

when I heard the news that shootings were happening in the U.S. Capitol—the fear as a staffer that went through me, wondering where my friend and my boss were. But I got to see it from out there. I never thought years later I would get to witness it as a Member of Congress.

And witness it, we all did, but also we learned from it, and we learned what America was all about. And today is our day in the U.S. Congress to stand up for those heroes who protected us that day and say: We are going to help you.

I, and my family, my kids, my wife, every family member who I was able to reach out to that morning, and all of those who I wasn't able to talk to, we cannot say thank you enough to Agent Griner, Agent Bailey, and the Alexandria Police Department for making sure we have the ability to make this fix.

I urge every one of my colleagues to vote “yes” on this bill. Let's send a message back to America that we thank them for what they did for our officers, and we thank them for allowing all of us the privilege to serve in this great institution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LANCE). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. RODNEY DAVIS) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3298, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3180) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2018 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 3180

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.

Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central Intelligence Agency.

TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 303. Congressional oversight of intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 304. Enhanced personnel security programs.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing environment.
Sec. 403. Technical correction to the executive schedule.

Subtitle B—Other Elements

Sec. 411. Requirements relating to appointment of General Counsel of National Security Agency.
Sec. 412. Transfer or elimination of certain components and functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 413. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.

TITLE V—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Sec. 501. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 502. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to Federal election campaigns.
Sec. 503. Assessment of threat finance relating to the Russian Federation.

TITLE VI—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 601. Period of overseas assignments for certain foreign service officers.
Sec. 602. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 603. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 604. Report on expansion of Security Protective Services jurisdiction.
Sec. 605. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 606. Report on Cyber Exchange Program.
Sec. 607. Review of intelligence community participation in vulnerabilities equities process.
Sec. 608. Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 609. Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures of classified information.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional intelligence committees” means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

- (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
- (3) The Department of Defense.
- (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
- (5) The National Security Agency.
- (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
- (7) The Coast Guard.
- (8) The Department of State.
- (9) The Department of the Treasury.
- (10) The Department of Energy.
- (11) The Department of Justice.
- (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
- (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
- (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
- (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2018, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) AUTHORITY FOR INCREASES.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2018 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number

of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such element.

(b) **TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PERSONNEL.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in—

(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;

(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or

(3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.

(c) **NOTICE TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a).

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2018 the sum of \$526,900,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2019.

(b) **AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.**—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 804 positions as of September 30, 2018. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

(c) **CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.**—

(1) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2018 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts made available for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2019.

(2) **AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL.**—In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2018, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2018 the sum of \$514,000,000.

SEC. 202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) **COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 221 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the end and inserting “, as determined by using the annual rate of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in that position.”;

(B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking “12-month” and inserting “2-year”;

(C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking “one year” and inserting “two years”;

(D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking “one year” both places it appears and inserting “two years”;

(E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and (l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively; and

(F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:

“(h) **CONDITIONAL ELECTION OF INSURABLE INTEREST SURVIVOR ANNUITY BY PARTICIPANTS MARRIED AT THE TIME OF RETIREMENT.**—

“(1) **AUTHORITY TO MAKE DESIGNATION.**—Subject to the rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section 222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and designate in writing an individual having an insurable interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the system after the participant's death, except that any such election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be equal to 55 percent of the participant's reduced annuity.

“(2) **REDUCTION IN PARTICIPANT'S ANNUITY.**—The annuity payable to the participant making such election shall be reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection (a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the designated individual is younger than the participant. The total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 percent.

“(3) **COMMENCEMENT OF SURVIVOR ANNUITY.**—The annuity payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last day of the month before the designated individual dies.

“(4) **RECOMPUTATION OF PARTICIPANT'S ANNUITY ON DEATH OF DESIGNATED INDIVIDUAL.**—An annuity which is reduced under this subsection shall, effective the first day of the month following the death of the designated individual, be recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not been so reduced.”.

(2) **CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.**—

(A) **CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT.**—The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et seq.) is amended—

(i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by striking “221(h),” and inserting “221(i),”; and

(ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by striking “221(k)” and inserting “221(l)”.

(B) **CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949.**—Subsection (a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking “221(h)(2), 221(i), 221(l),” and inserting “221(i)(2), 221(j), 221(m),”.

(b) **ANNUITIES FOR FORMER SPOUSES.**—Subparagraph (B) of section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by striking “one year” and inserting “two years”.

(c) **PRIOR SERVICE CREDIT.**—Subparagraph (A) of section 252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking “October 1, 1990” both places that term appears and inserting “March 31, 1991”.

(d) **REEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.**—Section 273 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

“(b) **PART-TIME REEMPLOYED ANNUITANTS.**—The Director shall have the authority to reemploy an annuitant in a part-time basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United States Code.”.

