[Pages S5020-S5025]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

MUELLER REPORT

Mr. MERKLEY. Madam President, as our Founders worked to design what
would become the Constitution of the United States, they had certain
core principles in mind--certain principles that were the exact
opposite of the way government worked in Europe. They did not want to
see America be a land run by a dictator or a King. They wanted to make
sure that power was distributed between voting Americans, a principle
Jefferson called the equal voice principle, because distributed power
among the people would lead to laws by and for the people, not laws by
and for the powerful.
They had another principle, and it was the opposite of what existed
in Europe, where a King and perhaps the King's circle were above the
law, not accountable to any core principles of conduct or any rules.
What they did in their lives as rulers in that fashion just simply was
accountable to no one.
But our Constitution had a different vision. The goal was to have
everyone in America accountable to the law--that we are all in this
together. No one is a King. No one is a dictator. That vision is really
embodied in four simple words carved into the facade of the doors of
the Supreme Court: Equal Justice Under Law.
If you stand here in the Johnson Room, just across the hallway, and
you look out the window toward the Supreme Court, you see this: Equal
Justice Under Law. It is a principle so foundational to our vision of a
citizen-run nation, a nation by and for the people, that it was the
source of my first political act.
If memory serves me well, I was a junior in high school. I read an
article in the evening newspaper. Now, at that point, many cities in
the country had a morning newspaper, which was more of the business
community's newspaper, and an evening newspaper, which was more the
workers' newspaper, which made sense. For my father, a union machinist,
his work started at 7 in the morning and concluded 9 hours later at 4
in the afternoon. He would come home, get the evening newspaper, read
it, have dinner, and watch the evening news on television.
In that newspaper that evening, there was an article about Spiro
Agnew, our former Vice President. He was convicted of taking $100,000
in bribes, but what was his penalty? His penalty was a $10,000 fine. I
was enraged: Like, what? People get sent to prison for stealing a loaf
of bread, and the Vice President illegally took $100,000 and gets to
keep 90 percent of it. What kind of a story is that to America, that if
you are wealthy and powerful, you can commit crimes and keep the vast
share of what you have taken in that crime? So I wrote an outraged
letter to the newspaper, and the newspaper published it.
Equal Justice Under Law--it is a very important principle to our
Nation. But today we face a political crisis--a crisis about whether we
have a President who is above the law, and that somehow this phrase,
this principle, the foundation of our country, doesn't apply to this
particular President. If that stands, then we will have lost a core
principle of our democratic Republic.
Tomorrow we are going to have testimony from former Special Counsel
Mueller in the House of Representatives. He is scheduled for some 3
hours before the Judiciary Committee of the House and another couple of
hours with the Intelligence Committee. He will be following up to share
insights and answer questions related to this hefty document: Report On
The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential
Election.
There is a lot in this report. You wouldn't know that if you just
listened to our Attorney General, because our current Attorney General
Barr said there is nothing here--nothing in this. That is not the case,
and I have come to the floor tonight to make that absolutely clear.
Here is the easiest way to summarize it. We received an open letter
from more than 1,000 former prosecutors evaluating what is in this
hefty book. It says:

We are former federal prosecutors. We served under both
Republican and Democratic administrations at different levels
. . . line attorneys, supervisors, special prosecutors,
United States Attorneys, and senior officials at the
Department of Justice. The offices in which we served were
small, medium, and large; urban, suburban, and rural; and
located in all parts of our country.
Each of us believes that the conduct of President Trump
described in Special Counsel Robert Mueller's report would,
in the case of any other person not covered by the

[[Page S5021]]

Office of Legal Counsel policy against indicting a sitting
President, result in multiple felony charges for obstruction
of justice.
The Mueller report describes several acts that satisfy all
of the elements for an obstruction charge, conduct that
obstructed or attempted to obstruct the truth-finding
process, as to which the evidence of corrupt intent and
connection to pending proceedings is overwhelming. These
include:
The President's efforts to fire Mueller and to falsify
evidence about that effort;
The President's efforts to limit the scope of Mueller's
investigation to exclude his conduct; and
The President's efforts to prevent witnesses from
cooperating with the investigators probing him and his
campaign.

