[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1658 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1658
To provide for oversight of North Korea policy, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 23 (legislative day, May 22), 2019
Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Gardner, and Mr. Coons) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide for oversight of North Korea policy, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``North Korea Policy Oversight Act of
2019''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
(2) Denuclearization.--The term ``denuclearization'' refers
to the complete, verified, and irreversible dismantlement of
North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and programs related to
the delivery mechanisms for nuclear weapons, including
ballistic missile programs.
(3) Government of north korea.--The term ``Government of
North Korea'' means the Government of North Korea and its
agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities.
(4) North korea.--The term ``North Korea'' means the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(5) Nuclear nonproliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483).
(6) South korea.--The term ``South Korea'' means the
Republic of Korea.
(7) Vienna convention on diplomatic relations.--The term
``Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations'' means the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna April 18,
1961.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The North Korean nuclear weapons program is the
culmination of the Government of North Korea's illegal efforts
over six decades to acquire a nuclear weapons program capable
of threatening both the United States and United States
critical allies in the Indo-Pacific region.
(2) North Korea maintains a robust ballistic missile
arsenal that includes a diverse array of delivery systems
capable of striking targets throughout the Indo-Pacific region,
including short- and medium-range missiles that hold regional
countries, including some United States allies, at risk, and
intercontinental ballistic missiles that are potentially
capable of targeting the United States mainland.
(3) North Korea has flagrantly defied the international
community by continuing to illicitly develop its nuclear and
ballistic missile programs in violation of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087
(2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017),
2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017).
(4) United States law, including the North Korea Sanctions
and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-122; 22
U.S.C. 9201 et seq.) authorizes sanctions in response to North
Korea's pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
and ballistic missiles, and its human rights abuses. United
States law also specifies the conditions under which sanctions
may be removed or waived, including that North Korea takes
meaningful and verifiable actions toward denuclearization and
addresses human rights concerns.
(5) International economic and diplomatic sanctions applied
since the passage of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 2016, including by the United States and the
United Nations, when enforced, have intensified pressure on
North Korea and degraded North Korea's ability to advance it's
nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
(6) The United States has applied sanctions against North
Korean individuals and entities, including on Kim Jong Un, for
their complicity in human rights abuses against the North
Korean people and citizens of other countries, including the
United States, South Korea, and Japan.
(7) For decades, the Government of North Korea has failed
to live up to its diplomatic commitments, rejecting good faith
efforts by United States and international negotiators, and
leveraging talks to extract concessions such as sanctions
relief.
(8) On January 1, 2018, in a New Year's Day address, Kim
Jong Un signaled an interest in undertaking diplomatic
engagement, which led to direct bilateral talks between Kim
Jong Un and the leaders of the South Korea, China, and the
United States.
(9) On April 22, 2018, Kim Jong Un asserted that North
Korea had completed its quest for nuclear weapons, stating that
``under the proven condition of complete nuclear weapons, we no
longer need any nuclear tests, mid-range and intercontinental
ballistic rocket tests, and that the nuclear test site in
northern area has also completed its mission''.
(10) The Panmunjom Declaration released following the
Inter-Korean summit meeting on April 27, 2018, and the joint
declaration by President Trump and Kim Jong Un at the June 12,
2018, summit between the United States and North Korea in
Singapore reaffirmed that North Korea ``commits to working
toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula''.
(11) On June 13, 2018, Secretary of State Pompeo said,
``President Trump has been incredibly clear about the
sequencing of denuclearization and relief from the sanctions.
We are going to get complete denuclearization; only then will
there be relief from the sanctions.''.
(12) The Secretary of State confirmed on July 25, 2018, in
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that
North Korea does ``continue to produce fissile material'' and,
according to open source analysis, North Korea has enough
fissile material for at least 30 to 60 nuclear weapons.
