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2D SESSION

S. 2736

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 24, 2018

Mr. GARDNER (for himself, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. SULLIVAN, Mr. PERDUE, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. COONS, and Mr. KAINE) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

OCTOBER 3 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 28), 2018

Reported by Mr. CORKER, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) ~~SHORT TITLE.~~—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018”.

1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
 2 this Act is as follows:

- See. 1. Short title; table of contents.
 See. 2. Findings.
 See. 3. Statement of policy on United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

TITLE I—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN
 THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

- See. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
 See. 102. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
 See. 103. United States-China relationship.
 See. 104. United States-India strategic partnership.
 See. 105. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
 See. 106. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership.
 See. 107. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
 See. 108. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
 See. 109. Commitment to Taiwan.
 See. 110. North Korea strategy.
 See. 111. New Zealand and the Pacific islands.
 See. 112. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law.
 See. 113. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
 See. 114. Cybersecurity cooperation.
 See. 115. Nuclear nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.

TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN
 THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

- See. 201. Findings; sense of Congress.
 See. 202. Trade negotiations; multilateral agreements; and regional economic summits.
 See. 203. United States-ASEAN Economic Partnership.
 See. 204. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
 See. 205. Intellectual property protection.
 See. 206. Energy programs and initiatives.
 See. 207. Lower Mekong Initiative.

TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-
 PACIFIC REGION

- See. 301. Findings.
 See. 302. Trafficking-in-persons.
 See. 303. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement.
 See. 304. Imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States assistance.
 See. 305. Authorization of appropriations.

3 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

4 Congress makes the following findings:

5 (1) The Indo-Pacific region—

1 (A) represents nearly ½ of the global pop-
2 ulation;

3 (B) is home to some of the most dynamic
4 economies in the world; and

5 (C) poses security challenges that threaten
6 to undermine United States national security
7 interests, regional peace, and global stability.

8 (2) The core tenants of the United States-
9 backed international system are being challenged
10 with increasingly coercive behavior, including—

11 (A) China’s illegal construction and mili-
12 tarization of artificial features in the South
13 China Sea;

14 (B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nu-
15 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and

16 (C) the increased presence throughout
17 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to
18 in this Act as “ISIS”) and other international
19 terrorist organizations that threaten the United
20 States.

21 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re-
22 gion continues to transform, presenting both oppor-
23 tunities and challenges to United States economic
24 interests.

1 (4) The United States has a fundamental inter-
2 est in defending human rights and promoting the
3 rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although
4 many countries in that region have improved the
5 treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific
6 countries continue to be human rights abusers and
7 there are serious concerns with political rights and
8 civil liberties throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

9 (5) Without strong leadership from the United
10 States, the international system, fundamentally root-
11 ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment
12 of United States, regional, and global interests. It is
13 imperative that the United States continue to play
14 a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by—

15 (A) defending peace and security;

16 (B) advancing economic prosperity; and

17 (C) promoting respect for fundamental
18 human rights.

19 (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia,
20 the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy
21 of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
22 held a series of hearings on United States leadership
23 in the Indo-Pacific region, in which—

24 (A) experts, including Representative

25 Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci,

1 Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador
2 Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr.
3 Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the secu-
4 rity challenges, economic opportunities, and im-
5 peratives of promoting rule of law, human
6 rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific re-
7 gion; and

8 (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dil-
9 lon Professor of Government at the John F.
10 Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
11 University, testified, “As realistic students of
12 history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role
13 the U.S. has played since World War II as the
14 architect and underwriter of regional stability
15 and security has been essential to the rise of
16 Asia, including China itself. But they believe
17 that as the tide that brought the U.S. to Asia
18 recedes, America must leave with it. Much as
19 Britain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded
20 at the beginning of the twentieth century, so
21 must America’s role in Asia as the region’s his-
22 toric superpower resumes its place.”

23 (7) The United States National Security Strat-
24 egy (referred to in this Act as the “National Secu-

1 rity Strategy”), which was released in December
2 2017, states—

3 (A) “A geopolitical competition between
4 free and repressive visions of world order is tak-
5 ing place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region,
6 which stretches from the west coast of India to
7 the western shores of the United States, rep-
8 represents the most populous and economically dy-
9 namic part of the world. The U.S. interest in
10 a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to
11 the earliest days of our republic.”; and

12 (B) “Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex-
13 cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit-
14 ment to established alliances and partnerships,
15 while expanding and deepening relationships
16 with new partners that share respect for sov-
17 ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule
18 of law. We will reinforce our commitment to
19 freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution
20 of territorial and maritime disputes in accord-
21 ance with international law. We will work with
22 allies and partners to achieve complete,
23 verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on
24 the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-pro-
25 liferation regime in Northeast Asia.”

1 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-**
 2 **GAGEMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.**

3 It is the policy of the United States to develop, and
 4 to commit to, a long-term strategic vision and a com-
 5 prehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States pol-
 6 icy for the Indo-Pacific region that—

7 (1) preserves peace through strength by secur-
 8 ing the vital national security interests of the United
 9 States;

10 (2) promotes American prosperity by advancing
 11 the economic interests of the United States;

12 (3) advances American influence by reflecting
 13 the values of the American people and universal
 14 human rights; and

15 (4) accords with and supports the rule of law
 16 and international norms.

17 **TITLE I—PROMOTING UNITED**
 18 **STATES SECURITY INTERESTS**
 19 **IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

20 **SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appro-
 22 priated for the Department of State, the United States
 23 Agency for International Development, and, as appro-
 24 priate, the Department of Defense \$1,500,000,000 for
 25 each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall
 26 be used—

1 (1) to advance United States foreign policy in-
2 terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in
3 recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and
4 programs in the furtherance of United States strat-
5 egy;

6 (2) to bolster the United States military pres-
7 ence and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region for the
8 purpose of deterring and defending against provoca-
9 tive actions, including by improving the defense in-
10 frastructure and critical munitions stockpiles of the
11 United States Armed Forces;

12 (3) to improve the defense capacity of partner
13 nations to resist coercion and to deter and defend
14 against security threats, including through foreign
15 military financing and international military edu-
16 cation and training programs;

17 (4) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral
18 exercises, particularly with our most highly-capable
19 allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges, in-
20 cluding—

21 (A) certain destabilizing activities of the
22 People’s Republic of China; and

23 (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear
24 and ballistic missile programs of the Demo-
25 cratic People’s Republic of Korea;

1 (5) to build new counterterrorism partnership
2 programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing
3 presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations
4 that pose a significant threat to the United States,
5 our allies, and our citizens' interests abroad; and

6 (6) to increase maritime domain awareness pro-
7 grams in Southeast Asia—

8 (A) by expanding the scope of naval and
9 coast guard training efforts with Southeast
10 Asian countries;

11 (B) through intelligence sharing and other
12 information-sharing efforts; and

13 (C) through multilateral exercises, includ-
14 ing by involving Japan, Australia, and India in
15 such efforts and exercises.

16 (b) COUNTERING CHINA'S INFLUENCE TO UNDER-
17 MINE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appro-
18 priated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made available
19 for United States Government efforts to counter the stra-
20 tegic influence of the People's Republic of China, in ac-
21 cordance with the strategy required under section
22 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper-
23 ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014
24 (division K of Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 536) and

1 in consultation with the appropriate committees of Con-
2 gress:

3 (c) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pur-
4 suant to subsection (a) may be made available for the pro-
5 grams, initiatives, or interactions that may benefit the de-
6 fense sector of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (his-
7 torically known as “Burma”).

8 (d) PHILIPPINES.—Amounts appropriated pursuant
9 to subsection (a) may not be made available for counter-
10 narcotics assistance (other than maritime programs) for
11 the Philippine National Police unless the Secretary of
12 State certifies and reports to the appropriate committees
13 of Congress that the Government of the Philippines has
14 adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy
15 that complies with international norms of due process.

16 (e) CAMBODIA.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to
17 subsection (a) may not be made available for certain
18 United States assistance programs that benefit the Gov-
19 ernment of Cambodia.

20 (f) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term “ap-
21 propriate committees of Congress” means—

22 (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the
23 Senate;

24 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
25 Senate;

1 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the
2 House of Representatives; and

3 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
4 House of Representatives.

5 **SEC. 102. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE-**
6 **GION.**

7 (a) **UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.**—The United
8 States Government—

9 (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co-
10 operation and Security between the United States
11 and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960,
12 and subsequent security agreements;

13 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
14 tween the United States and Japan in promoting
15 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

16 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
17 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
18 the United States and Japan.

19 (b) **UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI-**
20 **ANCE.**—The United States Government—

21 (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty
22 Between the United States and the Republic of
23 Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and
24 subsequent security agreements;

1 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
2 tween the United States and South Korea in pro-
3 moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;
4 and

5 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
6 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
7 the United States and the Republic of Korea.

8 (c) ~~UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.~~—The
9 United States Government—

10 (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Be-
11 tween Australia and the United States of America,
12 done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and sub-
13 sequent security agreements between these 2 na-
14 tions;

15 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
16 tween the United States and Australia in promoting
17 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

18 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
19 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
20 the United States and Australia.

21 (d) ~~UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.~~—The
22 United States Government is committed to the Mutual
23 Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines
24 and the United States of America, done at Washington
25 August 30, 1951, and subsequent bilateral security agree-

1 ments, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
2 Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 2014.

3 (c) THAILAND.—The United States Government is
4 committed to—

5 (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assist-
6 ance Between the Government of the United States
7 of America and the Government of Thailand, done
8 at Bangkok October 17, 1950;

9 (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Trea-
10 ty, done at Manila September 8, 1954; and

11 (3) all subsequent bilateral security agreements,
12 including the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-
13 U.S. Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok November
14 15, 2012.

15 **SEC. 103. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

17 (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese ac-
18 tions that seek—

19 (A) to further constrain space for civil so-
20 ciety within China; and

21 (B) to undermine a rules-based order in
22 the Indo-Pacific region;

23 (2) encourages China to play a constructive role
24 in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect
25 for the rule of law and international norms;

1 (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and
2 comprehensive relationship with China—

3 (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and

4 (B) by addressing areas of disagreement,
5 including over human rights, economic policies,
6 and maritime security; and

7 (4) is committed to working with China on
8 shared regional and global challenges, especially—

9 (A) upholding and strengthening the rules-
10 based international system; and

11 (B) the denuclearization of the Korean pe-
12 ninsula.

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
14 gress that the United States should—

15 (1) welcome China’s decision to change course
16 and pursue responsible engagement on global issues;

17 (2) encourage China to play a constructive role
18 in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and

19 (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that un-
20 dermine the rules-based international system.

