

have created not just better outcomes for families but have resulted in significant savings. Through this program, 91 percent of the children achieved stable, permanent homes and caregivers, and it is estimated that the SafeStart Program has resulted in nearly \$1.5 million in foster care savings and in over \$9.5 million in child welfare involvement by stabilizing 106 families. So we are grateful for those results from the SafeStart Program in Allentown.

Head Start is a critical program for lifting families out of poverty, obviously, and providing children with the early learning experiences they need to start kindergarten and to be ready to learn. Unfortunately, only about a third of eligible children still have access to Head Start, and less than 10 percent—these are national numbers—have access to Early Head Start. Again, Early Head Start serves those who are up to 3 years old, and Head Start serves those who are 3 to 5 years old. So funding for these programs is critical.

To give you an example of those numbers in Pennsylvania—and the numbers are even a little lower—just 27 percent of eligible 3- to 5-year-olds have access to Head Start, and only 7 percent of eligible children under 3 years old have access to Early Head Start. Even with a lot of children being eligible but not being served, this is purely a question of funding.

As we celebrate over 50 years of Head Start on May 18, we must work to ensure these programs receive robust funding and continue to serve low-income children and families across the Nation.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all postcloture time on the Truncate nomination expire at 10:45 a.m., Tuesday, May 14. I further ask unanimous consent that, if confirmed, the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table and the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to legislative session for a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

VOTE EXPLANATION

Ms. SINEMA. Mr. President, I was necessarily absent but, had I been present, would have voted yes on rollcall vote 99, the confirmation of Joseph F. Bianco, of New York, to be United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit.

Mr. President, I was necessarily absent but, had I been present, would have voted yes on rollcall vote 100, the confirmation of Kimberly A. Reed, of West Virginia, to be President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States for a term expiring January 20, 2021.

Mr. President, I was necessarily absent but, had I been present, would have voted yes on rollcall vote 101, the confirmation of Spencer Bachus III, of Alabama, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States for a term expiring January 20, 2023.

Mr. President, I was necessarily absent but, had I been present, would have voted yes on rollcall vote 102, the confirmation of Judith DelZoppo Pryor, of Ohio, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States for a term expiring January 20, 2021.

Mr. President, I was necessarily absent but, had I been present, would have voted no on rollcall vote 103, the motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of Janet Dhillon, of Pennsylvania, to be a Member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for a term expiring July 1, 2022.

Mr. President, I was necessarily absent but, had I been present, would have voted no on rollcall vote 104, the confirmation of Janet Dhillon, of Pennsylvania, to be a Member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for a term expiring July 1, 2022.

Mr. President, I was necessarily absent but, had I been present, would have voted no on rollcall vote 105, the motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of Michael H. Park, of New York, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit.

Mr. President, I was necessarily absent but, had I been present, would have voted no on rollcall vote 106, the confirmation of Michael H. Park, of New York, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19-14 concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Qatar for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$3.0 billion. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

GREGORY M. KAUSNER,
(For Charles W. Hooper, Lieutenant
General, USA, Director).

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-14

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Qatar.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$1.90 billion.

Other \$1.10 billion.

Total \$3.00 billion.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Twenty-four (24) AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters.

Fifty-two (52) T700-GE-701D Engines (2 per aircraft, 4 spares).

Twenty-six (26) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight (MTADS) (1 per aircraft, 2 spares).

Twenty-six (26) AN/AAQ-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (1 per aircraft, 2 spares).

Eight (8) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component).

Eight (8) AN/APR-48 Modernized-Radar Frequency Interferometers (MRFI).

Twenty-nine (29) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) (1 per aircraft, 5 spares).

Fifty-eight (58) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGI) (2 per aircraft, 10 spares).

Two thousand five hundred (2,500) AGM-114R Hellfire Missiles.

Twenty-five (25) Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM) (1 per aircraft, 1 spare).

