[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 10 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 136
116th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. CON. RES. 10
Recognizing that Chinese telecommunications companies such as Huawei
and ZTE pose serious threats to the national security of the United
States and its allies.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 28, 2019
Mr. Gardner (for himself, Mr. Coons, Mr. Markey, Mr. Cruz, and Mr.
Rubio) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
July 9, 2019
Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment and an amendment to the
preamble
[Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
[Strike the preamble and insert the part printed in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Recognizing that Chinese telecommunications companies such as Huawei
and ZTE pose serious threats to the national security of the United
States and its allies.
Whereas fifth generation (5G) wireless technology promises greater speed and
capacity and will provide the backbone for the next generation of
digital technologies;
Whereas fifth generation wireless technology will be a revolutionary advancement
in telecommunications with the potential to create millions of jobs and
billions of dollars in economic opportunity;
Whereas Chinese companies, including Huawei, have invested substantial resources
in advancing fifth generation wireless technology and other
telecommunications services around the globe, including subsidies
provided directly by the Government of the People's Republic of China;
Whereas Chinese officials have increased leadership roles at the International
Telecommunications Union, where international telecommunications
standards are set, and companies such as Huawei have increased their
influence at the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), whose work
informs global technology standards;
Whereas Huawei and ZTE have aggressively sought to enter into contracts
throughout the developing world, including throughout Latin America and
Africa in countries such as Venezuela and Kenya;
Whereas, in 2012, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives released a bipartisan report naming Huawei and ZTE as
national security threats;
Whereas, in 2013, the United States restricted Federal procurement of certain
products produced by Huawei and ZTE and has since expanded restrictions
on Federal procurement of those products;
Whereas, in 2016, the national legislature of the People's Republic of China
passed the Cyber Security Law of the People's Republic of China, article
28 of which requires ``network operators'', including companies like
Huawei, to ``provide technical support and assistance'' to Chinese
authorities involved in national security efforts;
Whereas, in 2017, the national legislature of the People's Republic of China
passed the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China,
article 7 of which requires ``all organizations and citizens''--
including companies like Huawei and ZTE--to ``support, assist, and
cooperate with national intelligence efforts'' undertaken by the
People's Republic of China;
Whereas, in August 2018, the Government of Australia banned Huawei and ZTE from
building the fifth generation wireless networks of Australia;
Whereas, in August 2018, Congress restricted the heads of Federal agencies from
procuring certain covered telecommunications equipment and services,
which included Huawei and ZTE equipment;
Whereas, in December 2018, the Government of Japan issued instructions
effectively banning Huawei and ZTE from official contracts in the
country;
Whereas, on December 7, 2018, a Vice-President of the European Commission
expressed concern that Huawei and other Chinese companies may be forced
to cooperate with China's intelligence services to install ``mandatory
backdoors'' to allow access to encrypted data;
Whereas, in January 2019, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
issued a Worldwide Threat Assessment that describes concerns ``about the
potential for Chinese intelligence and security services to use Chinese
information technology firms as routine and systemic espionage platforms
against the United States and allies'';
Whereas, in February 2019, the Government of New Zealand expressed serious
concern about Huawei building the fifth generation wireless networks of
New Zealand;
Whereas the Department of Justice has charged Huawei with the theft of trade
secrets, obstruction of justice, and other serious crimes;
Whereas, against the strong advice of the United States and a number of the
security partners of the United States, the governments of countries
such as Germany have indicated that they may permit Huawei to build out
the fifth generation wireless networks of those countries;
Whereas installation of Huawei equipment in the communications infrastructure of
countries that are allies of the United States would jeopardize the
security of communication lines between the United States and those
allies;
Whereas secure communications systems are critical to ensure the safety and
defense of the United States and allies of the United States;
Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other vital
international security arrangements depend on strong and secure
communications, which could be put at risk through the use of Huawei and
ZTE equipment; and
Whereas there has been broad bipartisan consensus in Congress for years that
Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE present serious threats to
national and global security: Now, therefore, be it
Whereas fifth-generation (in this preamble referred to as ``5G'') wireless
technology promises greater speed and capacity and will provide the
backbone for the next generation of digital technologies;
Whereas 5G wireless technology will be a revolutionary advancement in
telecommunications with the potential to create millions of jobs and
billions of dollars in economic opportunity;
Whereas Chinese companies, including Huawei, have invested substantial resources
in advancing 5G wireless technology and other telecommunications
services around the globe, including subsidies provided directly by the
Government of the People's Republic of China;
Whereas Chinese officials have assumed a greater number of leadership roles at
the International Telecommunications Union, where international
telecommunications standards are set, and Chinese companies such as
Huawei have increased their influence at the 3rd Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP), whose work informs global telecommunications network
technology standards;
Whereas Huawei and ZTE have rapidly expanded their market share throughout the
developing world, including in Latin America and Africa, in countries
such as Venezuela and Kenya;
