[Pages S3008-S3009]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. WYDEN:
S. 1569. A bill to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to
allow certain expenditures for cybersecurity-related services or
assistance; to the Committee on Rules and Administration.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Federal Campaign
Cybersecurity Assistance Act of 2019--a bulky name for a bill that
attempts to do a simply stated thing: protect our democracy from
foreign cyber attacks. This bill allows the national campaign
committees to provide much-needed cybersecurity assistance to State
political parties, Federal campaign offices' staffs, and Federal
candidates' personal accounts and devices.
In 2015 and 2016, hackers working for the Russian government
penetrated the networks of the Democratic National Committee and the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. The hackers also
compromised the email account of Senator Hillary Clinton's presidential
campaign manager, John Podesta. The Russian government subsequently
leaked and weaponized Democratic party and campaign emails in order to
influence the outcome of several elections--most publicly, the
presidential race between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, but also
U.S. House of Representatives races in Illinois, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Hackers also targeted
Republicans during the same period, but were less successful in their
efforts.
The impact of Russia's hacking-enabled influence campaign was a
surprise to many. However, this was not the first time that a foreign
government hacked into the campaign organization of someone running to
be President of the United States. Senior officials from the 2008 Obama
and McCain presidential campaigns have publicly confirmed that both
organizations were compromised by hackers. In an interview with NBC
News 2013, Dennis Blair, who served as President Obama's Director of
National Intelligence between 2009 and 2010 stated that ``Based on
everything I know, this was a case of political cyber-espionage by the
Chinese government against the two American political parties. They
were looking for positions on China, surprises that might be rolled out
by campaigns against China.''
In recent years, the Republican National Committee, the National
Republican Senatorial Committee, and the the National Republican
Congressional Committee have all been hacked, as well as the campaigns
of Senators Graham and McCain. Both major political parties have
suffered hacks, and will undoubtedly continue to be targeted by foreign
governments and other sophisticated hackers.
Over the past two years, Congress has turned its attention to several
weaknesses in our democracy that were exploited by Russia including the
role of social media companies and long-standing flaws in paperless
voting machines used in several states. While these issues have yet to
be meaningfully addressed, they have, at least, been the subject of
oversight hearings and legislative proposals in Congress. In contrast,
Congress has yet to hold a single hearing on the vulnerability of
political parties and campaigns to hacking by foreign governments, nor
has anyone else in Congress introduced legislation to help defend these
organizations from cyber attacks.
For the sake of the integrity of the American political process, I
introduce this bill today to protect those running for office, and the
organizations that support them, from cyber attacks. Russia's hacking
and leaking of emails in 2016 is now well documented. Their efforts
continue. If you think they aren't working towards the 2020 federal
elections as hard as any cub reporter in Iowa, you'd be sadly mistaken.
And they are likely NOT alone. Other hostile governments will
undoubtedly seek to emulate and improve on Russia's tactics.
Congress has acted in the past to protect those running for office
from serious threats. After Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated
in 1968, Congress authorized the Secret Service to protect Presidential
and Vice Presidential candidates. In extending Secret Service
protection to candidates, Congress recognized that the threats to
Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates required professional
protection. Congress must now take action to protect candidates for
Federal office--and consequently, our democracy--from another serious
threat: hacking by foreign governments.
The political parties are best of the available options to provide
cybersecurity to campaigns. Politicians are already dependent upon the
parties for fundraising, advertising, polling, messaging, and other
forms of support. Giving parties the responsibility to provide
cybersecurity does not make politicians dependent on help from a new
entity. Parties are also responsible to politicians they protect,
moreso at least than any other government, corporate, or non-profit
entity.
Quite simply, this bill gives the national campaign committees the
role of the ``IT Department'' for state parties, campaigns, and
candidates. The committees will be able to provide these entities with
securely configured laptops and cellphones, professionally administered
email, encrypted messaging, and collaboration software, and if
necessary, hire third-party cybersecurity experts to help in the event
of a successful hack.
This bill also permits the national parties to provide this
assistance with money they raise in their ``building fund.'' The
building fund is one of three supplementary accounts through which
Congress permitted the national campaign committees to raise an
additional $100,000 per individual, per year, to pay for the cost of
presidential nominating conventions, national party headquarters
buildings, and election recounts and other legal battles.
I know that some advocates have serious concerns about the building
fund and the other supplementary accounts created by Congress in 2014.
I share these concerns, and have long supported bold reforms of our
campaign finance system. However, the current Senate is extremely
unlikely to pass legislation creating public financing of elections
anytime soon, and so while we have the current system, permitting the
use of money in the building fund for cybersecurity appears to be the
least bad option. Most importantly, this approach does not permit the
parties to raise any new funds--it merely permits a new use of money
raised through the building fund.
I am not the only one to recognize the severity of the cyber threat
aimed at political parties. Earlier this year, the Canadian agency
responsible for government cybersecurity, the Communications Security
Establishment, issued a lengthy report on threats to elections, which
noted that that ``Globally, political parties, candidates, and their
staff remain attractive targets for cyber threat activity.'' Likewise,
the Maryland Board of Elections published guidance last week,
recognizing

