[Pages S3203-S3209]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Madam President, on May 24, 2019, pursuant to section
36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of State determined
``that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale of the
following military sales'' to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates. The Arms Export Control Act indicates that, in
the Senate, the notification of such a determination shall be sent to
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant
information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to
have printed in the Record the Secretary's determination and
transmittals submitted to the committee by the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency regarding sales under section 36(b). The Secretary's
emergency determination and transmittals for sales conducted pursuant
to other sections of the Arms Export Control Act were included in the
Congressional Record via separate executive communications on June 3,
2019.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Defense Security

Cooperation Agency,

Arlington, VA.
Hon. James E. Risch,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On May 23, 2019, the Secretary of State,
pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended, determined that an emergency exists which requires
the immediate sale of the defense articles and defense
services identified in the attached transmittals to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through
the Foreign Military Sales process, including any further
amendments specific to costs, quantity, or requirements,
occurring within the duration of circumstances giving rise to
these emergency sales, in order to deter further the malign
influence of the Government of Iran throughout the Middle
East region.
Please find attached (Tab 1) the Secretary of State
Determination and Justification waiving the Congressional
review requirements under Section 36(b)(l) and 36 (b)(5)(C)
of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, for the attached
list of Transmittals of proposed Letters of Offer and
Acceptance to the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia for defense articles and services pursuant to
the notification requirements of Section 36(b)(1) and Section
36(b)(5)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as
amended. The determination and detailed justification are a
part of each Transmittal. After this letter is delivered to
your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the
public of the proposed sales.
Sincerely,
Charles W. Hooper,
Lieutenant General, USA, Director.
Enclosures.

DETERMINATION UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Subject: Emergency Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Jordan

Pursuant to sections 36(b)(1), 36(c)(2), and 36(d)(2) of
the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, I hereby state
that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale of
the following foreign military sales and direct commercial
sales cases, including any further amendments specific to the
cost, quantity, or requirements of these cases, in the
national security interest of the United States:
For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
F-15 Support
Paveway Precision Guided Munitions (sale and co-production)
Aircraft Maintenance Support
Aurora Bomb Fuzing System
120mm M933A1 Mortar Bombs
Fl10 Engines for F-15s
F/A-18 Panel Manufacture in Saudi Arabia for other end-
users
Advising and support of Ministry of Defense reform
Continuation of follow-on logistics support and services
for Royal Saudi Air Force, including Tactical Air
Surveillance System support
For the United Arab Emirates:
AH-64 Equipment
APK WS Laser-guided Rockets
Javelin Anti-Tank Missiles
Paveway Precision Guided Munitions and Maverick missile
support
RQ-2l Blackjack UAS
M107A1 .50 caliber Rifles
FMU-152A/B Programmable Bomb Fuse
Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missile--Tactical Ballistic
Missile
U.S. Marine Corps training of UAE Presidential Guard
F-16 engine parts
Amendment to previously Congressionally notified case for
ScanEagle and Integrator Unmanned Aerial Systems
For Jordan:
Transfer of Paveway II Precision Guided Munitions from the
United Arab Emirates.
This determination shall be published in the Federal
Register and, along with the accompanying Memorandum of
Justification, shall be transmitted to Congress.

(U) MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR EMERGENCY ARMS TRANSFERS AND
AUTHORIZATIONS TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES, AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN TO DETER IRANIAN MALIGN
INFLUENCE

(U) Iranian malign activity poses a fundamental threat to
the stability of the Middle East and to American security at
home and abroad. Iran's actions have led directly to the
deaths of over six hundred U.S. military personnel in Iraq,
untold suffering in Syria, and significant threats to Israeli
security. In Yemen, Iran helps fuel a conflict creating the
world's greatest humanitarian crisis. Iran directed repeated
attacks on civilian and military infrastructure in Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates by Iranian-designed
explosives-laden drones and ballistic missiles fired by the
Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, who receive financial,
technical, and materiel support from Iran.
(U) Current threat reporting indicates Iran engages in
preparations for further malign activities throughout the
Middle East region, including potential targeting of U.S. and
allied military forces in the region. As the Administration
publicly noted and briefed to Congress in greater detail in
the appropriate setting, a number of troubling and escalatory
indications and warnings from the Iranian regime have
prompted an increased U.S. force posture in the region. The
Iran-backed Houthis publicly threatened to increase
operations targeting vital military targets in the United
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi-Led Coalition
positions in Yemen. The rapidly-evolving security situation
in the region requires an accelerated delivery of certain
capabilities to U.S. partners in the region.
(U) As President Trump noted in National Security
Memorandum 11 of May 8, 2018, ``the actions and policies of
the Government of Iran, including its proliferation and
development of missiles and other asymmetric and conventional
weapons capabilities, its network and campaign of regional
aggression, its support for terrorist groups, and the malign
activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its
surrogates continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy
of the United States.''
(U) Iran's actions pose a critical threat to regional
stability and the national security of the United States,
which has been long acknowledged. Since 1984, Iran remains
designated by the United States as a State Sponsor of
Terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control
Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. In
addition, the recent designation of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act notes the Government of Iran, through the
IRGC-Quds Force, provides material support