This statement goes on in some detail, but the point that needs to be
repeated is this point: ``Each of us believes that the conduct of
President Trump described in Special Counsel Robert Mueller's report
would, in the case of any other person . . . result in multiple felony
charges.''
In other words, 1,000--in fact, more than 1,000--Federal prosecutors
said, in their minds, reading just this report, that the President has
committed multiple crimes.
What happened to the principle of equal justice under the law? There
are 1,000 Federal prosecutors who said that anyone else--you or you or
you--would be indicted for felonies as a result of the conduct that is
in this report. But the President has not been indicted.
Why has he not been indicted? It is simply this: An indictment has to
stem from the Department of Justice, which is now run by an Attorney
General who has dedicated himself to preventing the President from
being held accountable rather than to the principle of equal justice
under the law.
No one who does not believe in the founding principle of our Nation
should ever serve as Attorney General of the United States. Yet he
serves and refuses to conduct his responsibilities under the
Constitution. That is why there is no choice but for the House to act.
In the failure of Attorney General Barr to honor the principle that our
Nation was founded on, equal justice under the law, the only recourse
is the House of Representatives.
Down this hallway, through these double doors, not far away, is the
House of Representatives, which is charged under the Constitution with
determining if a President has committed high crimes and misdemeanors.
While there may be a discussion of exactly what is meant by high crimes
and misdemeanors, surely they entail acts of obstruction of justice for
which any other American would have been indicted. Surely, felony
crimes qualify.
The House doesn't determine guilt or innocence. The House plays the
role of Federal prosecutors who are deciding whether to indict. Is the
evidence sufficient to say it is credible and substantial that the
individual conducted a felony, a crime? The answer by 1,000 Federal
prosecutors is absolutely.
It can't be done by the Supreme Court. It can't be done by the
judiciary as long as the Attorney General is blocking it. It can be
done only by the House. That is why the House has to act now and has to
proceed to put together a committee on impeachment or this principle
means nothing.
Then it would come to this Chamber to hold the actual trial. But
there will be no trial if there is no indictment. There is no trial in
the Senate Chamber if there is no impeachment, and there is no
credibility to this principle in America if the House doesn't act.
So I call upon the House to convene that committee and to conduct
that impeachment inquiry, and if they come out of that inquiry with
1,000 Federal prosecutors, they must act and vote to impeach.
This cannot be about politics: Is it a smart thing to do? How will it
affect the next election? Will it put our Presidential candidates in a
strange space? Let's do an opinion poll of America. No, absolutely not.
Our institutions are under assault, and we have a responsibility
because we took an oath of office to the Constitution to defend this
principle. The House took the same oath, and they have a responsibility
to defend that principle.

I am going to take the time to lay out four of those charges of
obstruction justice just to set the stage for tomorrow.
This is what is referred to as a ``heat map.'' It lays out different
cases in which the President interfered with the judicial process, and
then it proceeds to ask: Is there substantial evidence of the three
things that are needed as a foundation for saying that a felony crime
has been committed?
The first is, was there an obstructive act? The second is, was there
a nexus to an issue? The third is, was there criminal intent?
There are four cases in which capable individuals have reviewed the
Mueller report and have said yes on all three--meaning, each of these
is red.
Let's take a look at this. First, let's turn to this issue of efforts
to fire Mueller. I am reading now from page 87 of this hefty report on
the investigation, the special counsel's report.
On page 87, under ``Analysis,'' it proceeds to say: ``In analyzing
the President's direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel
removed, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of
obstruction of justice.''
Then he walks through each of these three pieces:

Obstructive act. As with the President's firing of Comey,
the attempt to remove the Special Counsel would qualify as an
obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the
investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flow
from the inquiry. Even if the removal of the lead prosecutor
would not prevent the investigation from continuing under a
new appointee, a factfinder would need to consider whether
the act had the potential to delay further action in the
investigation, chill the actions of any replacement Special
Counsel, or otherwise impede the investigation.
A threshold question is whether the President in fact
directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed. After
news organizations reported that in June 2017 the President
had ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the
President publicly disputed these accounts, and privately
told McGahn that he had simply wanted McGahn to bring
conflicts of interest to the Department of Justice's
attention. . . . Some of the President's specific language
that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that
explanation. Substantial evidence, however, supports the
conclusion that the President went further and in fact
directed McGahn to call Rosenstein to have the Special
Counsel removed.
First, McGahn's clear recollection was that the President
directed him to tell Rosenstein not only that conflicts
existed but also that ``Mueller has to go.'' McGahn is a
credible witness with no motive to lie or exaggerate given
the position he held in the White House. McGahn spoke with
the President twice and understood the directive the same way
both times, making it unlikely that he misheard or
misinterpreted the President's request. In response to that
request, McGahn decided to quit because he did not want to
participate in events that he described as akin to the
Saturday Night Massacre.