Non-MDE: Also included are twenty-eight (28) M230 30mm automatic chain guns (1 per aircraft, 4 spares), AN/AVR-2B laser detecting sets, AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, AN/AVS-6 Night Vision Goggles, M299 Hellfire missile launchers, 2.75 inch Hydra Rockets, 30mm cartridges, CCU-44 impulse cartridges, M206 and 211 countermeasure flares, M230 automatic guns and associated components, 2.75 inch rocket launcher tubes, AN/ARC-231 and AN/ARC-201D radios with

associated components, AN/APX-123 transponders, image intensifiers, MUMT2i systems, AN/ARN-153 tactical airborne navigation systems, chaff, spare and repair parts, support equipment, training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army (QA-B-WAG).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: QA-B-WYX, QA-B-OAM, QA-B-HAA.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 9, 2019.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Oatari—AH-64E Apache Helicopters with Spare Parts and Related Equipment

The Government of Qatar has requested to buy twenty-four (24) AH-64E Apache Attack helicopters; fifty-two (52) T700-GE-701D engines (2 per aircraft, 4 spares); twenty-six (26) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight (MTADS) (1 per aircraft, 2 spares); twenty-six (26) AN/AAQ-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (1 per aircraft, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component); eight (8) AN/APR-48 Modernized-Radar Frequency Interferometers (MRFI); twenty-nine (29) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) (1 per aircraft, 5 spares); fifty-eight (58) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGI) (2 per aircraft, 10 spares); two thousand five hundred (2,500) AGM-114R Hellfire missiles; and twenty-five (25) Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM) (1 per aircraft, 1 spare). Also included are twenty-eight (28) 30mm automatic chain guns (1 per aircraft, 4 spares), AN/AVR-2B laser detecting sets, AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, AN/AVS-6 Night Vision Goggles, M299 Hellfire missile launchers, 2.75 inch Hydra Rockets, 30mm cartridges, CCU-44 impulse cartridges, M206 and 211 countermeasure flares, M230 automatic guns and associated components, 2.75 inch rocket launcher tubes, AN/ARC-231 and AN/ARC-201D radios with associated components, AN/APX-123 transponders, image intensifiers, MUMT2i systems, AN/ARN-153 tactical airborne navigation systems, chaff, spare and repair parts, support equipment, training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$3.0 billion.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political and economic progress in the Middle East. Qatar is host to the U.S. Central Command forces and serves as a critical forward-deployed location in the region. The acquisition of these helicopters will allow for integration with U.S. forces for training exercises, which contributes to regional security and interoperability.

The proposed sale of the AH-64E Apache helicopters will supplement the Qatar Emiri Air Force's previous procurement of twenty-four (24) AH-64Es, which are capable of meeting its requirements for close air support, armed reconnaissance, and anti-tank warfare missions. The helicopters will provide a long-term defensive and offensive capability

to the Qatar peninsula as well as enhance the protection of key oil and gas infrastructure and platforms. Qatar will have no difficulty absorbing these helicopters into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractors will be The Boeing Company, Mesa, Arizona; Lockheed Martin Corporation, Orlando, Florida; General Electric, Cincinnati, Ohio; Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors, Owego, New York; Longbow Limited Liability Corporation, Orlando, Florida; Thales Corporation, Paris, France; and Raytheon Corporation. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of three (3) U.S. Government and five (5) contractor representatives to Qatar to support delivery of the Apache helicopters and provide support and equipment familiarization. In addition, Qatar has expressed an interest in expanding their planned Technical Assistance Fielding Team for additional in-country pilot and maintenance training to support this additional quantity of aircraft. To support the requirement a team of twenty (20) personnel (up to three military team members and 17 contractors) would be deployed to Qatar for approximately three years.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-14

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter weapon system contains communications and target identification equipment, navigation equipment, aircraft survivability equipment, displays, and sensors. The airframe itself does not contain sensitive technology; however, the equipment listed below will be either installed on the aircraft or included in the sale and carries technology transfer significance. The highest level of information that could be disclosed through the sale of the Apache in the configuration proposed for sale to Qatar is SECRET.

2. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active, low probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined with the AN/APR-48, a passive Radar Frequency Interferometer (RFI) mounted on top of the helicopter mast. The FCR Targeting Mode detects, locates, classifies and prioritizes stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks and mobile air defense systems as well as hovering and moving helicopters and fixed wing aircraft in normal flight. The highest level of information associated with the FCR and RFI is classified SECRET.

3. The AN/ASQ-170, Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight (AN/AAQ-11), Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensor (M-TADS/M-PNVS) is an enhanced version of its predecessor. It provides second generation day, night, and limited adverse weather target information, as well as night navigation capabilities. The M-PNVS provides second generation thermal imaging that permits safer nap-of-the-earth flight to, from, and within the battle area. The M-TADS provides the co-pilot gunner with improved search, deletion, recognition, and designation by means of Direct View Optics (DVO), television, and second generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sighting systems that may be used singularly or in combinations. M-TAD/M-PNVS hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. The technical manuals for au-

thorized maintenance levels are UNCLASSIFIED. Specific information related to effective system performance parameters (e.g. range, accuracy, etc.) is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

4. The AN/AAR-57(V)7, Common Missile Warning System detects threat missiles in flight, evaluates potential false alarms, declares validity of threat, and selects appropriate Infrared Countermeasures (IRCM). It includes Electro Optical Missile Sensors, Electronic Control Unit (ECU), Sequencer, and the Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD) that consists of the Dispenser Assembly and the Payload Module. The ICMD dispenses decoy expendable objects (chaff, flares, etc.) to confuse threat radar devices. In-country repair capability will not be provided. Reverse engineering is not a major concern. The hardware is UNCLASSIFIED when the software is not loaded. The software is classified SECRET.