[[Page S3204]]

to the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Iran is also identified
as constituting an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy and economy of the United
States under Executive Orders dating back to the Carter and
Clinton Administrations.
(U) In 2014, the Houthis, an Iran-supported force
increasingly contributing to the Iranian regime's efforts to
destabilize the Arabian Peninsula, attempted to overthrow the
internationally recognized government of Yemen. The Houthis
have greatly increased regional instability, threatened the
global economy, destroyed infrastructure, and terrorized the
Yemeni people.
(U) The Houthis have attacked civilian areas within Saudi
Arabia and the UAE with ballistic missile and unmanned aerial
vehicle attacks in addition to cross-border raids; these have
resulted in the deaths of over five hundred Saudi civilians,
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was fortunate in 2017 to have
intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at Mecca which could
have led to a regional conflagration.
(U) The Houthi threat to stability extends beyond the
security of their immediate neighbors. Over 10% of global
shipping passes through the Bab-el-Mandeb straits separating
Yemen from Africa, including an estimated 4.8 million barrels
of oil per day, or about 5% of the global oil trade. Since
2016, the Houthis have repeatedly targeted international
shipping transiting these straits to or from the Suez Canal.
Houthi-controlled media recently announced the Houthis'
intent to target Saudi ARAMCO infrastructure. Utilizing anti-
ship cruise missiles, small boat attacks, and remote-
controlled explosive vessels, the Houthis continue to strike
not only commercial oil tankers, but also struck a cargo ship
carrying grain to a Yemeni port. The Houthis conducted
maritime attacks on the USS Mason and the USS Ponce,
demonstrating the direct nature of the Houthi threat to U.S.
personnel, assets, and our national security.
(U) Within Yemen, the Houthis severely limited the ability
of the international community to provide humanitarian
assistance to the population under their control.
International humanitarian organizations report the ``Houthi
forces' widespread use of landmines along Yemen's western
coast since mid-2017 has killed and injured hundreds of
civilians and prevented aid groups from reaching vulnerable
communities.'' Despite the humanitarian catastrophe, the
Houthis continue to escalate the conflict in Yemen, most
recently disregarding their own commitments under the UN-
sponsored ceasefire deal regarding the port city of Hudaydah.
(U) The United States strongly backs peace efforts brokered
by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Griffiths' painstaking
endeavor to have parties reach agreements in peace talks in
Sweden in 2018 would lay a solid track for a political
process to end the conflict.
(U) For the reasons cited above, an emergency exists
requiring immediate provision of certain defense systems to
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan in the
national security interest of the United States. Such
transfers, whether provided via the Foreign Military Sales
system, or through the licensing of Direct Commercial Sales,
must occur as quickly as possible in order to deter further
Iranian adventurism in the Gulf and throughout the Middle
East. The Secretary of State, therefore, has certified an
emergency exists under sections 36(b)(l), 36(c)(2), and
36(d)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776,
thereby waiving the congressional review requirements of
those provisions.