21 **SEC. 104. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

23 (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic
24 partnership between the United States and India in

1 promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific re-
2 gion;

3 (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening
4 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
5 the United States and India; and

6 (3) is committed to—

7 (A) the New Framework for the United
8 States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar-
9 lington, Virginia June 28, 2005;

10 (B) the United States-India Defense Tech-
11 nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;

12 (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-
13 Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on
14 January 25, 2015; and

15 (D) all related and subsequent bilateral
16 and security agreements.

17 (b) INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress
18 makes the following findings:

19 (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De-
20 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Pub-
21 lic Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751
22 note) requires the recognition of India as a major
23 defense partner.

24 (2) The designation of India as a major defense
25 partner, which is unique to India—

1 (A) institutionalizes the progress made to
2 facilitate defense trade and technology sharing
3 between the United States and India;

4 (B) elevates defense trade and technology
5 cooperation between the United States and
6 India to a level commensurate with the closest
7 allies and partners of the United States;

8 (C) facilitates technology sharing between
9 the United States and India, including license-
10 free access to a wide range of dual-use tech-
11 nologies, after taking into account national se-
12 curity concerns; and

13 (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination
14 on defense strategy and policy, military ex-
15 changes, and port calls in support of defense
16 cooperation between the United States and
17 India.

18 **SEC. 105. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER-**
19 **SHIP.**

20 It is the sense of the Senate that the United States
21 should—

22 (1) support and affirm the elevation of the
23 United States-Association of Southeast Asian Na-
24 tions (ASEAN) relationship to a strategic partner-
25 ship;

1 (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping
2 build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi-
3 cally integrated, and socially responsible community
4 of nations that has common rules, norms, proce-
5 dures, and standards which are consistent with
6 international law and the principles of a rules-based
7 Indo-Pacific community;

8 (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos-
9 ter greater integration among its members;

10 (4) recognize the value of—

11 (A) ASEAN engagement with economic,
12 political, and security partners within Asia and
13 elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu-
14 ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-
15 way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and

16 (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as
17 the U.S.-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a
18 commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Eco-
19 nomic Community and build upon economic re-
20 lationships in the Indo-Pacific region;

21 (5) support efforts by the nations comprising
22 ASEAN—

23 (A) to address maritime and territorial dis-
24 putes in a constructive manner; and

1 (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, dip-
2 lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter-
3 national arbitration mechanisms, consistent
4 with international law, including through the
5 adoption of a code of conduct in the South
6 China Sea to further promote peace and sta-
7 bility in the Indo-Pacific region;

8 (6) support efforts by United States partners
9 and allies in ASEAN—

10 (A) to enhance maritime capability and
11 maritime domain awareness;

12 (B) to protect unhindered access to, and
13 use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pa-
14 cific region that are critical to ensuring the se-
15 curity and free flow of commerce;

16 (C) to counter piracy;

17 (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking
18 activities such as the trafficking of persons,
19 goods, and drugs; and

20 (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of
21 countries or regional organizations to respond
22 to emerging threats to maritime security in the
23 Asia-Pacific region; and

24 (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a
25 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the

1 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect
 2 to the case between the Republic of the Philippines
 3 and the People’s Republic of China.

4 **SEC. 106. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRI-**
 5 **LATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.**

6 It is the sense of Congress that the President should
 7 develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security co-
 8 operation between the United States, South Korea, and
 9 Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and
 10 other defense-related initiatives.

11 **SEC. 107. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.**

12 It is the sense of Congress that—

13 (1) the security dialogue between the United
 14 States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to ad-
 15 dressing pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pa-
 16 cific region in order to promote—

17 (A) a rules-based order;

18 (B) respect for international law; and

19 (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and

20 (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment,
 21 rather than to replace, current mechanisms.

22 **SEC. 108. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH-**
 23 **EAST ASIA.**

24 (a) **INDONESIA.**—The United States Government is
 25 committed to—

1 (1) the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partner-
2 ship, done in Washington November 9, 2010;

3 (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive De-
4 fense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26,
5 2015; and

6 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
7 curity agreements between the United States and
8 Indonesia.

9 (b) MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is
10 committed to—

11 (1) the U.S.-Malaysia Comprehensive Partner-
12 ship, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;

13 (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the
14 Comprehensive Partnership between the United
15 States of America and Malaysia, done in Wash-
16 ington September 13, 2017; and

17 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
18 curity agreements between the United States and
19 Malaysia.

20 (c) SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is
21 committed to—

22 (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Be-
23 tween the United States of America and the Repub-
24 lic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partner-

1 ship in Defense and Security, done at Washington
2 July 12, 2005;

3 (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree-
4 ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7,
5 2015; and

6 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
7 curity agreements between the United States and
8 Singapore.

9 (d) VIETNAM.—The United States Government is
10 committed to—

11 (1) the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partner-
12 ship, done at Washington December 16, 2013;

13 (2) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement
14 on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1,
15 2015;

16 (3) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement,
17 done at Washington May 31, 2017; and

18 (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
19 curity agreements between the United States and
20 Vietnam.

21 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that the United States should deepen the diplomatic,
23 economic, and security cooperation, especially in the areas
24 of maritime security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia,
25 Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

1 **SEC. 109. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.**

2 (a) ~~UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.~~—It
3 is the policy of the United States to faithfully enforce all
4 existing United States Government commitments to Tai-
5 wan, as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979
6 (Public Law 96–8) and the Six Assurances agreed to by
7 President Ronald Reagan in July 1982.

8 (b) ~~ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.~~—The President shall
9 conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan
10 that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future
11 threats from the People’s Republic of China, including
12 supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate
13 asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and
14 air defense capabilities, into its military forces.

15 (c) ~~TRAVEL.~~—The President shall authorize the trav-
16 el of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in ac-
17 cordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–
18 135).

19 **SEC. 110. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.**

20 (a) ~~FINDINGS.~~—Congress makes the following find-
21 ings:

22 (1) The Government of the Democratic People’s
23 Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter-
24 national community by illicitly developing its nuclear
25 and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United
26 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006),

1 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270
2 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017),
3 and 2397 (2017).

4 (2) The Government of the Democratic People's
5 Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights
6 abuses against its own people and citizens of other
7 countries, including the United States, the Republic
8 of Korea, and Japan.

9 (3) The United States is committed to pursuing
10 a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo-
11 ple's Republic of Korea through a policy of max-
12 imum pressure and engagement, in close concert
13 with its partners.

14 (b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT
15 TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S RE-
16 PUBLIC OF KOREA.—

17 (1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of
18 the United States to continue to impose sanctions
19 with respect to activities of the Government of the
20 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, persons act-
21 ing for or on behalf of such government, or other
22 persons in accordance with Executive Order 13687
23 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing addi-
24 tional sanctions with respect to North Korea), Exec-
25 utive Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to

1 blocking the property of certain persons engaging in
2 significant malicious cyber-enabled activities); Executive
3 Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
4 blocking the property of the Government of North
5 Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea; and prohib-
6 iting certain transactions with respect to North
7 Korea); and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg.
8 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions
9 with respect to North Korea); as such Executive or-
10 ders are in effect on the day before the date of the
11 enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People's
12 Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit
13 activities described in such Executive orders, includ-
14 ing actions in violation of United Nations Security
15 Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),
16 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321
17 (2016), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017).

18 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after ter-
19 minating any sanction with respect to the activities
20 of the Government of the Democratic People's Re-
21 public of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of
22 such government, or any other person provided for
23 in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the
24 Secretary of State shall submit a report to the ap-
25 propriate congressional committees regarding the

1 cessation of any illicit activity that violates United
2 Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006),
3 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270
4 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017)
5 by such Government or person.

6 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
7 subsection shall be construed to limit the authority
8 of the President pursuant to the International
9 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
10 et seq.).

11 (c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT
12 TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S RE-
13 PUBLIC OF KOREA'S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE
14 PROGRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the
15 objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and
16 ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People's Re-
17 public of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
18 dismantlement of such programs.

19 (d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE
20 THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE
21 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
23 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180
24 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee
25 of the Secretary, shall submit a report to the appro-

1 appropriate congressional committees that describes ac-
2 tions taken by the United States to address the
3 threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Demo-
4 cratic People's Republic of Korea.

5 (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under
6 paragraph (1) shall include—

7 (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the
8 United States to identify strategies and policies,
9 including an assessment of the strengths and
10 weaknesses of such strategies and policies—

11 (i) to achieve peaceful denucleariza-
12 tion of the Korean Peninsula; and

13 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by
14 the ballistic missile program of the Demo-
15 cratic People's Republic of Korea;

16 (B) an assessment of—

17 (i) potential road maps toward peace-
18 ful denuclearization of the Korean Penin-
19 sula and the elimination of the nuclear and
20 ballistic missile threats posed by the
21 Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
22 and

23 (ii) specific actions that the Demo-
24 cratic People's Republic of Korea would

1 need to take for each such roadmap to be-
2 come viable;

3 (C) a summary of the United States strat-
4 egy to increase international coordination and
5 cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or
6 multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement
7 and interdiction, to address the threat posed by
8 the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the
9 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which
10 shall include—

11 (i) a description of the actions taken
12 by the Secretary of State, or designees of
13 the Secretary, to consult with governments
14 around the world, with the purpose of in-
15 ducing such governments to diplomatically
16 and economically isolate the Democratic
17 People's Republic of Korea;

18 (ii) a description of the actions taken
19 by such governments to implement meas-
20 ures to diplomatically and economically iso-
21 late the Democratic People's Republic of
22 Korea;

23 (iii) a list of countries with govern-
24 ments that the Secretary has determined
25 are noncooperative with respect to imple-

1 menting measures to diplomatically and
2 economically isolate the Democratic Peo-
3 ple's Republic of Korea; and

4 (iv) a plan of action to engage, and
5 increase cooperation with respect to the
6 Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
7 with the governments of the countries on
8 the list described in clause (iii); and

9 (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the
10 national export control regimes of countries
11 that are members of the United Nations; and
12 multilateral export control regimes; that are
13 necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with re-
14 spect to the Democratic People's Republic of
15 Korea pursuant to United Nations Security
16 Council resolutions; and

17 (E) an action plan to encourage and assist
18 countries in adopting and using authorities nec-
19 essary to enforce export controls required by
20 United Nations Security Council resolutions.

21 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required
22 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi-
23 fied form; but may include a classified annex.

