

116TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. 178

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 12, 2019

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

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## AN ACT

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and harassment of these communities inside and outside China.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Uyghur Human Rights  
3 Policy Act of 2019”.

4 **SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.**

5 The purpose of this Act is to direct United States  
6 resources to address gross violations of universally recog-  
7 nized human rights, including the mass internment of over  
8 1,000,000 Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim eth-  
9 nic minorities in China and the intimidation and threats  
10 faced by United States citizens and legal permanent resi-  
11 dents.

12 **SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

13 In this section, the term “appropriate congressional  
14 committees” means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the  
16 Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee  
17 on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Hous-  
18 ing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judi-  
19 ciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the  
20 Senate; and

21 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the  
22 Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select  
23 Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Finan-  
24 cial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and  
25 the Committee on Appropriations of the House of  
26 Representatives.

1 **SEC. 4. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of  
4 China has a long history of repressing approximately  
5 13,000,000 Turkic, moderate Sunni Muslims, par-  
6 ticularly Uyghurs, in the nominally autonomous  
7 Xinjiang region. These actions are in contravention  
8 of international human rights standards, including  
9 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the  
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

11 (2) In recent decades, central and regional Chi-  
12 nese government policies have systematically dis-  
13 criminated against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and  
14 other Muslims in Xinjiang by denying them a range  
15 of civil and political rights, including the freedoms of  
16 expression, religion, movement, and a fair trial,  
17 among others.

18 (3) Increased unrest in the Xinjiang region as  
19 a result of the central government’s severe repres-  
20 sion is used in Orwellian fashion by the Government  
21 of the People’s Republic of China as evidence of  
22 “terrorism” and “separatism” and as an excuse for  
23 further disproportionate response.

24 (4) In 2014, Chinese authorities launched their  
25 latest “Strike Hard against Violent Extremism”  
26 campaign, in which the pretext of wide-scale, inter-

1 nationally linked threats of terrorism were used to  
2 justify pervasive restrictions on, and gross human  
3 rights violations against, the ethnic minority commu-  
4 nities of Xinjiang.

5 (5) Those policies included—

6 (A) pervasive, high-tech surveillance across  
7 the region, including the arbitrary collection of  
8 biodata, such as DNA samples from children,  
9 without their knowledge or consent;

10 (B) the use of QR codes outside homes to  
11 gather information on how frequently individ-  
12 uals pray;

13 (C) facial and voice recognition software  
14 and “predictive policing” databases; and

15 (D) severe restrictions on the freedom of  
16 movement across the region.

17 (6) Chinese security forces have never been held  
18 accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in  
19 Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya  
20 (2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of  
21 Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014).

22 (7)(A) The August 2016 transfer of former  
23 Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen  
24 Quanguo to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary

1 prompted an acceleration in the crackdown across  
2 the region.

3 (B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used  
4 chilling political rhetoric to describe the purpose of  
5 government policy, including “eradicating tumors”  
6 and “spray[ing] chemicals” on crops to kill the  
7 “weeds”.

8 (C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese  
9 cultural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and  
10 unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to  
11 state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as  
12 muqam (a musical tradition) and meshrep (tradi-  
13 tional cultural gatherings), and due to elimination of  
14 the Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in  
15 Xinjiang schools and universities.

16 (8) In 2017, credible reports found that family  
17 members of Uyghurs living outside of China had  
18 gone missing inside China, that Chinese authorities  
19 were pressuring those outside the country to return,  
20 and that individuals were being arbitrarily detained  
21 in large numbers.

22 (9) There is ample credible evidence provided  
23 by scholars, human rights organizations, journalists,  
24 and think tanks substantiating the establishment by  
25 Chinese authorities of “political reeducation” camps.

1           (10) Independent organizations conducted  
2 interviews, including testimonies from Kayrat  
3 Samarkan, Omir Bekali, and Mihrigul Tursun, along  
4 with others who had been detained in such facilities,  
5 who described forced political indoctrination, torture,  
6 beatings, food deprivation, and solitary confinement,  
7 as well as uncertainty as to the length of detention,  
8 humiliation, and denial of religious, cultural, and lin-  
9 guistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told  
10 by guards that the only way to secure release was  
11 to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty. Poor con-  
12 ditions and lack of medical treatment at such facili-  
13 ties appear to have contributed to the deaths of  
14 some detainees, including the elderly and infirm.  
15 Uyghurs Muhammed Salih Hajim (2018), Yaqupjan  
16 Naman (2018), Abdughappar Abdujappar (2018),  
17 Ayhan Memet (2018), Abdulreshit Seley Hajim  
18 (2018), Nurimangul Memet (2018), Adalet Teyip  
19 (2018), Abdulehed Mehsum (2017), Hesen Imin  
20 (2017), and Sawut Raxman (2017) reportedly died  
21 while in the custody of the Chinese authorities in  
22 “political reeducation” camps, without proper inves-  
23 tigation of the circumstances.

