

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-38

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Morocco.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:  
Major Defense Equipment\* \$187 million.  
Other \$22 million.  
Total \$209 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Five thousand eight hundred and ten (5,810) MK82-1 Bomb (Tritonal).

Three hundred (300) MK84-4 Bomb (Tritonal).

One hundred and five (105) Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) KMU-572F/B Tail Kits.

One hundred eighty (180) MXU-651B/B Air Foil Group (AFG), GBU-10.

Four thousand one hundred twenty five (4,125) MXU-650C/B AFG, GBU-12.

Four thousand three hundred and five (4,305) MAU-169L/B Computer Control Group (CCG), GBU-10, -12, -16.

Five thousand one hundred seventy-eight (5,178) FMU-152 Fuze.

Non-MDE: Also included are flares M-206, Flares MJU-7A/B, Impulse Cartridges BBU-36, Impulse Cartridges BBU-351B, Bomb Sensor DSU-33C/B, chaff, bomb components, spares, repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, engineering technical and support services, and other related elements of logistics, transportation, and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (MO-D-AAG and MO-D-AAE).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: MO-D-SAY.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: September 11, 2019.

\*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

## POLICY JUSTIFICATION

## Morocco—Additional F-16 Ammunition

The Government of Morocco has requested a possible sale of five thousand eight hundred and ten (5,810) MK82-1 Bombs (Tritonal); three hundred (300) MK84-4 Bombs (Tritonal); one hundred and five (105) Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) KMU-572F/B Tail Kits; one hundred eighty (180) MXU-651B/B Air Foil Groups (AFG), GBU-10; four thousand one hundred twenty five (4,125) MXU-650C/B AFGs, GBU-12; four thousand three hundred and five (4,305) MAU-169L/B Computer Control Groups (CCG), GBU-10, -12, -16; and five thousand one hundred seventy-eight (5,178) FMU-152 Fuzes. Also included are flares M-206, Flares MJU-7A/B, Impulse Cartridges BBU-36, Impulse Cartridges BBU-35/B, Bomb Sensor DSU-33C/B, chaff, bomb components, spares, repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, engineering technical and support services, and other related elements of logistics, transportation, and program support. The estimated cost is \$209 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a major Non-NATO ally that continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in Africa.

The proposed sale will improve Morocco's capability to meet current and future threats of terror from violent extremist organizations prevalent throughout the region.

Additionally, the additional munitions provided by this sale will improve interoperability with the United States and other regional allies and enhance Morocco's ability to undertake coalition operations, as it has done in the past in flying sorties against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Morocco will have no difficulty absorbing these additional munitions and services into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors will be Raytheon USA, Orbital ATK (USA), General Dynamics, Kilgore Cheming Groupe (USA), Cheming Groupe (USA), and Kaman Precision Products (USA). The purchaser typically requests offsets, however there are no known offset agreements at this time in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require U.S. Government or contractor representatives to be assigned to Morocco.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

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## Annex Item No. vii

## (vii) Sensitivity of Technology.

1. Sensitive and/or classified (up to SECRET) elements of the proposed sale include munitions and support equipment: MK82-1 Bomb (Tritonal), MAU-169L/B, MXU-651B/B, MXU-650C/B, Fuzes FMU-152A/B, and JDAM MK-84 KMU-572 F/B. The hardware, software, and data identified are classified to protect vulnerabilities, design and performance parameters, and other similar critical information.

2. GBU-10/12/16/58 Paveway II (PWII), a Laser Guided Bomb (LGB), is a maneuverable, free-fall weapon that guides to a spot of laser energy reflected off the target. The LGB is delivered like a normal general purpose (GP) warhead, and the semi-active guidance corrects for many of the normal errors inherent in any delivery system. Laser designation for the LGB consists of a Computer Control Group (CCG) that is not warhead specific, and a warhead specific Air Foil Group (AFG) that attaches to the nose and tail of a GP bomb body. The PWII can use either the FMU-152 or FMU-139D/B fuzes. The overall weapon is CONFIDENTIAL. The GBU-10 is a 2,000 lb (MK-84 or BLU-117 B/B) GP bomb body fitted with the MXU-650 AFG, and MAU-209C/B or MAU-168L/B CCGs to guide to its laser designated target. MK-82 bomb body's hardware are UNCLASSIFIED.

3. Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) is a Joint Service weapon which uses an onboard GPS-aided Inertial Navigation System (INS) Guidance Set with a MK82, MK83, MK84, BLU-109, BLU-100, BLU-111, BLU-117, BLU-126 (Navy) or BLU-129 warhead. The Guidance Set, when combined with a warhead and appropriate fuze, forms a JDAM Guided Bomb Unit (GBU). The JDAM Guidance Set gives these bombs adverse weather capability with improved accuracy. The JDAM weapon can be delivered from modest standoff ranges at high or low altitudes against a variety of land and surface targets during the day or night. After release, JDAM autonomously guides to a target using the resident GPS-aided INS guidance system. JDAM is capable of receiving target coordinates via preplanned mission data from the delivery aircraft, by onboard aircraft sensors (i.e. FLIR, Radar, etc.) during captive carry, or from a third party source via manual or automated aircrew cockpit entry. The JDAM as an All Up Round is UNCLASSIFIED; technical data for JDAM is classified up to SECRET.

4. Joint Programmable Fuze (JPF) FMU-152 is a multi-delay, multi-arm and proximity sensor compatible with general purpose blast, frag and hardened-target penetrator weapons. The JPF settings are cockpit selectable in flight when used with JDAM weapons.

5. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

6. A determination has been made that Morocco can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

7. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of Morocco.

## ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH, Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY  
COOPERATION AGENCY,  
Arlington, VA.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19-45 concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Morocco for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$776 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER,  
Lieutenant General, USA, Director.

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-45

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Morocco.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:  
Major Defense Equipment\* \$700 million.

Other \$76 million.

Total \$776 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Two thousand four hundred and one (2,401) TOW 2A, Radio Frequency (RF) Missiles (BGM-71-4B-RF).

Twenty-eight (28) TOW 2A, Radio Frequency (RF) Missiles (BGM-71-4B-RF) Fly-to-Buy Lot Acceptance Missiles.

Four hundred (400) M220A2 TOW Launchers and/or four hundred (400) M41 Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) Launchers.

Non-MDE: Also included are missile support equipment; Government furnished equipment; technical manuals/publications; spare parts; tool and test equipment; training; U.S. Government technical and logistical support, contractor technical support, and other associated equipment and services.

(iv) Military Department: Army.

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: MO-B-USZ.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: September 11, 2019.

\* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

#### POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Morocco—TOW 2A., Radio Frequency (RF) Missiles (BGM-71-4B-RF)

The Government of Morocco has requested a possible sale of two thousand four hundred and one (2,401) TOW 2A, Radio Frequency (RF) Missiles (BGM-71-4B-RF); and twenty eight (28) TOW 2A, Radio Frequency (RF) Missiles (BGM-71-4B-RF), Fly-to-Buy missiles for lot acceptance testing; and Four hundred (400) M220A2 TOW Launchers and/or four hundred (400) M41 Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) Launchers. Also included are missile support equipment; Government furnished equipment; technical manuals/publications; spare parts; tool and test equipment; training; U.S. Government technical and logistical support, contractor technical support, and other associated equipment and services. The estimated cost is \$776 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a major Non-NATO ally that continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in North Africa.

The proposed sale of the TOW 2A Missiles and TOW Launchers will advance Morocco's efforts to develop an integrated ground defense capability. A strong national defense and dedicated military force will assist Morocco to sustain itself in its efforts to maintain stability.

