

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2707

To limit funding for any extension of the New START Treaty or any successor agreement unless the agreement includes the People's Republic of China and covers all strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 14, 2019

Ms. CHENEY (for herself, Mr. BANKS, Mr. WALTZ, Mr. DESJARLAIS, Mr. LAMBORN, and Mr. TURNER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To limit funding for any extension of the New START Treaty or any successor agreement unless the agreement includes the People's Republic of China and covers all strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “New START Treaty
5 Improvement Act of 2019”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The United States and the Russian Federation signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (the “New START Treaty”) on April 8, 2010.

6 (2) The United States Senate advised and consented to the the treaty on December 22, 2010, by
7 a vote of 71-26.

9 (3) The Senate resolution advising and consenting to the ratification of the New START Treaty states that “prior to the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to the Senate that. . .the United States will seek to initiate. . .not later than one year after the entry into force of the New START Treaty, negotiations with the Russian Federation on an agreement to address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States”.

20 (4) The New START Treaty is due to expire in
21 February 2021.

22 (5) The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states—
23 (A) “While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, others, including Russia and China, have moved in the opposite direction.

1 Russia has expanded and improved its strategic
2 and non-strategic nuclear forces. China's mili-
3 tary modernization has resulted in an expanded
4 nuclear force, with little to no transparency into
5 its intentions.”;

6 (B) “Russia is developing and deploying
7 new nuclear warheads and launchers. These ef-
8 forts include multiple upgrades for every leg of
9 the Russian nuclear triad of strategic bombers,
10 sea-based missiles, and landbased missiles. Rus-
11 sia is also developing at least two new inter-
12 continental range systems, a hypersonic glide
13 vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear-
14 armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous
15 torpedo.”;

16 (C) “[Russia] is also building a large, di-
17 verse, and modern set of non-strategic systems
18 that are dual-capable. . .These theater- and
19 tactical-range systems are not accountable
20 under the New START Treaty”;

21 (D) “China continues to increase the num-
22 ber, capabilities, and protection of its nuclear
23 forces.”; and

24 (E) “China has developed a new road-mo-
25 bile strategic intercontinental ballistic missile

1 (ICBM), a new multi-warhead version of its
2 DF5 silo-based ICBM, and its most advanced
3 ballistic missile submarine armed with new sub-
4 marine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It
5 has also announced development of a new nu-
6 clear-capable strategic bomber, giving China a
7 nuclear triad.”.

1 tion, for example, with the Russians, it may make
2 sense to include China in that discussion as well".

3 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) arms control is beneficial for both United
6 States national security and international stability,
7 but the United States should not enter arms control
8 agreements that impose unilateral restrictions on the
9 United States Armed Forces and fail to properly ac-
10 count for the nuclear arsenals of all near-peer com-
11 petitors in the international system; and

12 (2) any New START Treaty extension or suc-
13 cessor agreement must be a trilateral arrangement
14 among the United States, the Russian Federation,
15 and the People's Republic of China.

16 **SEC. 4. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.**

17 No funds shall be expended to implement a New
18 START Treaty extension or any successor agreement un-
19 less the New START Treaty or such successor agree-
20 ment—

21 (1) includes and is signed by the People's Re-
22 public of China; and

23 (2) covers all strategic and non-strategic nu-
24 clear forces held by the Russian Federation, includ-
25 ing—

○