(13) The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
of 2016 provides that certain sanctions terminate when North
Korea has ``made significant progress toward--
(A) ``completely, verifiably, and irreversibly
dismantling all of its nuclear, chemical, biological,
and radiological weapons programs, including all
programs for the development of systems designed in
whole or in part for the delivery of such weapons'';
and
(B) accounting for and repatriating the citizens of
other countries abducted or unlawfully held captive,
releasing political prisoners including those in
political prison camps, and accepting and abiding by
internationally recognized standards for the
distribution and monitoring of humanitarian aid.
(14) A robust military posture, including regular training
and exercises, by the United States, South Korea, and Japan,
has contributed to peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
(15) South Korea has contributed heavily to its own defense
and to the defense of the United States military forces in
South Korea, including by providing $10 billion of the $10.8
billion toward the Camp Humphreys project to build and relocate
United States military forces to a new base in South Korea.
(16) United States military forces, pursuant to
international law, are lawfully deployed on the Korean
Peninsula.
(17) The nuclear and ballistic missile programs of North
Korea are clear and consistent violations of international law.
(18) The long-stated strategic objective of authoritarian
states, such as China, Russia, and North Korea, has been the
removal of United States military forces from the Korean
Peninsula.
(19) On September 18, 2018, the Pyongyang Declaration
between President Moon of South Korea and Chairman Kim Jong Un
of North Korea clarified that North Korea's willingness to
denuclearize was conditioned on unspecified United States or
international concessions stating, ``The North expressed its
willingness to continue to take additional measures, such as
the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in
Yeongbyeon, as the United States takes corresponding measures
in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 U.S.-DPRK Joint
Statement.''.
(20) On December 31, 2018, President Trump signed into law
the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-
409), which states that--
(A) it is the policy of the United States that the
objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear
and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea be the complete, verifiable,
and irreversible dismantlement of such programs;
(B) it is the policy of the United States to
continue to impose sanctions with respect to activities
of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such
government, or other persons in accordance with
applicable United States law;
(C) the Secretary of State shall submit regular
reports to the appropriate congressional committees
that describe actions taken by the United States to
address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of,
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
(D) the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit
justifications to the appropriate committees not later
than 30 days after terminating any sanction with
respect to the activities of the Government of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or a person
acting for or on behalf of such government.
(21) On December 20, 2018, North Korean state media
reiterated North Korea's longstanding nuclear policy, stating
``if we unilaterally eliminate our security guarantees against
a U.S. nuclear preemptive strike, it would not be considered
denuclearization'', and further defined ``denuclearization of
the Korean peninsula'' as ``removing all nuclear threats, not
only from North and South Korean territory, but also from the
surrounding area aimed at the Korean Peninsula''.
(22) On January 1, 2019, in his New Year's Day address, Kim
Jong Un stated, ``Given that the North and South committed
themselves to advancing along the road of peace and prosperity,
we maintain that the joint military exercises with foreign
forces, which constitute the source of aggravating the
situation on the Korean Peninsula, should no longer be
permitted and the introduction of war equipment including
strategic assets from outside should be completely
suspended.''.
(23) On January 1, 2019, in his New Year's Day address, Kim
Jong Un further stated, ``But if the United States does not
keep the promise it made in the eyes of the world, and of the
miscalculation of our people's patience, it attempts to
unilaterally enforce something upon us and persists in imposing
sanctions and pressure against our Republic, we may be
compelled to find a new way for defending the sovereignty of
the country and the supreme interests of the state and for
achieving peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.''.
(24) On January 29, 2019, Director of National Intelligence
Coats testified before the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate that ``we currently assess that North Korea will
seek to retain its WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
capabilities and is unlikely to completely give up its nuclear
weapons and production capability because its leaders
ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to regime
survival'' and that the United States intelligence agencies are
observing ``activity that is inconsistent with full
denuclearization''.
(25) On February 28, 2019, a second United States-North
Korea summit ended without a joint statement or agreement, and
Secretary of State Pompeo has said that ``I am confident there
will be'' a third summit between President Trump and Chairman
Kim Jong Un, adding ``We came out of Hanoi with a deeper
understanding of each other. The positions that the two sides
had, the two leaders were able to make progress in that
respect. We didn't get as far as the world is demanding. These
are global sanctions that are on North Korea today . . . We're
determined. I'm convinced the North Koreans are determined as
well. Chairman Kim has promised me, he's promised President
Trump, he will denuclearize. Now it's the mission of my team to
make sure that happens.''.
