McCain. We also must act to show solidarity with the millions of brave human rights defenders, anti-poverty advocates, journalists, and investigators who put their lives at risk every day—and sometimes pay the ultimate price—to fight the scourge of corruption and impunity.

I am proud that last week Senator YOUNG and I, along with Senators LEAHY, RUBIO, BLUMENTHAL, and MERKLEY, reaffirm bipartisan political will to combat global corruption by reintroducing the Combating Global Corruption Act, S. 1309. Our bill makes clear that the United States must meet the scale of the problem of corruption with greater resolve and commitment. To do that, our bill focuses on four things.

First, we must institutionalize the fight against corruption as a national security priority. Our bill requires the State Department to produce an annual report, similar to the Trafficking in Persons Report, which takes a close look at each country's efforts to combat corruption. That model, which has effectively advanced the effort to combat modern day slavery, will similarly embed the issue of corruption in our collective work, so that we hold governments to account. This bill establishes minimum standards for combating corruption, standards that should be part and parcel of every government's commitment to its citizens. These include whether a country has laws that recognize corrupt acts for the crimes they are—violations of the people's trust—along with appropriate penalties for breaking that trust, whether a country has an independent judiciary for deciding corruption cases, free from influence and abuse, whether there is support for civil society organizations that are the watchdogs of integrity against would-be thieves of the state. This bill, hopefully, will build anticorruption DNA into the foundations of government action.

Second, in the United States, our whole-of-government effort must be better coordinated. Right now, we work across multiple agencies and in multiple offices to combat corruption. There is much information and many best practices that can be shared; we have got to do better at that and take advantage of those areas where we have been successful. The State Department and the United States Agency for International Development have done great work, but the vast nature of the problem requires that we improve our ability to tackle it. In this bill, agencies and bureaus and our missions overseas will have to prioritize corruption into their strategic planning as an essential part of our foreign policy work, a step that I believe will foster greater cooperation.

Third, we must improve oversight of our own foreign assistance and promote transparency. The U.S. taxpayer has a right to know how our foreign assistance is being spent and also should feel confident that we are doing the kind of risk assessments, analysis, and oversight that ensure our assistance to other countries is having the effect we want it to have. Our bill consolidates information and puts it online, where citizens can see the numbers and the programs. That kind of transparency is in and of itself good, but in my experience it has the effect of making us better at self-policing our work. We can use the data to capture redundancies and analyze trends, which I believe will make our decision-making better. The bill embeds oversight into our foreign assistance programs overseas, maintaining the flexibility we need to meet our goals rapidly while also holding government to account.

In fact, it is a natural complement to the Foreign Assistance Transparency and Accountability Act, a bipartisan law Senator RUBIO and I cosponsored that looks at our foreign aid and seeks to ensure that our foreign assistance programs are tracked and evaluated adequately and appropriately.

I am a believer in the power of example. This ''one-two'' punch of the Combating Global Corruption Act and the Foreign Assistance Transparency Act strengthens our foreign assistance policy, demonstrates that we hold ourselves to the highest standards, and shows other countries that we are committed to this fight.

Finally, we have to find ways to resource anti-corruption work. Corruption is big business and big money. We should look for ways to use seized assets and ill-gotten proceeds to build civil society capacity to fight corruption and make it easier to transfer these assets to the appropriate effort. We have also witnessed the damaging impact of corruption on our foreign assistance efforts. The Combating Global Corruption Act understands that corruption risk assessment before, during, and after the provision of foreign aid and security assistance is integral to reducing and eliminating corruption. It holds U.S. foreign assistance and security assistance programs accountable to U.S. taxpayers by specifying transparency and accountability measures for the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development to advance anti-corruption efforts in those countries where the U.S. administers foreign and security assistance.

As we project the American values of good governance and anticorruption abroad, we must also redouble our efforts to strengthen these core values here in the United States. Unfortunately, these values have been put into question under our current administration. Our concerns run deeper than noticing the lack of priority given to anti-corruption and good governance policies. U.S. credibility has been weakening on this issue. In turn, our U.S. foreign policy is threatened.

For the 3rd straight year, the Trump administration, through its budget request, sent a message to the world of its priorities for the United States. For the 3rd straight year, the Trump administration proposed drastic cuts to the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs—SFOPS—budget, which would cut foreign assistance funding by more than 30 percent. This also came amidst the recent decision to cut off foreign assistance to the Northern Triangle of Central America, a region of the world where U.S. assistance in combating corruption has a direct impact on our national security. This decision threatens to undermine the critical anti-corruption programming that helps us combat narcotics trafficking groups and violent gangs, as well as to address the root causes of migration. For this very reason, the bipartisan U.S.—Central America strategy names good governance as one of its central pillars.

This is why for Fiscal Year 2020, I asked the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs to include at least $500,000 for the Department of State and $500,000 for the U.S. Agency for International Development to achieve meaningful and robust implementation of the activities outlined in the Combating Global Corruption Act. This includes the bill's reporting requirements, staffing, and staff training to support anticorruption as a foreign policy and development priority. This bipartisan bill recognizes the importance of combating corruption as a hurdle to achieving peace, prosperity, and human rights around the world. Passage of S. 1309 would signal to the international community that the U.S. Congress has not forgotten U.S. values and that we will continue to fight to ensure such values and U.S. credibility remain intact.

There is only one United States of America. There is only one country that can do what we can do, and this bill sends the message that we will continue to fight to ensure that stature does not change.

I am under no illusion that this global fight against corruption will be easy. It will make the work of our government agencies more challenging. It will make our diplomacy more challenging. It will require political will, but political will finds its source and its strength in our values. Political will is created when we embrace those values. Political will endures in good governance, accountability, and transparency and those values that are at the core of the compact between the government and the governed.

As this bill moves forward, I urge my colleagues to find the political will to combat global corruption, ensure accountability, and keep our commitment to the best of American values.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATIONS

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon

such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD–423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19–06 concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Bahrain for defense articles and services estimated to cost $2.478 billion. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

GREGORY M. KAUSNER,
(For Charles W. Hooper, Lieutenant General, USA, Director).

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19–06

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Bahrain.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* $1.445 billion.

Other $1.033 billion.

Total $2.478 billion.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Sixty (60) Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC–3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) Missiles.

