

Our bipartisan legislation enhances the FSS Program by streamlining the administration of this program, broadening the supportive services that can be provided, and extending the reach of the FSS Program to tenants who live in privately owned properties with project-based assistance. In short, we make the FSS Program easier to administer and more effective.

First, to streamline the FSS Program, our bill would permanently combine two separate but similar FSS Programs into one. Under the existing authorization, HUD is supposed to operate one FSS Program for those families served by the Housing Choice Voucher Program and another for those families served by the Public Housing Program. This is the case even though the purpose of each FSS Program—to increase economic independence and self-sufficiency—is identical. Unfortunately, without a permanent change in the authorization, public housing agencies, PHAs, may at some point in the future have to operate essentially two programs to achieve the same goal. With our bill, PHAs would be relieved of this unnecessary burden permanently.

Second, our legislation broadens the scope of the supportive services that may be offered to include attainment of a high school equivalency certificate, education in pursuit of a postsecondary degree or certification, and financial literacy, such as training in financial management, financial coaching, and asset building. Providing families in need with affordable rental housing is critical, but combining this resource with the support and services to help families get ahead increases the effectiveness of this Federal investment. Our legislation makes it easier for FSS participants to obtain the training necessary to secure employment and the education to make prudent financial decisions to protect and grow their earnings.

Lastly, our bill permanently extends the FSS Program to families who live in privately owned properties subsidized with project-based rental assistance. It shouldn't matter what kind of housing assistance a family gets. Families seeking to achieve self-sufficiency shouldn't be held back by this sort of technicality.

I thank Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Compass Working Capital, Housing Partnership Network, Preservation of Affordable Housing, National Housing Conference, Stewards of Affordable Housing for the Future, National NeighborWorks Association, National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, Public Housing Authority Directors Association, Public Housing Association of Rhode Island, and Rhode Island Housing for their support. I also thank Senator BLUNT, Senator MENENDEZ, and Senator SCOTT for their partnership and I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan bill, which will help give those receiving housing assistance a greater chance to build their skills and achieve economic independence.

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED AND PROPOSED

SA 234. Mr. PERDUE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table.

TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

SA 234. Mr. PERDUE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. _____. SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE COOPERATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Iran developed a close working relationship with North Korea on many ballistic missile programs, dating back to an acquisition of Scud missiles from North Korea in the mid-1980s.

(2) By the mid-1980s North Korea reverse-engineered Scud B missiles originally received from Egypt, and developed the 500-kilometer range Scud C missile in 1991, and sold both the Scud B and Scud C, as well as missile production technology, to Iran.

(3) In 1992, then-Director of the Central Intelligence Robert Gates, in testimony to Congress, identified Iran as a recipient of North Korean Scud missiles.

(4) In 1993, then-Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey provided more detail, stating that North Korea had sold Iran extended range Scud C missiles and agreed to sell other forms of missile technology.

(5) Annual threat assessments from the intelligence community during the 1990s showed that North Korea's ongoing export of ballistic missiles provided a qualitative increase in capabilities to countries such as Iran.

(6) The same threat assessments noted that Iran was using North Korean ballistic missile goods and services to achieve its goal of self-sufficiency in the production of medium-range ballistic missiles.

(7) The intelligence community assessed in the 1990s that Iran's acquisition of missile systems or key missile-related components could improve Iran's ability to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

(8) Throughout the 2000s, the intelligence community continued to assess that North Korean cooperation with Iran's ballistic missile program was ongoing and significant.

(9) In 2007 a failed missile test in Syria caused the death of Syrian, Iranian, and North Korean experts.

(10) North Korea built the nuclear reactor in Syria that was bombed in 2007. Syria failed to report the construction of the reactor to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was Syria's obligation under its safeguards agreement with the agency.

(11) Official sources confirm that Iran and North Korea have engaged in various forms of clandestine nuclear cooperation.

(12) North Korea and Iran obtained designs and materials related to uranium enrichment from a clandestine procurement network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan.

(13) In the early 2000s, North Korea exported, with the assistance of Abdul Qadeer Khan, uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas to Libya, which was intended to be used in Libya's clandestine nuclear weapons program.

(14) On January 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear weapons test.

(15) On September 9, 2016, North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear weapons test.

(16) Iranian officials reportedly traveled to North Korea to witness its three previous nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013.

(17) Before North Korea's 2013 test, a senior American official was quoted as saying "it's very possible that North Koreans are testing for two countries".

(18) In September 2012, Iran and North Korea signed an agreement for technological and scientific cooperation.

(19) In an April 2015 interview with CNN, then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said that North Korea and Iran "could be" cooperating to develop a nuclear weapon.

(20) On March 11, 2017, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats provided written testimony to Congress that stated that Pyongyang's "export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria's construction of a nuclear reactor . . . illustrate its willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies".

(21) A 2016 Congressional Research Service report confirmed that "ballistic missile technology cooperation between the two [Iran and North Korea] is significant and meaningful".

(22) Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander of United States Northern Command, testified to Congress on April 14, 2016, that "Iran's continuing pursuit of long-range missile capabilities and ballistic missile and space launch programs, in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions, remains a serious concern".

(23) Iran has engaged in nuclear technology cooperation with North Korea.

(24) It has been suspected for over a decade that Iran and North Korea are working together on nuclear weapons development.

(25) Since the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-277) repealed requirements for the intelligence community to provide unclassified annual report to Congress on the "Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions", the number of unclassified reports to Congress on nuclear-weapons issues decreased considerably.

(26) North Korea's cooperation with Iran on nuclear weapon development is widely suspected, but has yet to be detailed by the President to Congress.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the ballistic missile programs of Iran and North Korea represent a serious threat to allies of the United States in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, members of the Armed Forces deployed in those regions, and ultimately the United States;

(2) further cooperation between Iran and North Korea on nuclear weapons or ballistic missile technology is not in the security interests of the United States or our allies;

(3) the testing and production by Iran of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear device is a clear violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council and supported by the international community; and

(4) Iran is using its space launch program to develop the capabilities necessary to deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile that could threaten the United States, and