

116TH CONGRESS
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To review United States Saudi Arabia policy, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 9, 2019

Mr. RISCH (for himself, Mrs. SHAHEEN, Mr. RUBIO, and Mr. COONS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To review United States Saudi Arabia policy, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Saudi Arabia Diplomatic Review Act of 2019” or
6 “SADRA”.

7 (b) **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**—The table of contents for
8 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I—COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF UNITED STATES SAUDI
RELATIONS

- Sec. 101. Sense of Congress on actions of the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- Sec. 102. Comprehensive review of the United States-Saudi bilateral relationship.

TITLE II—SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN SAUDI ARABIA

- Sec. 201. Findings.
- Sec. 202. Denial of visas to certain officials of the Government of Saudi Arabia.

TITLE III—COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SAUDI GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

- Sec. 301. Preventing diplomats from aiding and abetting flights from justice.
- Sec. 302. Review of Saudi facility activities.

TITLE IV—PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE WAR IN YEMEN AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

- Sec. 401. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 402. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 403. Strategy for ending the war in Yemen.
- Sec. 404. Measures in response to Iranian actions aggravating the civil war in Yemen.
- Sec. 405. Report on accountability for violations of international law, including war crimes, and other harm to civilians in Yemen.
- Sec. 406. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons hindering humanitarian access and threatening the peace or stability of Yemen.
- Sec. 407. Report on interdiction of illegally supplied weapons to Yemen.
- Sec. 408. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons supporting the Houthis in Yemen.
- Sec. 409. Authority to enter into a cooperative agreement to protect civilians in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from weaponized unmanned aerial systems.
- Sec. 410. Emergency protection for Yemeni cultural property.
- Sec. 411. Technical assistance to improve governance at the Central Bank of Yemen.
- Sec. 412. Modification of certifications regarding actions by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in Yemen.

TITLE V—GENERAL PROVISIONS

- Sec. 501. Rule of construction with respect to International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
- Sec. 502. Rule of construction with respect to use of military force.
- Sec. 503. Sunset.

1 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

- 3 (1) **ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.**—The terms
- 4 “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the

1 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
2 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

3 (2) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly”, with
4 respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,
5 means that a person has actual knowledge, or should
6 have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the
7 result.

8 **TITLE I—COMPREHENSIVE RE-**
9 **VIEW OF UNITED STATES**
10 **SAUDI RELATIONS**

11 **SEC. 101. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ACTIONS OF THE GOV-**
12 **ERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARA-**
13 **BIA.**

14 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
15 ings:

16 (1) Historically, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
17 has been an important strategic partner of the
18 United States, and the United States and Saudi
19 Arabia share broad interests, including defeating the
20 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), combating al
21 Qaeda and its affiliates, regional stability, and coun-
22 tering Iran’s malign activities in the Middle East.

23 (2) On June 21, 2017, King Salman appointed
24 Prince Mohammed bin Salman as Crown Prince and
25 heir apparent to the Saudi throne.

1 (3) Following his elevation in the line of succes-
2 sion to the Saudi throne, Crown Prince Mohammed
3 bin Salman’s actions have had the potential to sig-
4 nificantly harm the United States historic relation-
5 ship with Saudi Arabia. The Crown Prince has fre-
6 quently behaved in a reckless manner, including ar-
7 resting those opposed to his rule. He has engaged in
8 problematic foreign policy, including pressuring the
9 Lebanese Prime Minister to resign, and he has con-
10 solidated his personal control over Saudi government
11 decision making.

12 (4) One of Mohammed bin Salman’s first acts
13 as Saudi Arabia’s minister of defense was to launch
14 a military campaign in Yemen with the stated objec-
15 tive of restoring the internationally recognized Gov-
16 ernment of Yemen, which had been forced out of
17 Yemen by Iran-backed Houthi forces and former
18 military units loyal to deposed President Ali Saleh.

19 (5) As of July 2019, Iranian-sponsored Houthi
20 rebels have conducted up to 14 ballistic missile and
21 weaponized unmanned aerial system attacks per
22 month against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
23 Emirates, posing a significant threat and endan-
24 gering the lives of 80,000 Americans residing on the
25 Arabian Peninsula.

1 (6) Yemen serves as sanctuary space for al
2 Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP ex-
3 ternal operations plotting poses a direct threat to
4 the United States and United States allies. AQAP
5 was responsible for the Paris attacks against the of-
6 fices of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, and was in-
7 volved in terrorist plots against the United States,
8 including the “Christmas Day Bomber” in 2009 and
9 the “Times Square Bomber” in 2010. The ongoing
10 civil war and resulting instability has complicated ef-
11 forts to counter AQAP in Yemen.

12 (7) Yemen sits adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb
13 strait, a strategic waterway located between Djibouti
14 and Yemen that links the Red Sea to the Indian
15 Ocean. Free flow of traffic through the strait, only
16 18 miles across at its narrowest point, is critical to
17 exports from the Persian Gulf and Asia destined for
18 Western markets.

19 (8) Iranian-sponsored Houthi coastal weapons,
20 explosive boats, and mines pose a direct threat to
21 the free flow of commerce and shipping through the
22 Bab el-Mandeb strait.

23 (9) In October 2016, Houthi forces struck a
24 United Arab Emirates merchant vessel, and twice
25 attacked a United States Navy vessel, the USS

1 Mason, as they transited the Bab el-Mandeb strait.
2 In July 2018, Iranian-sponsored Houthi forces at-
3 tacked and damaged two Saudi oil tankers attempt-
4 ing to transit the strait.

5 (10) According to the United Nations, the civil
6 war in Yemen is the world's worst humanitarian cri-
7 sis and has resulted in approximately 24,000,000
8 Yemenis in need of humanitarian assistance, roughly
9 80 percent of the population.

10 (11) The Houthi seizure of the Sana'a Central
11 Bank has resulted in the inability to pay government
12 salaries in Yemen and the breakdown of banking
13 functions, which has complicated the humanitarian
14 crisis and further hampered access to aid supplies.

15 (12) Despite framework agreements in Stock-
16 holm and Hudaydah, the conflict in Yemen con-
17 tinues unabated.

18 (13) On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, along
19 with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt,
20 and other countries, severed diplomatic relations
21 with Qatar, recalled their ambassadors, expelled
22 Qatari diplomats, and imposed limits on the entry
23 and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their
24 territories, waters, and airspace.

1 (14) The blockade against Qatar has signifi-
2 cantly complicated relationships in the region and
3 hindered United States counterterrorism and
4 counter-Iran objectives, undermined United States
5 efforts to end regional conflicts, and empowered Ira-
6 nian influence in the region.

7 (15) According to the organization Reporters
8 without Borders, the number of arrests of journal-
9 ists and bloggers has doubled since the appointment
10 of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman.

11 (16) Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin
12 Salman, the Government of Saudi Arabia continues
13 to detain political prisoners, including Saudi wom-
14 en's rights advocates.

15 (17) Jamal Khashoggi was a prominent Saudi
16 journalist and an outspoken critic of Crown Prince
17 Mohammed bin Salman. Throughout 2017 and
18 2018, Jamal Khashoggi wrote a series of opinion ar-
19 ticles offering pointed critiques and advice to Crown
20 Prince Mohammed bin Salman and to United States
21 and Saudi officials.

22 (18) Prior to his death, Jamal Khashoggi had
23 sought status as a lawful permanent resident of the
24 United States and was the father to four United
25 States citizens. On October 2, 2018, Jamal

1 Khashoggi disappeared during a visit to the Con-
2 sulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Istanbul,
3 Turkey.