The proposed sale of this equipment will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors involved in this program are Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona and McKinney, Texas. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the U.S. Government or contractor representatives to travel to Morocco.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

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Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The TOW 2A, Radio Frequency (RF) Missiles (BGM-71-4B-RF) is a direct attack missile designed to defeat armored vehicles, reinforced urban structures, field fortifications and other such targets. TOW missiles are fired from a variety of TOW launchers in the U.S. Army, USMC, and FMS customer forces. The TOW 2A RF missile can be launched from the same launcher platforms as the existing wire-guided TOW 2A missile without modification to the launcher. The TOW 2A missile (both wire & RF) contains two tracker beacons (xenon and thermal) for the launcher to track and guide the missile in flight. Guidance commands from the launcher are provided to the missile by a RF link contained within the commands from the missile case. The hardware, software, and technical publications provided with the sale are UNCLASSIFIED. However, the system itself contains sensitive technology that instructs the system on how to operate in the presence of countermeasures.

2. Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) is designed to fire all existing versions of the TOW missile and consists of a Target Acquisition Subsystem (TAS), a Fire Control Subsystem (FCS), a Li-Ion Battery Box (LBB), a modified Traversing Unit (TU) plus the standard launch tube and tripod. The ITAS provides for the integration of both the direct view optics and a second generation Standard Advanced Dewar Assembly (SADA) II thermal sensor into a single housing; direct view optics that provide viewing the target scene in daylight and non-obscured conditions; introduction of both passive and active eye safe laser-ranging; development of embedded training and training sustainment; automatic bore sight which allows the gunner to align the night vision system with the direct view optics; insertion of advanced Built-in Test/Built-in Test Equipment (BIT/BITE) which provides fault detection and recognition and go/no go status for the gunner; and an Aided Target Tracker (A17) that provides the capability to process infrared imagery into recognizable contour features used to assist the gunner's aim point.

3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

4. A determination has been made that Morocco can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of Morocco.

#### FT. HUACHUCA

Ms. SINEMA. Mr. President, I join my colleagues in opposition to cutting congressionally mandated support from critical military construction projects in Arizona, the United States, and around the world. This misguided effort takes \$30 million away from Ft. Huachuca, home to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, where all Army intelligence professionals train at least once in their careers.

The \$30 million was set to fund construction of a long-needed, new facility

to protect and maintain equipment used to replicate the communications networks and threat displays of our adversaries. This investment is critical to ensuring our Army intelligence professionals receive the training they need to keep our country safe. Backfilling these cuts will likely delay several other needed projects at Ft. Huachuca and may lead to wasted taxpayer dollars as the cost of construction goes up over time.

I recently saw firsthand how the training our soldiers receive at Ft. Huachuca is essential in preparing our country to respond to threats from Russia, China, and other bad actors around the globe. As we continue to counter terrorism, we must consider threats our adversaries pose across multiple domains—notably disinformation campaigns, cyber warfare, and conventional military operations. Our intelligence training mission at Ft. Huachuca is critical to our national security, and our intelligence soldiers deserve our full support.

Ft. Huachuca is the largest employer in Cochise County, and the residents of Sierra Vista and the surrounding communities remain steadfast supporters of our brave servicemembers and America's intelligence mission. They know personally that taking \$30 million from the base risks military readiness and our security.

This misguided plan weakens our national security and will likely cost American taxpayers more money in the long-run, which is why I thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle who have rejected taking money away from these important military projects. We all support the men and women of our Armed Forces and must work together to ensure they have the resources and support to do their jobs and keep us safe.

#### ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

##### TRIBUTE TO DEPUTY CODY CRINER

• Mr. DAINES. Mr. President, this week I have the honor of recognizing Deputy Cody Criner of Sweetgrass County for his brave action in service of his community.

On February 6, 2019, Deputy Cody Criner was performing a routine check at a rest stop along I-90 near Big Timber, when he came across a Toyota Prius. At first, he believed the car to be abandoned. The car was covered in snow, and the hood and the exhaust were completely frozen over. Abandoned cars are common along this stretch of highway; however, Deputy Criner knew in his gut that something was wrong.

Deputy Criner approached the vehicle to inspect the windows, and that is when he saw the hand of a 33-year-old man. The man's eyes were rolled into the back of his head, and he wasn't responding as Criner pounded on the window. In temperatures 10 degrees below