.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 106. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRILATERAL
SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that the President should
develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security cooperation
between the United States, South Korea, and Japan, including missile
defense, intelligence-sharing, and other defense-related
initiatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 107. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the security dialogue between the United
States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to addressing
pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in
order to promote--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) a rules-based order;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) respect for international law;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather
than to replace, current mechanisms.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 108. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Indonesia.--The United States Government is committed
to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership,
done in Washington November 9, 2010;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense
Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and
security agreements between the United States and
Indonesia.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Malaysia.--The United States Government is committed
to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the U.S.-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership,
done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the
Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America
and Malaysia, done in Washington September 13, 2017;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and
security agreements between the United States and
Malaysia.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Singapore.--The United States Government is committed
to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the
United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a
Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at
Washington July 12, 2005;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,
done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and
security agreements between the United States and
Singapore.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Vietnam.--The United States Government is committed
to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership,
done at Washington December 16, 2013;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on
Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, done
at Washington May 31, 2017; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and
security agreements between the United States and
Vietnam.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should deepen the diplomatic, economic, and security
cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime security and
counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Vietnam.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 109. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) United States Commitment to Taiwan.--It is the policy
of the United States to faithfully enforce all existing United States
Government commitments to Taiwan, as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations
Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8) and the Six Assurances agreed to by
President Ronald Reagan in July 1982.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Arms Sales to Taiwan.--The President shall conduct
regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to
meet the existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic
of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and
integrate asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and air
defense capabilities, into its military forces.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Travel.--The President shall authorize the travel of
high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the
Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135).</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 110. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following
findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) The Government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the international
community by illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic
missile programs, in violation of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and
2397 (2017).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) The Government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against
its own people and citizens of other countries, including the
United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) The United States is committed to pursuing a
peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement,
in close concert with its partners.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Policy of the United States With Respect to Sanctions
Against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the
United States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to
activities of the Government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such
government, or other persons in accordance with Executive Order
13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional
sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive Order 13694
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of
certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled
activities), Executive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note;
relating to blocking the property of the Government of North
Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohibiting certain
transactions with respect to North Korea), and Executive Order
13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating to imposing additional
sanctions with respect to North Korea), as such Executive
orders are in effect on the day before the date of the
enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit activities
described in such Executive orders, including actions in
violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718
(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016),
2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after
terminating any sanction with respect to the activities of the
Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a
person acting for or on behalf of such government, or any other
person provided for in an Executive order listed in subsection
(a), the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees regarding the cessation of
any illicit activity that violates United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017)
by such Government or person.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of the
President pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Policy of the United States With Respect to
Negotiation on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Nuclear and
Ballistic Missile Programs.--It is the policy of the United States that
the objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic
missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be the
complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of such
programs.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Report on a Strategy To Address the Threats Posed by,
and the Capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee of the
Secretary, shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that describes actions taken by the
United States to address the threats posed by, and the
capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Elements.--Each report required under
paragraph (1) shall include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the
United States to identify strategies and policies,
including an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses
of such strategies and policies--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) to achieve peaceful
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) to eliminate the threat posed
by the ballistic missile program of the
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) an assessment of--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) potential road maps toward
peaceful denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula and the elimination of the nuclear
and ballistic missile threats posed by the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) specific actions that the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea would
need to take for each such roadmap to become
viable;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) a summary of the United States
strategy to increase international coordination and
cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or
multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement and
interdiction, to address the threat posed by the
nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which shall
include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) a description of the actions
taken by the Secretary of State, or designees
of the Secretary, to consult with governments
around the world, with the purpose of inducing
such governments to diplomatically and
economically isolate the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) a description of the actions
taken by such governments to implement measures
to diplomatically and economically isolate the
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) a list of countries with
governments that the Secretary has determined
are noncooperative with respect to implementing
measures to diplomatically and economically
isolate the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iv) a plan of action to engage,
and increase cooperation with respect to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the
governments of the countries on the list
described in clause (iii); and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the
national export control regimes of countries that are
members of the United Nations, and multilateral export
control regimes, that are necessary to enforce
sanctions imposed with respect to the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea pursuant to United Nations
Security Council resolutions; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) an action plan to encourage and assist
countries in adopting and using authorities necessary
to enforce export controls required by United Nations
Security Council resolutions.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Form of report.--Each report required under
this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) representatives of the United States shall use
the voice and vote of the United States in all international
organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from such
organizations, until such time as the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea meets its commitments under United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087
(2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017),
2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Secretary of State may take such actions
as are necessary to induce countries to take measures to
diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) reducing the diplomatic presence in
the United States of countries with governments that
the Secretary has determined are noncooperative with
respect to implementing measures to diplomatically and
economically isolate the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) reducing the diplomatic presence of
the United States in such countries; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) the Secretary of State may terminate or reduce
United States foreign assistance to countries enabling the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 111. NEW ZEALAND AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the United States supports strengthening
diplomatic, economic, and the security relationship with New
Zealand;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the United States supports strong United
States engagement with the nations of the South Pacific,
including Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated
States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa,
the Solomon Islands Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) the United States recognizes the strong
historical, strategic and cultural ties to these
