''(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

''(1) AGENCY.—The term 'agency' has the meaning given the term 'executive agency' in section 102 of title 40.

''(2) SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITION THRESHOLD.—The term 'simplified acquisition threshold' has the meaning given that term in section 134.''.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

''6310. Requirement for agencies to buy domestically made United States flags.''.

(b) APPLICABILITY.—Section 6310 of title 41, United States Code, as added by subsection (a)(1), shall apply with respect to any contract entered into on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. COMER) and the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise today in support of H.R. 3121, introduced by Congresswoman BUSTOS of Illinois. H.R. 3121 is a bipartisan bill to ensure government agencies only buy United States flags made from 100 percent American-made material.

Most Americans may think American flags purchased with taxpayer money for the government are made here at home by Americans using only U.S. materials. Surprisingly, this is not a uniform requirement in current Federal acquisition laws and regulations. When it comes to the content of American flags purchased by executive agencies, the requirements under the current law are inconsistent.

The Department of Defense and the military departments generally are required to buy American flags made entirely of U.S. materials, but civilian agencies are currently permitted to buy flags that are manufactured in the U.S. consisting of only 51 percent American-made materials, or sometimes even less than that.

This bill brings all executive agencies under a single rule when it comes to the content of American flags bought by agencies across the government.

Rather than impose new rules and exceptions for DOD and civilian agency flag purchases, the All-American Flag Act recognizes and essentially adopts current DOD requirements and exceptions.

□ 1730

H.R. 3121 contains limited exceptions that recognize practical realities, such as domestic nonavailability, in keeping with current law governing DOD purchases in textiles, including U.S. flags.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Representative BUSTOS and the many cosponsors who are leading this effort to honor America's greatest symbol of freedom, and I urge my colleagues to support the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the All-American Flag Act is a commonsense bill that all Members should support. It would simply require all Federal agencies to purchase American flags that are manufactured in the United States, using materials grown or produced in the United States.

Under current law, this requirement applies only to the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs. It should be extended to all Federal agencies.

As under current law, the bill would provide certain limited exceptions and allow agencies to purchase American flags made elsewhere if they are not available in sufficient quantity or quality from American manufacturers.

Mr. Speaker, I intend to reserve my time eventually, but first, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois (Mrs. BUSTOS), my distinguished colleague.

Mrs. BUSTOS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from New York for yielding me time. I appreciate it.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bipartisan bill, the All-American Flag Act. This commonsense legislation will require all American flags purchased by the Federal Government to be made entirely in the United States from materials grown or manufactured in the United States.

The idea for this bill came to me when I was sitting down and talking with a Vietnam vet. We were at a VFW hall, and he pointed to the corner, saw an American flag there, and said: Do you know that the American flag can be made in China?

I was very surprised that that could even happen. I will never forget when he looked at me and said: ''I didn't fight for China. I fought for the USA.''

I later learned that, in 2015 alone, taxpayers footed the bill to import American flags to the tune of $4.4 million, $4 million of which went straight to China.

Since that conversation, I have worked with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to require the Department of Defense to purchase 100 percent American-made flags. With the support of my colleagues today, we can ensure that all American flags purchased with taxpayer money are 100 percent American made.

There is no reason that the symbol of our Nation, our freedoms, and our values, proudly worn on the sleeves of our American soldiers or displayed right here, like right behind me, in our Nation's Capitol should be manufactured anywhere but in the United States of America.

By purchasing flags made on American soil, we can ensure that the symbol of our Nation is preserved, while supporting American jobs and manufacturing.

Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate my friend and colleague on this excellent, patriotic bill, of which I am a cosponsor.

I have no further speakers on this side of the aisle, so I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. COMER) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3121, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

## INSPECTOR GENERAL ACCESS ACT OF 2017

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3154) to amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 relative to the powers of the Department of Justice Inspector General.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 3154

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

**SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

This Act may be cited as the ''Inspector General Access Act of 2017''.

**SEC. 2. INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERSONNEL.**

Section 8E of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ''and paragraph (3)'';

(B) by striking paragraph (3);

(C) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; and

(D) in paragraph (4), as redesignated, by striking ''paragraph (4)'' and inserting ''paragraph (3)''; and

(2) in subsection (d), by striking '', except with respect to allegations described in subsection (b)(3),''.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. COMER) and the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members

may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3154 introduced by Congressman RICHMOND of Louisiana.