4 (19) On October 8, 2018, the brother of Crown
5 Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Saudi Amba-
6 sador to the United States, Prince Khalid bin
7 Salman, stated that “the reports that suggest that
8 Jamal Khashoggi went missing in the Consulate in
9 Istanbul or that the Kingdom’s authorities have de-
10 tained him or killed him are absolutely false, and
11 baseless”.

12 (20) On October 19, 2018, the Saudi Ministry
13 of Foreign Affairs announced that Mr. Khashoggi
14 was murdered inside the Saudi consulate by Saudi
15 nationals on October 2, 2018.

16 (21) On December 13, 2018, the Senate passed
17 Senate Joint Resolution 69, a joint resolution sup-
18 porting a diplomatic solution in Yemen and con-
19 demning the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, stating
20 that the Senate “believes Crown Prince Mohammad
21 bin Salman is responsible for the murder of Jamal
22 Khashoggi” and calling on the Kingdom of Saudi
23 Arabia to ensure appropriate accountability for all
24 those responsible for Jamal Khashoggi’s murder.

1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE ACTIONS
2 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA.—It is the sense
3 of Congress that, since the promotion of Mohammad bin
4 Salman to the position of Crown Prince with significant
5 authority over foreign and domestic affairs of the King-
6 dom of Saudi Arabia, the Government of Saudi Arabia has
7 demonstrated increasingly erratic and disturbing conduct
8 that—

9 (1) threatens to undermine and alienate allies,
10 friends, and partners of the United States in efforts
11 to promote regional stability, economic growth, and
12 human rights;

13 (2) threatens to place United States national
14 interests in the Middle East in serious danger; and

15 (3) necessitates a comprehensive review of the
16 United States-Saudi bilateral relationship.

17 **SEC. 102. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE UNITED**
18 **STATES-SAUDI BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.**

19 (a) REVIEW.—The Secretary of State, in consultation
20 with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National
21 Intelligence, and the Secretary of the Treasury and any
22 other department or agency the President may designate,
23 shall conduct a comprehensive review of United States re-
24 lations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

25 (b) REPORT.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days
2 after the date of enactment of this Act, the Sec-
3 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
4 gressional committees a report with the findings of
5 the review conducted under subsection (a).

6 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under
7 paragraph (1) shall include:

8 (A) A review of the foreign policy goals of
9 the Government of Saudi Arabia, with an eval-
10 uation as to whether those goals align with, or
11 could potentially cause damage to, United
12 States regional interests.

13 (B) An evaluation of the current risks to
14 United States policy, interests, and influence in
15 the Middle East created by the actions of the
16 Government of Saudi Arabia in furtherance of
17 its foreign policy goals, with particular atten-
18 tion to violations of treaty obligations, detention
19 of foreign government officials, and economic
20 embargoes of countries in the region.

21 (C) An analysis of the current diplomatic
22 relationships between Saudi Arabia and other
23 regional and global actors—in particular, Saudi
24 relationships with the Russian Federation and
25 the People’s Republic of China.

1 (D) An evaluation of the human rights
2 record of the current Government of Saudi Ara-
3 bia and its compliance with internationally rec-
4 ognized individual, civil, and political rights, as
5 set forth in the Universal Declaration of
6 Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations
7 General Assembly in Paris on December 10,
8 1948, and other international agreements, in
9 particular with respect to the following factors:

10 (i) The extent to which officials of the
11 Government of Saudi Arabia, including
12 members of the military or security serv-
13 ices, are responsible for or complicit in
14 gross violations of internationally recog-
15 nized human rights, including violations of
16 the human rights of journalists, bloggers,
17 and those who support women’s rights or
18 religious freedom.

19 (ii) The extent to which the Govern-
20 ment of Saudi Arabia—

21 (I) has knowingly blocked access
22 to Yemeni ports, ports of entry, or
23 other facilities used by the United Na-
24 tions, its specialized agencies and im-
25 plementing partners, nongovernmental

1 organizations, or any other actors en-
2 gaged in humanitarian relief activities
3 in Yemen;

4 (II) has hindered the efforts of
5 the organizations described in sub-
6 clause (I) to deliver humanitarian re-
7 lief, including through diversion of
8 goods and materials intended to pro-
9 vide relief to civilians in Yemen; and

10 (III) has prohibited or directly or
11 indirectly restricted the transport or
12 delivery of United States humani-
13 tarian assistance to Yemen.

14 (iii) The extent to which Saudi Arabia
15 has improved targeting and strike proce-
16 dures to reduce harm to civilians and un-
17 necessary collateral damage in Yemen.

18 (E) A review of United States export con-
19 trols to ensure certain exports of law enforce-
20 ment technology are not being used to suppress
21 legitimate calls for improvements in governance
22 or human rights.

23 (F) A review of the diplomatic presence of
24 Saudi Arabia within the United States.

1 (G) An evaluation of United States secu-
2 rity cooperation with Saudi Arabia, including
3 an evaluation of how—

4 (i) the Government of Saudi Arabia
5 has used the defense articles and defense
6 services it has received from the United
7 States;

8 (ii) its junior officers and noncommis-
9 sioned officers have performed in military
10 campaigns since 2001; and

11 (iii) the military of Saudi Arabia is
12 equipped and trained for asymmetric war-
13 fare.

14 (H) An evaluation of whether and to what
15 extent United States entities with licenses
16 issued by the Department of State have trained
17 and supported Saudi security forces.

18 (I) An evaluation of the ability of the Gov-
19 ernment of Saudi Arabia to influence global oil
20 prices.

21 (J) A review of the financial and material
22 support of the Government of Saudi Arabia for
23 the construction or renovation of educational in-
24 stitutions abroad that promote Salafism,
25 Wahhabism, or other strict interpretations of

1 Islam and to what extent those institutions
2 have contributed to a rise in extremist views
3 globally.

4 (K) Any other matters that the Secretary
5 of State considers relevant.

6 (3) FORM.—The report required under para-
7 graph (1) shall be in unclassified form but may con-
8 tain a classified annex.

9 (c) PERIOD OF REVIEW.—The review required under
10 subsection (a) shall cover the period beginning with the
11 appointment of Mohammad bin Salman to the position of
12 Deputy Crown Prince.

13 (d) ESTABLISHMENT OF MECHANISM FOR PUBLIC
14 COMMENT.—

15 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Department of
16 State shall establish a mechanism to provide a 30-
17 day period to receive written comments from inter-
18 ested parties, including a process for—

19 (A) initial public notification that the De-
20 partment is conducting a review;

21 (B) guidance on the scope of the review;

22 and

23 (C) the receipt of public comments.

24 (2) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The Department of
25 State shall endeavor to make comments received

1 from the public available in a timely and easily ac-
2 cessible manner.

3 (e) CONSIDERATION OF PUBLIC COMMENTS.—The
4 Department shall consider public comments received but
5 may use discretion with respect to the inclusion of public
6 comments in its evaluation, analysis, and conclusions in
7 the report required under subsection (b).

8 (f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
9 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
10 sional committees” means—

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
12 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
13 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

14 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
15 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent
16 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
17 Representatives.

18 **TITLE II—SUPPORTING HUMAN** 19 **RIGHTS IN SAUDI ARABIA**

20 **SEC. 201. FINDINGS.**

21 Congress makes the following findings:

22 (1) Since May 2018, the Government of Saudi
23 Arabia has arrested prominent women’s rights advo-
24 cates and imposed travel bans on numerous others—
25 many of them longtime supporters of ending the ban

1 on women driving and abolishing the male guardian-
2 ship system.

3 (2) Many of the jailed activists have not been
4 charged with or convicted of any crimes, and many
5 reportedly have been held in solitary confinement for
6 prolonged periods.

7 (3) At least 10 women’s rights activists have
8 been subjected to psychological and physical abuse,
9 including sexual violence, beatings, electric shocks,
10 and sleep deprivation, according to press reports.

