

116TH CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

H. R. 8438

AN ACT

To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Belarus Democracy,
3 Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
6 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
7 to read as follows:

8 **“SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

9 “Congress finds the following:

10 “(1) The Government of Belarus, led by
11 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to engage in a
12 pattern of clear and persistent violations of human
13 rights and fundamental freedoms.

14 “(2) The Government of Belarus, led by
15 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to engage in a
16 pattern of clear and uncorrected violations of basic
17 principles of democratic governance, including
18 through a series of fundamentally flawed presi-
19 dential and parliamentary elections undermining the
20 legitimacy of executive and legislative authority in
21 that country.

22 “(3) The Government of Belarus, led by
23 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to subject thou-
24 sands of pro-democracy political activists and peace-
25 ful protesters to harassment, beatings, and imprison-
26 ment, particularly as a result of their attempts to

1 peacefully exercise their right to freedom of assem-
2 bly and association.

3 “(4) The Government of Belarus, led by
4 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to suppress inde-
5 pendent media and journalists and to restrict access
6 to the internet, including social media and other dig-
7 ital communication platforms, in violation of the
8 right to freedom of speech and expression of those
9 dissenting from the dictatorship of Alyaksandr
10 Lukashenka.

11 “(5) The Government of Belarus, led by
12 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues a systematic
13 campaign of harassment, repression, and closure of
14 nongovernmental organizations, including inde-
15 pendent trade unions and entrepreneurs, creating a
16 climate of fear that inhibits the development of civil
17 society and social solidarity.

18 “(6) The Government of Belarus, led by
19 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has pursued a policy un-
20 dermining the country’s sovereignty and independ-
21 ence by making Belarus political, economic, cultural,
22 and societal interests subservient to those of Russia.

23 “(7) The Government of Belarus, led by
24 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to reduce the
25 independence of Belarus through integration into a

1 so-called ‘Union State’ that is under the control of
2 Russia.

3 “(8) On August 9, 2020, the Government of
4 Belarus conducted a presidential election that was
5 fraudulent and did not meet international standards.
6 There were serious irregularities with ballot counting
7 and the reporting of election results. The Govern-
8 ment of Belarus also put in place restrictive meas-
9 ures that impeded the work of local independent ob-
10 servers and did not provide sufficient notice to the
11 OSCE to allow for the OSCE to monitor the elec-
12 tions, as is customary.

13 “(9) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
14 election, the Government of Belarus responded to
15 the peaceful opposition protests, which are the larg-
16 est in Belarus history, with a violent crackdown, in-
17 cluding, according to the United Nations Special
18 Rapporteur, the detention of more than 10,000
19 peaceful protestors as of September 18, 2020.

20 “(10) Thousands of employees at Belarusian
21 state-owned enterprises, who have been seen as
22 Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s traditional base during his
23 26-year rule, went on strike across the country to
24 protest Lukashenka’s illegitimate election and the
25 subsequent crackdowns, including at some of

1 Belarus’s largest factories such as the BelAZ truck
2 plant, the Minsk Tractor Works, and the Minsk
3 Automobile Plant.

4 “(11) Women have served as the leading force
5 in demonstrations across the country, protesting the
6 police brutality and mass detentions by wearing
7 white, carrying flowers, forming ‘solidarity chains’,
8 and unmasking undercover police trying to arrest
9 demonstrators.

10 “(12) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
11 election, the Government of Belarus has sought to
12 stop the work of the Coordination Council, which
13 was formed by the leading opposition presidential
14 candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, to facilitate a
15 peaceful transition of power by subjecting the Coun-
16 cil’s senior members to violence, detention, and
17 forced exile.

18 “(13) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
19 election, the Government of Belarus restricted the
20 free flow of information to silence the opposition and
21 to conceal the regime’s violent crackdown on peace-
22 ful protestors, including by stripping the accredita-
23 tion of journalists from major foreign news outlets,
24 disrupting internet access, limiting access to social

1 media and other digital communication platforms,
2 and detaining and harassing countless journalists.