countries;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) the United States should deepen its
cooperation with New Zealand and the nations of the South
Pacific in areas of mutual interest, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) fisheries and marine resource
conservation;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) environmental challenges and
resilience;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) global health;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) development and trade; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) people-to-people ties; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) the United States should provide robust
foreign assistance to the Pacific islands.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 112. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; PROMOTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Freedom of Navigation.--It is the policy of the United
States--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of
Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation and
overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance
with applicable international law; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations
to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea,
in accordance with applicable international law.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Joint Indo-Pacific Diplomatic Strategy.--It is the
sense of Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic
strategy that includes working with United States allies and partners
to conduct joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations
in the Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South
China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefitting
all countries.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 113. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and
other appropriate officials, shall submit a report to the appropriate
committees of Congress that contains an assessment of the current and
future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and
other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that pose a
significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its citizens
interests abroad.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-
linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters
in Southeast Asia;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the estimated number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-
linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters
expected to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the
Middle East;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) the current resources available to combat the
threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent
extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the
additional resources required to combat such threat;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of
ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist
group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively in countries
such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) a description of the capabilities and
resources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent
extremist groups; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) a list of additional United States resources
and capabilities that the Department of Defense recommends
providing to governments in Southeast Asia to combat violent
extremist groups.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Definitions.--In this section--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the term ``ISIS'' means the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 114. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United
States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity
threats, including state-sponsored threats;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to share best practices to combat such
threats; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to strengthen resilience against
misinformation and propaganda.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to build capacity for responding to
cybersecurity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to enhance cooperation between the United
States and nations in such region for combating such
threats.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 115. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC REGION.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--The United States Government--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear weapons,
and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to
international peace and security;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique
challenge posed to regional and global stability by the illicit
use, and the proliferation to and from North Korea, of
sensitive nuclear and missile technologies;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) notes efforts by China and Russia--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) to expand and modernize their
respective nuclear arsenals; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear
technologies; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many
countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a
variety of peaceful applications.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States Government should undertake all reasonable and
appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms control and nuclear
nonproliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific region to limit the
further spread of potentially dangerous and destabilizing conventional
and nuclear weapons.</DELETED>
<DELETED>TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC REGION</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 201. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following
findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) According to the United States Chamber of
Commerce, by 2030--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) 66 percent of the global middle class
population will be in Asia; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) 59 percent of middle class consumption
will be in Asia.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) According to the Asian Development Bank--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) Asian countries have signed 140
bilateral or regional trade agreements; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian
countries are under negotiation or concluded and
awaiting entry into force.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) The United States has signed free trade
agreements with 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region, namely
Australia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) The member states of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section as
``ASEAN''), as a group--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) represent the fifth largest economy in
the world; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) have a combined gross domestic product
of $2,400,000,000,000.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member states
grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value
of bilateral trade between the United States and ASEAN member
states has increased by 78 percent since 2004.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by
companies in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United
States was $77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade
surplus of services provided to consumers in ASEAN member
states was $8,000,000,000.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) According to U.S.-ASEAN Business Council,
Inc., goods and services exported from the United States to
ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in the United
States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) According to the Business Roundtable--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were responsible for a
combined 40 percent of global gross domestic product in
2017; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) United States bilateral trade with the
other nations referred to in subparagraph (A) supports
15,600,000 jobs in the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) According to the United States National
Security Strategy--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) ``remain centerpieces of the Indo-
Pacific's regional architecture and platforms for
promoting an order based on freedom''; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the United States will ``work with
partners to build a network of states dedicated to free
markets and protected from forces that would subvert
their sovereignty.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
trade between the United States and the nations in the Indo-Pacific
region is vitally important to the United States economy, United States
exports, and jobs in the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 202. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, AND
REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress supports--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade
agreements that increase United States employment and expand
the economy;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) formal economic dialogues that include
concrete outcomes;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties
between the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific
region;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services
Agreement and the Environmental Goods Agreement that include
several major Asian economies; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-
level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the
East Asia Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States
economic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP.</DELETED>
<DELETED> The President, acting through the United States Trade
Representative, is authorized to negotiate a comprehensive economic
engagement framework with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 204. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE
FACILITATION.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--The President is encouraged to produce a
robust and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilitation
strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out
subsection (a).</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 205. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--The President is encouraged to impose
penalties on all entities found to be complicit in the theft of United
States intellectual property, in accordance with applicable law,
including commercial cyber-enabled theft.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President
shall submit a report to Congress that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) describes the efforts of the United States
Government to combat intellectual property and commercial
cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly
the People's Republic of China; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of
priority areas for United States engagement and capacity
building assistance.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to sponsor
bilateral and multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the
identified priority areas described in the annual report required under
subsection (b).</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 206. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Indo-Pacific Energy Strategy.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Energy, shall create a United States Government strategy to
increase United States exports of energy to the nations in the
Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary
to carry out paragraph (1).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Reliable Energy Partnerships.--It is the sense of
Congress that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the President should establish bilateral and
regional initiatives to increase energy security in the Indo-
Pacific region;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the United States should authorize the supply
of liquefied natural gas to the nations in the Indo-Pacific
region; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) the United States should create a dedicated
program, in partnership with the private sector and
multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable
electricity in Myanmar (historically known as