Thirty-six (36) Patriot MIM–104E Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM–T) Missiles with Canisters.

Nine (9) M903 Launching Stations (LS).

Five (5) Antenna Mast Groups (AMG).

Three (3) Electrical Power Plants (EPP) III.

Two (2) AN/MPQ–65 Radar Sets (RS).

Two (2) AN/MSQ–132 Engagement Control Stations (ECS).

Non-MDE: Also included is communications equipment, tools and test equipment, range and test programs, support equipment, prime movers, generators, publications and technical documentation, training equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training, Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT), U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, Systems Integration and Checkout (SICO), field office support, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army (BA–B–UKY).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 3, 2019.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Bahrain—Patriot Missile System and Related Support and Equipment

The Government of Bahrain has requested to buy sixty (60) Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC–3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles, thirty-six (36) Patriot MIM–104E Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM–T) missiles with canisters, nine (9) M903 Launching Stations (LS), five (5) Antenna Mast Groups (AMG), three (3) Electrical Power Plants (EPP) III, two (2) AN/MPQ–65 Radar Sets (RS), and two (2) AN/MSQ–132 Engagement Control Stations (ECS). Also included is communications equipment, tools and test equipment, range and test programs, support equipment, prime movers, generators, publications and technical documentation, training equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training, Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT), U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, Systems Integration and Checkout (SICO), field office support, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $2.478 billion.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of a Major Non-NATO ally which is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. This sale is consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key allies in the region with modem systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.

The proposed sale will enhance Bahrain's interoperability with the United States. Bahrain will use Patriot to improve its missile defense capability, defend its territorial integrity, and deter regional threats. Bahrain will have no difficulty absorbing this system into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of these missiles will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor for the PAC–3 Missile is Lockheed-Martin in Dallas, Texas. The prime contractor for the GEM–T missile is Raytheon Company in Andover, Massachusetts. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require approximately 25 U.S. Government and 40 contractor representatives to travel to Bahrain for an extended period for equipment de-processing/fielding, system checkout, training, and technical and logistics support.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19–06

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The Patriot Air Defense System contains classified CONFIDENTIAL hardware components, SECRET tactical software and critical/sensitive technology. Patriot ground support equipment and Patriot missile hardware contain CONFIDENTIAL components and the associated launcher hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. The items requested represent significant technological advances for Bahrain. The Patriot Air Defense System continues to hold a significant technology lead over other surface-to-air missile systems in the world.

2. The Patriot sensitive/critical technology is primarily in the area of design and production know-how and primarily inherent in the design, development and/or manufacturing data related to certain components. The list of components is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

3. Information on system performance capabilities, effectiveness, survivability, missile seeker capabilities, select software/software documentation and test data are classified up to and including SECRET.

4. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures or equivalent systems which might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

5. A determination has been made that the Government of Bahrain can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

6. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of Bahrain.

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD–423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 18–20, concerning the Air Force's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Bahrain for defense articles and services estimated to cost $750 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER,
Lieutenant General, USA, Director.

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 18–20

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Bahrain.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment * $400 million.

Other $350 million.

Total $750 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Thirty-two (32) AIM–120C–7 AMRAAM Missiles.

One (1) AIM–120C–7 AMRAAM Guidance Section.

Thirty-two (32) AIM–9X Missiles.

Twenty (20) AGM–84 Block II Harpoon Missiles.

Two (2) ATM–84L–1 Block II Harpoon Missiles.

Forty (40) AGM–154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) All-Up-Rounds.

Fifty (50) AGM–88B High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM).

Four (4) AGM–88 HARM Training Missiles.

One hundred (100) GBU–39 250 lb Small Diameter Bomb (SDB–1) All-Up-Rounds.

Four hundred (400) MAU–209 C/B Computer Control Groups (GBU–10, –12).

Eighty (80) MAU–210 Enhanced Computer Control Groups (GBU–49, –50).

Three hundred forty (340) MXU–650 Air Foil Group (GBU–12, –49).

One hundred forty (140) MXU–651 Air Foil Groups (GBU–10, –50).

Seventy (70) KMU–557 GBU–31 Tail Kits (GBU–31 JDAM, GBU–56 JDAM).

One hundred twenty (120) KMU–572 Tail Kits (GBU–38, –54).

One hundred (100) DSU–38 Proximity Sensors (GBU–54).

Four hundred sixty-two (462) MK–82 or BLU–111 500 lb Bomb Bodies (Supporting GBU–12, GBU–38, GBU–49, GBU–54).

Two hundred ten (210) BLU–109/BLU–117 or MK–84 2000 lb Bomb Bodies (Supporting GBU–10, GBU–31, GBU–50, GBU–56).

Ten (10) Practice BLU–109/BLU–117.

Six hundred seventy (670) FMU–152 Fuses (supporting GBU–10, –12, –31, –38, –49, –50, –54, & –56).

Non-MDE: Also included are LAU–118 launchers; BRU–61 racks; general purpose Air Foil Groups; tactical training rounds; combat arms training and Maintenance Assets; nose support cups; Swivel/Link attachments; DSU–38/40/42 proximity sensors; Repair and Return services; studies and surveys; weapons system support and test equipment; publications and technical documentation; Alternate Mission Equipment (AME); mission system spares and munitions spare parts; software maintenance and support; missile support and test equipment; common munitions bit/reprogramming equipment; missile and munitions containers; personnel training and training equipment; site surveys; U.S. Government/Contractor technical, engineering, and logistical support; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (BA–D–YAF).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: BA–D–SAC, BA–D–YAE, BA–D–YBI.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 3, 2019.

* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Bahrain—Weapons to Support F–16 Block 70/F–16V Aircraft Fleet

The Government of Bahrain has requested to buy thirty-two (32) AIM–120C–7 AMRAAM missiles; one (1) AIM–120C–7 AMRAAM guidance section; thirty-two (32) AIM–9X missiles; twenty (20) AGM–84 Block II Harpoon missiles; two (2) ATM–84L–1 Block II Harpoon missiles; forty (40) AGM–154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) All –Up –Rounds; fifty (50) AGM–88B High –Speed Anti –Radiation Missiles (HARM); four (4) AGM–88 HARM training missiles; one hundred (100) GBU–39 250 lb Small Diameter Bomb (SDB–1) All –Up –Rounds; four hundred (400) MAU–209 C/B Computer Control Groups (GBU–10, –12); eighty (80) MAU–210 Enhanced Computer Control Groups (GBU–49, –50); three hundred forty (340) MXU–650 Air Foil Group (GBU–12, –49); one hundred forty (140) MXU–651 Air Foil Groups (GBU–10, –50); seventy (70) KMU–557 GBU–31 tail kits (GBU–31 JDAM, GBU–56 JDAM); one hundred twenty (120) KMU–572 tail kits (GBU–38, –54); one hundred (100) DSU–38 proximity sensors (GBU–54); four hundred sixty –two (462) MK–82 or BLU–111 500 lb Bomb Bodies (Supporting GBU–12, GBU–38, GBU–49, GBU–54); two hundred ten (210) BLU–109/BLU–117 or MK–84 2000 lb Bomb Bodies; (Supporting GBU–10, GBU–31, GBU–50, GBU–56); ten (10) practice BLU–109/BLU–117; six hundred seventy (670) FMU–152 fuses (supporting GBU–10, –12, –31, –38; 49, –50, –54, & –56). Also included are LAU–118 launchers; BRU–61 racks; general purpose Air Foil Groups; tactical training rounds; combat arms training and Maintenance Assets; nose support cups; Swivel/Link attachments; DSU–38/40/42 proximity sensors; Repair and Return services; studies and surveys; weapons system support and test equipment; publications and technical documentation; Alternate Mission Equipment (AME); mission system spares and munitions spare parts; software maintenance and support; missile support and test equipment; common munitions bit/reprogramming equipment; missile and munitions containers; personnel training and training equipment; site surveys; U.S. Government/Contractor technical, engineering, and logistical support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $750 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a major non-NATO ally which is an important security partner in the region. Our mutual defense interests anchor our relationship and the Royal Bahraini Air Force (RBAF) plays a significant role in Bahrain's defense.

The proposed sale improves Bahrain's ability to meet current and future threats. Bahrain will use these capabilities as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen its homeland defense. These weapons support the new procurement of F–16 Block 70 and upgrades of existing F–16V aircraft, providing an increase in the capability of existing aircraft to sustain operations, meet training requirements, and support transition training for pilots to the upgraded aircraft. This proposed sale and upgrade will improve interoperability with U.S. forces and other regional allies.

Bahrain will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

The proposed sale will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors for this effort will be Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, Fort Worth, TX; Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, AZ; and Boeing Corporation, Chicago, IL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of at least two (2) additional U.S. Government representatives to Bahrain.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 18–20

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. Sensitive and/or classified (up to SECRET) elements include hardware, accessories, components, and associated software for the AIM–120C–7, AIM–9X, AGM–88B, AGM–84, AGM–154, GBU–10/12, GBU–31/38, GBU–49/50/54/56, and GBU–39. Additional sensitive areas include operating manuals and maintenance technical orders containing performance information, operating and test procedures, and other information related to support operations and repair. The hardware, software, and data identified are classified to protect vulnerabilities, design and performance parameters and other similar critical information.

2. The AIM–120C–7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) is a supersonic, air-launched, aerial intercept, guided missile featuring digital technology and micro-miniature solid-state electronics. The missile employs active radar target tracking, proportional navigation guidance, and active Radio Frequency target detection. It can be launched day or night, in any weather, and increases pilot survivability by allowing the pilot to disengage after missile launch and engage other targets. AMRAAM capabilities include lookdown/shootdown, multiple launches against multiple targets, resistance to electronic countermeasures, and interception of high- and low-flying maneuvering targets. The AMRAAM all up round is classified CONFIDENTIAL, major components and subsystems range from UNCLASSIFIED to CONFIDENTIAL, and technical data and other documentation are classified up to SECRET.

3. AIM–9X Sidewinder missile is an air-to-air guided missile that employs a passive infrared (IR) target acquisition system that features digital technology and miniature solid-state electronics. The AIM–9X tactical and Captive Air Training Missile guidance units are subsets of the overall missile and were recently designated as MDE. The AIM–9X is CONFIDENTIAL. Major components and subsystems range from UNCLASSIFIED to CONFIDENTIAL, and technical data and other documentation are classified up to SECRET. The overall system classification is SECRET.

The AIM–9X is launched from the aircraft using a LAU–129 guided missile launcher (currently in country inventory). The LAU–129 provides mechanical and electrical interface between missile and aircraft. The LAU–129 system is UNCLASSIFIED.

4. AGM–88B High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) is an air-to-ground missile designed to destroy or suppress enemy radars used for air defense. HARM has wide frequency coverage, is target reprogrammable in flight, and has a reprogrammable threat library. Hardware and software for the system is classified SECRET and ballistics data is CONFIDENTIAL. The overall system classification is SECRET.

The AGM–88 is launched from the aircraft using a LAU–118A guided missile launcher. The LAU–118A provides mechanical and electrical interface between missile and aircraft. The LAU–118A system is UNCLASSIFIED.

5. GBU–10/12: 2000 lb (GBU–10) and 500 lb (GBU–12) Paveway II (PW–II) laser guided

bombs. The PW–II is a maneuverable, free-fall weapon that guides on laser energy reflected off of the target. The PW–II is delivered like a normal general purpose warhead and the laser guidance guides the weapon into the target. Laser designation for the weapon can be provided by a variety of laser target designators. The PW–II consists of a laser guidance kit, a computer control group and a warhead specific air foil group, that attach to the nose and tail of Mk 84, Mk 82 bomb bodies. The weapon components are UNCLASSIFIED. Some technical data and vulnerabilities/countermeasures are classified up to SECRET.

a. The GBU–10: This is a 2000 lb (BLU–117 B/B or Mk 84) General Purpose (GP) guided bomb fitted with the MXU–651 airfoil and the MAU–169 or MAU–209 computer control group to guide to its laser-designated target.

b. The GBU–12: This is a 500 lb (BLU–111/B or Mk–82) guided bomb fitted with the MXU–650 airfoil and the MAU–169 or MAU 209 computer control group to guide to its laser-designated target.