5. The AN/APR-39, Radar Signal Detecting Set is designed to operate on rotary wing and slow moving fixed wing aircraft to detect, categorize, and prioritize pulse radio frequency emitter illuminating the host platform to allow appropriate countermeasures. This is the 1553 data bus compatible configuration. In-country repair capability will not be provided. Hardware is UNCLASSIFIED when the software is not loaded. The software is CONFIDENTIAL. The system can be programmed with threat data provided by the purchasing country.

6. The AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Set is a passive laser warning system that receives processes, and displays threat information resulting from aircraft illumination by laser designators, rangefinders, and beamrider missile guidance systems. The AN/AVR-2B uses the existing AN/APR-39A/D interface for control status and crew warning. The threat information is processed by the AN/APR-39 RSDS, displayed on the aircraft multi-function display and announced by the AN/APR-39 RSDS via the aircraft Inter Communication System. In-country repair capability will not be provided. Reverse engineering is not a major concern. The hardware is classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.

7. Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS). GPS/INS utilize GPS satellite signals to correct or calibrate a solution from an INS. Inertial navigation systems usually can provide an accurate solution only for short duration. The INS accelerometers produce an unknown bias signal that appears as a genuine specific force. The EGI is Selective Available Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) based on navigation platform that combines an inertia sensor for position information and is UNCLASSIFIED. The GPS crypto variables need the highest GPS accuracy and are classified up to SECRET.

8. The AGM-114R Hellfire missile is precision strike, Semi-Active Laser (SAL) guided missile and is the principle air to ground weapon for the AH-64 Apache. The SAL Hellfire missile is guided by laser energy reflected off the target. It has three warhead variants: a dual warhead, shape-charge, high explosive anti-tank capability for armored targets, a blast fragmentation warhead for urban patrol boat and other soft targets and metal augmented charge warhead for urban structures. AGM-114R allows selection of warhead effects corresponding to a specific target type. Hardware for the AGM-114R is UNCLASSIFIED.

9. The highest level for release of the AGM-114R Hellfire III missile is Secret, based upon the software. The highest level of classified information that could be disclosed by a proposed sale or by testing of the

end item is SECRET; the highest level that must be disclosed for production, maintenance, or training is CONFIDENTIAL. Reverse engineering could reveal confidential information. Vulnerability data, countermeasures, vulnerability/susceptibility analyses, and threat definitions are classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL.

10. The M211-flare is a countermeasure decoy in a 1" x 1" x 8" form factor in an aluminum case cartridge. It consists of case, piston, special material payload foils, and end cap. The special material is a pyrophoric metal (iron) foil that reacts with oxygen to generate infrared energy. The M211 decoys are dispersed from an aircraft to be used as a decoy in combination with the currently fielded M206 and M212 countermeasure flares to protect against advanced air-to-air and surface-to-air missile threats. The hardware is Unclassified and releasable technical manuals for operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.

11. The M36E9 Captive Air Training Missile (CATM) is a Hellfire training missile (Non-NATO) that consists of a functional guidance section coupled to an inert missile bus. The missile has an operational semi-active laser seeker that can search for and lock-on to laser designated targets for pilot training, but it does not have a warhead or propulsion section and cannot be launched.

12. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

13. A determination has been made that Qatar can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

14. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of Qatar.

COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION VETERANS REVIEW ACT

Mr. SCHATZ. Mr. President, due to a clerical error, the senior Senator from Alaska, Ms. MURKOWSKI, was not added as an original cosponsor and co-lead of the Compact of Free Association Veterans Review Act when we introduced the bill together on April 29, 2019. Senator MURKOWSKI has been a tireless advocate of veterans from the Compact States and a strong partner in our effort to expand Department of Veterans Affairs care to those veterans still living in the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau. I thank her for her partnership to fulfill our commitment to provide veterans everywhere with the access to high-quality care they have earned and deserve. Thank you.