24 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
25 gress that—

1 (1) representatives of the United States shall
2 use the voice and vote of the United States in all
3 international organizations, as appropriate, to advo-
4 cate for the expulsion of the Democratic People's
5 Republic of Korea from such organizations, until
6 such time as the Democratic People's Republic of
7 Korea meets its commitments under United Nations
8 Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874
9 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016),
10 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397
11 (2017);

12 (2) the Secretary of State may take such ac-
13 tions as are necessary to induce countries to take
14 measures to diplomatically and economically isolate
15 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, includ-
16 ing—

17 (A) reducing the diplomatic presence in the
18 United States of countries with governments
19 that the Secretary has determined are non-
20 cooperative with respect to implementing meas-
21 ures to diplomatically and economically isolate
22 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and

23 (B) reducing the diplomatic presence of
24 the United States in such countries; and

1 (3) the Secretary of State may terminate or re-
2 duce United States foreign assistance to countries
3 enabling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

4 **SEC. 111. NEW ZEALAND AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.**

5 It is the sense of Congress that—

6 (1) the United States supports strengthening
7 diplomatic, economic, and the security relationship
8 with New Zealand;

9 (2) the United States supports strong United
10 States engagement with the nations of the South
11 Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Is-
12 lands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru,
13 Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Is-
14 lands Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;

15 (3) the United States recognizes the strong his-
16 torical, strategic and cultural ties to these countries;

17 (4) the United States should deepen its co-
18 operation with New Zealand and the nations of the
19 South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ-
20 ing—

21 (A) fisheries and marine resource con-
22 servation;

23 (B) environmental challenges and resil-
24 ience;

25 (C) global health;

1 (~~D~~) development and trade; and

2 (~~E~~) people-to-people ties; and

3 (~~5~~) the United States should provide robust for-
4 eign assistance to the Pacific islands.

5 **SEC. 112. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT;**
6 **PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.**

7 (a) **FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.**—It is the policy of
8 the United States—

9 (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of
10 Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation
11 and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region,
12 in accordance with applicable international law; and

13 (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations
14 to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South
15 China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter-
16 national law.

17 (b) **JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.**—

18 It is the sense of Congress that the President should de-
19 velop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with
20 United States allies and partners to conduct joint mari-
21 time training and freedom of navigation operations in the
22 Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the
23 South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international
24 system benefitting all countries.

1 **SEC. 113. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.**

2 (a) **REPORT.**—Not later than 180 days after the date
3 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
4 telligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the
5 Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate officials, shall
6 submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress
7 that contains an assessment of the current and future ca-
8 pabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked,
9 and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that
10 pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies,
11 and its citizens interests abroad.

12 (b) **ELEMENTS.**—The report required under sub-
13 section (a) shall include—

14 (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-
15 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af-
16 filiated fighters in Southeast Asia;

17 (2) the estimated number of ISIS-linked, al-
18 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af-
19 filiated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia
20 from fighting in the Middle East;

21 (3) the current resources available to combat
22 the threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other
23 violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in South-
24 east Asia, and the additional resources required to
25 combat such threat;

1 (4) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of
2 ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex-
3 tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively
4 in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and
5 Malaysia;

6 (5) a description of the capabilities and re-
7 sources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter
8 violent extremist groups; and

9 (6) a list of additional United States resources
10 and capabilities that the Department of Defense rec-
11 ommends providing to governments in Southeast
12 Asia to combat violent extremist groups.

13 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

14 (1) the term “appropriate committees of Con-
15 gress” means—

16 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of
17 the Senate;

18 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
19 the Senate;

20 (C) the Committee on Armed Services of
21 the House of Representatives; and

22 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
23 the House of Representatives; and

24 (2) the term “ISIS” means the Islamic State of
25 Iraq and Syria.

1 **SEC. 114. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.**

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
3 gress that there should be robust cybersecurity coopera-
4 tion between the United States and nations in the Indo-
5 Pacific region—

6 (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity
7 threats, including state-sponsored threats;

8 (2) to share best practices to combat such
9 threats; and

10 (3) to strengthen resilience against misinforma-
11 tion and propaganda.

12 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
13 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
14 necessary—

15 (1) to build capacity for responding to cyberse-
16 curity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region;
17 and

18 (2) to enhance cooperation between the United
19 States and nations in such region for combating
20 such threats.

21 **SEC. 115. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CON-**
22 **TROL IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

24 (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear weap-
25 ons, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat
26 to international peace and security;

1 (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique chal-
2 lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il-
3 licit use, and the proliferation to and from North
4 Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies;

5 (3) notes efforts by China and Russia—

6 (A) to expand and modernize their respec-
7 tive nuclear arsenals; and

8 (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear
9 technologies; and

10 (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many
11 countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear en-
12 ergy for a variety of peaceful applications.

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
14 gress that the United States Government should under-
15 take all reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effec-
16 tive arms control and nuclear nonproliferation policies in
17 the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of po-
18 tentially dangerous and destabilizing conventional and nu-
19 clear weapons.

1 **TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED**
2 **STATES ECONOMIC INTER-**
3 **ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC**
4 **REGION**

5 **SEC. 201. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
7 ings:

8 (1) According to the United States Chamber of
9 Commerce, by 2030—

10 (A) 66 percent of the global middle class
11 population will be in Asia; and

12 (B) 59 percent of middle class consump-
13 tion will be in Asia.

14 (2) According to the Asian Development
15 Bank—

16 (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilat-
17 eral or regional trade agreements; and

18 (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian
19 countries are under negotiation or concluded
20 and awaiting entry into force.

21 (3) The United States has signed free trade
22 agreements with 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific re-
23 gion, namely Australia, Singapore, and the Republic
24 of Korea.

1 (4) The member states of the Association of
2 Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section
3 as “~~ASEAN~~”), as a group—

4 (A) represent the fifth largest economy in
5 the world; and

6 (B) have a combined gross domestic prod-
7 uct of \$2,400,000,000,000.

8 (5) The economy comprised of ~~ASEAN~~ member
9 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015,
10 and the total value of bilateral trade between the
11 United States and ~~ASEAN~~ member states has in-
12 creased by 78 percent since 2004.

13 (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by
14 companies in ~~ASEAN~~ member states to consumers
15 in the United States was \$77,000,000,000, while the
16 United States 2015 trade surplus of services pro-
17 vided to consumers in ~~ASEAN~~ member states was
18 \$8,000,000,000.

19 (7) According to ~~U.S.-ASEAN~~ Business Coun-
20 cil, Inc., goods and services exported from the
21 United States to ~~ASEAN~~ member states support
22 550,000 jobs in the United States.

23 (8) According to the Business Roundtable—

24 (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei,
25 Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New

1 Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re-
 2 sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global
 3 gross domestic product in 2017; and

4 (B) United States bilateral trade with the
 5 other nations referred to in subparagraph (A)
 6 supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States.

7 (9) According to the United States National Se-
 8 curity Strategy—

9 (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic
 10 Cooperation (APEC) “remain centerpieces of
 11 the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and
 12 platforms for promoting an order based on free-
 13 dom”; and

14 (B) the United States will “work with
 15 partners to build a network of states dedicated
 16 to free markets and protected from forces that
 17 would subvert their sovereignty.”.

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 19 gress that trade between the United States and the na-
 20 tions in the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the
 21 United States economy, United States exports, and jobs
 22 in the United States.

23 **SEC. 202. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREE-**
 24 **MENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS.**

25 Congress supports—

1 (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade
2 agreements that increase United States employment
3 and expand the economy;

4 (2) formal economic dialogues that include con-
5 crete outcomes;

6 (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties
7 between the United States and nations in the Indo-
8 Pacific region;

9 (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agree-
10 ment and the Environmental Goods Agreement that
11 include several major Asian economies; and

12 (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing
13 high-level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
14 tion forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group
15 of 20 to pursue United States economic objectives in
16 the Indo-Pacific region.

17 **SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNER-**
18 **SHIP.**

19 The President, acting through the United States
20 Trade Representative, is authorized to negotiate a com-
21 prehensive economic engagement framework with the As-
22 sociation of Southeast Asian Nations.

1 **SEC. 204. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI-**
2 **TATION.**

3 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President is encouraged to
4 produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity build-
5 ing and trade facilitation strategy for the Indo-Pacific re-
6 gion.

7 (b) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There
8 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may
9 be necessary to carry out subsection (a).

10 **SEC. 205. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.**

11 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President is encouraged to
12 impose penalties on all entities found to be complicit in
13 the theft of United States intellectual property, in accord-
14 ance with applicable law, including commercial cyber-en-
15 abled theft.

16 (b) **ANNUAL REPORT.**—Not later than 180 days after
17 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-
18 after, the President shall submit a report to Congress
19 that—

20 (1) describes the efforts of the United States
21 Government to combat intellectual property and
22 commercial cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific
23 region, particularly the People’s Republic of China;
24 and

1 (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of
2 priority areas for United States engagement and ca-
3 pacity building assistance.

4 (c) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There
5 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may
6 be necessary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities
7 designed to build capacity in the identified priority areas
8 described in the annual report required under subsection
9 (b).

10 **SEC. 206. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.**

11 (a) **INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.**—

12 (1) **STRATEGY.**—Not later than 180 days after
13 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
14 thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation
15 with the Secretary of Energy, shall create a United
16 States Government strategy to increase United
17 States exports of energy to the nations in the Indo-
18 Pacific region.

19 (2) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—

20 There are authorized to be appropriated such
21 amounts as may be necessary to carry out para-
22 graph (1).

23 (b) **RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.**—It is the
24 sense of Congress that—

1 (1) the President should establish bilateral and
2 regional initiatives to increase energy security in the
3 Indo-Pacific region;

4 (2) the United States should authorize the sup-
5 ply of liquefied natural gas to the nations in the
6 Indo-Pacific region; and

7 (3) the United States should create a dedicated
8 program, in partnership with the private sector and
9 multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank
10 and the Asian Development Bank, to promote uni-
11 versal access to reliable electricity in Myanmar (his-
12 torically known as “Burma”).

13 **SEC. 207. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.**

14 The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Ad-
15 ministrator of the United States Agency for International
16 Development, should increase regional engagement in the
17 areas of environment, health, education, and infrastruc-
18 ture development with the Lower Mekong countries, in-
19 cluding—

20 (1) assisting to develop programs that focus on
21 forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;

22 (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on
23 sustainable uses of forest and water resources with
24 the goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong
25 Basin and access to safe drinking water;

1 (3) assisting with education enrollment and
2 broadband internet connectivity, particularly English
3 training and connectivity in rural communities; and

4 (4) improving global health in the Lower
5 Mekong countries, including—

6 (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate;

7 and

8 (B) helping regional partners to track and
9 treat malaria and tuberculosis.

