[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7423 Introduced in House (IH)]
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116th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 7423
To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a
fait accompli by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan, and for
other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 30, 2020
Mr. Gallagher introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed
Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in
each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the
jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a
fait accompli by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Defense Act''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Deny.--The term ``deny'' means to use combined joint
operations to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt
by the People's Republic of China to execute a fait accompli
against Taiwan, resulting in--
(A) the termination of hostilities or, at a
minimum, the termination of the attempted fait
accompli; or
(B) the neutralization of the ability of the
People's Republic of China to execute a fait accompli
against Taiwan.
(2) Fait accompli.--The term ``fait accompli'' means the
strategy of the People's Republic of China designed to allow
the People's Republic of China to use military force to seize
control of Taiwan before the United States Armed Forces are
able to respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an
effective combined joint response by the United States Armed
Forces by convincing the United States that mounting such a
response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Taiwan is--
(A) a beacon of democracy in Asia; and
(B) a steadfast partner of the United States in the
common pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific region
in which--
(i) all societies enjoy sovereign autonomy;
(ii) people live securely, prosperously,
and with dignity; and
(iii) the societies of the region rise and
fall not by coercion but on the basis of
peaceful competition.
(2) If the Government of the People's Republic of China
were to use military force to compel the unification of Taiwan
with the People's Republic of China--
(A) the world would lose one of the great champions
of freedom and democracy;
(B) the United States and allies and partners of
the United States would face severe difficulty in
maintaining favorable balances of power relative to the
People's Republic of China in Northeast and Southeast
Asia; and
(C) as the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific
region shifted in favor of the People's Republic of
China, the Government of the People's Republic of China
would possess an increasing ability--
(i) to impose its will throughout the Indo-
Pacific region; and
(ii) to prevent United States access to key
trade routes and markets in the Indo-Pacific
region, thereby imposing severe economic
hardship on middle-class and working-class
people of the United States and undermining the
American way of life.
(3) In January 2019, the Defense Intelligence Agency
assessed that the ``longstanding'' intent of the Government of
the People's Republic of China to compel the unification of
Taiwan with the People's Republic of China, and deter any
attempt by Taiwan to declare independence, was the ``primary
driver for China's military modernization''.
(4) The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report
released in June 2019, states that the Government of the
People's Republic of China is ``preparing for a contingency to
unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously
deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on
Taiwan's behalf''.
(5) Department of Defense statements and publications
indicate that the Government of the People's Republic of China
is developing the plans and capabilities required to employ the
fait accompli strategy to compel the unification of Taiwan with
the People's Republic of China, including--
(A) the assessment by the Defense Science Board in
2017 that the Government of the People's Republic of
China had adopted a theory of victory whereby once
conflict with the United States appeared inevitable, as
might be the case if the Government of the People's
Republic of China attempted to use military force to
compel the unification of Taiwan with the People's
Republic of China, then the Government of the People's
Republic of China ``will attempt to achieve a decisive
outcome very quickly, presenting the United States and
its allies with a fait accompli'' and ``then seek to
demonstrate that the United States and its allies will
incur significant costs in seeking to reverse that
outcome'';
(B) the assessment in the Indo-Pacific Strategy
Report that, if the Government of the People's Republic
of China or another competitor in the Indo-Pacific
region decides ``to advance their interests through
force, they are likely to enjoy a local military
advantage at the onset of conflict. In a fait accompli
scenario, competitors would seek to employ their
capabilities quickly to achieve limited objectives and
forestall a response from the United States and its
allies and partners'';
(C) testimony by then Acting Secretary of Defense
Patrick Shanahan in March 2019 that--
(i) the Government of the People's Republic
of China ``has made investments specifically
intended to offset U.S. advantages''; and
(ii) if deployed in the initial stages of a
conflict, ``these capabilities could seek to
achieve a `fait accompli' that would make
reversing Chinese gains more difficult,
militarily and politically''; and
(D) testimony by then Commanding General of Marine
Corps Combat Development Command Lieutenant General
David Berger in April 2019 that peer adversaries of the
United States seek ``to create strategic dilemmas
through fait accompli scenarios''.
(6) In March 2019, then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick
Shanahan testified that the implementation of the 2018 National
Defense Strategy would ensure the United States has ``the
capabilities, posture, and employment of forces'' required to
prevent a fait accompli by the People's Republic of China.
(7) According to the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, ``[t]he
National Defense Strategy implicitly acknowledges the most
stressing potential scenarios will occur along our competitors'
peripheries''. An attempted fait accompli by the People's
Republic of China against Taiwan should therefore be expected
to constitute a ``most stressing'' potential scenario for the
United States Armed Forces.
(8) The National Defense Strategy Commission found that the
United States Armed Forces must be postured ``to deter and
prevent a fait accompli by an agile opportunistic adversary''
in order to compete effectively in the Indo-Pacific region and
stated that ``the United States must develop new operational
concepts to achieve strategic advantage, including by
addressing the ability of aggressive regimes to achieve a fait
accompli against states on their periphery,'' in recognition
of--
(A) the unique challenges to the United States
Armed Forces posed by the employment of the fait
accompli strategy by the Government of the People's
Republic of China or another strategic competitor; and
(B) the consequent urgent need for new thinking and
steady focus by the Department of Defense on ensuring
the ability of the United States Armed Forces to
prevent an adversary from using the fait accompli
strategy to advance its interests at the expense of
those of the United States.