24           (11) Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now ob-  
25 tained permanent residence or citizenship in other

1 countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment  
2 from Chinese officials.

3 (12) Under pressure from the Government of  
4 the People’s Republic of China, countries have fore-  
5 ibly returned Uyghurs to China in violation of the  
6 non-refoulement principle and their well-founded  
7 fear of persecution. States returning Uyghurs in-  
8 clude Egypt, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Burma,  
9 Cambodia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,  
10 Tajikistan, Pakistan, Nepal, and India.

11 (13) Six journalists for Radio Free Asia’s  
12 Uyghur service have publicly detailed abuses their  
13 family members in Xinjiang have endured in re-  
14 sponse to their work exposing abusive policies across  
15 the region.

16 (14) Several United States-based companies are  
17 conducting business with Xinjiang authorities with-  
18 out sufficient due diligence or safeguards to ensure  
19 their business operations do not create or contribute  
20 to human rights violations.

21 (15) The Government of the People’s Republic  
22 of China is increasingly investing in the “Belt and  
23 Road Initiative” across Xinjiang and throughout  
24 Central Asia, extending its influence through organi-  
25 zations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-

1       tion without regard to the political, religious, cul-  
2       tural, or linguistic rights of ethnic minorities.

3               (16) The Secretary of State, Congressional-Ex-  
4       ecutive Commission on China, Tom Lantos Human  
5       Rights Commission, and individual members of the  
6       executive branch and Congress have all expressed  
7       growing concern regarding the pervasive human  
8       rights abuses across Xinjiang and the “political re-  
9       education” camps.

10              (17) In August 2018, the United Nations Com-  
11       mittee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination challenged  
12       the Government of the People’s Republic of China  
13       over abuses in Xinjiang, including the establishment  
14       of mass arbitrary detention camps.

15              (18) Between August and September 2018,  
16       Chinese authorities responded to these allegations by  
17       either flatly denying them or insisting that the facili-  
18       ties are “vocational training centers”.

19              (19) In September 2018, newly appointed  
20       United Nations High Commissioner for Human  
21       Rights Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as  
22       High Commissioner the “deeply disturbing allega-  
23       tions of large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs  
24       and other Muslim communities, in so-called re-edu-  
25       cation camps across Xinjiang”.



1           (20) On September 18, 2018, the Washington  
2 Post editorial board wrote, “At stake is not just the  
3 welfare of the Uighurs, but also whether the tech-  
4 nologies of the 21st century will be employed to  
5 smother human freedom.”

6           (21) In December 2018 testimony before the  
7 Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and Inter-  
8 national Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on  
9 Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Assistant  
10 Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor  
11 Scott Busby testified that the number of those de-  
12 tained in camps since April 2017 was “at least  
13 800,000 and possibly more than 2 million”.

14           (22) In December 2018, independent media re-  
15 ports pointed to growing evidence of forced labor in  
16 the camps, as well as reports of individuals who have  
17 been released from camps being forced to labor in  
18 nearby factories for low wages under threat of being  
19 sent back to “political reeducation” camps.

20           (23) In December 2018 and January 2019,  
21 Chinese officials organized visits to “political reedu-  
22 cation” camps in Xinjiang for a small group of for-  
23 eign journalists and diplomats from 12 non-Western  
24 countries. In the months preceding the visits, inter-  
25 national media reported that officials worked to re-

1       move security features from some “political reeduca-  
2       tion” facilities, and coached detainees and area resi-  
3       dents not to make negative comments about the  
4       camps. Reports also indicated that officials had  
5       transferred large numbers of detainees to detention  
6       facilities in other parts of China.

7               (24) Experts have described the Xinjiang region  
8       as “a police state to rival North Korea, with a for-  
9       malized racism on the order of South African apart-  
10      heid” and the repression in the Xinjiang region as  
11      a “slow motion Tiananmen”.