Transmittal No. 17-0B

Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology
or Capability (Sec. 36(8)(5)(C), AECA)
(i) Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates
(UAE).
(ii) Sec. 36(b)(l), AECA Transmittal No.: 16-15.
Date: 8 December 2016.
Military Department: Army.
(iii) Description: On December 8, 2016, Congress was
notified by Congressional certification transmittal number
16-15 of the possible sale under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms
Export Control Act of twenty-eight (28) AH-64E Remanufactured
Apache Attack Helicopters; nine (9) new AH-64E Apache Attack
Helicopters; seventy-six (76) T700-GE-701D Engines (56
remanufactured, 18 new, 2 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/ASQ-
170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/
AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (28
remanufactured, 9 new, 2 spares); thirty-two (32)
remanufactured AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency
Interferometers; forty-six (46) AAR-57 Common Missile Warning
Systems (31 remanufactured, 9 new, 6 spares); eighty-eight
(88) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial
Navigation (72 new, 16 spares); forty-four (44) Manned-
Unmanned Teaming-International (MUMTi) systems (28
remanufactured, 9 new, 7 spares); and fifteen (15) new MUMTi
System Upper Receivers, training devices, helmets,
simulators, generators, transportation, wheeled vehicles and
organization equipment, spare and repair parts, support
equipment, tools and test equipment, technical data and
publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S.
government and contractor engineering, technical, and
logistics support services, and other related elements of
logistics support. The estimated cost was $3.5 billion. Major
Defense Equipment (MDE) constituted $1.68 billion of this
total.
This transmittal reports:
1. the addition of thirty (30) Radar Electronic Units (REU)
as MDE, which were included in the total value of the
original transmittal, but were not properly identified as
MDE; and
2. the inclusion of additional quantities of the following
items: one (1) new AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter, six (6)
T700-GE-701D engines (2 installed, 4 spares), one (1) new AN/
ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/
AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensor, one (1) new
AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System, sixty-two (62) Embedded
Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGIs)
(60 remanufactured, 2 new), and one (1) new Manned-Unmanned
Teaming-International (MUMTi) system. The total MDE value of
these items is $101,518,591. The addition will not add to the
total notified value of MDE, which will remain $1.68 billion.
The total notified case value will remain $3.5 billion.
(iv) Significance: This notification is being provided to
report the inclusion of MDE and non-MDE items that were not
included in the original notification. The UAE lost a
helicopter during recent operations and has requested to
replace this loss.
(v) Justification: The Secretary of State has determined
and provided detailed justification that an emergency exists
that requires the immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates
of the above defense articles (and defense services) in the
national security interests of the United States, thereby
waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section
36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended. This
equipment will support the capabilities of UAE's Apache fleet
and enhance interoperability with the United States.
(vi) Sensitivity of Technology: The AH-64E Apache Attack
Helicopter weapon system contains communications and target
identification equipment, navigation equipment, aircraft
survivability equipment, displays, and sensors. The airframe
itself does not contain sensitive technology; however, the
pertinent equipment listed below will be either installed on
the aircraft or included in the sale:
a. The Radar Electronic Unit (REU) is a component upgrade
to the AN/APO-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR). The REU replaces
two legacy Line Replaceable Units (Programmable Signal
Processor and Low Power Radio Frequency), achieving a weight
reduction of approximately 85 pounds, with improved
reliability, increased processing power, growth for new
modes/capabilities and replacement of obsolete components.
Critical system information is stored in the FCR/REU in the
form of mission executable code, target detection,
classification algorithms and coded threat parametric. This
information is provided in a form that cannot be extracted by
the foreign user via anti-tamper provisions built into the
system.
b. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active, low
probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined
with a passive AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency
Interferometer (M-RFI) mounted on top of the helicopter mast.
The FCR Ground Targeting Mode detects, locates, classifies
and prioritizes stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks
and mobile air defense systems as well as hovering
helicopters, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft in normal
flight. If desired, the radar data can be used to refer
targets to the regular electro-optical Modernized Target
Acquisition and Designation Sight (MTADS). This information
is provided in a form that cannot be extracted by the foreign
user. The content of these items is classified SECRET. User
Data Module (UDM) on the RFI processor, contains the Radio
Frequency threat library. The UDM, which is a hardware
assemblage, is classified CONFIDENTIAL when programmed with
threat parameters, threat priorities and/or techniques
derived from U.S. intelligence information.
c. The AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and
Designation Sight/AN/AAQ-11 Pilot Night Vision Sensor (MTADS/
PNVS) provides day, night, and limited adverse weather target
information, as well as night navigation capabilities. The
PNVS provides thermal imaging that permits nap-of-the-earth
flight to, from, and within the battle area, while TADS
provides the co-pilot gunner with search, detection,
recognition, and designation by means of Direct View Optics
(DVO), EI2 television, and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
sighting systems that may be used singularly or in
combinations. Hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. Technical manuals for
authorized maintenance levels are UNCLASSIFIED. Reverse
engineering is not a major concern.
d. The AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) detects
energy emitted by threat missiles in-flight, evaluates
potential false alarm emitters in the environment, declares
validity of threat and selects appropriate countermeasures.
The CMWS consists of an Electronic Control Unit (ECU),
Electro-Optic Missile Sensors (EOMSs), and Sequencer and
Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD). The ECU hardware
is classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for
operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.
e. The Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial
Navigation System plus Multi-Mode Receiver (EGI+MMR) The
aircraft has

[[Page S3205]]

two EGIs which use internal accelerometers, rate gyro
measurements, and external sensor measurements to estimate
the aircraft state, provides aircraft flight and position
data to aircraft systems. The EGI is a velocity-aided, strap
down, ring laser gyro based inertial unit. The EGI unit
houses a GPS receiver. The receiver is capable of operating
in either non-encrypted or encrypted. When keyed, the GPS
receiver will automatically use anti-spoof/jam capabilities
when they are in use. The EGI will retain the key through
power on/off/on cycles. Because of safeguards built into the
EGI, it is not considered classified when keyed. Integrated
within the EGI is an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) for
processing functions. Each EGI also houses a Multi-Mode
Receiver (MMR). The MMR is incorporated to provide for
reception of ground based NAVAID signals for instrument aided
flight. Provides IMC I IFR integration and certification of
improved Embedded Global Positioning System and Inertial
(EGI) unit, with attached MMR, with specific cockpit
instrumentation allows Apaches to operate within the
worldwide IFR route structure. Also includes integration of
the Common Army Aviation Map (CAAM), Area Navigation (RNAV),
Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF) and
Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) compliance.
f. Manned-Unmanned Teaming-International (MUMT-I) provides
Manned-Unmanned Teaming with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs),
other Apaches and other interoperable aircraft and land
platforms. Provides ability to display real-time UAS sensor
information to aircraft and transmit MTADS video. Capability
to receive video and metadata from Interoperability Profile
compliant (IOP) as well as legacy systems. It is a data link
for the AH-64E that provides a fully integrated multiband,
interoperable capability that allows pilots to receive off-
board sensor video streaming from different platforms in non-
Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) bands. The MUMT-I data link
can retransmit UAS or Apache Modernized Target Acquisition
Designation Sight full-motion sensor video and metadata to
another MUMT-I-equipped Apache. It can also transmit to
ground forces equipped with the One Station Remote Video
Terminal. It provides Apache aircrews with increased
situational awareness and net-centric interoperability while
significantly reducing sensor-to-shooter timelines. This
combination results in increased survivability of Apache
aircrews and ground forces by decreasing their exposure to
hostile fire.
(vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.

