

TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

SA 193. Mr. LEE (for Mr. PAUL) proposed an amendment to the joint resolution S.J. Res. 7, to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING NO AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE.

Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1547(a)(1)), nothing in this joint resolution may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.

SA 194. Mr. LEE (for Mr. INHOFE (for himself and Mr. CORNYN)) proposed an amendment to the joint resolution S.J. Res. 7, to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress; as follows:

On page 5, line 7, insert after “associated forces” the following: “or operations to support efforts to defend against ballistic missile, cruise missile, and unmanned aerial vehicle threats to civilian population centers in coalition countries, including locations where citizens and nationals of the United States reside”.

SA 195. Mr. LEE (for Mr. RUBIO (for himself and Mr. CORNYN)) proposed an amendment to the joint resolution S.J. Res. 7, to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress; as follows:

Insert after section 3 the following new section:

SEC. 4. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING INTELLIGENCE SHARING.

Nothing in this joint resolution may be construed to influence or disrupt any intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative activities relating to threats in or emanating from Yemen conducted by, or in conjunction with, the United States Government involving—

- (1) the collection of intelligence;
- (2) the analysis of intelligence; or
- (3) the sharing of intelligence between the United States and any coalition partner if the President determines such sharing is appropriate and in the national security interests of the United States.

SA 196. Mr. MERKLEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the joint resolution S.J. Res. 7, to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

On page 5, line 5, insert after “Yemen” the following: “, including by blocking any arms sales to Saudi Arabia for any item designated as a Category III, IV, VII, or VIII item on the United States Munitions List (USML) pursuant to section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)) as long as Saudi Arabia continues to use such weapons in the civil war in the Republic of Yemen”.

SA 197. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed

by him to the joint resolution S.J. Res. 7, to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

SEC. 6. REQUIREMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS CONDITION OF ENTERING INTO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO SECTION 123 OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In 1971, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), which non-nuclear weapons states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington July 1, 1968 (commonly known as the “NPT”), are obligated to bring into force to verify compliance with their nonproliferation obligations under the treaty.

(2) In 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established the model Additional Protocol to CSAs, which grants the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and sites related to a state’s peaceful nuclear program.

(3) The IAEA and international nonproliferation community established the Additional Protocol as a response to major shocks to the nonproliferation regime, most notably revelations that the IAEA’s existing safeguards system had failed to detect the Government of Iraq’s covert, undeclared nuclear program for non-peaceful purposes prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

(4) The Additional Protocol strengthens the IAEA’s ability not only to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also to provide assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material activities in a state by—

(A) applying IAEA safeguards to a state’s entire nuclear program, including uranium mining and milling sites, fuel fabrication, enrichment, and nuclear waste sites, as well as to any other location where nuclear is or may be present;

(B) expanding the amount and type of information a state is obligated to report to the IAEA regarding its nuclear program and related activities;

(C) expanding the IAEA’s inspection access at declared—and undeclared—locations to verify the absence of undeclared material or to resolve questions or inconsistencies in the information a state has provided about its nuclear activities; and

(D) specifying the IAEA’s right to use additional safeguards methods and equipment, including environmental sampling at both declared and undeclared sites.

(5) Universalizing the Additional Protocol and establishing it as the international standard for IAEA safeguards has been a bipartisan objective of United States nonproliferation policy since the Additional Protocol’s adoption.

(6) During the 2000 NPT Review Conference at the United Nations, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright endorsed the “IAEA’s new strengthened safeguards to deter and detect cheating” and urged “all states to adopt them”.

(7) During the 2005 NPT Review Conference at the United Nations, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen G. Rademaker stated that President George W. Bush’s nonproliferation policy included “universalizing adherence to the Additional

Protocol and making it a condition of nuclear supply”.

(8) During the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized that the “United States is working to bring the Additional Protocol into force globally and to make it the global standard for safeguards compliance”.

(9) During the 2018 IAEA General Conference, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry delivered a letter on behalf of President Donald J. Trump, announcing that the United States “will continue promoting high standards of safety, security, safeguards, and nonproliferation, including an Additional Protocol as the international standard, and call on other nations to do the same”.

(10) At the same conference, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher Ashley Ford stressed that the Additional Protocol “should be universalized, and all supplier states should make adherence to the AP by recipient states a condition for nuclear supply”.

(11) As of December 2018, 134 states have brought into force the Additional Protocol with the IAEA while another 16 states have signed the Additional Protocol but have yet to bring it into force.