That is a reference to Watergate.

He called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packed up
his office, prepared to submit a resignation letter with his
chief of staff, told Priebus that the President had asked him
to ``do crazy shit,'' and informed Priebus and Bannon that he
was leaving. Those acts would be a highly unusual reaction to
a request to convey information to the Department of Justice.
Second, in the days before the calls to McGahn, the
President, through his counsel, had already brought the
asserted conflicts to the attention of the Department of
Justice. Accordingly, the President had no reason to have
McGahn call Rosenstein that weekend to raise conflicts issues
that already had been raised.
Third, the President's sense of urgency and repeated
requests to McGahn to take immediate action on a weekend--
``You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod.''--support McGahn's
recollection that the President wanted the Department of
Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel. Had the
President instead sought only to have the Department of
Justice re-examine asserted conflicts to evaluate whether
they posed an ethical bar, it would have been unnecessary to
set the process in motion on a Saturday and to make repeated
calls to McGahn.
Finally, the President had discussed ``knocking out
Mueller'' and raised conflicts of interest in a May 23, 2017
call to McGahn, reflecting that the President connected the
conflicts to a plan to remove the Special Counsel. And in the
days leading up to June 17, 2017, the President made clear to
Priebus and Bannon, who then told Ruddy, that the President
was considering terminating the Special Counsel. Also, during
this time period, the President reached out to Christie to
get his thoughts on firing the Special Counsel. This evidence
shows that the President was not just seeking an examination
of whether conflicts existed but instead was looking to use
asserted conflicts as a way to terminate the Special Counsel.

So those are the obstructive acts, efforts to fire special counsel
Mueller.

Nexus to an official proceeding [the second test]. To
satisfy the proceeding requirement, it would be necessary to
establish a nexus

[[Page S5022]]

between the President's act of seeking to terminate the
Special Counsel and a pending or foreseeable grand jury
proceeding.
Substantial evidence indicates that by June 17, 2017, the
President knew his conduct was under investigation by a
federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal
crimes to a grand jury. On May 23, 2017, McGahn explicitly
warned the President that his ``biggest exposure'' was not
his act of firing Comey but his ``other contacts'' and
``calls,'' and his ``ask re: Flynn.'' By early June, it was
widely reported in the media that federal prosecutors had
issued grand jury subpoenas in the Flynn inquiry and that the
Special Counsel had taken over the Flynn investigation. On
June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White
House that investigators would be interviewing intelligence
agency officials who allegedly had been asked by the
President to push back against the Russia investigation. On
June 14, 2017, news outlets began reporting that the
President himself was being investigated for obstruction
of justice. Based on widespread reporting, the President
knew that such an investigation could include his request
for Comey's loyalty; his request that Comey ``let[] Flynn
go''; his outreach to Coats and Rogers; and his
termination of Comey and statement to the Russian Foreign
Minister that the termination had relieved ``great
pressure'' related to Russia. And on June 16, 2017, the
day before he directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel
removed, the President publicly acknowledged that his
conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor,
tweeting, ``I am being investigated for firing the FBI
Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI
Director!''

That covers the nexus to an official proceeding, but what about this
third issue, this issue of intent?
Reading again from the special counsel's report evaluating this,
going to the issue of intent on efforts to fire Mueller:

Substantial evidence indicates that the President's
attempts to remove the Special Counsel were linked to the
Special Counsel's oversight of investigations that involved
the President's conduct--and, most immediately, to reports
that the President was being investigated for potential
obstruction of justice.
Before the President terminated Comey, the President
considered it critically important that he was not under
investigation and that the public not erroneously think he
was being investigated. As described in Volume II . . .
advisors perceived the President, while he was drafting the
Comey termination letter, to be concerned more than anything
else about getting out that he was not personally under
investigation. When the President learned of the appointment
of the Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, he expressed further
concern about the investigation, saying ``[t]his is the end
of my Presidency.'' The President also faulted Sessions for
recusing, saying ``you were supposed to protect me.''
On June 14, 2017, when the Washington Post reported that
the Special Counsel was investigating the President for
obstruction of justice, the President was facing what he had
wanted to avoid: a criminal investigation into his own
conduct that was the subject of widespread media attention.
The evidence indicates that news of the obstruction
investigation prompted the President to call McGahn and seek
to have the Special Counsel removed. By mid-June, the
Department of Justice had already cleared the Special
Counsel's service and the President's advisors had told him
that the claimed conflicts of interest were ``silly'' and did
not provide a basis to remove the Special Counsel. On June
13, 2017, the Acting Attorney General testified before
Congress that no good cause for removing the Special Counsel
existed, and the President dictated a press statement to
Sanders saying he had no intention of firing the Special
Counsel. But the next day, the media reported that the
President was under investigation for obstruction of justice
and the Special Counsel was interviewing witnesses about
events related to possible obstruction--spurring the
President to write critical tweets about the Special
Counsel's investigation. The President called McGahn at home
that night and then called him on Saturday from Camp David.
The evidence accordingly indicates that news that an
obstruction investigation had been opened is what led the
President to call McGahn to have the Special Counsel
terminated.
There also is evidence that the President knew that he
should not have made those calls to McGahn. The President
made the calls to McGahn after McGahn had specifically told
the President that the White House Counsel's Office--and
McGahn himself--could not be involved in pressing conflict
claims and that the President should consult with his
personal counsel if he wished to raise conflicts. Instead of
relying on his personal counsel to submit the conflicts
claims, the President sought to use his official powers to
remove the Special Counsel. And after the media reported on
the President's actions, he denied that he had ever ordered
McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated and made
repeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story, as discussed
in Volume II. . . . Those denials are contrary to the
evidence and suggest the President's awareness that the
direction to McGahn could be seen as improper.

So there it is--obstruction, a nexus to an investigation, and
criminal intent. Those are the efforts to fire Mueller. That is the
first one laid out in this quote that I am reading from, the first one
that I am conveying to you all, and there are four of these I am going
to go through to set the stage for understanding the gravity of what is
happening in the United States. I think this conversation has been
going on for so long that people have lost sight of the egregious
nature and the criminal nature of the President's conduct--at least the
degree laid out in exquisite detail, as I am reading it to you--and
that more than 1,000 former Federal prosecutors who have looked at
these top four issues and others have said that anyone else would be
indicted, meaning that in their minds, these acts met the three tests
for felony conduct; that is, in their view, the President committed
crimes.
So the second issue is efforts to curtail the Mueller investigation.
The first was to fire Mueller, and the second was to curtail the
investigation. I will start reading the analysis laid out starting on
page 97, continuing through page 98.

In analyzing the President's efforts to have Lewandowski
deliver a message directing Sessions to publicly announce
that the Special Counsel investigation would be confined to
future election interference, the following evidence is
relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice.

Looking first to the obstructive act.

The President's effort to send Sessions a message through
Lewandowski would qualify as an obstructive act if it would
naturally obstruct the investigation in any grand jury
proceedings that might flow from the inquiry.
The President sought to have Sessions announce that the
President ``shouldn't have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel'' and
that Sessions was going to ``meet with the Special Prosecutor
to explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor
move forward with investigating election meddling for future
elections so that nothing can happen in future elections.''
The President wanted Sessions to disregard his recusal from
the investigation, which had followed from a former DOJ
ethics review, and have Sessions declare that he knew ``for a
fact'' that ``there were no Russians involved in the
campaign'' because he ``was there.'' The President further
directed that Sessions should explain that the President
should not be subject to an investigation ``because he hasn't
done anything wrong.'' Taken together, the President's
directives indicate that Sessions was being instructed to
tell the Special Counsel to end the existing investigation
into the President and his campaign, with the Special
Counsel being permitted to ``move forward with
investigating election meddling for future elections.''

So the obstructive act was perceived to box in the Mueller
investigation so it wouldn't touch on the President. That is an
obstruction of justice. But is there a nexus to an official proceeding?
That is next addressed in the Mueller report as follows:

As described above, by the time of the President's initial
one-on-one meeting with Lewandowski on June 19, 2017, the
existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by the
Special Counsel was public knowledge. By the time of the
President's follow-up meeting with Lewandowski--

I bet you would like to know what comes next, but take a look here. I
can't tell you because it has been blacked out. So whatever it was, it
created a key point about the nexus to the official proceeding. The
section goes on after the blacked out section:

To satisfy the nexus requirement, it would be necessary to
show that limiting the Special Counsel's investigation would
have the natural and probable effect of impeding that grand
jury proceeding.

So nexus and substantial evidence. Let's go to intent. Again, I am
reading from page 97:

Substantial evidence indicates that the President's effort
to have Sessions limit the scope of the Special Counsel's
investigation to future election interference was intended to
prevent further investigative scrutiny of the President's and
his campaign's conduct.

