[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3843 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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116th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3843
To establish a positive agenda and framework for the future of arms
control with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 21, 2020
Mr. Menendez introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To establish a positive agenda and framework for the future of arms
control with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Future of Arms Control Act''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) New start.--The term ``New START'' means the Treaty
between the United States and the Russian Federation on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered into force
February 5, 2011 (commonly known as the ``New START Treaty'').
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the end of World War II, the United States has
relied on a robust and effective nuclear deterrent as part of
its national defense, particularly against the Soviet Union and
its successor state, the Russian Federation.
(2) In tandem with its nuclear deterrent, the United States
pursued a number of arms control, disarmament, and
nonproliferation agreements with the Soviet Union as a means of
ensuring strategic stability, providing transparency into the
Soviet Union's nuclear forces, reducing United States nuclear
expenditures, and defending the United States, including the
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty.
(3) After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United
States continued to pursue arms control with the Russian
Federation along with a credible nuclear deterrent as a means
of ensuring United States security from nuclear attack.
(4) The New START Treaty, ratified with bipartisan support
on December 22, 2010, remains an important tool for limiting
and verifying the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear
arsenal.
(5) The New START Treaty, which expires in February 2021,
can be extended until February 2026 if both parties agree to
such an extension.
(6) The United States engages in robust, verifiable arms
control because it fundamentally protects United States and
allied security interests.
(7) On April 17, 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met
with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and in those talks
asserted that any future arms control talks must include the
People's Republic of China.
(8) The Government of the People's Republic of China has
signaled that it has no intention of engaging in trilateral
arms control talks with the United States and the Russian
Federation.
(9) Since 1964, the People's Republic of China has been a
nuclear weapons state and has developed strategic and tactical
systems capable of threatening the United States, United States
allies and partners, and United States and alliance assets in
the Indo-Pacific region.
(10) Today, the People's Republic of China retains a
limited but survivable nuclear deterrent with an extensive
modernization program which, according to the Defense
Intelligence Agency's 2019 China Military Power Report, will
make its arsenal ``more mobile, responsive, and accurate''.
(11) It is in the security interests of the United States
to engage with the People's Republic of China on relevant arms
control issues, whether in a bilateral or multilateral format,
through a coherent, coordinated strategy.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States that--
(1) unless the President determines and so informs Congress
that the Russian Federation is not in material compliance with
New START such that the object and purpose of the Treaty is
significantly undermined, and that efforts to resolve any such
material noncompliance have been undertaken and not resolved
such noncompliance, the United States shall extend New START
from its initial termination date in February 2021 to February
2026, as permitted under Article XIV of the Treaty;
(2) if the President has not extended New START by November
3, 2020, the United States Government should encourage the
Government of the Russian Federation not to exceed or prepare
to exceed the limitations of the New START Treaty prior to the
expiration of the Treaty on February 5, 2021, providing an
opportunity from January 20, 2021, until February 5, 2021, for
the United States and the Russian Federation to negotiate an
extension to and continued implementation of the treaty;
(3) if the President does not extend the New START Treaty
by November 3, 2020, no action or activity should be taken by
any United States official, agency, or department that would
violate or lead to the violation of the treaty while the treaty
remains in force;
(4) the United States must maintain a credible nuclear
deterrent capable of defending the homeland and United States
allies covered under extended deterrence;
(5) the United States, in conjunction with New START's
extension, should pursue additional arms control frameworks
with the Russian Federation that limit the possibility of
purposeful or accidental nuclear war and advance United States
security, including--
(A) further reductions to the Russian Federation's
strategic nuclear arsenal, including the number of its
warheads and deployed delivery systems;
(B) limitations or elimination of the Russian
Federation's tactical and intermediate range systems
that directly threaten United States allies and
partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific;
(C) control, limitation, or elimination of the
Russian Federation's novel nuclear weapons, such as
hypersonic weapons, undersea nuclear weapons, or other
delivery systems;
(D) transparency and confidence-building measures
to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, conventional, and
unconventional military escalation between the United
States and the Russian Federation;
(E) areas of potential dialogue between the
governments of the United States and the Russian
Federation on space, cyberspace, and conventional
forces, as well as other strategic domains, which could
reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if a
conflict were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing
arms race; and
(F) rigorous inspection and monitoring mechanisms
to verify compliance with any future arms control
framework; and
(6) the United States Government should formulate a
coherent strategy to engage the Government of the People's
Republic of China on relevant bilateral issues that lays the
groundwork for bringing the People's Republic of China into an
arms control framework, including--
(A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms control
leading to the convening of bilateral strategic
stability talks;
(B) negotiating norms for outer space;
(C) developing pre-launch notification regimes
aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and
(D) expanding lines of communication between both
governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of
conventional war and increasing transparency.
SEC. 5. RESTRICTION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY.
(a) In General.--If the President does not extend the New START
Treaty by November 3, 2020, no action or activity may be taken by any
United States official, agency, or department that would violate or
lead to the violation of the treaty until March 1, 2021.
(b) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The President may waive the restriction in
subsection (a) 15 days after certifying to the appropriate
congressional committees that the Government of the Russian
Federation has materially violated the New START Treaty such
that the security of the United States has been gravely
threatened. The certification shall include the reasons for
making such determination. The certification shall be
unclassified to the maximum extent possible, but may include a
classified annex.
(2) Effectiveness.--
(A) In general.--A waiver under subsection (a)
shall take effect if, at the end of 15 days after the
President makes the certification described under such
subsection, Congress has not enacted a joint resolution
of disapproval.
(B) Consideration of joint resolution of
disapproval.--A joint resolution introduced pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall be considered in the Senate in
accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-329; 90 Stat. 765).
SEC. 6. REPORTS.
(a) Implementation of United States Policy.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report, and a separate
classified annex, detailing the United States Government's plans for
implementing the policy of the United States stated in section 4 with
respect to the Russian Federation.
(b) Arms Control Talks With the Russian Federation and the People's
Republic of China.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that describes--
(1) a concrete plan for arms control talks that includes
both the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation;
(2) if trilateral arms control dialogue does not arise,
what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for
ensuring United States security from Russian and Chinese
nuclear weapons;
(3) efforts at engaging the People's Republic of China to
join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral
basis; and
(4) the interest level of the Government of the People's
Republic of China in joining arms control talks, whether on a
bilateral or multilateral basis.
(c) Extension of New START.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination
with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
a report, and a separate classified annex, that includes the following
elements:
(1) The strategy behind the decision to extend or not
extend New START.
(2) If New START is set to expire, an assessment whether
such an expiration is in the national security interests of the
United States, including the specific reasons for such
conclusion.
(3) An examination of the effects of the expiration of New
START on--
(A) strategic stability with the Russian
Federation;
(B) the United States nuclear budget;
(C) spending on United States conventional forces
as a result of increased nuclear spending; and
(D) international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
(4) An assessment of how the Government of the Russian
Federation will modify its nuclear forces in an unconstrained
environment and how the United States Government will respond
if the Government of the Russian Federation expands its
arsenal.
(5) An assessment of how the United States Government will
need to alter intelligence capabilities and spending to regain,
if possible, the knowledge of the Russian Federation's arsenal
that is currently provided by the inspection and verification
mechanisms inherent to New START.
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