[Pages S27-S30]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. McCONNELL:
S. 28. A bill to reauthorize the United States-Jordan Defense
Cooperation Act of 2015, and for other purposes; read the first time.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text
of the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:

S. 28

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``United States-Jordan Defense
Cooperation Extension Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) In December 2011, Congress passed section 7041(b) of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (Public Law 112-74;
125 Stat. 1223), which appropriated funds made available
under the heading ``Economic Support Fund'' to establish an
enterprise fund for Jordan.
(2) The intent of an enterprise fund is to attract private
investment to help entrepreneurs and small businesses create
jobs and to achieve sustainable economic development.
(3) Jordan is an instrumental partner in the fight against
terrorism, including as a member of the Global Coalition To
Counter ISIS and the Combined Joint Task Force - Operation
Inherent Resolve.
(4) In 2014, His Majesty King Abdullah stated that
``Jordanians and Americans have been standing shoulder to
shoulder against extremism for many years, but to a new level
with this coalition against ISIL''.
(5) On February 3, 2015, the United States signed a 3-year
memorandum of understanding with Jordan, pledging to provide
the kingdom with $1,000,000,000 annually in United States
foreign assistance, subject to the approval of Congress.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Jordan plays a critical role in responding to the
overwhelming humanitarian needs created by the conflict in
Syria; and
(2) Jordan, the United States, and other partners should
continue working together to address this humanitarian crisis
and promote regional stability, including through support for
refugees in Jordan and internally displaced people along the
Jordan-Syria border and the creation of conditions inside
Syria that will allow for the secure, dignified, and
voluntary return of people displaced by the crisis.

SEC. 4. REAUTHORIZATION OF UNITED STATES-JORDAN DEFENSE
COOPERATION ACT OF 2015.

Section 5(a) of the United States-Jordan Defense
Cooperation Act of 2015 (22 U.S.C. 2753 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``During the 3-year period'' and inserting
``During the period''; and
(2) by inserting ``and ending on December 31, 2022'' after
``enactment of this Act''.

SEC. 5. REPORT ON ESTABLISHING AN ENTERPRISE FUND FOR JORDAN.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the
establishment of the United States Development Finance
Corporation, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a detailed report assessing the
costs and benefits of the United States Development Finance
Corporation establishing a Jordan Enterprise Fund.
(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
______

By Mr. SCHUMER:
S.J. Res. 2. A joint resolution disapproving the President's proposal
to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with
respect to the Russian Federation; to the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, on December 19, as Congress was preparing
to leave for the holidays, the Treasury Department notified Congress of
its intent to terminate within 30 days a set of Russia sanctions
imposed on En+ Group plc (``En+''), UC Rusal plc (``Rusal''), and JSC
EuroSibEnergo (``ESE''). Each of these firms were sanctioned because
they were owned or controlled by Oleg Deripaska, a notorious Russian
oligarch and trusted agent of Vladimir Putin. As Treasury noted when it
sanctioned him: ``Deripaska has been investigated for money laundering,
and accused of threatening the lives of business rivals, illegally
wiretapping a government official, and taking part in extortion and
racketeering. There are also allegations that Deripaska bribed a
government official, ordered the murder of a businessman, and had links
to a Russian organized crime group.''

[[Page S28]]