6. GBU–49 and GBU–50 are 500 lb/2000 lb Enhanced Paveway II (EP-II) dual mode laser and GPS guided munitions respectively. The GBU–49/50 uses airfoil groups similar to those used on the GBU–12 and GBU–10 for inflight maneuverability, and uses a MAU–210 Enhanced Computer Control Group. The ''enhanced'' component is the addition of GPS guidance to the laser seeker. This dual-mode allows the weapon to operate in all-weather conditions. Weapons components are UNCLASSIFIED. Technical data and countermeasures/vulnerabilities are SECRET. The overall system classification is SECRET.

7. GBU–31 and GBU–38 2000 lb/500 lb Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) is a guidance kit that converts existing unguided free-fall bombs into precision-guided munitions. By adding a new tail section containing Inertial Navigation System (INS) guidance/Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance to existing inventories of BLU–109, BLU–111 and BLU–117 or Mk–84 and Mk–82 bombs, the cost effective JDAM provides highly accurate weapon delivery in any ''flyable'' weather. The INS, using updates from the GPS, helps guide the bomb to the target via the use of movable tail fins. The JDAM and all of its components are UNCLASSIFIED; technical data for JDAM is classified up to SECRET.

8. GBU–54/56 are the 500 lb/2000 lb Laser JDAM. These weapons use the DSU–38/B/DSU–40/42 laser sensor respectively and use both Global Position System aided inertial navigation and/or laser guidance to execute threat targets. The laser sensor enhances standard JDAM's reactive target capability by allowing rapid prosecution of fixed targets with large initial target location errors (TLE). The laser sensor also provides the additional capability to engage mobile targets. The addition of the DSU–38 laser sensor combined with additional cabling and mounting hardware turns a GBU–38 JDAM into a GBU–54 Laser JDAM. The addition of the DSU–40/42 laser sensor combined with additional cabling and mounting hardware turns a GBU–31 JDAM into a GBU–56 Laser JDAM. Weapons components are UNCLASSIFIED. Technical data and countermeasures/vulnerabilities are SECRET. The overall system classification is SECRET.

9. GBU–39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB–1): The GBU–39 is a 250 lb class precision guided munition that allows aircraft with an ability to carry a high number of bombs. The weapon offers day or night, adverse weather, precision engagement capability against pre-planned fixed or stationary soft, non-hardened, and hardened targets, with a significant standoff range. Aircraft are able to carry four SDB-ls in place of one 2000 lb bomb. The SDB–1 is equipped with a UPS-aided inertial navigation system to attack fixed, stationary targets such as fuel depots and bunkers. The SDB–1 and all of its components are UNCLASSIFIED; technical data is classified up to SECRET.

10. The AGM–154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) is a family of low-cost standoff weapons that are modular in design and incorporate either a sub-munition or a unitary warhead. Potential targets for JSOW range from soft targets, such as troop concentrations, to hardened point targets like bunkers. The AGM–154C is a penetrator weapon that carries a BROACH warhead and pay load. The AGM–154 hardware, software and maintenance data is UNCLASSIFIED. Vulnerabilities and countermeasures are classified up to SECRET. Overall system classification is SECRET.

11. The AGM–84L–1 Harpoon provides a day, night, and adverse weather, standoff air-to-surface capability. Harpoon Block II is a follow on to the Harpoon missile, which is no longer in production. Harpoon Block II is an effective Anti-Surface Warfare missile. The AGM–84L–1 Harpoon incorporates components, software, and technical design information that are considered sensitive. The following Harpoon components being conveyed by the proposed sale that are considered sensitive and are classified CONFIDENTIAL include: IIR seeker, INS, OPP software and, missile operational characteristics and performance data. The overall system classification is SECRET.

12. Software, hardware, and other data/information, which is classified or sensitive, is reviewed prior to release to protect system vulnerabilities, design data, and performance parameters. Some end-item hardware, software, and other data identified above are classified at the CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET level. Potential compromise of these systems is controlled through management of the basic software programs of highly sensitive systems and software-controlled weapon systems on a case-by-case basis.

13. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

14. A determination has been made that Bahrain can provide substantially the same degree of protection of this technology as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification. Moreover, the benefits to be derived from this sale, as outlined in the Policy Justification, outweigh the potential damage that could result if the sensitive technology were revealed to unauthorized persons.

15. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of Bahrain.

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD–423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19–17 concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of the Czech Republic for defense articles and services estimated to cost $800 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER,
Lieutenant General, USA, Director.

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19–17

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the Czech Republic.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment* $450 million.
Other $350 million.
Total $800 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: The Government of the Czech Republic has requested to buy twelve (12) UH–60M Black Hawk Helicopters in standard U.S. Government configuration with designated unique equipment and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE).

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Twelve (12) UH–60M Black Hawk Helicopters with Designated Unique Equipment.

Twenty-eight (28) T700–GE–701D Engines (24 installed and 4 spares).

Twenty-nine (29) H–764GU Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation and Country Unique SAASM (24 installed and 5 spares).

Twenty-four (24) M240H Machine Guns.

One-hundred fourteen (114) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS).

Fifteen (15) AN/AAR–57(V)3 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) (12 installed and 3 spares).

Non-MDE: Also included are four (4) Aviation Mission Planning Systems (AMPS), twenty-nine (29) AN/ARC–231 UHF/VHF Radios with RT–1808A, twenty-nine (29) AN/ARC–201D SINCGARS Airborne Radios System with RT–1478D, fifteen (15) AN/ARC–220(V)3 HF Radio, twelve (12) Federated Advanced Navigation System (FANS) with RNP/RNAV, fifteen (15) AN/APX–123 IFF with Mode 4/5 Transponder (12 installed and 3 spares), fifteen (15) AN/ARN–147(V) (12 installed and 3 spares), fifteen (15) AN/ARN–149(V) Automatic Digital Frequency (12 installed and 3 spares), fifteen (15) Tactical Airborne Navigation System (TACAN) AN/ARN–153 (12 installed and 3 spares), fifteen (15) AN/APR–39C(V)1/4 Radar Warning Receiver, fifteen (15) AN/AVR–2B(V) Laser Warning System (12 installed and 3 spares), sixty (60) Military Grade AN/AVS–6 Night