11 (4) According to the 2018 Department of State
12 Human Rights Report, Saudi Arabia human rights
13 violations and issues included arbitrary arrest and
14 detention, the detention of political prisoners, tor-
15 ture of prisoners, criminalization of libel, censorship,
16 and restrictions on peaceful assembly.

17 **SEC. 202. DENIAL OF VISAS TO CERTAIN OFFICIALS OF THE**
18 **GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA.**

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall deny any visa
20 to, and revoke any visa of, any individual who is—

21 (1) a citizen of Saudi Arabia—

22 (A) descended from King Abd al Aziz bin
23 Abd al Rahman Al Saud (aka Abdulaziz ibn
24 Saud); and

1 (B) serving in a position in the Govern-
2 ment of Saudi Arabia that the President deter-
3 mines is equivalent to—

4 (i) a position in the Executive Sched-
5 ule specified in subchapter II of chapter 53
6 of title 5, United States Code; or

7 (ii) a Senior Executive Service posi-
8 tion (as defined in section 3132 of title 5,
9 United States Code) in the United States;
10 or

11 (2) a spouse or child of an individual described
12 in paragraph (1).

13 (b) EXCEPTION FOR COMPLIANCE WITH INTER-
14 NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Subsection (a) shall not apply
15 with respect to the admission of an individual to the
16 United States if such admission is necessary to comply
17 with United States obligations under the Agreement be-
18 tween the United Nations and the United States of Amer-
19 ica regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
20 signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into
21 force November 21, 1947, under the Convention on Con-
22 sular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and en-
23 tered into force March 19, 1967, or under other inter-
24 national obligations.

25 (c) WAIVERS.—

1 (1) PARTICIPANTS IN INTERNATIONAL MILI-
2 TARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM.—The
3 President may waive the application of subsection
4 (a) with respect to an individual who is a participant
5 in the International Military Education and Train-
6 ing program.

7 (2) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—The Presi-
8 dent may waive the application of subsection (a)
9 with respect to an individual if the President deter-
10 mines that the waiver is important to the national
11 interests of the United States.

12 (3) REPORT ON WAIVERS.—

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days
14 after issuing a waiver under paragraph (1) or
15 (2), the President shall submit to the appro-
16 priate congressional committees a report on the
17 waiver and the reasons for issuing the waiver.

18 (B) FORM OF REPORT.—A report required
19 by subparagraph (A) may be submitted in clas-
20 sified form if necessary.

21 (d) TERMINATION.—This section shall terminate on
22 the date on which the President certifies to the appro-
23 priate congressional committees that the Government of
24 Saudi Arabia has made demonstrable progress in address-

1 ing arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, and tor-
 2 ture of prisoners.

3 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
 4 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
 5 sional committees” means—

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
 7 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
 8 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
 10 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent
 11 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
 12 Representatives.

13 **TITLE III—COMPREHENSIVE RE-**
 14 **VIEW OF SAUDI GOVERN-**
 15 **MENT ACTIVITIES WITHIN**
 16 **THE UNITED STATES**

17 **SEC. 301. PREVENTING DIPLOMATS FROM AIDING AND**
 18 **ABETTING FLIGHTS FROM JUSTICE.**

19 (a) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
 21 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
 22 of State, in coordination with the Attorney General
 23 and the Director of National Intelligence, shall sub-
 24 mit a report to the President and the appropriate
 25 congressional committees that describes the degree

1 to which any citizen of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
2 who enjoys diplomatic immunity from criminal juris-
3 diction in the United States has assisted in the un-
4 lawful removal of any Saudi citizen in the United
5 States for the purposes of evading criminal prosecu-
6 tion or otherwise evading a criminal sentence in the
7 United States.

8 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under
9 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

10 (A) A review of the extent to which offi-
11 cials from the Government of Saudi Arabia as-
12 sist in the posting of bond for Saudi nationals
13 facing criminal prosecution within the United
14 States.

15 (B) A review as to whether officials from
16 the Government of Saudi Arabia have aided,
17 abetted, or assisted in any way Saudi nationals
18 in avoiding criminal prosecution in the United
19 States, including an assessment as to the scope
20 and frequency of any such conduct.

21 (C) A review as to whether officials from
22 the Government of Saudi Arabia have harbored
23 or concealed Saudi nationals after escape from
24 the lawful custody of a Federal, State, or local
25 law enforcement authority or penal or correc-

1 tional institution, including an assessment as to
2 the scope and frequency of any such conduct.

3 (D) A review of how the Government of
4 Saudi Arabia's conduct compares to that of
5 other foreign governments.

6 (E) A review of the effectiveness of terms
7 of bail requiring the surrender of a foreign na-
8 tional's passport as a condition of release at
9 preventing foreign nationals from fleeing Fed-
10 eral, State, and local criminal justice systems
11 within the United States, including an assess-
12 ment of any shortcomings in current policies.

13 (F) Any other matter the Secretary of
14 State determines relevant.

15 (3) FORM.—The report required under para-
16 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
17 but may include a classified annex.

18 (4) INCLUSION OF INFORMATION IN REPORT ON
19 CASES INVOLVING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY.—Any
20 conclusions reached during the preparation of the re-
21 port required under paragraph (1) shall be included
22 in the first Report on Cases Involving Diplomatic
23 Immunity submitted to Congress pursuant to sec-
24 tions 56 and 204B of the State Department Basic

1 Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2728 and
2 4304b) after the date of the enactment of this Act.

3 (5) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
4 TEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appro-
5 priate congressional committees” means—

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
7 the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Select
8 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

9 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
10 Committee on the Judiciary, and the Perma-
11 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
12 House of Representatives.

13 (b) PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION.—If the report
14 required under subsection (a) concludes that officials from
15 the Government of Saudi Arabia have aided, abetted, or
16 assisted in the unlawful removal of Saudi nationals from
17 the United States or harbored Saudi nationals within the
18 United States for the purpose of avoiding criminal pros-
19 ecution or evading law enforcement authorities, the Presi-
20 dent is authorized to enforce any of the measures de-
21 scribed in subsection (c).

22 (c) PENALTIES.—

23 (1) DENIAL OF USE OF CERTAIN DIPLOMATIC
24 FACILITIES.—Notwithstanding any other provision
25 of law, the President may deny access to and use by

1 the Government of Saudi Arabia of Saudi-owned
2 diplomatic facilities and properties located at 2045
3 Sawtelle Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, or 8500
4 Hilltop Road, Fairfax, Virginia.

5 (2) SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS TO AND FROM
6 THE UNITED STATES BY SAUDI ARABIAN AIR CAR-
7 RIERS.—

8 (A) SUSPENSION OF OPERATING PER-
9 MIT.—

10 (i) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding
11 any agreement between the United States
12 and Saudi Arabia relating to air services,
13 the President may suspend the permit of a
14 foreign air carrier owned or controlled, di-
15 rectly or indirectly, by the Government of
16 Saudi Arabia to operate in foreign air
17 transportation under chapter 413 of title
18 49, United States Code.

19 (ii) PROCEDURES.—If the President
20 determines under clause (i) to suspend the
21 permit of an air carrier described in that
22 clause—

23 (I) the President shall notify the
24 Government of Saudi Arabia of the

1 intention of the President to suspend
2 the permit; and

3 (II) not later than 10 days after
4 the President notifies that Govern-
5 ment of that intention, the Secretary
6 of Transportation shall take such
7 measures as may be necessary to sus-
8 pend the permit at the earliest pos-
9 sible date.