In its notification letter, Treasury argued it had secured an
agreement with Deripaska, the companies and other stakeholders involved
to significantly restructure the companies and make corporate
governance changes. Under the agreement, Deripaska will remain
sanctioned, and his property will remain blocked. The Treasury
Department proposes to remove the three firms, including the huge
Russian aluminum producer Rusal, from the sanctions list in the belief
that the agreement will effectively separate the companies from
Deripaska, eliminating his control over them and sharply limiting his
influence. The proposal also reportedly places limits on any family
members of Deripaska who are also significant investors in the
companies.
I noted in December that Treasury's decision raises critical
questions that the Administration must answer about whether the
structural and governance changes made by these companies are
sufficient to ensure that Deripaska is no longer directing or even
influencing these firms. I have also said that it remains to be seen
whether Treasury's approach can succeed in Putin's Russia. Serious
questions remain about whether Treasury can monitor and enforce the
agreement even with the monitoring mechanisms proposed.
The timing of Treasury's notice compressed an already tight 30-day
review timetable provided for in sanctions law, giving Congress until
January 17 to make its own independent assessment of whether it
adequately protects US economic and national security, especially with
respect to Russia. The Congressional review provisions of CAATSA were
designed for precisely this kind of circumstance. They were imposed by
Congress after serious questions had arisen about President Trump's
relationship with Russia. Members on both sides of the aisle wanted an
opportunity to independently assess the Administration's actions to
lift, terminate or issue licenses on Russia-related sanctions. Those
questions still linger, and have become even more pronounced in recent
days.
The formal review process is underway. The Banking and Foreign
Relations committees are assessing the terms of the agreement, and the
documents that have been provided by Treasury. But time is short, and
if we did not introduce a resolution today we would have been overtaken
by events, since any resolution must be pending in committee for ten
days before it is subject to discharge to the full Senate. So today I
am introducing such a resolution. I do so not because I have concluded
that Congress should act to disapprove this agreement--I have not made
that determination yet--but to preserve the procedural option of moving
to bring up such a resolution at the end of the review process, if
necessary, for expedited review and a vote by the full Senate.
I intend to consult with my colleagues on the Banking, Foreign
Relations, and Intelligence Committees, and others, before making a
judgment on whether to call for consideration, under expedited
procedures provided for in CAATSA, of this disapproval resolution. I
know my colleagues will carefully review the proposal, and I look
forward to hearing their conclusions once that assessment is complete.
I ask unanimous consent that the Treasury Department's report
provided pursuant to section 216 of CAATSA be printed in the Record.
Mr. PRESIDENT. Without objection, so ordered.

Department of the Treasury,

Washington, DC, December 19, 2018.
Hon. Sherrod Brown,
Ranking Member, Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban
Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Ranking Member Brown: With this letter, we wish to
provide you with notification that Treasury intends to
terminate the sanctions imposed on En+ Group plc (``En+''),
UC Rusal plc (``Rusal''), and JSC EuroSibEnergo (``ESE'') in
30 days. En+, Rusal, and ESE have agreed to undertake
significant restructuring and corporate governance changes to
address the circumstances that led to their designation,
including reducing Oleg Deripaska's direct and indirect
shareholding stake in those entities to below 50 percent;
overhauling the composition of those entities' boards of
directors; taking restrictive steps related to their
corporate governance; and agreeing to unprecedented
transparency by undertaking extensive, ongoing auditing,
certification, and reporting requirements. As part of this
agreement, half of En+'s restructured board of directors will
be comprised of U.S. or UK nationals and Rusal's current
board chairman will step down. Deripaska will remain
sanctioned. All of Deripaska's property and interests in
property, including entities in which he owns a fifty percent
or greater interest, will remain blocked, and foreign persons
will continue to be subject to secondary sanctions should
they knowingly facilitate a significant transaction for or on
behalf of Deripaska or entities in which he owns a fifty
percent or greater interest. None of the transactions to be
undertaken to divest Deripaska of his interests in these
companies will allow Deripaska to obtain cash either in
return for shares relinquished in, or from future dividends
he may receive from, En+, Rusal, or ESE. OFAC reserves the
right to relist any or all of these companies should the
change in circumstances represented by their implementation
of the agreement with OFAC be reversed, including by a
material breach of the terms of the agreement.

1. Background

On April 6, 2018, OFAC designated seven Russian oligarchs,
including Oleg Deripaska, and 12 companies they own or
control. This action also targeted 17 senior government
officials as well as a state-owned Russian weapons trading
company and its subsidiary, a Russian bank. The April 6
action aggressively targeted Russian oligarchs and elites
that further the Kremlin's global malign activities,
including its attempts to subvert Western democracy, its
support for the Assad regime, its malicious cyber activities,
its occupation of Crimea, and its instigation of violence in
Ukraine. This sanctions action was one of many that the
Treasury Department has taken to target Russia's malign
behavior. Under this Administration, Treasury has sanctioned
256 Russia-related individuals and entities, including 150
individuals and entities under Ukraine/Russia-related
sanctions authorities codified by the Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
Among the 12 companies targeted on April 6, OFAC designated
En+ for being owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly,
Deripaska, and placed En+ on its list of Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons (``SDN List'') pursuant to
Executive Order 13661 of March 16, 2014, ``Blocking Property
of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in
Ukraine'' (``E.O. 13661'') and Executive Order 13662 of March
20, 2014, ``Blocking Property of Additional Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine'' (``E.O. 13662'').
OFAC also designated Rusal for being owned or controlled by,
directly or indirectly, En+; Deripaska has a 0.01 percent
direct ownership interest in Rusal, and his involvement was
not a basis for the designation of Rusal. OFAC also
designated ESE for being owned or controlled by, directly or
indirectly, En+ and Deripaska. As with En+, OFAC placed both
Rusal and ESE on the SDN List pursuant to E.O. 13661 and E.O.
13662.
The action on April 6 was among the most impactful targeted
sanctions actions ever taken by OFAC and included many of the
globally integrated companies the oligarchs rely on to
generate their wealth. The designation of Rusal, the world's
second largest aluminum producer, was felt immediately in
global aluminum markets. The price of aluminum soared in the
weeks following the designation, and Rusal subsidiaries in
the United States, Ireland, Sweden, Jamaica, Guinea, and
elsewhere faced imminent closure without limited sanctions
mitigation in the form of OFAC general licenses.

