

116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 7850

To require a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian proxy forces, and
for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 29, 2020

Mr. SCHNEIDER (for himself, Mr. ZELDIN, Mrs. MURPHY of Florida, Mrs. BROOKS of Indiana, Mr. CORREA, Mrs. WALORSKI, Mr. GOTTHEIMER, Mr. SUOZZI, Mr. YOHO, and Mr. ROONEY of Florida) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To require a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian proxy
forces, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “NIE on Iranian Proxy
5 Forces Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1 (1) Hizballah is Iran's oldest and most success-
2 ful proxy force.

3 (2) Hizballah has trained militia groups in Iraq.

4 (3) Hizballah is active in Syria and its fighters
5 have helped President Bashar Al-Assad maintain re-
6 gime control.

7 (4) Hizballah fighters are returning to Lebanon
8 more battle-tested and more capable than ever be-
9 fore.

10 (5) In 2006, Hizballah's rocket and missile ar-
11 senal in Lebanon was approximately 15,000; how-
12 ever, by 2020, this figure has grown ten-fold to more
13 than 150,000.

14 (6) With the assistance of Iran, Hizballah's
15 weapons arsenal has not only increased in quantity,
16 but also quality, including technologically advanced
17 weapons and more accurate missiles.

18 (7) Iran is reportedly building missile produc-
19 tion facilities in Lebanon to enable an indigenous
20 rocket-producing capability for Hizballah.

21 (8) Iran is actively pursuing its regional inter-
22 ests and challenging United States interests and
23 United States allies through the use of proxy forces
24 in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

1 (b) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.—Not later
2 than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
3 the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with
4 the Secretary of State, shall produce a National Intel-
5 ligence Estimate—

6 (1) on Iranian support of proxy and other part-
7 ner and militia forces in the Middle East region; and

8 (2) assessing the increased threat posed to
9 Israel, other United States regional allies, and other
10 specified interests of the United States as a result
11 of such support.

12 (c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The National In-
13 telligence Estimate required under subsection (b) shall in-
14 clude, at a minimum, information relating to the following
15 matters with respect to both the strategic and tactical im-
16 plications for the United States and its allies:

17 (1) A description of Iranian and Iranian-con-
18 trolled personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite mili-
19 tias, and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
20 forces, operating in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, in-
21 cluding the number and geographic distribution of
22 such personnel.

23 (2) A description of arms and related material
24 transferred by Iran to such Iranian and Iranian-con-
25 trolled personnel since January 2011, including the

1 number and type of such arms and related material
2 and whether such transfer was by land, sea, or air,
3 as well as financial and additional technological ca-
4 pabilities.

5 (3) An identification of financial institutions,
6 businesses, and other persons that provide material
7 support, including financial support, to such Iranian
8 and Iranian-controlled personnel.

9 (4) An assessment of the operational and doc-
10 trinal lessons learned and relationships forged by
11 such Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel based
12 on recent battle experiences in Iraq and Syria, and
13 on the performance of these groups in the aftermath
14 of the killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu-Mahdi
15 al-Muhandis.

16 (5) A description of any rocket and missile pro-
17 duction and modification facilities in Lebanon and
18 Syria for such Iranian and Iranian-controlled per-
19 sonnel, and whether—

20 (A) such facilities involve precision-guided
21 munitions;

22 (B) such facilities were assessed to be built
23 at the direction of Hizballah leadership, Iranian
24 leadership, or both Hizballah and Iranian lead-
25 ership; and

1 (C) such facilities are connected to the Ira-
2 nian “landbridge” project.

3 (6) An analysis of the foreign and domestic
4 supply chains that significantly facilitate, support, or
5 otherwise aid Hizballah’s acquisition or development
6 of missile production facilities, including the geo-
7 graphic distribution of such foreign and domestic
8 supply chains.

9 (7) An assessment of the provision of goods,
10 services, or technology transferred by Iran or its af-
11 filiates to Hizballah to indigenously manufacture or
12 otherwise produce missiles.

13 (8) The number of arms or related material
14 transferred by Iran or its affiliates to such Iranian
15 and Iranian-controlled personnel in Iraq, Syria, and
16 Lebanon and an identification of the Iranian or Ira-
17 nian-controlled personnel to which the arms or re-
18 lated material were transferred.

19 (9) An identification of foreign persons that
20 are, based on credible information, facilitating the
21 transfer of significant financial support or arms or
22 related material to such Iranian and Iranian-con-
23 trolled personnel.

24 (10) A description of the threat posed to Israel
25 and other United States partners in the Middle East

1 by the transfer of arms or related material or other
2 support offered to such Iranian and Iranian-con-
3 trolled personnel.

4 (11) An assessment of the military capabilities
5 of United States partners in the region to address
6 and offset the transfers described in paragraph (10).

7 (d) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Upon completion of
8 the National Intelligence Estimate required under sub-
9 section (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall sub-
10 mit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
11 on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services,
12 and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
13 the House of Representatives and the Committee on For-
14 eign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
15 Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the
16 Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a copy of
17 such estimate.

18 (e) ARMS OR RELATED MATERIAL DEFINED.—The
19 term “arms or related material” means—

20 (1) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological
21 weapons or materials or components of such weap-
22 ons;

23 (2) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or mate-
24 rials or components of such weapons;

1 (3) destabilizing numbers and types of ad-
2 vanced conventional weapons, as well as unmanned
3 aerial threats such as drones, rockets, and mortars;

4 (4) defense articles or defense services, as those
5 terms are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respec-
6 tively, of section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act
7 (22 U.S.C. 2794);

8 (5) defense information, as that term is defined
9 in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
10 (22 U.S.C. 2403); or

11 (6) items designated by the President for pur-
12 poses of the United States Munitions List under sec-
13 tion 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22
14 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

15 **SEC. 3. STRATEGY.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after com-
17 pletion of the National Intelligence Estimate required
18 under section 2(b), the President shall transmit to Con-
19 gress a strategy to prevent Iran from expanding its influ-
20 ence and power in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

21 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Such strategy
22 shall include plans to—

23 (1) limit Iranian and Iranian-controlled per-
24 sonnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and

1 Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating
2 in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon; and

3 (2) interdict the sale, supply, or transfer of
4 weapons from Iran to such Iranian and Iranian-con-
5 trolled personnel operating in such countries.

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