

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate be in a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. BOB CORKER,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 17-20, concerning the Navy's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of the United Arab Emirates for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$270.4 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER,
Lieutenant General, USA, Director.
Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-20

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$240.0 million.
Other \$30.4 million.
Total \$270.4 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Three hundred (300) AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II Missiles.

Forty (40) AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs).

Thirty (30) AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II Tactical Guidance Units.

Fifteen (15) AIM-9X-2 CATM Guidance Units.

Non-MDE includes: Also includes containers, spares, support equipment and mis-

sile support, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and other related logistics support, and other associated support equipment and services.

(iv) Military Department: Navy (ABJ).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AE-P-AAL (AIM-9M); and AE-P-ABA (AIM-9-X2 (previously notified and offered but the customer allowed the LOA to expire)).

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: March 7, 2018.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II Missiles

The UAE has requested the possible sale of three hundred (300) AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II missiles, forty (40) AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs), thirty (30) AIM-9X-2 Block II Tactical guidance units, fifteen (15) AIM-9X-2 CATM guidance units, containers, spares, support equipment and missile support, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and other related logistics support, and other associated support equipment and services. The total estimated cost is \$270.4 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country which has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

This potential sale will improve the UAE's capability to meet current and future threats and provide an enhanced capability for its Air Force. The UAE will use the enhanced capability to strengthen its homeland defense. The UAE will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support does not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be Raytheon Missile Systems Company, Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require U.S. Government or contractor representatives to travel to the UAE on a temporary basis for program technical support and management oversight.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-20

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II missile represents a substantial increase in missile acquisition and kinematics performance over the AIM-9M and replaces the AIM-9X Block I missile configuration. The missile includes a high off-boresight seeker, enhanced countermeasure rejection capability, low drag/high angle of attack airframe and the ability to integrate the Helmet Mounted Cueing System. The software algorithms are the most sensitive portion of the AIM-9X-2 missile. The software continues to be modified via a Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P³I) program in order to improve its counter-countermeasure capabilities. No

software source code or algorithms will be released. The missile is classified as CONFIDENTIAL.

2. The AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II missile will result in the transfer of sensitive technology and information. The equipment, hardware, and documentation are classified CONFIDENTIAL. The software and operational performance are classified SECRET. The seeker/guidance control section and the target detector are CONFIDENTIAL and contain sensitive state-of-the-art technology. Manuals and technical documentation that are necessary or support operational use and organizational management are classified up to SECRET. Performance and operating logic of the counter-countermeasures circuits are classified SECRET. The hardware, software, and data identified are classified to protect vulnerabilities, design and performance parameters and similar critical information.

3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar advanced capabilities.

4. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. BOB CORKER,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 17-41, concerning the Air Force's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Qatar for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$197 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

GREG M. KAUSNER,
(For Charles W. Hooper, Lieutenant
General, USA Director).

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-41

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Qatar.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment:* \$1 million.
Other: \$196 million.
Total: \$197 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: The Government of Qatar has requested to purchase equipment and support to upgrade the Qatari Emiri Air Force's (QEAF) Air Operation Center (AOC), to include Link 16 network and classified networks integration, to enhance the performance of integrated air defense planning and provide US-Qatari systems interoperability.

Major Defense Equipment (MDE): One (1) Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) Low Volume Terminal (LVT).

Non-MDE: Also included are Global Positioning System (GPS) Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) Chips, Simple Key Loaders (SKL), High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptors (HAiPE),

Ground Support System (GSS) components for Link-16, as well as the necessary infrastructure construction, integration, installation, and sustainment services, cybersecurity services, technical and support facilities, COMSEC support, secure communications equipment, encryption devices, software development, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, security certification and accreditation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (QA-DAG)

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: N/A

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: March 7, 2018.

As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Qatar—Upgrade of Qatar Air Operations Center (AOC)

The Government of Qatar has requested to purchase equipment and support to upgrade the Qatari Emiri Air Force's (QEAF) Air Operation Center (AOC) to enhance the performance of integrated air defense planning and provide US-Qatari systems interoperability. This sale includes: one (1) Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) Low Volume Terminal (LVT), Global Positioning System (GPS) Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) chips, Simple Key Loaders (SKL), High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptors (HAiPE), Ground Support System (GSS) components for Link-16 as well as the necessary infrastructure construction, integration, installation, and sustainment services, cybersecurity services, technical and support facilities, COMSEC support, secure communications equipment, encryption devices, software development, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, security certification and accreditation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated cost is \$197 million.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country that has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Persian Gulf region. Our mutual defense interests anchor our relationship and the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF) plays a predominant role in Qatar's defense.