2. En+, Rusal, and ESE Petition OFAC for Delisting

As stated publicly by Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin,
the designations of En+, Rusal, and ESE, as well as the
follow-on collateral consequences, were not the primary aim
of the April 6 sanctions against Deripaska. Rather, En+,
Rusal, and ESE were designated due to their entanglement with
Deripaska. Economic sanctions, including those in E.O. 13661
and E.O. 13662, are designed to change behavior. In this
case, the objectives of the sanctions were to reduce
Deripaska's ownership in and sever his control of these
entities.
Upon their designation on April 6, 2018, En+, Rusal, and
ESE (collectively, the ``Petitioners'') approached the U.S.
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) to petition for delisting pursuant to 31 C.F.R.
Sec. 501.807. The Petitioners, led by Lord Gregory Barker,
the former Minister of State for Energy and Climate Change
for the United Kingdom, have engaged in negotiations with
OFAC extensively during the past eight months, while OFAC
evaluated whether Petitioners were credibly able to make
material changes in the structure and composition of the
companies such to be eligible for delisting. Petitioners
conducted themselves throughout in a cooperative and
transparent manner. Petitioners submitted proposals whereby
they would sever the ownership and control of Deripaska over
Petitioners. Throughout the negotiations, OFAC pressed for
terms that were targeted towards further restricting
Deripaska. Ultimately, OFAC and the Petitioners were able to
settle on terms acceptable to OFAC and implementable by
Petitioners. As a result, Petitioners have agreed to
undertake significant restructuring and corporate governance
changes to address the circumstances that led to their
designation, including significantly reducing Deripaska's
direct and indirect shareholding stake in Petitioners;
overhauling the composition of their boards of

[[Page S29]]

directors; taking other restrictive steps related to their
corporate governance; and agreeing to undertake extensive,
ongoing auditing, certification, and reporting
requirements.

3. Change in Circumstances With Respect to En+, Rusal, and ESE

Since their designation and following months of detailed
negotiations with Treasury, OFAC has secured from Petitioners
a binding agreement that severs Deripaska's control over
these critical revenue-generating entities and reduces his
ownership in these entities below 50 percent, thereby
untangling and protecting these companies from the
controlling influence of a Kremlin insider. The agreement
between OFAC and the Petitioners is subject to approval by a
number of stakeholders. Furthermore, the agreement reached
between OFAC and the Petitioners will create an unprecedented
level of transparency for the U.S. government into these
global companies, along with the other substantial
concessions obtained from them.
With the change in circumstances that led to the original
designations of Petitioners, including Petitioners' ongoing
substantial commitments, this letter serves as notification
of Treasury's intention to terminate the sanctions imposed on
En+, Rusal, and ESE in 30 days. Treasury also assesses that
this action--a removal based on a change in factual
circumstances that is in line with longstanding U.S.
sanctions precedent and practice designed to change
behavior--is not intended to significantly alter U.S. foreign
policy.
We stress that Deripaska will remain sanctioned and on
OFAC's SDN List. All of Deripaska's property and interests in
property, including entities in which he owns a fifty percent
or greater interest, will remain blocked. The result of
OFAC's conditions for delisting is that Deripaska's
investment in En+ is isolated and frozen. En+ is the linchpin
underlying the designations of these companies, since
Deripaska has virtually no direct ownership stake in Rusal,
and none at all in ESE. Specifically, Deripaska's stake in
En+ will be reduced from approximately 70 percent to 44.95
percent, and his stake cannot be increased in the future.
Pursuant to the agreement, Deripaska's stake in En+ will be
reduced through corporate restructuring transactions that do
not involve the transfer of funds directly or indirectly to
Deripaska, as well as by a donation of shares to a charitable
foundation. None of the transactions to be undertaken
consistent with the agreement will allow Deripaska to obtain
cash either in return for his shares or from future dividends
issued by En+, Rusal, or ESE. Future dividends to which
Deripaska may be entitled due to his diminished ownership
interests will be placed into a blocked account. Furthermore,
foreign persons will be subject to secondary sanctions under
section 228 of the CAATSA should they knowingly facilitate a
significant transaction for or on behalf of Deripaska.
Finally, OFAC has made it clear to the Petitioners that it
reserves the right to relist any or all of the Petitioners
should the change in circumstances represented by their
implementation of the agreement with OFAC be reversed,
including by a material breach of the terms of the agreement.

