[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7260 Introduced in House (IH)]
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116th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 7260
To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United
States, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 18, 2020
Mr. McGovern (for himself, Ms. Titus, and Mr. Blumenauer) introduced
the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed
Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a
period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the
committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United
States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Hastening Arms Limitations Talks Act
of 2020'' or the ``HALT Act of 2020''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an existential threat
to humanity, a fact that led President Ronald Reagan and Soviet
Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to declare in a joint statement in
1987 that a ``nuclear war cannot be won and must never be
fought''.
(2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 people
attended the largest peace rally in United States history, in
support of a movement to freeze and reverse the nuclear arms
race, a movement that helped to create the political will
necessary for the negotiation of several bilateral arms control
treaties between the United States and former Soviet Union, and
then the Russian Federation. Those treaties contributed to
strategic stability through mutual and verifiable reciprocal
nuclear weapons reductions.
(3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, millions
of people around the world have stood up to demand meaningful,
immediate international action to halt, reduce, and eliminate
the threats posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing,
and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet.
(4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21
UST 483) (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT''), entered into force,
which includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon
states (commonly referred to as the ``P5''), among other
things, ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race . .
. and to nuclear disarmament''.
(5) Bipartisan United States global leadership has curbed
the growth in the number of countries possessing nuclear
weapons and has slowed overall vertical proliferation among
countries already possessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted
by a more than 85-percent reduction in the United States
nuclear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 31,255 in
1967.
(6) The United States testing of nuclear weapons is no
longer necessary as a result of the following major technical
developments since the Senate's consideration of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as
the ``CTBT'') in 1999:
(A) The verification architecture of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization
(commonly referred to as the ``CTBTO'')--
(i) has made significant advancements, as
seen through its network of 300 International
Monitoring Stations and its International Data
Centre, which together provide for the near
instantaneous detection of nuclear explosives
tests, including all 6 such tests conducted by
North Korea between 2006 and 2017; and
(ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week.
(B) Since the United States signed the CTBT,
confidence has grown in the science-based Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan of the Department of
Energy, which forms the basis of annual certifications
to the President regarding the continual safety,
security, and effectiveness of the United States
nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing,
leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz to
remark in 2015 that ``lab directors today now state
that they certainly understand much more about how
nuclear weapons work than during the period of nuclear
testing''.
(7) Despite the progress made to reduce the number and role
of, and risks posed by, nuclear weapons, and to halt the Cold
War-era nuclear arms race, tensions between countries that
possess nuclear weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk
reduction treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of
weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a qualitative
global nuclear arms race is now underway with each of the
countries that possess nuclear weapons spending tens of
billions of dollars each year to maintain and improve their
arsenals.
(8) The United States and the Russian Federation are both
pursuing the development of destabilizing types of nuclear
weapons, including new lower-yield nuclear weapons that are
more usable, and the People's Republic of China, India,
Pakistan, and North Korea have each taken concerning steps to
diversify their more modest, but nonetheless very deadly,
nuclear arsenals.
(9) Since January 2017, President Donald Trump has taken
the following actions, which have run counter to the objectives
of the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament
(commonly referred to as ``CEND'') initiative that his
administration launched in 2018:
(A) The release of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
on February 5, 2018, which lowered the threshold for
nuclear weapons use and called for the development of
the following new nuclear weapons:
(i) A low-yield warhead on a submarine-
launched ballistic missile, which was deployed
before the date of the enactment of this Act.
(ii) A sea-launched cruise missile, still
under development on the date of the enactment
of this Act.
(B) The unilateral United States withdrawal from
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (commonly
referred to as the ``JCPOA'') announced on May 8, 2018,
which may lead to the complete collapse of an agreement
that had verifiably closed of each of Iran's pathways
to a nuclear weapon.
(C) The unilateral United States withdrawal,
completed on August 2, 2019, from the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed
at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force
June 1, 1988 (commonly referred to as the
``Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty'' or the
``INF Treaty''), in response to the material breach by
the Russian Federation of its obligations under that
Treaty, which has removed all legal constraints on the
testing, procurement, and deployment of ground-based
shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles,
increasing the risk of a missile arms race in the Euro-
Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.
(D) The unilateral United States withdrawal,
announced on May 22, 2020, from the Treaty on Open
Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered
into force January 1, 2002 (commonly referred to as the
``Open Skies Treaty''), which is likely to deny to
United States allies and partners a key confidence-
building measure and one of the few remaining
operational diplomatic forums, through the Open Skies
Consultative Commission, to engage with the Russian
Federation.
(10) During a May 15, 2020, National Security Council
meeting, one or more senior officials of the Trump
administration reportedly advocated that the United States
conduct its first nuclear explosives test since 1992, as part
of an effort to bring the Russian Federation and the People's
Republic of China into negotiations on a trilateral arms
control agreement.