Transmittal No. 17-39

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: United Arab Emirates.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment * $35 million.
Other $45 million.
Total $80 million.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Twenty (20) RQ-21A Blackjack Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs).
Non-MDE: This request also includes the following Non-MDE:
Forty (40) Global Positioning Systems (GPS) with Selective
Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) Type II (MPE-S),
air vehicle support equipment to include eight (8) Ground
Control Stations (GCS), four (4) launchers, and four (4)
retrievers, spare and repair parts, publications, training
and technical support services.
(iv) Military Department: Navy (AE-P-SAW).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached
Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control
Act.

policy justification

United Arab Emirates (UAE)--RQ-21A Blackjack Unmanned Air Vehicles

The Government of the UAE has requested to buy twenty (20)
RQ-21A Blackjack Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs). Also included
are forty (40) Global Positioning Systems (GPS) with
Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) Type II
(MPE-S); air vehicle support equipment including eight (8)
Ground Control Stations (GCS), four (4) launchers, and four
(4) retrievers; spare and repair parts; publications;
training; and technical support services. The estimated total
case value is $80 million.
The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed
justification that an emergency exists that requires the
immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above
defense articles (and defense services) in the national
security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the
Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the
Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign and
national security of the United States by improving the
security of an important ally in the Middle East. This sale
is consistent with U.S. national security objectives of
assisting the UAE in developing and maintaining a strong and
ready self-defense capability and enhancing interoperability
with U.S. forces. The UAE will have no difficulty absorbing
these UAVs into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The prime contractor will be Insitu, Bingen, WA, a wholly
owned subsidiary of the Boeing Company. There are no known
offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential
sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple
trips by U.S. Government and contractor representatives to
participate in program and technical reviews plus training
and maintenance support in country, on a temporary basis, for
a period of twenty-four (24) months. It will also require one
(1) contractor representative to reside in country for a
period of two (2) years to support this program.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 17-39

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
1. The following components and technical documentation
for the program are classified as listed below:
a. The RQ-21 unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is a runway-
independent, modular unmanned aircraft system that is
designed for a variety of missions. The RQ-21 UAS has four
subsystems: RQ-21A air vehicle (AV), launcher, retriever, and
ground control stations (GCS).
1) The RQ-2IA AV is a fixed-wing, single engine AV
remotely controlled by an operator via the GCS.
2) The launcher is a pneumatically-controlled launch
device that accelerates the RQ-2IA AV to flying speed.
3) The retriever is a hydraulically-controlled telescoping
crane that captures the RQ-21A AV at the end of the flight.
4) The GCS is a workstation that is used to plan missions,
control and monitor the RQ-21A AV, and manage the data
received from the air vehicle.
b. The RQ-21 UAS is capable of transport via ground, air,
or ship. The RQ-21 UAS performs a wide variety of
reconnaissance, intelligence, and special missions.
Operationally or tactically vital data may be obtained cost-
effectively by exploiting the UAS mission systems and payload
options. The RQ-21A AV is designed to perform air
reconnaissance (AR) based missions. It is equipped to carry a
forward turret to support the primary mission of
reconnaissance and an assortment of specialized, mission
specific, payloads within the center payload bay. The Electro
Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Imager Counter Countermeasures
sensor ball is the Alticam 11 EOIR4, which provides
exceptional day/night capability in a small, lightweight, low
power solution, or the EOIR5 which adds a laser designator
capability. It uses mid-wave infrared (MWIR) electro-optical
image, a gyrostabilized gimbal system, has multiple operating
modes, is compatible with the Alticam video processing board
(AVS), and has a laser pointer and rangefinder. It is
designed for small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and is
also used on piloted airplanes, blimps, ground vehicles, and
unmanned surface vehicles.
c. The imagery and electronic reconnaissance functions of
the RQ-21A AV support intelligence functions and operational
warfighting missions. Intelligence-based support functions
range from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) to intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
including imagery associated sub-tasks. Operational functions
are enhanced by a laser rangefinder and infrared marking
system. The turret, with laser system, facilitates target
acquisition and terminal guidance operations in support of a
wide breadth of aviation support to MAGTF operations mission.
These include but are not limited to point, area, and route
reconnaissance; convoy escort; call for indirect fires;
battle damage assessment; and tactical recovery of aircraft
and personnel. The aircraft also passively supports radio
communications relay and the vessel traffic function of
automatic identification.
d. The GCS includes an operator work station (OWS), a
ground data terminal for C2 communication and video downlink,
and a GPS electronics module (GEM) integration kit for
navigation. The GCS is composed of a standard component
package. If installed on a ship, the GCS will be composed of
the same components as the land based system, but the number
and arrangement of each of the components will vary depending
on the specific class of ship on which the GCS is installed.
The RQ-21 GCS is comprised of the following components:
1) Two operator work stations. The OWS consist of four
modules: electronics power module (EPM), network computer
module (NCM), user interface module (UIM), and the data
storage module (DSM). The EPM provides the power source for
the GCS. The EPM is the bottom module in the OWS. The UIM is
not installed in the GCS for ship-based operations.
2) Ground data terminal. The GDT includes the antenna
interface module (AIM), directional antenna, and omni
antennas (for ship-board operations only). The AIM models are
different between land and ship-based configurations.