10 **TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED**
11 **STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-**
12 **PACIFIC REGION**

13 **SEC. 301. FINDINGS.**

14 Congress finds that—

15 (1) the promotion of human rights and respect
16 for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in
17 the United States national security interests;

18 (2) there are serious concerns with the rule of
19 law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North
20 Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all
21 been identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”;

22 (3) there have been recent disturbing human
23 rights developments in—

1 (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been
2 identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”;
3 and

4 (B) the Philippines, which has been identi-
5 fied by Freedom House as “Partly Free”; and

6 (4) according to the National Security Strategy,
7 the United States—

8 (A) will “support, with our words and ac-
9 tions, those who live under oppressive regimes
10 and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and
11 the rule of law”;

12 (B) “may use diplomacy, sanctions, and
13 other tools to isolate states and leaders who
14 threaten our interests and whose actions run
15 contrary to our values”; and

16 (C) “will support efforts to advance wom-
17 en’s equality, protect the rights of women and
18 girls, and promote women and youth empower-
19 ment programs.”

20 **SEC. 302. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.**

21 The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef-
22 forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery
23 in the Indo-Pacific region.

1 **SEC. 303. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-**
 2 **TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT.**

3 The Secretary of State should—

4 (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional
 5 dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re-
 6 garding human rights and religious freedom viola-
 7 tions;

8 (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people
 9 exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par-
 10 ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and

11 (3) establish educational exchanges and capac-
 12 ity-building programs emphasizing civil society devel-
 13 opment.

14 **SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND SUSPENSION OF**
 15 **UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.**

16 (a) **SANCTIONS.**—The President is authorized to im-
 17 pose sanctions, in accordance with applicable law, includ-
 18 ing financial penalties and visa bans, on any individual
 19 or entity that—

20 (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms;

21 or

22 (2) engages in censorship activities.

23 (b) **SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.**—The
 24 President is authorized, in accordance with applicable law,
 25 to terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United States

1 economic assistance to any country that has engaged in
2 serious violations of human rights or religious freedoms.

3 **SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

4 (a) **PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PA-**
5 **CIFIC REGION.—**

6 (1) **IN GENERAL.—**There is authorized to be
7 appropriated \$150,000,000, for each of the fiscal
8 years 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy,
9 strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law,
10 transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific
11 region.

12 (2) **DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—**Amounts appro-
13 priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made
14 available for United States Government efforts, led
15 by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
16 Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy,
17 the rule of law, and human rights in the People's
18 Republic of China.

19 (3) **TIBET.—**Amounts appropriated pursuant to
20 paragraph (1) shall be made available for non-
21 governmental organizations to support activities pre-
22 serving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable
23 development, education, and environmental conserva-
24 tion in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autono-

1 mous Region and in other Tibetan communities in
2 China, India, and Nepal.

3 (b) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH
4 KOREA.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
6 appropriated \$10,000,000, for each of the fiscal
7 years 2019 through 2023, to implement programs to
8 enhance freedom of information efforts with regard
9 to North Korea.

10 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
11 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180
12 days thereafter through September 30, 2023, the
13 Broadcasting Board of Governors shall submit a re-
14 port to Congress that describes the implementation
15 of the programs described in paragraph (1).

16 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

17 (a) *SHORT TITLE.*—*This Act may be cited as the*
18 *“Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018”.*

19 (b) *TABLE OF CONTENTS.*—*The table of contents for*
20 *this Act is as follows:*

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings.

**TITLE I—UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

Sec. 101. Policy.

Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy.

**TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

- Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.*
Sec. 203. United States-China relationship.
Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership.
Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership.
Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan.
Sec. 210. North Korea strategy.
Sec. 211. New Zealand.
Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands.
Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law.
Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation.
Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.

*TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION*

- Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress.*
Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic summits.
Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership.
Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection.
Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives.
Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative.
Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource conservation.
Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women's economic rights.

*TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION*

- Sec. 401. Findings.*
Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons.
Sec. 403. Freedom of the press.
Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel.
Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement.
Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy.
Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea.
Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States assistance.
Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights and environmental defenders.
Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives.

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) *The Indo-Pacific region—*

1 (A) represents nearly 50 percent of the glob-
2 al population;

3 (B) is home to some of the most dynamic
4 economies in the world; and

5 (C) poses security challenges that threaten
6 to undermine United States national security in-
7 terests, regional peace, and global stability.

8 (2) The core tenets of the United States-backed
9 international system are being challenged, including
10 by—

11 (A) China’s illegal construction and mili-
12 tarization of artificial features in the South
13 China Sea and coercive economic practices;

14 (B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nu-
15 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and

16 (C) the increased presence throughout
17 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to
18 in this Act as “ISIS”) and other international
19 terrorist organizations that threaten the United
20 States.

21 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re-
22 gion continues to transform, presenting opportunities
23 and challenges to United States economic interests.

24 (4) The United States has a fundamental inter-
25 est in defending human rights and promoting the rule

1 *of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although many*
2 *countries in the region have improved the treatment*
3 *of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific governments*
4 *continue to commit human rights abuses and place*
5 *restrictions on basic human rights and political and*
6 *civil liberties.*

7 *(5) Without strong leadership from the United*
8 *States, the international system, fundamentally root-*
9 *ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment*
10 *of United States, regional, and global interests. It is*
11 *imperative that the United States continue to play a*
12 *leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by—*

13 *(A) defending peace and security;*

14 *(B) advancing economic prosperity; and*

15 *(C) promoting respect for fundamental*
16 *human rights.*

17 *(6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the*
18 *Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the*
19 *Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate held a*
20 *series of hearings on United States leadership in the*
21 *Indo-Pacific region, in which—*

22 *(A) experts, including Representative*
23 *Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms.*
24 *Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador*
25 *Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr.*

1 *Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security*
2 *challenges, economic opportunities, and impera-*
3 *tives of promoting the rule of law, human rights,*
4 *and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific region; and*

5 *(B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon*
6 *Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy*
7 *School of Government at Harvard University,*
8 *testified, “As realistic students of history, Chi-*
9 *nese leaders recognize that the role the United*
10 *States has played since World War II as the ar-*
11 *chitect and underwriter of regional stability and*
12 *security has been essential to the rise of Asia, in-*
13 *cluding China itself. But they believe that as the*
14 *tide that brought the United States to Asia re-*
15 *cedes, America must leave with it. Much as Brit-*
16 *ain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded at*
17 *the beginning of the twentieth century, so must*
18 *America’s role in Asia as the region’s historic su-*
19 *perpower resumes its place.”.*

20 *(7) The United States National Security Strat-*
21 *egy (referred to in this Act as the “National Security*
22 *Strategy”), which was released in December 2017,*
23 *states—*

24 *(A) “A geopolitical competition between free*
25 *and repressive visions of world order is taking*

1 *place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region,*
2 *which stretches from the west coast of India to*
3 *the western shores of the United States, rep-*
4 *resents the most populous and economically dy-*
5 *namic part of the world. The United States in-*
6 *terest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends*
7 *back to the earliest days of our republic.”; and*

8 *(B) “Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex-*
9 *cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit-*
10 *ment to established alliances and partnerships,*
11 *while expanding and deepening relationships*
12 *with new partners that share respect for sov-*
13 *ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule*
14 *of law. We will reinforce our commitment to*
15 *freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of*
16 *territorial and maritime disputes in accordance*
17 *with international law. We will work with allies*
18 *and partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and*
19 *irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Pe-*
20 *ninsula and preserve the non-proliferation re-*
21 *gime in Northeast Asia.”.*

1 **TITLE I—UNITED STATES POL-**
2 **ICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRAT-**
3 **EGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE-**
4 **GION**

5 **SEC. 101. POLICY.**

6 *It is the policy of the United States to develop and*
7 *commit to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehen-*
8 *sive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for*
9 *the Indo-Pacific region that—*

10 *(1) secures the vital national security interests of*
11 *the United States and our allies and partners;*

12 *(2) promotes American prosperity and economic*
13 *interests by advancing economic growth and develop-*
14 *ment of a rules-based Indo-Pacific economic commu-*
15 *nity;*

16 *(3) advances American influence by reflecting the*
17 *values of the American people and universal human*
18 *rights;*

19 *(4) supports functional problem-solving regional*
20 *architecture; and*

21 *(5) accords with and supports the rule of law*
22 *and international norms.*

23 **SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.**

24 *It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States—*

25 *(1) to work with United States allies—*

- 1 (A) to confront common challenges;
- 2 (B) to improve information sharing;
- 3 (C) to increase defense investment and
- 4 trade;
- 5 (D) to ensure interoperability; and
- 6 (E) to strengthen shared capabilities;
- 7 (2) to strengthen relationships with partners
- 8 who—
- 9 (A) share mutual respect for the rule of law;
- 10 (B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade;
- 11 and
- 12 (C) understand the importance of civil soci-
- 13 ety, the rule of law, and transparent governance;
- 14 (3) to support functional problem-solving re-
- 15 gional architecture, including through the Association
- 16 of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic
- 17 Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit;
- 18 (4) to emphasize the commitment of the United
- 19 States—
- 20 (A) to freedom of navigation under inter-
- 21 national law;
- 22 (B) to promote peaceful resolutions of mari-
- 23 time and territorial disputes; and
- 24 (C) to expand security and defense coopera-
- 25 tion with allies and partners, as appropriate;

1 (5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve
2 complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization
3 of North Korea;

4 (6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule
5 of law, and advocate for transparent governance;

6 (7) to develop and grow the economy through
7 private sector partnerships between the United States
8 and Indo-Pacific partners;

9 (8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade
10 agreements in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner and
11 build a network of partners in the Indo-Pacific com-
12 mitted to free markets;

13 (9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific
14 countries—

15 (A) to pursue high-quality and transparent
16 infrastructure projects;

17 (B) to maintain unimpeded commerce, open
18 sea lines or air ways, and communication; and

19 (C) to seek the peaceful resolution of dis-
20 putes; and

21 (10) to sustain a strong military presence in the
22 Indo-Pacific region and strengthen security relation-
23 ships with allies and partners throughout the region.