(e) **EFFECTIVE DATE AND APPLICATION.**—The amendments made by subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.

TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 303. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.

(a) **OVERSIGHT BY CONGRESS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506J the following new section:

“SEC. 506K. OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.

“Notwithstanding the terms of any contract awarded by the head of an element of the intelligence community, the head may not—

“(1) prohibit a contractor of such element from contacting or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a contract;

“(2) take any adverse action against a contractor of such element, including by suspending or debarring the contractor or terminating a contract, based on the contractor contacting or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a contract; or

“(3) require the approval of the head before a contractor of such element contacts or meets with either of the congressional intelligence committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a contract.”.

(2) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506J the following new item:

“Sec. 506K. Oversight of intelligence community contractors.”.

(b) **APPLICATION.**—The amendment made by subsection (a)(1) shall apply with respect to a contract awarded by the head of an element of the intelligence community on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 304. ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS.

Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the subsection heading, by striking “AUDIT” and inserting “REVIEW”;

(2) in paragraph (1), by striking “audit” and inserting “review”; and

(3) in paragraph (2), by striking “audit” and inserting “review”.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking “such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate;” and inserting “current and former personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence may designate;”.

SEC. 402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER—INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT.

(a) INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT.—Section 1016(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “President” and inserting “Director of National Intelligence”; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking “President” both places that term appears and inserting “Director of National Intelligence”.

(b) PROGRAM MANAGER.—Section 1016(f) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)) is amended by striking “The individual designated as the program manager shall serve as program manager until removed from service or replaced by the President (at the President’s sole discretion).” and inserting “Beginning on the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, each individual designated as the program manager shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.”.

SEC. 403. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security.”.

Subtitle B—Other Elements

SEC. 411. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL COUNSEL OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(c)(1) There is a General Counsel of the National Security Agency.

“(2) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (c) of section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 U.S.C. 3602) shall apply with respect to any person who is appointed to serve as General Counsel of the National Security Agency on or after January 21, 2021.

SEC. 412. TRANSFER OR ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) INFORMATION REVIEW TASK FORCE.—

(1) TRANSFER REQUIRED.—Effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all functions performed by the Information Review Task Force and all assigned responsibilities performed by the Information Review Task Force. Upon such transfer,

such Task Force shall be designated as a chairman’s controlled activity.

(2) TRANSITION PLAN.—

(A) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(B) SUBMITTAL OF FORMAL PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(3) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Information Review Task Force for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) IDENTITY INTELLIGENCE PROJECT OFFICE.—

(1) ELIMINATION.—Effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Identity Intelligence Project Office, including all functions and assigned responsibilities performed by the Identity Intelligence Project Office. All personnel and assets pertaining to such Office shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.

(2) TRANSITION PLAN.—

(A) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the elimination required under paragraph (1).

(B) SUBMITTAL OF FORMAL PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the elimination required under paragraph (1).

(3) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Identity Intelligence Project Office for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.

(c) WATCHLISTING BRANCH.—

(1) TRANSFER REQUIRED.—Effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff all functions and all assigned responsibilities performed by the Watchlisting Branch.

(2) TRANSITION PLAN.—

(A) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff shall jointly brief the congressional intelligence committees

and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(B) SUBMITTAL OF FORMAL PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(3) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Watchlisting Branch for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff.

(d) COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE.—

(1) ELIMINATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Counter-Threat Finance analysis function of the Defense Intelligence Agency. All personnel and assets pertaining to such function shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.

(2) TRANSITION PLAN.—

(A) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to eliminate the Counter-Threat Finance analysis function under paragraph (1).

(B) SUBMITTAL OF FORMAL PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan to eliminate such function under paragraph (1).

(3) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Counter-Threat Finance analysis function for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.

(e) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY.—

(1) TRANSFER REQUIRED.—Effective on October 1, 2020, there is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Director of National Intelligence all functions and all assigned responsibilities performed by the National Intelligence University.

(2) TRANSITION PLAN.—

(A) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(B) SUBMITTAL OF FORMAL PLAN.—Not later than April 1, 2019, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required under paragraph (1).

(3) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency

may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the National Intelligence University after October 1, 2020. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to the Director of National Intelligence.

(f) CONGRESSIONAL NOTICE FOR REPROGRAMMING.—Not later than 30 days before transferring any funds relating to transferring or eliminating any function under this section, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees notice in writing of such transfer.

(g) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any function or executive agent responsibility that is transferred to the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to this section, the Director of National Intelligence may not delegate such function or responsibility to another element of the intelligence community.

(2) EXECUTIVE AGENT RESPONSIBILITY.—In this subsection, the term “executive agent responsibility” means the specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities assigned by the Director of National Intelligence to the head of an intelligence community element to provide defined levels of support for intelligence operations, or administrative or other designated activities.

