

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2913

To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean,
and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 22, 2019

Mr. DEUTCH (for himself, Mr. BILIRAKIS, and Mr. CICILLINE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, Oversight and Reform, Ways and Means, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern
Mediterranean, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Eastern Mediterranean
5 Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) The security of partners and allies in the
2 Eastern Mediterranean region is critical to the secu-
3 rity of the United States and Europe.

4 (2) Greece is a valuable member of the North
5 Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a key pil-
6 lar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

7 (3) Israel is a steadfast ally of the United
8 States and has been designated a “major non-NATO
9 ally” and “major strategic partner”.

10 (4) Cyprus is an important partner in the East-
11 ern Mediterranean and signed a Statement of Intent
12 with the United States on July 10, 2018, to enhance
13 bilateral security cooperation.

14 (5) The countries of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus
15 participate in a critical trilateral dialogue to improve
16 cooperation on energy and security issues.

17 (6) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo partici-
18 pated in the trilateral dialogue among the three
19 countries on March 20, 2019.

20 (7) All three countries oppose any action in the
21 Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea that
22 could challenge stability, violate international law, or
23 undermine good neighborly relations.

24 (8) The recent discovery of a large natural gas
25 field off the Egyptian coast and the newest discov-

1 eries of natural gas off of the Cypriot coast could
2 represent a significant positive development for the
3 Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and
4 may offer new economic opportunities in the region
5 provided ecologically sound extraction methods pro-
6 tect the regional environment.

7 (9) The Government of Turkey has expressed
8 an intent to purchase the S-400 missile defense sys-
9 tem from the Russian Federation, which could trig-
10 ger the imposition of mandatory sanctions under the
11 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanc-
12 tions Act (Public Law 115-114).

13 (10) It is in the national security interests of
14 the United States to promote, achieve, and maintain
15 energy security among, and through cooperation
16 with, allies.

17 (11) Natural gas developments in the Eastern
18 Mediterranean have the potential to provide eco-
19 nomic gains and contribute to energy security in the
20 region and Europe, as well as support European ef-
21 forts to diversify away from natural gas supplied by
22 the Russian Federation.

23 (12) The soon to be completed Trans Adriatic
24 pipeline is a critical component of the Southern Gas

1 Corridor and the European Union’s efforts to diver-
2 sify energy resources.

3 (13) The proposed Eastern Mediterranean pipe-
4 line if commercially viable would provide for energy
5 diversification in accordance with the European
6 Union’s third energy package of reforms.

7 (14) Cooperation between the United States,
8 Cyprus, and Greece for the purpose of research and
9 development of energy sources would be in the na-
10 tional interests of not only the United States, but
11 also Israel, and other countries in the Eastern Medi-
12 terranean and North Africa with similar natural gas
13 finds.

14 (15) The United States acknowledges the
15 achievements and importance of the Binational In-
16 dustrial Research and Development Foundation
17 (BIRD) and the United States-Israel Binational
18 Science Foundation (BSF) and supports continued
19 multiyear funding to ensure the continuity of the
20 programs of the Foundations.

21 (16) The United States has welcomed Greece’s
22 allocation of two percent of its gross domestic prod-
23 uct (GDP) to defense in accordance with commit-
24 ments made at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales.

1 (17) Energy exploration efforts in the Eastern
2 Mediterranean region must be safeguarded against
3 threats posed by terrorist and extremist groups, in-
4 cluding Hezbollah and others.

5 (18) The energy exploration in the Republic of
6 Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial
7 waters—

8 (A) furthers United States interests by
9 providing a potential alternative to Russian gas
10 for United States allies and partners; and

11 (B) should not be impeded by other sov-
12 ereign states.

13 (19) The United States Government cooperates
14 closely with the Government of Cyprus through nu-
15 merous bilateral agreements.

16 (20) United States officials have assisted the
17 Government of Cyprus with crafting that country’s
18 national security strategy.

19 (21) The United States Government provides
20 training to Cypriot officials in areas such as cyberse-
21 curity, counterterrorism, and explosive ordnance dis-
22 posal and stockpile management.