1 **TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED**
2 **STATES SECURITY INTERESTS**
3 **IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

4 **SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

5 (a) *DEFINED TERM.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—*

7 (1) *the Committee on Appropriations of the Sen-*
8 *ate;*

9 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
10 *Senate;*

11 (3) *the Committee on Appropriations of the*
12 *House of Representatives; and*

13 (4) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
14 *House of Representatives.*

15 (b) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There are*
16 *authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State,*
17 *the United States Agency for International Development,*
18 *and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense,*
19 *\$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through*
20 *2023, which shall be used—*

21 (1) *to advance United States foreign policy in-*
22 *terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in*
23 *recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and*
24 *programs in the furtherance of United States strat-*
25 *egy;*

1 (2) to improve the defense capacity of partner
2 nations to resist coercion and deter and defend
3 against security threats, including through foreign
4 military financing and international military edu-
5 cation and training programs;

6 (3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral
7 engagements, particularly with the United States'
8 most highly-capable allies and partners, to meet stra-
9 tegic challenges, including—

10 (A) certain destabilizing activities of the
11 People's Republic of China; and

12 (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear
13 and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic
14 People's Republic of Korea;

15 (4) to build new counterterrorism partnership
16 programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing
17 presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations
18 that pose a significant threat to the United States, its
19 allies, and its citizens' interests abroad; and

20 (5) to increase maritime domain awareness pro-
21 grams in South Asia and Southeast Asia—

22 (A) by expanding the scope of naval and
23 coast guard training efforts with Southeast
24 Asian countries;

1 (B) by expanding cooperation with demo-
2 cratic partners in South Asia, including Ban-
3 gladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka;

4 (C) through intelligence sharing and other
5 information-sharing efforts; and

6 (D) through multilateral engagements, in-
7 cluding by involving Japan, Australia, and
8 India in such efforts.

9 (c) *COUNTERING CHINA’S INFLUENCE TO UNDERMINE*
10 *THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.*—Amounts appropriated
11 pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made available for
12 United States Government efforts to counter the strategic
13 influence of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance
14 with the strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the
15 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Pro-
16 grams Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of Public Law
17 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation with the appro-
18 priate committees of Congress.

19 (d) *BURMA.*—None of the amounts appropriated pur-
20 suant to subsection (b) may be made available for Inter-
21 national Military Education and Training and Foreign
22 Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of the
23 Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as
24 “Burma”).

25 (e) *PHILIPPINES.*—

1 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—None of the amounts appro-
2 priated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made
3 available for counternarcotics assistance for the Phil-
4 ippine National Police unless the Secretary of State
5 determines and reports to the appropriate committees
6 of Congress that the Government of the Philippines
7 has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics
8 strategy that is consistent with international human
9 rights standards, including investigating and pros-
10 ecuting individuals who are credibly alleged to have
11 ordered, committed, or covered up extrajudicial
12 killings and other gross violations of human rights in
13 the conduct of counternarcotics operations.

14 (2) *EXCEPTION.*—The limitation under para-
15 graph (1) shall not apply to funds made available—

16 (A) for drug demand reduction, maritime
17 programs, or transnational interdiction pro-
18 grams; or

19 (B) to support for the development of such
20 counternarcotics strategy, after consultation with
21 the appropriate committees of Congress.

22 (f) *CAMBODIA.*—None of the amounts authorized to be
23 appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made
24 available for United States assistance programs that benefit
25 the Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of State

1 *certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional com-*
2 *mittees that the requirements under section 7043(b)(1) of*
3 *division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018*
4 *(Public Law 115–141) have been met.*

5 **SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE-**
6 **GION.**

7 *(a) UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.—The United*
8 *States Government—*

9 *(1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co-*
10 *operation and Security between the United States*
11 *and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960,*
12 *and all related and subsequent bilateral security*
13 *agreements and arrangements concluded on or before*
14 *the date of the enactment of this Act;*

15 *(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-*
16 *tween the United States and Japan in promoting*
17 *peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and*

18 *(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of*
19 *diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the*
20 *United States and Japan.*

21 *(b) UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI-*
22 *ANCE.—The United States Government—*

23 *(1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty*
24 *Between the United States and the Republic of Korea,*
25 *done at Washington October 1, 1953, and all related*

1 *and subsequent bilateral security agreements and ar-*
2 *rangements concluded on or before the date of the en-*
3 *actment of this Act;*

4 (2) *recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-*
5 *tween the United States and South Korea in pro-*
6 *moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;*
7 *and*

8 (3) *calls for the strengthening and broadening of*
9 *diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the*
10 *United States and the Republic of Korea.*

11 (c) *UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The*
12 *United States Government—*

13 (1) *is committed to the Security Treaty Between*
14 *Australia and the United States of America, done at*
15 *San Francisco September 1, 1951, and all related and*
16 *subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrange-*
17 *ments concluded on or before the date of the enact-*
18 *ment of this Act;*

19 (2) *recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-*
20 *tween the United States and Australia in promoting*
21 *peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and*

22 (3) *calls for the strengthening and broadening of*
23 *diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the*
24 *United States and Australia.*

1 (d) *UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.*—The
2 *United States Government is committed to the Mutual De-*
3 *fense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and*
4 *the United States of America, done at Washington August*
5 *30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security*
6 *agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the*
7 *date of the enactment of this Act, including the Enhanced*
8 *Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Manila April 28,*
9 *2014.*

10 (e) *THAILAND.*—The *United States Government is*
11 *committed to—*

12 (1) *the Agreement Respecting Military Assist-*
13 *ance Between the Government of the United States of*
14 *America and the Government of Thailand, done at*
15 *Bangkok October 17, 1950;*

16 (2) *the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,*
17 *done at Manila September 8, 1954; and*

18 (3) *all related and subsequent bilateral security*
19 *agreements and arrangements concluded on or before*
20 *the date of the enactment of this Act, including the*
21 *Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-United States*
22 *Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok November 15,*
23 *2012.*

24 **SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.**

25 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—The *United States Government—*

1 (1) *expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions*
2 *that seek—*

3 (A) *to further constrain space for civil soci-*
4 *ety within China; and*

5 (B) *to undermine a rules-based order in the*
6 *Indo-Pacific region;*

7 (2) *encourages China to play a constructive role*
8 *in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect*
9 *for the rule of law and international norms;*

10 (3) *seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and*
11 *comprehensive relationship with China—*

12 (A) *by expanding areas of cooperation; and*

13 (B) *by addressing areas of disagreement, in-*
14 *cluding over human rights, economic policies,*
15 *and maritime security; and*

16 (4) *is committed to working with China on*
17 *shared regional and global challenges, especially—*

18 (A) *upholding and strengthening the rules-*
19 *based international system; and*

20 (B) *the denuclearization of North Korea.*

21 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
22 *that the United States should—*

23 (1) *welcome a decision by China to change*
24 *course and pursue a responsible results-oriented rela-*

1 *tionship with the United States and engagement on*
2 *global issues;*

3 *(2) encourage China to play a constructive role*
4 *in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and*

5 *(3) continue to call out Chinese actions that un-*
6 *dermine the rules-based international system.*

7 **SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.**

8 *(a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—*

9 *(1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic part-*
10 *nership between the United States and India in pro-*
11 *moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;*

12 *(2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of*
13 *diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the*
14 *United States and India; and*

15 *(3) is committed to—*

16 *(A) the New Framework for the United*
17 *States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar-*
18 *lington, Virginia on June 28, 2005;*

19 *(B) the United States-India Defense Tech-*
20 *nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;*

21 *(C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-*
22 *Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on*
23 *January 25, 2015;*

1 (D) *the United States-India Joint State-*
2 *ment on Prosperity Through Partnership, issued*
3 *on June 26, 2017; and*

4 (E) *all related and subsequent bilateral and*
5 *security agreements and arrangements concluded*
6 *as of the date of the enactment of this Act.*

7 (b) *INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress*
8 *makes the following findings:*

9 (1) *Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De-*
10 *fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public*
11 *Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note)*
12 *requires the recognition of India as a major defense*
13 *partner.*

14 (2) *The designation of India as a major defense*
15 *partner, which is unique to India—*

16 (A) *institutionalizes the progress made to*
17 *facilitate defense trade and technology sharing*
18 *between the United States and India;*

19 (B) *elevates defense trade and technology co-*
20 *operation between the United States and India*
21 *to a level commensurate with the closest allies*
22 *and partners of the United States;*

23 (C) *facilitates technology sharing between*
24 *the United States and India, including license-*
25 *free access to a wide range of dual-use tech-*

1 *nologies, after taking into account national secu-*
2 *rity concerns; and*

3 *(D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination*
4 *on defense strategy and policy, military ex-*
5 *changes, and port calls in support of defense co-*
6 *operation between the United States and India.*

7 **SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER-**
8 **SHIP.**

9 *(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
10 *that the United States should—*

11 *(1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the*
12 *United States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations*
13 *(referred to in this section as “ASEAN”) relationship*
14 *to a strategic partnership;*

15 *(2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping*
16 *build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi-*
17 *cally integrated, and socially responsible community*
18 *of nations that has common rules, norms, procedures,*
19 *and standards which are consistent with inter-*
20 *national law and the principles of a rules-based Indo-*
21 *Pacific community;*

22 *(3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster*
23 *greater integration among its members;*

24 *(4) recognize the value of—*

1 (A) *ASEAN engagement with economic, po-*
2 *litical, and security partners within Asia and*
3 *elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu-*
4 *ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-*
5 *way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and*

6 (B) *strategic economic initiatives, such as*
7 *the United States-ASEAN Connect, which dem-*
8 *onstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the*
9 *ASEAN Economic Community and build upon*
10 *economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific re-*
11 *gion;*

12 (5) *support efforts by the nations comprising*
13 *ASEAN—*

14 (A) *to address maritime and territorial dis-*
15 *putes in a constructive manner; and*

16 (B) *to pursue claims through peaceful, dip-*
17 *lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter-*
18 *national arbitration mechanisms, consistent with*
19 *international law, including through the adop-*
20 *tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea*
21 *to further promote peace and stability in the*
22 *Indo-Pacific region;*

23 (6) *support efforts by United States partners*
24 *and allies in ASEAN—*

1 (A) to enhance maritime capability and
2 maritime domain awareness;

3 (B) to protect unhindered access to, and use
4 of, international waterways in the Asia-Pacific
5 region that are critical to ensuring the security
6 and free flow of commerce;

7 (C) to counter piracy;

8 (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking
9 activities such as the trafficking of persons,
10 goods, and drugs; and

11 (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of
12 countries or regional organizations to respond to
13 emerging threats to maritime security in the
14 Asia-Pacific region; and

15 (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a
16 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Per-
17 manent Court of Arbitration's ruling with respect to
18 the case between the Republic of the Philippines and
19 the People's Republic of China.

20 (b) REPORT ON STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR EN-
21 GAGEMENT WITH ASEAN.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after
23 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
24 thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report
25 to the appropriate congressional committees on a

1 *strategic framework to administer programs, projects,*
2 *and activities of the United States to support diplo-*
3 *matic and economic engagement between the United*
4 *States and ASEAN member countries for the 10-year*
5 *period beginning on the date of the enactment of this*
6 *Act.*

7 (2) *ELEMENTS.—The report required under*
8 *paragraph (1) shall address the following elements of*
9 *United States strategy:*

10 (A) *Promoting commercial engagement be-*
11 *tween the United States and member countries of*
12 *ASEAN.*

13 (B) *Helping member countries of ASEAN*
14 *use sustainable, efficient, and innovative tech-*
15 *nologies in their respective energy sectors.*

16 (C) *Supporting economic conditions in*
17 *member countries of ASEAN that promote inno-*
18 *vation, the creation of new businesses, sustain-*
19 *able growth, and the education of the region's fu-*
20 *ture innovators, entrepreneurs, and business*
21 *leaders.*

22 (D) *Working with member countries of*
23 *ASEAN to improve the policy and regulatory en-*
24 *vironment for growth, trade, innovation, and in-*
25 *vestment.*

1 (E) Supporting the regional integration ob-
2 jectives of member countries of ASEAN under the
3 ASEAN Economic Community.

