[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3080 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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116th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 3080
To state the policy of the United States regarding the need for
strategic placement of military assets in the Arctic, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
December 18, 2019
Mr. Sullivan (for himself, Mr. King, and Ms. Murkowski) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To state the policy of the United States regarding the need for
strategic placement of military assets in the Arctic, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic Arctic Naval Focus Act of
2019''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The strategic importance of the Arctic continues to
increase as the United States and other countries recognize the
military significance of the sea lanes and choke points within
the region and understand the potential for power projection
from the Arctic into multiple regions.
(2) On January 19, 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis
released the ``2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America'' in which the Secretary outlined the
reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by countries
classified by the National Security Strategy as revisionist
powers such as China and Russia.
(3) Russia and China have conducted military exercises
together in the Arctic, have agreed to connect the Northern Sea
Route, claimed by Russia, with China's Maritime Silk Road, and
are working together in developing natural gas resources in the
Arctic.
(4) The Government of the Russian Federation--
(A) has prioritized the development of Arctic
capabilities and has made significant investments in
military infrastructure in the Arctic, including the
creation of a new Arctic Command and the construction
or refurbishment of 16 deepwater ports and 14 airfields
in the region;
(B) has approximately 40 icebreakers as of May
2019, including several nuclear-powered icebreakers, is
currently constructing four icebreakers, and is
planning to build an additional eight icebreakers; and
(C) conducted the largest military exercise since
the 1980s, Vostok 2018, which included--
(i) 300,000 troops;
(ii) 1,000 aircraft;
(iii) 80 ships;
(iv) 36,000 vehicles; and
(v) notably, 3,200 Chinese troops, 30
Chinese rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, and 900
Chinese tanks.
(5) The Government of the People's Republic of China--
(A) released, in January 2018, its new Arctic
Strategy, the Polar Silk Road, in which it declares
itself as a ``near-Arctic state'', even though its
nearest territory to the Arctic is 900 miles away;
(B) has publicly stated that it seeks to expand its
``Belt and Road Initiative'' to the Arctic region,
including current investment in the natural gas fields
in the Yamal Peninsula in Russia, rare-earth element
mines in Greenland, and the real estate, alternative
energy, and fisheries in Iceland; and
(C) has shown great interest in expanding its
Arctic presence, including through--
(i) the operation of research vessels in
the region;
(ii) the recent construction of the Xuelong
2, or Snow Dragon II, the only polar research
boat vessel in the world that can break ice
while going forward or backward;
(iii) a freedom of navigation operation in
the Aleutian Islands in 2015; and
(iv) its recent plans to develop a 33,000
ton nuclear-powered icebreaker.
(6) The economic significance of the Arctic continues to
grow as countries around the globe begin to understand the
magnitude of the natural resources in the Arctic, the potential
for maritime transportation through, and economic and trade
development in, the region.
(7) The Arctic is home to 13 percent of the world's
undiscovered oil, 30 percent of its undiscovered gas, an
abundance of uranium, rare earth minerals, gold, diamonds, and
millions of square miles of untapped resources, including
abundant fisheries.
(8) The Bering Strait is experiencing significant increases
in international traffic from vessels transiting the Northern
Sea Route, increases which are projected to continue if
decreases in sea ice coverage continue.
(9) Along a future ice-free Arctic shipping route, a ship
sailing from South Korea to Germany would have an average
travel time of just 23 days, compared to 34 days via the Suez
Canal and 46 days via the Cape of Good Hope.
(10) In a speech at the Arctic Forum in September 2011,
Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin highlighted the
Northern Sea Route as a potential alternative to the Suez Canal
and has publicly stated plans to invest $11,400,000,000 along
the Northern Sea Route by 2024.
(11) Increases in human, maritime, and resource development
activity in the Arctic region create additional mission
requirements for the Department of Defense and the Department
of Homeland Security, given--
(A) the strategic focus of the Government of the
Russian Federation and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Arctic;
(B) overlapping territorial claims; and
(C) the potential for maritime accidents, oil
spills, and illegal fishing near the exclusive economic
zone of the United States.
(12) The increasing role of the United States in the Arctic
has been highlighted in each of the last four National Defense
Authorization Acts.
(13) Section 1068 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 992)
required a new Department of Defense strategy to protect United
States national security interests in the Arctic region.
(14) Section 1095 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2438)
required the Department of Defense to create criteria to
designate a Department of Defense Strategic Arctic Port.