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3) GEM integration kit. The GEM integration kit includes
the GEM itself and the ground GPS antenna.
4) Moving platform module (MPM) integration kit (ship-
based only).
5) Selective availability and anti-spoofing module (SAASM)
GPS antenna.
6) Systems check laptop.
7) GCS cables.
e. The launcher provides the initial RQ-21A AV speed
required for air vehicle flight over a wide range of wind and
density altitude conditions, and enables expeditionary
employment of the UAS in locations without suitable runways.
The launcher is designed for transport by air, ship, or towed
by light vehicles into rugged terrain. The launcher is made
up of the launcher core and systems and the accessory
components. The launcher core is attached lengthwise on the
launcher trailer deck at two interface towers. The trailer is
used to transport the launcher components and serves as a
platform for the launcher core and systems.
f. The retriever system is comprised of the recovery system
and trailer. The recovery system is a hydraulically-
controlled telescoping crane mast that uses a vertical
capture rope to catch the RQ-21A AV. The vertical capture
rope features a bungee and rope energy dissipation system.
The retriever is mounted to a modified MIL-STD trailer
chassis. The trailer frame and hitch assembly connects the
retriever to a towing vehicle. The trailer has one axle and
four outriggers that are installed for use.
g. While no part of the RQ-21A UAS is itself classified,
the following performance data and technical characteristics
are classified as annotated:
RQ-21 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
GPS P/Y Code navigation equipment: SECRET when keyed.
UAS Susceptibility to Jamming: SECRET.
UAS TEMPEST Characteristics: SECRET.
UAS Vulnerabilities: SECRET.
UAS Survivability: SECRET.
UAS Radar Cross Section: Up to SECRET.
UAS Infrared Signature: SECRET.
UAS Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Vulnerability:
SECRET.
UAS Threat Data: SECRET.
Communications Relay Tactical Employment: CONFIDENTIAL.
Electro Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Imager Counter
Countermeasures: SECRET.
EO/IR Imager Operational Characteristics: Up to SECRET.
Automatic Information System Vulnerabilities: SECRET.
2. If a technologically advanced adversary obtains
knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the
information could be used to develop countermeasures or
equivalent systems that might reduce weapon system
effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with
similar or advanced capabilities.
3. A determination has been made that the United Arab
Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of
protection for the sensitive technology being released as the
U.S. Government. This proposed sale of the RQ-21 UAS and
associated equipment is necessary to the furtherance of the
U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined
in the policy justification.
4. All defense articles and services listed in this
transmittal are authorized for release and export to the
Government of the United Arab Emirates.

Transmittal No. 17-70

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab
Emirates.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment * $92 million.
Other $10 million.
Total $102 million.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Three hundred thirty-one (331) Javelin Guided Missiles with
Containers.
Non-MDE: Also included are System Integration & Checkout
(SICO) service; Field Service Representative; U.S. Government
and contractor technical, engineering and logistics support
services' tools and test equipment; support equipment;
publications and technical documentation; spare and repair
parts; and other related elements of logistics and program
support.
(iv) Military Department: Army (AE-B-ZAO, Amendment 3).
(v) Prior Related Cases. if any: AE-B-ZUB.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee. etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached
Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control
Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