23 (22) Cyprus is a valued member of the Pro-
24 liferation Security Initiative to combat the traf-
25 ficking of weapons of mass destruction.

1 (23) Cyprus continues to work closely with the
2 United Nations and regional partners in Europe to
3 combat terrorism and violent extremism.

4 (24) Cyprus has been used as an offshore bank-
5 ing hub. While Cyprus is working to upgrade its
6 anti-money laundering legal framework, the Depart-
7 ment of State’s 2019 International Narcotics Con-
8 trol Strategy Report (INCSR) noted that, “the Cyp-
9 riot financial system is vulnerable to money laun-
10 dering by domestic and foreign criminal enterprises
11 and individuals” and that “organized criminal
12 groups and others have reportedly used Cypriot
13 banks to launder proceeds, particularly from Rus-
14 sian and Ukrainian illicit activity.”

15 (25) As of February 2019, Cyprus has taken
16 steps to address legitimate criticism of its use of in-
17 vestor citizenship schemes (known as “golden pass-
18 ports”), which have in the past allowed Russian
19 oligarchs under United States sanctions to obtain
20 Cypriot passports and gain full access to the Euro-
21 pean Union.

22 (26) United Nations Security Council Resolu-
23 tion 1251 (1999) noted “grave concern at the con-
24 tinuing excessive levels of military forces and arma-
25 ments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at

1 which they are being expanded, upgraded and mod-
2 ernized” and called upon “all concerned to commit
3 themselves to . . . limiting and then substantially
4 reducing the level of all troops and armaments in
5 the Republic of Cyprus.”.

6 (27) A 1987 United States arms prohibition
7 was designed to restrict United States arms sales
8 and transfer to Cyprus and the occupied part of Cy-
9 prus to avoid hindering reunification efforts.

10 (28) At least 40,000 Turkish troops are sta-
11 tioned in the occupied part of Cyprus.

12 (29) While the United States has, as a matter
13 of policy, avoided the provision of defense articles
14 and services to Cyprus, the Government of Cyprus
15 has, in the past, sought to obtain defense articles
16 from other countries, such as Russia, that pose chal-
17 lenges to United States interests around the world.

18 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

19 It is the policy of the United States—

20 (1) to continue to actively participate in the tri-
21 lateral dialogue on energy, maritime security, cyber
22 security and protection of critical infrastructure con-
23 ducted among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;

24 (2) to support diplomatic efforts with partners
25 and allies to deepen energy security cooperation

1 among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus and encourage the
2 private sector to make investments in energy infra-
3 structure in the Eastern Mediterranean;

4 (3) to strongly support the completion of the
5 Trans Adriatic pipeline and the Eastern Mediterra-
6 nean pipeline and the establishment of liquified nat-
7 ural gas (LNG) terminals across the Eastern Medi-
8 terranean as a means of diversifying regional energy
9 needs away from the Russian Federation;

10 (4) to maintain a robust United States naval
11 presence and investments in the naval facility at
12 Souda Bay, Greece, and develop deeper security co-
13 operation with Greece;

14 (5) to welcome Greece's commitment to move
15 forward with the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria
16 (IGB pipeline) and additional LNG terminals that
17 will help facilitate delivery of non-Russian gas to the
18 Balkans and central Europe;

19 (6) to continue to support efforts to reach a
20 comprehensive settlement to reunify Cyprus as a bi-
21 zonal, bicomunal federation and urge all parties to
22 intensify their work on behalf of peace;

23 (7) to deepen security cooperation with Cyprus,
24 potentially including lifting current restrictions on
25 the export of defense articles and services to Cyprus;

1 (8) to support robust International Military
2 Education and Training (IMET) programing with
3 Greece and Cyprus;

4 (9) to leverage relationships within NATO and
5 the European Union to encourage investments in
6 Cypriot border and maritime security;

7 (10) to support efforts to counter Russian in-
8 terference and influence in the Eastern Mediterra-
9 nean through increased security cooperation with
10 Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, to include intelligence
11 sharing, cyber cooperation, and maritime domain
12 awareness;