(26) On May 5, 2019, North Korea tested three missile
systems at ranges of up to 240 kilometers, including a short-
range ballistic missile (SRBM), a 300mm multiple rocket
launcher (MRL), and a 240mm multiple rocket launcher.
(27) On May 9, 2019, the Department of Justice announced
the filing of a civil forfeiture complaint against a bulk
carrier ship registered in North Korea, which according to the
complaint, ``was used to illicitly ship coal from North Korea
and to deliver heavy machinery to the DPRK'', in violation of
``longstanding U.S. law and United Nations Security Council
resolutions''.
SEC. 4. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.
(a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to pursue all credible diplomatic means to achieve the
denuclearization of North Korea, including--
(A) the complete abandonment of all North Korean
nuclear weapons, fissile material, and existing nuclear
programs; and
(B) North Korea returning to, and at an early date
coming into compliance with, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards;
(2) to seek the complete and verifiable dismantlement of
all North Korean nuclear weapons-related facilities, including
for--
(A) the production and processing of fissile
material; and
(B) scientific research related to the production
of nuclear weapons;
(3) to seek appropriate inspections, verification, and
compliance measures, including full-scope safeguards, to assure
the complete denuclearization of North Korea;
(4) to seek the complete and verifiable dismantlement of--
(A) all North Korean ballistic missiles, of any
range; and
(B) all infrastructure and facilities related to
the production, testing, and fielding or deployment of
ballistic missiles;
(5) to seek the complete and verifiable dismantlement of
all North Korean programs related to weapons of mass
destruction, including chemical and biological weapons and the
industrial and scientific facilities to support such programs;
(6) to affirm that the United States has no intention to
undertake any military action against North Korea that is
contrary to the United States Constitution and international
law;
(7) until such time as denuclearization is achieved--
(A) to deter North Korea from using weapons of mass
destruction or leveraging those weapons to coerce
United States allies;
(B) to contain attempts by North Korea to
proliferate such weapons and technologies;
(C) to sustain United States and multilateral
efforts to reduce the risk of conflict on the Korean
Peninsula; and
(D) to continue to exert economic pressure against
North Korea in cooperation with the United Nations and
the international community;
(8) should diplomacy and deterrence fail to result in the
denuclearization of North Korea, to reserve the right to
utilize all available options pursuant to the United States
Constitution to protect and defend United States national
security interests and meet United States treaty obligations;
and
(9) to uphold the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and not
recognize North Korea as a legitimate nuclear weapons state.
(b) Diplomacy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to pursue diplomatic engagement with the Government of
North Korea for the purposes of--
(A) advancing meaningful negotiations regarding
denuclearization, including the Government of North
Korea abandoning and dismantling its missile and
nuclear weapons programs, ceasing its proliferation
activities, and coming into compliance with
international agreements and United Nations Security
Council resolutions;
(B) reducing the risks of military miscalculation;
and
(C) creating opportunities for the development of
confidence-building measures;
(2) to formulate and carry out policy affecting the Korean
Peninsula in close cooperation with United States allies,
particularly South Korea;
(3) to encourage those countries that maintain diplomatic
relations with North Korea to take all necessary steps to
ensure that North Korean diplomatic missions are not used for
any activities inconsistent with the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, international law governing the operation
of diplomatic missions, United States and United Nations
sanctions, and accepted norms of behavior for diplomats and
diplomatic missions;
(4) to encourage all countries to fully implement and
enforce United Nations sanctions commitments with respect to
North Korea, including ending the practice of hosting overseas
North Korean workers;
(5) to increase the effectiveness of United States
sanctions by seeking to work through the United Nations and
with other like-minded countries to ensure a multilateral
approach to sanctions;
(6) to provide unmistakable assurance to Japan and South
Korea that the United States is committed to fulfilling its
treaty obligations if they are attacked;
(7) to provide support for North Korean refugees and asylum
seekers in accordance with United States and international law;
(8) to promote the human rights and dignity of the North
Korean people, including through the United Nations and other
multilateral institutions; and
(9) to seek opportunities for humanitarian actions, such as
family reunification and the return of human remains of United
States servicemembers missing in action and killed in action on
the Korean Peninsula.