4 (F) Partnership opportunities with the gov-
5 ernments of other countries friendly to the
6 United States that have committed to a high set
7 of standards for investment and development
8 with ASEAN, as determined by the Secretary of
9 State.

10 **SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRI-**
11 **LATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.**

12 *It is the sense of Congress that the President should*
13 *develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security coopera-*
14 *tion between the United States, South Korea, and Japan,*
15 *including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and other*
16 *defense-related initiatives.*

17 **SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.**

18 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

19 (1) *the security dialogue between the United*
20 *States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to ad-*
21 *dress pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific*
22 *region in order to promote—*

23 (A) *a rules-based order;*

24 (B) *respect for international law; and*

25 (C) *a free and open Indo-Pacific; and*

1 (2) *such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather*
2 *than to replace, current mechanisms.*

3 **SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH-**
4 **EAST ASIA.**

5 (a) *INDONESIA.—The United States Government is*
6 *committed to—*

7 (1) *the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive*
8 *Partnership, done in Washington November 9, 2010;*

9 (2) *the Joint Statement on Comprehensive De-*
10 *fense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26,*
11 *2015; and*

12 (3) *all related and subsequent bilateral and secu-*
13 *rity agreements and arrangements between the United*
14 *States and Indonesia concluded on or before the date*
15 *of the enactment of this Act.*

16 (b) *MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is*
17 *committed to—*

18 (1) *the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive*
19 *Partnership, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;*

20 (2) *the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Com-*
21 *prehensive Partnership between the United States of*
22 *America and Malaysia, done in Washington Sep-*
23 *tember 13, 2017; and*

24 (3) *all related and subsequent bilateral and secu-*
25 *rity agreements and arrangements between the United*

1 *States and Malaysia concluded on or before the date*
2 *of the enactment of this Act.*

3 (c) *SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is*
4 *committed to—*

5 (1) *the Strategic Framework Agreement Between*
6 *the United States of America and the Republic of*
7 *Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in*
8 *Defense and Security, done at Washington July 12,*
9 *2005;*

10 (2) *the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree-*
11 *ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015;*
12 *and*

13 (3) *all related and subsequent bilateral and secu-*
14 *rity agreements and arrangements between the United*
15 *States and Singapore concluded on or before the date*
16 *of the enactment of this Act.*

17 (d) *VIETNAM.—The United States Government is com-*
18 *mitted to—*

19 (1) *the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive*
20 *Partnership, done at Washington December 16, 2013;*

21 (2) *the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision*
22 *Statement on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on*
23 *June 1, 2015;*

24 (3) *the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision*
25 *Statement, done at Washington May 31, 2017; and*

1 (4) *all related and subsequent bilateral and secu-*
2 *urity agreements and arrangements between the United*
3 *States and Vietnam concluded on or before the date*
4 *of the enactment of this Act.*

5 (e) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
6 *that the United States should deepen diplomatic, economic,*
7 *and security cooperation, especially in the areas of mari-*
8 *time security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malay-*
9 *sia, Singapore, and Vietnam.*

10 **SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.**

11 (a) *UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It is*
12 *the policy of the United States—*

13 (1) *to support the close economic, political, and*
14 *security relationship between Taiwan and the United*
15 *States;*

16 (2) *to faithfully enforce all existing United*
17 *States Government commitments to Taiwan, con-*
18 *sistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public*
19 *Law 96–8), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six As-*
20 *surances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan in*
21 *July 1982; and*

22 (3) *to counter efforts to change the status quo*
23 *and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both*
24 *sides of the Taiwan Strait.*

1 **(b) ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.**—*The President should*
2 *conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that*
3 *are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats*
4 *from the People’s Republic of China, including supporting*
5 *the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric*
6 *capabilities, as appropriate, including undersea warfare*
7 *and air defense capabilities, into its military forces.*

8 **(c) TRAVEL.**—*The President should encourage the trav-*
9 *el of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accord-*
10 *ance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135).*

11 **SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.**

12 **(a) FINDINGS.**—*Congress makes the following findings:*

13 **(1)** *The Government of the Democratic People’s*
14 *Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter-*
15 *national community by illicitly developing its nu-*
16 *clear and ballistic missile programs, in violation of*
17 *United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718*
18 *(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270*
19 *(2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and*
20 *2397 (2017).*

21 **(2)** *The Government of the Democratic People’s*
22 *Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights*
23 *abuses against its own people and citizens of other*
24 *countries, including the United States, the Republic*
25 *of Korea, and Japan.*

1 (3) *The United States is committed to pursuing*
2 *a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People’s*
3 *Republic of Korea through a policy of maximum pres-*
4 *sure and engagement, in close concert with its part-*
5 *ners.*

6 (b) *POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT*
7 *TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE-*
8 *PUBLIC OF KOREA.—*

9 (1) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of*
10 *the United States to continue to impose sanctions*
11 *with respect to activities of the Government of the*
12 *Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, persons act-*
13 *ing for or on behalf of such government, or other per-*
14 *sons in accordance with Executive Order 13687 (50*
15 *U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional*
16 *sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive*
17 *Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to block-*
18 *ing the property of certain persons engaging in sig-*
19 *nificant malicious cyber-enabled activities), Executive*
20 *Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to block-*
21 *ing the property of the Government of North Korea*
22 *and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and prohibiting cer-*
23 *tain transactions with respect to North Korea), and*
24 *Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating*
25 *to imposing additional sanctions with respect to*

1 *North Korea), as such Executive orders are in effect*
2 *on the day before the date of the enactment of this*
3 *Act, until the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*
4 *is no longer engaged in the illicit activities described*
5 *in such Executive orders, including actions in viola-*
6 *tion of the United Nations Security Council resolu-*
7 *tions referred to in subsection (a)(1).*

8 (2) *REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after ter-*
9 *minating any sanction with respect to the activities*
10 *of the Government of the Democratic People’s Repub-*
11 *lic of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of such*
12 *government, or any other person provided for in an*
13 *Executive order listed in subsection (a), the Secretary*
14 *of State shall submit a report to the appropriate con-*
15 *gressional committees justifying the termination of*
16 *the sanction and explaining the relationship between*
17 *such termination and the cessation of any illicit ac-*
18 *tivity that violates any of the United Nations Secu-*
19 *rity Council resolutions referred to in subsection*
20 *(a)(1) by such Government or person.*

21 (3) *RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this*
22 *subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of*
23 *the President pursuant to the International Emer-*
24 *gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).*

1 (c) *POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT*
2 *TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUB-*
3 *LIC OF KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PRO-*
4 *GRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the objec-*
5 *tive of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic*
6 *missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of*
7 *Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dis-*
8 *mantlement of such programs.*

9 (d) *REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE*
10 *THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE*
11 *DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.—*

12 (1) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after*
13 *the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180*
14 *days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee*
15 *of the Secretary, shall submit a report to the appro-*
16 *priate congressional committees that describes actions*
17 *taken by the United States to address the threats*
18 *posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic Peo-*
19 *ple’s Republic of Korea.*

20 (2) *ELEMENTS.—Each report required under*
21 *paragraph (1) shall include—*

22 (A) *a summary of ongoing efforts by the*
23 *United States to identify strategies and policies,*
24 *including an assessment of the strengths and*
25 *weaknesses of such strategies and policies—*

1 (i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization
2 of the Democratic People's Republic of
3 Korea; and

4 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the
5 ballistic missile program of the Democratic
6 People's Republic of Korea;

7 (B) an assessment of—

8 (i) potential road maps toward peace-
9 ful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo-
10 ple's Republic of Korea and the elimination
11 of the nuclear and ballistic missile threats
12 posed by the Democratic People's Republic
13 of Korea; and

14 (ii) specific actions that the Demo-
15 cratic People's Republic of Korea would
16 need to take for each such roadmap to be-
17 come viable;

18 (C) a summary of the United States strat-
19 egy to increase international coordination and
20 cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or
21 multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement
22 and interdiction, to address the threat posed by
23 the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the
24 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which
25 shall include—

1 (i) a description of the actions taken
2 by the Secretary of State, or designees of the
3 Secretary, to consult with governments
4 around the world, with the purpose of in-
5 ducing such governments to fully implement
6 the United Nations Security Council resolu-
7 tions referred to in subsection (a)(1);

8 (ii) a description of the actions taken
9 by such governments to fully implement
10 United Nations Security Council resolutions
11 related to the Democratic People's Republic
12 of Korea;

13 (iii) a list of countries with govern-
14 ments that the Secretary has determined are
15 noncooperative with respect to imple-
16 menting the United Nations Security Coun-
17 cil resolutions referred to in subsection
18 (a)(1); and

19 (iv) a plan of action to engage, and in-
20 crease cooperation with respect to the Demo-
21 cratic People's Republic of Korea, with the
22 governments of the countries on the list de-
23 scribed in clause (iii);

24 (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the
25 national export control regimes of countries that

1 *are members of the United Nations, and multi-*
2 *lateral export control regimes, that are necessary*
3 *to enforce sanctions imposed with respect to the*
4 *Democratic People’s Republic of Korea pursuant*
5 *to the United Nations Security Council resolu-*
6 *tions referred to in subsection (a)(1); and*

7 *(E) an action plan to encourage and assist*
8 *countries in adopting and using authorities nec-*
9 *essary to enforce export controls required by*
10 *United Nations Security Council resolutions.*

11 *(3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required*
12 *under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi-*
13 *fied form, but may include a classified annex.*

14 *(e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
15 *that—*

16 *(1) representatives of the United States shall use*
17 *the voice and vote of the United States in all inter-*
18 *national organizations, as appropriate, to advocate*
19 *for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s Republic*
20 *of Korea from such organizations, until such time as*
21 *the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea meets its*
22 *commitments under the United Nations Security*
23 *Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1);*
24 *and*

1 (2) *the Secretary of State should work to induce*
2 *countries to meet their commitments under the United*
3 *Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in*
4 *subsection (a)(1), including by considering appro-*
5 *priate adjustments to the diplomatic posture and for-*
6 *ign assistance of the United States with governments*
7 *that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative*
8 *with respect to implementing the United Nations Se-*
9 *curity Council resolutions referred to in subsection*
10 *(a)(1).*