Vision Goggles (NVGs), four (4) EBC–406HM Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), Aircraft Wireless Intercom System (AWIS), forty-eight (48) Machine Gun Mounts, twenty-four (24) M134D Mini Gun, four thousand (4,000) M–134 Inert Training Rounds, twenty-four (24) M–134 Power Supply Pack, twelve (12) GP–19 Machine Gun Pods, twelve (12) GAU–19B Machine Guns, twenty-four (24) M–134 Power Supply Pack, one hundred forty-four (144) M–134 Spare Barrels, four thousand (4,000) M–134 Training Rounds, twelve (12) M–134 Mount Systems, twelve (12) Packaging Crating and Handling Mount System in Support of M–134, twelve (12) M261 Rocket Launchers, one hundred thousand (100,000) 7.62MM 4 Ball M80 1 Tracer M62 Linked, five hundred one thousand (501,000) Cartridge 7.62MM 4 Ball 1 Tracer, ten thousand (10,000) Cartridge 50 Caliber Ball, ten thousand (10,000) 50 Caliber 4 Ball 1 Tracer, ten thousand (10,000) Cartridge 50 Caliber 4 Armor Piercing Incendiary 1 Armor Piercing Incendiary Tracer Linked, three Hundred (300) Cartridge 25.4 Millimeter Decoy M839, four (4) Cartridge Impulse CCU–92/A, three hundred eighty-four (384) Rocket 2.75 Inch High Explosive Warhead M151 Fuze M423 Motor MK66–4, two hundred forty (240) Warhead 2.75 Inch Rocket M151HE, one hundred eighty (180) Rocket Motor 2.75 Inch MK66–4, four hundred (400) Flare Aircraft Countermeasure M206, Two (2) Airborne Command and Control Systems includes three (3) PRC–117s (two (2) as line-of-sight and one (1) as beyond line-of-sight, one (1) iridium phone, one (1) ROVER 4 (to UAS), DAGAR (GPS)), twelve (12) AN/APN–209 Radar Altimeter, twenty-four (24) Upturned Exhaust System, thirteen (13) MX–10D EO/IR Sensor with Laser Designator (12 and 1 spare), thirteen (13) IZLED 200 PIR Laser (12 installed and 1 spare), thirty (30) User Data Modules (UDM) for Common Missile Warning System (CMWS), Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) Classified Software Updates, Machine Gun Component Spare Parts, Operation Mission Data Set (MDS) in support of the AN/APR–39C(V)1/4, twelve (12) AN/AVS–7 Heads-Up Display, aircraft warranty, air worthiness support, calibration services, spare and repair parts, support equipment, communication equipment, weapons, ammunition, night vision devices, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training devices, site surveys, tool and test equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army (EZ–B–UEK).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 3, 2019.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Czech Republic—UH–60M Black Hawk Helicopters

The Government of Czech Republic has requested to buy (12) UH–60M Black Hawk helicopters, with twenty-eight (28) T700–GE–701D engines (24 installed and 4 spares), twenty-nine (29) H–764GU Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation and Country Unique SAASM (24 installed and 5 spares), twenty-four (24) M240H machine guns, one-hundred fourteen (114) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS), and fifteen (15) AN/AAR–57(V)3 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) (12 installed and 3 spares). Also included are four (4) Aviation Mission Planning Systems (AMPS), twenty-nine (29) AN/ARC–231 UHF/VHF Radios with RT–1808A, twenty-nine (29) AN/ARC–201D SINCGARS Airborne Radios System with RT–1478D, fifteen (15) AN/ARC–220(V)3 HF Radio, twelve (12) Federated Advanced Navigation System (FANS) with RNP/RNAV, fifteen (15) AN/APX–123 IFF with Mode 4/5 Transponder (12 installed and 3 spares), fifteen (15) AN/ARN–147(V) (12 installed and 3 spares), fifteen (15) AN/ARN–149(V) Automatic Digital Frequency (12 installed and 3 spares), fifteen (15) Tactical Airborne Navigation System (TACAN) AN/ARN–153 (12 installed and 3 spares), fifteen (15) AN/APR–39C(V)1/4 Radar Warning Receiver, fifteen (15) AN/AVR–2B(V) Laser Warning System (12 installed and 3 spares), sixty (60) Military Grade AN/AVS–6 Night Vision Goggles (NVGs), four (4) EBC–406HM Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), Aircraft Wireless Intercom System (AWIS), forty-eight (48) Machine Gun Mounts, twenty-four (24) M134/D Mini Gun, four thousand (4,000) M–134 Inert Training Rounds, twenty-four (24) M–134 Power Supply Pack, twelve (12) GP–19 Machine Gun Pods, twelve (12) GAU–19B Machine Guns, twenty-four (24) M–134 Power Supply Pack, one hundred forty-four (144) M134 Spare Barrels, four thousand (4,000) M–134 Training Rounds, twelve (12) M–134 Mount Systems, twelve (12) Packaging Crating and Handling Mount System in Support of M–134, twelve (12) M261 Rocket Launchers, one hundred thousand (100,000) 7.62MM 4 Ball M80 1 Tracer M62 Linked, five hundred one thousand (501,000) Cartridge 7.62MM 4 Ball 1 Tracer, ten thousand (10,000) Cartridge 50 Caliber Ball, ten thousand (10,000) 50 Caliber 4 Ball 1 Tracer, ten thousand (10,000) Cartridge 50 Caliber 4 Armor Piercing Incendiary 1 Armor Piercing Incendiary Tracer Linked, three Hundred (300) Cartridge 25.4 Millimeter Decoy M839, four (4) Cartridge Impulse CCU–92/A, three hundred eighty-four (384) Rocket 2.75 Inch High Explosive Warhead M151 Fuze M423 Motor MK66–4, two hundred forty (240) Warhead 2.75 Inch Rocket M151HE, one hundred eighty (180) Rocket Motor 2.75 Inch MK66–4, four hundred (400) Flare Aircraft Countermeasure M206, Two (2) Airborne Command and Control Systems includes three (3) PRC–117s (two (2) as line-of-sight and one (1) as beyond line-of-sight, one (1) iridium phone, one (1) ROVER 4 (to UAS), DAGAR (GPS)), twelve (12) AN/APN–209 Radar Altimeter, twenty-four (24) Upturned Exhaust System, thirteen (13) MX–10D EO/IR Sensor with Laser Designator (12 and 1 spare), thirteen (13) IZLED 200 PIR Laser (12 installed and 1 spare), thirty (30) User Data Modules (UDM) for Common Missile Warning System (CMWS), Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) Classified Software Updates, Machine Gun Component Spare Parts, Operation Mission Data Set (MDS) in support of the AN/APR–39C(V)1/4, twelve (12) AN/AVS–7 Heads-Up Display, aircraft warranty, air worthiness support, calibration services, spare and repair parts, support equipment, communication equipment, weapons, ammunition, night vision devices, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training devices, site surveys, tool and test equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated program cost is $800 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO partner that is an important force for ensuring peace and stability in Europe. The proposed sale will support the Czech Republic's need for its own self-defense and support NATO defense goals.