Whereas, in 2018, Huawei increased its penetration to approximately 29 percent
of the global telecommunications equipment market and 43 percent of the
market in the Asia-Pacific, according to Dell'Oro Group;
Whereas, in 2012, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives released a bipartisan report naming Huawei and ZTE as
national security threats;
Whereas, in 2013, the United States restricted Federal procurement of certain
products produced by Huawei and ZTE and has since expanded these
restrictions;
Whereas, in 2016, the national legislature of the People's Republic of China
passed the Cyber Security Law of the People's Republic of China, Article
28 of which requires ``network operators'', including companies like
Huawei, to ``provide technical support and assistance'' to Chinese
authorities involved in national security efforts;
Whereas, in 2017, the national legislature of the People's Republic of China
passed the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China,
Article 7 of which requires ``all organizations and citizens'',
including companies like Huawei and ZTE, to ``support, assist, and
cooperate with national intelligence efforts'' undertaken by the
People's Republic of China;
Whereas, in August 2018, the Government of Australia banned Huawei and ZTE from
building the 5G wireless networks of Australia;
Whereas, in August 2018, Congress restricted the heads of Federal agencies from
procuring certain telecommunications equipment and services, which
included Huawei and ZTE equipment;
Whereas, in December 2018, the Government of Japan issued a directive barring
procurement by the government and the Japan Self-Defense Forces of
telecommunications equipment that would undermine national security;
Whereas, on December 7, 2018, a Vice President of the European Commission
expressed concern that Huawei and other Chinese companies may be forced
to cooperate with China's intelligence services to install ``mandatory
backdoors'';
Whereas, in January 2019, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
issued a Worldwide Threat Assessment that describes concerns ``about the
potential for Chinese intelligence and security services to use Chinese
information technology firms as routine and systemic espionage platforms
against the United States and allies'';
Whereas, in February 2019, the Government of New Zealand expressed serious
concern about Huawei building the 5G wireless networks of New Zealand;
Whereas, on May 3, 2019, the Prague 5G Security Conference, which was widely
attended by representatives from the European Union and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including the United States,
produced the Prague Proposals, which state that ``communication networks
and services should be designed with resilience and security in mind'';
Whereas the Department of Justice has charged Huawei with the theft of trade
secrets, obstruction of justice, and other serious crimes;
Whereas, against the strong advice of the United States, the governments of some
countries, including United States security partners such as Germany,
have indicated they may permit the involvement of Huawei in building 5G
wireless networks in those countries;
Whereas installation of Huawei equipment in the communications infrastructure of
United States allies would jeopardize the security of communication
lines between the United States and those allies;
Whereas secure communications systems are critical to ensure the safety and
defense of the United States and allies of the United States;
Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other vital international
security arrangements, including the Five Eyes partnership, depend on
strong and secure communications, which could be at risk through the use
of Huawei and ZTE equipment; and
Whereas there has been broad bipartisan consensus in Congress for years that
Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE present serious threats to
national and global security: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That--
<DELETED> (1) Chinese telecommunications companies such as
Huawei and ZTE pose serious threats to the national security of
the United States and allies of the United States;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the United States should reiterate to
countries that are choosing to incorporate Huawei or ZTE
products in their new telecommunications infrastructure that
the United States will consider all necessary measures to limit
the risks incurred by entities of the United States Government
or Armed Forces from use of such compromised
networks;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) the United States should continue to make
allies of the United States aware of the ongoing and future
risks to telecommunications networks shared between the United
States and such allies; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) the United States should work with the private
sector and allies and partners of the United States, including
the European Union, in a regularized bilateral or multilateral
format, to identify secure, cost-effective, and reliable
alternatives to Huawei or ZTE products.</DELETED>
That--
(1) Chinese telecommunications companies such as Huawei and
ZTE pose serious threats to the national security of the United
States and allies of the United States;
(2) the United States should reiterate to countries
choosing to incorporate Huawei or ZTE products into their new
telecommunications infrastructure that the United States will
seek to limit the risks posed to the United States Government
or Armed Forces from use of such compromised networks;
(3) the United States should continue to make allies of the
United States aware of the ongoing and future risks to
telecommunications networks shared by the United States and
such allies;
(4) the United States should work with the private sector
and allies and partners, including the European Union, in
regularized bilateral or multilateral formats, to identify
secure, cost-effective, and reliable alternatives to Huawei or
ZTE products; and
(5) the United States should accelerate its efforts to
increase its leadership and participation in the international
fora responsible for global telecommunications standards, and
work with allies and partners as well as the private sector to
also increase their engagement.
Calendar No. 136
116th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. CON. RES. 10
_______________________________________________________________________
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Recognizing that Chinese telecommunications companies such as Huawei
and ZTE pose serious threats to the national security of the United
States and its allies.
_______________________________________________________________________
July 9, 2019
Reported with an amendment and an amendment to the preamble