(15) Section 122 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91; 131 Stat. 1310)
authorized the procurement of one polar-class heavy icebreaker
vessel.
(16) Section 151 of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 132
Stat. 1671) authorized the procurement of five additional
polar-class icebreaker vessels and expressed that the Coast
Guard should--
(A) maintain an inventory of not fewer than six
polar-class icebreaker vessels;
(B) award a contract for the first new polar-class
icebreaker not later than fiscal year 2019 and deliver
the icebreaker not later than fiscal year 2023; and
(C) deliver the second through sixth polar-class
icebreakers at a rate of one vessel per year in fiscal
years 2025 through 2029.
(17) In January 2017, the Department of Defense released a
report entitled ``Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect
United States National Security Interests in the Arctic
Region'' to update ``the ways and means'' the Department of
Defense intends to use to achieve its objectives as it
implements the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region,
including--
(A) enhancing the capability of United States
forces to defend the homeland and exercise sovereignty;
(B) strengthening deterrence at home and abroad;
(C) preserving freedom of the seas in the Arctic;
and
(D) evolving the infrastructure and capabilities of
the Department in the Arctic consistent with changing
conditions and needs.
(18) The United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook
released in April 2019 states that ``[d]emonstrating commitment
to operational presence, Canada, Denmark, and Norway have made
strategic investments in ice-capable patrol ships charged with
national or homeland security missions. [The United States] is
the only Arctic State that has not made similar investments in
ice-capable surface maritime security assets. This limits the
ability of the Coast Guard, and the Nation, to credibly uphold
sovereignty or respond to contingencies in the Arctic''.
(19) On July 16, 2019, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper
stated that ``[t]he Arctic is strategic terrain for the United
States. The region has significant economic opportunity, and
must remain free and open. It is also growing more complicated
as strategic competitors--Russia and, increasingly, China--seek
to enhance their position in the region. It is critical that
the Arctic remain a secure and stable region where U.S.
national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is
defended, and nations work together to address challenges''.
(20) On January 9, 2019, Secretary of the Air Force Heather
Wilson and Chief of Staff of the Air Force General David
Goldfein wrote that ``. . . the Arctic has become even more
important to the nation. Both a northern approach to the United
States, as well as a critical location for projecting American
power, its geo-strategic significance is difficult to
overstate''.
(21) On February 26, 2019, General John Hyten, Commander of
the United States Strategic Command, stated that ``[i]n
particular, the Arctic is an area that we really need to focus
on and really look at investing. That is no longer a buffer
zone. We need to be able to operate there. We need to be able
to communicate there. We need to have a presence there that we
have not invested in in the same way that our adversaries have.
And they see that as a vulnerability from us, whereas it is
becoming a strength for them and it is a weakness for us, we
need to flip that equation''.
(22) On February 26, 2019, General Terrence O'Shaughnessy,
Commander of the United States Northern Command stated that
``[i]t has become clear that defense of the homeland depends on
our ability to detect and defeat threats operating both in the
Arctic and passing through the Arctic. Russia's fielding of
advanced, long-range cruise missiles capable of flying through
the northern approaches and striking targets in the United
States and Canada has emerged as the dominant military threat
in the Arctic. . . . Meanwhile, China has declared that it is
not content to remain a mere observer in the Arctic and has
taken action to normalize its naval and commercial presence in
the region in order to increase its access to lucrative
resources and shipping routes. I view the Arctic as the front
line in the defense of the United States and Canada . . .''.
(23) On May 6, 2019, Admiral Karl Schultz, Commandant of
the Coast Guard stated that ``[w]e talk about the Arctic as a
competitive space. We've seen China, we see Russia investing
extensively. China built icebreakers in the time since we
updated our strategy. China's been operating off the Alaskan
Arctic for a good part of the last six years on an annual
basis. [The Coast Guard is] championing increased capabilities
in the Arctic . . . better communications, better domain
awareness . . . I want to see the Arctic remain a peaceful
domain. China's a self-declared Arctic state. They're not one
of the eight Arctic nations, so for me, for the service, its
presence equals influence''.