4. Details of the Restructuring Agreed to by En+, Rusal, and ESE

The significant restructuring and corporate governance
changes agreed to by Petitioners have been documented in a
``Terms of Removal,'' which is a binding agreement between
Petitioners and OFAC that remains in effect as long as
Deripaska is on the SDN List. The foundation of this
agreement is the role of En+ in the restructuring and
corporate governance changes. Deripaska will have no direct
ownership stake in ESE and will retain only a 0.01 percent
direct ownership stake in Rusal. En+ will own and control
Rusal and ESE, which operates to isolate and freeze
Deripaska's indirect ownership in Rusal and ESE. Through the
Terms of Removal, Petitioners agreed to implement the
following:
Deripaska's ownership in En+ brought well below 50 percent.
Deripaska's stake in En+ will fall from approximately 70
percent to 44.95 percent, and his stake cannot be increased.
Pursuant to the Terms of Removal, VTB Bank or another non-SDN
assignee approved by OFAC (``VTB Bank'') will take ownership
of a block of Deripaska's shares in En+ pledged as collateral
for previously issued obligations of entities controlled by
Deripaska issued by VTB Bank. Deripaska's ownership interest
in En+ will fall further as a result of a restructuring
transaction whereby the Swiss company Glencore, or its
subsidiary, swaps shares in Rusal for a direct ownership
interest in En+. The end result of these corporate
transactions will be a significant fall in Deripaska's
ownership of En+, none of which involve the transfer of funds
directly or indirectly to Deripaska. Deripaska will also
donate a block of shares to a charitable foundation. None of
the transactions to be undertaken consistent with the
agreement will allow Deripaska to obtain cash either in
return for his shares or from future dividends issued by En+,
Rusal, or ESE.
Limited voting rights in En+. Deripaska will not be able to
vote more than 35 percent of En+ shares, as Deripaska will
assign any voting rights above 35 percent of En+ shares to a
voting trust obligated to vote in the same manner as the
majority of shares held by shareholders other than Deripaska.
Furthermore, OFAC has identified several shareholders with
professional or family ties to Deripaska. In all such cases,
En+ has agreed to assign the voting rights under these shares
to an independent third party with no personal or
professional ties to Deripaska. Furthermore, VTB Bank will
reassign voting rights associated with the shares it takes
ownership of to an independent third party.
Independent board of directors for En+. En+ agreed to
create a board of 12 directors with a majority of independent
directors. Eight of the directors will be independent of
Deripaska and selected through an agreed-to process that
utilizes an executive search firm to select members with no
business, professional, or family ties to Deripaska or any
other designated person. With these changes, half of the En+
board will now be U.S. or UK nationals with extensive
business expertise. OFAC has vetted the entire slate of the
proposed new board members. Prior to designation, En+'s board
was not majority-independent and consisted of 12 directors,
of whom only three were independent non-executive directors.
Deripaska will have the right to nominate no more than four
directors. Replacements for these eight will be selected
through the same process, with an opportunity for further
review by OFAC. En+ has agreed that Directors nominated by
Deripaska will not be permitted to sit on the Audit or
Nominations committees.
Further extinguishment of control. To further extinguish
potential avenues of control by Deripaska, Deripaska is
required by the Terms of Removal to provide a deed letter to
En+ that includes a number of binding legal commitments
severing his ability to control En+. Specifically, the deed
letter provides that En+ and Deripaska explicitly agree not
to act in any manner or to enter into any arrangement,
whether by contract, trust, or otherwise, that directly or
indirectly provides Deripaska with the ability to exercise a
controlling influence over the management or policies of En+
or any entity owned or controlled by En+, including Rusal and
ESE. En+ also has agreed to certify that, besides the right
to nominate four directors, it has not granted Deripaska or
any of his relatives any rights beyond those of ordinary
shareholders with respect to En+ and any entity owned or
controlled by En+.
Ongoing transparency through auditing, certification, and
reporting. The Petitioners have agreed to provide OFAC with
an unprecedented level of transparency into the management
and operation of these companies. En+ and Rusal agreed to
comply with ongoing auditing, certification, and reporting
requirements, including: (i) auditing En+'s and Rusal's
engagements with and obligations to Deripaska and any
entities controlled by Deripaska as well as certifications
that such engagements have been terminated or do not
constitute control by Deripaska; (ii) providing OFAC monthly
certifications of compliance with the agreed upon Terms of
Removal; (iii) providing OFAC quarterly company reports for
En+ and Rusal; (iv) providing OFAC board minutes for En+ and
Rusal; (v) immediately notifying OFAC of any change in the
composition of the independent En+ board and certifying that
any such change is consistent with the selection process
outlined in the Terms of Removal; (vi) immediately notifying
OFAC of any anticipated changes to the identity of any
independent third party assigned voting rights in relation to
En+ and certifying that such individual has no business,
professional, or family ties to Deripaska or any other SDN;
(vii) immediately notifying OFAC of any anticipated change in
ownership of shares of En+ related to the Terms of Removal
and certifying, inter alia, that the change is consistent
with the Terms of Removal and that Deripaska's ownership
shall not rise above 44.95 percent; (viii) immediately
notifying OFAC of any anticipated changes to the constituent
documents of any of the Petitioners and certifying the
anticipated changes are consistent with the Terms of Removal.
In all cases, notifications and certifications required to
be made under the Terms of Removal are designed to ensure
that Deripaska cannot obtain increased influence over En+ or
Rusal by changes in the management or ownership of En+.
Furthermore, En+ has agreed that no entity owned or
controlled by En+, including En+ and Rusal, will change its
place of incorporation to Russia from any other jurisdiction
without an affirmative vote of the new En+ board and
certifications to OFAC.
En+ has agreed to respond fully and expeditiously to any
request for information from OFAC regarding the Terms of
Removal or general sanctions compliance. OFAC will continue
to actively monitor the Petitioners' compliance with the
Terms of Removal for any information suggesting that
Deripaska, any entity in which he owns a 50 percent or
greater interest, or any other blocked person seeks to
influence the Petitioners. All of the information provided
and certifications En+ is required to make under the Terms
of Removal will be directed to OFAC's Office of Global
Targeting, the office that develops evidentiary packages
to designate individuals and entities and which manages
the delisting process.
Additional commitments with respect to Rusal. OFAC
designated Rusal for being owned or controlled by En+.
Therefore, through the same binding agreement with OFAC,
Rusal and En+ agreed that En+, once it is no longer subject
to sanctions, shall continue to control Rusal through a 56.88
percent stake and that En+ shall retain its right to nominate
the CEO of Rusal.