11 **SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND.**

12 *The United States Government is committed to—*

13 (1) *the Wellington Declaration, signed on No-*
14 *vember 5, 2010, which reaffirmed close ties and out-*
15 *lined future practical cooperation between the United*
16 *States and New Zealand;*

17 (2) *the Washington Declaration, signed on June*
18 *19, 2012, which strengthened the defense relationship*
19 *by providing a framework and strategic guidance for*
20 *security cooperation and defense dialogues; and*

21 (3) *all related and subsequent bilateral and secu-*
22 *rity agreements and arrangements between the United*
23 *States and New Zealand concluded on or before the*
24 *date of enactment of this Act.*

1 **SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.**

2 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*It is the sense of Congress that the*
3 *United States should—*

4 (1) *support strong United States engagement*
5 *with the nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji,*
6 *Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of*
7 *Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea,*
8 *Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and*
9 *Vanuatu;*

10 (2) *deepen its cooperation with the nations of the*
11 *South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ-*
12 *ing—*

13 (A) *fisheries and marine resource conserva-*
14 *tion;*

15 (B) *environmental challenges and resilience;*

16 (C) *global health;*

17 (D) *development and trade; and*

18 (E) *people-to-people ties; and*

19 (3) *continue to provide assistance to the Pacific*
20 *Islands, as appropriate, to support the rule of law,*
21 *good governance, and economic development.*

22 (b) *UNITED STATES-COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIA-*
23 *TION.*—*It is the sense of Congress that the Compacts of Free*
24 *Association entered between the United States and the Free-*
25 *ly Associated States (Republic of Marshall Islands, the Fed-*
26 *erated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau)—*

1 (1) *enhance the strategic posture of the United*
2 *States in the Western Pacific;*

3 (2) *reinforce United States regional commitment;*

4 (3) *preempt potential adversaries from estab-*
5 *lishing positional advantage; and*

6 (4) *further self-governance, economic develop-*
7 *ment, and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated*
8 *States.*

9 **SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT;**

10 **PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.**

11 (a) *FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.*—*It is the policy of the*
12 *United States—*

13 (1) *to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of*
14 *Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation,*
15 *and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region,*
16 *in accordance with applicable international law; and*

17 (2) *to promote genuine multilateral negotiations*
18 *to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South*
19 *China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter-*
20 *national law.*

21 (b) *JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.*—*It*
22 *is the sense of Congress that the President should develop*
23 *a diplomatic strategy that includes working with United*
24 *States allies and partners to conduct joint maritime train-*
25 *ing and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pa-*

1 *cific region, including the East China Sea and the South*
2 *China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system*
3 *benefitting all countries.*

4 **SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.**

5 *(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

6 *(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—*

7 *The term “appropriate committees of Congress”*
8 *means—*

9 *(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the*
10 *Senate;*

11 *(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
12 *the Senate;*

13 *(C) the Committee on Armed Services of the*
14 *House of Representatives; and*

15 *(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
16 *House of Representatives.*

17 *(2) ISIS.—The term “ISIS” means the Islamic*
18 *State of Iraq and Syria.*

19 *(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date*
20 *of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-*
21 *ligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Sec-*
22 *retary of Defense, and other appropriate Federal officials,*
23 *shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Con-*
24 *gress that contains an assessment of the current and future*
25 *capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked,*

1 *and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that*
2 *pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and*
3 *its citizens interests abroad.*

4 *(c) ELEMENTS.—The report required under subsection*
5 *(b) shall include—*

6 *(1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-*
7 *linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated*
8 *fighters in Southeast Asia;*

9 *(2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked, al-*
10 *Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affili-*
11 *ated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia*
12 *from fighting in the Middle East;*

13 *(3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of*
14 *ISIS-linked, al Qaeda-linked, and other various ex-*
15 *tremist group affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia;*

16 *(4) the current resources available to combat the*
17 *threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other vio-*
18 *lent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast*
19 *Asia, and the additional resources required to combat*
20 *such threat;*

21 *(5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of*
22 *ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex-*
23 *tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively*
24 *in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Philippines,*
25 *Indonesia, and Malaysia;*

1 (6) a description of the capabilities and resources
2 of governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent
3 extremist groups; and

4 (7) a list of additional United States resources
5 and capabilities that the Department of Defense and
6 the Department of State recommend providing to gov-
7 ernments in Southeast Asia to combat violent extrem-
8 ist groups.

9 **SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.**

10 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—It is the sense of Congress
11 that there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation be-
12 tween the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific
13 region—

14 (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats,
15 including state-sponsored threats;

16 (2) to share best practices to combat such threats;
17 and

18 (3) to strengthen resilience against misinforma-
19 tion and propaganda.

20 (b) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—There are
21 authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be nec-
22 essary for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023—

23 (1) to build capacity for responding to cybersecu-
24 rity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region;
25 and

1 (2) to enhance cooperation between the United
2 States and Indo-Pacific nations for combating such
3 threats.

4 **SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE**
5 **INDO-PACIFIC REGION.**

6 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—The United States Government—

7 (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and
8 other weapons of mass destruction, and their means
9 of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace
10 and security;

11 (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique chal-
12 lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il-
13 licit use, and the proliferation to and from North
14 Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies,
15 and other weapons of mass destruction;

16 (3) notes efforts by China and Russia—

17 (A) to expand and modernize their respec-
18 tive nuclear arsenals, including through signifi-
19 cant research and development resources in
20 hypersonic glide vehicles and other advanced
21 technologies; and

22 (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear
23 technologies; and

1 (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many
2 countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy
3 for a variety of peaceful applications.

4 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—It is the sense of Congress
5 that the United States Government should undertake all
6 reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms
7 control and nonproliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific re-
8 gion to limit the further spread of weapons of mass destruc-
9 tion and their means of delivery.

10 **TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED**
11 **STATES ECONOMIC INTER-**
12 **ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC**
13 **REGION**

14 **SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

15 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress makes the following findings:

16 (1) According to the United States Chamber of
17 Commerce, by 2030—

18 (A) 66 percent of the global middle class
19 population will be living in Asia; and

20 (B) 59 percent of middle class consumption
21 will take place in Asia.

22 (2) According to the Asian Development Bank—

23 (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilat-
24 eral or regional trade agreements; and

1 (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian
2 countries are under negotiation or concluded and
3 awaiting entry into force.

4 (3) Free trade agreements between the United
5 States and 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Aus-
6 tralia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea) have
7 entered into force.

8 (4) The member states of the Association of
9 Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section as
10 “ASEAN”), as a group—

11 (A) represent the fifth largest economy in
12 the world; and

13 (B) have a combined gross domestic product
14 of \$2,400,000,000,000.

15 (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member
16 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015,
17 and the total value of bilateral trade between the
18 United States and ASEAN member states has in-
19 creased by 78 percent since 2004.

20 (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by
21 companies in ASEAN member states to consumers in
22 the United States was \$77,000,000,000, while the
23 United States 2015 trade surplus of services provided
24 to consumers in ASEAN member states was
25 \$8,000,000,000.

1 (7) *According to US-ASEAN Business Council,*
2 *goods and services exported from the United States to*
3 *ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in the*
4 *United States.*

5 (8) *According to the Business Roundtable—*

6 (A) *the United States, Australia, Brunei,*
7 *Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New*
8 *Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re-*
9 *sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global*
10 *gross domestic product in 2017; and*

11 (B) *United States bilateral trade with the*
12 *other nations referred to in subparagraph (A)*
13 *supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States.*

14 (9) *According to the United States National Se-*
15 *curity Strategy—*

16 (A) *ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Co-*
17 *operation “remain centerpieces of the Indo-*
18 *Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for*
19 *promoting an order based on freedom”; and*

20 (B) *the United States will “work with part-*
21 *ners to build a network of states dedicated to free*
22 *markets and protected from forces that would*
23 *subvert their sovereignty.”.*

24 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
25 *that trade between the United States and the nations in*

1 *the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the United*
2 *States economy, United States exports, and jobs in the*
3 *United States.*

4 **SEC. 302. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREE-**
5 **MENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS.**

6 *Congress supports—*

7 *(1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade*
8 *agreements that increase United States employment*
9 *and expand the economy;*

10 *(2) formal economic dialogues that include con-*
11 *crete, verifiable, and measured outcomes;*

12 *(3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties*
13 *between the United States and nations in the Indo-*
14 *Pacific region;*

15 *(4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agree-*
16 *ment and the Environmental Goods Agreement that*
17 *include several major Asian economies; and*

18 *(5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-*
19 *level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation*
20 *forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group of 20*
21 *to pursue United States economic objectives in the*
22 *Indo-Pacific region.*

1 **SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP.**

2 *The President is authorized to negotiate a compre-*
3 *hensive economic engagement framework with the Association*
4 *of Southeast Asian Nations.*

5 **SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI-**
6 **TATION.**

7 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The President is encouraged to*
8 *produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity build-*
9 *ing and trade facilitation strategy for the Indo-Pacific re-*
10 *gion.*

11 (b) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There are*
12 *authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be nec-*
13 *essary to carry out subsection (a).*

14 **SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.**

15 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The President is encouraged to*
16 *make enforcement of United States intellectual property*
17 *laws a top priority, including taking all appropriate action*
18 *to deter and punish commercial cyber-enabled theft of intel-*
19 *lectual property.*

20 (b) *ANNUAL REPORT.*—*Not later than 180 days after*
21 *the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-*
22 *after, the President shall submit a report to Congress that—*

23 (1) *describes the efforts of the United States Gov-*
24 *ernment to combat intellectual property violations*
25 *and commercial cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pa-*

1 *cific region, particularly the People’s Republic of*
2 *China; and*

3 *(2) includes a country-by-country assessment of*
4 *priority areas for United States engagement and ca-*
5 *capacity building assistance.*

6 *(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are*
7 *authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be nec-*
8 *essary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities de-*
9 *signed to build capacity in the identified priority areas de-*
10 *scribed in the annual report required under subsection (b).*

11 **SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.**

12 *(a) INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.—*

13 *(1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after*
14 *the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually*
15 *thereafter, the President shall establish a comprehen-*
16 *sive, integrated, multiyear strategy to encourage the*
17 *efforts of Indo-Pacific countries to implement na-*
18 *tional power strategies and cooperation with United*
19 *States energy companies to develop an appropriate*
20 *mix of power solutions to provide access to sufficient,*
21 *reliable, and affordable power in order to reduce pov-*
22 *erty and drive economic growth and job creation.*