(c) Economic Pressure.--It is the policy of the United States to
sustain and calibrate economic pressure on North Korea until North
Korea undertakes meaningful and verifiable actions toward
denuclearization, including by--
(1) encouraging all countries to implement and enforce
existing United Nations sanctions;
(2) leveraging the strength of the United States financial
system to deny access by the Government of North Korea and
those with whom such government facilitates illicit financial
transactions to the United States and global markets, including
through the use of secondary sanctions;
(3) encouraging all countries, in accordance with United
Nations Security Council resolutions, to end the practice of
hosting North Koreans as guest workers, recognizing that such
workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit source of
revenue for the Government of North Korea and its nuclear
program;
(4) working with the international community on
interdiction of shipments to and from North Korea, including
ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United Nations Security
Council resolutions that have banned nearly every major export
from North Korea; and
(5) enforcing United States laws with respect to
sanctioning entities, including Russian and Chinese entities,
that knowingly engage with sanctioned entities from North Korea
or trade in items prohibited under United Nations Security
Council resolutions.
(d) Proliferation of Nuclear and Missile Technology.--It is the
policy of the United States--
(1) to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons, missile
technology, or related material to or from North Korea and
other states or non-state actors;
(2) to support the efforts of the international community
to detect, interdict, and prevent the transfers of nuclear or
missile technology or related items to or from North Korea;
(3) to prioritize coordination with global partners,
including through technical assistance and capacity building,
to enhance the ability of the global community to monitor,
interdict, and prosecute entities that engage in transfer of
nuclear weapons, missile technology, or related material to or
from North Korea; and
(4) to abide by United States obligations under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty--
(A) not to assist any country in the development of
nuclear weapons; and
(B) to encourage all countries to abide by their
commitments under such Treaty and International Atomic
Energy Agency agreements.
(e) Alliances and Military Posture.--It is the policy of the United
States--
(1) to reaffirm the importance of the United States-Japan
and United States-South Korea alliances for maintaining peace
and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;
(2) to reaffirm that the United States commitments to South
Korea and Japan, as codified under the Mutual Defense Treaty
between the United States and the Republic of Korea (1954) and
the Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan
(1951), are not contingent on the state of the United States'
relations with North Korea or any progress that may be made
towards North Korea's denuclearization;
(3) to reaffirm United States extended deterrence
commitments to Japan and South Korea, including through
maintaining forward-deployed United States military forces;
(4) to reaffirm the importance of the forward-deployed
presence of United States military forces in Japan and South
Korea that continues to play a critical role in safeguarding
the peaceful and stable rules-based international order that
benefits all countries;
(5) to reaffirm close alliance coordination on any
adjustment of United States military posture in the region;
(6) to strengthen United States efforts to confront
emerging or asymmetric challenges, including in the cyber and
space domains;
(7) to safeguard maritime security and ensure freedom of
navigation, commerce, and overflight in the region;
(8) to cooperate with allies and partners in the provision
of public goods to the region, including humanitarian relief
and disaster response; and
(9) to ensure any action to curtail or remove United States
military forces in South Korea shall include regular
consultation with Congress regarding the implications of
proposed changes on United States readiness to meet our
commitments in the region.