3 “(14) Before the European Parliament on Au-
4 gust 25, 2020, Tsikhanouskaya stressed that a
5 ‘peaceful revolution’ was underway in Belarus, and
6 that ‘It is neither a pro-Russian nor anti-Russian
7 revolution. It is neither an anti-European Union nor
8 a pro-European Union revolution. It is a democratic
9 revolution.’.

10 “(15) Against the will of the majority of the
11 Belarusian people, Russian President Vladimir Putin
12 has propped up the Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime,
13 including by offering security assistance, providing
14 significant financial support, and sending Russian
15 propagandists to help disseminate pro-regime propa-
16 ganda on Belarus state television.

17 “(16) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
18 election, the United States, the European Union, the
19 United Kingdom, and Canada condemned the violent
20 crackdown on peaceful protestors, refused to accept
21 the results of the fraudulent election and called for
22 new free and fair elections under independent obser-
23 vation.

24 “(17) On September 8, 2020, Secretary of
25 State Michael R. Pompeo said, ‘The United States,

1 in coordination with our partners and Allies, is con-
2 sidering additional targeted sanctions to promote ac-
3 countability for those involved in human rights
4 abuses and repression in Belarus.’.

5 “(18) Following Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Sep-
6 tember 23, 2020, secret inauguration, the United
7 States, the European Union, numerous European
8 Union member states, the United Kingdom, and
9 Canada announced they did not recognize him as the
10 legitimately elected leader of Belarus.”.

11 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

12 Section 3 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
13 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
14 to read as follows:

15 **“SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

16 “It is the policy of the United States to—

17 “(1) condemn the conduct of the August 9,
18 2020, presidential election and crackdown on opposi-
19 tion candidates, senior members of the Coordination
20 Council, peaceful protestors, employees from state-
21 owned enterprises participating in strikes, inde-
22 pendent election observers, and independent journal-
23 ists and bloggers;

24 “(2) continue to call for the immediate release
25 without preconditions of all political prisoners in

1 Belarus, including all those individuals detained in
2 connection with the August 9, 2020, presidential
3 election, a leading opposition figure Maryia
4 Kalesnikava, and United States citizen Vitali
5 Shkliarov;

6 “(3) continue to support the aspirations of the
7 people of Belarus for democracy, human rights, and
8 the rule of law;

9 “(4) continue to support the aspirations of the
10 people of Belarus to exercise their religion freely, in-
11 cluding the head of the Catholic Church in Belarus
12 Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz who was barred
13 from entering the country after criticizing
14 Belarusian authorities;

15 “(5) continue to support actively the aspirations
16 of the people of the Republic of Belarus to preserve
17 the independence and sovereignty of their country;

18 “(6) not to recognize any incorporation of
19 Belarus into a ‘Union State’ with Russia, as this so-
20 called ‘Union State’ would be both an attempt to ab-
21 sorb Belarus and a step to reconstituting the totali-
22 tarian Soviet Union;

23 “(7) continue to reject the results of the fraud-
24 ulent August 9, 2020, presidential election in
25 Belarus, and to support calls for new presidential

1 and parliamentary elections, conducted in a manner
2 that is free and fair according to OSCE standards
3 and under the supervision of OSCE observers and
4 independent domestic observers;

5 “(8) refuse to recognize Alyaksandr
6 Lukashenka as the legitimately elected leader of
7 Belarus;

8 “(9) continue to call for the fulfillment by the
9 Government of Belarus of Belarus’s freely under-
10 taken obligations as an OSCE participating state
11 and as a signatory of the Charter of the United Na-
12 tions;

13 “(10) support an OSCE role in mediating a
14 dialogue within Belarus between the government and
15 genuine representatives of Belarusian society;

16 “(11) recognize the Coordination Council as a
17 legitimate institution to participate in a dialogue on
18 a peaceful transition of power;

19 “(12) urge an expanded United States diplo-
20 matic presence in Belarus to advocate for the aspira-
21 tions of the people of Belarus for democracy, human
22 rights, and the rule of law;

23 “(13) continue to work closely with the Euro-
24 pean Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and
25 other countries and international organizations, to

1 promote the principles of democracy, the rule of law
2 and human rights in Belarus; and

3 “(14) remain open to reevaluating United
4 States policy toward Belarus as warranted by de-
5 monstrable progress made by the Government of
6 Belarus consistent with the aims of this Act as stat-
7 ed in this section.”.