``Burma'').</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 207. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, should increase regional engagement in the areas of
environment, health, education, and infrastructure development with the
Lower Mekong countries, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) assisting to develop programs that focus on
forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on
sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the goal of
preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to
safe drinking water;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) assisting with education enrollment and
broadband internet connectivity, particularly English training
and connectivity in rural communities; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong
countries, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) helping regional partners to track and
treat malaria and tuberculosis.</DELETED>
<DELETED>TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
REGION</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 301. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress finds that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the promotion of human rights and respect for
democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United
States national security interests;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) there are serious concerns with the rule of
law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all been identified by
Freedom House as ``Not Free'';</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) there have been recent disturbing human rights
developments in--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been
identified by Freedom House as ``Not Free'';
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Philippines, which has been
identified by Freedom House as ``Partly Free'';
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) according to the National Security Strategy,
the United States--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) will ``support, with our words and
actions, those who live under oppressive regimes and
who seek freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of
law'';</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) ``may use diplomacy, sanctions, and
other tools to isolate states and leaders who threaten
our interests and whose actions run contrary to our
values''; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) ``will support efforts to advance
women's equality, protect the rights of women and
girls, and promote women and youth empowerment
programs.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 302. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts
to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-Pacific
region.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 303. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE
ENGAGEMENT.</DELETED>
<DELETED> The Secretary of State should--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional
dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding
human rights and religious freedom violations;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people
exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly
programs engaging young leaders; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-
building programs emphasizing civil society
development.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED
STATES ASSISTANCE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Sanctions.--The President is authorized to impose
sanctions, in accordance with applicable law, including financial
penalties and visa bans, on any individual or entity that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms;
or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) engages in censorship activities.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Suspension of Foreign Assistance.--The President is
authorized, in accordance with applicable law, to terminate, suspend,
or otherwise alter United States economic assistance to any country
that has engaged in serious violations of human rights or religious
freedoms.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Promotion of Democracy in the Indo-Pacific Region.--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $150,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019
through 2023, to promote democracy, strengthen civil society,
human rights, rule of law, transparency, and accountability in
the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Democracy in china.--Amounts appropriated
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made available for United
States Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the People's
Republic of China.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Tibet.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be made available for nongovernmental
organizations to support activities preserving cultural
traditions and promoting sustainable development, education,
and environmental conservation in Tibetan communities in the
Tibet Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in
China, India, and Nepal.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Freedom of Information to North Korea.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $10,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019
through 2023, to implement programs to enhance freedom of
information efforts with regard to North Korea.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
thereafter through September 30, 2023, the Broadcasting Board
of Governors shall submit a report to Congress that describes
the implementation of the programs described in paragraph
(1).</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act of 2018''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
Sec. 101. Policy.
Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy.
TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
Sec. 203. United States-China relationship.
Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership.
Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security
partnership.
Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan.
Sec. 210. North Korea strategy.
Sec. 211. New Zealand.
Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands.
Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of
international law.
Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation.
Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.
TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional
economic summits.
Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership.
Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection.
Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives.
Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative.
Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource
conservation.
Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women's economic rights.
TITLE IV--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons.
Sec. 403. Freedom of the press.
Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel.
Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people
engagement.
Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy.
Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea.
Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension
of United States assistance.
Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights and environmental defenders.
Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Indo-Pacific region--
(A) represents nearly 50 percent of the global
population;
(B) is home to some of the most dynamic economies
in the world; and
(C) poses security challenges that threaten to
undermine United States national security interests,
regional peace, and global stability.
(2) The core tenets of the United States-backed
international system are being challenged, including by--
(A) China's illegal construction and militarization
of artificial features in the South China Sea and
coercive economic practices;
(B) North Korea's acceleration of its nuclear and
ballistic missile capabilities; and
(C) the increased presence throughout Southeast
Asia of the Islamic State (referred to in this Act as
``ISIS'') and other international terrorist
organizations that threaten the United States.
(3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region continues
to transform, presenting opportunities and challenges to United
States economic interests.
(4) The United States has a fundamental interest in
defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the
Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in the region have
improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific
governments continue to commit human rights abuses and place
restrictions on basic human rights and political and civil
liberties.
(5) Without strong leadership from the United States, the
international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of law,
may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional, and
global interests. It is imperative that the United States
continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by--
(A) defending peace and security;
(B) advancing economic prosperity; and
(C) promoting respect for fundamental human rights.
(6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific,
and International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of hearings on
United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, in which--
(A) experts, including Representative Randy Forbes,
Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert
Orr, Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King,
Mr. Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security
challenges, economic opportunities, and imperatives of
promoting the rule of law, human rights, and democracy,
in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon
Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University, testified, ``As
realistic students of history, Chinese leaders
recognize that the role the United States has played
since World War II as the architect and underwriter of
regional stability and security has been essential to
the rise of Asia, including China itself. But they
believe that as the tide that brought the United States
to Asia recedes, America must leave with it. Much as
Britain's role in the Western Hemisphere faded at the
beginning of the twentieth century, so must America's
role in Asia as the region's historic superpower
resumes its place.''.
(7) The United States National Security Strategy (referred
to in this Act as the ``National Security Strategy''), which
was released in December 2017, states--
(A) ``A geopolitical competition between free and
repressive visions of world order is taking place in
the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches
from the west coast of India to the western shores of
the United States, represents the most populous and
economically dynamic part of the world. The United
States interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends
back to the earliest days of our republic.''; and
(B) ``Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no
nation. We will redouble our commitment to established
alliances and partnerships, while expanding and
deepening relationships with new partners that share
respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and
the rule of law. We will reinforce our commitment to
freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of
territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with
international law. We will work with allies and
partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and
irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula
and preserve the non-proliferation regime in Northeast
Asia.''.
TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
SEC. 101. POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to develop and commit to a
long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and
principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region that--
(1) secures the vital national security interests of the
United States and our allies and partners;
(2) promotes American prosperity and economic interests by
advancing economic growth and development of a rules-based
Indo-Pacific economic community;
(3) advances American influence by reflecting the values of
the American people and universal human rights;
(4) supports functional problem-solving regional
architecture; and
(5) accords with and supports the rule of law and
international norms.
SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.
It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States--
(1) to work with United States allies--
(A) to confront common challenges;
(B) to improve information sharing;
(C) to increase defense investment and trade;
(D) to ensure interoperability; and
(E) to strengthen shared capabilities;
(2) to strengthen relationships with partners who--
(A) share mutual respect for the rule of law;
(B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade; and
(C) understand the importance of civil society, the
rule of law, and transparent governance;
(3) to support functional problem-solving regional
architecture, including through the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East
Asia Summit;
(4) to emphasize the commitment of the United States--
(A) to freedom of navigation under international
law;
(B) to promote peaceful resolutions of maritime and
territorial disputes; and
(C) to expand security and defense cooperation with
allies and partners, as appropriate;
(5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve complete,
verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea;
(6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule of law,
and advocate for transparent governance;
(7) to develop and grow the economy through private sector
partnerships between the United States and Indo-Pacific
partners;
(8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade agreements
in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner and build a network of
partners in the Indo-Pacific committed to free markets;
(9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific countries--
(A) to pursue high-quality and transparent
infrastructure projects;
(B) to maintain unimpeded commerce, open sea lines
or air ways, and communication; and
(C) to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes;
and
(10) to sustain a strong military presence in the Indo-
Pacific region and strengthen security relationships with
allies and partners throughout the region.
TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated for the Department of State, the United States Agency for
International Development, and, as appropriate, the Department of
Defense, $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023,
which shall be used--
(1) to advance United States foreign policy interests and
objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the
value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the furtherance
of United States strategy;
(2) to improve the defense capacity of partner nations to
resist coercion and deter and defend against security threats,
including through foreign military financing and international
military education and training programs;
(3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral
engagements, particularly with the United States' most highly-
capable allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges,
including--
(A) certain destabilizing activities of the
People's Republic of China; and
(B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear and
ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea;
(4) to build new counterterrorism partnership programs in
Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and other
terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat to the
United States, its allies, and its citizens' interests abroad;
and
(5) to increase maritime domain awareness programs in South
Asia and Southeast Asia--
(A) by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard
training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;
(B) by expanding cooperation with democratic
partners in South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal,
and Sri Lanka;
(C) through intelligence sharing and other
information-sharing efforts; and
(D) through multilateral engagements, including by
involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts.
(c) Countering China's Influence to Undermine the International
System.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made
available for United States Government efforts to counter the strategic
influence of the People's Republic of China, in accordance with the
strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014
(division K of Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation
with the appropriate committees of Congress.
(d) Burma.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection
(b) may be made available for International Military Education and
Training and Foreign Military Financing Programs for the armed forces
of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as
``Burma'').
(e) Philippines.--
(1) In general.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant
to subsection (b) may be made available for counternarcotics
assistance for the Philippine National Police unless the
Secretary of State determines and reports to the appropriate
committees of Congress that the Government of the Philippines
has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy
that is consistent with international human rights standards,
including investigating and prosecuting individuals who are
credibly alleged to have ordered, committed, or covered up
extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of human
rights in the conduct of counternarcotics operations.
(2) Exception.--The limitation under paragraph (1) shall
not apply to funds made available--
(A) for drug demand reduction, maritime programs,
or transnational interdiction programs; or
(B) to support for the development of such
counternarcotics strategy, after consultation with the
appropriate committees of Congress.
(f) Cambodia.--None of the amounts authorized to be appropriated
pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available for United States
assistance programs that benefit the Government of Cambodia unless the
Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate
congressional committees that the requirements under section 7043(b)(1)
of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (Public Law
115-141) have been met.
SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) United States-Japan Alliance.--The United States Government--
(1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between the United States and Japan, done at
Washington, January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent
bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or
before the date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and Japan in promoting peace and security in the
Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and Japan.
(b) United States-Republic of Korea Alliance.--The United States
Government--
(1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington
October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral
security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the
date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and South Korea in promoting peace and security
in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and the Republic of Korea.
(c) United States-Australia Alliance.--The United States
Government--
(1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between Australia
and the United States of America, done at San Francisco
September 1, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral
security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the
date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and Australia in promoting peace and security in
the Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and Australia.
(d) United States-Philippines Alliance.--The United States
Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, done at
Washington August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral
security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 2014.
(e) Thailand.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between
the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 1950;
(2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at
Manila September 8, 1954; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral security
agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act, including the Joint Vision Statement
for the Thai-United States Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok
November 15, 2012.
SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.
(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions that
seek--
(A) to further constrain space for civil society
within China; and
(B) to undermine a rules-based order in the Indo-
Pacific region;
(2) encourages China to play a constructive role in world
affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the rule of law
and international norms;
(3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and
comprehensive relationship with China--
(A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and
(B) by addressing areas of disagreement, including
over human rights, economic policies, and maritime
security; and
(4) is committed to working with China on shared regional
and global challenges, especially--
(A) upholding and strengthening the rules-based
international system; and
(B) the denuclearization of North Korea.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should--
(1) welcome a decision by China to change course and pursue
a responsible results-oriented relationship with the United
States and engagement on global issues;
(2) encourage China to play a constructive role in the
Indo-Pacific region and globally; and
(3) continue to call out Chinese actions that undermine the
rules-based international system.
SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.
