

men and women in uniform have the wherewithal to do their job.”

“Joe Dunford is a man for all seasons,” says Jim Mattis, the former defense secretary and a fellow Marine. “Joe has a quiet mind, not easily distracted; he quantifies things, but he brings in the nonquantifiable. Still waters run deep in him. You simply can’t shake his faith in his fundamental values.”

Mattis cites two combat anecdotes to explain Dunford’s unflappable style. In March 2003, on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, Mattis told Dunford that because of a last-minute change of plans, his regiment had to move out in five hours, rather than at dawn the next morning. “He just took it in stride,” says Mattis.

A few days later, Dunford’s unit had fought its way to the Tigris River, with the loss of some Marines, and was ready to seize a strategic bridge. Mattis told him he had to fall back until conditions were safer for the assault. Dunford obeyed that painful retreat order without hesitation, Mattis says.

Dunford was born for the job. The son of a Marine who fought at Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War, he grew up in Quincy, Mass., a working-class suburb of Boston. Colleagues say he retained those grounded values throughout a rapidly rising career.

Gen. Frank McKenzie, head of the Central Command and another fellow Marine, remembers that Dunford faced a delicate problem as a young lieutenant colonel on the staff of the Marine commandant. He had to manage a popular but misplaced protocol officer. He promptly removed the officer, to the consternation of some politically powerful friends.

Dunford’s dream was probably to become Marine commandant himself, and after he was appointed to that position in 2014, friends say he assumed it was his last military post. When President Barack Obama nominated him chairman in 2015, “he took the job with a Catholic sense of guilt” to do his duty, says one friend.

On Dunford’s desk as chairman, he placed the admonition of a venerated predecessor, Gen. Omar Bradley, who cautioned his staff that they didn’t have the “luxury” of focusing on just one theater but needed to think globally. Dunford has prodded the different services and combatant commands to do just that—move toward integrated global strategy, rather than separate fiefdoms.

Dunford built a powerful joint staff to coordinate policy, directed by strong officers such as McKenzie and Adm. Michael Gilday, the new chief of naval operations. The joint staff’s importance grew as the interagency process of the National Security Council decayed. Some grouse that the joint staff is now too powerful, but it helped fill a dangerous vacuum.

In dealing with Trump, Dunford’s friends say his model was Gen. George C. Marshall, the celebrated wartime chief of staff to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Marshall didn’t try to be FDR’s pal, or laugh at his jokes, or join his social gatherings. Marshall simply did his job.

One four-star general recalls that Trump would sometimes ask Dunford whether he liked a particular policy option. “I’m not in love with any of them,” Dunford would answer. “My job is to give you choices.”

It’s Dunford’s legacy that in a time of national tumult and division, the military seems to have remained steady as a rock.

(At the request of Mr. THUNE, the following statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD.)

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

● Mr. RUBIO. Mr. President, due to a family matter, I am unable to be in

Washington, DC, today. I informed Senate leaders of this commitment several weeks ago.●

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee’s intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY, Arlington, VA.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19-47 concerning the Air Force’s proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Qatar for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$86 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,
GREGORY M. KAUSNER
(For Charles W. Hooper, Lieutenant
General, USA, Director).

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-47

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Qatar.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment* \$17 million.
Other \$69 million.
Total \$86 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: Qatar requested a possible sale of two (2) AN/AAQ-24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) systems to protect two (2) Boeing 747-800 Head-of-State aircraft. Each LAIRCM system consists of three (3) Guardian Laser Turret Assemblies (GLTA), one (1) LAIRCM System Processor Replacement (LSPR), five (5) Missile Warning Sensors (MWS), one (1) Control Indicator Unit Replacement (CIUR), one (1) Smart Card Assembly (SCA), and one (1) High Capacity Card (HCC/User Data Memory (UDM) card.

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Twelve (12) Guardian Laser Turret Assemblies (GLTA) (6 installed, 6 spares).
Seven (7) LAIRCM System Processor Replacements (LSPR) (2 installed, 5 spares).

Twenty-three (23) Missile Warning Sensors (MWS) (10 installed, 13 spares).

Non-MDE: Also included are LAIRCM CIURs; SCAs; HCCs; UDM cards; initial spares; consumables; repair and return support; support equipment; engineering design; integration; hardware integration; flight test and certifications; selective availability anti-spoofing modules (SAASM); publications and technical documentation; training and training equipment; field service representatives; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (QA-D-BAB).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: QA-D-QAA and QA-D-QAF.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: September 24, 2019.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Qatar—Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) System for Head-of-State Aircraft

The Government of Qatar has requested to buy two AN/AAQ-24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) systems to protect two (2) 747-800 Head-of-State aircraft. This proposed sale will include: twelve (12) Guardian Laser Turret Assemblies (GLTA) (6 installed, 6 spares); seven (7) LAIRCM System Processor Replacements (LSPR) (2 installed 5 spares); twenty-three (23) Missile Warning Sensors (MWS) (10 installed, 13 spares); Control Indicator Unit Replacements (CIURs); Smart Card Assemblies (SCAs); High Capacity Cards (HCCs); User Data Memory (UDM) cards; initial spares; consumables; repair and return support; support equipment; engineering design; integration; hardware integration; flight test and certifications; selective availability anti-spoofing modules (SAASM); publications and technical documentation; training and training equipment; field service representatives; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$86 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political and economic progress in the Middle East. Qatar is host to the U.S. Central Command forces and serves as a critical forward-deployed location in the region.

The proposed sale will improve Qatar’s capability to deter regional threats. The self-protection suite will facilitate a more robust capability into areas of increased missile threats. Qatar will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and capability into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be Northrop Grumman, Rolling Meadows, IL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale may require the assignment of a U.S. Government and/or contractor representatives to Qatar to provide the field service support as requested.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.