UAE--JaVELIN Guided Missiles and Associated Materiel and Services

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has
requested to buy three hundred thirty-one (331) Javelin
Guided Missiles with container. Also included are System
Integration & Checkout (SICO) service; Field Service
Representative; U.S. Government and contractor technical,
engineering and logistics support services' tools and test
equipment; support equipment; publications and technical
documentation; spare and repair parts; and other related
elements of logistics and program support. The estimated
total case value is $102 million.
The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed
justification that an emergency exists that requires the
immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above
defense articles (and defense services) in the national
security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the
Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the
Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy
and national security of the United States by improving the
security of an important partner that has been, and continues
to be, a force for political stability and economic progress
in the Middle East. This sale is consistent with U.S.
initiatives to provide key partners in the region with modem
systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces
and increase security.
The proposed program will enhance the UAE's capability to
meet current and future enemy threats. The UAE will use the
capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to
strengthen its homeland defense. The UAE previously procured
Javelin missiles and will have no difficulty absorbing these
additional missiles into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The prime contractor will be is Raytheon, Tucson, AZ. There
are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with
this potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed program will not require
additional Contractor or U.S. Government personnel in country
for an extended period of time.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 17-70

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
1. The Javelin Weapon System is a medium-range, man
portable, shoulder-launched, fire and forget, anti-tank
system for infantry, scouts, and combat engineers. It may
also be mounted on a variety of platforms including vehicles,
aircraft and watercraft. The system weighs 49.5 pounds and
has a maximum range in excess of 2,500 meters. The system is
highly lethal against tanks and other systems with
conventional and reactive armors, The system possesses a
secondary capability against bunkers.
2. Javelin's key technical feature is the use of fire-and-
forget technology which allows the gunner to fire and
immediately relocate or take cover. Additional special
features are the top attack and/or direct fire modes, an
advanced tandem warhead and imaging infrared seeker, target
lock-on before launch, and soft launch from enclosures or
covered fighting positions. The Javelin missile also has a
minimum smoke motor thus decreasing its detection on the
battlefield.
3. The Javelin Weapon System is comprised of two major
tactical components, which are a reusable Command Launch Unit
(CLU) and a round contained in a disposable launch tube
assembly. The CLU incorporates an integrated day-night sight
that provides a target engagement capability in adverse
weather and countermeasure environments. The CLU may also be
used in a stand-alone mode for battlefield surveillance and
target detection. The CLU's thermal sight is a second
generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor. To
facilitate initial loading and subsequent updating of
software, all on-board missile software is uploaded via the
CLU after mating and prior to launch.
4. The missile is autonomously guided to the target using
an imaging infrared seeker and adaptive correlation tracking
algorithms. This allows the gunner to take cover or reload
and engage another target after firing a missile. The missile
has an advanced tandem warhead and can be used in either the
top attack or direct fire modes (for target undercover). An
onboard flight computer guides the missile to the selected
target.
5. The Javelin Missile System hardware and the
documentation are UNCLASSIFIED. The missile software which
resides in the CLU is considered SENSITIVE. The sensitivity
is primarily in the software programs which instruct the
system how to operate in the presence of countermeasures. The
overall hardware is also considered sensitive in that the
infrared wavelengths could be useful in attempted
countermeasure development.
6. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain
knowledge of specific hardware, the information could be used
to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapons system
effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with
similar or advanced capabilities.
7. A determination has been made that the United Arab
Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of
protection for sensitive technology being released as the
U.S. Government. This proposed sustainment program is
necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and
national security objectives outlined in the policy
justification.
8. All defense articles and services listed in this
transmittal are authorized for release and export to the
Government of United Arab Emirates.

[[Page S3207]]

Transmittal No. 17-73

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab
Emirates.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment * $850 million.
Other $50 million.
Total $900 million.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Twenty thousand four (20,004) Advanced Precision Kill
Weapon Systems (APKWS) II All-Up-Rounds.
Non-MDE: Also included is weapon support and test
equipment, spares, technical publications, personnel
training, other training equipment, transportation, U.S.
Government and contractor engineering, technical and
logistics support services, and other related elements of
logistical and program support.
(iv) Military Department: Navy (AE-P-ABL).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AE-P-ABH (P&A) and AE-P-
ABI (P&A).
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached
Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control
Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Arab Emirates (UAE)--Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System
(APKWS)

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a
possible sale of twenty thousand four (20,004) Advanced
Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) II All-Up-Rounds. Also
included is weapon support and test equipment, spares,
technical publications, personnel training, other training
equipment, transportation, U.S. Government and contractor
engineering, technical and logistics support services, and
other related elements of logistical and program support. The
estimated total case value is $900 million.
The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed
justification that an emergency exists that requires the
immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above
defense articles (and defense services) in the national
security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the
Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the
Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy
and national security of the United States by improving the
security of an important partner in the region. This sale is
consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key partners in
the region with modern systems that will enhance
interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.
The APKWS will provide the UAE with flexibility in the use
of proportional, precision fires when operating in remote and
mountainous regions as well as populated areas. The APKWS
will complement the Hellfire II missile as a secondary
precision munition with lower collateral damage potential.
These aspects make the APKWS, employed in conjunction with
UAE's multiple types of helicopters and Hellfire II missiles,
an appropriate munition for the UAE's counterterrorism
operations. UAE will have no difficulty absorbing the APKWS
into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The prime contractor will be BAE Systems, Nashua, NH. There
are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with
this potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require up to 20
U.S. Government and up to 30 contractor representatives to
travel to UAE.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 17-73