13 (11) to support Cyprus's efforts to better regu-
14 late its banking industry to ensure that it is not
15 used as a source of international money laundering
16 and encourage additional measures toward that end;

17 (12) to encourage Cyprus and other relevant
18 countries to ensure that investor citizenship schemes
19 do not create security, money laundering, or tax eva-
20 sion vulnerabilities;

21 (13) to strongly oppose any actions that would
22 trigger mandatory sanctions pursuant to section 231
23 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through
24 Sanctions Act (Public Law 115-44), to include the

1 purchase by Turkey of an S-400 missile defense sys-
2 tem from the Russian Federation;

3 (14) to continue robust official strategic dia-
4 logues with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;

5 (15) to urge countries in the region to deny
6 port services to Russian vessels deployed to support
7 the government of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and
8 terminate existing agreements granting Russian
9 naval vessels access to ports;

10 (16) to support joint military exercises among
11 Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;

12 (17) to fully implement relevant provisions of
13 the Countering America's Adversaries Through
14 Sanctions Act (Public Law 115-44) to prevent inter-
15 ference by the Government of the Russian Federa-
16 tion in the region;

17 (18) to support efforts by countries in the re-
18 gion to demobilize military equipment supplied by
19 the Government of the Russian Federation in favor
20 of equipment provided by NATO and NATO-allied
21 member countries; and

22 (19) to strongly support the active and robust
23 participation of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in the
24 Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program.

1 **SEC. 4. UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN-**
2 **ERGY COOPERATION.**

3 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State, in con-
4 sultation with the Secretary of Energy, may, subject to
5 the availability of appropriations, enter into cooperative
6 agreements supporting and enhancing dialogue and plan-
7 ning involving international partnerships between the
8 United States and Israel, Greece, and Cyprus.

9 (b) **ANNUAL REPORTS.**—If the Secretary of State, in
10 consultation with the Secretary of Energy, enters into
11 agreements authorized under subsection (a), the Secretary
12 shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congres-
13 sional committees that describes—

14 (1) actions taken to implement such agree-
15 ments; and

16 (2) any projects undertaken pursuant to such
17 agreements.

18 (c) **UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN-**
19 **ERGY CENTER.**—The Secretary of Energy, in consultation
20 with the Secretary of State, may establish a joint United
21 States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center in the
22 United States leveraging the experience, knowledge, and
23 expertise of institutions of higher education and entities
24 in the private sector, among others, in offshore energy de-
25 velopment to further dialogue and collaboration to develop
26 more robust academic cooperation in energy innovation

1 technology and engineering, water science, technology
2 transfer, and analysis of emerging geopolitical implica-
3 tions, which include opportunities as well as crises and
4 threats from foreign natural resource and energy acquisi-
5 tions.

6 **SEC. 5. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF ARTI-**
7 **CLES ON THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS**
8 **LIST TO CYPRUS.**

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that—

11 (1) the direct sale or transfer of arms by the
12 United States to Cyprus would advance United
13 States security interests in Europe by helping to re-
14 duce the dependence of the Government of Cyprus
15 on other countries for defense-related materiel, in-
16 cluding countries that pose challenges to United
17 States interests around the world; and

18 (2) it is in the interest of the United States—

19 (A) to continue to support United Nations-
20 facilitated efforts toward a comprehensive solu-
21 tion to the division of Cyprus; and

22 (B) for the Republic of Cyprus to join
23 NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

24 (b) MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION.—Section
25 620C(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.

1 2373(e)) is amended by adding at the end of the following
2 new paragraph:

3 “(3) The requirement under paragraph (1)
4 shall not apply to any sale or other provision of any
5 defense article or defense service to Cyprus if the
6 end-user of such defense or defense service is Cy-
7 prus.”.

8 (c) EXCLUSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RE-
9 PUBLIC OF CYPRUS FROM CERTAIN RELATED REGULA-
10 TIONS.—Beginning on the date of the enactment of this
11 Act, the Secretary of State shall not apply a policy of de-
12 nial for exports, re-exports, or transfers of defense articles
13 and defense services destined for or originating in the Re-
14 public of Cyprus if—

15 (1) the request is made by or on behalf of Cy-
16 prus; and

17 (2) the end-user of such defense articles or de-
18 fense services is Cyprus.