10 (B) SUSPENSION OF AIR SERVICE AGREE-
11 MENT.—

12 (i) IN GENERAL.—The President may
13 direct the Secretary of State to terminate
14 any agreement between the United States
15 and Saudi Arabia relating to air services in
16 accordance with the provisions of that
17 agreement.

18 (ii) SUSPENSION OF OPERATING PER-
19 MIT.—Upon termination of an agreement
20 under clause (i), the Secretary of Trans-
21 portation may take such measures as may
22 be necessary to revoke, at the earliest pos-
23 sible date, the permit of any foreign air
24 carrier owned or controlled, directly or in-
25 directly, by the Government of Saudi Ara-

1 bia to operate in foreign air transportation
2 under chapter 413 of title 49, United
3 States Code.

4 (C) EXCEPTIONS.—The Secretary of
5 Transportation may provide for such exceptions
6 to subparagraphs (A) and (B) as the Secretary
7 considers necessary to address emergencies in
8 which the safety of an aircraft or the crew or
9 passengers on an aircraft is threatened.

10 (D) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph, the
11 terms “foreign air carrier” and “foreign air
12 transportation” have the meanings given those
13 terms in section 40102(a) of title 49, United
14 States Code.

15 (d) ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCES FOR ENGAGING IN
16 PROHIBITED CONDUCT.—A foreign official enjoying diplo-
17 matic immunity in the United States who aids, abets, or
18 assists in the unlawful removal of any foreign national
19 from the United States or harbors any foreign national
20 within the United States for the purpose of avoiding crimi-
21 nal prosecution or evading a law enforcement authority
22 may be subject to one or more of the following measures:

23 (1) Submission of a request for a waiver of im-
24 munity from the United States to the sending coun-

1 try for the purposes of pursuing criminal prosecu-
2 tion within the United States.

3 (2) A declaration that the official is persona
4 non grata and is expelled from the United States,
5 without replacement of that position.

6 (3) Revocation of any existing visa or other rel-
7 evant entry documentation, which may include de-
8 nial of future visa requests.

9 (4) Sanctions described under subsection (e).

10 (e) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may exercise
12 all of the powers granted to the President under the
13 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
14 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block
15 and prohibit all transactions in property and inter-
16 ests in property of a foreign official described in
17 subsection (d) if such property and interests in prop-
18 erty are in the United States, come within the
19 United States, or are or come within the possession
20 or control of a United States person.

21 (2) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMER-
22 GENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements under
23 section 202 of the International Emergency Eco-
24 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply
25 for purposes of paragraph (1).

1 (3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF
2 GOODS.—

3 (A) IN GENERAL.—The authority to block
4 and prohibit all transactions in all property and
5 interests in property under paragraph (1) shall
6 not include the authority to impose sanctions on
7 the importation of goods.

8 (B) GOOD.—In this paragraph, the term
9 “good” means any article, natural or manmade
10 substance, material, supply or manufactured
11 product, including inspection and test equip-
12 ment, and excluding technical data.

13 (4) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

14 (A) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President
15 may exercise all authorities provided to the
16 President under sections 203 and 205 of the
17 International Emergency Economic Powers Act
18 (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) for purposes of car-
19 rying out the provisions of this subsection.

20 (B) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided
21 for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of
22 the International Emergency Economic Powers
23 Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person
24 that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to
25 violate, or causes a violation of paragraph (1),

1 or any regulation, license, or order issued to
2 carry out that paragraph, to the same extent
3 that such penalties apply to a person that com-
4 mits an unlawful act described in section
5 206(a) of that Act.

6 **SEC. 302. REVIEW OF SAUDI FACILITY ACTIVITIES.**

7 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days
8 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
9 of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, shall
10 submit a report to the appropriate congressional commit-
11 tees that provides a comprehensive review of the activities
12 of the Saudi facility located at 8500 Hilltop Road, Fair-
13 fax, Virginia. The report shall include an assessment of
14 the extent to which the Saudi facility engages in surveil-
15 lance activities of Saudi students and other Saudi nation-
16 als in the United States.

17 (b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)
18 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
19 a classified annex.

20 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
21 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
22 sional committees” means—

23 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
24 Committee on the Judiciary, and the Select Com-
25 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
2 Committee on the Judiciary, and the Permanent Se-
3 lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
4 resentatives.

5 **TITLE IV—PEACEFUL RESOLU-**
6 **TION OF THE WAR IN YEMEN**
7 **AND PROTECTION OF CIVIL-**
8 **IANS**

9 **SEC. 401. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

10 It is the policy of the United States—

11 (1) that responsibly ending the civil war in
12 Yemen will further United States national security
13 interests, including by increasing regional stability,
14 ensuring the free flow of commerce through the re-
15 gion, and preventing al Qaeda in the Arabian Penin-
16 sula (AQAP) and the Islamic State from capitalizing
17 on Yemen’s instability to threaten the United States
18 homeland;

19 (2) to support United Nations-led efforts to
20 achieve a cease-fire and a comprehensive political
21 settlement that leads to a territorially unified, sta-
22 ble, and independent Yemen;

23 (3) to insist on the urgent need for a political
24 solution consistent with United Nations Security
25 Council Resolution 2216 (2015), or any successor

1 United Nations Security Council Resolution demand-
2 ing an end to violence in Yemen and a peaceful reso-
3 lution of the conflict in that country;

4 (4) to generally oppose statements, policies, or
5 actions advocating for a military solution to the civil
6 war in Yemen as counterproductive to peace efforts;

7 (5) to encourage the Government of Saudi Ara-
8 bia, the Government of the United Arab Emirates,
9 and the internationally recognized Government of
10 Yemen to develop and promote confidence-building
11 measures that create opportunities for political dia-
12 logue to end the war in Yemen and address the hu-
13 manitarian crisis;

14 (6) in the interests of achieving a lasting peace
15 in Yemen, to encourage security partners of the
16 United States enjoying full diplomatic relations with
17 the Government of Iran to use their good offices to
18 influence or pressure the Government of Iran, as
19 necessary, to end its support of the Houthi rebels;
20 and

21 (7) to support the implementation of the agree-
22 ment reached between the parties to the conflict at
23 Stockholm, Sweden, on December 13, 2018 (referred
24 to in this title as the “Stockholm Agreement”), and
25 the Hudaydah Agreement of December 18, 2018 (re-

1 ferred to in this title as the “Hudaydah Agree-
2 ment”), and any successor agreements the parties
3 may enter into, consistent with—

4 (A) United Nations Security Council Reso-
5 lution 2451 (2018);

6 (B) United Nations Security Council Reso-
7 lution 2452, establishing the United Nations
8 Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement
9 (UNMHA) (2019); and

10 (C) any relevant successor resolutions the
11 United Nations Security Council may adopt.

12 **SEC. 402. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

13 It is the sense of Congress that—

14 (1) continued direct negotiations between the
15 Government of Saudi Arabia, the Government of the
16 United Arab Emirates, the internationally recog-
17 nized Government of Yemen, and representatives of
18 the Houthi movement are necessary—

19 (A) to reach a stable political solution;

20 (B) to implement the agreements reached
21 between the Saudi-led coalition, the internation-
22 ally recognized Government of Yemen, local
23 Yemeni forces, and the Houthis, including the
24 Stockholm Agreement, the Hudaydah Agree-

1 ment, and any successor agreements the parties
2 may enter into;

3 (C) to address the suffering of the Yemeni
4 people; and

5 (D) to counter efforts by Iran, al Qaeda in
6 the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), other al Qaeda
7 adherents and affiliates, and the Islamic State
8 to exploit instability for their own malign pur-
9 poses;

10 (2) finding a peaceful solution to conflict in
11 Yemen is complicated by the actions and demands of
12 other separatist groups;

13 (3) the Government of Saudi Arabia, the Gov-
14 ernment of the United Arab Emirates, and the Gov-
15 ernment of Iran should bear financial responsibility
16 for the economic stabilization and eventual recon-
17 struction of Yemen; and

18 (4) the United States and the international
19 community must continue to support the work of
20 United Nations missions to achieve a political solu-
21 tion to the civil war in Yemen.