Inspectors general perform a critical oversight function with regard to misconduct at their respective agencies. The Oversight and Government Reform Committee has long pushed for IGs to have timely and complete access to all the information they need to fulfill their oversight and investigative functions.

In continuance of that mission, H.R. 3154 removes an outdated statute that prevents the inspector general from investigating certain misconduct at the Justice Department.

Under current statute, the DOJ IG must refer allegations of misconduct by Department attorneys to the Office of Professional Responsibility, or OPR, rather than initiate an investigation himself.

The OPR existed prior to the creation of the DOJ IG in 1988, and OPR retained this specific authority when the DOJ IG was created.

H.R. 3154 seeks to harmonize the DOJ inspector general's investigative authority with that of the rest of the Federal inspectors general, who are not similarly restricted. The bill repeals the provision requiring the IG to refer allegations of attorney misconduct to OPR.

Congress and, in particular, the Oversight and Government Reform Committee have consistently supported the need for independent and transparent oversight of Federal agencies and programs.

The current division of investigative authority at DOJ is inconsistent with the committee's history of supporting the notion of an unburdened IG.

The IG is confirmed by the Senate, is accountable to the public, and only can be removed by the President after notification to Congress. Further, the IG has statutory reporting obligations to both agency leadership and Congress.

In contrast, the Director of OPR is selected and appointed by the Attorney General, answers to the Attorney General, and can be removed or disciplined by the Attorney General.

The IG's independence is critical to the value of their work.

The IG maintains transparency by publishing its reports on a public website. The website contains information about the reports, operations, and functions of the IG, including a full archive of its completed reports and its ongoing work. This standard of transparency does not apply to OPR.

Adverse findings by OPR against a DOJ lawyer are subject to review by the Department's leadership and can be overruled by the Department's leadership without any transparency.

It is important to note that this division of authority is a unique situation in the Federal IG community. For instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission Office of Inspector General is responsible for handling misconduct allegations against SEC lawyers, including those with prosecuting authority.

The need for this legislation has also been discussed in multiple hearings before our committee and in reports by watchdog groups. The DOJ IG, Michael Horowitz, testified before this committee most recently on November 15, 2017, about the importance of eliminating this discrepancy.

Congress' own watchdog, the Government Accountability Office, has issued reports with recommendations to empower the DOJ IG.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3154, the Inspector General Access Act.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Representatives RICHMOND, HICE, and LYNCH for the bipartisan manner in which they worked on this very important bill.

The Inspector General Access Act would allow the IG of the Department of Justice to investigate allegations of misconduct by Department attorneys. The IG is statutorily independent and currently has the authority to investigate other DOJ personnel, but is barred from pursuing appropriate investigations into the attorneys at the Department.

Under current law, the authority to investigate attorneys is restricted to the Office of Professional Responsibility within DOJ. OPR is not statutorily independent; its head is not Senate confirmed like the IG; and treating attorneys differently from other personnel is unfair.

One year ago, Michael Horowitz, the inspector general at the Department of Justice, testified before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: ''This bifurcated jurisdiction creates a system where misconduct by FBI agents and other DOJ law enforcement officers is conducted by a statutorily independent IG appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, while misconduct by DOJ prosecutors is investigated by a component head who is appointed by the Department's leadership and who lacks statutory independence. There is no principled reason for treating misconduct by Federal prosecutors differently than misconduct by DOJ law enforcement agents.''

Mr. Speaker, I include in the RECORD the letter from Mr. Horowitz expressing his strong support for this bill before us today.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
*November 29, 2018.*

Hon. TREY GOWDY,
*Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.*

Hon. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS,
*Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MEMBER CUMMINGS: I write to express my strong support for H.R. 3154, the ''Inspector General Access Act of 2017'' (Access Act), which your Committee approved unanimously on September 27, 2018. The Access Act would amend the Inspector General Act (IG Act) to provide the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) with authority to investigate allegations of misconduct against DOJ attorneys for their actions as lawyers, just as the OIG has authority under the IG Act to investigate allegations of misconduct made against any non-lawyer in the Department, including law enforcement agents at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). Currently, under Section 8E of the Inspector General Act, the OIG does not have the authority to investigate allegations of misconduct made against DOJ attorneys acting in their capacity as lawyers; this role is reserved exclusively for the Department's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR).