That sums it up. Then it goes on in some greater detail:

As previously described, see Volume II . . . the President
knew that the Russian investigation was focused in part on
his campaign, and he perceived allegations of Russian
interference to cast doubt on the legitimacy of his election.
The President further knew that the investigation had
broadened to include his own conduct and whether he had
obstructed justice. Those investigations would not proceed if
the Special Counsel's jurisdiction were limited to future
election interference only.
The timing and circumstances of the President's actions
support the conclusion that he sought that result. The
President's initial direction that Sessions should limit the
Special Counsel's investigation came just 2 days

[[Page S5023]]

after the President ordered McGahn to have the Special
Counsel removed, which itself followed public reports that
the President was personally under investigation for
obstruction of justice. The sequence of those events raises
an inference that after seeking to terminate the Special
Counsel, the President sought to exclude his and his
campaign's conduct from the investigation's scope. The
President raised the matter with Lewandowski again on July
19, 2017, just days after emails and information about the
June 9, 2016 meeting between Russians and senior campaign
officials had been publicly disclosed, generating substantial
media coverage and investigative interest.
The manner in which the President acted provides additional
evidence of his intent. Rather than rely on official
channels, the President met with Lewandowski alone in the
Oval Office. The President selected a loyal ``devotee''
outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting an
inference that he was working outside White House channels,
including McGahn, who had previously resisted contacting the
Department of Justice about the Special Counsel. The
President also did not contact the Acting Attorney General,
who had just testified publicly that there was no cause to
remove the Special Counsel. Instead, the President tried to
use Sessions to restrict and redirect the Special Counsel's
investigation when Sessions was recused and could not
properly take any action on it.
The July 19, 2017 events provide further evidence of the
President's intent. The President followed up with
Lewandowski in a separate one-on-one meeting one month after
he first dictated the message for Sessions, demonstrating he
still sought to pursue the request. And just hours after
Lewandowski assured the President that the message would soon
be delivered to Sessions, the President gave an unplanned
interview to the New York Times in which he publicly attacked
Sessions and raised questions about his job security. Four
days later, on July 22, 2017, the President directed Priebus
to obtain Sessions' resignation. That evidence could raise an
inference that the President wanted Sessions to realize that
his job might be on the line as he evaluated whether to
comply with the President's direction that Sessions publicly
announce that, notwithstanding his recusal, he was going to
confine the Special Counsel's investigation to future
election interference.

It is laid out in great detail--an obstructive act, a nexus to an
official proceeding, and the issue of intent. This did not happen by
accident--not on the efforts to fire Mueller and not on the efforts to
curtail the Mueller investigation.
Now we will go to the third major point here--the order to McGahn to
deny the attempt to fire Mueller. This analysis in the special
prosecutor's report starts on page 118.

In analyzing the President's efforts to have McGahn deny
that he had been ordered to have the Special Counsel removed,
the following evidence is relevant to the elements of
obstruction of justice.

First, obstructive act.

The President's repeated efforts to get McGahn to create a
record denying that the President had directed him to remove
the Special Counsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it
had a natural tendency to constrain McGahn from testifying
truthfully or to undermine his credibility as a potential
witness if he testified consistently with his memory rather
than with what the record said.
There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times
and Washington Post stories were published in late January
2018, the President believed the stories were wrong and that
he had never told McGhan to have Rosenstein remove the
Special Counsel. The President correctly understood that
McGhan had not told the President directly that he planned to
resign. In addition, the President told Priebus and Porter
that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel, and
in the Oval Office meeting with McGhan, the President said,
``I never said to fire Mueller. I never said `fire.' '' That
evidence could indicate that the President was not attempting
to persuade McGhan to change his story but instead offering
his own but different recollection of the substance of his
June 2017 conversations with McGhan and McGhan's reaction to
them.
Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the
President's conduct.

That is an important line to understand. Is it possible that the
President simply had a different recollection? And the answer in the
special prosecutor's report is this: ``Other evidence cuts against that
understanding.''
The special counsel continues:

As previously described, see Volume II . . . substantial
evidence supports McGhan's account that the President had
directed him to have the Special Counsel removed, including
the timing and context of the President's directive; the
manner in which McGhan reacted; and the fact that the
President had been told the conflicts were insubstantial,
were be being considered by the Department of Justice, and
should be raised with the President's personal counsel rather
than brought to McGhan. In addition, the President's
subsequent denials that he had told McGhan to have the
Special Counsel removed were carefully worded. When first
asked about the New York Times story, the President said,
``Fake news, folks. Fake news. A typical New York Times fake
story.'' And when the President spoke with McGhan in the Oval
Office, he focused on whether he had used the word ``fire,''
saying, ``I never said to fire Mueller. I never said
``fire.''