(h) DEADLINE FOR POLICY UPDATES.—Not later than October 1, 2020, the Director of National Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall ensure that all relevant policies of the intelligence community and Department of Defense are updated to reflect the transfers required to be made pursuant to this section.

(i) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNCTIONS.—No transferred functions or assigned responsibility referred to in subsection (a), (c), or (e) shall be considered a new start by the receiving element, including in the case of any lapse of appropriation for such transferred function or assigned responsibility.

(j) REPORTS ON OTHER ELEMENTS OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.—

(1) NATIONAL CENTER FOR CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT.—

(A) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(i) the assignment of executive agency for the National Center for Credibility Assessment to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of the Center to effectively serve the Federal customer base of the Center;

(ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence, in the role of the Director as security executive for the Federal Government, to define in policy the term “Executive Agent” may be further limiting the ability of the Center to receive sufficient resources to carry out the critical Federal mission of the Center; and

(iii) the evolution of the Center from an organization of the Army to an organization serving 27 departments and agencies and responsible for all Federal credibility assessment training, oversight, and research and development, has resulted in a convoluted oversight structure based on legacy reporting requirements.

(B) REPORT.—Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a report on—

(i) the current and projected missions and functions of the National Center for Credibility Assessment;

(ii) the effectiveness of the current organizational assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency;

(iii) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of National Intelligence; and

(iv) the resources and authorities necessary to most effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.

(2) UNDERGROUND FACILITIES ANALYSIS CENTER.—

(A) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(i) the assignment of executive agency for the Underground Facilities Analysis Center to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of the Center to effectively serve the broader intelligence community customer base of the Center;

(ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence to define in policy the term “Executive Agent” may be further limiting the ability of the Center to receive sufficient resources to carry out the critical mission of the Center; and

(iii) the requirements of the intelligence community and Department of Defense with respect to underground facilities are not adequately being met given the scale and complexity of the problem set and the relatively small amount of funding currently received by the Center.

(B) REPORT.—Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a report on—

(i) the missions and functions of the Underground Facilities Analysis Center;

(ii) the state of the requirements of the intelligence community and Department of Defense with respect to underground facilities and the ability of the Center to meet such requirements;

(iii) the effectiveness of the current organizational assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency;

(iv) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence; and

(v) the resources and authorities necessary to most effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.

(k) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “congressional defense committees” means—

(1) the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives.

SEC. 413. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.

(a) ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACT.—Section 4524(b)(2) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended by inserting “Intelligence and” after “The Director of”.

(b) NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.—Paragraph (2) of section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting “and Counterintelligence” after “Office of Intelligence”; and

(2) by striking subparagraph (F);

(3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and

(4) in subparagraph (H), as redesignated by paragraph (3), by realigning the margin of such subparagraph two ems to the left.

TITLE V—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

SEC. 501. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA.

(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an analytical assessment of the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any, conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. Such assessment shall include—

(1) a summary of such significant Russian influence campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific goal of each such campaign;

(2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the elections or referenda;

(3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of assisting the government of such foreign state in defending against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns; and

(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).

(b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an unclassified summary.

(c) RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN DEFINED.—In this section, the term “Russian influence campaign” means any effort, covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or similar process in a country other than the Russian Federation or the United States.

SEC. 502. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.

(a) REPORTS REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—As provided in paragraph (2), for each Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an internet website an advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall include, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, each of the following:

(A) A description of foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices.

(B) A summary of best practices that election campaigns for Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such threats.

(C) An identification of any publicly available resources, including United States Government resources, for countering such threats.

(2) SCHEDULE FOR SUBMITTAL.—A report under this subsection shall be made available as follows:

(A) In the case of a report regarding an election held for the office of Senator or Member of the House of Representatives during 2018, not later than the date that is 60

days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(B) In the case of a report regarding an election for a Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the date that is one year before the date of the election.

(3) INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED.—A report under this subsection shall reflect the most current information available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.

(b) TREATMENT OF CAMPAIGNS SUBJECT TO HEIGHTENED THREATS.—If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, may make available additional information to the appropriate representatives of such campaign.

SEC. 503. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Manager for Threat Finance, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an assessment of the financing of threat activity by the Russian Federation.

(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period prior to the date of the report of any threat finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the behest of officials of the Government of Russia, persons subject to sanctions under any provision of law imposing sanctions with respect to Russia, or Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any other provision of law.

(2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in threat finance activities relating to Russia, including common methods of conducting such activities.

(3) A summary of engagement and coordination with international partners on threat finance relating to Russia, especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement and coordination.

(4) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.