[[Page S30]]

Deripaska will only retain a direct shareholding interest in
Rusal of 0.01 percent and any dividends from this interest
would be placed in a blocked account. En+ has committed to
use its majority control of Rusal to create a board of 14
members, and a majority of those board members (eight) will
be independent non-executive directors who have no business,
professional, or family ties to Deripaska, or any other SDN.
The Chairman of the Board of Rusal will be one of the
independent non-executive directors, and the current Chairman
of Rusal (Matthias Warnig) is stepping down as a condition of
the delisting of Rusal and further will no longer be a member
of the Rusal board. The other six directors will likewise
have no business, professional, or family ties to Deripaska,
or any other SDN, other than their professional backgrounds
as employees of Rusal or En+. Deripaska will have no right to
appoint any board members of Rusal. Prior to designation,
Rusal's board was not majority-independent and consisted of
18 directors, of whom only six were independent non-executive
directors. OFAC has vetted the current slate of directors for
Rusal's board, will review any future independent director
candidates, and will monitor all director appointments to
ensure Rusal's ongoing compliance with the Terms of Removal.
Rusal has also agreed to extensive certification and
reporting requirements similar to those agreed to by En+.
Furthermore, En+ has agreed that it will use its majority
control of Rusal to provide ongoing auditing and monitoring
of potential Deripaska involvement in Rusal.
Commitments with respect to ESE. OFAC designated ESE for
being owned or controlled by En+ and Deripaska. ESE is a
Russian power company and a wholly owned subsidiary of En+.
It does not have an independent board of directors, and day-
to-day management is the responsibility of the General
Director, who is appointed and overseen by the En+ board of
directors. The change in ownership and control of En+
described above would also extinguish Deripaska's control of
ESE. Deripaska will not have any direct shareholding interest
in ESE. Furthermore, ESE's General Director will provide OFAC
with monthly certifications that he or she is not acting for
or on behalf of Deripaska, or any other SDN, and that control
over ESE rests with the General Director of ESE and En+. As a
wholly owned subsidiary of En+, the reporting and
certification requirements that En+ committed to will
necessarily encompass ESE operations and management.