The Access Act has received broad, bipartisan support over successive Congresses because it promotes independent oversight, transparency, and accountability within DOJ and for all of its employees. For these same reasons, in 1994, the then-General Accounting Office, now the Government Accountability Office (GAO), issued a report that found that preventing the OIG from investigating attorney misconduct was inconsistent with the independence and accountability that Congress envisioned under the IG Act.

The OIG has long questioned this carve-out because OPR lacks statutory independence and does not regularly release its reports and conclusions to the public. Moreover, to our knowledge, the DOJ Inspector General is the only Inspector General in the entire federal government that does not have the authority to investigate alleged professional misconduct by attorneys who work in the agency it oversees. Providing the OIG with authority to exercise jurisdiction in attorney professional misconduct cases would enhance the public's confidence in the outcomes of these investigations and provide the OIG with the same authority as every other Inspector General.

Alleged professional misconduct by DOJ prosecutors, like any alleged misconduct by DOJ agents, should be subject to statutorily independent oversight.

Over fifteen years ago, the Department and Congress recognized the importance of statutorily independent OIG oversight over all DOJ law enforcement components (FBI, DEA, USMS, and ATF) when Attorney General Ashcroft authorized the OIG to conduct additional law enforcement oversight in 2001 and Congress legislated it in 2002. Yet, allegations against Department prosecutors for professional misconduct continue to be handled exclusively by OPR. As a result, presently, if an allegation of misconduct is made against the FBI Director, it is reviewed by the OIG; by contrast, if an allegation of professional misconduct is made against the Attorney General, it is handled by OPR, a Departmental component that the Attorney General supervises.

The rationale supporting independent oversight for alleged misconduct by law enforcement applies with equal force to alleged wrongdoing by federal prosecutors, regardless of the nature of the alleged misconduct. There is no principled reason to have two standards of oversight at DOJ—one for federal agents, who are subject to statutorily independent and transparent oversight by the OIG, and one for federal prosecutors, who are not for allegations of professional misconduct. This is particularly true given the extraordinary power that Department lawyers have to charge individuals with crimes, to seek incarceration, and to pursue the seizure of assets and property.

The OIG's independence, established by statutory authorities and protections, facilitates objective and credible investigations of misconduct allegations, as well as unbiased reports that identify and make useful recommendations for improving the Department. The OIG is headed by a Senate-confirmed Inspector General who can only be removed by the President, with prior notice to Congress. The OIG's statutory independence is bolstered by the OIG's dual obligation to report findings and concerns both to the Attorney General and to Congress. The independent OIG is able to make critical investigative and audit findings without fear of reprisal.

Conversely, OPR has no statutory independence or protections. The OPR Counsel is appointed by and answers to the Attorney General, and can be removed or disciplined by the Attorney General. Although a November 27, 2018 letter from DOJ's Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) on H.R. 3154 states that ''OPR has always acted independently,'' it does not point to any protections, statutory or otherwise, that exist to ensure OPR's independence from the Attorney General, nor has DOJ proposed strengthening OPR's independence by adding such protections. Indeed, the letter fails to explain or even address why DOJ believes it is better to have a non-statutorily independent entity handle attorney professional misconduct cases rather than a statutorily independent organization, as is the case for law enforcement professional misconduct allegations.

The OIG's independent and transparent oversight enhances the public's confidence in the DOJ's programs and improves its operations.

In addition to independence, the OIG considers transparency a crucial component of its oversight mission. With limited exceptions, the OIG ensures that the public is aware of the results of our work. The majority of our reports are posted on our public website at the time of release to ensure that Congress and the public are informed of our findings, in a comprehensive and timely manner. The OIG, consistent with the IG Act, publishes on our website summaries of investigations resulting in findings of administrative misconduct by senior government employees and in matters of public interest even when the subject is not prosecuted. We post such summaries without identifying the investigative subject consistent with the legal requirements under the Privacy Act. Because of this commitment to transparency, there are currently hundreds of OIG reports, audits, and reviews posted on our web site. There are also summaries of dozens of OIG investigative reports posted, including recent reports involving significant misconduct by senior DOJ officials.