22 **SEC. 403. STRATEGY FOR ENDING THE WAR IN YEMEN.**

23 (a) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the
24 date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
25 thereafter until a complete cessation of hostilities in the

1 Yemen civil war, the Secretary of State, the Administrator
2 of the United States Agency for International Develop-
3 ment, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Na-
4 tional Intelligence shall provide a briefing to the appro-
5 priate congressional committees on progress toward end-
6 ing the war in Yemen.

7 (b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under sub-
8 section (a) shall include—

9 (1) a summary of the United States national
10 security interests threatened by continued civil war
11 and instability in Yemen;

12 (2) a description of the steps and reciprocal
13 confidence-building measures necessary to end the
14 civil war in Yemen and achieve a territorially uni-
15 fied, stable, and independent Yemen;

16 (3) a description of efforts to implement the
17 Stockholm Agreement, the Hudaydah Agreement,
18 and successor agreements;

19 (4) a description of whether the Saudi-led coal-
20 ition, including the United Arab Emirates, the inter-
21 nationally recognized Government of Yemen, the
22 Houthis, and local Yemeni forces, including forces
23 aligned with Al-Islah and the Southern Transition
24 Council, are taking the necessary steps referred to in
25 paragraphs (2) and (3);

1 (5) a description of United States activities to
2 encourage all parties to take the necessary steps re-
3 ferred to in paragraphs (2) and (3);

4 (6) an assessment of the threat posed by al
5 Qaeda and ISIS in Yemen to United States national
6 security, including—

7 (A) a comprehensive list of all sources of
8 support received by these groups; and

9 (B) an assessment regarding whether the
10 activities of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
11 and ISIS in Yemen have expanded or dimin-
12 ished since the beginning of the war in Yemen;

13 (7) an assessment of the Government of Iran’s
14 activities in Yemen, including—

15 (A) a comprehensive list of Iranian malign
16 activities in and around Yemen, including
17 through the use of proxies;

18 (B) a comprehensive summary of all recipi-
19 ents of malign Iranian support in Yemen; and

20 (C) an assessment regarding whether the
21 scope of the Government of Iran’s influence and
22 activities in Yemen have increased or decreased
23 since the beginning of the war in Yemen;

24 (8) a description of the Government of the Rus-
25 sian Federation’s activities in Yemen and an assess-

1 ment of the Government of the Russian Federation’s
2 objectives for such activities; and

3 (9) any other matters relevant to ending the
4 civil war in Yemen, including efforts to alleviate ten-
5 sions in the South.

6 (c) FORM.—The briefing required in this section may
7 be provided in classified form, as necessary.

8 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
9 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
10 gressional committees” means—

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
12 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

13 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
14 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
15 resentatives.

16 **SEC. 404. MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO IRANIAN ACTIONS**
17 **AGGRAVATING THE CIVIL WAR IN YEMEN.**

18 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
19 ings:

20 (1) On November 10, 2014, the administration
21 of President Barack Obama designated the leader-
22 ship of the Iranian-supported Houthi insurgent
23 group, and the ally of that group, the former Presi-
24 dent of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, for the imposi-
25 tion of sanctions under Executive Order 13611 (50

1 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of
2 persons threatening the peace, security, or stability
3 of Yemen).

4 (2) Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps has
5 transferred increasingly sophisticated weapons sys-
6 tems to the Houthis, who have in turn fired missiles
7 into Saudi Arabia from positions in northern Yemen,
8 including a missile in November 2017 that targeted
9 Riyadh International Airport. In response, then-Am-
10 bassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley called
11 on “the United Nations and international partners
12 to take necessary action to hold the Iranian regime
13 accountable for these violations”.

14 (3) In addition to weapons, Iran is reportedly
15 providing proxies, including Hezbollah, to train
16 Houthi units and act as logistical advisers.

17 (4) The Iranian-supported Houthis have at-
18 tacked coalition or coalition-affiliated maritime tar-
19 gets multiple times, a United States Navy ship
20 twice, and other shipping, forcing the United States
21 to respond with a combination of diplomacy and cali-
22 brated military strikes against three radar facilities
23 in Houthi-controlled territory.

24 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
25 United States—

1 (1) to condemn the activities conducted by the
2 Government of Iran that—

3 (A) aggravate the civil war in Yemen; or

4 (B) undermine United Nations peace ef-
5 forts in Yemen; and

6 (2) to call on all responsible governments to
7 take measures to reduce conflict in Yemen, including
8 by—

9 (A) interdicting weapons being transferred
10 from Iran to the Houthis; and

11 (B) imposing bilateral and multilateral
12 sanctions with respect to Iran for its violations
13 of United Nations Security Council Resolutions
14 with respect to Yemen.

15 (c) DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
16 IRANIAN PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR AGGRAVATING THE
17 CIVIL WAR IN YEMEN.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
20 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
21 the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate con-
22 gressional committees a report on the actions taken
23 by the Department of State and the Department of
24 the Treasury to carry out Executive Order 13611
25 that includes—

1 (A) a description of the activities carried
2 out by Iranian persons that are subject to sanc-
3 tions under that Executive order; and

4 (B) an identification of the persons with
5 respect to which sanctions have been imposed
6 under that Executive order for aggravating the
7 civil war in Yemen.

8 (2) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report submitted
9 under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassi-
10 fied form but may include a classified annex.

11 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
12 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
13 gressional committees” means—

14 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
15 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
16 fairs of the Senate; and

17 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
18 Committee on Financial Services of the House of
19 Representatives.

20 **SEC. 405. REPORT ON ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS**
21 **OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING WAR**
22 **CRIMES, AND OTHER HARM TO CIVILIANS IN**
23 **YEMEN.**

24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
25 gress that—

1 (1) all participants in hostilities in Yemen
2 should refrain from engaging in generally proscribed
3 practices involving arbitrary arrests, enforced dis-
4 appearances, torture, and other unlawful treatment;
5 and

6 (2) participants in hostilities in Yemen should
7 fully cooperate with the United Nations Panel of Ex-
8 perts on Yemen.

9 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
10 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
11 coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit
12 a report to the appropriate congressional committees that
13 describes the causes and consequences of civilian harm oc-
14 curring in the armed conflict in Yemen, including war
15 crimes and gross violations of human rights, as a result
16 of the actions of all parties involved in hostilities in
17 Yemen.

18 (c) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-
19 section (b) shall include the following elements:

20 (1) A description of possible civilian harm oc-
21 curring in the context of the armed conflict in
22 Yemen, including—

23 (A) mass casualty incidents; and

24 (B) damage to, and destruction of, civilian
25 infrastructure and services, including—

- 1 (i) hospitals and other medical facili-
2 ties;
3 (ii) electrical grids;
4 (iii) water systems;
5 (iv) ports and port infrastructure; and
6 (v) other critical infrastructure.

7 (2) A description of possible violations of the
8 law of armed conflict committed during the war in
9 Yemen by—

10 (A) all forces involved in the Saudi-led coa-
11 lition and all forces fighting on its behalf;

12 (B) members of the Houthi movement and
13 all forces fighting on its behalf;

14 (C) members of violent extremist organiza-
15 tions; and

16 (D) any other combatants in the conflict.