(c) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

(d) THREAT FINANCE DEFINED.—In this section, the term “threat finance” means—

(1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation, terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;

(2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move, raise, or conceal money or value on behalf of threat actors;

(3) sanctions evasion; or

(4) other forms of threat financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the President.

TITLE VI—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 601. PERIOD OF OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS FOR CERTAIN FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS.

(a) LENGTH OF PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT.—Subsection (a) of section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3982) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) In making assignments under paragraph (1), and in accordance with section 903,

and, if applicable, section 503, the Secretary shall assure that a member of the Service may serve at a post for a period of not more than six consecutive years.”.

(b) FOREIGN LANGUAGE DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS.—Section 702 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022) is amended by—

(1) redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

“(c) FOREIGN LANGUAGE DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, with the assistance of other relevant officials, shall require all members of the Service who receive foreign language training in Arabic, Farsi, Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), Turkish, Korean, and Japanese by the institution or otherwise in accordance with subsection (b) to serve three successive tours in positions in which the acquired language is both relevant and determined to be a benefit to the Department.

“(2) OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS.—In carrying out paragraph (1), at least one of the three successive tours referred to in such paragraph shall be an overseas deployment.

“(3) WAIVER.—The Secretary of State may waive the application of paragraph (1) for medical or family hardship or in the interest of national security.

“(4) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of State shall notify the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate at the end of each fiscal year of any instances during the prior twelve months in which the waiver authority described in paragraph (3) was invoked.”.

SEC. 602. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—On a semiannual basis, each covered official shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes, with respect to the preceding 6-month period—

“(1) the number of investigations opened by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information;

“(2) the number of investigations completed by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information; and

“(3) of the number of such completed investigations identified under paragraph (2), the number referred to the Attorney General for criminal investigation.

“(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) The term ‘covered official’ means—

“(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence community; and

“(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.

“(2) The term ‘investigation’ means any inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.

“(3) The term ‘unauthorized public disclosure of classified information’ means the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to a journalist or media organization.”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first section of the National

Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the following new item:

“Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information.”.

SEC. 603. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY CLEARANCES.

Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(1)—

(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting “and” after the semicolon;

(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking “; and” and inserting a period; and

(C) by striking subparagraph (C);

(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);

(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):

“(b) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS.—

(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the security clearances processed by each element of the intelligence community during the preceding calendar year. Each such report shall separately identify security clearances processed by each such element and shall cover Federal employees and contractor employees.

“(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include each of the following for each element of the intelligence community for the year covered by the report:

“(A) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations opened for new applicants.

“(B) The total number of security clearance periodic re-investigations opened for existing employees.

“(C) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations for new applicants that were finalized and adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the prospective applicant, including—

“(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and granted access to classified information; and

“(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(D) The total number of security clearance periodic background investigations that were finalized and adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the existing employee, including—

“(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and

“(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(E) The total number of pending security clearance background investigations, including initial applicant investigations and periodic re-investigations, that were not finalized and adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained pending as follows:

“(i) For 180 days or less.

“(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.

“(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.

“(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.

“(v) For 24 months or longer.

“(F) In the case of security clearance determinations completed or pending during the year preceding the year for which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12 months to complete—

“(i) the cause of the delay for such determinations; and

“(ii) the number of such determinations for which polygraph examinations were required.

“(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, including initial and periodic re-investigations, that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations that resulted in incomplete information.

“(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations that did not result in enough information to make a decision on potentially adverse information.

“(3) The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.”; and

(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by inserting “and (b)” after “subsection (a)(1)”.

SEC. 604. REPORT ON EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICES JURISDICTION.

(a) **REPORT.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the feasibility, justification, costs, and benefits of expanding the jurisdiction of the protective services of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 15(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)). The report shall include—

(1) an explanation of the need for expanding such jurisdiction beyond the 500-foot limit specified in such section 15(a)(1); and

(2) an identification of any comparable departments or agencies of the Federal Government in the Washington metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40, United States Code) whose protective services jurisdictions exceed 500 feet.

(b) **FORM.**—The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 605. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.

(a) **REPORT.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the Federal Government of national security risks associated with potential foreign investments into the United States.

(b) **MATTERS INCLUDED.**—The report under subsection (a) shall—

(1) describe the current process for the provision of the analytic materials described in subsection (a);

(2) identify the most significant benefits and drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the Director, including any benefits or drawbacks relating to the time allotted to the Director to prepare such materials; and

(3) include recommendations to improve such process.

SEC. 606. REPORT ON CYBER EXCHANGE PROGRAM.

(a) **REPORT.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the potential establishment of a fully voluntary exchange program between elements of the intelligence community and private technology companies under which—

(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community with demonstrated ex-

pertise and work experience in cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed to a private technology company that has elected to receive the detailee; and

(2) an employee of a private technology company with demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed to an element of the intelligence community that has elected to receive the detailee.