The upgrade of the AOC will support the defensive capability of Qatar. The proposed sale will help strengthen Qatar's capability to counter current and future threats in the region and reduce dependence on U.S. forces. Qatar will have no difficulty absorbing the required equipment and capability into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be Raytheon, Waltham, MA. Qatar typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between Qatar and the contractor.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of approximately five

(5) additional U.S. Government and approximately fifteen (15) contractor representatives to Qatar.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 17-41

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminal (MIDS-LVT) is an advanced Link-16 command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system incorporating high-capacity, jam-resistant, digital communication links is used for exchange of near real-time tactical information, including both data and voice, among air, ground, and sea elements. The terminal hardware, publications, performance specifications, operational capability, parameters, vulnerabilities to countermeasures, and software documentation are classified CONFIDENTIAL. The classified information to be provided consists of that which is necessary for the operation, maintenance, and repair (through intermediate level) of the data link terminal, installed systems, and related software.

2. A Global Positioning System (GPS) Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) deploys anti-spoofing measures using cryptography to protect authorized users from false satellite signals generated by an enemy. Information revealing SAASM implementation details such as number or length of keying variables, circuit diagrams, specific quantitative measures, functions, and capabilities are classified SECRET.

3. Software, hardware, and other data/information, which is classified or sensitive, is reviewed prior to release to protect system vulnerabilities, design data, and performance parameters. Some end-item hardware, software, and other data identified above are classified at the CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET//RELEASABLE TO QATAR level. Potential compromise of these systems is controlled through management of the basic software programs of highly sensitive systems and software-controlled weapon systems on a case-by-case basis.

4. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

5. A determination has been made that Qatar can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary to further the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

6. All defense articles and services listed on this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of Qatar.

UNITED STATES-GUATEMALA BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I wish to affirm the partnership between the United States and Guatemala. I also rise to speak to the crucial role the Guatemalan attorney general has in efforts to strengthen the rule of law and the importance of the selection of the country's next attorney general.

In addition to the important contributions that more than 1 million Guatemalan Americans make to the United States, our two countries share a wide range of economic, social, and cultural linkages. In the past 2 years, Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales has emerged as a partner on U.S. foreign policy priorities. He has supported U.S. efforts to increase diplomatic pressure against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in the face of the humanitarian, economic, and political crisis in Venezuela. President Morales is also working to align Guatemalan foreign policy with the U.S. approach to the Middle East, both at the United Nations and by recently announcing that Guatemala will move its embassy to Jerusalem.

Since 2014, I have supported increased U.S. assistance for Guatemala and the other Northern Triangle countries in order to address levels of violence and poverty that drive migration in the region. I believe that continued U.S. engagement can be transformative for efforts to increase security, strengthen democratic governance, support civil society, improve protections for human rights, and foster economic development. However, we must recognize that these efforts would be futile without the work of Guatemala's attorney general.

While President Morales made the commendable decision to increase the budget for Guatemala's Public Ministry, which is overseen by the attorney general, I am troubled by recent actions that run counter to the Ministry's work. For the past 11 years, Guatemala has become an example in the fight against impunity. This is due, in no small part, to the work, commitment, and determination of Guatemala's attorneys general and the efforts of the United Nations International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala—known by its Spanish acronym, CICIG—an independent investigative body that works closely with the Public Ministry.

Since its creation in 2006, CICIG has worked with the Public Ministry to investigate and dismantle the criminal networks that seek to influence the Guatemalan state, while also helping increase the capacity of local judicial institutions. Such efforts have contributed to reducing Guatemala's overall impunity rate for homicides from 95 percent to 72 percent. These institutions deserve our steadfast support so they can continue their progress building a safer and more prosperous Guatemala, which in turn contributes to a more stable hemisphere. The success of this model has served as a model for similar efforts in other countries.

Although there has been tangible progress, much work remains, and Guatemala will continue to benefit from a sustained commitment to good governance and accountability. I worry recent actions signal a move in the wrong direction, including the recent removal