19 **SEC. 6. IMET ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE AND CYPRUS.**

20 (a) GREECE.—There is authorized to be appropriated
21 for fiscal year 2020 \$2,000,000 for assistance under chap-
22 ter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
23 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.; relating to International Military
24 Education and Training) for Greece.

1 (b) CYPRUS.—It is the sense of Congress that for fis-
2 cal year 2020 such sums as may be necessary should be
3 made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II
4 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for Cyprus.

5 (c) PURPOSES.—The assistance described in sub-
6 sections (a) and (b) should be made available for the fol-
7 lowing purposes:

8 (1) Training of future leaders.

9 (2) Fostering a better understanding of the
10 United States.

11 (3) Establishing a rapport between the United
12 States military and the country's military to build
13 alliances for the future.

14 (4) Enhancement of interoperability and capa-
15 bilities for joint operations.

16 (5) Focusing on professional military education.

17 (6) Enabling countries to use their national
18 funds to receive a reduced cost for other Department
19 of Defense education and training.

20 (7) Provision of English Language Training as-
21 sistance.

22 **SEC. 7. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE.**

23 There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year
24 2020 \$3,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing for
25 Greece to assist the country in meeting its commitment

1 as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
2 to dedicate 20 percent of its defense budget to enhance
3 research and development.

4 **SEC. 8. LIMITATION ON TRANSFER OF F-35 AIRCRAFT TO**
5 **TURKEY.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under sub-
7 section (b), no funds may be obligated or expended—

8 (1) to transfer, facilitate the transfer, or au-
9 thorize the transfer of, an F-35 aircraft to Turkey;

10 (2) to transfer intellectual property or technical
11 data necessary for or related to any maintenance or
12 support of the F-35 aircraft; or

13 (3) to construct a storage facility for, or other-
14 wise facilitate the storage in Turkey of, an F-35 air-
15 craft transferred to Turkey.

16 (b) EXCEPTION.—The President may waive the limi-
17 tation under subsection (a) upon a written certification to
18 Congress that the Government of Turkey does not plan
19 or intend to accept delivery of the S-400 air defense sys-
20 tem.

21 (c) TRANSFER DEFINED.—In this section, the term
22 “transfer” includes the physical relocation outside of the
23 continental United States.

1 (d) APPLICABILITY.—The limitation under sub-
2 section (a) does not apply to F–35 aircraft operated by
3 the United States Armed Forces.

4 **SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PURCHASE BY TURKEY OF**
5 **S–400 AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.**

6 It is the sense of Congress that, if the Government
7 of Turkey purchases the S–400 air defense system from
8 the Russian Federation—

9 (1) such a purchase would constitute a signifi-
10 cant transaction within the meaning of section
11 231(a) of the Countering Russian Influence in Eu-
12 rope and Eurasia Act of 2017 (22 U.S.C. 9525(a));

13 (2) such a purchase would endanger the integ-
14 rity of the NATO alliance;

15 (3) such a purchase would adversely affect on-
16 going operations of the United States Armed Forces,
17 including coalition operations in which the United
18 States Armed Forces participate;

19 (4) such a purchase would result in a signifi-
20 cant impact to defense cooperation between the
21 United States and Turkey;

22 (5) such a purchase would significantly increase
23 the risk of compromising United States defense sys-
24 tems and operational capabilities; and

1 (6) the President should faithfully execute the
2 Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eur-
3 asia Act of 2017 by imposing and applying sanctions
4 described in section 235 of that Act (22 U.S.C.
5 9529) with respect to any individual or entity deter-
6 mined to have engaged in such significant trans-
7 action as if such person were a sanctioned person for
8 purposes of such Act.

9 **SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES ENERGY COOPERA-**
10 **TION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
12 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
13 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-
14 retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
15 sional committees a strategy on enhanced security and en-
16 ergy cooperation with countries in the Eastern Mediterra-
17 nean, including Israel, Greece, and Cyprus.