(f) Defense and Deterrence Measures.--It is the policy of the
United States--
(1) to keep United States security commitments to United
States allies and take necessary actions for United States
self-defense and the defense of United States allies, including
joint military exercises, the modernization of weapons systems
deployed in the Indo-Pacific region, and counter-provocation
planning by the United States and Republic of Korea Combined
Forces Command, as well as to negotiate full and equitable
Special Measures Agreements for alliance burden sharing with
South Korea and Japan;
(2) to develop and deploy antiballistic missile
capabilities to defend the United States homeland, United
States military forces in the region, and United States allies
Japan and South Korea;
(3) to formulate and carry out military planning and
operations impacting the Korean Peninsula in close cooperation
with United States allies, particularly South Korea and Japan;
(4) to deter North Korea in a manner that bolsters the
force posture and military strength of United States alliance
and partner networks in the region; and
(5) to maintain, as necessary and appropriate, credible and
overwhelming military options to be used in a manner consistent
with the United States Constitution against the Government of
North Korea, to deter the Government of North Korea from use of
nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and related technology.
(g) Human Rights.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to promote human rights for the North Korean people;
(2) to revisit and explore new opportunities for
coordinating efforts to plan for humanitarian needs in North
Korea, in accordance with United States and international law
and with appropriate measures in place to discourage the
diversion of humanitarian assistance to the North Korean
military or other unintended recipients;
(3) to press for access for the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in North Korea and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights;
(4) to continue to seek cooperation from foreign
governments on the resettlement of North Korean refugees
overseas;
(5) to urge China to halt forcible repatriation of North
Koreans;
(6) to promote democracy, human rights, and a market
economy in North Korea; and
(7) to appoint a Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights
Issues in accordance with section 107 of the North Korean Human
Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7817).
(h) Information Dissemination Efforts.--It is the policy of the
United States--
(1) to increase the availability of information not
controlled by the Government of North Korea inside North Korea;
(2) to continue to prioritize expanding access to
information in North Korea by exploring the use of new and
emerging technologies, including digital media, and expanding
nongovernmental radio broadcasting to North Korea, including
news and information, to increase information dissemination in
North Korea; and
(3) to fulfill all requirements under United States law,
including the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
of 2016, with regard to providing resources for freedom of
information efforts into North Korea, and to regularly consult
with Congress regarding such efforts.
(i) Strategy and Briefings Required.--
(1) In general.--The President shall submit to the national
security committees a detailed strategy, which may include a
classified annex, for the implementation of policies outlined
in subsections (a) through (h), augmented by briefings to the
national security committees on a quarterly basis or as
requested.
(2) National security committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``national security committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
SEC. 5. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY REPORT.
Section 210(d)(2) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018
(Public Law 115-409) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) in clause (i), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the
end and inserting a semicolon; and
(C) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:
``(iii) how diplomatic negotiations with
the Government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea are expected to proceed; and
``(iv) United States efforts to continue to
exert economic pressure, in coordination with
United States allies, with respect to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea;''; and
(2) in subparagraph (C)--
(A) in clause (iii), by striking ``and'' at the
end; and
(B) by inserting after clause (iv) the following:
``(v) an assessment of credible diplomatic
engagement by the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea; and
``(vi) an assessment of the threat posed by
the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;''.
SEC. 6. BRIEFINGS.
(a) Member Briefings.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 15 legislative days after
each visit for the purposes of diplomatic talks between the
United States and North Korea at the Secretary of State level
or above, including any meeting between the respective heads of
state, the Secretary of State or the Secretary's designee, in
coordination with appropriate officials, shall brief the
national security committees (as such term is defined in
section 4(i)(2)), briefings on the diplomatic talks.
(2) Classification.--The briefings required under paragraph
(1) shall be held in a classified format.
(b) Staff Briefings.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs shall hold quarterly briefings
for appropriately cleared staff members of the national
security committees (as such term is defined in section
4(i)(2)).
(2) Classification.--The briefings required under paragraph
(1) shall be held in a classified format.
(3) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply when
diplomatic talks described in subsection (a)(1) have not taken
place within the prior 60-day period and will not take place
within the next 30 days.
SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS.
It is the sense of Congress that regular congressional oversight
through hearings is important while diplomatic talks between the United
States and North Korea continue, and as such the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate should, as appropriate, hold such hearings,
including with participation of official witnesses, and otherwise
obtain information in order to fully review the negotiations.