The Czech Republic is considering either the UH–60M or the UH–1Y/AH–1Z to replace its aging Mi–24 helicopters. The Czech Republic intends to use these helicopters to modernize its armed forces and strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats. This will contribute to the Czech Republic's military goal of updating its capabilities while further enhancing interoperability with the United States and NATO allies. The Czech Republic will have no difficulty absorbing these helicopters into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors will be Sikorsky Aircraft Company, Stratford, Connecticut; and General Electric Aircraft Company (GEAC), Lynn, Massachusetts. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale may require the assignment of an additional three U.S. Government and five contractor representatives in country full-time to support the delivery and training for approximately two-five years.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19–17

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The UH–60M aircraft is a medium lift four bladed aircraft which includes two (2) T–701D Engines. The aircraft has four (4) Multifunction Displays (MFD), which provides aircraft system, flight, mission, and communication management systems. The instrumentation panel includes four (4) Multifunction Displays (MFDs), two (2) Pilot and Co-Pilot Flight Director Panels, and two (2) Data Concentrator Units (DCUs). The Navigation System will have Embedded GPS/INS (EGIs), and two (2) Advanced Flight Control Computer Systems (AFCC), which provide 4 axis aircraft control.

2. The H764–G EGI provides GPS and INS capabilities to the aircraft. The EGI will include Selective Availability anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) security modules to be used for secure GPS PPS if required. The Embedded GPS/INS within the SAASM contains sensitive technology.

3. The Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) is a low cost semi-active laser guidance kit developed by BAE Systems which is added to current unguided 70 mm rocket motors and warheads similar to and including the Hydra 70 rocket. It is a low collateral damage weapon that can effectively strike both soft and lightly armored targets. APKWS turns a standard unguided 2.75 inch (70 mm) rocket into a precision laser-guided rocket, classification up to SECRET.

4. The AAR–57A Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) detects energy emitted by threat missile in-flight, evaluates potential false alarm emitters in the environment, declares validity of threat and selects appropriate counter-measures. The CMWS consists of an Electronic Control Unit (ECU), Electro-Optic Missile Sensors (EOMSs), and Sequencer and Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD). Reverse engineering is not a major concern. The ECU hardware is classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.

5. The AN/ARC–231, Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency (VHF/UHF), Line-of-Sight (LOS) Radio with frequency agile modes, Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), UHF Satellite Communications (S ATCOM), Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA), Integrated Waveform (IW), Air Traffic Control (ATC) channel spacing is operator selectable in 5, 8.33,12.5, and 25kHz steps. The antennas associated with this radio contain sensitive technology.

6. The AN/AVR–2B Laser Detecting Set is a passive laser warning system that receives, processes and displays threat information resulting from aircraft illumination by lasers on multifunctional display. The hardware is classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.

7. The AN/APR–39A Radar Signal Detecting Set is a system that provides warning of radar directed air defense threat and allows appropriate countermeasures. This is the 1553 databus compatible configuration. The hardware is classified CONFIDENTIAL when programmed with U.S. threat data; releasable technical manual for operation and maintenance are classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical data (technical performance) is classified SECRET.

8. The AN/APX–123A, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Transponder, is a space diversity transponder and is installed on various military platforms. When installed in conjunction with platform antennas and the Remote Control Unit (or other appropriate control unit), the transponder provides identification, altitude and surveillance reporting in response to interrogations from airborne, ground-based and/or surface interrogators. This item is contains sensitive technology.

9. The AN/AVS–6 Aviator's Night Vision Goggle is a lightweight binocular that can be mounted to a variety of aviator helmets. The binocular offers high reliability and performance and enables rotary-wing aviators to conduct and complete night operations during the darkest nights of the year. This item contains sensitive technology.

10. The AN/ARC–201D, Single Channel Ground to Air Radio System (SINCGARS), is a tactical airborne radio subsystem that provides secure, anti jam voice and data communication. The integration of COMSEC and the Data Rate Adapter (DRA) combines three Line Replaceable Units into one and reduces overall weight of the aircraft. Performance capabilities, ECM/ECCM specification and Engineering Change Orders (ECOs) are classified SECRET.

11. The AN/ARC–220 is a fully digital signal processing (DSP) high-frequency radio that gives you two-way communication over the 2.0000 to 29.9999 MHz high-frequency. The AN/ARC–220 also offers advanced communications features such as embedded Automatic Link Establishment (ALE), serial tone data modem and anti jam (ECCM) functions that can be used for tactical rotary wing and fixed-wing applications.

12. The AN/ARN–149, Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) Receiver, is a low frequency radio that provides automatic compass bearing on any radio signal within the frequency range of 100 to 2199.5 kHz as well as navigation where a commercial AM broadcast signal is the only available navigation aid.

13. The AN/ARN–153, Tactical Airborne Navigation (TACAN) System, is a full featured navigational system that supports four modes of operation: receive mode; transmit receive mode; air-to-air receive mode; and air-to-air transmit-receive mode. The TACAN provides a minimum 500-watt transmit capability with selecting range ratios of 30:1 or 4:1 which is accomplished through the automatic gain control (AGC) enable/disable switch, the 1553 bus, or the RNAV (ARINC) input bus.

14. The AN/ARN–147, Very High Frequency (VHF) Omni Ranging/Instrument Landing System Receiver, that provides internal MIL-STD–1553B capability and is MIL-E–5400 class II qualified. It meets international operability requirements by providing 50-kHz channel spacing for 160-VOR and 40-localizer/glideslope channels.

15. The KIV–77, a Common IFF Applique Crypto Computer Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) which maintains the crypto in a separate 3.5 in. x 4.25 in. x 1 in., 16-oz LRU allowing it to be removed and stored. This item is a Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI).