5. Ongoing OFAC Monitoring and Enforcement

OFAC will continue to enforce its sanctions on Deripaska
aggressively, including by closely monitoring the
Petitioners' compliance with the Terms of Removal (``TOR'').
Should one or all of the Petitioners fail to abide by the
binding TOR, OFAC will consider all remedies at its disposal,
including re-designating the offending entity.
Enforcement through complete transparency. The TOR agreed
to between OFAC and Petitioners require unprecedented
transparency. The Petitioners must regularly provide OFAC
with information and certifications about their compliance
with the TOR. This will supplement and be confirmed with the
U.S. Government's own information.
The Petitioners are required to provide OFAC monthly
certifications regarding independence from Deripaska and any
other designated person; En+ and Rusal, which make extensive
commitments in the TOR, are required to certify monthly to
their compliance with respect to all elements of the TOR.
En+ and Rusal are required to submit to OFAC copies of
their quarterly reports, board minutes, and audit reports
related to Deripaska's or other designated persons' potential
collateral involvement in En+ and Rusal.
En+ and Rusal are required to give OFAC notice of and an
opportunity to respond to anticipated changes in the
composition of their boards, as well as of anticipated
changes to third parties assigned voting rights pursuant to
the commitments in the TOR.
En+ and Rusal are required to commit to respond in full and
on a timely basis to any additional questions from OFAC
related to compliance with the TOR.
En+ and Rusal are required to agree that if OFAC provides
En+/Rusal with information that bears on the compliance of
En+/Rusal with any of the elements of the TOR--including with
respect to the independence of any of the eight non-Deripaska
appointed directors of En+ or with respect to any of the
eight independent non-executive directors of Rusal--En+/Rusal
will report to OFAC promptly on any actions that will be
undertaken to remediate the issues identified by OFAC and
will provide OFAC with an opportunity to respond or object to
those actions.
OFAC reserves the right to relist any or all of the
Petitioners to the extent that the change in circumstances
represented by Petitioners' entering into and adhering to the
TOR is reversed, including by a material breach of the TOR.
Additional mechanisms for enforcement. Over and above the
TOR, OFAC retains broad authorities to potentially designate
or bring an enforcement action for direct or indirect
dealings with Deripaska or any other designated person in the
course of dealing with the Petitioners.
Notwithstanding the delisting of the Petitioners, Deripaska
remains sanctioned. OFAC, therefore, has the authority to
designate any person for providing, directly or indirectly,
material support to Deripaska, including, for example, an
``independent'' director who acts at Deripaska's behest.
Notwithstanding a delisting of the Petitioners, U.S.
persons will continue to be prohibited from dealing, directly
or indirectly, with Deripaska or any other designated person.
OFAC's civil enforcement authorities and processes to address
such a situation are described in detail in OFAC's Economic
Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. part 501, app. A.
Notwithstanding a delisting of the Petitioners, non-U.S.
persons will face potential secondary sanctions for knowingly
facilitating significant transactions for or on behalf of
Deripaska or any other person or entity subject to sanctions
imposed by the United States with respect to the Russian
Federation, as described in OFAC's guidance.

6. Conclusion

Treasury officials stand ready to engage and answer any
questions that may arise upon review of this submission,
Moreover, the Petitioners have confirmed their consent to the
release of the proprietary information contained in the TOR
to the appropriate congressional leadership and committees as
may be necessary. Please feel free to reach out to Treasury's
Office of Legislative Affairs at (202) 622-1900 if you would
like to discuss this matter further.
Sincerely,
Andrea M. Gacki,
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that
the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no
objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

S.J. Res. 2

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress
disapproves of the action relating to the application of
sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation
proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress
under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of
2017 on December 19, 2018, relating to terminating sanctions
imposed on En+ Group plc (``En+''), UC Rusal plc (``Rusal''),
and JSC EuroSibEnergo (``ESE'').
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

____________________