[Pages S296-S297]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  SENATE RESOLUTION 24--SUPPORTING A ROBUST AND MODERN ICBM FORCE TO 
      MAXIMIZE THE VALUE OF THE NUCLEAR TRIAD OF THE UNITED STATES

  Mr. HOEVEN (for himself, Mr. Barrasso, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Daines, Mr. 
Enzi, and Mr. Tester) submitted the following resolution; which was 
referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

                               S. Res. 24

       Whereas land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (in 
     this preamble referred to as ``ICBMs'') have been a critical 
     part of the strategic deterrent of the United States for 6 
     decades in conjunction with air and sea-based strategic 
     delivery systems;

[[Page S297]]

       Whereas President John F. Kennedy referred to the 
     deployment of the first Minuteman missile during the Cuban 
     Missile Crisis as his ``ace in the hole'';
       Whereas the Minuteman III missile entered service in 1970 
     and is still deployed in 2019, well beyond its originally 
     intended service life;
       Whereas the ICBM force of the United States peaked at more 
     than 1,200 deployed missiles during the Cold War;
       Whereas the ICBM force of the United States currently 
     consists of approximately 400 Minuteman III missiles deployed 
     across 450 operational missile silos, each carrying a single 
     warhead;
       Whereas the Russian Federation currently deploys at least 
     300 ICBMs with multiple warheads loaded on each missile and 
     has announced plans to replace its Soviet-era systems with 
     modernized ICBMs;
       Whereas the People's Republic of China currently deploys at 
     least 75 ICBMs and plans to grow its ICBM force through the 
     deployment of modernized, road-mobile ICBMs that carry 
     multiple warheads;
       Whereas the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of 
     China deploy nuclear weapons across a variety of platforms in 
     addition to their ICBM forces;
       Whereas numerous countries possess or are seeking to 
     develop nuclear weapons capabilities that pose challenges to 
     the nuclear deterrence of the United States;
       Whereas the nuclear deterrent of the United States is 
     comprised of a triad of delivery systems for nuclear weapons, 
     including submarine-launched ballistic missiles (in this 
     preamble referred to as ``SLBMs''), air-delivered gravity 
     bombs and cruise missiles, and land-based ballistic missiles 
     that provide interlocking and mutually reinforcing attributes 
     that enhance strategic deterrence;
       Whereas weakening one leg of the triad limits the deterrent 
     value of the other legs of the triad;
       Whereas, in the nuclear deterrent of the United States, 
     ICBMs provide commanders with the most prompt response 
     capability, SLBMs provide stealth and survivability, and 
     aircraft armed with nuclear weapons provide flexibility;
       Whereas the ICBM force of the United States forces any 
     would-be attacker to confront more than 400 discrete targets, 
     thus creating an effectively insurmountable targeting problem 
     for a potential adversary;
       Whereas the size, dispersal, and global reach of the ICBM 
     force of the United States ensures that no adversary can 
     escalate a crisis beyond the ability of the United States to 
     respond;
       Whereas a potential attacker would be forced to expend far 
     more warheads to destroy the ICBMs of the United States than 
     the United States would lose in an attack, because of the 
     deployment of a single warhead on each ICBM of the United 
     States;
       Whereas the ICBM force provides a persistent deterrent 
     capability that reinforces strategic stability;
       Whereas ICBMs are the cheapest delivery system for nuclear 
     weapons for the United States to operate and maintain;
       Whereas United States Strategic Command has validated 
     military requirements for the unique capabilities of ICBMs;
       Whereas, in a 2014 analysis of alternatives, the Air Force 
     concluded that replacing the Minuteman III missile would 
     provide upgraded capabilities at lower cost when compared 
     with extending the service life of the Minuteman III missile; 
     and
       Whereas the Minuteman III replacement program, known as the 
     ground-based strategic deterrent, is expected to provide a 
     land-based strategic deterrent capability for 5 decades after 
     the program enters service: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved, That the Senate--
       (1) recognizes that land-based intercontinental ballistic 
     missiles (in this resolution referred to as ``ICBMs'') have 
     certain characteristics, including responsiveness, 
     persistence, and dispersal, that enhance strategic stability 
     and magnify the deterrent value of the air and sea-based legs 
     of the nuclear triad of the United States;
       (2) emphasizes the role that ICBMs have played and continue 
     to play in deterring attacks on the United States and its 
     allies;
       (3) observes that while arms control agreements have 
     reduced the size of the ICBM force of the United States, 
     adversaries of the United States continue to enhance, 
     enlarge, and modernize their ICBM forces;
       (4) supports the modernization of the ICBM force of the 
     United States through the ground-based strategic deterrent 
     program;
       (5) highlights that ICBMs have the lowest operation, 
     maintenance, and modernization costs of any part of the 
     nuclear deterrent of the United States; and
       (6) opposes efforts to unilaterally reduce the size of the 
     ICBM force of the United States or delay the implementation 
     of the ground-based strategic deterrent program, which would 
     degrade the deterrent capabilities of a fully operational and 
     modernized nuclear triad.

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