12              (25) On December 31, 2018, President Donald  
13      J. Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Ini-  
14      tiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 105–409), which  
15      condemned China’s “forced disappearances, extra-  
16      legal detentions, invasive and omnipresent surveil-  
17      lance, and lack of due process in judicial pro-  
18      ceedings,” authorized funding to promote democ-  
19      racy, human rights, and the rule of law in China,  
20      and supported sanctions designations against any  
21      entity or individual that—

22                      (A) violates human rights or religious free-  
23                      doms; or

24                      (B) engages in censorship activities.

1 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

2 It is the sense of Congress that—

3 (1) the President should condemn abuses  
4 against Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities in  
5 Xinjiang and call on Chinese President Xi Jinping  
6 to recognize the profound abuse and likely lasting  
7 damage of China’s current policies, and immediately  
8 close the “political reeducation” camps, lift all re-  
9 strictions on and ensure respect for internationally  
10 guaranteed human rights across the region, and  
11 allow for reestablishment of contact between those  
12 inside and outside China;

13 (2) the United States Government should de-  
14 velop a strategy to support the United Nations High  
15 Commissioner for Human Rights and numerous  
16 United Nations Special Rapporteurs’ urgent calls for  
17 immediate and unfettered access to Xinjiang, includ-  
18 ing the “political reeducation” camps, and instruct  
19 representatives of the United States at the United  
20 Nations to use the voice and vote of the United  
21 States to condemn the mass arbitrary detainment,  
22 torture, and forced labor of Turkic Muslims in the  
23 People’s Republic of China;

24 (3) the Secretary of State should consider the  
25 applicability of existing authorities, including the  
26 Global Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of Public Law

1 114–328), to impose targeted sanctions on members  
2 of the Government of the People’s Republic of  
3 China, the Chinese Communist Party, and state se-  
4 curity apparatus, including Xinjiang Party Secretary  
5 Chen Quanguo and other officials credibly alleged to  
6 be responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang  
7 and elsewhere;

8 (4) the Secretary of State should fully imple-  
9 ment the provisions of the Frank Wolf International  
10 Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114–281) and  
11 consider strategically employing sanctions and other  
12 tools under the International Religious Freedom Act  
13 (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.) and to employ measures re-  
14 quired as part of the “Country of Particular Con-  
15 cern” (CPC) designation for the Government of the  
16 People’s Republic of China that directly address par-  
17 ticularly severe violations of religious freedom;

18 (5) the Secretary of Commerce should review  
19 and consider prohibiting the sale or provision of any  
20 United States-made goods or services to any state  
21 agent in Xinjiang, and adding the Xinjiang branch  
22 of the Chinese Communist Party, the Xinjiang Pub-  
23 lic Security Bureau, and the Xinjiang Office of the  
24 United Front Work Department, or any entity act-  
25 ing on their behalf to facilitate the mass internment

1 or forced labor of Turkic Muslims, to the “Entity  
2 List” administered by the Department of Commerce;

3 (6) United States companies and individuals  
4 selling goods or services or otherwise operating in  
5 Xinjiang should take steps, including in any public  
6 or financial filings, to publicly assert that their com-  
7 mercial activities are not contributing to human  
8 rights violations in Xinjiang or elsewhere in China  
9 and that their supply chains are not compromised by  
10 forced labor;

11 (7) the Federal Bureau of Investigation and ap-  
12 propriate United States law enforcement entities  
13 should track and take steps to hold accountable offi-  
14 cials from China who harass, threaten, or intimidate  
15 not only United States citizens and legal permanent  
16 residents, including Turkic Muslims, Uyghur-Ameri-  
17 cans, and Chinese-Americans, but also Chinese na-  
18 tionals legally studying or working in the United  
19 States;

20 (8) the Secretary of State should work with tra-  
21 ditional United States allies and partners to take  
22 similar steps and coordinate closely on targeted  
23 sanctions and visa restrictions;

24 (9) the Secretary of State should appoint a  
25 United States Special Coordinator for Xinjiang,

1 from officers and employees of the Department of  
2 State, who will coordinate diplomatic, political, pub-  
3 lic diplomacy, financial assistance, sanctions,  
4 counterterrorism, security resources, and congres-  
5 sional reporting requirements within the United  
6 States Government to respond to the gross violations  
7 of universally recognized human rights occurring in  
8 the Xinjiang region, including by addressing—

9 (A) the mass detentions of Uyghurs and  
10 other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities;

11 (B) the deployment of technologically ad-  
12 vanced surveillance and police detection meth-  
13 ods; and

14 (C) the counterterrorism and counter-radi-  
15 calism claims used to justify the policies of the  
16 Government of the People’s Republic of China  
17 in Xinjiang;

18 (10) the United States Special Coordinator for  
19 Xinjiang position should continue until the mass  
20 surveillance and internment of Uyghurs and other  
21 predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities has ended  
22 and all detainees released; and

23 (11) the full and timely implementation of sec-  
24 tions 408, 409, and 410 of the Asia Reassurance  
25 Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) is crit-

1 ical to demonstrating unwavering support by the  
2 United States for the universally recognized human  
3 rights of all ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities  
4 in China, including Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.