16. The AN/PYQ–10(C) Simple Key Loader (SKL) is a ruggedized, portable, handheld fill device, for securely receiving, storing, and transferring data between compatible cryptographic and communications equipment. It supports both the DS–101 and DS–102 interfaces, as well as the KSD–64 Crypto Ignition Key and is backward-compatible with existing End Cryptographic Units (ECU) and forward-compatible with future security equipment and systems. This item is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

17. Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) User Data Module (UDM) to support Generation III Electronics Control Unit (ECU). The UDM is a ruggedized, portable, hand-held data storage device for securely receiving, storing, and transferring data between CMWS ECUs (similar to a flash, or ''thumb'' drive). The UDM itself is UNCLASSIFIED when initially received. However, when loaded with data, it becomes classified to the appropriate level of the data. In the case of CMWS Software, this raises the classification level to SECRET.

18. Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) Classified Software is provided as Country Specific Software required for the operation and support of the Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) AN/AAR–57. The software, once developed and encrypted, is loaded on a User Data Module (UDM) for transfer and use by the Customer. The software is classified SECRET.

19. Operational Mission Data Set (MDS) in support of the AN/APR–39C(V)1/4 including Software Development. The MDS is a Country Specific, customer defined software data set that defines the radar emitter specifications used by the APR–39C(V)I/4 Radar Warning Receiver to examine signal received signal for potential threats. The Data Set includes data Electronic Warfare Integrated Preprogramming Database (EWIRDB) emitter parametric information to generate the MDS. The MDS is classified SECRET.

20. M1 (Z133) is a 25.4mm Decoy Chaff Cartridge. Z133 is a component in A965. All cartridge components including the cartridge case, piston, end cap and theoretical band coverage are UNCLASSIFIED. The specification and the drawings for this item are also UNCLASSIFIED. Radar Cross Section (RCS) measurements of deployed chaff are CONFIDENTIAL.

21. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures or equivalent systems which might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

22. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the enclosed Policy Justification. A determination has been made that Czech Republic can provide the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government.

23. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to Czech Republic.

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD–423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19–34 concerning the Navy's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of the Czech Republic for defense articles and services estimated to cost $205 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER,
Lieutenant General, USA, Director.

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19–34

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the Czech Republic.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* $180 million.

Other $25 million.

Total $205 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Four (4) AH–1Z Attack Helicopters.

Eight (8) T700–GE–701D Engines (installed).

Eight (8) Honeywell Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Navigation (EGI) and Precise Positioning Service (PPS) (installed).

Fourteen (14) AGM–114 Hellfire Missiles.

Non-MDE: Also included is communication equipment, electronic warfare systems, M197 20mm machine guns, Target Sight System, support equipment, spare engine containers, spare and repair parts, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Navy (EZ–P–SBF).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None,

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 3, 2019.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Czech Republic—AN–1Z Attack Helicopters

The Government of Czech Republic has requested to buy four (4) AH–1Z attack helicopters, eight (8) T700–GE–701D engines (installed), eight (8) Honeywell Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGI) and Precise Positioning Service (PPS) (installed), and fourteen (14) AGM–114 Hellfire missiles. Also included is communication equipment, electronic warfare systems, M197 20mm machine guns, Target Sight System, support equipment, spare engine containers, spare and repair parts, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated program cost is $205 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO partner that is an important force for ensuring peace and stability in Europe. The proposed sale will support the Czech Republic's need for its own self-defense and support NATO defense goals.

The Czech Republic is considering either the UH–60M or the UH–1Y/AH–1Z to replace its aging Mi–24 helicopters. The Czech Republic intends to use these helicopters to modernize its armed forces and strengthen its homeland defense. This will contribute to the Czech Republic's military goal of updating its capabilities while further enhancing interoperability with the United States and NATO allies. The Czech Republic will have no difficulty absorbing these helicopters into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors will be Bell Helicopter, Textron, Fort Worth, Texas; and General Electric Company, Lynn, Massachusetts. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips by U.S. Government and contractor representatives to participate in program and technical reviews plus training and maintenance support in country, on a temporary basis, for a period of twenty-four (24) months. It will also require three (3) contractor representatives to reside in country for a period of two (2) years to support this program.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19–34

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The AH–1Z Helicopter is a twin-engine attack helicopter developed for the United States Marine Corps. The AH–1Z incorporates new rotor technology with upgraded military avionics, weapons systems, and electro-optical sensors in an integrated weapons platform. It has improved survivability and can find targets at longer ranges and attack them with precision weapons. The four blades are made of composites, which have an increased ballistic survivability, and there is a semi-automatic folding system for stowage aboard amphibious assault ships.

2. The Z-model has an integrated avionics system (IAS) which includes two (2) mission computers and an automatic flight control system. Each crew station has two (2) 8x6–inch multifunction liquid crystal displays (LCD) and one (1) 4.2x4.2–inch dual function LCD display. The communications suite will have NON-COMSEC ARC 210 UHFNHF radios with associated communications equipment. The navigation suite includes a Precise Positioning System (SPS) Honeywell embedded GPS inertial navigation system (EGI), a digital map system, and a low-airspeed air data subsystem, which allows weapons delivery when hovering.

3. The crew is equipped with the Optimized Top Owl (OTO) helmet-mounted sight and display system. The OTO has a Day Display Module (DDM) and a Night Display Module (NDM). The AH–1Z has survivability equipment including the AN/AAR–47 Missile Warning and Laser Detection System, AN/ALE–47 Counter Measure Dispensing System (CMOS) and the AN/APR–39 Radar Warning Receiver to cover countermeasure dispensers, radar warning, incoming/on-way missile warning and on-fuselage laser-spot warning systems.