8 **SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SO-**
9 **CIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS.**

10 Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
11 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend-
12 ed—

13 (1) in the section heading to read as follows:

14 **“ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL**
15 **SOCIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS.”;**

16 (2) in subsection (a)—

17 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking “Euro-
18 pean” and inserting “Trans-Atlantic”; and

19 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and
20 (3) as paragraphs (3) and 4, respectively; and

21 (C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the
22 following:

23 “(2) To assist the people of Belarus in building
24 the sovereignty and independence of their country.”;

25 (3) in subsection (b)—

1 (A) by inserting “and Belarusian groups
2 outside of Belarus” after “indigenous
3 Belarusian groups”; and

4 (B) by inserting “and Belarusian sov-
5 ereignty” before the period at the end;

6 (4) in subsection (c)—

7 (A) by striking paragraph (8);

8 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (3)
9 through (7) as paragraphs (4) through (8), re-
10 spectively;

11 (C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the
12 following:

13 “(3) countering internet censorship and repres-
14 sive surveillance technology that seek to limit free
15 association, control access to information, and pre-
16 vent citizens from exercising their rights to free
17 speech;”;

18 (D) in paragraph (8) (as redesignated), by
19 striking “and” at the end; and

20 (E) by adding at the end the following:

21 “(9) supporting the work of women advocating
22 freedom, human rights, and human progress;

23 “(10) supporting the development of Belarusian
24 language education;

1 “(11) enhancing the development of the private
2 sector, particularly the information technology sec-
3 tor, and its role in the economy of Belarus, including
4 by increasing the capacity of private sector actors,
5 developing business support organizations, offering
6 entrepreneurship training, and expanding access to
7 finance for small and medium enterprises;

8 “(12) supporting political refugees in neigh-
9 boring European countries fleeing the crackdown in
10 Belarus;

11 “(13) supporting the gathering of evidence on
12 and investigating of the human rights abuses in
13 Belarus;

14 “(14) supporting the public health response, in-
15 cluding filling the information void, in Belarus dur-
16 ing the COVID-19 pandemic; and

17 “(15) other activities consistent with the pur-
18 poses of this Act.”;

19 (5) by redesignating subsection (d) as sub-
20 section (g);

21 (6) by inserting after subsection (c) the fol-
22 lowing:

23 “(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
24 gress that, in light of the political crisis in Belarus and
25 the unprecedented mobilization of the Belarusian people,

1 United States foreign assistance to Belarusian civil society
2 should be reevaluated and increased to carry out the pur-
3 poses described in subsection (a) and to include the activi-
4 ties described in subsection (c).

5 “(e) COORDINATION WITH EUROPEAN PARTNERS.—
6 In order to maximize impact, eliminate duplication, and
7 further the achievement of the purposes described in sub-
8 section (a), the Secretary of State shall ensure coordina-
9 tion with the European Union and its institutions, the gov-
10 ernments of countries that are members of the European
11 Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada.

12 “(f) REPORT ON ASSISTANCE.—Not later than one
13 year after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
14 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020, the
15 Secretary of State, acting through the Office of the Coor-
16 dinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, and
17 in coordination with the Administrator of the United
18 States Agency for International Development, shall submit
19 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
20 the programs and activities carried out to achieve the pur-
21 poses described in subsection (a), including an assessment
22 of whether or not progress was made in achieving those
23 purposes.”; and

24 (7) in subsection (g) (as redesignated)—

1 (A) by striking “AUTHORIZATION OF AP-
2 PROPRIATIONS” and all that follows through
3 “There are” and inserting “AUTHORIZATION OF
4 APPROPRIATIONS.—There are”;

5 (B) by striking “fiscal years 2007 and
6 2008” and inserting “fiscal years 2021 and
7 2022”; and

8 (C) by striking paragraph (2).

9 **SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREE-**
10 **DOM, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN**
11 **BELARUS.**

12 Section 5 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
13 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
14 to read as follows:

15 **“SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREE-**
16 **DOM, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN**
17 **BELARUS.**

18 “(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that—

20 “(1) the President should support and reallo-
21 cate resources to radio, television, and internet
22 broadcasting in languages spoken in Belarus by
23 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to the people of
24 Belarus;

1 “(2) the United States should also support
2 other independent media providing objective infor-
3 mation to the Belarusian people, particularly in the
4 Belarusian language;

5 “(3) the President should provide the United
6 States Agency for Global Media with a surge capac-
7 ity (as such term is defined in section 316 of the
8 United States International Broadcasting Act (22
9 U.S.C. 6216)) for programs and activities in
10 Belarus;

11 “(4) the Chief Executive Officer of the United
12 States Agency for Global Media, working through
13 the Open Technology Fund and in coordination with
14 the Secretary of State, should expand and prioritize
15 efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and
16 services to journalists and civil society in Belarus in
17 order to enhance their ability to safely access or
18 share digital news and information without fear of
19 repercussions or surveillance; and

20 “(5) the United States should continue to con-
21 demn the Belarusian authorities’ crackdown on inde-
22 pendent media, including the harassment and mass
23 detentions of independent and foreign journalists
24 and the denial of accreditation.

1 “(b) STRATEGY TO PROMOTE EXPANDED BROAD-
2 CASTING, INTERNET FREEDOM, AND ACCESS TO INFOR-
3 MATION IN BELARUS.—

4 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
5 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
6 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of
7 2020, the Chief Executive Officer of the United
8 States Agency for Global Media and the Secretary of
9 State shall jointly submit to the appropriate congress-
10 sional committees a comprehensive strategy, includ-
11 ing a cost estimate, to carry out the following:

12 “(A) Expand independent radio, television,
13 live stream, and social network broadcasting
14 and communications in Belarus to provide news
15 and information, particularly in the Belarusian
16 language, that is credible, comprehensive, and
17 accurate.

18 “(B) Support the development and use of
19 anti-censorship and circumvention technologies
20 by the Open Technology Fund and the Bureau
21 of Democracy Human Rights and Labor that
22 enable the citizens of Belarus to communicate
23 securely and undertake internet activities with-
24 out interference from the Government of
25 Belarus.

1 “(C) Assist efforts to overcome attempts
2 by the Government of Belarus to disrupt inter-
3 net access and block content online.

4 “(D) Monitor the cooperation of the Gov-
5 ernment of Belarus with any foreign govern-
6 ment or organization for purposes related to the
7 censorship or surveillance of the internet, in-
8 cluding an assessment of any such cooperation
9 in the preceding ten years.

10 “(E) Monitor the purchase or receipt by
11 the Government of Belarus of any technology or
12 training from any foreign government or orga-
13 nization for purposes related to the censorship
14 or surveillance of the internet, including an as-
15 sessment of any such purchase or receipt in the
16 preceding ten years.

17 “(F) Assist with the protection of journal-
18 ists who have been targeted for free speech ac-
19 tivities, including through the denial of accredi-
20 tation.

21 “(G) Provide cyber-attack mitigation serv-
22 ices to civil society organizations in Belarus.

23 “(H) Provide resources for educational ma-
24 terials and training on digital literacy, bypass-
25 ing internet censorship, digital safety, and in-

1 vestigative and analytical journalism for inde-
2 pendent journalists working in Belarus.

3 “(I) Build the capacity of civil society,
4 media, and other nongovernmental and organi-
5 zations to identify, track, and counter
6 disinformation, including from proxies of the
7 Government of Russia working at Belarusian
8 state television.

9 “(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
10 (1) shall be transmitted in unclassified form but
11 may contain a classified annex.”

12 **SEC. 6. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF**
13 **BELARUS.**

14 Section 6 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
15 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend-
16 ed—

17 (1) in subsection (b)—

18 (A) by striking “December 19, 2010” each
19 place it appears and inserting “August 9,
20 2020”;

21 (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting “,
22 peaceful protesters,” after “all opposition activ-
23 ists”; and

1 (C) by striking paragraphs (3) and (6) and
2 redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (7) as
3 paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), respectively;
4 (2) in subsection (c)—

5 (A) in the subsection heading, by inserting
6 “AND RUSSIAN INDIVIDUALS COMPLICIT IN
7 THE CRACKDOWN THAT OCCURRED AFTER
8 THE AUGUST 9, 2020, ELECTION” after
9 “BELARUS”;

10 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and
11 (5) as paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively;

12 (C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the
13 following:

14 “(4) is a member of the Central Election Com-
15 mission of Belarus or assisted the Commission in
16 manipulating the presidential election of August 9,
17 2020;”;

18 (D) in paragraph (5) (as redesignated) to
19 read as follows:

20 “(5) is a member of any branch of the security
21 or law enforcement services of Belarus, including the
22 KGB, Interior Ministry, and OMON special police
23 unit, and is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering,
24 controlling, materially assisting, sponsoring, or pro-
25 viding financial, material, or technological support

1 for, or otherwise directing, the crackdown on opposi-
2 tion leaders, journalists, and peaceful protestors that
3 occurred in connection with the presidential election
4 of August 9, 2020; or”; and

5 (E) by adding at the end the following:

6 “(7) is a government official, including at the
7 Information Ministry, responsible for the crackdown
8 on independent media, including revoking the ac-
9 creditation of journalists, disrupting internet access,
10 and restricting online content;

11 “(8) is an official in the so-called ‘Union State’
12 between Russia and Belarus (regardless of nation-
13 ality of the individual); or

14 “(9) is a Russian individual that has signifi-
15 cantly participated in the crackdown on independent
16 press or human rights abuses related to political re-
17 pression in Belarus, including the Russian propa-
18 gandists sent to replace local employees at
19 Belarusian state media outlets.”;

20 (3) in subsection (d)(1), by striking “the Over-
21 seas Private Investment Corporation” and inserting
22 “the United States International Development Fi-
23 nance Corporation”;

24 (4) in subsection (e), by striking “(including
25 any technical assistance or grant) of any kind”; and

1 (5) in subsection (f)—

2 (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “or
3 by any member or family member closely linked
4 to any member of the senior leadership of the
5 Government of Belarus” and inserting “or by
6 the senior leadership of the Government of
7 Belarus or by any member or family member
8 closely linked to the senior leadership of the
9 Government of Belarus, or an official of the so-
10 called ‘Union State’ with Russia”; and

11 (B) in paragraph (2)—

12 (i) in subparagraph (A), by adding at
13 the end before the semicolon the following:
14 “, or an official of the so-called ‘Union
15 State’ with Russia”; and

16 (ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting
17 “, or the so-called ‘Union State’ with Rus-
18 sia,” after “the Government of Belarus”.

19 **SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.**

20 Section 7 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
21 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
22 to read as follows:

23 **“SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.**

24 “It is the sense of Congress that the President should
25 continue to coordinate with the European Union and its

1 institutions, European Union member states, the United
2 Kingdom, and Canada to develop a comprehensive, multi-
3 lateral strategy to—

4 “(1) further the purposes of this Act, including,
5 as appropriate, encouraging other countries to take
6 measures with respect to the Republic of Belarus
7 that are similar to measures described in this Act;
8 and

9 “(2) deter the Government of Russia from un-
10 dermining democratic processes and institutions in
11 Belarus or threatening the independence, sov-
12 ereignty, and territorial integrity of Belarus.”.