5 **SEC. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
7 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National  
8 Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State,  
9 shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees  
10 a report to assess national and regional security threats  
11 posed by the crackdown across Xinjiang, the frequency  
12 with which Central and Southeast Asian governments are  
13 forcibly returning Turkic Muslim refugees and asylum  
14 seekers, and the transfer or development of technology  
15 used by the Government of the People’s Republic of China  
16 that facilitates the mass internment and surveillance of  
17 Turkic Muslims, including technology relating to pre-  
18 dictive policing and large-scale data collection and anal-  
19 ysis.

20 (b) ANNEX.—The report required under subsection  
21 (a) shall include an unclassified annex with a list of all  
22 Chinese companies involved in the construction or oper-  
23 ation of the “political education” camps, and the provision  
24 or operation of surveillance technology or operations,  
25 across Xinjiang.

1 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under  
2 subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form  
3 but may contain a classified annex.

4 **SEC. 7. PROTECTING CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS OF THE**  
5 **UNITED STATES FROM INTIMIDATION AND**  
6 **COERCION.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
8 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Fed-  
9 eral Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Sec-  
10 retary of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate  
11 congressional committees that outlines any and all efforts  
12 to provide information to and protect United States citi-  
13 zens and residents, including ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese  
14 nationals legally studying or working temporarily in the  
15 United States, who have experienced harassment or in-  
16 timidation by officials or agents of the Government of the  
17 People’s Republic of China and the Communist Party  
18 within the United States and those whose families in  
19 China have experienced threats or detention because of  
20 their work or advocacy.

21 (b) DATABASE OF DETAINED FAMILY MEMBERS OF  
22 UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS.—The Sec-  
23 retary of State should explore appropriate mechanisms to  
24 establish a voluntary database to which United States citi-  
25 zens or permanent resident family members of the Uyghur



1 diaspora can provide details about missing family mem-  
2 bers, with a view towards pressing for information and ac-  
3 countability from the Government of the People’s Republic  
4 of China and to take appropriate measures to expedite the  
5 asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic  
6 Muslim minorities.

7 **SEC. 8. REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.**

8 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date  
9 of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United  
10 States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appro-  
11 priate congressional committees a report that—

12 (1) describes the current status and reach of  
13 United States broadcasting to the Xinjiang region  
14 and Uyghur speaking communities globally, barriers  
15 to the free flow of news and information to these  
16 communities, and, if appropriate, detailed technical  
17 and fiscal requirements necessary to increase broad-  
18 casting and other media to these communities glob-  
19 ally;

20 (2) describes efforts to intimidate Radio Free  
21 Asia and Voice of America reporters reporting on  
22 human rights issues in the People’s Republic of  
23 China; and

24 (3) in consultation with the Global Engagement  
25 Center at the Department of State, describes and

1 assesses disinformation and propaganda by the Gov-  
2 ernment of the People’s Republic of China or other  
3 members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  
4 targeting Uyghur communities globally and efforts  
5 to downplay gross violations of universally recog-  
6 nized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region  
7 and any activities or programs that address these ef-  
8 forts.

9 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the  
10 United States to commend and support the journalists of  
11 the Uyghur language service of Radio Free Asia for their  
12 reporting on the human rights and political situation in  
13 Xinjiang despite efforts to silence or intimidate their re-  
14 porting through the detention of family members and rel-  
15 atives by the Government of the People’s Republic of  
16 China.