(11) A move by the United States to break its moratorium on
nuclear explosives testing would conflict with United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2310, led by the United States and
adopted in 2016, which states that any nuclear explosives test
would defeat the ``object and purpose'' of the CTBT and called
on all countries to maintain their respective moratoriums on
such tests.
(12) In light of moves by the United States and other
countries to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons, the
21st century nuclear freeze movement would seek to halt the new
nuclear arms race by seeking conclusion of a comprehensive and
verifiable freeze on the testing, deployment, and production of
nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.
(13) The United States would benefit from conclusion of a
comprehensive nuclear arms agreement with each of the nuclear-
weapon state parties to the NPT and potentially all countries
that possess nuclear weapons.
(14) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons employment
strategy of the United States submitted under section 492 of
title 10, United States Code, determined that it is possible to
ensure the security of the United States and allies and
partners of the United States and maintain a strong and
credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a \1/
3\ reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level
established in the Treaty between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed
April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011
(commonly referred to as the ``New START Treaty'').
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States that:
(1) The United States should build upon its decades long,
bipartisan efforts to reduce the number and salience of nuclear
weapons by leading international negotiations on specific arms-
reduction measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear
freeze movement.
(2) The United States should immediately agree to extend
the New START Treaty for 5 years, until February 5, 2026,
through mutual agreement with the Russian Federation to provide
continued insight into the location, movement, and disposition
of strategic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads belonging
to the Russian Federation, which would be an important first
step to building momentum for a multilateral arms control
initiative.
(3) Upon the successful extension of the New START Treaty,
the United States should engage with all other countries that
possess nuclear weapons to negotiate and conclude future
multilateral arms control, disarmament, and risk reduction
agreements, which should contain some or all of the following
provisions:
(A) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on the
testing, production, and further deployment of all
nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.
(B) An agreement that establishes a verifiable
numerical ceiling on the deployed shorter-range and
intermediate-range and strategic delivery systems (as
defined by the INF Treaty and the New START Treaty,
respectively) and the nuclear warheads associated with
such systems belonging to the P5, and to the extent
possible, all countries that possess nuclear weapons,
at August 2, 2019, levels.
(C) An agreement by each country to adopt a policy
of no first use of nuclear weapons.
(D) An agreement on a proactive United Nations
Security Council resolution that expands access by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to any country found
by the Board of Governors of that Agency to be
noncompliant with its obligations under the NPT.
(E) An agreement to refrain from configuring
nuclear forces in a ``launch on warning'' nuclear
posture allowing a country to launch a ballistic
missile attack in response to detection by an early-
warning satellite or sensor of a suspected incoming
ballistic missile.
(F) An agreement not to target or interfere in the
nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly
referred to as ``NC3'') infrastructure of another
country through a cyberattack.
(G) An agreement on transparency measures or
verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic cruise
missiles and glide vehicles that are mounted on
ballistic missiles.
(H) An agreement to provide a baseline and
continuous exchanges detailing the aggregate number of
active nuclear weapons and associated systems possessed
by each country.
(4) The United States should rejuvenate efforts in the
United Nations Conference on Disarmament governing the
consensus rule on negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material
Treaty or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or move negotiations
to another international body or fora, such as a meeting of the
P5. Successful conclusion of such a treaty would verifiably
prevent any country's production of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
(5) The United States should convene a series of high level
summits on nuclear disarmament modeled on the Nuclear Security
Summits process, which saw the elimination of the equivalent of
3,000 nuclear weapons.
(6) The President should seek ratification by the Senate of
the CTBT and mobilize all countries covered by Annex 2 of the
CTBT to pursue similar action to hasten entry into force of the
CTBT. The entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification
by the United States will provide critical momentum, will
activate the CTBT's onsite inspection provision to investigate
allegations that any country that is a party to the CTBT has
conducted a nuclear test of any yield.
(7) The President should make the accession of North Korea
to the CTBT a component of any final agreement in fulfilling
the pledges the Government of North Korea made in Singapore, as
North Korea is reportedly the only country to have conducted a
nuclear explosive test since 1998.
(8) The United States should--
(A) refrain from developing any new designs for
nuclear warheads or bombs, but especially designs that
could add a level of technical uncertainty into the
United States stockpile and thus renew calls to resume
nuclear explosive testing in order to test that new
design; and
(B) seek reciprocal commitments from other
countries that possess nuclear weapons.
SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSIONS.
(a) In General.--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2021 or any fiscal year
thereafter, or authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for any fiscal year before fiscal year 2021 and available for
obligation as of the date of the enactment of this Act, may be
obligated or expended to conduct or make preparations for any explosive
nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until such time as--
(1) the President submits to Congress an addendum to the
report required by section 4205 of the Atomic Energy Defense
Act (50 U.S.C. 2525) that details any change to the condition
of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the report
submitted under that section in the preceding year; and
(2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution of
Congress that approves the test.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Subsection (a) does not limit nuclear
stockpile stewardship activities that are consistent with the zero-
yield standard and other requirements under law.
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