(b) **MATTERS INCLUDED.**—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The feasibility of establishing the exchange program described in such subsection.

(2) Identification of any challenges in establishing the exchange program.

(3) An evaluation of the benefits to the intelligence community that would result from the exchange program.

SEC. 607. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCEEDINGS.

(a) **REVIEW.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall review, with respect to the 3-year period preceding the date of the review, the roles and responsibilities of the elements of the intelligence community in the process of the Federal Government for determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public.

(b) **REPORT.**—

(1) **SUBMISSION.**—Not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the results of the review under subsection (a).

(2) **ELEMENTS.**—The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A description of the roles and responsibilities of the elements of the intelligence community in the process of determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public.

(B) The criteria used by the Federal Government, including elements of the intelligence community, in making such determination.

(C) With respect to the period covered by the review—

(i) a summary of vulnerabilities known to elements of the intelligence community that were reviewed by the Federal Government pursuant to such process, including—

(I) the number of vulnerabilities known to the intelligence community that were reviewed; and

(II) of such number of reviewed vulnerabilities, the number for which information was shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public;

(ii) an assessment of whether there were any vulnerabilities known to elements of the intelligence community that were not reviewed pursuant to such process, and if so, the basis and rationale for not conducting such a review; and

(iii) a summary of the most significant incidents in which a vulnerability known to the intelligence community, but not shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public, was exploited by an individual, an entity, or a foreign country in the course of carrying out a cyber intrusion.

(D) A description of any current mechanisms for overseeing such process.

(E) Recommendations to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and,

consistent with national security, transparency of such process.

(F) Any other matters the Inspector General determines appropriate.

(3) **FORM.**—The report may be submitted in classified form.

(c) **VULNERABILITY DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “vulnerability” means, with respect to information technology, a design, configuration, or implementation weakness in a technology, product, system, service, or application that can be exploited or triggered to cause unexpected or unintended behavior.

SEC. 608. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.

(a) **REVIEW OF WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.**—The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other practices and procedures relating to intelligence community whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors general.

(b) **OBJECTIVE OF REVIEW.**—The objective of the review required under subsection (a) is to identify any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, which frustrate the timely and effective reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.

(c) **CONDUCT OF REVIEW.**—The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an independent and objective fashion.

(d) **REPORT.**—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report containing the results of the review required under subsection (a), along with recommendations to improve the timely and effective reporting of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters to inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.

SEC. 609. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress finds that section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires elements of the intelligence community to keep the congressional intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” about all “intelligence activities” of the United States, and to “furnish to the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities... which is requested by either of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.”.

(b) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the authorities described in subsection (a), together with other intelligence community authorities, obligate an element of the intelligence community to submit to the congressional intelligence committees written notification, by not later than 7 days after becoming aware, that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed covered classified information to an official of an adversary foreign government using methods other than established intelligence channels; and

(2) each such notification should include—

(A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified information covered by the notification;

(B) a description of such classified information;

(C) identification of the individual who made such disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was made; and

(D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term “adversary foreign government” means the government of any of the following foreign countries:

(A) North Korea.

(B) Iran.

(C) China.

(D) Russia.

(E) Cuba.

(2) The term “covered classified information” means classified information that was—

(A) collected by an element of the intelligence community; or

(B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.

(3) The term “established intelligence channels” means methods to exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign intelligence relationships, as established pursuant to law by the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, or other head of an element of the intelligence community.

(4) The term “individual in the executive branch” means any officer or employee of the executive branch, including individuals—

(A) occupying a position specified in article II of the Constitution;

(B) appointed to a position by an individual described in subparagraph (A); or

(C) serving in the civil service or the senior executive service (or similar service for senior executives of particular departments or agencies).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES) and the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 3180.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

□ 1730

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is the most important tool Congress has to conduct effective oversight of the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. The Intelligence Committee has brought a bill to the floor every year since fiscal year 2010. Once again, the bill is a bipartisan product that reflects contributions from all committee members. It was reported out of committee by a unanimous voice vote.

Because most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified pro-

grams, the bulk of the Committee's schedule of authorizations and direction are found in the classified annex to the bill. This classified annex has been made available to Members since markup in the House Intelligence Committee spaces.

At the unclassified level, I can report that the overall funding authorized by this bill is slightly below the President's budget request. Furthermore, the bill funds the Military Intelligence Program in line with the levels of the House-passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.

The bill implements the first stage of a committee initiative to streamline and optimize defense intelligence beginning with the Defense Intelligence Agency; provides guidelines to guarantee that intelligence community contractors can meet with Congress unhindered; and enhances oversight of intelligence activities by mandating intelligence community reports on threats to Federal elections, leaks of classified information, security clearance processing, and other vital activities.