18 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-
19 section (a) shall include the following elements:

20 (1) A description of United States participation
21 in the Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Forum.

22 (2) An evaluation of all possible delivery mecha-
23 nisms into Europe for natural gas discoveries in the
24 Eastern Mediterranean.

1 (3) An evaluation of efforts to protect energy
2 exploration infrastructure in the region, including
3 that of United States companies.

4 (4) An assessment of the capacity of Cyprus to
5 host an Energy Crisis Center in the region which
6 could provide basing facilities in support of search
7 and rescue efforts in the event of an accident.

8 (5) An assessment of the timing of natural gas
9 delivery in the region as well as assessment of the
10 ultimate destination countries for the natural gas
11 delivery from the region.

12 (6) A plan to work with United States busi-
13 nesses seeking to invest in Eastern Mediterranean
14 energy exploration, development, and cooperation.

15 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)
16 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
17 a classified annex.

18 **SEC. 11. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION MALIGN INFLU-**
19 **ENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
22 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
23 a report on Russian Federation malign influence in Israel,
24 Greece, and Cyprus since January 1, 2017.

1 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-
2 section (a) shall include the following elements:

3 (1) An assessment of security, political, and en-
4 ergy goals of the Government of the Russian Fed-
5 eration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

6 (2) A description of energy projects of the Gov-
7 ernment of the Russian Federation in the Eastern
8 Mediterranean.

9 (3) A listing of Russian national ownership of
10 media outlets in these countries, including the name
11 of the media outlet, approximate viewership, and as-
12 sessment of whether the outlet promotes pro-Krem-
13 lin views.

14 (4) An assessment of military engagement by
15 the Government of the Russian Federation in the se-
16 curity sector, including engagement by military
17 equipment and personnel contractors.

18 (5) An assessment of efforts supported by the
19 Government of the Russian Federation to influence
20 elections in the three countries, through the use of
21 cyber attacks, social media campaigns, or other ma-
22 lign influence techniques.

23 (6) An assessment of activity by Russian re-
24 lated entities and other entities to use Cyprus's

1 banking and legal systems to facilitate illicit busi-
2 ness transactions.

3 (7) An assessment of improvements that Cy-
4 prus must make to its banking system and legal sys-
5 tem to prevent the country from serving as a safe
6 haven for those seeking to conduct illicit business
7 transactions.

8 (8) An assessment of efforts by the Government
9 of the Russian Federation to intimidate and influ-
10 ence the decision by His All Holiness Ecumenical
11 Patriarch Bartholomew, leader of 300,000,000 Or-
12 thodox Christians worldwide, to grant autocephaly to
13 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

14 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)
15 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
16 a classified annex.

17 **SEC. 12. REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIVE ECO-**
18 **NOMIC ZONE OF CYPRUS, THE SOVEREIGN**
19 **TERRITORY OF GREECE IN THE AEGEAN SEA,**
20 **AND ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
22 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
23 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-
24 retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
25 sional committees a report that—

1 (1) lists incidents where the Exclusive Eco-
2 nomic Zone of Cyprus or the sovereign territory of
3 Greece in the Aegean Sea have been violated; and

4 (2) assesses opportunities to establish long-term
5 peace on Cyprus.

6 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-
7 section (a) shall include the following elements:

8 (1) A listing of incidents since January 1,
9 2017, determined by the Secretary of State to be
10 violations by unauthorized vessels of Cyprus' Exclu-
11 sive Economic Zone.

12 (2) A listing of incidents since January 1,
13 2017, determined by the Secretary of State to be
14 violations of the sovereign territory of Greece by its
15 neighbors, particularly airspace violations over the
16 Aegean Sea.

17 (3) An assessment of the opportunities to estab-
18 lish a long-term peace agreement among all parties
19 in Cyprus.

20 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)
21 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
22 a classified annex.

1 **SEC. 13. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-**
2 **FINED.**

3 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-
4 mittees” means—

5 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
6 Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Com-
7 mittee on Science, Space, and Technology of the
8 House of Representatives; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
10 the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of
11 the Senate.

○