(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic partnership
between the United States and India in promoting peace and
security in the Indo-Pacific region;
(2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and India; and
(3) is committed to--
(A) the New Framework for the United States-India
Defense Relationship, done at Arlington, Virginia on
June 28, 2005;
(B) the United States-India Defense Technology and
Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;
(C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific
and Indian Ocean Region, announced on January 25, 2015;
(D) the United States-India Joint Statement on
Prosperity Through Partnership, issued on June 26,
2017; and
(E) all related and subsequent bilateral and
security agreements and arrangements concluded as of
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) India as Major Defense Partner.--Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130
Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) requires the recognition of
India as a major defense partner.
(2) The designation of India as a major defense partner,
which is unique to India--
(A) institutionalizes the progress made to
facilitate defense trade and technology sharing between
the United States and India;
(B) elevates defense trade and technology
cooperation between the United States and India to a
level commensurate with the closest allies and partners
of the United States;
(C) facilitates technology sharing between the
United States and India, including license-free access
to a wide range of dual-use technologies, after taking
into account national security concerns; and
(D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination on
defense strategy and policy, military exchanges, and
port calls in support of defense cooperation between
the United States and India.
SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should--
(1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the United
States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in
this section as ``ASEAN'') relationship to a strategic
partnership;
(2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build a strong,
stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, and
socially responsible community of nations that has common
rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent
with international law and the principles of a rules-based
Indo-Pacific community;
(3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater
integration among its members;
(4) recognize the value of--
(A) ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and
security partners within Asia and elsewhere, including
Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan;
and
(B) strategic economic initiatives, such as the
United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a
commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community
and build upon economic relationships in the Indo-
Pacific region;
(5) support efforts by the nations comprising ASEAN--
(A) to address maritime and territorial disputes in
a constructive manner; and
(B) to pursue claims through peaceful, diplomatic,
and legitimate regional and international arbitration
mechanisms, consistent with international law,
including through the adoption of a code of conduct in
the South China Sea to further promote peace and
stability in the Indo-Pacific region;
(6) support efforts by United States partners and allies in
ASEAN--
(A) to enhance maritime capability and maritime
domain awareness;
(B) to protect unhindered access to, and use of,
international waterways in the Asia-Pacific region that
are critical to ensuring the security and free flow of
commerce;
(C) to counter piracy;
(D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking
activities such as the trafficking of persons, goods,
and drugs; and
(E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of
countries or regional organizations to respond to
emerging threats to maritime security in the Asia-
Pacific region; and
(7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach
to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration's ruling with respect to the case between the
Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China.
(b) Report on Strategic Framework for Engagement With ASEAN.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees on a strategic framework to administer
programs, projects, and activities of the United States to
support diplomatic and economic engagement between the United
States and ASEAN member countries for the 10-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1)
shall address the following elements of United States strategy:
(A) Promoting commercial engagement between the
United States and member countries of ASEAN.
(B) Helping member countries of ASEAN use
sustainable, efficient, and innovative technologies in
their respective energy sectors.
(C) Supporting economic conditions in member
countries of ASEAN that promote innovation, the
creation of new businesses, sustainable growth, and the
education of the region's future innovators,
entrepreneurs, and business leaders.
(D) Working with member countries of ASEAN to
improve the policy and regulatory environment for
growth, trade, innovation, and investment.
(E) Supporting the regional integration objectives
of member countries of ASEAN under the ASEAN Economic
Community.
(F) Partnership opportunities with the governments
of other countries friendly to the United States that
have committed to a high set of standards for
investment and development with ASEAN, as determined by
the Secretary of State.
SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRILATERAL SECURITY
PARTNERSHIP.
It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a
strategy to deepen the trilateral security cooperation between the
United States, South Korea, and Japan, including missile defense,
intelligence-sharing, and other defense-related initiatives.
SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the security dialogue between the United States,
Australia, India, and Japan is vital to address pressing
security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to
promote--
(A) a rules-based order;
(B) respect for international law; and
(C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and
(2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than to
replace, current mechanisms.
SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
(a) Indonesia.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership,
done in Washington November 9, 2010;
(2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense
Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Indonesia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(b) Malaysia.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership,
done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;
(2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive
Partnership between the United States of America and Malaysia,
done in Washington September 13, 2017; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Malaysia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(c) Singapore.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer
Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at
Washington July 12, 2005;
(2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at
Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Singapore concluded on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(d) Vietnam.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership,
done at Washington December 16, 2013;
(2) the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on
Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;
(3) the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, done
at Washington May 31, 2017; and
(4) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Vietnam concluded on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation,
especially in the areas of maritime security and counterterrorism, with
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.
SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.
(a) United States Commitment to Taiwan.--It is the policy of the
United States--
(1) to support the close economic, political, and security
relationship between Taiwan and the United States;
(2) to faithfully enforce all existing United States
Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8), the 3 joint
communiques, and the Six Assurances agreed to by President
Ronald Reagan in July 1982; and
(3) to counter efforts to change the status quo and to
support peaceful resolution acceptable to both sides of the
Taiwan Strait.
(b) Arms Sales to Taiwan.--The President should conduct regular
transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the
existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic of China,
including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate
asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including undersea warfare and
air defense capabilities, into its military forces.
(c) Travel.--The President should encourage the travel of high-
level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan
Travel Act (Public Law 115-135).
SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by
illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile
programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013),
2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397
(2017 ).
(2) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own
people and citizens of other countries, including the United
States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.
(3) The United States is committed to pursuing a peaceful
denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, in close
concert with its partners.