Mr. Speaker, America faces an international threat matrix more complicated than anything we have endured in the past. The recent, impressive progress made by the U.S. military and its allies against ISIS in Iraq and Syria has not ended the ISIS terror threat. In fact, based on the group's ability to inspire terror attacks through social media and other means, ISIS could remain a significant threat to the West even after it loses all the territory it controls. Additionally, al-Qaida remains active in Afghanistan and has retained its close links to the resurgent Taliban. Meanwhile, other threats from belligerent regimes like Iran and North Korea continue to intensify, while instability in failed states like Libya presents pressing security challenges to the U.S. and our European allies, including through the facilitation of waves of mass migration that provide cover for the movement of jihadists to the West.

This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our intelligence community have the funding, authorities, and support they need to carry out their mission and to keep us safe, while providing Congress with the tools it needs to provide robust oversight over their actions.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
Washington, DC, July 24, 2017.

Hon. DEVIN NUNES,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN NUNES: I am writing to you concerning the jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Homeland Security in H.R. 3180, the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.” The bill includes provisions that fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security.

I recognize and appreciate the desire to bring this legislation before the House of

Representatives in an expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on Homeland Security will forego seeking a sequential referral on this bill. However, this is conditional based on our mutual understanding that foregoing action on H.R. 3180 at this time does not prejudice this Committee with respect to any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matter contained in this bill or similar legislation.

This waiver is also given with the understanding that the Committee on Homeland Security expressly reserves its authority to seek conferees on any provision within its jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference that may be convened on this or any similar legislation, and requests your support for such a request.

I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 3180, and ask that a copy of this letter and your response be included in the Congressional Record during consideration of this bill on the House floor.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

Washington, DC, July 24, 2017.

Hon. MICHAEL MCCAUL,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MCCAUL: I received your letter regarding H.R. 3180, the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.” You have asserted that Section 502 of the Act falls within your jurisdiction because it requests that the Director of National Intelligence coordinate with the National Intelligence Program (NIP) funded Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A) to produce a publicly available advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cyber threats.

Consistent with our January 11, 2017 exchange of letters, HPSCI has exclusive jurisdiction over NIP funded DHS I&A intelligence activities. However, I acknowledge that your letter in no way diminishes or alters the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security with respect to any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matter contained in the bill or any similar legislation.

I will include a copy of your letter and this response in the Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation on the House Floor. Thank you for your assistance with this matter.

Sincerely,

DEVIN NUNES,
Chairman.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to taking up the Intelligence Authorization Act on suspension at a time when issues concerning the intelligence community have taken on an even greater significance and urgency, and taking up the bill this way will deprive Members of the opportunity to offer important amendments.

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 is a good and bipartisan bill, but even a good bill can be made better. And although we have taken up the IAA on suspension on occasion in the past, it has only been on the basis of mutual agreement, which is not the case this year.

On its merits, I believe the IAA should and will become law, and I look

forward to its ultimate approval by both the House and Senate, and enactment.

Nevertheless, I share Leader PELOSI and Whip HOYER's view that tonight's suspension vote should be opposed. This IAA should go through regular order so that Members may offer amendments. I will vote "no" today because I disagree with the expedited procedure used to bring this to the floor.

The Intelligence Committee has a unique role in this House and a special obligation to the American people.

It is our job to oversee the activities of the 17 agencies that comprise the intelligence community, ensuring that we strike an appropriate balance between protecting our country's national security and the civil liberties of everyone who calls America home.

On behalf of the House—by and through our oversight tools, including the IAA—our committee helps ensure that the activities of the U.S. intelligence community do the following: that they adhere to the Constitution and to the law; that they advance the national security interests of the United States; that they wisely expend taxpayer dollars; and that they steadfastly protect Americans' civil liberties and privacy rights.

The legislation before us today, like its predecessors, continues to fund, equip, and give policy direction to the intelligence community and military intelligence elements of the Department of Defense. It provides funding levels slightly below the President's 2018 budget request and sustains intelligence priorities provided for in previous authorizations.

In addition to the unclassified legislative text and accompanying House report, the IAA includes a classified annex, which directs the resources and spending for the IC's activities and programs. This includes a correlating schedule of authorizations that lays out funding for the IC and the DOD.

This year's IAA, once again, incorporates a number of Democratic Member oversight priorities: it improves our efforts to stamp out waste, fraud, and abuse by requiring an Inspector General-level review of existing whistleblower procedures and by permitting IC contractors to come directly to Congress without requiring permission from the IC elements that employ them.

A provision accompanying the report mandates that the ODNI notify and provide justification to Congress if the executive branch alters the existing Presidential Policy Guidance, or PPG, relating to U.S. counterterrorism actions located outside of designated areas of active hostilities. The PPG, first promulgated under the previous administration, is an important element of U.S. policymaking that seeks to ensure direct action against lawful terrorist targets is undertaken only when necessary and consistent with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. This is the result of rig-

orous legal and policy deliberation and coordination within the U.S. Government. Reporting to Congress on any changes to it ensures proper oversight.

The bill also furthers our committee's belief that the future of the IC workforce depends on diversity; as such, this year's IAA enhances the ODNI's Centers of Academic Excellence program.

Finally, this bill reflects a clear-eyed assessment of the threat we face from a resurgent Russia determined to undermine our democratic institutions and our faith in the American political process.

As the intelligence community has determined, Moscow initiated as early as mid-2015 an active measures campaign to assault our 2016 election. The Kremlin's influence campaign consisted of cyber espionage, hacking and weaponizing stolen documents, and a propaganda machine that was used to great effect to amplify every element of their appalling campaign, and perhaps more.

This year's IAA acts on that unanimous IC judgment by directing assessments on Moscow's influence campaigns against foreign elections and the threat posed by Russian finance activities globally. It also requires ODNI to publish a report on the foreign cybersecurity and counterintelligence threats to future U.S. Federal election campaigns.

As with any product of a good-faith attempt at compromise, I do not pretend this bill is perfect. There are provisions I wish were modified, and some provisions that I would have liked to have seen included. Many of my colleagues feel the same way, and they should have been permitted to offer amendments, something I hope they will be permitted to do by voting "no" on this bill under suspension.

For example, we wish this bill had done more to codify in law some of the previous administration's counterterrorism reforms, including giving the status of law to an executive order requiring the Director of National Intelligence to continue the practice of releasing publicly available data on the total number of combatants and non-combatants killed or injured due to counterterrorism action.

I look forward to the fiscal year '18 Intelligence Authorization Act being enacted into law—not through the vehicle of the suspension calendar, but through consideration under regular order. For that reason, I urge a "no" vote here so that all Members will have a chance to be heard.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Alabama (Ms. SEWELL), who is one of our superb members of the committee and also one of our ranking members.

Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, today I rise to speak on the passage of the fiscal year 2018 Intelligence Authorization Act under suspension of the rules.

Unfortunately, I strongly oppose its passage today, not because it is a bad

bill. On the contrary, I voted for it out of committee. But today I disagree on how this bill is presented on the floor. The Intelligence Authorization Act should be on regular order and rule and not on suspension.

This critically important piece of legislation is the most substantial oversight mechanism that Congress has over the intelligence community, and it deserves full consideration and robust debate. The American public and our intelligence community deserve nothing less.

Before authorizing tens of billions of dollars for the United States intelligence community, our lawmakers should carefully consider and debate the issues our intelligence community faces, many of which directly impact our national security. Instead, today's consideration of the IAA has been fast-tracked, and debate has been cut short.

Most of the work of the intelligence community and our committee happens behind closed doors, which means that debate on the House floor over the Intelligence Authorization Act is one of the few times the public can engage with the issues facing our intelligence community. By limiting debate on this bill, we cut public engagement off as well.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud of the bipartisan way in which our committee worked to craft this year's Intelligence Authorization Act. I am excited that this year's IAA includes a provision that I drafted that provides our lawmakers, election officials, campaigns, and the public with additional information and resources to defend our democracy against emerging cyber threats. Additionally, we will continue to be able to provide a summer internship program to students from the existing Centers of Academic Excellence in intelligence. This year's IAA will also hold the IC accountable for creating a more diverse and inclusive working environment.

Nevertheless, I will oppose today's bill not because I don't support the underlying bill, but because I believe that national security issues raised by this legislation are too important to be fast-tracked.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose today's vote under suspension of the rules and to stand with us in demanding full debate and consideration under regular order.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time to close.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

The Intelligence Authorization Act is a critical oversight tool, one component of the legal architecture that governs the authorities and boundaries of our civilian and military intelligence professionals.

The bipartisan legislation before us today is sound, and I endorse its substance on the merits. But I agree with our leadership that the suspension process is not the appropriate venue for its adoption.

For this reason, I will vote “no” on the measure tonight, but I remain optimistic about this legislation’s ultimate passage into law after we complete its consideration under regular order.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, first, I thank Mr. Phil Tubesing, who has been a congressional fellow with our committee for the last 2 years. This will be his last bill. He will be leaving us at the end of the month, so I wanted to recognize him for all his fine work on the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote “yes” on this bill. This is typically how the bill has come to the floor from the Intelligence Committee. As nearly all the Members know, for the last several years that is how it has occurred. Unfortunately, we are beginning to deteriorate into political theater at the Intelligence Committee. As long as I am chairman, I am going to continue to try to stop that from happening.