17 (3) As examples of possible violations referred
18 to in paragraph (2), a description of—

19 (A) alleged war crimes;

20 (B) specific instances of failure by the par-
21 ties to the conflict to exercise distinction, pro-
22 portionality, and precaution in the use of force
23 in accordance with the law of armed conflict;

1 (C) arbitrary denials of humanitarian ac-
2 cess and the resulting impact on the alleviation
3 of human suffering;

4 (D) detention-related abuses;

5 (E) the use of child soldiers; and

6 (F) other acts that may constitute viola-
7 tions of the law of armed conflict.

8 (4) Recommendations for establishing account-
9 ability mechanisms for the civilian harm, war crimes,
10 other violations of the law of armed conflict, and
11 gross violations of human rights perpetrated by par-
12 ties to the conflict in Yemen, including the potential
13 for prosecuting individuals responsible for perpe-
14 trating, organizing, directing, or ordering such viola-
15 tions.

16 (d) FORM.—The report required under subsection (b)
17 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
18 a classified annex.

19 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
20 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
21 sional committees” means—

22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
23 Senate; and

24 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
25 House of Representatives.

1 **SEC. 406. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
2 **PERSONS HINDERING HUMANITARIAN AC-**
3 **CESS AND THREATENING THE PEACE OR STA-**
4 **BILITY OF YEMEN.**

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that the President should continue to implement Ex-
7 ecutive Order 13611 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
8 blocking property of persons threatening the peace, secu-
9 rity, or stability of Yemen).

10 (b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Not later than 60
11 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Presi-
12 dent shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c)
13 with respect to any foreign person that the President de-
14 termines—

15 (1) knowingly blocks the transport or delivery
16 of significant humanitarian goods or services
17 through Yemeni ports, ports of entry, or other facili-
18 ties used by actors engaged in legitimate humani-
19 tarian relief activities in Yemen;

20 (2) otherwise intentionally and significantly
21 hinders humanitarian efforts of actors engaged in le-
22 gitimate humanitarian relief activities in Yemen, in-
23 cluding through the diversion of goods and services
24 intended to provide relief to civilians in Yemen;

1 (3) knowingly engages in significant acts with
2 the intent to undermine the United Nations-led po-
3 litical process to end the conflict in Yemen; or

4 (4) knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or
5 provides significant financial, material, or techno-
6 logical support for, or significant goods or services
7 to or in support of, acts described in paragraph (1),
8 (2), or (3) or any person the property and interests
9 in property of which are blocked in connection with
10 such acts.

11 (c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in
13 this subsection are the following:

14 (A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President
15 shall, pursuant to the International Emergency
16 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.),
17 block and prohibit all transactions in property
18 and interests in property of a person subject to
19 subsection (b) if such property and interests in
20 property are in the United States, come within
21 the United States, or are or come within the
22 possession or control of a United States person.

23 (B) ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, AD-
24 MISSION, OR PAROLE.—

1 (i) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED
2 STATES.—The Secretary of State shall
3 deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Home-
4 land Security shall exclude from the
5 United States, any alien subject to sub-
6 section (b).

7 (ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

8 (I) IN GENERAL.—The issuing
9 consular officer, the Secretary of
10 State, or the Secretary of Homeland
11 Security (or a designee of any such
12 officer or Secretary) shall revoke any
13 visa or other entry documentation
14 issued to an alien subject to sub-
15 section (b), regardless of when the
16 visa or other documentation was
17 issued.

18 (II) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—

19 A revocation under subclause (I) shall
20 take effect immediately and shall
21 automatically cancel any other valid
22 visa or entry documentation that is in
23 the alien's possession.

24 (2) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMER-
25 GENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements under

1 section 202 of the International Emergency Eco-
2 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply
3 for purposes of paragraph (1)(A).

4 (d) EXCEPTIONS.—

5 (1) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—Subsection
6 (c)(1) shall not apply to any act incidental or nec-
7 essary to the provision of humanitarian assistance.

8 (2) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF
9 GOODS.—

10 (A) IN GENERAL.—The requirement to
11 block and prohibit all transactions in all prop-
12 erty and interests in property under subsection
13 (c)(1)(A) shall not include the authority to im-
14 pose sanctions on the importation of goods.

15 (B) GOOD.—In this paragraph, the term
16 “good” means any article, natural or manmade
17 substance, material, supply or manufactured
18 product, including inspection and test equip-
19 ment, and excluding technical data.

20 (3) COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLI-
21 GATIONS.—Subsection (c)(1)(B) shall not apply with
22 respect to the admission of an alien to the United
23 States if such admission is necessary to comply with
24 United States obligations under the Agreement be-
25 tween the United Nations and the United States of

1 America regarding the Headquarters of the United
2 Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and
3 entered into force November 21, 1947, under the
4 Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna
5 April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19,
6 1967, or under other international obligations.

7 (e) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

8 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-
9 ercise all authorities provided under sections 203
10 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
11 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out
12 this section.

13 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-
14 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
15 violation of subsection (c)(1)(A) or any regulation,
16 license, or order issued to carry out that subsection
17 shall be subject to the penalties set forth in sub-
18 sections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-
19 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
20 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that
21 commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a)
22 of that section.

23 (f) WAIVER.—

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may—

1 (A) waive the application of this section for
2 a period of not more than 180 days if the
3 President certifies to the appropriate congress-
4 sional committees that such a waiver is in the
5 national security interests of the United States;
6 and

7 (B) may renew that waiver for additional
8 periods of not more than 180 days each.

9 (2) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after
10 issuing a waiver under paragraph (1), and every 180
11 days thereafter while the waiver remains in effect,
12 the President shall brief the appropriate congress-
13 sional committees on the reasons for the waiver.

14 (g) TERMINATION.—This section and sanctions im-
15 posed under this section shall terminate on the date on
16 which the President submits to the appropriate congress-
17 sional committees a certification that all parties are mak-
18 ing good faith efforts to implement the Stockholm Agree-
19 ment, the Hudaydah Agreement, and any successor agree-
20 ments, in an effort to end the conflict.

21 (h) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
22 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
23 gressional committees” means—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
2 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
3 fairs of the Senate; and

4 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
5 Committee on Financial Services of the House of
6 Representatives.

7 **SEC. 407. REPORT ON INTERDICTION OF ILLEGALLY SUP-**
8 **PLIED WEAPONS TO YEMEN.**

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
10 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
11 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-
12 port—

13 (1) assessing the manner and extent to which
14 the government of any other country may be sup-
15 plying weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen, in viola-
16 tion of the applicable United Nations Security Coun-
17 cil resolutions;

18 (2) describing the strategy and efforts of the
19 United States Government to interdict such illegally
20 supplied weapons to Yemen; and

21 (3) describing the strategy and efforts of coun-
22 tries on the Arabian Peninsula to take reasonable
23 measures to prohibit the flow of illicit cargo by both
24 land and sea routes into Yemen.

1 (b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
2 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
3 a classified annex.

4 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

5 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
6 TEES DEFINED.—The term “appropriate congress-
7 sional committees” means—

8 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
9 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
10 Senate; and

11 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
12 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
13 of the House of Representatives.

14 (2) ARABIAN PENINSULA.—The term “Arabian
15 peninsula” means Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
16 Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and
17 Yemen.

18 **SEC. 408. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
19 **PERSONS SUPPORTING THE HOUTHIS IN**
20 **YEMEN.**

21 (a) DETERMINATION.—Not later than 120 days after
22 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
23 determine if the Houthi movement has engaged meaning-
24 fully in United Nations-led efforts for a comprehensive po-

1 litical settlement that leads to a territorially unified, sta-
2 ble, and independent Yemen.