4. The following performance data and technical characteristics are classified as annotated:

AH–1Z Airframe:	
—Countermeasure capability	SECRET
—Counter-countermeasures capability	SECRET
—Vulnerability to countermeasures	SECRET
—Vulnerability to electromagnetic pulse from nuclear environmental effects.	SECRET
—Radar signature	SECRET
—Infrared signature	SECRET
—Acoustic signature	CONFIDENTIAL
—Ultraviolet signature	SECRET
—Mission effectiveness against threats	CONFIDENTIAL
Target Sight System (TSS)	Up to SECRET
Other Systems:	
—Tactical Air Moving Map Capability (TAMMAC).	
—Honeywell Embedded GPS & INS (EGI) w/SPS.	Up to SECRET
—AN/ARC–210 RT 1939(A)	Up to SECRET
—APX–123A IFF Transponder	Up to SECRET
—VCR or DVR	Up to SECRET
—APR–39 Radar Warning System (RWS).	Up to SECRET
—AN/AAR–47 Missile/Laser Warning System (MLWS).	Up to SECRET
—AN/ALE–47 Countermeasures Dispenser Set (CMDS).	Up to SECRET

5. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures or equivalent systems which might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

6. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the enclosed Policy Justification. A determination has been made that Czech Republic can provide the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government.

7. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to Czech Republic.

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD–423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19–37 concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of the United Arab Emirates for defense articles and services estimated to cost $2.728 billion. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER,
Lieutenant General, USA, Director.

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19–37

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* $2.700 billion.

Other $.028 billion.

Total $2.728 billion.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Up to four hundred fifty-two (452) Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC–3) Missiles Segment Enhanced (MSE).

Non-MDE: Also included are tools and test equipment, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, spare and repair parts, facility design, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics, sustainment and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army (AE–B–ZUT).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AE–B–ZUG.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 3, 2019.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Arab Emirates (UAE)—Patriot Missile System and Related Support Equipment

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested to buy up to four hundred fifty-two (452) Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC–3) Missiles Segment Enhanced (MSE). Also included are tools and test equipment, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, spare and repair parts, facility design, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics, sustainment and program support. The estimated cost is $2.728 billion.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of an important ally which has been, and continues to be, a force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. This sale is consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key allies in the region with modern systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.

The proposed sale will enhance the UAE's capability to meet current and future aircraft and missile threats. The UAE will use the capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen its homeland defense. The UAE will have no difficulty absorbing these additional missiles into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of these missiles will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor for the PAC–3 System will be Raytheon Corporation, Andover, Massachusetts, and Lockheed-Martin, Dallas, Texas. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed program will require additional contractor representatives to travel to the UAE. It is not expected additional U.S. Government personnel will be required in country for an extended period of time.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19–37

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The PATRIOT Air Defense System contains classified CONFIDENTIAL hardware components, SECRET tactical software and critical/sensitive technology. The Patriot Advanced Capability–(PAC–3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) hardware is classified CONFIDENTIAL and the associated launcher hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. The PAC–3 MSE is a high velocity, hit-to-kill, surface-to-air missile that provides critical air and missile defense by intercepting and destroying Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBM), Air-Breathing Threats (ABT), cruise missiles, and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).

2. The PAC–3 MSE sensitive/critical technology is primarily in the area of design and production know-how and primarily inherent in the design, development and/or manufacturing data related to certain components. The list of components is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

3. Information on system performance capabilities, effectiveness, survivability, missile seeker capabilities, select software/software documentation and test data are classified up to and including SECRET.

4. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures or equivalent systems which might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

5. A determination has been made that the Government of the UAE can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

6. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the United Arab Emirates.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

RECOGNIZING THE USS ''BILLINGS'' COMMISSIONING COMMITTEE

● Mr. DAINES. Mr. President, today I wish to honor the men and women of the USS Billings Commissioning Committee and their notable contributions to our State and Nation. The USS Billings Commissioning Committee is a group of volunteers from Montana's largest city, who have dedicated themselves to promoting awareness and fostering support for the future commissioning of the USS *Billings* and all those who will sail aboard her in defense of our Nation.

Upon commissioning, the USS *Billings* will be the first U.S. Navy warship to bear the city's namesake, a historic moment for our State. Montana has a proud heritage of military service. Some 3,500 Active Duty servicemembers currently serve at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Great Falls, and another 4,500 citizen-soldiers serve in the National Guard and Reserve at various locations across the State. Beyond the borders of our landlocked home, more than 2,200 U.S. Navy sailors currently call Montana home, adding 134 new Montanans to their ranks in the past 12 months. Montana also proudly boasts the highest percentage of veterans per capita in the contiguous United States.

A Freedom Class littoral combat ship, the USS *Billings* will be among the fastest, most technologically advanced, and agile efficient ships in our naval fleet. The USS *Billings* will project power near the shoreline and conduct a wide range of missions, including mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare missions. We wait with great anticipation as her August 3 commissioning quickly approaches.

In keeping with time-honored naval traditions, the USS Billings Commissioning Committee on behalf of the city of Billings is making preparations to host the commission ceremony and a series of celebrations. Determined to accomplish this ambitious goal, the committee has made great strides in rallying support across the State. The city has had the honor and privilege of hosting the crew of the USS *Billings* at the of the committee, and we look forward to their return in the weeks ahead. These efforts have made great strides in fostering a strong and enduring relationship between the city of Billings, the State of Montana, and the U.S. Navy.

In recognition of these and other notable accomplishments, I ask that the following names who have volunteered for the USS Billings Commissioning Committee be entered into the RECORD: Mayor Bill Cole, Chairman; Councilman Mike Yakawich, Co-Vice Chair; Commissioner Denis Pitman, Co-Vice Chair; Ron Spence, Committee Coordinator; Councilman Larry Brewster; Brent Brooks; Dan Brooks; Councilman Dick Clark; Sue Davidson; Katy Easton; Mike Jennings; Al Swanson; and Nancy Swanson.●

REMEMBERING DAMON J. KEITH

● Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, today I wish to pay tribute to the Honorable Damon J. Keith, a civil rights icon and one of the greatest jurists in our Nation's history.

Judge Keith was born on July 4, 1922, in Detroit, to parents who had relocated from Atlanta so his father could work for $5 a day in a Ford Motor Company plant to create a better future for their family.

Judge Keith's father encouraged him to attend college, and he went on to graduate from West Virginia State College, a historically Black college and university, in 1943. Upon graduation, he served his country in a segregated Army unit during World War II.

After his military service, he received his J.D. from Howard University Law School in 1949, passed the Michigan bar in 1950, married Dr. Rachel Boone in 1953, and received his master of laws degree from Wayne State University School of Law in 1956.

It was during his time at Howard when Judge Keith found a mentor in future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall.