

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1433

To limit funding for any extension of the New START Treaty or any successor agreement unless the agreement includes the People’s Republic of China and covers all strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 13, 2019

Mr. COTTON (for himself and Mr. CORNYN) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To limit funding for any extension of the New START Treaty or any successor agreement unless the agreement includes the People’s Republic of China and covers all strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “New START Treaty
5 Improvement Act of 2019”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) The United States and the Russian Federa-
2 tion signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Trea-
3 ty (the “New START Treaty”) on April 8, 2010.

4 (2) The United States Senate advised and con-
5 sented to the treaty on December 22, 2010, by a
6 vote of 71–26.

7 (3) The Senate resolution advising and con-
8 senting to the ratification of the New START Trea-
9 ty states that “prior to the entry into force of the
10 New START Treaty, the President shall certify to
11 the Senate that . . . the United States will seek to
12 initiate . . . not later than one year after the entry
13 into force of the New START Treaty, negotiations
14 with the Russian Federation on an agreement to ad-
15 dress the disparity between the non-strategic (tac-
16 tical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian
17 Federation and of the United States”.

18 (4) The New START Treaty is due to expire in
19 February 2021.

20 (5) The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states—

21 (A) “While the United States has contin-
22 ued to reduce the number and salience of nu-
23 clear weapons, others, including Russia and
24 China, have moved in the opposite direction.

25 Russia has expanded and improved its strategic

1 and non-strategic nuclear forces. China’s mili-
2 tary modernization has resulted in an expanded
3 nuclear force, with little to no transparency into
4 its intentions.”;

5 (B) “Russia is developing and deploying
6 new nuclear warheads and launchers. These ef-
7 forts include multiple upgrades for every leg of
8 the Russian nuclear triad of strategic bombers,
9 sea-based missiles, and landbased missiles. Rus-
10 sia is also developing at least two new inter-
11 continental range systems, a hypersonic glide
12 vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear-
13 armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous
14 torpedo.”;

15 (C) “[Russia] is also building a large, di-
16 verse, and modern set of non-strategic systems
17 that are dual-capable These theater- and
18 tactical-range systems are not accountable
19 under the New START Treaty”;

20 (D) “China continues to increase the num-
21 ber, capabilities, and protection of its nuclear
22 forces.”; and

23 (E) “China has developed a new road-mo-
24 bile strategic intercontinental ballistic missile
25 (ICBM), a new multi-warhead version of its

1 DF5 silo-based ICBM, and its most advanced
2 ballistic missile submarine armed with new sub-
3 marine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It
4 has also announced development of a new nu-
5 clear-capable strategic bomber, giving China a
6 nuclear triad.”.

7 (6) On April 4, 2019, President Donald J.
8 Trump stated, “Between Russia and China and us,
9 we’re all making hundreds of billions of dollars
10 worth of weapons, including nuclear, which is ridicu-
11 lous . . . and I would say that China will come
12 along, and I would say Russia will come along. It
13 doesn’t really make sense that we’re doing this.”.

14 (7) In testimony before the Committee on For-
15 eign Relations of the Senate on April 10, 2019, Sec-
16 retary of State Mike Pompeo stated, in response to
17 a question about extending the New START treaty,
18 that “we need to make sure that we’ve got all of the
19 parties that are relevant as a component of this as
20 well”.

21 (8) On March 16, 2019, National Security Ad-
22 visor John Bolton stated, “China is building up its
23 nuclear capacity now. It’s . . . one reason why if
24 we’re going to have another arms control negotia-

1 tion, for example, with the Russians, it may make
2 sense to include China in that discussion as well”.

3 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) arms control is beneficial for both United
6 States national security and international stability,
7 but the United States should not enter arms control
8 agreements that impose unilateral restrictions on the
9 United States Armed Forces and fail to properly ac-
10 count for the nuclear arsenals of all near-peer com-
11 petitors in the international system; and

12 (2) any New START Treaty extension or suc-
13 cessor agreement must be a trilateral arrangement
14 among the United States, the Russian Federation,
15 and the People’s Republic of China.

16 **SEC. 4. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.**

17 No funds shall be expended to implement a New
18 START Treaty extension or any successor agreement un-
19 less the New START Treaty or such successor agree-
20 ment—

21 (1) includes and is signed by the People’s Re-
22 public of China; and

23 (2) covers all strategic and non-strategic nu-
24 clear forces held by the Russian Federation, includ-
25 ing—

1 (A) the RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-30) inter-
2 continental ballistic missile system;

3 (B) the 9M730 Burevestnik (SSC-X-9)
4 nuclear-powered cruise missile system;

5 (C) the KH-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched
6 hypersonic missile system;

7 (D) the Avangard hypersonic boost-glide
8 vehicle system; and

9 (E) the Status-6 (Kanyon) unmanned un-
10 dersea vehicle.

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