3 (b) SANCTIONS.—If the President is unable to deter-
4 mine under subsection (a) that the Houthi movement has
5 engaged meaningfully with the efforts described in that
6 subsection, the President shall impose the sanctions de-
7 scribed in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person
8 that the President determines—

9 (1) knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or
10 provides significant financial, material, or techno-
11 logical support for, or goods or services to or in sup-
12 port of, the Houthi movement in Yemen;

13 (2) knowingly engages in any significant activ-
14 ity that materially contributes to the supply, sale, or
15 direct or indirect transfer to or from the Houthi
16 movement in Yemen of any lethal aid, including fire-
17 arms or ammunition, battle tanks, armored vehicles,
18 artillery or mortar systems, aircraft, attack heli-
19 copters, weaponized maritime vessels, missiles or
20 missile systems, explosives or explosive mines of any
21 type (as such terms are defined for the purpose of
22 the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms),
23 ground-to-air missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, or
24 related materiel, including spare parts; or

1 (3) knowingly provides any significant technical
2 training, financial resources or services, advice, other
3 significant services or assistance related to the sup-
4 ply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use
5 of arms and related materiel described in paragraph
6 (2) to the Houthi movement in Yemen.

7 (c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in
9 this subsection are the following:

10 (A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President
11 shall, pursuant to the International Emergency
12 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.),
13 block and prohibit all transactions in property
14 and interests in property of a person subject to
15 subsection (b) if such property and interests in
16 property are in the United States, come within
17 the United States, or are or come within the
18 possession or control of a United States person.

19 (B) ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, AD-
20 MISSION, OR PAROLE.—

21 (i) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED
22 STATES.—The Secretary of State shall
23 deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Home-
24 land Security shall exclude from the

1 United States, any alien subject to sub-
2 section (b).

3 (ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

4 (I) IN GENERAL.—The issuing
5 consular officer, the Secretary of
6 State, or the Secretary of Homeland
7 Security (or a designee of any such
8 officer or Secretary) shall revoke any
9 visa or other entry documentation
10 issued to an alien subject to sub-
11 section (b), regardless of when the
12 visa or other documentation was
13 issued.

14 (II) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—

15 A revocation under subclause (I) shall
16 take effect immediately and shall
17 automatically cancel any other valid
18 visa or entry documentation that is in
19 the alien's possession.

20 (2) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMER-
21 GENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements under
22 section 202 of the International Emergency Eco-
23 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply
24 for purposes of paragraph (1)(A).

25 (d) EXCEPTIONS.—

1 (1) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—Subsection
2 (c)(1) shall not apply to any act incidental or nec-
3 essary to the provision of humanitarian assistance.

4 (2) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF
5 GOODS.—

6 (A) IN GENERAL.—The requirement to
7 block and prohibit all transactions in all prop-
8 erty and interests in property under subsection
9 (c)(1)(A) shall not include the authority to im-
10 pose sanctions on the importation of goods.

11 (B) GOOD.—In this paragraph, the term
12 “good” means any article, natural or man-made
13 substance, material, supply or manufactured
14 product, including inspection and test equip-
15 ment, and excluding technical data.

16 (3) COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLI-
17 GATIONS.—Subsection (c)(1)(B) shall not apply with
18 respect to the admission of an alien to the United
19 States if such admission is necessary to comply with
20 United States obligations under the Agreement be-
21 tween the United Nations and the United States of
22 America regarding the Headquarters of the United
23 Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and
24 entered into force November 21, 1947, under the
25 Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna

1 April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19,
2 1967, or under other international obligations.

3 (e) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

4 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-
5 ercise all authorities provided under sections 203
6 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
7 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out
8 this section.

9 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-
10 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
11 violation of subsection (c)(1)(A) or any regulation,
12 license, or order issued to carry out that subsection
13 shall be subject to the penalties set forth in sub-
14 sections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-
15 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
16 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that
17 commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a)
18 of that section.

19 (f) WAIVER.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may—

21 (A) waive the application of this section for
22 a period of not more than 180 days if the
23 President certifies to the appropriate congres-
24 sional committees that such a waiver is in the

1 national security interests of the United States;
2 and

3 (B) may renew that waiver for additional
4 periods of not more than 180 days each.

5 (2) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after
6 issuing a waiver under paragraph (1), and every 180
7 days thereafter while the waiver remains in effect,
8 the President shall brief the appropriate congres-
9 sional committees on the reasons for the waiver.

10 (g) TERMINATION.—This section and sanctions im-
11 posed under this section shall terminate on the date on
12 which the President submits to the appropriate congres-
13 sional committees a certification that the Houthi move-
14 ment is making good faith efforts to implement the Stock-
15 holm Agreement, the Hudaydah Agreement, and any suc-
16 cessor agreements, in an effort to end the conflict.

17 (h) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
18 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
19 gressional committees” means—

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
21 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
22 fairs of the Senate; and

23 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
24 Committee on Financial Services of the House of
25 Representatives.

1 **SEC. 409. AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO A COOPERATIVE**
2 **AGREEMENT TO PROTECT CIVILIANS IN**
3 **SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIR-**
4 **ATES FROM WEAPONIZED UNMANNED AER-**
5 **IAL SYSTEMS.**

6 (a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following find-
7 ings:

8 (1) In January 2019, Houthi fighters launched
9 an attack on a Saudi military parade, using an un-
10 manned aerial systems killing 7 people and marking
11 one of many Houthi attacks using unmanned aerial
12 systems.

13 (2) United States military officials have publicly
14 confirmed that the Government of Iran is providing
15 parts to the Houthis to build unmanned aerial sys-
16 tems.

17 (b) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Con-
18 gress that—

19 (1) the partner countries of the United States
20 in the Arabian Peninsula face urgent and emerging
21 threats from armed unmanned aerial systems and
22 other unmanned aerial vehicles launched from
23 Yemen by the Houthis;

24 (2) joint research and development to counter
25 unmanned aerial systems will serve the national se-

1 security interests of the United States and its partners
2 in the Arabian Peninsula; and

3 (3) the United States and partners in the Ara-
4 bian Peninsula should continue to work together to
5 protect United States citizens and personnel in the
6 Middle East and civilians in the Arabian Peninsula
7 in the face of the threat from unmanned aerial sys-
8 tems.

9 (c) AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENT.—

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized
11 to enter into a cooperative project agreement with
12 countries in the Arabian Peninsula under the au-
13 thority of section 27 of the Arms Export Control Act
14 (22 U.S.C. 2767) to carry out research on and de-
15 velopment, testing, evaluation, and joint production
16 (including follow-on support) of defense articles and
17 defense services to detect, track, and destroy armed
18 unmanned aerial systems that threaten the United
19 States and its partners in the Arabian Peninsula.

20 (2) APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS.—The cooper-
21 ative project agreement described in paragraph
22 (1)—

23 (A) shall provide that any activities carried
24 out pursuant to the agreement are subject to—

1 (i) the applicable requirements de-
2 scribed in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C)
3 of section 27(b)(2) of the Arms Export
4 Control Act; and

5 (ii) any other applicable requirements
6 of the Arms Export Control Act with re-
7 spect to the use, transfer, and security of
8 such defense articles and defense services
9 under that Act; and

10 (B) shall establish a framework to nego-
11 tiate the rights to intellectual property devel-
12 oped under the agreement.

13 (d) ARABIAN PENINSULA DEFINED.—In this section,
14 the term “Arabian Peninsula” means Bahrain, Kuwait,
15 Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
16 and Yemen.

17 **SEC. 410. EMERGENCY PROTECTION FOR YEMENI CUL-**
18 **TURAL PROPERTY.**

19 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
20 gress that an agreement with the legitimate Government
21 of Yemen, as recognized by the United States, is necessary
22 to achieve the following interests:

23 (1) Ensuring the protection and preservation of
24 the cultural heritage of the people of Yemen.