In contrast, there are currently only a total of five reports (other than annual reports) posted on OPR's website. Four of those five reports are from 2008 and were the result of OPR's joint work with the OIG, and which the OIG posted on our website consistent with the IG Act and our practice. The fifth report was completed by OPR in 2013 and only released in 2015 in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Moreover, although the OLA letter states that ''OPR discloses a substantial amount of information about its work and findings in its annual report,'' this information is not reported in a timely or comprehensive manner. Congress and the public only find out about some, but not necessarily all, of OPR's work when it issues an annual report.

An example of this dichotomy can be found in a case involving an Oregon lawyer who was arrested by the FBI and wrongly imprisoned after mismatched fingerprints linked him to the 2004 bombing at a Madrid train station. The OIG investigated the allegations of FBI agent misconduct, while the Department's OPR investigated the allegations of attorney misconduct. This bifurcation led to inconsistent treatment. The OIG report on the actions of the FBI agents was published on the OIG's website, but OPR did not publish the report on the conduct of the DOJ attorneys who were involved in the same case.

Transparency ensures greater accountability, and sends an important deterrent message to other Department employees. The credibility of the Department's disciplinary process is inevitably reduced when the responsible component operates under the direction of the Department's senior leadership and is not subject to public scrutiny because of limited transparency.

The OIG has demonstrated its excellence in reviewing complex legal and factual issues, including employee ethics and misconduct matters.

Over the past 30 years, the OIG has shown that it is capable of fair and independent oversight of the DOJ. The jurisdictional limitation of Section 8E(b)(3) is an unnecessary historical vestige of the fact that OPR was in existence prior to the statutory creation of the OIG in 1988. Those who unsuccessfully tried in 2002 to forestall Congress from providing the OIG with oversight of alleged misconduct by FBI and DEA agents contended that those cases required specialized expertise—just like the Department argues currently that prosecutorial oversight requires specialized expertise—and that argument was roundly rejected and has proven to be entirely without merit. The decision by Congress to extend OIG jurisdiction in 2002 to encompass misconduct by FBI and DEA agents has allowed for significant and important oversight of DOJ's law enforcement operations, and has had significant positive impact on the integrity of those agencies' operations.

The OIG has consistently demonstrated our ability to handle complex legal and factual issues related to our misconduct reviews, including those involving FBI and DEA agents as well as, on occasion, ethics issues involving DOJ lawyers. In addition to our recent investigation of the FBI's actions prior to the 2016 presidential election, which involved evaluating the professional conduct by FBI agents, FBI lawyers, and FBI senior officials, we have investigated the FBI's actions involving its former agent Robert Hanssen, the FBI's activities related to James ''Whitey'' Bulger, the DEA's oversight of its confidential informant program, the DEA and other components' handling of sexual misconduct and harassment cases, the operation of the FBI laboratory, ATF's actions involving Operation Fast and Furious, and the FBI's use of its national security authorities (National Security Letters, Patriot Act Section 215, FISA Amendment Act Section 702).

Each of those and many other reviews resulted in independent and transparent findings by the OIG, and resulted in changes to Department operations that enhanced their effectiveness and thereby increased the public's confidence in those programs. Moreover, OIGs throughout the government, including at the Department of Homeland Security and the Securities and Exchange Commission, have authority to investigate misconduct allegations made against attorneys at those agencies and they have demonstrated that they are fully capable of dealing with such matters covering a wide range of complex legal issues. The DOJ OIG is the only OIG, to our knowledge, that is barred by the IG Act from reviewing misconduct by lawyers within the agency it oversees.

The Access Act would provide the OIG with oversight over Department lawyers in a manner that is entirely consistent with its oversight authority over Department non-attorneys.

The present oversight system that applies to allegations made against any DOJ nonlawyer, as provided for in the IG Act and Department regulations, is precisely the oversight mechanism that the Access Act seeks to apply to Department lawyers. Specifically, under the current system for DOJ nonlawyers, all non-frivolous misconduct allegations must be provided to the OIG for the OIG's review and determination as to whether it is of the type and nature that warrants and necessitates independent OIG investigation. Given the OIG's limited resources, the OIG handles only those allegations that warrant an independent OIG investigation, and therefore the OIG returns routine and less serious misconduct allegations to Department components, such as the FBI's Inspections Division and the DEA's OPR, for their handling and investigation. For those matters that the OIG retains, when the OIG completes its investigation, it sends its report to the component so that it can adjudicate the OIG's findings and take disciplinary action, as appropriate. The Access Act creates a similar practice, by maintaining the Department's OPR to handle misconduct allegations that do not require independent outside review as determined by the OIG, much as the internal affairs offices at the FBI, DEA, ATF, and USMS remain in place today.