23 *(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—*
24 *There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts*
25 *as may be necessary to carry out paragraph (1).*

1 (b) *RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.*—*It is the*
2 *sense of Congress that—*

3 (1) *the President should establish bilateral and*
4 *regional initiatives to increase energy security in the*
5 *Indo-Pacific region;*

6 (2) *the United States should reaffirm support for*
7 *liquefied natural gas exports to the nations in the*
8 *Indo-Pacific region;*

9 (3) *the United States should seek to establish*
10 *partnership between Department of Energy national*
11 *laboratories and Indo-Pacific countries to provide*
12 *technical assistance on electrical grid development*
13 *and for the development and deployment of new and*
14 *advanced energy technologies; and*

15 (4) *the United States should explore opportuni-*
16 *ties to partner with the private sector and multilat-*
17 *eral institutions, such as the World Bank and the*
18 *Asian Development Bank, to promote universal access*
19 *to reliable electricity in Myanmar (historically known*
20 *as “Burma”).*

21 **SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.**

22 *The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Ad-*
23 *ministrator of the United States Agency for International*
24 *Development, should increase regional engagement in the*

1 *areas of environment, health, education, and infrastructure*
2 *development with the Lower Mekong countries, including—*

3 *(1) assisting in the development of programs that*
4 *focus on forecasting environmental challenges and re-*
5 *silience;*

6 *(2) assisting with transnational cooperation on*
7 *sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the*
8 *goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong*
9 *Basin and access to safe drinking water;*

10 *(3) assisting with education enrollment and*
11 *broadband internet connectivity, particularly English*
12 *training and connectivity in rural communities; and*

13 *(4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong*
14 *countries, including—*

15 *(A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate;*

16 *and*

17 *(B) helping regional partners to track and*
18 *treat malaria and tuberculosis.*

19 **SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH**
20 **AND NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION.**

21 *It is the sense of Congress that the President should*
22 *encourage the governments of countries in the Indo-Pacific*
23 *region and United States private sector interests with oper-*
24 *ations and investments in the region to deploy agriculture*
25 *practices that—*

- 1 (1) *conserve natural resources; and*
- 2 (2) *preserve culturally and ecological valuable*
- 3 *lands and water bodies.*

4 **SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN'S**
5 **ECONOMIC RIGHTS.**

6 *It is the sense of the Congress that the United States*
7 *should—*

- 8 (1) *support activities that secure private prop-*
- 9 *erty rights and land tenure for women in developing*
- 10 *countries in Asia, including—*

- 11 (A) *establishing legal frameworks to give*
- 12 *women equal rights to own, register, use, profit*
- 13 *from, and inherit land and property;*

- 14 (B) *improving legal literacy to enable*
- 15 *women to exercise the rights described in sub-*
- 16 *paragraph (A); and*

- 17 (C) *increasing the capacity of law enforce-*
- 18 *ment and community leaders to enforce such*
- 19 *rights;*

- 20 (2) *work with Asian civil society, governments,*
- 21 *and multilateral organizations to increase the capa-*
- 22 *bility of disadvantaged women and girls in Asia—*

- 23 (A) *to realize their rights;*

- 24 (B) *to determine their life outcomes;*

- 25 (C) *to assume leadership roles; and*

1 (D) to influence decision-making in their
2 households, communities, and societies; and
3 (3) seek to expand access to appropriate finan-
4 cial products and services for women-owned micro,
5 small, and medium-sized enterprises in Asia.

6 **TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED**
7 **STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-**
8 **PACIFIC REGION**

9 **SEC. 401. FINDINGS.**

10 Congress makes the following findings:

11 (1) The promotion of human rights and respect
12 for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in
13 the United States' national security interest.

14 (2) Continued support for human rights, demo-
15 cratic values, and good governance is critical to a
16 successful United States diplomatic strategy in the
17 Indo-Pacific.

18 (3) Strong support for human rights and democ-
19 racy in the Indo-Pacific region is critical to efforts to
20 reduce poverty, build rule of law, combat corruption,
21 reduce the allure of extremism, and promote economic
22 growth.

23 (4) There are serious concerns with the rule of
24 law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North

1 *Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all*
2 *been identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”.*

3 (5) *There have been unacceptable human rights*
4 *developments in—*

5 (A) *Burma (Myanmar), which has been*
6 *identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”, ac-*
7 *cording to the Department of State, and the De-*
8 *partment of State has declared that the violence*
9 *against the Rohingya constitutes ethnic cleans-*
10 *ing;*

11 (B) *the Philippines, which has been identi-*
12 *fied by Freedom House as “Partly Free”, and*
13 *where there are continued disturbing reports of*
14 *extra-judicial killings; and*

15 (C) *China, where forced disappearances, ex-*
16 *tralegal detentions, and lack of due process in ju-*
17 *dicial proceedings remain troublesome.*

18 (6) *according to the National Security Strategy,*
19 *the United States—*

20 (A) *will “support, with our words and ac-*
21 *tions, those who live under oppressive regimes*
22 *and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and*
23 *the rule of law”;*

24 (B) *“may use diplomacy, sanctions, and*
25 *other tools to isolate states and leaders who*

1 *threaten our interests and whose actions run*
2 *contrary to our values”;* and

3 (C) “*will support efforts to advance wom-*
4 *en’s equality, protect the rights of women and*
5 *girls, and promote women and youth empower-*
6 *ment programs”.*

7 **SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.**

8 *The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef-*
9 *forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery*
10 *in the Indo-Pacific region.*

11 **SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.**

12 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

13 (1) *United States Government officials should*
14 *lead by example—*

15 (A) *by continuing to advocate for freedom of*
16 *the press in the Indo-Pacific region; and*

17 (B) *by engaging with the press corps at*
18 *every appropriate opportunity; and*

19 (2) *the United States should advocate and sup-*
20 *port a Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the*
21 *Indo-Pacific to convene government and civil society,*
22 *including journalists, to discuss and address the chal-*
23 *lenges facing press freedom in the Indo-Pacific region.*

1 **SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PER-**
2 **SONNEL.**

3 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

4 *(1) United States embassies and consulates in*
5 *the Indo-Pacific region should have personnel, as ap-*
6 *propriate, who are dedicated to reporting on and ad-*
7 *vancing United States democracy, human rights,*
8 *labor, anti-corruption, and good governance policy*
9 *interests; and*

10 *(2) appropriate resources should be made avail-*
11 *able to carry out such activities.*

12 **SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-**
13 **TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT.**

14 *The Secretary of State should, as appropriate—*

15 *(1) establish high-level bilateral and regional*
16 *dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re-*
17 *garding human rights and religious freedom viola-*
18 *tions;*

19 *(2) establish or support robust, people-to-people*
20 *exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par-*
21 *ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and*

22 *(3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-*
23 *building programs emphasizing civil society develop-*
24 *ment.*

1 **SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS**
2 **HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY.**

3 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
4 *that the United States should continue to work with*
5 *ASEAN to improve the capacity of ASEAN to address*
6 *human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in*
7 *Southeast Asia.*

8 (b) *STRATEGY.*—*Not later than 90 days after the date*
9 *of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall*
10 *submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional commit-*
11 *tees to increase cooperation with ASEAN to promote human*
12 *rights, democracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia.*

13 (c) *CONTENTS.*—*The strategy submitted under sub-*
14 *section (b) should include—*

15 (1) *an assessment of the types of United States*
16 *Government resources available to support increased*
17 *cooperation; and*

18 (2) *an assessment to identify entities within*
19 *ASEAN that the United States could potentially sup-*
20 *port or partner with to promote human rights, de-*
21 *mocracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia.*

22 **SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA.**

23 *The President is encouraged to continue efforts to en-*
24 *hance freedom of information access with regard to North*
25 *Korea.*

1 **SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANC-**
2 **TIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES**
3 **ASSISTANCE.**

4 (a) *SANCTIONS.*—*It is the sense of Congress that the*
5 *President should impose sanctions, in accordance with ap-*
6 *plicable law and other relevant authorities, including tar-*
7 *geted financial penalties and visa bans, on any individual*
8 *or entity that—*

9 (1) *violates human rights or religious freedoms;*

10 *or*

11 (2) *engages in censorship activities.*

12 (b) *SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.*—*It is the*
13 *sense of Congress that the President should, in accordance*
14 *with applicable law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter*
15 *United States economic assistance to any country that has*
16 *engaged in serious violations of human rights or religious*
17 *freedoms.*

18 **SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

19 (a) *PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC*
20 *REGION.*—

21 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*There is authorized to be ap-*
22 *propriated \$210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years*
23 *2019 through 2023, to promote democracy, strengthen*
24 *civil society, human rights, rule of law, transparency,*
25 *and accountability in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-*
26 *ing for universities, civil society, and multilateral in-*

1 stitutions that are focusing on education awareness,
2 training, and capacity building.

3 (2) *DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.*—Amounts appro-
4 priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made
5 available for United States Government efforts, led by
6 the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
7 Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the
8 rule of law, and human rights in the People’s Repub-
9 lic of China.

10 (3) *TIBET.*—Amounts appropriated pursuant to
11 paragraph (1) shall be made available for nongovern-
12 mental organizations to support activities preserving
13 cultural traditions and promoting sustainable devel-
14 opment, education, and environmental conservation
15 in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous Re-
16 gion and in other Tibetan communities in China,
17 India, and Nepal.

18 **SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRON-**
19 **MENTAL DEFENDERS.**

20 (a) *DEFINED TERM.*—In this section, the term
21 “human rights and environmental defenders” means indi-
22 viduals, working alone or in groups, who nonviolently advo-
23 cate for the promotion and protection of universally recog-
24 nized human rights, fundamental freedoms, land issues, or

1 *the conservation of local ecosystems if the advocacy of such*
2 *issues may result in the risk of safety or life.*

3 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
4 *that human rights and environmental defenders in the*
5 *Indo-Pacific region have been facing increased difficulties*
6 *with the rise of unprecedented crackdowns and conflicts.*

7 (c) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are*
8 *authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be nec-*
9 *essary to support human rights and environmental defend-*
10 *ers through the Department of State’s Human Rights De-*
11 *fenders Fund.*

12 **SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIA-**
13 **TIVES.**

14 *There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts*
15 *as may be necessary, for fiscal years 2019 through 2025,*
16 *to support Indo-Pacific young leaders initiatives, including*
17 *the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the ASEAN*
18 *Youth Volunteers Program, and other people-to-people ex-*
19 *change programs that focus on building the capacity of de-*
20 *mocracy, human rights, and good governance activists in*
21 *the Indo-Pacific region.*

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A BILL

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.

OCTOBER 3 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 28), 2018

Reported with an amendment