1 (2) Furthering the interests of all nations in
2 the historical preservation of unique items of Yemeni
3 cultural history.

4 (3) Ensuring appropriate actions will be taken
5 to protect Yemeni cultural sites from looting and to
6 prevent trafficking in stolen Yemeni archeological or
7 ethnological material as defined by section 302 of
8 the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
9 Act (19 U.S.C. 2601).

10 (4) Protecting the legitimate property rights of
11 persons lawfully owning or possessing Yemeni ar-
12 cheological or ethnological material.

13 (b) NEGOTIATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF
14 YEMEN TO ESTABLISH AND IMPLEMENT A CULTURAL
15 PATRIMONY AGREEMENT.—Not later than 30 days after
16 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
17 consult with the legitimate Government of Yemen, as rec-
18 ognized by the United States, for the purpose of entering
19 into an agreement with Yemen as a State Party to the
20 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing
21 the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
22 Cultural Property of 1970 in accordance with section 303
23 of the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
24 Act (19 U.S.C. 2206).

1 (c) ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS OF OWNERSHIP OF
2 CULTURAL PROPERTY SEIZED OR OTHERWISE DETAINED
3 BY UNITED STATES OFFICIALS UNDER THE AUTHORI-
4 TIES PROVIDED BY THIS SECTION.—Claims of ownership
5 or control of property seized or otherwise detained by
6 United States authorities pursuant to this section shall be
7 adjudicated under the provisions of the Civil Assets For-
8 feiture Reform Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–185).

9 (d) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

10 (1) CONSULTATION WITH CULTURAL PROPERTY
11 ADVISORY COMMITTEE.—The Department of State
12 shall consult with the Cultural Property Advisory
13 Committee established under section 306 of the Cul-
14 tural Property Implementation Act (19 U.S.C.
15 2605) regarding any agreement on cultural pat-
16 rimony with the Government of Yemen as authorized
17 by this Act.

18 (2) REPORT.—The Secretary of State shall sub-
19 mit to the appropriate congressional committees the
20 report of the Cultural Property Advisory Committee
21 prepared pursuant to section 306 of the Convention
22 on Cultural Property Implementation Act (19 U.S.C.
23 2605(f)), with redactions as necessary to protect any
24 proprietary information (including trade secrets and
25 commercial or financial information that is privi-

1 leged or confidential) submitted in confidence by the
2 private sector to officers or employees of the United
3 States or to the Committee in connection with the
4 responsibilities of the Committee.

5 (3) FORM.—The report required under para-
6 graph (2) may be provided in classified form, as nec-
7 essary.

8 (e) SAFE HARBOR WAIVER.—

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive
10 import restrictions established under the authorities
11 of this section if the President certifies to the appro-
12 priate congressional committees that—

13 (A)(i) the owner or lawful custodian of the
14 specified archaeological or ethnological material
15 of Yemen has requested that such material be
16 temporarily located in the United States for
17 protection purposes; or

18 (ii) if no owner or lawful custodian can
19 reasonably be identified—

20 (I) the President determines that, for
21 purposes of protecting and preserving such
22 material, the material should be tempo-
23 rarily located in the United States; and

24 (II) the material will be returned to
25 the owner or lawful custodian when such

1 owner or lawful custodian can be identified
2 and has made a request for the property to
3 be returned; and

4 (B) there is no credible evidence that the
5 return of the property will contribute to illegal
6 trafficking in archaeological or ethnological ma-
7 terial of Yemen or financing of criminal or ter-
8 rorist activities.

9 (2) CUSTODY.—If the President grants a waiv-
10 er under this subsection, the specified archaeological
11 or ethnological material of Yemen that is the subject
12 of such waiver shall be placed in the temporary cus-
13 tody of the United States Government or in the tem-
14 porary custody of a cultural or educational institu-
15 tion within the United States for the purpose of pro-
16 tection, restoration, conservation, study, or exhi-
17 bition, without profit.

18 (3) IMMUNITY FROM SEIZURE.—Any archae-
19 ological or ethnological material that enters the
20 United States pursuant to a waiver granted under
21 this section shall have immunity from seizure under
22 Public Law 89–259 (22 U.S.C. 2459). All provisions
23 of Public Law 89–259 shall apply to such material
24 as if immunity from seizure had been granted under
25 that law.

1 (f) INAPPLICABILITY OF SUNSET PROVISION.—Not-
 2 withstanding section 602, the authorities provided under
 3 this section shall continue beyond the 5-year sunset speci-
 4 fied in such section 602.

5 (g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
 6 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
 7 gressional committees” means—

8 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
 9 the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

10 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
 11 Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
 12 Representatives.

13 **SEC. 411. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE GOVERN-**
 14 **ANCE AT THE CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury, in
 16 consultation with the Secretary of State, may provide
 17 technical assistance to the internationally recognized Gov-
 18 ernment of Yemen for the purpose of improving govern-
 19 ance at the Central Bank of Yemen.

20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 21 gress that—

22 (1) restoring the functionality of the Central
 23 Bank of Yemen will help unlock donor commitments
 24 and mitigate the effects of the humanitarian crisis
 25 in Yemen;

1 (2) restoring the governance capacity of the
2 Central Bank should be an important goal of any
3 peace effort in Yemen; and

4 (3) in providing technical assistance pursuant
5 to subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury
6 should take into account the following near-term ob-
7 jectives:

8 (A) Enhancing the governance and organi-
9 zation of the Central Bank, including revising
10 the organizational structure and decision-mak-
11 ing processes of the Central Bank and insti-
12 tuting best internal audit and risk management
13 practices.

14 (B) Improving market oversight and end-
15 ing the multiplicity of exchange rates that have
16 the potential to create distortions, including
17 harmful arbitrage, corruption, and rent-seeking.

18 (C) Improving the domestic payments sys-
19 tem to build trust in the Central Bank and to
20 facilitate the transfer of humanitarian assist-
21 ance, public salaries, and social assistance
22 throughout Yemen.

23 (D) Strengthening banking supervision, in-
24 cluding the regulatory framework and bank su-
25 pervisory process.

1 **SEC. 412. MODIFICATION OF CERTIFICATIONS REGARDING**
2 **ACTIONS BY SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED**
3 **ARAB EMIRATES IN YEMEN.**

4 Section 1290 of the John S. McCain National De-
5 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law
6 115–232) is amended—

7 (1) in subsection (d), by striking “Not later
8 than 180 and 360 days” and inserting “Not later
9 than 720 and 900 days”;

10 (2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as
11 subsections (h) and (i), respectively; and

12 (3) by inserting after subsection (f) the fol-
13 lowing new subsection:

14 “(g) **SUBMITTAL OF CERTIFICATION REQUIRED**
15 **NOTWITHSTANDING CESSATION, PAUSE, OR CANCELLA-**
16 **TION OF IN-FLIGHT REFUELING.**—Notwithstanding a
17 cessation, pause, or cancellation of authorized in-flight re-
18 fueling under section 2342 of title 10, United States Code,
19 or other applicable statutory authority, of Saudi or Saudi-
20 led coalition non-United States aircraft conducting mis-
21 sions in Yemen, the Secretary of State shall submit the
22 certifications required under subsections (c) and (d).”.

1 **TITLE V—GENERAL PROVISIONS**

2 **SEC. 501. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO**
3 **INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC**
4 **POWERS ACT.**

5 Nothing in this Act may be construed to limit the
6 authority of the President pursuant to the International
7 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
8 seq.).

9 **SEC. 502. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO USE**
10 **OF MILITARY FORCE.**

11 Nothing in this Act may be construed as an author-
12 ization for the use of military force.

13 **SEC. 503. SUNSET.**

14 This Act shall cease to be effective on the date that
15 is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

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