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
1. The APKWS II All-Up-Round (AUR) is an air-to-ground
weapon that consists of an APKWS II Guidance Section (GS),
legacy 2.75-inch MK66 Mod 4 rocket motor and legacy MK152,
MK282 and MK435/436 warhead/fuze. The APKWS II GS is
installed between the rocket motor and warhead and provides a
Semi-Active Laser (SAL) precision capability to legacy
unguided 2.75-inch rockets. The APKWS II is procured as an
independent component to be mated to the appropriate 2.75-
inch warhead/fuze. The GS is manually set with the
appropriate laser code during loading and is launched from
any platform configured with a LAU-68F/A, or similar
launcher(s). After launch, the GS activates and the seeker
detects laser energy reflected from a target designated with
a remote or autonomous laser. The control system then guides
the rocket to the target. The only interface required with
the host platform is a 28V direct current (DC) firing pulse.
2. APKWS II increases stowed kills by providing precise
engagements at standoff ranges with sufficient accuracy for a
high single-shot probability of hit against soft and lightly
armored targets, thereby minimizing collateral damage. The
APKWS II is capable of day and night operation and
performance in many adverse environments.
3. The APKWS II requires no depot maintenance. Activities
to prepare the APKWS II for use include setting the laser
code switches, turning on the Electronic Thermal Battery
Initiator, and loading the AUR into the launcher. Wing Slot
Seals (WSS) may be replaced, if necessary, at an I-level
maintenance facility.
4. All training for APKWS II is unclassified. The training
required is:
a. Pilot training to effectively employ the APKWS II,
b. Ordnance Handler training for safe handling and
preparation of the APKWS II and AUR, and
c. Maintenance training for replacement of WSS.
5. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain
knowledge of specific hardware, the information could be used
to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapons system
effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with
similar or advanced capabilities.
6. A determination has been made that the United Arab
Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of
protection for sensitive technology being released as the
U.S. Government. This proposed sustainment program is
necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and
national security objectives outlined in the policy
justification.
7. All defense articles and services listed in this
transmittal are authorized for release and export to the
Government of the United Arab Emirates.

Transmittal No. 18-21

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment * $0 million.
Other $800 million.
Total $800 million.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE): None
Non-MDE: Follow-on support and services for Royal Saudi Air
Force aircraft, engines, and weapons; publications and
technical documentation; support equipment; spare and repair
parts; repair and return; calibration support and test
equipment; personnel equipment; U.S. Government and
contractor technical and logistics support, and other related
elements of program support. Equipment and spares will be
procured for support of, but not limited to, F-5, RG-5, F-15,
C-130, KC-130, E-3, RE-3, and KE-3 aircraft.
(iv) Military Department: Air Force (QAH).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: FMS Case QAY-$100,000,000-
05 June 2010 and QAY Amendment 7-$739,508,525-30 October
2016.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
* As defined in Section 471(6) of the Arms Export Control
Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Saudi Arabia--Follow-on Support and Services for the Royal Saudi Air
Force Aircraft

Saudi Arabia has requested to purchase follow-on support
and services for Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft, engines, and
weapons; publications and technical documentation; support
equipment; spare and repair parts; repair and return;
calibration support and test equipment; personnel equipment;
U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics
support, and other related elements of program support.
Equipment and spares will be procured for support of, but not
limited to, F-5, RG-5, F-15, C-130, KC-130, E-3, RE-3, and
KE-3 aircraft. The total estimated program cost will be $800
million.
The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed
justification that an emergency exists that requires the
immediate sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the above
defense articles (and defense services) in the national
security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the
Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the
Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
This proposed sale will support U.S. foreign policy and
national security objectives by helping to improve the
security of a friendly country, which has been, and continues
to be, an important force for political stability and
economic growth in the Middle East. This potential sale is a
continuation of current support. Saudi Arabia will have no
difficulty absorbing this support and services into its armed
forces.
Implementation of this sale will sustain Saudi Arabia's
flight and maintenance activity. It will improve
sustainability and continue support for the fleet.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
There will be various contractors associated with the
equipment involved with this case, and there is no prime
contractor. There are no known offset agreements proposed in
connection with this potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require the
assignment of a small number of additional U.S. Government or
contractor representatives to Saudi Arabia for maintenance,
training, and sustainment.