17 **SEC. 9. REPORT AND SEMI-ANNUAL BRIEFING.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
19 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,  
20 after consulting relevant Federal agencies and civil society  
21 organizations, shall submit to the appropriate congres-  
22 sional committees and make available on the website of  
23 the Department of State an interagency report that in-  
24 cludes—

1           (1) an assessment of the number of individuals  
2           detained in political “reeducation camps” and condi-  
3           tions in the camps for detainees in the Xinjiang re-  
4           gion, including whether detainees endure torture,  
5           forced renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment;

6           (2) a description, as possible, of the geographic  
7           location of the camps and estimates of the number  
8           of people detained in such facilities;

9           (3) a description, as possible, of the methods  
10          used by People’s Republic of China authorities to  
11          “reeducate” Uyghur detainees, as well as the Peo-  
12          ple’s Republic of China agencies in charge of reedu-  
13          cation;

14          (4) an assessment of the number of individuals  
15          being arbitrarily detained, including in pretrial de-  
16          tention centers and prisons;

17          (5) an assessment of forced labor in the camps  
18          and in regional factories for low wages under threat  
19          of being sent back to “political reeducation” camps;

20          (6) a list of Chinese companies and industries  
21          benefitting from such labor, and a description of ac-  
22          tions taken to address forced labor in Xinjiang con-  
23          current with the People’s Republic of China’s Tier  
24          3 designation under the 2018 Trafficking in Persons  
25          Report;

1           (7) an assessment of the level of access People’s  
2     Republic of China authorities grant to diplomats,  
3     journalists, and others to the Xinjiang region and a  
4     description of measures used to impede efforts to  
5     monitor human rights conditions in the Xinjiang re-  
6     gion;

7           (8) an assessment of the repressive surveillance,  
8     detection, and control methods used by People’s Re-  
9     public of China authorities in the Xinjiang region,  
10    and a list of individuals who hold senior leadership  
11    positions and are responsible for “high-tech” polic-  
12    ing, mass incarceration, and reeducation efforts tar-  
13    geting Uyghur and other predominately Muslim eth-  
14    nic minorities in the Xinjiang region;

15          (9) a description of United States diplomatic ef-  
16    forts to address the gross violations of universally  
17    recognized human rights in the Xinjiang region and  
18    to protect asylum seekers from the region, including  
19    in multilateral institutions and through bilateral re-  
20    lations with the People’s Republic of China, the na-  
21    tions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation  
22    (OIC), and other countries; and

23          (10) a description, as appropriate, of diplomatic  
24    efforts by United States allies and other nations to  
25    address the gross violations of universally recognized

1 human rights in the Xinjiang region and to protect  
2 asylum seekers from the region.

3 (b) BRIEFING AND SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after  
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180  
6 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or the Sec-  
7 retary's designee, shall provide a briefing to the ap-  
8 propriate congressional committees covering the sub-  
9 jects listed in subsection (a). At the time of each  
10 briefing, the Department of State shall provide un-  
11 classified written materials detailing the subject  
12 matters covered in paragraphs (1), (2), (4), (6), and  
13 (9) of such subsection.

14 (2) TERMINATION.—The briefing requirement  
15 under paragraph (1) terminates 5 years after the  
16 date of the enactment of this Act.

17 **SEC. 10. REPORT ON SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN**  
18 **RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE XINJIANG RE-**  
19 **GION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
21 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State  
22 shall, except as provided in subsection (c), submit to Con-  
23 gress a report that includes a statement of whether the  
24 persons described in subsection (b) meet the criteria to  
25 be designated for the imposition of sanctions under section

1 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Account-  
2 ability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-  
3 238; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) because the persons—

4 (1) are responsible for extrajudicial killings, tor-  
5 ture, or other gross violations of internationally rec-  
6 ognized human rights in the Xinjiang region of the  
7 People’s Republic of China; or

8 (2) materially assisted, sponsored, or provided  
9 financial, material, or technological support for, or  
10 goods or services in support of, such violations.

11 (b) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—The persons described in  
12 this subsection are the following:

13 (1) The Party Secretary for Xinjiang region of  
14 the People’s Republic of China, Chen Quanguo.

15 (2) Senior full or alternate members of the Cen-  
16 tral Committee of the Communist Party of China  
17 whose professional responsibilities relate to the gov-  
18 ernmental administration of the Xinjiang region, or  
19 who have conducted business with government enti-  
20 ties in the Xinjiang region.

21 (c) EXCEPTION.—The Secretary shall not be required  
22 to submit a report under subsection (a) if the Secretary  
23 determines, not later than 90 days after the date of the  
24 enactment of this Act, that the Government of the Peo-  
25 ple’s Republic of China allows independent, unrestricted,

- 1 and unsupervised access to the Xinjiang region for inter-
- 2 national human rights organizations.

Passed the Senate September 11, 2019.

Attest: JULIE E. ADAMS,  
*Secretary.*