He then said:

``Did I say the word `fire'? The President's assertion in
the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed McGhan to
have the Special Counsel removed thus runs counter to the
evidence.
In addition, even if the President sincerely disagreed with
McGhan's memory of the June 17, 2017 events, the evidence
indicates that the President knew by the time of the Oval
Office meeting that McGhan's account differed and that McGhan
was firm in his views. Shortly after the story broke, the
President's counsel told McGhan's counsel that the President
wanted McGhan to make a statement denying he had been asked
to fire the Special Counsel, but McGhan responded through his
counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he
therefore could not comply with the President's request. The
President then directed Sanders to tell McGhan to correct the
story, but McGhan told her he would not do so because the
story was accurate in reporting on the President's order.
Consistent with that position, McGhan never issued a
correction. More than a week later, the President brought up
the issue again with Porter, made comments indicating that
the President thought McGhan had leaked the story, and
directed Porter to have McGhan create a record denying that
the President had tried to fire the Special Counsel. At that
point, the President said he might ``have to get rid of''
McGhan if McGhan did not comply. McGhan again refused and
told Porter, as he told Sanders and as his counsel had told
the President's counsel, that the President had in fact
ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel.
That evidence indicates that by the time of the Oval Office
meeting the President was aware that McGhan did not think the
story was false and did not want to issue a statement or
create a written record denying facts that McGhan believed to
be true. The President nevertheless persisted and asked
McGhan to repudiate facts that McGhan had repeatedly said
were accurate.

So that is the evidence of the order to McGhan to deny that he had
been instructed to fire Mueller by the President. But is there a nexus
to an official proceeding--the second test? The special counsel's
report continues to address that issue.

Nexus to an official proceeding. By January 2018, the
Special Counsel's use of a grand jury had been further
confirmed by the return of several indictments. The President
also was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating
obstruction-related events because, among other reasons, on
January 8, 2018, the Special Counsel's office provided his
counsel with a detailed list of topics for a possible
interview with the President. The President knew that McGhan
had personal knowledge in many of the events the Special
Counsel was investigating and that McGhan had already been
interviewed by Special Counsel investigators. And in the Oval
Office meeting, the President indicated he knew that McGhan
had told the Special Counsel's Office about the President's
effort to remove the Special Counsel. The President
challenged McGhan for disclosing that information and for
taking notes that he viewed as creating unnecessary legal
exposure. That evidence indicates the President's awareness
that the June 17, 2017 events were relevant to the Special
Counsel's investigation and any grand jury investigation that
might grow out of it.
To establish a nexus, it would be necessary to show that
the President's actions would have the natural tendency to
affect such a proceeding or that they would hinder, delay or
prevent the communication of information to investigators.
Because McGhan had spoken to Special Counsel investigators
before January 2018, the President could not have been
seeking to influence his prior statements in those
interviews. But because McGhan had repeatedly spoken to
investigators and the obstruction inquiry was not complete,
it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again on
obstruction-related topics. If the President were focused
solely on a press strategy in seeking to have McGhan
refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding
or to further investigative interviews would not be shown.
But the President's efforts to have McGhan write a letter
``for our records'' approximately ten days after the story
had come out--well past the typical time to issue a
correction for a news story--indicates the President was
not focused solely on press strategy, but instead likely
contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings
arising from it.

So that is the nexus.
And now to intent.

Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging
McGhan to dispute that he was ordered to have the Special
Counsel terminated, the President acted for the purpose of
influencing McGhan's account in order to deflect or prevent
further scrutiny of the President's conduct towards the
investigation.

[[Page S5024]]

That summarizes the intent.
Let me just repeat a piece of that.

Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging
McGhan to dispute that he was ordered to have the Special
Counsel terminated--

In other words, his repeated efforts to have McGhan lie--

the President acted for the purpose of influencing McGhan's
account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of
the President's conduct. . . .
Several facts support that conclusion. The President made
repeated attempts to get McGhan to change his story.

Not just one, but repeated attempts.