[[Page S3208]]

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 18-31

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment * $0 million.
Other $136 million.
Total $136 million.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MOE): None.
Non-MOE: Continued spare and repair parts, U.S. Government
and Contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support
services, and other related elements of program support for
the TASS (Tactical Air Surveillance System) aircraft program.
Additionally, the sale will support the rehabilitation of the
integrated lab located in the United States used for testing
and troubleshooting.
(iv) Military Department: Air Force (SR-D-QDJ).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: SR-D-QAS, SR-D-QCH.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control
Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Saudi Arabia--Sustainment Support for Tactical Air Surveillance System
(TASS)

Saudi Arabia has requested to purchase spare and repair
parts, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical,
and logistics support services, and other related elements of
program support for their TASS (Tactical Air Surveillance
System) aircraft program. Additionally, the sale will support
rehabilitation of the integrated lab located in the United
States used for testing and troubleshooting. The total
estimated program cost will be $136 million.
The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed
justification that an emergency exists that requires the
immediate sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the above
defense articles (and defense services) in the national
security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the
Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the
Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and
national security of the United States by helping to improve
the security of a key regional ally which is an important
force for political stability and economic progress in the
Middle East.
The proposed sale will improve Saudi Arabia's surveillance
capability to counter current and future regional threats and
strengthen its homeland defense. This is a continuation of a
previous sustainment case and Saudi Arabia will have no
difficulty absorbing addition support in country.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The prime contractor will be L3 Technologies, Greenville,
Texas. There are no known offsets proposed with this sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require the
assignment of up to 25 additional L3 contractor
representatives to Saudi Arabia.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 19-18

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab
Emirates.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment* $0 million.
Other $100 million.
Total $100 million.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MOE): None.
Non-MDE: Follow-on blanket order U.S. Marine Corps
training, training support, and other training related
services in support of the United Arab Emirates Presidential
Guard Command.
(iv) Military Department: Navy (AE-P-TAM).
(v) Prior Related Cases. if any: AE-P-TAM.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee. etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
* As defined in Section 47
(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Arab Emirates (UAE)--Follow-On Blanket Order Training

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has
requested follow-on blanket order U.S. Marine Corps training,
training support, and other training related services in
support of the UAE Presidential Guard Command. The total
value for this sale is $100 million.
The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed
justification that an emergency exists that requires the
immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above
defense articles (and defense services) in the national
security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the
Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the
Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy
and national security of the United States by helping to
improve the security of an important partner in the region.
The proposed sale will provide the continuation of U.S.
Marine Corps training of the UAE's Presidential Guard for
counterterrorism, counter-piracy, critical infrastructure
protection, and national defense. This training also provides
engagement opportunities through military exercises,
training, and common equipment. UAE will have no difficulty
absorbing this training.
The proposed sale of training will not alter the basic
military balance in the region.
There will be no principal contractor associated with this
proposed sale. There are no known offset agreements proposed
in connection with this potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed amendment to a current sale
will allow for the continued permanent assignment of thirty-
four (34) U.S. Marine Corps active duty personnel to the UAE.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 19-01

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment* $0 billion.
Other $1.8 billion.
Total $1.8 billion.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE): None.
Non-MDE: Follow-on logistics support and services for the
Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft, engines, and weapons;
publications and technical documentation; support equipment;
spare and repair parts; repair and return; calibration
support and test equipment; personnel equipment; U.S.
Government and contractor technical and logistics support,
and other related elements of program support. Equipment and
spares will be procured for support of, but not limited to,
F-5, F-15, KA-350, C-130, KC-130, E-3, RE-3, and KE-3
aircraft. The total estimated program cost is $1.8 billion.
(iv) Militarv Department: Air Force.
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: SR-D-QAY, SR-D-QDE, SR-D-
QBO, SR-D-QBD, SR-D-QBI, SR-D-QDF, SR-D-QAH.
(vi) Sales Commission. Fee, etc., Paid, Offered. or Agreed
to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control
Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Saudi Arabia--Follow-on Logistics Support and Services

Saudi Arabia has requested to buy follow-on logistics
support and services for the Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft,
engines, and weapons; publications and technical
documentation; support equipment; spare and repair parts;
repair and return; calibration support and test equipment;
personnel equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical
and logistics support, and other related elements of program
support. Equipment and spares will be procured for support
of, but not limited to, F-5, F-15, KA-350, C-130, KC-130, E-
3, RE-3, and KE-3 aircraft. The total estimated program cost
will be $1.8 billion.
The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed
justification that an emergency exists that requires the
immediate sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the above
defense articles (and defense services) in the national
security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the
Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the
Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
This proposed sale will support U.S. foreign policy and
national security objectives by helping to improve the
security of a friendly country that continues to be an
important force for political stability and economic growth
in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty
absorbing this support and services into its armed forces.
The proposed sale will sustain Saudi Arabia's operations
and maintenance activity, improve sustainability and ensure
capability for near and long term air operations across the
fleet.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
There will be various contractors associated with the
equipment involved with this case, and there is no prime
contractor. There are no known offset agreements proposed in
connection with this potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require the
assignment of a small number of additional U.S. Government or
contractor representatives to Saudi Arabia for maintenance,
training, and sustainment.

[[Page S3209]]

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.

____________________