We are unaware of any claims by Department leaders that this approach has resulted in ''different investigative standards,'' ''decrease[d] efficiency,'' or ''inconsistent application'' of legal standards. There is no evidence that it has impacted the components ''ability to successfully defend any significant discipline decision before the Merit Systems Protection Board.'' Yet this parade of horribles is precisely what the OLA letter claims will occur if attorneys are treated in the same manner as Special Agents and nonattorneys at the Department, rather than continuing to receive the special oversight treatment granted to them under the current carve-out provision under the IG Act. This argument it meritless. Indeed, the disciplinary processes at the FBI and the DEA have substantially improved since the OIG obtained statutory oversight authority over those components in 2002, in significant part due to the greater transparency and accountability that has resulted from the OIG's oversight.

I very much appreciate your strong support for my Office and for Inspectors General throughout the federal government.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ,
*Inspector General.*

Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3154 would not prohibit OPR from investigating attorneys. It would simply add the ability to investigate attorneys when appropriate

in the IG's authority, an additional layer of accountability.

Empowering IGs has been, and should continue to be, a nonpartisan issue.

The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform relies on the work of IGs, and we strongly support ensuring they can do their jobs effectively.

This bill was ordered reported by the Oversight Committee unanimously. I urge my colleagues to continue their support for IGs by supporting the Inspector General Access Act.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. COMER) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3154.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

## 21ST CENTURY INTEGRATED DIGITAL EXPERIENCE ACT

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 5759) to improve executive agency digital services, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 5759

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

***SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.***

*This Act may be cited as the ''21st Century Integrated Digital Experience Act'' or the ''21st Century IDEA''.*

***SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.***

*In this Act:*

*(1) DIRECTOR.—The term ''Director'' means the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.*

*(2) EXECUTIVE AGENCY.—The term ''executive agency'' has the meaning given the term ''Executive agency'' in section 105 of title 5, United States Code.*

***SEC. 3. WEBSITE MODERNIZATION.***

*(a) REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW WEBSITES AND DIGITAL SERVICES.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, an executive agency that creates a website or digital service that is intended for use by the public, or conducts a redesign of an existing legacy website or digital service that is intended for use by the public, shall ensure to the greatest extent practicable that any new or redesigned website, web-based form, web-based application, or digital service—*

*(1) is accessible to individuals with disabilities in accordance with section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794d);*

*(2) has a consistent appearance;*

*(3) does not overlap with or duplicate any legacy websites and, if applicable, ensure that legacy websites are regularly reviewed, eliminated, and consolidated;*

*(4) contains a search function that allows users to easily search content intended for public use;*

*(5) is provided through an industry standard secure connection;*

*(6) is designed around user needs with data-driven analysis influencing management and development decisions, using qualitative and quantitative data to determine user goals, needs, and behaviors, and continually test the website, web-based form, web-based application, or digital service to ensure that user needs are addressed;*

*(7) provides users of the new or redesigned website, web-based form, web-based application, or digital service with the option for a more customized digital experience that allows users to complete digital transactions in an efficient and accurate manner; and*

*(8) is fully functional and usable on common mobile devices.*

*(b) REQUIREMENTS FOR EXISTING EXECUTIVE AGENCY WEBSITES AND DIGITAL SERVICES.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the head of each executive agency that maintains a website or digital service that is made available to the public shall—*

*(1) review each website or digital service; and*

*(2) submit to Congress a report that includes—*

*(A) a list of the websites and digital services maintained by the executive agency that are most viewed or utilized by the public or are otherwise important for public engagement;*

*(B) from among the websites and digital services listed under subparagraph (A), a prioritization of websites and digital services that require modernization to meet the requirements under subsection (a); and*

*(C) an estimation of the cost and schedule of modernizing the websites and digital services prioritized under subparagraph (B).*