13 **SEC. 8. REPORTS.**

14 Section 8 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
15 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
16 to read as follows:

17 **“SEC. 8. REPORTS.**

18 “(a) REPORT ON THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY AND
19 INDEPENDENCE OF BELARUS.—

20 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
21 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
22 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of
23 2020, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
24 the Director of National Intelligence, shall transmit
25 to the appropriate congressional committees a report

1 on the threat the Government of Russia poses to the
2 sovereignty and independence of Belarus.

3 “(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
4 required by paragraph (1) shall include the fol-
5 lowing:

6 “(A) An assessment of how the Govern-
7 ment of Russia is exploiting the current polit-
8 ical crisis in Belarus to push for deeper political
9 and economic control of or integration with
10 Belarus.

11 “(B) A description of the economic and en-
12 ergy assets in Belarus that the Government of
13 Russia, including Russian state-owned or state-
14 controlled companies, controls.

15 “(C) A description of Belarus major enter-
16 prises that are vulnerable of being taken over
17 by Russian entities amid the country’s wors-
18 ening financial crisis.

19 “(D) A description of how and to what
20 ends the Government of Russia seeks to aug-
21 ment its military presence in Belarus.

22 “(E) A description of Russian influence
23 over the media and information space in
24 Belarus and how the Government of Russia
25 uses disinformation and other malign tech-

1 niques to undermine Belarusian history, cul-
2 ture, and language.

3 “(F) A description of other actors in
4 Belarus that the Government of Russia uses to
5 advance its malign influence, including vet-
6 erans’ organizations and extrajudicial networks.

7 “(G) A description of efforts to undermine
8 Belarusian language, cultural, and national
9 symbols, including the traditional red and white
10 flag and the ‘Pahonia’ mounted knight.

11 “(H) An identification of Russian individ-
12 uals and government agencies that are signifi-
13 cantly supporting or involved in the crackdown
14 on peaceful protestors and the opposition or the
15 repression of independent media following the
16 August 9, 2020, presidential election.

17 “(3) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
18 section shall be transmitted in unclassified form but
19 may contain a classified annex.

20 “(b) REPORT ON PERSONAL ASSETS OF
21 ALYAKSANDR LUKASHENKA.—

22 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days
23 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
24 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of
25 2020, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation

1 with the Secretary of State and the Director of Na-
2 tional Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate
3 congressional committees a report on—

4 “(A) the total assets under the direct or
5 indirect control of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, in-
6 cluding estimated assets and known sources of
7 income of Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his im-
8 mediate family members, including assets, in-
9 vestments, bank accounts, and other business
10 interests; and

11 “(B) an identification of the most signifi-
12 cant senior foreign political figures in Belarus,
13 as determined by their closeness to Alyaksandr
14 Lukashenka.

15 “(2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
16 section shall be transmitted in unclassified form but
17 may contain a classified annex.”.

18 **SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.**

19 Section 9 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
20 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend-
21 ed—

22 (1) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the
23 following:

1 “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-
3 mittees’ means—

4 “(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
5 the Committee on Financial Services, and the
6 Committee on Appropriations of the House of
7 Representatives; and

8 “(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
9 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
10 Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Appro-
11 priations of the Senate.”; and

12 (2) in paragraph (3)(B)—

13 (A) in clause (i), by inserting “members of
14 the security and intelligence services,” after
15 “prosecutors,”; and

16 (B) in clause (ii), by inserting “, electoral
17 fraud, online censorship, or restrictions on inde-
18 pendent media and journalists” after “public
19 corruption”.

20 **SEC. 10. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.**

21 The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of
22 complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010,
23 shall be determined by reference to the latest statement
24 titled “Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation” for this
25 Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record

1 by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, pro-
2 vided that such statement has been submitted prior to the
3 vote on passage.

Passed the House of Representatives November 18,
2020.

Attest:

Clerk.

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2^D SESSION

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