TRIBUTE TO MICHIGAN'S VETERANS

Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, today I wish to pay special tribute to Michigan residents who have given their lives while serving in our Nation's Armed Forces and their families.

As long as Michigan has been a State—and even before—our people have been willing to put their lives on the line in defense of this Nation. From the War of 1812, to the Civil War, the World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, the Cold War, and the fight against terrorism, the people of Michigan have raised their hand when called upon and stood to the very end.

That was never more true than on December 7, 1941.

That morning, 2,341 American servicemembers lost their lives when Pearl Harbor was attacked. More than 30 of those who died were from Michigan.

This spring, I had the opportunity to honor their sacrifice in person when I visited Pearl Harbor with Senate colleagues.

It is difficult to explain just how moving it is to see Battleship Row and to gaze down at the USS *Arizona*, so quiet and still in those clear blue waters. I thought about what it must have been like that Sunday morning, a day that began like any other, but which would live in infamy.

Imagine being barely out of high school, far from home, and on the threshold of war. Imagine being aboard a ship that is coming under attack. Imagine the fearful realization that this might be where your story ends.

These veterans gave everything for us. It is our solemn duty to keep the promises we have made to them.

My own father served in the Navy during World War II. Being there at Pearl Harbor reminded me of his sacrifice and the sacrifices made by all of our veterans, especially those we have lost. On Memorial Day and every day, let's give them our heartfelt thanks, surround their families with love, and honor their sacrifice.

Thank you.

REMEMBERING JACQUELINE L. FALK

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, today I wish to honor Jacqueline "Jackie" Louise Falk. Jackie was an incredible force in Democratic politics for decades. She left behind a tightknit family of relatives and a political family that stretches around the world.

Jackie is best known for holding a key role in nearly every Democratic National Convention from 1972 through 2004. She also was on staff at the Democratic National Committee (DNC), as an aide to then-treasurer Robert Strauss, during the time of the Watergate break-in; she served as assistant to the counselor to the President during the Carter Administration; and served as administrative assistant and chief of staff to U.S. Representative Leo Zeferetti in the early 1980s.

Jackie suffered a stroke last week and passed away on Wednesday, May 8, surrounded by her loving, extended family. Jackie never sought the spotlight, but left her mark on our party and our country by bringing a sem-

blance of order to the sometimes-chaotic world of nominating the President of the United States.

Today, I would like to honor Jackie's memory by sharing some of her remarkable story. To tell the story of Jackie Falk is more than politics, although it is weaved throughout her life. As one friend, Yolanda Caraway, described her: "Jackie was one of the sweetest, kindest and funniest people I've ever known and I'm really going to miss her, especially her wonderful laugh."

Jackie was born in Trenton, NJ, to Minnie and Arlo Falk. She grew up with her brother Albert and sister Lisa. Jackie got hooked on politics and public service at a young age thanks to her Aunt Violet (Williams Biglane), who, after service in the Navy WAVES, went on to work as the personal secretary to former Senator and former Vice President Hubert Humphrey.

Jackie would tell stories of interacting with Hubert Humphrey and passing out flyers for his campaign. In 1964, Jackie accompanied Aunt Violet to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, NJ, to see Humphrey nominated as Vice President. Aunt Violet helped Jackie make her way to the Democratic National Committee, where she started working in 1972 for then-DNC Treasurer Robert Strauss. Jackie went on to work closely with every Democratic Party chairman from Strauss through Terry McAuliffe.

When Terry McAuliffe, former Governor of Virginia and former chairman of the DNC, heard of Jackie's death, he had this to say: "We lost a legend. The Democratic Party and Democratic National Conventions will never be the same. Jackie's convention credentialing was a labor of love and truly a work of art. She conducted her credential operation like Mozart conducted his symphonies. She never ceased to amaze. I and so many others will forever be in her debt and will miss her deeply."

In 1975, Jackie moved to Atlanta to work on the Presidential campaign of Jimmy Carter. She returned to Washington to work on his White House staff in the Office of the Counselor to the President. The Washington region would remain her home, even as she would take up temporary residence every 4 years in whatever city was the latest to host the Democratic nominating convention. Oftentimes, she was one of the first people working on a convention and one of the last to wrap things up.

After President Carter lost reelection, Jackie worked on Capitol Hill, where she served as chief of staff, administrative assistant, to Congressman Leo Zeferetti from January 1981 to January 1983. She then was hired early for the Democratic Convention in San Francisco, which was the start of her run overseeing credentials and a larger swath of the conventions.

From 1984 on, she was responsible for credentials—who gets the precious access passes and where they could go—