*(c) INTERNAL DIGITAL SERVICES.—The head of each executive agency shall ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that any Intranet established after the date of enactment of this Act conforms to the requirements described in subsection (a).*

*(d) PUBLIC REPORTING.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act and every year thereafter for 4 years, the head of each executive agency shall—*

*(1) report annually to the Director on the progress of the executive agency in implementing the requirements described in this section for the previous year; and*

*(2) include the information described in paragraph (1) in a publicly available report that is required under another provision of law.*

*(e) COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED STATES WEBSITE STANDARDS.—Any website of an executive agency that is made available to the public after the date of enactment of this Act shall be in compliance with the website standards of the Technology Transformation Services of the General Services Administration.*

***SEC. 4. DIGITIZATION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND FORMS.***

*(a) NON-DIGITAL SERVICES.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director shall issue guidance to the head of each executive agency that establishes a process for the executive agency to—*

*(1) identify public non-digital, paper-based, or in-person Government services; and*

*(2) include in the budget request of the executive agency—*

*(A) a list of non-digital services with the greatest impact that could be made available to the public through an online, mobile-friendly, digital service option in a manner that decreases cost, increases digital conversion rates, and improves customer experience; and*

*(B) an estimation of the cost and schedule associated with carrying out the modernization described in subparagraph (A).*

*(b) SERVICES REQUIRED TO BE DIGITAL.—The head of each executive agency shall regularly review public-facing applications and services to ensure that those applications and services are, to the greatest extent practicable, made available to the public in a digital format.*

*(c) FORMS REQUIRED TO BE DIGITAL.—Not later than 2 years after the enactment of this Act, the head of each executive agency shall ensure that any paper based form that is related to serving the public is made available in a digital format that meets the requirements described in section 3(a).*

*(d) NON-DIGITIZABLE PROCESSES.—If the head of an executive agency cannot make available in a digital format under this section an in-person Government service, form, or paper-based process, the head of the executive agency shall document—*

*(1) the title of the in-person Government service, form, or paper-based process;*

*(2) a description of the in-person Government service, form, or paper-based process;*

*(3) each unit responsible for the in-person Government service, form, or paper-based process and the location of each unit in the organizational hierarchy of the executive agency;*

*(4) any reasons why the in-person Government service, form, or paper-based process cannot be made available under this section; and*

*(5) any potential solutions that could allow the in-person Government service, form, or paper-based process to be made available under this section, including the implementation of existing technologies, procedural changes, regulatory changes, and legislative changes.*

*(e) PHYSICAL AVAILABILITY.—Each executive agency shall maintain an accessible method of completing digital services through in-person, paper-based, or other means, such that individuals without the ability to use digital services are not deprived of or impeded in access to those digital services.*

***SEC. 5. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES.***

*Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each executive agency shall submit to the Director and the appropriate congressional committees a plan to accelerate the use of electronic signatures standards established under the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. 7001 et seq.).*

***SEC. 6. CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE AND DIGITAL SERVICE DELIVERY.***

*The Chief Information Officer of each executive agency, or a designee, shall—*

*(1) coordinate and ensure alignment of the internal and external customer experience programs and strategy of the executive agency;*

*(2) coordinate with the management leaders of the executive agency, including the head of the executive agency, the Chief Financial Officer, and any program manager, to ensure proper funding to support the implementation of this Act;*

*(3) continually examine the digital service delivery strategy of the executive agency to the public and submit recommendations to the head of the executive agency providing guidance and best practices suitable to the mission of the executive agency;*

*(4) using qualitative and quantitative data obtained from across the executive agency relating to the experience and satisfaction of customers, identify areas of concern that need improvement and improve the delivery of customer service;*

*(5) coordinate and ensure, with the approval of the head of the executive agency, compliance by the executive agency with section 3559 of title 44, United States Code; and*

*(6) to the extent practicable, coordinate with other agencies and seek to maintain as much standardization and commonality with other agencies as practicable in implementing the requirements of this Act, to best enable future transitions to centralized shared services.*

***SEC. 7. STANDARDIZATION.***

*(a) DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION.—Each executive agency shall, to the extent practicable, seek to maintain as much standardization and commonality with other executive agencies as practicable in implementing the requirements of this Act to best enable future transitions to centralized shared services.*

*(b) COORDINATION.—The Chief Information Officer of each executive agency, or a designee,*