(24) On May 6, 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated
that--
(A) the Arctic ``has become an arena for power and
for competition'', and the United States is ``entering
a new age of strategic engagement in the Arctic,
complete with new threats to the Arctic and its real
estate, and to all of our interests in that region'';
(B) ``Arctic sea lanes could become the 21st
century Suez and Panama Canals'';
(C) ``[w]e're concerned about Russia's claim over
the international waters of the Northern Sea Route,
including its newly announced plans to connect it with
China's Maritime Silk Road'';
(D) ``[i]n the Northern Sea Route, Moscow already
illegally demands other nations request permission to
pass, requires Russian maritime pilots to be aboard
foreign ships, and threatens to use military force to
sink any that fail to comply with their demands'';
(E) there is a ``pattern of aggressive Russian
behavior here in the Arctic'' and ``we know Russian
territorial ambitions can turn violent''; and
(F) we do not want ``the Arctic Ocean to transform
into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization
and competing territorial claims'', nor do we want
``the fragile Arctic environment exposed to the same
ecological devastation caused by China's fishing fleet
in the seas off its coast, or unregulated industrial
activity in its own country''.
(25) On December 6, 2018, Secretary of the Navy Richard
Spencer stated that ``[w]e need to have a strategic Arctic port
up in Alaska. We need to be doing FONOPs in the northwest--in
the northern passage . . . peace through presence with a
submarine is a little tough''.
(26) Meanwhile, the two closest strategic seaports, as
designated by the Department of Defense, to the Arctic Circle
are the Port of Anchorage and the Port of Tacoma, located
approximately 1,500 nautical miles and 2,400 nautical miles
away, respectively, and approximately 1,900 nautical miles and
2,800 nautical miles respectively from Barrow, Alaska.
(27) The distance from Bangor, Maine, to Key West, Florida,
is approximately 1,450 nautical miles.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to prioritize Navy and Coast Guard missions,
infrastructure and capability development, training, and
stationing of assets to meet the growing array of challenges in
the Arctic due to the region's strategic importance to the
national security interests of the United States;
(2) that the increasing freedom of navigation and expansion
of activity in the Arctic must be met with increasing
deployment of Navy and Coast Guard surface vessels capable of
exerting influence through persistent presence in the Arctic;
(3) that, while the recapitalization of the Coast Guard's
fleet of cutters and aircraft is needed and important, the
Coast Guard must avoid overextending operational assets for
remote international missions at the cost of dedicated focus on
this domestic area of responsibility with significant
international interest and activity; and
(4) that, although some progress has been made to increase
awareness of Arctic issues and to promote increased military
presence in the region, additional measures shall be taken to
protect vital economic, environmental, and national security
interests of the United States, and to show the commitment of
the United States to this emerging strategic choke point of
increasing great power competition, including the formation of
an Arctic Security Initiative with the funding and authority to
drive--
(A) the creation of a network of strategically
advantageous ports in the Arctic;
(B) the long-term homeporting of significant Coast
Guard assets in the Arctic;
(C) the development of Navy and Coast Guard ship
maintenance and repair relationships with facilities
located within Alaska in or near the Arctic;
(D) increased military training for operating in
the Arctic environment; and
(E) the creation of a Department of Defense Center
for Security Studies for the Arctic.
SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE STRATEGIC NAVAL FOCUS IN THE ARCTIC.
(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense in consultation with
the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the
development and execution of a strategic plan that focuses on
addressing the findings in section 2 and the policy stated in section
3.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include
a detailed plan to achieve the following:
(1) The creation of a Department of Defense Strategic
Arctic Port by 2035.
(2) The establishment of the position of Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for the Arctic tasked with optimizing the
Unified Command Plan for the Arctic and other overarching
strategies for the Arctic region.
(3) The procurement of not fewer than four ice-hardened
Navy vessels by 2030.
(4) Not fewer than one ice-hardened Navy vessel on patrol
in the Arctic and able to maintain maritime domain awareness,
conduct training exercises, and perform national defense
operations not fewer than six months of every year.
(5) Not fewer than one major Coast Guard cutter on patrol
in the Arctic and able to execute search and rescue operations,
fisheries enforcement, pollution response, and support for
national defense operations at all times.
(6) Not fewer than two icebreaking vessels permanently
stationed within the Arctic by 2035.
(7) Sufficient icebreaking activity to keep the Northwest
Passage sea lanes open for commerce, national defense, rescue
and recovery operations, and scientific exploration by 2030.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 5. ARCTIC DEFINED.
In this Act, the term ``Arctic'' has the meaning given that term in
section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (15 U.S.C.
4111).
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