[[Page S3009]]

that ``Campaigns are a potential cyber target,'' and consequently
permitted state political parties to provide additional cybersecurity
assistance to campaigns.
November 2020 gets closer by the day. Congress cannot wait any longer
to protect state parties, campaigns, and the candidates themselves from
sophisticated cyber attacks. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to
promptly act on this legislation, and to secure our democracy from
cyber threats before it is too late.
______

By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. Scott of South Carolina, Mr.
Menendez, Mr. Young, Ms. Duckworth, Mr. Portman, Mr. Kaine, and
Ms. Smith):
S. 1583. A bill to amend the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention
Act to provide for additional procedures for families with children
under the age of 6, and for other purposes; to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of
the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:

S. 1583

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Lead-Safe Housing for Kids
Act of 2019''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE LEAD-BASED PAINT POISONING
PREVENTION ACT.

Section 302(a) of the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention
Act (42 U.S.C. 4822(a)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
``(4) Additional procedures for families with children
under the age of 6.--
``(A) Risk assessment.--
``(i) Definition.--In this subparagraph, the term `covered
housing'--

``(I) means housing receiving Federal assistance described
in paragraph (1) that was constructed prior to 1978; and
``(II) does not include--

``(aa) single-family housing covered by an application for
mortgage insurance under the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.); or
``(bb) multi-family housing that--
``(AA) is covered by an application for mortgage insurance
under the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); and
``(BB) does not receive any other Federal housing
assistance.
``(ii) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of enactment of the Lead-Safe Housing for Kids Act of 2019,
the Secretary shall promulgate regulations that--

``(I) require the owner of covered housing in which a
family with a child of less than 6 years of age will reside
or is expected to reside to conduct an initial risk
assessment for lead-based paint hazards--

``(aa) in the case of covered housing receiving tenant-
based rental assistance under section 8 of the United States
Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437f), not later than 15 days
after the date on which the family and the owner submit a
request for approval of a tenancy or lease renewal, whichever
occurs first;
``(bb) in the case of covered housing receiving public
housing assistance under the United States Housing Act of
1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq.) or project-based rental
assistance under section 8 of the United States Housing Act
of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437f), not later than 15 days after the
date on which a physical condition inspection occurs; and
``(cc) in the case of covered housing not described in item
(aa) or (bb), not later than a date established by the
Secretary;

``(II) provide that a visual assessment alone is not
sufficient for purposes of complying with subclause (I);
``(III) require that, if lead-based paint hazards are
identified by an initial risk assessment conducted under
subclause (I), the owner of the covered housing shall--

``(aa) not later than 30 days after the date on which the
initial risk assessment is conducted, control the lead-based
paint hazards, including achieving clearance in accordance
with regulations promulgated under section 402 or 404 of the
Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 2682, 2684), as
applicable; and
``(bb) provide notice to all residents in the covered
housing affected by the initial risk assessment, and provide
notice in the common areas of the covered housing, that lead-
based paint hazards were identified and will be controlled
within the 30-day period described in item (aa); and

``(IV) provide that there shall be no extension of the 30-
day period described in subclause (III)(aa).

``(iii) Exceptions.--The regulations promulgated under
clause (ii) shall provide an exception to the requirement
under subclause (I) of such clause for covered housing--

``(I) if the owner of the covered housing submits to the
Secretary documentation--

``(aa) that the owner conducted a risk assessment of the
covered housing for lead-based paint hazards during the 12-
month period preceding the date on which the family is
expected to reside in the covered housing; and
``(bb) of any clearance examinations of lead-based paint
hazard control work resulting from the risk assessment
described in item (aa);

``(II) from which all lead-based paint has been identified
and removed and clearance has been achieved in accordance
with regulations promulgated under section 402 or 404 of the
Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 2682, 2684), as
applicable;
``(III)(aa) if lead-based paint hazards are identified in
the dwelling unit in the covered housing in which the family
will reside or is expected to reside;
``(bb) the dwelling unit is unoccupied;
``(cc) the owner of the covered housing, without any
further delay in occupancy or increase in rent, provides the
family with another dwelling unit in the covered housing that
has no lead-based paint hazards; and
``(dd) the common areas servicing the new dwelling unit
have no lead-based paint hazards; and
``(IV) in accordance with any other standard or exception
the Secretary deems appropriate based on health-based
standards.

``(B) Relocation.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of enactment of the Lead-Safe Housing for Kids Act of 2019,
the Secretary shall promulgate regulations to provide that a
family with a child of less than 6 years of age that occupies
a dwelling unit in covered housing in which lead-based paint
hazards were identified, but not controlled in accordance
with regulations required under clause (ii), may relocate on
an emergency basis and without placement on any waitlist,
penalty (including rent payments to be made for that dwelling
unit), or lapse in assistance to--
``(i) a dwelling unit that was constructed in 1978 or
later; or
``(ii) another dwelling unit in covered housing that has no
lead-based paint hazards.''.

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out the
amendments made by section 2 such sums as may be necessary
for each of fiscal years 2020 through 2024.

____________________