(b) Policy of the United States With Respect to Sanctions Against
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
(1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to
activities of the Government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such
government, or other persons in accordance with Executive Order
13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional
sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive Order 13694
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of
certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled
activities), Executive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note;
relating to blocking the property of the Government of North
Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohibiting certain
transactions with respect to North Korea), and Executive Order
13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating to imposing additional
sanctions with respect to North Korea), as such Executive
orders are in effect on the day before the date of the
enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit activities
described in such Executive orders, including actions in
violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions
referred to in subsection (a)(1).
(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after terminating any
sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a person acting for
or on behalf of such government, or any other person provided
for in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the
Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees justifying the termination of the
sanction and explaining the relationship between such
termination and the cessation of any illicit activity that
violates any of the United Nations Security Council resolutions
referred to in subsection (a)(1) by such Government or person.
(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.).
(c) Policy of the United States With Respect to Negotiation on the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile
Programs.--It is the policy of the United States that the objective of
negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic missile programs
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be the complete,
verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of such programs.
(d) Report on a Strategy to Address the Threats Posed by, and the
Capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, shall
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees
that describes actions taken by the United States to address
the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea.
(2) Elements.--Each report required under paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the United
States to identify strategies and policies, including
an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of such
strategies and policies--
(i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
(ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the
ballistic missile program of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea;
(B) an assessment of--
(i) potential road maps toward peaceful
denuclearization of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea and the elimination of the
nuclear and ballistic missile threats posed by
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
(ii) specific actions that the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea would need to take
for each such roadmap to become viable;
(C) a summary of the United States strategy to
increase international coordination and cooperation,
whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally,
including sanctions enforcement and interdiction, to
address the threat posed by the nuclear and ballistic
missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, which shall include--
(i) a description of the actions taken by
the Secretary of State, or designees of the
Secretary, to consult with governments around
the world, with the purpose of inducing such
governments to fully implement the United
Nations Security Council resolutions referred
to in subsection (a)(1);
(ii) a description of the actions taken by
such governments to fully implement United
Nations Security Council resolutions related to
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(iii) a list of countries with governments
that the Secretary has determined are
noncooperative with respect to implementing the
United Nations Security Council resolutions
referred to in subsection (a)(1); and
(iv) a plan of action to engage, and
increase cooperation with respect to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the
governments of the countries on the list
described in clause (iii);
(D) an assessment of the adequacy of the national
export control regimes of countries that are members of
the United Nations, and multilateral export control
regimes, that are necessary to enforce sanctions
imposed with respect to the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea pursuant to the United Nations
Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection
(a)(1); and
(E) an action plan to encourage and assist
countries in adopting and using authorities necessary
to enforce export controls required by United Nations
Security Council resolutions.
(3) Form of report.--Each report required under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) representatives of the United States shall use the
voice and vote of the United States in all international
organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from such
organizations, until such time as the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea meets its commitments under the United
Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection
(a)(1); and
(2) the Secretary of State should work to induce countries
to meet their commitments under the United Nations Security
Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1), including
by considering appropriate adjustments to the diplomatic
posture and foreign assistance of the United States with
governments that the Secretary has determined are
noncooperative with respect to implementing the United Nations
Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1).
SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND.
The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on November 5, 2010,
which reaffirmed close ties and outlined future practical
cooperation between the United States and New Zealand;
(2) the Washington Declaration, signed on June 19, 2012,
which strengthened the defense relationship by providing a
framework and strategic guidance for security cooperation and
defense dialogues; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and New
Zealand concluded on or before the date of enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States
should--
(1) support strong United States engagement with the
nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;
(2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of the South
Pacific in areas of mutual interest, including--
(A) fisheries and marine resource conservation;
(B) environmental challenges and resilience;
(C) global health;
(D) development and trade; and
(E) people-to-people ties; and
(3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands,
as appropriate, to support the rule of law, good governance,
and economic development.
(b) United States-Compacts of Free Association.--It is the sense of
Congress that the Compacts of Free Association entered between the
United States and the Freely Associated States (Republic of Marshall
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of
Palau)--
(1) enhance the strategic posture of the United States in
the Western Pacific;
(2) reinforce United States regional commitment;
(3) preempt potential adversaries from establishing
positional advantage; and
(4) further self-governance, economic development, and
self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated States.
SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; PROMOTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
(a) Freedom of Navigation.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of Navigation
Program, regular freedom of navigation, and overflight
operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with
applicable international law; and
(2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations to
peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, in
accordance with applicable international law.
(b) Joint Indo-Pacific Diplomatic Strategy.--It is the sense of
Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic strategy that
includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct
joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the
Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China
Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefitting all
countries.
SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives.
(2) ISIS.--The term ``ISIS'' means the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and
other appropriate Federal officials, shall submit a report to the
appropriate committees of Congress that contains an assessment of the
current and future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-
Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that
pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its
citizens interests abroad.
(c) Elements.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
include--
(1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and
other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast
Asia;
(2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-
linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters
expected to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the
Middle East;
(3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of ISIS-linked,
al Qaeda-linked, and other various extremist group affiliated-
fighters in Southeast Asia;
(4) the current resources available to combat the threat of
ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist
group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the additional
resources required to combat such threat;
(5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of ISIS-
linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-
affiliated fighters to operate effectively in the Indo-Pacific
region, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia;
(6) a description of the capabilities and resources of
governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent extremist
groups; and
(7) a list of additional United States resources and
capabilities that the Department of Defense and the Department
of State recommend providing to governments in Southeast Asia
to combat violent extremist groups.
SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that there
should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United States
and nations in the Indo-Pacific region--
(1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats,
including state-sponsored threats;
(2) to share best practices to combat such threats; and
(3) to strengthen resilience against misinformation and
propaganda.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years
2019 through 2023--
(1) to build capacity for responding to cybersecurity
threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(2) to enhance cooperation between the United States and
Indo-Pacific nations for combating such threats.
SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes a
threat to international peace and security;
(2) seeks to peacefully address the unique challenge posed
to regional and global stability by the illicit use, and the
proliferation to and from North Korea, of sensitive nuclear and
missile technologies, and other weapons of mass destruction;
(3) notes efforts by China and Russia--
(A) to expand and modernize their respective
nuclear arsenals, including through significant
research and development resources in hypersonic glide
vehicles and other advanced technologies; and
(B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear
technologies; and
(4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many countries in
the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a variety of
peaceful applications.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States Government should undertake all reasonable and appropriate
efforts to pursue effective arms control and nonproliferation policies
in the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery.
TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, by
2030--
(A) 66 percent of the global middle class
population will be living in Asia; and
(B) 59 percent of middle class consumption will
take place in Asia.
(2) According to the Asian Development Bank--
(A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilateral or
regional trade agreements; and
(B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian countries
are under negotiation or concluded and awaiting entry
into force.
(3) Free trade agreements between the United States and 3
nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Australia, Singapore, and
the Republic of Korea) have entered into force.
(4) The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (referred to in this section as ``ASEAN''), as a
group--
(A) represent the fifth largest economy in the
world; and
(B) have a combined gross domestic product of
$2,400,000,000,000.
(5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member states grew by 66
percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value of bilateral
trade between the United States and ASEAN member states has
increased by 78 percent since 2004.
(6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by companies
in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United States was
$77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade surplus of
services provided to consumers in ASEAN member states was
$8,000,000,000.
(7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council, goods and
services exported from the United States to ASEAN member states
support 550,000 jobs in the United States.
(8) According to the Business Roundtable--
(A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada,
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore and Vietnam were responsible for a combined
40 percent of global gross domestic product in 2017;
and
(B) United States bilateral trade with the other
nations referred to in subparagraph (A) supports
15,600,000 jobs in the United States.
(9) According to the United States National Security
Strategy--
(A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
``remain centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific's regional
architecture and platforms for promoting an order based
on freedom''; and
(B) the United States will ``work with partners to
build a network of states dedicated to free markets and
protected from forces that would subvert their
sovereignty.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that trade
between the United States and the nations in the Indo-Pacific region is
vitally important to the United States economy, United States exports,
and jobs in the United States.
SEC. 302. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, AND REGIONAL
ECONOMIC SUMMITS.
Congress supports--
(1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements
that increase United States employment and expand the economy;
(2) formal economic dialogues that include concrete,
verifiable, and measured outcomes;
(3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties between the
United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region;
(4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agreement and the
Environmental Goods Agreement that include several major Asian
economies; and
(5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-level use
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the East Asia
Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States economic
objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP.
The President is authorized to negotiate a comprehensive economic
engagement framework with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILITATION.
(a) In General.--The President is encouraged to produce a robust
and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilitation
strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out subsection
(a).
SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.
(a) In General.--The President is encouraged to make enforcement of
United States intellectual property laws a top priority, including
taking all appropriate action to deter and punish commercial cyber-
enabled theft of intellectual property.
(b) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall
submit a report to Congress that--
(1) describes the efforts of the United States Government
to combat intellectual property violations and commercial
cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly
the People's Republic of China; and
(2) includes a country-by-country assessment of priority
areas for United States engagement and capacity building
assistance.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to sponsor bilateral and
multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the identified
priority areas described in the annual report required under subsection
(b).
SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.
(a) Indo-Pacific Energy Strategy.--
(1) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
President shall establish a comprehensive, integrated,
multiyear strategy to encourage the efforts of Indo-Pacific
countries to implement national power strategies and
cooperation with United States energy companies to develop an
appropriate mix of power solutions to provide access to
sufficient, reliable, and affordable power in order to reduce
poverty and drive economic growth and job creation.
(2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry
out paragraph (1).
(b) Reliable Energy Partnerships.--It is the sense of Congress
that--
(1) the President should establish bilateral and regional
initiatives to increase energy security in the Indo-Pacific
region;
(2) the United States should reaffirm support for liquefied
natural gas exports to the nations in the Indo-Pacific region;
(3) the United States should seek to establish partnership
between Department of Energy national laboratories and Indo-
Pacific countries to provide technical assistance on electrical
grid development and for the development and deployment of new
and advanced energy technologies; and
(4) the United States should explore opportunities to
partner with the private sector and multilateral institutions,
such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to
promote universal access to reliable electricity in Myanmar
(historically known as ``Burma'').
SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.
The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development, should increase
regional engagement in the areas of environment, health, education, and
infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong countries, including--
(1) assisting in the development of programs that focus on
forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;
(2) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable
uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving
the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to safe
drinking water;
(3) assisting with education enrollment and broadband
internet connectivity, particularly English training and
connectivity in rural communities; and
(4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong countries,
including--
(A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; and
(B) helping regional partners to track and treat
malaria and tuberculosis.
SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND NATURAL RESOURCE
CONSERVATION.
It is the sense of Congress that the President should encourage the
governments of countries in the Indo-Pacific region and United States
private sector interests with operations and investments in the region
to deploy agriculture practices that--
(1) conserve natural resources; and
(2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable lands and
water bodies.
SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN'S ECONOMIC RIGHTS.