SEC. 8. OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH NORTH KOREA.
(a) Transmission to Congress of Nuclear Agreements With North Korea
and Verification Assessment With Respect to Such Agreements.--
(1) Transmission of agreements.--Not later than 5 days
after entering into an agreement with North Korea relating to
the nuclear and missile program of North Korea, the President
shall transmit to the chairmen and ranking members of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the
Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader of the House of
Representatives and the majority and minority leader of the
Senate--
(A) the agreement, including all related materials
and annexes; and
(B) a verification assessment report prepared by
the Secretary of State in accordance with paragraph
(2).
(2) Verification assessment report.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall
prepare, with respect to an agreement described in
paragraph (1), a report assessing--
(i) the extent to which the Secretary will
be able to verify that North Korea is complying
with its obligations and commitments under the
agreement, including how North Korea might
attempt to conceal its program;
(ii) whether North Korea has made a
complete, transparent, and verifiable
declaration of all facilities and
infrastructure materially relevant to North
Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs;
(iii) the adequacy of the safeguards and
other control mechanisms and other assurances
contained in the agreement with respect to
North Korean nuclear and missile programs to
ensure North Korea activities are limited to
the subset of activities permitted under the
agreement; and
(iv) the capacity and capability of the
United States and international organizations,
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency,
to effectively implement the verification
regime required by or related to the agreement,
including whether the United States or
international organizations will have--
(I) sufficient access to--
(aa) all nuclear facilities
that span the entire nuclear
fuel cycle;
(bb) facilities associated
with the nuclear weaponization
program;
(cc) facilities associated
with its missile program; and
(dd) declared and
undeclared sites; and
(II) the ability to investigate
suspicious sites or allegations of
covert nuclear-related activities.
(B) Classified annex.--The report required under
subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted in unclassified
form, but shall include a classified annex prepared in
consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified
information.
(b) Sense of Congress on North Korea Final Agreement.--It is the
sense of Congress that any binding agreement between the United States
and North Korea should be submitted to the United States Congress as a
treaty and subject to the advice and consent of the Senate in
accordance with article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of
the United States.
SEC. 9. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE.
(a) Verification and Compliance Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with appropriate cabinet-level officials, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
North Korea's record of verification and compliance.
(2) Classification.--The report required under paragraph
(1)--
(A) may be submitted in classified form;
(B) shall contain an unclassified executive
summary; and
(C) may contain an unclassified annex.
(b) Semiannual Report.--Not later than 180 days after entering into
an agreement with North Korea, and not less frequently than once every
180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on North Korea's nuclear and missile
program and the compliance of North Korea with the agreement during the
period covered by the report, which shall include--
(1) a description of any action or failure to act by the
Government of North Korea that breached the agreement or is in
noncompliance with the terms of the agreement;
(2) a description of the status and activities of any North
Korea nuclear facilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle,
including mining and exploration, milling, conversion,
enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactors, reprocessing, and
storage;
(3) a description of the status and activities of any North
Korea nuclear facilities related to the North Korean nuclear
weaponization program, including research and development,
education and training, and testing;
(4) a description of the status and activities of any North
Korea missile facilities, including research and development,
production, testing, and basing;
(5) a description of any delay by the Government of North
Korea of more than 1 week in providing inspectors access to
facilities, people, and documents in North Korea as required by
the agreement;
(6) a description of any covert nuclear activities
undertaken by the Government of North Korea, including any
covert nuclear weapons-related activities, covert fissile
material activities, covert missile activities, or research and
development activities; and
(7) a description of any transfer or diversion by the
Government of North Korea of its nuclear materials, components,
technology, or equipment to state or non-state actors.
SEC. 10. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.
Any reports required to be submitted to the appropriate
congressional committees under this Act or any amendments made by this
Act that are subject to a deadline for submission consisting of the
same unit of time may be consolidated into a single report. The
consolidated report shall contain all information required under this
Act or any amendment made by this Act with respect to the reports
comprising such consolidated report.
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