As described above, by the time of the last attempt, the
evidence suggests that the President had been told on
multiple occasions that McGhan believed the President had
ordered him to have the Special Counsel terminated. McGhan
interpreted his encounter with the President in the Oval
Office as an attempt to test his mettle and see how committed
he was to his memory of what had occurred. The President had
already laid the groundwork for pressing McGhan to alter his
account by telling Porter that it might be necessary to fire
McGhan if he did not deny the story, and Porter relayed that
statement to McGhan. Additional evidence of the President's
intent might be gleaned from the fact that his counsel was
sufficiently alarmed by the prospect of the President's
meeting with McGhan that he called McGhan's counsel and said
that McGhan could not resign no matter what happened in the
Oval Office that day. The President's counsel was well aware
of McGhan's resolve not to issue what he believed to be a
false account of events despite the President's request.
Finally, as noted above, the President brought up the Special
Counsel investigation in his Oval Office meeting with McGhan
and criticized him for telling this Office about the June 17,
2017 events. The President's statements reflect his
understanding--and his displeasure--that those events would
be part of an obstruction-of-justice inquiry.

So there it is--the intent, all laid out very, very clearly in this
report--obstructive acts, a nexus to an official proceeding, and the
clear intent.
So let's turn to the fourth issue: Conduct toward Manafort. This can
be found on page 131 of the special counsel's report.

In analyzing the President's conduct towards Flynn,
Manafort--

And a third person who has been blacked out in the record--

the following evidence is relevant to the elements of
obstruction of justice:
Section a, Obstructive act.

Here we are addressing if there is evidence--is there substantial
evidence--of the President's conduct toward Manafort.

With respect to Manafort, there is evidence that the
President's actions had the potential to influence Manafort's
decision whether to cooperate with the government. The
President and his personal counsel made repeated statements
suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Manafort,
while also making it clear that the President did not want
Manafort to ``flip'' and cooperate with the government. On
June 15, 2018, the day the judge presiding over Manafort's
D.C. case was considering whether to revoke his bail, the
President said that he ``felt badly'' for Manafort and
stated, ``I think a lot of it is very unfair.'' And when
asked about a pardon for Manafort, the President said, ``I do
want to see people treated fairly. That's what it's all
about.'' Later that day, after Manafort's bail was revoked,
the President called it a ``tough sentence'' that was ``Very
unfair!'' Two days later, the President's personal counsel
stated that individuals involved in the Special Counsel's
investigation could receive a pardon ``if in fact the
[P]resident and his advisors . . . come to the conclusion
that you have been treated unfairly''--using language that
paralleled how the President had already described the
treatment of Manafort. Those statements, combined with the
President's commendation of Manafort for being a ``brave
man'' who ``refused to `break,' '' suggested that a pardon
was a more likely possibility if Manafort continued not to
cooperate with the government. And while Manafort eventually
pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, he was
found to have violated the agreement by lying to
investigators.
The President's public statements during the Manafort
trial, including during jury deliberations, also had the
potential to influence the trial jury. On the second day of
trial, for example, the President called the prosecution a
``terrible situation'' and a ``hoax'' that ``continues to
stain our country'' and referred to Manafort as a ``Reagan/
Dole darling'' who was ``serving solitary confinement'' even
though he was ``convicted of nothing.'' Those statements were
widely picked up by the press. While jurors were instructed
not to watch or read news stories about the case and are
presumed to follow those instructions, the President's
statements during the trial generated substantial media
coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to
see the statements or learned about them from others.
And the President's statements during deliberations of
Manafort ``happens to be a very good person'' and that ``it's
very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort'' had the
potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements,
which the President made just as jurors were considering
whether to convict or acquit Manafort.

Let me point out here that I see in this book substantial sections
have been blocked out under No. 8, the Obstructive Act and under
section C, the Intent. In spite of part of that section being blacked
out, that was the substantial evidence of the effort to influence Paul
Manafort and obstruct justice.

Nexus to an official proceeding. The President's actions
towards Flynn and Manafort and a third person blacked out in
this book appeared to have been connected to pending or
anticipated official proceedings involving each individual.
The President's conduct towards Flynn principally occurred
when both were under criminal investigation by the Special
Counsel's Office and press reports speculated about whether
they would cooperate with the Special Counsel's
investigation. And the President's conduct toward Manafort
was directly connected to the official proceedings involving
him. The President made statements about Manafort and the
charges against him during Manafort's criminal trial. And the
President's comments about the prospect of Manafort
``flipping'' occurred when it was clear the Special Counsel
continued to oversee grand jury proceedings.

So there is the nexus laid out very clearly in this report on this
effort to influence Manafort's testimony.
And then to intent, page 132.