Mr. Speaker, I urge a “yes” vote, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the House Intelligence Committee, I am proud of the bipartisanship that allowed us to put this bill together.

Our committee, which normally operates quietly, has gotten more attention than normal this year as we conduct the critical business of investigating Russian intervention in our elections.

But we still do our day job—overseeing intelligence programs and providing support to the men and women of our intelligence community who fight to keep our country safe.

This bill is the culmination of this cooperation.

Our country is facing a wide array of pervasive and complex threats.

Our near-peer adversaries, Russia and China, are rapidly growing their military capabilities and regularly, unashamedly violating international law.

A nuclear weapons stockpile and functioning ICBM program now sit in the hands of an unpredictable North Korean dictator.

And the so-called caliphate started by ISIS is losing ground, only to increase homegrown attacks against the United States and its allies.

My constituents, like all Americans, are rightly concerned.

But they can feel confident that we are working with the intelligence community on ways to address them.

As the Ranking Member of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee, I am particularly interested in supporting our intelligence professionals who assess and prevent terrorist threats to our homeland—while protecting the civil rights and liberties of innocent Americans.

I’m working to ensure they use their expertise, as well as that in the private sector, to find and remove online propaganda used to recruit would-be attackers.

I’m also proud to include language that will enable the IC and private sector to temporarily exchange IT talent in order to better tackle some of the toughest cybersecurity challenges.

Mr. Speaker, Chairman NUNES and Ranking Member SCHIFF have led this process with bipartisan professionalism.

This bill is stronger because it reflects the input of all of our members.

The full House should have this same opportunity—not be forced to vote up or down under suspension.

Republican leadership owes it to our members to return to regular order so our bill can benefit from the input of the full House.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Homeland Security Committee and vigilant defender of our national security, I rise in support of H.R. 3180, the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,” which will provide the Intelligence Community (IC) with the necessary resources and authorities to ensure they remain capable of protecting and defending the United States.

This bill authorizes appropriations for Fiscal Year 2018 for vital intelligence activities of the U.S. government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

H.R. 3180 comes at a critical time in the status of our national security and the IC’s ability to protect it.

As we continue to face a diverse and growing array of threats from terrorist groups, hostile nation states, and questionable or incompetent figures in the Trump administration, it is crucial that the IC receive all the resources it needs to do its job while Congress has the necessary tools to carry out rigorous oversight of its work.

This bill seeks to meet these challenges by supporting critical national security programs, particularly those focused on countering terrorism and cyberattacks.

Under H.R. 3180, the Director of National Intelligence will be required to electronically publish an unclassified advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to federal elections.

It also bolsters intelligence oversight by ensuring that IC contractors can meet freely with Congress.

Lastly, this bill improves IC accountability to Congress by requiring the IC to provide reports on:

Investigations of leaks of classified information;

Security clearance processing timelines;

The process for reviewing information about computer vulnerabilities for retention or potential release;

And Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and threat finance activities.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3180 is a necessary response to the overwhelming evidence pointing to a carefully planned and executed infiltration of our 2016 Presidential Election by the Russian government and its operatives.

The issue of cybersecurity, particularly with regards to our federal election computer system infrastructure, has been of great concern to me and the American public as more and more reports of Russian hacking efforts have come to light.

In addition, the provision requiring reports on security clearance processing timelines should shed light on the highly dubious and inscrutable security clearances of Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner.

Donald Trump’s blatant and irresponsible nepotism towards his daughter and son-in-law

have made us all vulnerable to Russian and other foreign influence at the highest levels of our federal government.

H.R. 3180 will give the American people what they crave and deserve: clarity and transparency to pierce through the haze of cover-ups and distractions surrounding the Trump Administration.

This bill also takes significant, much-needed steps to improve benefits for members of the IC, such as increasing employee compensation and authorizing \$514 million in appropriations for the CIA’s Retirement and Disability System.

Congress must do its part to adequately recompense the patriotic Americans who serve our nation through their work in the IC, especially employees with disabilities, who make up 9 percent of the intelligence workforce.

At the same time, we must continue to ensure that Congress can exercise oversight over and maintain transparency for the 17 agencies that comprise the IC.

I am heartened that my Republican colleagues in the Intelligence Committee are starting to see the light in recognizing the sinister threat of Russian infiltration and White House collusion, both of which endanger our nation’s ability to practice and protect its core democratic values.

I look forward to working with all Members of Congress to strengthen our IC, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this important legislation.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3180, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 12(a) of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess until approximately 6:30 p.m. today.

Accordingly (at 5 o’clock and 43 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess.

□ 1830

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. CARTER of Georgia) at 6 o’clock and 30 minutes p.m.