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should--
(1) support activities that secure private property rights
and land tenure for women in developing countries in Asia,
including--
(A) establishing legal frameworks to give women
equal rights to own, register, use, profit from, and
inherit land and property;
(B) improving legal literacy to enable women to
exercise the rights described in subparagraph (A); and
(C) increasing the capacity of law enforcement and
community leaders to enforce such rights;
(2) work with Asian civil society, governments, and
multilateral organizations to increase the capability of
disadvantaged women and girls in Asia--
(A) to realize their rights;
(B) to determine their life outcomes;
(C) to assume leadership roles; and
(D) to influence decision-making in their
households, communities, and societies; and
(3) seek to expand access to appropriate financial products
and services for women-owned micro, small, and medium-sized
enterprises in Asia.
TITLE IV--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
SEC. 401. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The promotion of human rights and respect for
democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United
States' national security interest.
(2) Continued support for human rights, democratic values,
and good governance is critical to a successful United States
diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
(3) Strong support for human rights and democracy in the
Indo-Pacific region is critical to efforts to reduce poverty,
build rule of law, combat corruption, reduce the allure of
extremism, and promote economic growth.
(4) There are serious concerns with the rule of law and
civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all been identified by
Freedom House as ``Not Free''.
(5) There have been unacceptable human rights developments
in--
(A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been identified by
Freedom House as ``Not Free'', according to the
Department of State, and the Department of State has
declared that the violence against the Rohingya
constitutes ethnic cleansing;
(B) the Philippines, which has been identified by
Freedom House as ``Partly Free'', and where there are
continued disturbing reports of extra-judicial
killings; and
(C) China, where forced disappearances, extralegal
detentions, and lack of due process in judicial
proceedings remain troublesome.
(6) according to the National Security Strategy, the United
States--
(A) will ``support, with our words and actions,
those who live under oppressive regimes and who seek
freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law'';
(B) ``may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools
to isolate states and leaders who threaten our
interests and whose actions run contrary to our
values''; and
(C) ``will support efforts to advance women's
equality, protect the rights of women and girls, and
promote women and youth empowerment programs''.
SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.
The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts to combat
trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) United States Government officials should lead by
example--
(A) by continuing to advocate for freedom of the
press in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(B) by engaging with the press corps at every
appropriate opportunity; and
(2) the United States should advocate and support a
Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the Indo-Pacific to
convene government and civil society, including journalists, to
discuss and address the challenges facing press freedom in the
Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PERSONNEL.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) United States embassies and consulates in the Indo-
Pacific region should have personnel, as appropriate, who are
dedicated to reporting on and advancing United States
democracy, human rights, labor, anti-corruption, and good
governance policy interests; and
(2) appropriate resources should be made available to carry
out such activities.
SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE
ENGAGEMENT.
The Secretary of State should, as appropriate--
(1) establish high-level bilateral and regional dialogues
with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding human rights
and religious freedom violations;
(2) establish or support robust, people-to-people exchange
programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly programs
engaging young leaders; and
(3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-building
programs emphasizing civil society development.
SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should continue to work with ASEAN to improve the capacity of
ASEAN to address human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in
Southeast Asia.
(b) Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a strategy
to the appropriate congressional committees to increase cooperation
with ASEAN to promote human rights, democracy, and good governance in
Southeast Asia.
(c) Contents.--The strategy submitted under subsection (b) should
include--
(1) an assessment of the types of United States Government
resources available to support increased cooperation; and
(2) an assessment to identify entities within ASEAN that
the United States could potentially support or partner with to
promote human rights, democracy, and good governance in
Southeast Asia.
SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA.
The President is encouraged to continue efforts to enhance freedom
of information access with regard to North Korea.
SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND SUSPENSION
OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.
(a) Sanctions.--It is the sense of Congress that the President
should impose sanctions, in accordance with applicable law and other
relevant authorities, including targeted financial penalties and visa
bans, on any individual or entity that--
(1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; or
(2) engages in censorship activities.
(b) Suspension of Foreign Assistance.--It is the sense of Congress
that the President should, in accordance with applicable law,
terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United States economic
assistance to any country that has engaged in serious violations of
human rights or religious freedoms.
SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Promotion of Democracy in the Indo-Pacific Region.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023,
to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights,
rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-
Pacific region, including for universities, civil society, and
multilateral institutions that are focusing on education
awareness, training, and capacity building.
(2) Democracy in china.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States
Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the
rule of law, and human rights in the People's Republic of
China.
(3) Tibet.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations to
support activities preserving cultural traditions and promoting
sustainable development, education, and environmental
conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous
Region and in other Tibetan communities in China, India, and
Nepal.
SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENDERS.
(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``human rights and
environmental defenders'' means individuals, working alone or in
groups, who nonviolently advocate for the promotion and protection of
universally recognized human rights, fundamental freedoms, land issues,
or the conservation of local ecosystems if the advocacy of such issues
may result in the risk of safety or life.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that human
rights and environmental defenders in the Indo-Pacific region have been
facing increased difficulties with the rise of unprecedented crackdowns
and conflicts.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to support human rights and
environmental defenders through the Department of State's Human Rights
Defenders Fund.
SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIATIVES.
There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be
necessary, for fiscal years 2019 through 2025, to support Indo-Pacific
young leaders initiatives, including the Young Southeast Asian Leaders
Initiative, the ASEAN Youth Volunteers Program, and other people-to-
people exchange programs that focus on building the capacity of
democracy, human rights, and good governance activists in the Indo-
Pacific region.
Calendar No. 616
115th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2736
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive,
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific
region, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
October 3 (legislative day, September 28), 2018
Reported with an amendment