(12) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has not brought into force an Additional Protocol. It currently has a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) with the IAEA, a safeguards agreement that suspends the application of many provisions of a CSA for countries with minimal nuclear material and activities on its territory or under its jurisdiction.

(13) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has expressed its intent to build an extensive civilian nuclear program, including two large-scale nuclear power reactors and multiple small modular reactors.

(14) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will no longer be eligible for a SQP and will be obligated to implement a CSA with the IAEA without exemptions if it either has nuclear material in quantities exceeding minimal limits or constructs nuclear facilities on its territory or under its jurisdiction, including a nuclear reactor.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Additional Protocol represents the international safeguards standard;

(2) Saudi Arabia should, at a minimum, bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA as a requirement under any nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States made pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153); and

(3) any future civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with other nations pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) should require that the proposed recipient has in force an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

(c) REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER NATIONS.—Section 123a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (8), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following new paragraph:

“(10) the cooperating party has in force an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.”.

SA 198. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the joint resolution S.J. Res. 7, to direct the removal of United

States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

SEC. 6. VISA RESTRICTIONS FOR CERTAIN ALIENS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall impose the visa restrictions described in subsection (c) on any alien who the Secretary determines is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing the unlawful detention of a United States citizen in Saudi Arabia.

(b) REMOVAL FROM VISA RESTRICTION LIST.—The Secretary may issue a visa to an alien described in subsection (a) if the Secretary—

(1) determines that such alien has afforded due process to the applicable United States citizen; and

(2) submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that contains a justification for such determination.

(c) VISA RESTRICTIONS DESCRIBED.—Subject to subsection (b)—

(1) an alien described in subsection (a)—

(A) is inadmissible to the United States; and

(B) is ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation authorizing entry into the United States; and

(2) in the case of an alien described in subsection (a) who is in possession of a valid visa or other documentation authorizing entry into the United States, the Secretary shall revoke such visa or other documentation under section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)).

(d) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION.—Notwithstanding section 222(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1202(f)), the Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register—

(1) the name of any alien to whom a visa restriction under subsection (a) applies; and

(2) any report submitted to the appropriate committees of Congress under subsection (b)(2).

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ALIEN.—The term “alien” has the meaning given the term in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).

(2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

(3) SECRETARY.—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of State.

(4) UNLAWFUL DETENTION.—The term “unlawful detention” means arbitrary arrest or imprisonment without a public charge or trial.

SA 199. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the joint resolution S.J. Res. 7, to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLING OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency assesses, with high confidence, before, on, or after such date of enactment, is responsible for, or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the extrajudicial killing of Jamal Khashoggi.

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions to be imposed under subsection (a) with respect to a foreign person are the following:

(1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The blocking, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), of all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(B) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements of section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for purposes of this subsection.

(2) INADMISSIBILITY TO UNITED STATES.—In the case of a foreign person who is an individual—

(A) ineligibility to receive a visa to enter the United States or to be admitted to the United States; or

(B) if the individual has been issued a visa or other documentation, revocation, in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of the visa or other documentation.

(c) EXCEPTIONS.—

(1) IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—The requirement to impose sanctions under subsection (b)(1) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions with respect to the importation of goods.

(2) COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Subsection (b)(2) shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien to the United States if such admission is necessary to comply with United States obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, under the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or under other international agreements.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.

(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms “admitted” and “alien” have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” means a person that is not a United States person.

(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

Mr. BLUNT. Mr. President, I have 9 requests for committees to meet during today's session of the Senate. They have the approval of the Majority and Minority leaders.

Pursuant to rule XXVI, paragraph 5(a), of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the following committees are authorized to meet during today's session of the Senate:

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

The Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, March 13, 2019, at 10 a.m., to conduct a hearing on the nomination of Heath P. Tarbert, of Maryland, to be Chairman, and to be a Commissioner of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, March 13, 2019, at 10 a.m., to conduct a hearing entitled “The New Space Race: Ensuring U.S. global leadership on the final frontier.”

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

The Committee on Environment and Public Works is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, March 13, 2019, at 10 a.m., to conduct a hearing.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Committee on Foreign Relations is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, March 13, 2019, at 10.15 a.m., to conduct a hearing entitled, “A new approach for an era of United States-China competition.”

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

The Committee on the Judiciary is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, March 13, 2019, at 10 a.m., to conduct a hearing on the nomination of Daniel P. Collins, and Kenneth Kiyul Lee, both of California, both to be a United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit.

COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

The Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, March 13, 2019, at 2:30 p.m., to conduct a hearing entitled “Cyber Crime: An existential threat to small business.”