(9) Department of Defense strategic guidance and official
statements underscore the essential role that denial operations
will play in preventing a fait accompli by the People's
Republic of China against Taiwan, including--
(A) the incorporation in the National Defense
Strategy of the Global Operating Model that includes a
``blunt layer'' of combat-credible forward forces
postured and employed to ``delay, degrade, or deny
adversary aggression'';
(B) the conclusion by the National Defense Strategy
Commission that the Department of Defense must position
``substantial capability forward'' in the form of the
``blunt layer'' included in the Global Operating Model
to ``deter and prevent a fait accompli'';
(C) the statement for the record by the Commander
of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil
Davidson, in April 2018 in which he concludes, ``[d]ue
to the distances involved in the Indo-Pacific, we
cannot rely solely on surge forces from the continental
United States to deter Chinese aggression or prevent a
fait accompli. PACOM must maintain a robust blunt layer
that effectively deters Chinese aggression in the Indo-
Pacific'';
(D) the Joint Operating Concept for Deterrence
Operations, which states that forward-deployed forces,
such as those included in the blunt layer of the Global
Operating Model and referenced by the National Defense
Strategy Commission and the Commander of the United
States Indo-Pacific Command, contribute to ``denying
benefits'' and thereby reduce ``the likelihood of an
adversary achieving strategic or tactical surprise,
thus helping to prevent adversary decisionmakers from
concluding they might achieve a military fait accompli
that could be extremely costly for the [United States]
to reverse by force'';
(E) the United States Army Multi-Domain Operations
concept document, which states that the Armed Forces
must demonstrate the capability ``to immediately deny a
fait accompli attack'' in order to deter a near-peer
adversary; and
(F) the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 report,
which states that forward-deployed forces ``that can
continue to operate inside an adversary's long-range
precision-fire weapons engagement zone (WEZ) are more
operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly
maneuver to positions outside the WEZ in order to
remain survivable,'' and that such ``stand-in'' forces
possess the capability to ``attrite adversary forces,
enable joint force access requirements, complicate
targeting and consume adversary [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance] resources, and
prevent fait accompli scenarios''.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the ability of the United States to uphold a free and
open Indo-Pacific region would be severely compromised if the
Government of the People's Republic of China were able to
compel the unification of Taiwan with the People's Republic of
China, particularly if the People's Republic of China were able
to do so by military force;
(2) the loss by the United States of the ability to
maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region would result in
the significantly increased vulnerability of the middle-class
and working-class people of the United States and the allies
and partners of the United States to economic coercion by the
Government of the People's Republic of China;
(3) the fate of Taiwan is therefore crucially linked to the
fates of all countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including to
the fate of the United States;
(4) under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et
seq.), it is the policy of the United States to consider any
effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful
means to be of grave concern to the United States;
(5) since 1979, the United States Government has
consistently upheld the commitments of the United States under
the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(6) the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020 (Public Law 116-92) reaffirms that the Taiwan Relations
Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ``Six Assurances'' are the
cornerstones of United States relations with Taiwan;
(7) the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.)
further establishes the policy of the United States ``to
maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort
to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security, or the social or economic system, of the people on
Taiwan'';
(8) the Government of the People's Republic of China
appears to be developing the plans and capabilities required to
use the fait accompli strategy to compel the unification of
Taiwan with the People's Republic of China, thereby
jeopardizing the security and the social and economic system of
the people of Taiwan;
(9) denial operations will have an essential role in any
strategy to prevent a fait accompli by the People's Republic of
China against Taiwan; and
(10) implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C.
3301 et seq.) therefore requires the United States to maintain
the ability to defeat a fait accompli by the People's Republic
of China against Taiwan, especially by denial operations.
SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability
of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the
People's Republic of China against Taiwan.
SEC. 6. REPORT ON PROGRESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WITH RESPECT TO
DENYING A FAIT ACCOMPLI BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AGAINST TAIWAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than April 30 each year, beginning in
2021 and ending in 2026, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report on the progress of the
Department of Defense with respect to improving the ability of the
United States Armed Forces to conduct combined joint operations to deny
the ability of the People's Republic of China to execute a fait
accompli against Taiwan.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) An explanation of the objectives for the United States
Armed Forces that would be necessary to deny the fait accompli
by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan.
(2) An identification of joint warfighting capabilities and
current efforts to organize, train, and equip the United States
Armed Forces in support of the objectives referred to in
paragraph (1), including--
(A) an assessment of whether the programs included
in the most recent future-years defense program
submitted to Congress under section 221 of title 10,
United States Code, are sufficient to enable the United
States Armed Forces to conduct joint combined
operations to achieve such objectives;
(B) a description of additional investments or
force posture adjustments required to maintain or
improve the ability of the United States Armed Forces
to conduct joint combined operations to achieve such
objectives;
(C) a description of the manner in which the
Secretary of Defense intends to develop and integrate
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force
operational concepts to maintain or improve the ability
of the United States Armed Forces to conduct joint
combined operations to achieve such objectives; and
(D) an assessment of the manner in which different
options for pre-delegating authorities, including
authorities relating to kinetic strikes against targets
on the mainland of the People's Republic of China, may
improve the ability of the United States Armed Forces
to conduct joint combined operations to achieve such
objectives.
(3) An assessment of the role of the nuclear forces of the
United States in deterring or defeating a fait accompli by the
People's Republic of China against Taiwan, including concepts
for--
(A) deterring limited use of nuclear weapons by the
People's Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region
without undermining the ability of the United States
Armed Forces to maintain nuclear deterrence at the
strategic and theater levels against the Russian
Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea; and
(B) ensuring the United States Armed Forces are
able to continue combined joint operations to defend
Taiwan in a nuclear environment following nuclear
weapons use by the People's Republic of China or the
United States.
(c) Form.--Each report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in classified form but may include an unclassified executive
summary.
(d) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this section, the
term ``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given the
term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.
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