Evidence concerning the President's conduct towards
Manafort indicates that the President intended to encourage
Manafort to not cooperate with the government. Before
Manafort was convicted, the President repeatedly stated that
Manafort had been treated unfairly. One day after Manafort
was convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a
lengthy prison term, the President said that Manafort was a
``brave man'' for refusing to ``break'' and that ``flipping''
``almost ought to be outlawed.'' At the same time, although
the President privately told aides he did not like Manafort,
he publicly called Manafort ``a good man'' and said he had a
``wonderful family.'' And when the President was asked
whether he was asked whether he was considering a pardon for
Manafort, the President did not respond directly and instead
said he had ``great respect for what [Manafort]'s done, in
terms of what he's gone through.'' The President added that
``some of the charges they threw against him, every
consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does.'' In
light of the President's counsel's previous statements that
the investigations ``might get cleaned up with some
presidential pardons'' and that a pardon would be possible if
the President come[s] to the conclusion that you have been
treated unfairly.'' The evidence supports the inference that
the President intended Manafort to believe that he could
receive a pardon, which would make cooperation with the
government as a means of a lesser sentence unnecessary.

To read that again:

The evidence supports the inference that the President
intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon
which would make cooperation with the government as a means
of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary.

The special counsel continues under intent:

We also examined the evidence of the President's intent
making public statements about Manafort at the beginning of
his trial and when the jury was deliberating. Some evidence
supports a conclusion the President intended, at least in
part, to influence the jury. The trial generated widespread
publicity, and as the jury began to deliberate, commentators
suggested that an acquittal would add pressure to end the
Special Counsel's investigation. By publicly stating on the
second day of deliberations that Manafort ``happens to be a
very good person'' and that ``it's very sad what they've done
to Paul Manafort'' right after calling the Special Counsel's
investigation a ``rigged witch hunt,'' the President's
statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural
tendency to engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and
a factfinder could infer that the President intended that
result. But there are alternative explanations to the
President's comments, including that he genuinely felt sorry
for Manafort or that his goal was not to influence the jury
but influence public opinion. The President's comments also
could have been intended to continue sending a message to
Manafort that a pardon was possible. As described above, the
President made his comments about Manafort being ``a very
good person'' immediately after declining to answer questions
about whether he would pardon Manafort.

You might be very interested in the additional information about
intent, but I can't read it to you because it is blacked out.
Nonetheless, in that previous paragraph, it is clearly declared the
evidence supports the inference the President intended Manafort to
believe he could receive a pardon, which would make cooperation with
the government

[[Page S5025]]

as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary.
Those are the first four cases of obstruction of justice in which a
special prosecutor lays out substantial evidence on the obstructive
act, on the nexus, and on the intent on the efforts to fire Mueller, on
the efforts to curtail the Mueller investigation, on the order to
McGahn to deny that he had attempted to fire Mueller, and on the effort
to influence Manafort by alluding to a potential pardon.
There is a lot more in this book--many other cases that, in the eyes
of analysts, isn't as strong as the first four, but the evidence could
support it, whether it is substantial evidence, but still very serious
stories of efforts to obstruct justice.
Ordinary Americans might say: If, in fact, the special prosecutor
found all three standards met on at least four of these cases, then why
hasn't the President been indicted? Well, indictment has to come from
the executive branch and the Attorney General, who runs the Department
of Justice, who isn't going to do that.
There is a policy within the White House that basically says a
President can't be indicted. Pull out your Constitution and try to find
where the Constitution says that a President can't be indicted. Try to
find that because it is not in there.
``Equal justice under law.'' That is what our Constitution is about,
not the case of a King who is above the law, so we have a democratic
republic, if we can keep it.
But that means that we are in this principle ``equal justice under
law,'' and if the special prosecutor is not going to make
recommendations based on the White House executive branch principle
that a President can't be indicted and the Department of Justice is not
going to do it, there is only one option, and that is the House of
Representatives. The House of Representatives has the huge
responsibility of defending this principle ``equal justice under law.''
No one else is going to do it. It can't be done here in the Senate
because the Constitution says the responsibility is in the House of
Representatives to decide whether to impeach a President.
There has been a lot of discussion of politics: Is this a smart thing
to do? Does it take up too much time? How will people respond? I can
tell you this, if the House fails to act, then this ``equal justice
under law'' means nothing.
This book is full of events that a thousand former Federal
prosecutors have told us constitutes criminal conduct, and that is why
the House must, in defending their oath of office to the Constitution,
bring a committee together and defend the Constitution--the vision--
that no one in the United States of America, not even the President, is
above the law. It is time--past time--to convene impeachment
proceedings.

____________________