[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7085 Introduced in House (IH)]
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116th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 7085
To amend the Revised Statutes to remove the defense of qualified
immunity in the case of any action under section 1979, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 4, 2020
Mr. Amash (for himself, Ms. Pressley, Ms. Omar, Ms. DeGette, Mr. Garcia
of Illinois, Mr. Blumenauer, Mr. McGovern, Ms. Pingree, Ms. Ocasio-
Cortez, Mr. Espaillat, Mr. Meeks, Ms. Velazquez, Ms. Norton, Ms. Lee of
California, Mr. Takano, Mr. Carson of Indiana, Mrs. Carolyn B. Maloney
of New York, and Mr. Kennedy) introduced the following bill; which was
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To amend the Revised Statutes to remove the defense of qualified
immunity in the case of any action under section 1979, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Ending Qualified Immunity Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds as follows:
(1) In 1871, Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act to combat
rampant violations of civil and constitutionally secured rights
across the Nation, particularly in the post-Civil War South.
(2) Included in the act was a provision, now codified at
section 1983 of title 42, United States Code, which provides a
cause of action for individuals to file lawsuits against State
and local officials who violate their legal and
constitutionally secured rights.
(3) Section 1983 has never included a defense or immunity
for government officials who act in good faith when violating
rights, nor has it ever had a defense or immunity based on
whether the right was ``clearly established'' at the time of
the violation.
(4) From the law's beginning in 1871, through the 1960s,
government actors were not afforded qualified immunity for
violating rights.
(5) In 1967, the Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, suddenly found that government actors had a good faith
defense for making arrests under unconstitutional statutes
based on a common law defense for the tort of false arrest.
(6) The Court later extended this beyond false arrests,
turning it into a general good faith defense for government
officials.
(7) Finally, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982),
the Court found the subjective search for good faith in the
government actor unnecessary, and replaced it with an
``objective reasonableness'' standard that requires that the
right be ``clearly established'' at the time of the violation
for the defendant to be liable.
(8) This doctrine of qualified immunity has severely
limited the ability of many plaintiffs to recover damages under
section 1983 when their rights have been violated by State and
local officials. As a result, the intent of Congress in passing
the law has been frustrated, and Americans' rights secured by
the Constitution have not been appropriately protected.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.
It is the sense of the Congress that we must correct the erroneous
interpretation of section 1983 which provides for qualified immunity,
and reiterate the standard found on the face of the statute, which does
not limit liability on the basis of the defendant's good faith beliefs
or on the basis that the right was not ``clearly established'' at the
time of the violation.
SEC. 4. REMOVAL OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.
Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1983) is amended by
adding at the end the following: ``It shall not be a defense or
immunity to any action brought under this section that the defendant
was acting in good faith, or that the defendant believed, reasonably or
otherwise, that his or her conduct was lawful at the time when it was
committed. Nor shall it be a defense or immunity that the rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws were not
clearly established at the time of their deprivation by the defendant,
or that the state of the law was otherwise such that the defendant
could not reasonably have been expected to know whether his or her
conduct was lawful.''.
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